A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security

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Editors

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Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives
Project on Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security

Over the last three years of foundation-funded efforts to promote confidence-building measures (CBMs) within various regions of tension, the Stimson Center has found considerable interest among governments, militaries, and non-government organizations (NGOs) in the value of negotiating and implementing CBMs. The center stresses that some security problems—such as border tension, terrorism, and fear of surprise attack or unwanted escalation—are generic in nature, although the particulars vary in each case. If suitably adapted, CBMs designed to address problems in one region may have some utility in others. The project has focused primarily on South Asia, the Middle East, and the Southern Cone of Latin America.

Our programming has five main components:

• First, we hold a series of meetings on CBMs in Washington for diplomats and military attaches from South Asia. We also have participants from the executive and legislative branches, NGOs, and foreign journalists based in Washington. Initially, these meetings provided an opportunity for westerners to explain the theory and practice of CBMs in non-directive ways. Now, most of our speakers come from the region. We ask them to present their own ideas on CBMs, which then serve as the basis of discussion.

• Second, we commission papers to stimulate thinking and problem-solving CBM approaches within regions of interest. We prefer collaborations across borders to encourage networking. Our commissions have been carried out in South Asia and the Southern Cone.

• Third, with local co-sponsorship, we convene workshops on CBMs within regions of interest, reaching key target audiences: military officers, journalists, academics, and government officials. Workshops have been held in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Southern Cone.

• Fourth, we have initiated a Visiting Fellows program, whereby talented individuals from South Asia come to Washington to conduct research and to become immersed in the theory and practice of CBMs.

• Fifth, we publish materials on CBMs and distribute them to diplomats, government officials, military officers, journalists, and academics interested in these subjects.

Support for The Stimson Center’s CBM Project has come from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.
Contents

Project on Confidence-building Measures for Regional Security

Contents

List of Tables

List of Abbreviations

Preface and Acknowledgments

The Decade for Confidence-building Measures
  Michael Krepon

Confidence-building on Nuclear-related Issues between
  Argentina and Brazil

East-West Confidence-building: Defusing the Cold War in Europe
  Richard E. Darilek

Confidence-building Measures on the Korean Peninsula

The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the
  European Experience
  Cathleen S. Fisher

Confidence-building Measures between Pakistan and India

Sino-Indian Confidence-building Measures

Bibliography

Contributors
List of Tables

Table 1  Contextual and Processual Factors in the Negotiation of European Confidence-building Measures ..................................................35

Table 2  Key Political Developments in East-West Relations and Phases in European Confidence-building ..................................................36

Table 3  Stages in East-West Confidence-building ..................................................42
## List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABACC</td>
<td>Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>Armored Combat Vehicle</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CAM</td>
<td>Conflict Avoidance Measure</td>
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<td>CBEAN</td>
<td>Argentine-Brazilian Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence-building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC(C^3)</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>CDE</td>
<td>Conventional Disarmament in Europe</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe</td>
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<td>CPL</td>
<td>Cease-fire Line</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNEA</td>
<td>Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence- and Security-building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>DCL</td>
<td>Dedicated Communication Link</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGMO</td>
<td>Director General of Military Operations</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>M(B)FR</td>
<td>Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NRRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Risk Reduction Center</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCCC</td>
<td>Argentine-Brazilian Joint System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile carrying Submarine</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>TLE</td>
<td>Treaty Limited Equipment</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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Preface and Acknowledgments

With the end of the cold war, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are emerging as an essential means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions. The East-West experience is one highly developed example of CBM implementation, but the practice has also been usefully applied in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Southern Cone of Latin America.

CBMs can usefully be implemented in disparate regions because the concerns which they are designed to address—surprise attack, border security, escalation control, and terrorism—are worldwide phenomena. CBMs can be tacit and informal, formal but private, or a matter of public record. They can cover humanitarian, economic, cultural, or military matters, and can be used for conflict avoidance as well as confidence-building.

In the East-West context, the “hotline” that was established between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban missile crisis is well known. Hotlines also exist between the director-generals of military operations in India and Pakistan and between sector commanders across borders disputed by India, Pakistan, and China. The Open Skies Treaty between members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact has unprecedented scope, but far more examples of cooperative aerial inspections have taken place in the Middle East as an outgrowth of disengagement agreements, United Nations or third-party peacekeeping operations, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In the absence of political reconciliation in South Asia and the Middle East, CBMs have become crucial in preventing war and the use of weapons of mass destruction. In the Southern Cone, transparency measures have improved relations between Argentina and Brazil, and helped to defuse costly nuclear weapons programs. There is also interest in CBMs on the Korean Peninsula.

This handbook has several purposes. The contributors wish to call attention to CBMs undertaken in a variety of regions. They also wish to call attention to the East-West experience in negotiating and implementing CBMs, not as a guide to action in other regions, but as a useful case study.

In the handbook’s first chapter, Michael Krepon suggests that CBMs may be an ideal tool for the 1990s, a decade in which promising trends and troubling developments coexist uneasily in many parts of the world. Under these confusing circumstances, political leaders can employ CBMs to accentuate the positive and guard against the negative. In his discussion, Krepon cites examples from the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, the Southern Cone, and the East–West experience. He identifies early steps, prior to actual confidence building, as conflict avoidance measures (CAMs). Such measures get the process started and require very modest amounts of political capital. Later, the more politically sensitive step of initiating CBMs can be taken. Once in place, CBMs can readily be adapted to accommodate changed political circumstances. Finally, Krepon argues that CAMs and CBMs can act as a springboard for less risk-averse leaders to move towards peace.
In chapter two Richard E. Darilek reviews the record of CBMs in Europe during the cold war as a way of understanding both established practice and evolving theory in one concrete, highly prominent case. He explains that states face a number of basic security concerns regardless of where they are located. The objectives of confidence-building measures relate to these concerns: inhibiting the threatened use of military force for political intimidation, uncontrolled escalation, and avoiding the outbreak of war by creating firebreaks. It was with these objectives in mind that CBMs were negotiated and implemented in Europe.

Darilek identifies five important lessons from the European experience. First, successful CBM negotiations can be a protracted process due to underlying conflict of interests between rivals. Second, the East-West CBM experience followed a step-by-step progression, suggesting a clear linkage between political developments and successful negotiations. Third, breaching the wall of secrecy that adversaries tend to erect around their military establishments and activities was the single most important contribution made by initial CBM agreements. Fourth, CBMs in East-West negotiations resulted in the institutionalized establishment of the right of adversaries to ask questions of and expect answers from one another. Finally, the European experience suggests that CBM agreements have been relatively resilient to controversies and to downturns in East-West relations.

In a chapter on the preconditions for confidence-building, Cathleen S. Fisher suggests that the European experience has served as an important source of inspiration for regional confidence-building initiatives. Whether in Korea, South Asia, Central America, the Pacific, or the Middle East, there is a clear correlation between the types of measures being proposed, negotiated, or implemented and the CBMs developed in Europe. While the details of their use have varied, CBMs have been perceived as relevant to the security concerns of regions characterized by diverse political, economic, historical, and cultural circumstances. Second, while all cases are indeed unique, the roots of the cold war, as well as the factors that first prompted the European states to risk limited forms of cooperation, can be viewed in more generic terms that permit comparison to other conflicts.

Fisher warns that one must be cautious when extrapolating general conclusions regarding the preconditions for confidence-building from one historical case. Nevertheless she feels that the European experience may hold a number of general lessons for other regions of conflict. These include: 1) confidence-building must be adapted to the unique cultural, historical, political, and economic conditions of different regions; 2) the experience of Europe suggests that timing is critical—unless conditions are ripe for confidence-building, even limited attempts at accommodation may end in failure; 3) the European experience underscores the need to consider the linkages between CBMs and other processes of conflict management when crafting confidence-building strategies; 4) if there is any broader lesson to be drawn from the European experience, it is the importance of modest expectations, patience, and an appreciation of small gains in trust.

Included in Fisher’s chapter is a detailed chronology of the CBM process in Europe. These tables should be of general interest as a summary of one prominent case of confidence building. They should also be of specific use to those interested in the evolution of confidence-building in Europe.
Preface and Acknowledgments

Short summaries are included to provide readers with basic information about CBMs on the Korean Peninsula, in South Asia, and between Argentina and Brazil. Of course, CBMs are in use or are under consideration in the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region, and in many parts of Latin America. The appended bibliography, prepared by Dominique M. McCoy, cites a number of recent works on confidence building in these areas and includes literature on CBMs in every major region of the globe.

We hope that the information and analysis provided in the pages that follow will encourage the continued pursuit of CBMs in regions of tension.

This handbook of confidence-building measures has been made possible by the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. We are grateful to Jane Wales and David Speedie of the Carnegie Corporation, George Perkovich of the W. Alton Jones Foundation, Tom Graham of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Hilary Palmer of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for believing in this work and providing us with the financial support to carry it out.

As the handbook evolved, we received critical support from Steven A. Wolfe and Virginia Page Fortna. Contributors Cathleen S. Fisher, Richard Darilek and David Albright provided invaluable advice and support. We also wish to thank Fred Axelgard, Alexander George and Fred Tanner for their helpful comments. Obtaining information about CBMs and verifying their details can be very difficult. In this regard we are thankful for the assistance of Kanti Bajpai, Jose Antonio Bellina, Lisa Burdick, Neelam Deo, Sumit Ganguly, Selig Harrison, Gaston Ibanes, Ashok Kantha, Sook Kim, Brig. Gen. Khalid Maqbool, C. Raja Mohan, Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Shireen Safdar, Brig. Gen. T.S. Shergill, Col. Don Stovall, and John Redick.

Most importantly, we wish to thank Jane Lee Dorsey, Nancy McCoy, Mishi Faruqee, Pamela Reed, and Mark Winter, whose editorial and administrative support made this handbook possible. Finally, responsibility for the content of this study, and for any errors or omissions, rests solely with the editors.

M.K., D.M.M., and M.C.J.R.
The Decade for Confidence-building Measures
*Michael Krepon*

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have played an essential role in improving East-West relations. Nevertheless, these unilateral, tacit or negotiated steps to improve cooperation or decrease tension were the forgotten stepchild of the cold war, always taking a back seat to formal arms control negotiations. Now with the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, CBMs are emerging from the shadows of strategic arms reductions to become the preeminent means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife-ridden regions.

**The East–West Experience**

Beginning with the establishment of the “hotline” after the Cuban missile crisis, the East–West CBM toolbox grew to include agreed rules for superpower navies operating in close proximity, and data exchanges on military equipment and force deployments. The West made a concerted effort not just to negotiate CBMs in the military-security arena, but also to develop other “baskets” of measures to promote economic and cultural exchanges as well as respect for human rights.

One of the most important breakthroughs in U.S.-Soviet relations—an agreement to accept mandatory on-site inspections—was first negotiated in the 1986 Stockholm accord to ease concerns arising from large-scale military exercises. Important new measures were added to the toolbox once the cold war began to thaw, such as the acceptance of cooperative aerial inspections or “open skies,” observations within military garrisons, and the creation of a crisis prevention center. Today there are literally dozens of CBMs to ease East-West security concerns that can now be used to establish new patterns of cooperation between old adversaries.

Nonetheless, nuclear arms control negotiations took center stage during the cold war, as both sides invested these weapons with symbolic power to match their destructive potential. The strategic arms limitation and reduction talks paradoxically became a reflection of the strategic competition and a means to ameliorate it. In conflict-prone regions like South Asia and the Middle East, CBMs assume these dual roles. In the absence of political reconciliation in these tense regions, the negotiation and implementation of CBMs have been critical in maintaining the peace and preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The East–West experience presents the most fully developed model for CBMs, notable for the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which formally recognized the status quo in Europe and facilitated a process of interaction between East and West, including inviting observers to military exercises on a voluntary basis. The Stockholm accord mandated such inspections, in addition to requiring an annual calendar of notifiable military activities. The 1990 Vienna document considerably broadened data exchanges, including detailed information on force deployments, major weapons programs, and military budgets. The 1992 Vienna agreement added another level of transparency by requiring demonstrations of new types of military equipment.
In the East–West struggle CBMs facilitated the negotiation of formal arms control agreements and provided strengthening measures for existing accords. Their continuing utility stems, in part, from their adaptability. CBMs can be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are flexible instruments that allow national leaders to adapt to a radically transformed security environment.

A Post–Cold War Growth Industry

After every major war, perverse problems and heady opportunities present themselves in strange and variable mixtures. These conditions have reappeared with the end of cold war. Entropic forces coexist alongside integrative trends in economics and communications, while blood feuds proceed concurrently with democratic and market reforms. Under these confusing circumstances, political leaders would do well to accentuate the positive and guard against the negative. CBMs will become increasingly employed in many regions for precisely these reasons: they are well suited to consolidate gains, while providing buffers against losses.

Once in place, CBMs can readily accommodate changed circumstances, as is most evident by the Open Skies Treaty. Negotiated to increase transparency in a region divided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact alliances, cooperative aerial inspections can now be employed to alleviate security concerns between Russia and Ukraine, and to dampen the potential for ethnic conflict between Hungary and Romania.

CBMs will also be a growth industry in the 1990s because they are easier to negotiate and implement than formal arms control agreements. CBMs can be tacit and informal, such as the general understandings between Israel and Jordan to cooperate in combating terrorist incidents across the Jordan River, including the establishment of a hotline in 1975 between each nation’s intelligence service, the Mossad and the Mukhbarat. Alternatively, CBMs can be quite specific but unpublished and unacknowledged, such as the existing agreements between India and Pakistan establishing ground rules for military exercises and aerial operations along their border.

Formal but private CBMs are also employed in the Middle East, where the United States routinely carries out aerial monitoring of the 1974 Israeli–Syrian disengagement agreement. In these operations, blessed by the states overflown and code-named Olive Harvest, the United States confirms compliance with agreed-upon thin-out zones for military equipment and personnel. Many CBMs, however, are a matter of record, such as the agreement between Argentina and Brazil to permit international inspections of their nuclear facilities even though these countries are not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

As these examples suggest, CBMs are already a worldwide phenomenon, as national leaders far removed from the East–West conflict have begun to adapt old CBMs and design new measures for their own purposes. These leaders understand that CBMs cannot be mindlessly transposed from Europe to other regions of the globe. Nonetheless, adaptation is possible because concerns raised during the cold war over border security, surprise attack, accidental war, and unintended escalation are felt in many regions.

During the Spring of 1990, for example, as tensions were fueled by large-scale Indian military exercises and forceful Pakistani countermeasures, the Indian govern-
ment directed army chief of staff General V. N. Sharma to keep his tank deployments behind the Indira Gandhi Canal so as to signal an intention not to cross the Pakistani border. Moreover, to ease concerns in Islamabad, Sharma allowed U.S. observers to monitor Indian deployments. For its part, Pakistan had permitted foreign defense attaches based in Islamabad to observe its 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercises.

North and South Korea have negotiated an extremely ambitious CBM agenda including security, political, and trade-related measures. Implementation has been poor, however, as political conditions in North Korea are presently inhospitable to far-reaching transparency and reconciliation. Even in Central America, an area beset during the 1980s with internal conflicts and border friction, a five-nation security commission has begun to negotiate regionwide CBMs.

This brief sampling of CBMs suggests many shortfalls and halting steps, but it is nonetheless impressive for its regional diversity and creativity. More and more political and military leaders are turning to these tools to prevent conflict, provide indications and warning of troubling developments, negotiate peace agreements, and strengthen fragile accords.

Stage One: Conflict Avoidance

Negotiating and implementing CBMs require political will, but only modest amounts of capital need be expended to get the process started. Even in regions of considerable tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, useful initiatives have been taken despite the inability or unwillingness of national leaders to resolve fundamental differences. These steps have met the minimal requirements of not worsening any state’s security and not increasing existing levels of hostility. No matter how serious outstanding grievances are, no sane national leader wants inadvertent escalation or accidental war.

These initial steps, like the establishment of hotlines between Indian and Pakistani sector commanders along the line-of actual-control in Kashmir, and between Indian and Chinese sector commanders along their disputed border, cannot solve underlying political and territorial disputes. Nevertheless, if precursor steps help prevent a full-blown crisis from occurring, they can still have enormous worth. The implementation of these measures can serve as an essential safety net against explosive developments, such as the destruction of religious shrines, urban acts of terror, and increased levels of violence in disputed territories.

Perhaps it is best to characterize initial steps to avoid unwanted wars and unintended escalation as conflict avoidance measures (CAMs) rather than CBMs. One such measure is the 1992 agreement between India and Pakistan to provide prior notification of military exercises involving more than ten thousand troops and the establishment of no-fly zones along their border. By opening channels of communication and providing modest transparency of selected military practices, these small tests of trust might also lay the groundwork for more substantive measures later on, if and when political leaders are amenable.

Conflict avoidance measures can be taken even when states have not established diplomatic relations, as attested by the Israeli–Syrian aerial monitoring agreements
along the Golan Heights. Conflict avoidance measures could include unpublicized “red lines” that are likely to trigger vigorous responses if crossed by outside military forces. Israel, for example, has drawn a red line for Syrian troops within Lebanon that Damascus has respected. Jordan benefits from a similar Israeli red line for foreign troops crossing its borders.

Another conflict avoidance measure, employed between Israel and Egypt, is the acceptance, with six hours’ advance notification, of national aerial reconnaissance flights along the median line of the buffer zone separating Israeli and Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula. This practice, mediated by the United States in the 1974 Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement established a framework for cooperative aerial inspections between once hostile states.

Not every first step needs to relate directly to conflict prevention. When government-to-government communication channels become a forum for ritualized grievances and rebuttals, or when such channels are completely absent, nongovernmental meetings can help stimulate problem-solving approaches while combating enemy images. The “Dartmouth Group” meetings between American and Soviet experts served these purposes during the depths of the cold war. A similar body, the “Neemrana Group” (named after a fort in Rajasthan where they first met), of Indian and Pakistani former officials and nongovernmental experts has been meeting regularly since 1991.

One reason to implement CBMs is to provide a cooling-off period after wars or periods of high tension. “Buying time” is a neutral profession, however. Cooling-off periods can be used to prepare for new wars, to conduct diplomatic activity toward conflict resolution, or simply to freeze a conflictual situation, such as the cease-fire arrangements for the Turkish-Greek impasse over Cyprus. CBMs are not value neutral: they will always be shaped by the motivation of national leaders over preferred end-states.

As a result, fears will arise that initial steps might be a Trojan horse, or an extension of a deadly strategic competition by other means. If this perception—whether real or imagined—is strongly felt, first steps will be halting, at best. In this way, the process of negotiating and implementing CBMs is self-regulating: if initial steps do not have proven worth, they will not readily be followed by others.

In South Asia, some fear that negotiating CBMs will place national leaders on a dangerous “slippery slope,” unwillingly leading to membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But leaders will always retain a veto power on the process: only those measures will be implemented that serve the interests of all participating states. The existing level of tension in South Asia has provided the most compelling reason to start this process, even though grievances over Kashmir clearly limit the extent of progress.

To get the process started, initial steps can be specifically designed to provide early indications and warning of hostile intentions. Measures that mandate annual calendars of military exercises or limits on their size and proximity to sensitive regions can be particularly useful in addressing domestic misgivings because they clearly promote national security. When agreed guidelines are not observed, a greater alert status would be warranted, and domestic advocates for more trusting arrangements would be weakened.
A building-block approach to CBMs is more appropriate when little foundation for trust exists in tense regions. Ambitious first steps, such as the comprehensive CBM agreements between North and South Korea, will face serious implementation problems, with no track record to alleviate distrust and no safety net to cushion failure.

The motivations behind the negotiation of initial steps need not be in concert as long as they are not implacably hostile. Nor do states require equivalent or balanced military capabilities to take initial steps, as the CBMs between Israel and Jordan or the Open Skies Treaty overflights suggest. All that is required is for the parties to see separate value in the particular steps chosen and for those steps not to intensify existing levels of hostility. If the parties view CBMs as a zero-sum game, negotiations will fail.

Integrated approaches that combine initiatives in the economic, political, humanitarian, cultural, and military realms are an ideal approach. In the East-West negotiations the creation of separate baskets facilitated trade-offs: at the outset of negotiations, the East hoped for economic gains and the West wanted improved records on human rights. Over time both blocs came to see the value of security measures. This matrix proved a good fit.

A similar negotiating strategy has obvious limitations in other regions of tension. In the Middle East, for example, linkages between baskets is stymied by the lack of diplomatic relations between Israel and most of its neighbors. India and Pakistan have also confined their initial steps to conflict prevention, with the important exception of the 1962 Indus Waters Treaty brokered by the World Bank, which provided a cooperative structure for the sharing and use of the subcontinent's northwestern river waters that were disputed after the 1947 partition of India and Pakistan.

Stage Two: Confidence-building

Simply put, negotiating conflict avoidance measures takes political will, but not in large measure, since prudent national leaders will wish to avoid unnecessary wars. The second stage of this process is far more difficult, as it requires traversing the critical passage from conflict avoidance to confidence-building. Far more political capital is required to reach this higher plane when states have deep-seated grievances or core issues to resolve. Both the Arab-Israeli and South Asian disputes are stuck here, between war and peace, awaiting national leaders willing and able to take politically risky initiatives toward reconciliation.

In both regions, the building blocks for CBMs are in place, but more far-reaching measures have been held hostage to progress on core issues. In the Arab-Israeli dispute demilitarized and thin-out zones along Israel's borders with Egypt and Syria have been in place for two decades. Multinational peacekeepers effectively monitor buffer zones, and cooperative aerial inspections provide indications and warning of troubling developments. As a result, Arab and Israeli peace negotiators can argue that accidental war is no longer of great concern.

Despite these conflict avoidance measures and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, countries in the Middle East have yet to move toward true confidence-building. Israel would like to negotiate CBMs, in part because of the uncertainties associated with
The Decade for Confidence-building Measures

territorial withdrawal. In the Arab view, CBMs are entirely negotiable, once Israel has agreed to tackle core political issues and swap land for peace.

In South Asia, the transition phase from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is even more difficult. To begin with, CAMs are far less sturdy and their implementation has been spotty. Moreover, an active negotiating channel still does not exist to address Pakistan's grievances over the status of Kashmir and its Muslim population, and India's central grievances over Pakistan's support for separatist groups. Both governments are leery of taking any steps that can be viewed as conciliatory—and politically damaging—in the face of continuing provocations.

As a result of lingering grievances, India and Pakistan are not yet ready to adopt an unequivocal "live and let live" policy toward one another. Each continues to jab at the other's soft spots while avoiding open warfare. As a result, partial steps have been taken to decrease the probability of unintended escalation, but this foundation for CBMs remains unfinished, and new construction has stopped after the demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu chauvinists, the bombings in Bombay apparently coordinated by Muslim criminal elements, and new levels of violence in Kashmir carried out by Indian security forces and separatist militants.

In light of these developments, Pakistan has deferred implementation of agreements negotiated with India in 1991 to exchange military bands and to conduct joint mountaineering expeditions and naval sailing races. Such measures are now considered cosmetic and potentially damaging politically by Pakistani officials and high-ranking military officers. In contrast, Brigadier General Dilber Naqvi, the director of operations and intelligence on the Pakistani joint staff, asserted in an interview that the value of CAMs was "beyond question."

Interviews with Indian government officials suggest similar political constraints to the negotiation of CBMs for reconciliation at this time. As the Indian director general of military operations, Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan, said in an interview, "As long as we are exchanging fire every day, there can be no CBMs." With the level of violence growing in Kashmir, cautious national leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad can use existing CAMs to contain explosions, but not as a springboard toward political reconciliation.

CBMs can become a vital companion to peacemaking, but not a substitute for it in regions of great tension. Indeed, without CBMs, including the good offices of a trusted third party, politically risky peacemaking efforts can easily fail. Many measures are available to facilitate the transition to confidence-building when political conditions permit. These CBMs might build upon precursor steps, such as formally acknowledging tacit understandings already in place or resolving border disputes that are not central to national security.

The forms adopted for CBMs can be as important as their substance. The transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building can be symbolized by the acceptance of foreign military observers at prenotified exercises. If this transition is too difficult to accomplish in one step, third parties can be usefully engaged, including multinational inspection teams that comprise representatives from adversarial states.
Security measures are absolutely essential during the transition stage, but true peacemaking also requires CBMs in the commercial, humanitarian, and cultural areas. The objectives at this stage are to establish new patterns of interaction that will become perceived as beneficial within participating states, and to make these patterns harder to reverse when perturbations occur.

The process of transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building is obviously easier if there are no core issues blocking the way. Domestic impediments that have prevented forward progress will still have to be surmounted, however. In the case of Argentina and Brazil it is noteworthy that CBMs on nuclear programs were undertaken only after fledgling democracies were in place in both governments, committed to devoting greater resources to economic development. Even without deep-seated grievances, both countries were unable to agree to transparency measures under military-dominated governments.

**Risk-taking for Peace**

The stakes involved in the U.S.-Soviet competition ensured a far more perilous transition from conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. Mikhail Gorbachev successfully challenged Washington to move beyond cold war thinking with powerful symbolic gestures and public declarations, such as his frank acknowledgment that the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted a violation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was a risk taker of similar stature. His trip to Jerusalem utterly recast Israeli-Egyptian relations, despite the hard-nosed content of his speech before the Israeli Knesset. President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolized his intention to close down the Brazilian military's nuclear weapons program by flying to the Amazon and shoveling dirt into a deep shaft originally dug for the purpose of carrying out an underground nuclear test.

Significantly, these symbolic gestures and transformational journeys did not occur in a vacuum; they were preceded by useful conflict avoidance measures. In the U.S.-Soviet competition "precursor" CBMs, such as the hotline and 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, helped to prevent unintended escalation until Gorbachev was willing to change ingrained habits of superpower hostility. Sadat's initiatives were facilitated by an impressive set of conflict avoidance measures brokered after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war by the Nixon administration.

In each of these cases, the groundwork for CBMs was different in important respects. In the East-West competition the precipitous decline in the Soviet economy appears to have been critical to Gorbachev's calculations. In the Middle East Sadat earned freedom of maneuver by waging war against Israeli occupation of Egyptian land. In the Southern Cone discredited military regimes allowed fledgling democracies to break new ground. Comparative studies of these and other transitions from conflict avoidance to confidence-building are essential in order to better understand the dynamics of transformation.

Active and farsighted leadership is required when the risks associated with political reconciliation are great. When security issues weigh heavily in this transition, conflict avoidance measures provide an essential safety net for peacemaking. The implementation of these prior steps was intrinsically valuable and absolutely essential for the
transition to confidence-building in U.S.-Soviet relations and in the Israeli-Egyptian peace process. Conversely, in regions where building blocks to CBMs have yet to be implemented, such as the Korean peninsula, the process has been stillborn.

Conflict avoidance measures are also a necessary precondition to confidence-building because setbacks will inevitably occur during peacemaking. The process of political reconciliation will energize opposing forces, and opposing forces in tense regions often resort to violent means. Precursor steps can help contain the damage and make setbacks that occur less severe and long lasting.

Just as important, conflict avoidance measures can have a trampoline effect if and when peacemaking takes hold, allowing leaders to elevate political relations onto a higher plane. The transition from cold war to unsettled peace in U.S.-Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian relations came remarkably fast, considering the distances traveled. The rate of transformation was accelerated, in part, by channels of communication and patterns of cooperative behavior developed through precursor steps.

Mikhail Gorbachev and Anwar Sadat received international acclaim for their risk-taking strategies, but both paid a heavy price for their leadership. Nor did President Collor de Mello fare well, despite his path-breaking efforts. Does the fate of these national leaders suggest that future risk takers will be deterred from peacemaking and confidence-building?

A careful assessment of cause and effect is warranted here. The downfall of Collor de Mello was due to personal corruption, not CBMs. On the other hand, Argentine president Carlos Menem has been well served by his efforts to strengthen Argentine-Brazilian cooperation. Sadat's death can clearly be tied to his efforts at political reconciliation, which were widely opposed within Egypt as well as by the Arab world. A decade later, however, his framework for peace with Israel is at long last the subject of negotiations by other Arab states and by Palestinians. As a result, a renewed appreciation of Sadat is evident among Egyptian elites; his place in history is already secure outside the region.

Evaluations of Gorbachev's downfall will continue for decades. Most assessments are likely to focus on the bankruptcy of the Soviet economy and Communist party leadership, and the poverty of communism as an ideology. The Stockholm accord and other CBMs may have accelerated the demise of a surprisingly brittle system, but so too did bloated U.S. and Soviet defense spending, the Kremlin's disastrous decision to intervene in Afghanistan, and a dozen other factors. As such, it is wildly inappropriate to credit or blame CBMs for Gorbachev's failure and that of the Soviet system.

What, then, can be said of the political fortunes of those who wanted to make the transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building? Only that the biggest risk takers lost the most in the near term, and will probably gain the most recognition and appreciation over time. The negotiation of CBMs to accompany peacemaking can be the source of lasting credit, regardless of other leadership failures.

Few national leaders, however, are willing to tackle peacemaking in extraordinarily bold steps. A safer strategy is to employ smaller tests of trust—a process perfectly suited to CBMs. This process is obviously easier when there are no core issues in dispute, as in
the Argentine-Brazilian case. Still, in this case, as in the U.S.-Soviet and Israeli-Egyptian cases, breakthroughs were accomplished only after earlier tests of trust had been passed.

Every case of risk-taking for confidence-building and peacemaking is unique. Some national leaders may well be deterred from embarking on this path because their security problems are not ripe for solution, or because they lack domestic support, personal courage, or regional standing. There simply are no substitutes for the political will and the political base to assume the risks associated with the transition from conflict avoidance to confidence-building.

Occasionally, heroic efforts are called for, but true heroes at the presidential or prime ministerial level are a rare breed. Extremely tough decisions are unavoidable, however, when confidence-building must proceed in parallel with peacemaking, as is the case in the Middle East. Progress on the CBM front is also painfully slow in South Asia, where there is still no active negotiating track to deal with core issues. Fortunately, most national leaders faced less daunting challenges when negotiating CBMs.

**Stage Three: Strengthening the Peace**

If formidable hurdles can be crossed to avoid war and then to negotiate a fragile peace, national leaders can continue to employ CBMs to strengthen the peace. Objectives at this stage of the process include broadening and deepening existing patterns of cooperation and making positive developments as irreversible as possible. The creation of properly functioning institutions to develop trade and cultural exchanges can be particularly helpful.

A number of security-related CBMs can also be usefully employed. Peace-strengthening measures might include constraints on the size and location of military exercises. Highly intrusive transparency measures, such as agreements to permit virtually unrestricted open skies and short-notice observations within military garrisons, could demonstrate nonhostile intent.

One way to measure progress in normalizing relations is to monitor the nature and number of exchanges between formerly hostile states. In 1992 the Israeli government of Yitzhak Rabin made a significant gesture to Cairo by returning archaeological objects collected by Moshe Dayan in the Sinai. U.S. and Russian exchanges are now routinely carried out at nuclear weapons laboratories and bases. In contrast India and Pakistan have agreed in principle to a regular exchange of military officers at each other’s national defense colleges, but implementation has been held up for political reasons.

**CBMs: A Tool for Security in the Nineties**

Confidence-building Measures are pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives. Those steps will necessarily be small at the outset if serious grievances must be bridged. A broad CBM negotiating framework that facilitates linkages and trade-offs is advisable, but when central security concerns are at issue, and when states have powerful military establishments, military-related steps tend to dominate at the outset. Ultimately, however, success in negotiating CBMs in the military sphere will depend on multiple initiatives in the political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian realms.
The Decade for Confidence-building Measures

The process naturally begins by identifying shared interests and developing an ethos of cooperation over time. CBMs can be molded to fit multiple needs, ranging from avoiding unintended escalation to making new wars unthinkable. An evolutionary step-by-step approach seems to work best, at least until core security issues must be tackled. It makes sense to start the process modestly, with steps that will widely be perceived as successful, not with suggestions that would lessen a nation's ability to defend itself. A successful CBM process can be encouraged with follow-up meetings, review conferences, and other techniques to institutionalize patterns of cooperation.

CBMs are like motherhood, apple pie, hummus, falafel, pakora, and kebab. They do not generate reflexive opposition except among those ideologically opposed to tension reduction. CBMs naturally commend themselves to national leaders who are both risk averse and risk takers.

A successful CBM process involves creating a framework of principles, values, and objectives that will govern foreign relations. Building blocks can be symbolic as well as substantive. After all, when Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev declared that a nuclear war must never be fought and could never be won, they changed nothing and everything: while targeting plans remained constant after their declaration, the status of nuclear theologians on both sides began to plummet. The importance of symbolic gestures in confidence-building cannot be underestimated.

The record to date suggests that the decade of the 1990s can be a time of considerable progress for CBMs. These steps cannot resolve blood feuds like those under way in the former Yugoslavia, but they can help states in South Asia and the Middle East to avoid new explosions. Existing conflict avoidance measures are fragile between India and Pakistan. Strengthening measures might be especially useful for large-scale military exercises, which led to tense confrontations in 1987 and 1990. In the Middle East, it takes little imagination to devise CBMs to facilitate peace-making, if only national leaders can be persuaded to take bold steps. In the Southern Cone CBMs can help democratic governments consolidate recent gains.

CBMs could also be usefully employed to avoid conflict and reduce tensions in the former Soviet Union, Africa, Southeast Asia, and other regions well suited for missionary work of this kind. In short, CBMs are an ideal tools for the 1990s, a decade of great opportunity as well as potential for backsliding. It makes sense to promote CBMs in regions of tension and to call attention to the East-West experience, not as a blueprint, but to stimulate problem-solving approaches. Outsiders can provide useful help and general guidelines, but the heavy lifting must come from within regions of tension.
Confidence-building on Nuclear Related-Issues Between Argentina and Brazil: A Chronology

The chronology that follows summarizes a decade of efforts by governments, non-governmental organizations, and individuals to prevent the establishment of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear weapons programs. Surprisingly, in the late 1970s and early 1980s it was the Argentine and Brazilian military dictatorships that took the first small steps toward increased transparency in their nuclear programs. These early agreements focused on instituting bilateral nuclear cooperation in non-sensitive areas.

Major progress, however, was not made until the mid-1980s when democratic elections were held in both countries. The fall of military rule in Argentina in 1983 led to the election of President Raúl Alfonsín, who launched major initiatives to defuse the traditional economic and military rivalry between Argentina and Brazil. He believed that nuclear competition was both counterproductive and dangerous.

In early 1985, Alfonsín and the newly elected Brazilian president, Tancredo Neves, agreed to further transparency in their nuclear programs and to negotiate mutual inspections for all nuclear facilities. President Tancredo’s untimely death delayed the implementation of the agreement. His replacement, José Sarney, was too weak politically to overcome the Brazilian military’s opposition to mutual inspections. Nevertheless, during the late 1980s both governments conducted a series of joint visits to their sensitive establishments. Tensions were eased and the stage set for what was to follow under the administrations of Fernando Collor de Mello and Carlos Saúl Menem.

The restoration of democracy in both countries was the key development driving these important changes. The popularly elected governments made economic recovery their major priority. The nuclear weapons programs left behind by previous military regimes were considered a costly distraction. These new governments hoped that increased transparency and an end to nuclear competition would help promote economic development, both at home and throughout the region.

Under democratic rule, scientific groups, citizens organizations, and newly-empowered legislators were able to lobby openly for constraints on wasteful nuclear activities. Many of these efforts helped to build a political climate more conducive to the implementation of bilateral and international safeguards.

International pressure from nuclear supplier nations also contributed to the change in policies. The United States consistently linked better economic relations to the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and a renunciation of peaceful nuclear explosions. Germany played a critical role in fostering a new attitude towards international inspections. In September 1990, the German government announced that “current and future” nuclear exports would be approved only if full-scope safeguards were in effect in the recipient country. Since Germany was a major nuclear supplier to both Argentina and Brazil, this policy reversal put additional pressure on the two countries to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for all of their nuclear facilities.

In 1990 and 1991, the Argentine and Brazilian governments signed a series of agreements that signaled a serious commitment to terminate their covert nuclear weapons programs. In September 1990, President Collor revealed that Brazil had indeed sought to build nuclear explosives, and that unsafeguarded parts of their program had been central to the effort. Collor claimed that no explosive devices had been built.

In 1991, Collor and Argentine president Menem agreed to a verifiable ban on the production of nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs). For years, both countries had shrouded their nuclear weapons ambitions behind the right to conduct PNEs. The two leaders also agreed to prohibit the production of nuclear-capable missiles, and they welcomed IAEA inspections of all their nuclear facilities.

Despite these dramatic successes, the implementation of international safeguards has been delayed. Argentina ratified the IAEA safeguards agreement in December 1992. By August 1993, the Brazilian congress had not yet concluded ratification. The disgrace and resignation of Collor, residual hostility to international safeguards, and a persistent economic crisis have all contributed to the delay.
The post-Collor administration is more sympathetic to the military. In March 1993, the government announced its intention to enlarge the naval uranium enrichment program at Iperó in Sao Paulo state. Although this decision does not unravel previous accomplishments, the enrichment program increases suspicion and complicates the implementation of IAEA safeguards. Nonetheless, Argentina and Brazil have demonstrated that highly nationalistic nuclear programs can be held in check with the implementation of transparency measures and the use bilateral and international inspections.

David Albright

A Chronology

- On May 17, 1980, presidents João Figueiredo of Brazil and Jorge Videla of Argentina sign the Corpus-Itaipu Agreement in Buenos Aires to promote nuclear fuel cycle cooperation. It provides for the exchange of technicians, the training of personnel, and exchanging of information on the manufacture of components, physical protection of nuclear material, exploration of uranium, nuclear safeguards and reactor design research. Argentina, given access to the Brazilian Computerized Information Center, receives a 120-ton supply of enriched uranium for its research reactors and, in return, supplies zirconium to Brazil. It is further agreed that Brazil's integrated factory for the production of heavy nuclear steam supply system components will construct part of the pressure vessel for an Argentine nuclear reactor supplied by West Germany.

- In May 1980, Argentina's National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and Brazil's state-owned Empresas Nucleares Brasilenas, S.A., sign an agreement on nuclear cooperation. The agreement has a protocol on industrial cooperation, permitting contracting with commercial entities for the loan and consumption of uranium concentrates, for the provision of zircalloy tubes and for the manufacture of a section of the pressure vessel for the Argentine nuclear power plant, Atucha II.

- In August 1980, in accordance with the Corpus-Itaipu Agreement, the Protocol of Execution No. 1, on cooperation in the training of personnel in the nuclear sector, and the Protocol of Execution No. 2, on technical nuclear information, are signed in Brasilia.

- In September 1981, three agreements are signed between the CNEA and the Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises, or Nucleabras, for technological exchange and an additional supply of 240 tons of uranium for Brazil's nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis.

- In May 1983, Alberto Constantini, the newly appointed head of the CNEA, cancels Argentina's nuclear submarine project.

- In November 1983, two days prior to the official announcement, Argentina notifies President Figueiredo that it has mastered uranium enrichment and is moving to complete the fuel cycle. Alfonsín assures Figueiredo that Argentina's nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes.

- In February 1985, Argentina's newly elected president, Raúl Alfonsín, and Brazilian President-elect Tancredo Neves meet and agree in principle to strengthen the 1980 Corpus-Itaipu Agreement so that it includes an eventual goal of mutual inspection of nuclear facilities.

- On November 30, 1985, president Alfonsín and the successor to the deceased President Tancredo Neves, José Sarney, sign an agreement on economic integration, including the Joint Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu on Nuclear Policy. Within the context of the agreement, the two nations establish a Joint Task Force on Nuclear Policy, since renamed the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy (CBEAN), under the leadership of the foreign ministries, but with representation from the nuclear energy commissions and other ministries. The task force commits both governments to a process of transition to democracy, the greater development of the Argentine and Brazilian economies and industrial structures, and a determination to conduct autonomous foreign policies vis-à-vis the hegemonic power. The task force is instrumental in the signing of the two protocols (Protocol No. 11, contained within the context of the Act of Integration, and Protocol No. 17, contained in the Declaration of Brasilia) that make up the agreements on economic cooperation for Argentine-Brazilian integration.
• Signed in Buenos Aires on July 31, 1986, by Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney, the Act of Integration outlines protocols for the co-production of nuclear fuel for test reactors, and plans for a joint venture between the Brazilian company Embrace and Argentina's Ministry of Defense for research and production of civil and military aircraft. The agreement is triggered by the initiative of Presidents Alfonsín and Figueiredo, who sponsor a joint enterprise to construct and export nuclear research reactors to Latin America and other developing countries. Protocol No. 11, on immediate notification and reciprocal assistance in case of nuclear accidents and radiological emergencies, is signed on July 30.

• Signed in Brasilia on December 10, 1986, by Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín, the Declaration of Brasilia (Protocol No. 17) defines several areas in which mutual cooperation and development can be achieved in nuclear cooperation. The agreement, included as the second annex to the 1986 Act of Integration, addresses the following issues: (1) high-density fuels for research reactors; (2) detectors, electronics, and nuclear instrumentation; (3) enrichment of stable isotopes; (4) research on nuclear physics and plasma physics; (5) safeguard techniques in light of the commitments made by both parties with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); (6) in the long term, technical and economic viability of joint development of a demonstration of a fast breeder reactor; and (7) nondestructive techniques of assays of materials used in nuclear technology. In an addendum to the declaration (annex 1 to Protocol No. 17), on August 23, 1989, in Brasilia, the foreign ministers of both countries sign an agreement "to promote the extensive industrial complementation to the nuclear sector."

• On July 17, 1987, following a visit by President Sarney and fifteen officials from the National Commission for Nuclear Energy to the unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu, Argentina, Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín issue the Declaration of Viedma. The declaration reaffirms the peaceful purpose of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear programs; states that the use of the advances derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy should benefit the people of both nations; calls for strengthened mutual confidence and consolidation of nuclear energy for the benefit of the people of both nations; and expresses concern for the peace and security of the region.

• In November 1987, President Sarney notifies Alfonsín two days prior to the press announcement that Brazil has also mastered uranium enrichment, but reiterates that the nuclear research program is designed with peaceful purposes in mind.

• Between 1987-1988, the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy continues its focus on technical and scientific cooperation and on coordination of foreign policy in the nuclear sphere. Progress reportedly entails joint research and information exchange on safeguards, including "comparison of results on burn-up calculations," and the "development of portable equipment for the non-destructive analysis of nuclear material and on the preparation and characterization of reference material for instrument calibration." Parallel to these efforts, work is conducted by CBEAN on the identification of equipment that each nation can manufacture for the other's nuclear installations, the creation of new finance arrangements, and the joint development of new foreign markets in the nuclear area.

• On April 8, 1988, President Alfonsín attends the inauguration of Brazil's Aramar experimental gas centrifuge facility in Iperó. Following the visit, Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín issue the Declaration of Iperó. The joint declaration establishes the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy to replace the working group on nuclear policy created in Foz do Iguaçu in 1985; mandates that the Permanent Committee meet every 120 days in each country alternatively; reaffirms the inalienable right to develop, without restrictions, nuclear programs for peaceful purposes; states that the use of the advances derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy should benefit the people of both nations; calls for the strengthening of mutual confidence resulting from increased and continued reciprocal exchange of knowledge and other joint efforts in the execution of important projects; and calls for coordination of common foreign policies on nuclear matters. Under the terms of the agreement, Argentina and Brazil reserve the right to peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEa).
In August 1988, the Brazilian Congress establishes a new constitution that prohibits the production, manufacture, and productions of nuclear weapons. The constitution, however, does not ban PNEs.

In August 1988, the Brazilian Congress, under a new constitution that gives it legal authority over the entire nuclear program, establishes a commission composed of technical advisers from the Brazilian Physics Society.

In September 1988, both Argentina and Brazil request and receive permission from the IAEA to participate as a single observer at the IAEA meetings on fast breeder reactors.

On November 29, 1988, following a trip by President Sarney to Argentina's pilot reprocessing plant in Ezeiza, Presidents Sarney and Alfonsín issue the Declaration of Ezeiza. The joint declaration reaffirms the peaceful purpose of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear programs; calls for the strengthening and consolidation of mutual confidence; declares that the advances derived from the peaceful use of nuclear energy should benefit the people of both nations; addresses the possibility of extending cooperation and interchange of nuclear technology in nuclear matters to all Latin America countries; and calls for coordination of common foreign policies on nuclear matters.

In July 1989, upon assuming office, President Carlos Saúl Menem announces his intent to continue to seek a fully transparent, noncompetitive nuclear relationship with Brazil.

In August 1989, during his first visit to Brazil, Menem signs a series of agreements with President Sarney, including agreements exempting from import duties equipment being exchanged for the Atucha II and Angra II power plants, and providing encouragement for joint breeder reactor research and development.

In August 1989, the chancellors for the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Policy of both countries sign the final text of the extension of Protocol No. 17.

In July 1990, Argentina announces its intention to suspend the Condor II missile program.

In September 1990, Brazil's Army Technological Center cuts back the thermal power from its unbuilt, unsafeguarded, air-cooled, graphite-moderated, plutonium enrichment plant from twenty to two megawatts.

In September 1990, Brazil's newly elected president, Fernando Collor de Mello, makes a visit to the secret nuclear test site in Cachimbo (Serra Do Caximbo) and declares the closing of the test site and the sealing of a one-thousand-foot shaft.

In September 1990, Brazil's representative of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat announces before the IAEA General Conference that CNEN has assumed full and direct responsibility for all projects in the Brazilian nuclear program.

In September 1990, before the United Nations General Assembly, Collor reveals the existence of a secret fifteen-year old atomic bomb project code-named Solimoes. The project, outlined in a 50-page classified report prepared for Collor, was composed of four parts, including the Iperó enrichment facility and the nuclear test site at Cachimbo. He also calls on all Latin American and Caribbean nations to ban all nuclear explosives, including those intended for peaceful purposes.

In November 1990, at Foz do Iguaçu, presidents Collor and Menem renounce nuclear weapons, pledge to implement the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and state their intention to ban PNEs as well as establish common safeguards.

In December 1990, the Commission for Congressional Investigations set up by the Brazilian Congress releases a confidential report providing details about the military's long secret nuclear program. The report concludes that João Figueiredo, the last of five military presidents, who left power in 1985, had decided to manufacture a nuclear bomb.

On July 18, 1991, Presidents Collor and Menem sign the **Argentine-Brazilian Bilateral Accord on Nuclear Energy** in Guadalajara. The agreement bans the production of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads, and prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as receipt, storage, installation, placement, or possession of any nuclear weapons, and peaceful nuclear explosions. A **Joint System for**
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons (SCCC) is created to control and verify all nuclear activity. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) is established to administer and apply the SCCC directive: to conduct inspections, designate inspectors, evaluate inspections, contract services to ensure fulfillment of its objective, act as third-party arbitrator, conclude international agreements, and serve as representative in the courts. The agreement entered into force on December 12, 1991. Routine inspections will be conducted following the completion of ad hoc inspections in 1993.

- On September 5, 1991, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile sign the Mendoza Compromise prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, storage, or transfer, either directly or indirectly, of chemical and biological weapons.

- On December 13, 1991, Presidents Menem and Collor, and representatives from the ABACC and the IAEA sign the Multilateral Agreement on the Application of Nuclear Safeguards placing both Argentina's and Brazil's nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards. The accord, which is subject to ratification by the Argentine and Brazilian Congresses, also provides guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear material.

- In February 1992, Presidents Menem and Collor issue a joint declaration pledges their support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and announce the submission of amendments to the treaty for consideration by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

- In April 1992, Menem signs a decree establishing the creation of an export control regime to monitor the transfer of all sensitive materials to any nation that refuses to allow full international safeguards. The regime covers nuclear and ballistic missiles and missile technology, chemical weapons and biological weapons.

- In December 1992, Argentina ratifies the 1991 multilateral safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA.

- In December 1992, Argentina releases a report detailing its record on nuclear nonproliferation.

- In January 1993, Argentina transfers control of the secret Falta del Carmen plant in Córdoba province, construction site for the Condor II missile program, from the air force to the civilian-run CNEA.

- In January 1993, Spain and Argentina reach an initial accord regarding disposal of Condor II missile parts.

- In January 1993, President Itamar Franco of Brazil announces the indefinite suspension of the Angra III nuclear power plant in Angra dos Reis.

- In February 1993, Argentina signs an agreement with the United States for the establishment of a license and export system to control the export of technology, data, and certain technical products. Argentina also announces plans to join the Coordinating Committee on Export Controls.

- In March 1993, the Argentine Senate unanimously ratifies the Treaty of Tlatelolco and sends it to the Chamber of Deputies for approval. Final approval rests with the executive branch.

Dominique M. McCoy
In a real sense, every state's security problems are unique, just as its borders, population, language, resources, and potential opponents may be unique. Equally real and important, however, are the features and problems that even very different states share in common. Many countries around the globe, for example, face problems of border security and perceived military threats from neighboring states. Although the causes and roots of such insecurity may vary from case to case, the fact of insecurity does not necessarily vary.

For most countries in regions of the world where international crisis and conflict loom as distinct possibilities, the range of security problems, like those faced in Europe during the cold war, stretch from preserving peace, at one extreme, to terminating a war that might break out, at the opposite end of the spectrum. In between lie a variety of other objectives, such as inhibiting the threatened use of military force for political intimidation and controlling escalation so that flareups do not lead to unwanted wars.

Successful crisis management is another important security objective for states, no matter where they are located. At a minimum, such management would imply an ability to control the escalation of a crisis so as to preclude any unintended effects. A further objective might be to avoid the outbreak of war by creating firebreaks that attempt to guarantee at least a pause before hostilities begin.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) were negotiated and implemented in Europe with these objectives in mind. This essay reviews the record of CBMs in Europe during the cold war as a way of understanding both established practice and evolving theory in one concrete, highly prominent, and successful case.

What we now call confidence-building measures probably owe their origins, at least in part, to the European military practice of inviting observers from various states to military exercises, which dates back to the years prior to World War I, if not much earlier. Similar measures emerged later in the context of the Versailles treaty's attempt to control a defeated Germany. Among other things, that treaty provided for demilitarization of the Rhineland and on-site inspections announced six days in advance.

**Precursor CBMs**

Following World War II, military liaison missions between the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France were established, ostensibly to improve relationships between the victorious allied powers that were occupying Germany. With the onset of the cold war, these missions soon turned into military intelligence-gathering devices for all parties involved. In the 1950s and 1960s, forerunners of modern-day CBMs were

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proposed at the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference held in Geneva and to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962. Two U.S. proposals during this period were actually instituted in the form of the hotline’s direct communication links between national command authorities in Washington and Moscow and the agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, both of which were signed in 1963.

The timing of these two agreements is particularly interesting. They were proposed and consummated in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. Although the cold war was far from over, that crisis had brought it to a head both militarily and politically. By forcing the opposing sides to confront the reality of how close they had actually come to nuclear war, the crisis gave rise to a political climate in which new approaches to superpower and East–West relationships were encouraged.

The first half of the 1970s witnessed a period of considerable, if short-lived, progress in both strategic nuclear and conventional arms control efforts. The 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) accords were followed by the Vladivostok Agreement in 1975, which raised expectations that yet another strategic arms treaty (SALT II) would be concluded before the end of the decade. Fueling further expectations of progress in arms control, the United States and the Soviet Union signed, in steady succession, the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War in 1971, which provides for immediate notification of an accidental, unauthorized, or unexplained nuclear detonation; the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972, which established operating procedures that attempt to decrease the potential for ship-to-ship harassment, such as simulated attacks, during peacetime; and, in 1973, the declaratory Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which provides for immediate and urgent consultations in times of crisis.

In 1973, moreover, negotiations aimed at reducing both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe commenced in Vienna, while preparations were well under way for a new Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with participation by all European states (except Albania) plus the United States and Canada. This period marked a new high point for détente in East–West and American–Soviet relations. Political breakthroughs were also being accomplished through the policy of West Germany towards Eastern Europe. Tangible results soon followed: the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in 1971; rapprochement between East and West Germany; and the treaties signed by the latter with various Warsaw Pact countries, which served to acknowledge postwar borders that had been in existence at that point for more than twenty-five years.

First-Generation CBMs

The CSCE, whose first set of meetings culminated in the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, presided over the birth of the first generation of CBMs, which were designed primarily for conventional armed forces in Europe. These CBMs were not genuinely welcomed by the superpowers. Instead, they were championed by neutral and

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nonaligned European states, which resented their exclusion from the alliance-oriented Vienna negotiations and insisted on inserting something more than declarations of principles in the “security” dialogue at the CSCE.

The result of these and other international interests and negotiating pressures was the Document on Confidence-building Measures in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. That document contained a variety of CBMs, including notification in advance (twenty-one days) of major military maneuvers (beyond 25,000 troops), other maneuvers (below 25,000 troops), major military movements (undefined); and the invitation of observers to major military maneuvers. The provision for the invitation of observers was entirely discretionary on the part of the state conducting the maneuvers. Otherwise, given the predominance of notification provisions in the document, this package of CBMs was heavily weighted toward producing various exchanges of information in advance of planned military activities.

The theory behind these measures was quite different from that for arms control efforts. The purpose of CBMs was not to limit the capabilities or otherwise control the military forces that states had in being, much less reduce their numbers. Nor were there any verification provisions attached to these measures. Instead, as indicated in the Helsinki act and elsewhere, CBMs were aimed at increasing “openness,” reducing the secrecy with which military matters were traditionally surrounded (particularly in Eastern Europe), and improving the predictability of military activities in general.

In a word that was to become emblematic of this rationale in years to come, promoting greater “transparency” with regard to military affairs in Europe was to be the main purpose of CBMs. Greater transparency, in turn, was expected to reduce the mutual suspicion that secrecy tends to breed as well as reflect. In theory, this would lessen the chances that war might come about as a result of misunderstanding or miscalculation.

According to this theory, increasing the transparency or openness of military activities in Europe might even lessen fears that a surprise attack could occur or that military exercises could be used successfully for political intimidation. When explained in terms of an hierarchy of arms control objectives, therefore, CBMs could be said to promote the immediate objective of increasing transparency. This increase in transparency would then promote higher level arms control objectives, such as reducing miscalculation and misunderstanding, which in turn would support even higher level objectives, such as preventing war and preserving peace.3

There were few illusions, however, about the ability of CBMs to promote these higher level arms control objectives any time soon, especially among the superpowers and their allies. The absence of any specific verification provisions for the Helsinki measures, their nonbinding character as voluntary political—as opposed to mandatory legal—measures, and even their lack of agreed definitions effectively undercut any hope that the Helsinki

CBMs might actually go beyond the goal of simply promoting greater military transparency by reducing secrecy.

According to the theory of increasing transparency, the mere fact that the side conducting a potentially threatening activity notifies the other side about the maneuvers tends to reduce anxiety levels. Is this a good thing, or could such measures be used to promote a false sense of confidence? In certain situations, greater apprehension might be warranted. What if the notification of an exercise, for example, even the invitation of observers to it, was a clever prelude to a surprise attack? Critics of early CBMs were quick to raise such questions and to diminish the potential utility of CBMs. The dual effect of CBMs in promoting transparency—they can reduce apprehensiveness but, in the process, can conceivably build false confidence—was a theoretical problem that the first generation of CBMs could not solve.

Second-Generation Measures

A new generation of CBMs grew in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and Soviet threats to Poland in the early 1980s. The new measures were both an outgrowth of and a reaction to the virtual disappearance of détente in East-West relations. It was one thing to worry about false confidence being generated by CBMs in a period of declining tensions and promising arms control negotiations. It was quite another matter to contemplate this problem as tensions were mounting and CBMs were being misused by the Soviet Union against Poland in 1981 for political intimidation. During this period, large-scale Soviet military exercises and force deployments were staged near Polish borders, in an obvious attempt to intimidate reform-minded Poles, who were threatening to topple their pro-Soviet government.4

Traditional arms control efforts were stalled in the early 1980s. In this barren landscape, two oases appeared that were later to yield substantial fruit.

One of these was the effort initiated by Senators Sam Nunn, John Warner, and Henry Jackson to ease tensions over interruption of the superpower dialogue. The three senators proposed the negotiation of new crisis management tools with the USSR, including, if feasible, nuclear risk reduction centers manned simultaneously and continuously by both sides. This initiative ultimately resulted in new American–Soviet agreements to add a facsimile transmission capability to the hotline (signed in 1984) and to establish nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow (signed in 1987) primarily to exchange the information and notification required under other agreements on arms control or confidence-building measures.5

The second effort that grew and developed in the heightened cold war environment of the early 1980s was the attempt to negotiate a new and improved set of CBMs for conventional forces in Europe. This effort reached fruition in the Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures of 1986. The addition of “security” to the

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Richard E. Darilek

title of CBMs in that document, thereby making them CSBMs, signified more ambitious objectives for such measures. In the language of the document, which took more than six years to negotiate, the new measures were to be more "militarily significant, binding, and verifiable" than their predecessors. They were to have more politico-military "bite," hence a greater security component, as protective compensation for the sharp downturn in East-West relations.

As negotiated in Stockholm, the new CSBMs were no longer subject to a participating state's discretionary choice as to whether or not, or to what degree, to observe them. The following mandatory measures were concluded:

- Notification forty-two (versus twenty-one) days in advance of a major military exercise or "concentration" of forces (whether movements or maneuvers) involving lower thresholds, for example, 13,000 troops or 300 tanks versus 25,000 troops;
- Notification only at the time of the commencement of certain otherwise notifiable exercises, such as "alerts";
- Exchange of annual calendars by November 15 of all military activities, subject to prior notification in the next year;
- Invitation of observers to all exercises or concentrations in excess of 17,000 troops (5,000 for amphibious or airborne troops);
- On-site inspection by challenge, subject to a limit of three on any one country's territory per year; and
- Constraints on the ability to conduct large-scale exercises (involving more than 40,000-75,000 troops).

The Helsinki CBMs promoted transparency. The Stockholm package of CSBMs not only required greater openness but also relied more heavily on "access" measures, requiring observation and inspection of certain military activities. These access measures aimed to make the information provided as a result of increased transparency more trustworthy. Hence the provisions for mandatory invitation of observers to exercises in excess of 17,000 troops (5,000 in the case of amphibious and airborne troops) and for on-site inspections by challenge, with no right of refusal, sought to ensure that seeing would be tantamount to believing. The Stockholm accord even made a first step in the direction of placing constraints on military exercises by imposing longer lead times—forty-two-days for major military exercises and one to two years in the case of larger scale exercises—before activities subject to prior notification could occur.

The new objective for CSBMs included not only prevention of war by misunderstanding or miscalculation (hence the need for greater transparency), but also a reduction in the possibilities for surprise attack and even, if possible, in the ability to use military forces for the purpose of political intimidation (as the Soviet Union had tried to do in Poland). The key to success for the new measures lay in their provision of independent means for verification of compliance and intent. A potential attacker could still attempt to mask preparations for war and maintain opportunities for surprise by continuing to comply with the CSBM regime to the last possible moment. The hope was, however, that such continuing compliance with the notification requirements would force a degrada-
tion in attack preparations and that, in any event, such preparations would be detected through the measures providing for observation and on-site inspection. If an attacker was to refuse to permit such observations or inspections in hope of preserving secrecy, that refusal itself would send a warning signal to the defender.

The key to successful implementation of the Stockholm CSBM package hinged largely on the Stockholm document's provision for mandatory on-site inspection of military activities. However, the number of inspections permitted on any given state's territory in any given year-three may have been too low to help prevent misunderstanding or miscalculation, much less a surprise attack, although nothing prevents a state from waiving its rights, upping the quota, and permitting additional inspections on its territory in the interests of clarifying an ambiguous situation and preserving the peace. In a crisis, such action would itself be a kind of confidence-building measure.

Prior to the end of the cold war, some feared that the Stockholm document's notification thresholds were not low enough to complicate a determined attacker's planning for surprise. Some argued that an attacker could make the necessary preparations within the calendar and notification requirements established, endure several on-site inspections without detection of the hidden intent, and go on to launch a surprise attack successfully. Others believed that while such a scenario was conceivable, it was highly unlikely because the risks of random detection were too great. The Stockholm CSBMs measurably improved on the Helsinki CBMs in this regard.

In the final analysis, Stockholm's CSBMs left room for improvement, particularly in limiting the use of force for political intimidation, since large-scale military exercises conducted as alerts—requiring notification only upon their commencement, not in advance—could still be staged with impunity during a crisis. Such exercises would tend to exacerbate, not dampen, the potential for escalation and intimidation. CSBM negotiations after Stockholm, therefore, were intent on negotiating tougher measures: expanded information exchanges, improved access quotas, lower thresholds for notifications, and the establishment of a risk reduction center for Europe.

Third-Generation CSBMs

In the late 1980s, detente had returned and the outlook for arms control negotiations had never been brighter. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations in December 1988 clearly placed conventional arms control high on the list of East-West priorities and helped to assuage fears in the West of the Soviet threat.

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This effect was compounded when the Kremlin allowed the fundamental political changes sweeping through Central and Eastern Europe to run their course.

As East-West relations began to make progress where none had been thought possible, a new generation of CSBMs were developed by the United States and its European allies. These measures promised to set limits, or “constraints,” on conventional military forces that were much tighter and more direct than any previously negotiated. Instead of trying to limit military exercises indirectly, as the Stockholm document did with calendar notification requirements of up to two years in advance, advocates of tougher constraint measures called for the outright prohibition of the specified activities. If exercises above a certain threshold were a problem, then exercises at those levels would be prohibited. If high readiness levels among units were the issue, then constraint measures would define and prohibit unacceptable levels. If the problem involved limiting the deployment of particular forces in certain areas—so-called keep-out zones—then these too could be drawn up, tailored specifically to the forces at issue, and subjected directly to a ban on deployments there.

Such measures were proposed in the context of negotiations on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), not in the follow-on CSBM talks that commenced simultaneously in March 1989 in Vienna. To accompany the force reductions that it was advocating in CFE negotiations, NATO put forward a package of proposals that included measures for information exchange, stabilization, and verification. In the way that they were intended to operate, most of these measures resembled CSBMs. The NATO package included a requirement that call-ups of 40,000 or more reservists within the CFE treaty area should be notified to all parties forty-two-days in advance; a system of inspections that aimed to grant all parties to the treaty access to one another’s forces and activities at virtually any time; and a call for each side to disclose the exact location of its military units as well as the quantity and types of its treaty-limited equipment.

This NATO package included constraint as well as transparency measures, such as placing various types of military equipment (tanks, artillery, armored troop carriers, and bridging equipment) in monitored storage sites and limiting the amount of such equipment that could be removed from storage at any given time. It also barred signatories of the treaty from conducting military exercises in excess of 40,000 troops or 800 main battle tanks more than once every two years. In addition, NATO proposed notification of such exercises a year in advance as well as notification forty-two-days in advance, of any movement of equipment that exceeded specified amounts (600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 1,200 armored troop carriers within fourteen days) or that came out of the storage sites.

Such constraint measures were intended to make it extraordinarily difficult for a state to launch a surprise attack successfully. Confronted with transparency and access measures simultaneously, an attacker would find itself in a quandary, or double bind:

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whether to comply with the measures and risk degradation or detection of surreptitious attack preparations, or whether to abrogate the measures and forfeit surprise. Constraints sharpen that bind by establishing prohibitions on military activities that are significant and relatively easy to verify: the prohibitions involved are clearer and more direct, with fewer loopholes. Any violations of these prohibitions, therefore, are grounds for serious and immediate concern.

These constraint measures were ultimately dropped from the CFE Treaty signed in Vienna on November 19, 1990. The treaty focused almost entirely on the numerical levels and post-treaty locations of military forces defined in terms of their equipment inventories. Negotiators in both the CFE and the CSBM talks in Vienna were working against a deadline to produce agreements by the time of the CSCE summit in November 1990. Work on some issues, such as the constraint on military exercises for CFE, was simply not finished by the deadline.

Lack of time was not the only reason for the limited advance of third generation CSBMs in East-West negotiations. By 1990 the Soviet threat in Europe had abated. The Soviet Union was undergoing a profound political revolution at the time that distracted attention from foreign and military affairs. Constraint measures were becoming less relevant to Europe’s future than other issues and concerns, in particular those having to do with political and economic developments. As military threats to security faded, the need for constraint measures became less compelling.

The 1990 Vienna CSBM talks focused, for the most part, on fleshing out agenda items originally introduced, but not agreed to, in Stockholm. To this end, during the course of several years of negotiations, participants in the 1990 talks achieved the following:

- Produced a sweeping information exchange provision, which rivals the CFE treaty’s requirements for data;
- Supplemented Stockholm’s on-site inspection regime by providing for the on-site presence of personnel from other states to evaluate information exchanged about military forces;
- Set up direct communication links among participants via a multilateral computer network for rapid exchange of data and notifications;
- Encouraged contacts among military forces by providing for periodic visits to air bases and promoting military personnel exchanges;
- Established an obligation for consultation and cooperation regarding “unusual and unscheduled” military activities, without defining specific thresholds for such activities; and
- Created a mechanism for implementing this obligation, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, serving all CSCE participants.  

See the 1990 Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures
In addition, the 1990 negotiations in Vienna advanced even further beyond the Stockholm measures. By producing several constraints on military activities, these constraints prohibited participants from carrying out the following:

- More than one military activity, subject to prior notification, involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks, per activity, within two calendar years;
- More than six military activities subject to prior notification, involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks but not more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks, per activity, within a calendar year;
- More than three military activities, subject to prior notification, each involving more than 25,000 troops or 400 battle tanks, within a calendar year; and
- More than three simultaneous military activities, subject to prior notification, each involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 battle tanks.

CSBM negotiators also strengthened the prior notification and observation provisions of the Stockholm Document. They applied, for example, the forty-two-day, advanced written notification requirement to military activities involving at least 9,000 troops and 250 battle tanks (versus 13,000 and 300, respectively, from Stockholm), and they lowered the threshold for mandatory invitation of observers to such activities from 17,000 to 13,000 troops (and from 5,000 to 3,500 troops for amphibious or airborne exercises). Moreover, they encouraged voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities, and they provided for demonstrations to other participants of new types of major weapon and equipment systems deployed by a participant. The CSBM negotiations, however, did not eliminate the Stockholm provision that exempts “notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved”—alerts—from either the prior notification or the constraining provisions of the Vienna documents.10

Reflections on the European Experience

In the historical sketch presented above, a variety of different types of Confidence-building measures have been identified:

- **Information measures**, which include information exchange requirements about the size of military forces, their equipment holdings, and their locations;
- **Communication measures**, which are represented by the American–Soviet hotline and its various offshoots and upgrades, as well as by consultative arrangements of the kind embodied in the Center for the Prevention of Conflict;

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• **Access measures**, which have included provisions, progressively improved since the 1975 Helsinki accords, for observers at notified military activities and on-site inspection measures of the kind first agreed upon in Stockholm;

• **Notification measures**, which permit military activities to occur but attach conditions to them, such as enjoining participants to refrain from undertaking activities that have not been notified in advance; and

• **Constraint measures**, which seek to discourage certain activities, if not ban them outright—in contrast to notification measures, which are essentially permissive, provided the specified activities are notified properly.

Several lessons might be learned from the European experience in negotiating these CBMs and CSBMs. The first is that while the spectrum of CBM possibilities is quite broad, Europe's experience suggests that the subset of measures likely to prove useful or negotiable between adversaries is rather limited, at least at the outset of the negotiating process.

A full menu of CBMs and CSBMs was available in East-West negotiations, but relatively few items were chosen. Although transparency and access measures were adopted, constraint measures were particularly difficult to negotiate. If the European experience is any guide, therefore, its teaching may be that the development of arms control and CBM initiatives is inevitably a highly selective, evolutionary process.

Because of the underlying conflict of interests between rivals, successful CBM negotiations can be a protracted process. Confidence takes a long time to build; security, even longer. Tangible results do not come readily or in great number. And dramatic results may require political breakthroughs rather than evolutionary steps in CBM negotiations. Nevertheless, useful results are possible, even early in the process. In an East-West context, the Helsinki and Stockholm agreements came early and helped to pave the way for later conventional force reductions among NATO and Warsaw Pact members. In the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, the hotline agreement (a communications CBM) and the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty (a type of constraint) came quickly in the wake of the political thaw resulting from the Cuban missile crisis and preceded by many years the first concrete steps toward nuclear arms reduction in SALT.

The second lesson is that the East-West CBM experience followed a step-by-step progression, suggesting a clear linkage between political developments and successful negotiations. Positive political developments can create conditions for the successful pursuit of CBMs or arms control. Such was the case in 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis; in the early 1970s, with détente; and in the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev presided over the Kremlin.

Once political conditions make it possible to begin CBM negotiations, it is hoped that the negotiations themselves and any agreements they produce can in turn positively influence and help improve political conditions. CBM negotiations in Europe did not, however, produce fundamental political changes. Moreover, once fundamental political changes occur, CBM negotiations may seem less and less relevant to the changed circumstances. Such efforts, therefore, seem to stand their best chance of success and to
promise most at earlier stages of political rapprochement among states. In other words, CBM negotiations appear to require only a modicum of political will on the part of participants, both in order to launch negotiations and in order to keep them going.

The pattern suggested by arms control negotiations in Europe was that of a graduated, building-block approach which involved relatively simple steps initially and more complicated arrangements later on. In Europe, a long process of CBM negotiations preceded force reductions. CBM agreements may not, however, inevitably lead to force reductions. While force reductions followed in the European case after two CBM agreements had already been implemented, there is no clear, direct connection between those agreements and the CFE treaty. Force reductions in Europe were far more directly tied to political revolutions in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Helsinki and Stockholm accords had little to do with these revolutions.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how force reductions could have somehow preceded CBM agreements in the East-West context. In the European case, fifteen years of CBM negotiations were able to produce positive results in the midst of adversarial conditions, even as force reduction negotiations were stalled. Hence, modest CBMs seem almost bound to precede force reductions, presuming any such agreements can be negotiated.

Significant CSBM constraint measures, however, such as the attempt in Europe to require notification of reserve call-ups forty-two-days in advance, may be more difficult to negotiate than arms reduction agreements. Such appears to have been the case in Europe, as officials opted to reduce military forces rather than accept restrictions on what they could do with them. In addition, significant constraint measures might seem unnecessary or not worth the additional negotiating effort following mutually agreed-upon reductions in opposing armed forces.

A third lesson, in the European context, is that breaching the wall of secrecy that adversaries tend to erect around their military establishments and activities was the single most important contribution made by initial CBM agreements. European CSBMs had the objectives of reducing misunderstanding, inhibiting the use of force for political intimidation, and lessening the chances of a surprise attack. The first order of business of East-West CBMs, however, was reducing military secrecy.

Although not always stated as an objective, this fundamental objective was, in effect, a sine qua non for further progress in the field of CBMs.

In a real sense, reducing the secrecy with which adversaries traditionally surround their military forces and activities lies at the heart of what it takes to start building confidence. Such secrecy breeds suspicion and mistrust, which in turn can generate lack

11. For further discussion of these objectives, see Y. Ben-Horin et al., Building Confidence and Security in Europe, 4–13.
of confidence and give rise to tensions over the nature, purpose, status, and disposition of a potential opponent’s military forces. The first and foremost task of CBMs, therefore, is to promote transparency and assail the rationales that promote secrecy.

Most CBM transparency measures are simply aimed at changing the secretive habits of military organizations. Through CBMs the countries of Europe grew accustomed to telling each other in advance, on a routine basis, about periodic military activities, which neighboring states would find out about anyway through their intelligence sources. The process of informing others is as important for the party that is doing the telling as it is for the side that is receiving the information (and checking it against what its own sources have provided). When it comes to building confidence, the fact that information is being passed by mutual agreement may even be more important than specific details of the information.

There are downside risks to openness, of course. False information could be passed, and the net effect of transparency measures could be to serve as instruments of deception rather than openness. Greater openness concerning military activities could also magnify attempts at political coercion through the use of armed forces. Despite such pitfalls, the European experience suggests that transparency measures were, on balance, reasonably successful in chipping away at the edifice of military secrecy, thus introducing a measure of predictability into political-military relationships among adversaries.

A fourth lesson to be drawn is that CBMs in East-West negotiations resulted in the institutionalized establishment of the right of adversaries to ask questions of and expect answers from one another. Direct communication links, such as the hotline between Washington and Moscow, served both the United States and the Soviet Union well as a vehicle for mutual give-and-take. The two countries valued the ability to conduct these exchanges sufficiently enough to upgrade the hotline’s capability, adding facsimile transmission to what was originally a teletype operation. The creation of direct communication links underscores the right to ask questions and expect a response.

The right to ask questions of and expect responses from potential adversaries is represented even more broadly in the 1990 Vienna CSBM agreement. That agreement provides for the establishment of a Center for the Prevention of Conflict, to serve all signatories, who have the responsibility to raise and address questions relating to the preservation of peace, security, and stability in Europe whenever they might arise. In addition, to bolster the chances of such questions being raised, the Vienna document includes a provision that requires participating states to consult and cooperate about any unusual and unscheduled military activities. Clearly, establishment of the right to raise and expect answers to questions related to security has been elevated to a new level in Europe.

Finally, a fifth lesson to be learned from the European–American experience with arms control is that CBM agreements have been relatively resilient to controversies and to downturns in East-West relations. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the NATO decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and the Soviet-prompted crackdown of the Solidarity movement in Poland, détente became a fleeting memory, and arms control efforts sputtered in the early 1980s. Despite the political turbulence of
this period, CBM talks continued. Indeed, they provided a model for how negotiations can be used to help keep lines of communication open and active during a political crisis.

CBM negotiations and agreements, therefore, did not bend and break like weak reeds during times of trouble in Europe. Indeed, they proved remarkably resilient under extremely challenging political conditions. Whatever intrinsic reasons there were for keeping CBM negotiations going, the talks provided a political safety valve for adversaries in a crisis. By continuing to maintain commitments made prior to the crisis, the adversaries demonstrated at least a modicum of interest in keeping the crisis from getting worse, if not in improving relations.

More significantly, perhaps, the maintenance of previously established CBMs during the Euro-American crisis of the early 1980s preserved existing channels of communication. In the end, these helped make it possible to move beyond the crisis and into new political-military relationships, which characterized the second half of the 1980s in Europe. It was this post-crisis era that enabled useful arms control initiatives to be launched and new beginnings cultivated.
Confidence-building on the Korean Peninsula

North and South Korea are still technically at war, and each state maintains large, well-equipped forces. Two broad and ambitious confidence-building measure (CBM) agreements were signed in December 1991, but implementation efforts have been delayed by competing visions of reunification and by North Korea's unwillingness to provide transparency for its troubling nuclear program.

The Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation is an ambitious document committing North and South Korea to build confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade, and other areas. The document, originally scheduled to go into effect in February 1992, stipulated that several consultation and communication bodies be established within a specified period of time from the agreement's date of activation. Among its provisions:

Reconciliation Measures

- Respect for each other's political and social system, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, renunciation of propaganda, sabotage, and subversion, and a commitment to cooperate in the international arena;
- Resolution to transform the Military Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, into a "solid state of peace";
- Establishment of a joint reconciliation commission and a working-level group to ensure implementation and observance of the agreement.

Nonaggression Measures

- Nonuse of force, peaceful resolution of disputes, and prevention of accidental armed clashes;
- Establishment of a joint military commission to negotiate confidence- and security-building measures and arms reduction accords on notification and limitation of military exercises; peaceful use of the demilitarized zone; exchanges of military personnel and information; phased reduction of armaments; elimination of weapons of mass destruction and surprise attack capabilities; verification provisions; installation of a hotline between "military authorities."

Trade, Exchange, Cultural, and Humanitarian Measures

- Increased trade, economic development, and cooperation;
- Increased travel, communication, and educational contact;
- Family reunions and visits.

The Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, included a range of CBMs specifically designed to address the nuclear issue:

- Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons;
- Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment;
- To use nuclear energy solely of peaceful purposes;
- To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed to by both;
- To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

Implementation has been put on hold, with the exception of those consultations specified in the agreements. Since 1992 the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and the Subcommittees on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange, have met repeatedly at the border town of Panmunjom.

South Korea has undertaken two unilateral measures to improve the political environment. The South Korean-U.S. "Team Spirit" military exercises were canceled in January 1992 for one year. South Korea also unilaterally released the North Korean detainee, Yi In Mo, whose imprisonment had been an irritant to relations.

Matthew C.J. Rudolph
The Preconditions of Confidence-building: Lessons from the European Experience

Cathleen S. Fisher

As the military structures of cold war Europe are gradually dismantled, international attention is focusing anew on unresolved conflicts elsewhere in the world. As the gulf war demonstrated, the receding danger of nuclear Armageddon in Europe has not made the world an altogether more peaceful place. Unchecked arms races, fueled by deep-rooted animosities and longstanding rivalries, may have grave implications not only for regional peace and stability but for the global community as well. The continuing military face-off along the inter-Korean divide, a potential nuclear arms race in South Asia, and simmering hatreds in the Middle East are but three examples of regional conflicts that may pose significant and unforeseen risks for global security.

Although limitations on military forces may be too ambitious for states locked in age-old cycles of hatred and distrust, more modest precursors to structural arms control, known as confidence-building measures (CBMs), may be feasible. In Europe CBMs were employed to introduce greater openness, or "transparency," into the military activities of the two alliances. By conveying "credible evidence of the absence of feared threats," measures such as the prenotification and observation of military exercises, secure communication lines, and exchanges of information on military forces or exercises were intended to reduce the incentives for militant competition, and to enhance predictability, stability, and trust in East-West relations.

A skeptical view would argue that the measures and tools developed in Europe cannot readily or easily be transferred to other regions. In many conflict-torn areas of the world, military security concerns may be linked to the troublesome legacies of colonialism or to the problems of economic development, and consequently would be less amenable to technical solutions. In this view, if CBMs are to be relevant to local needs, they must be founded on a broader conception of confidence-building, one encompassing so-called economic and political CBMs. An alternative perspective accepts the narrower,

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The Preconditions of Confidence-building

military conception of CBMs developed in the European context, but discounts the feasibility of applying CBMs under the politically volatile conditions found in many parts of the developing world. The first perspective contests the relevance of European-style CBMs to other regions’ security concerns; the second perspective accepts that CBMs may be relevant to local needs but doubts the feasibility of their effective application.

The central issue in both instances concerns the broader applicability of tools and lessons extracted from one, perhaps unique historical experience—that of European confidence-building. What conclusions, if any, can we draw from the European experience about the generic preconditions and phases of confidence-building, or about the prospects for regional CBM initiatives?

There are at least two important reasons for studying the European case. First, despite charges of irrelevance, the European experience clearly has served as an important source of inspiration for regional confidence-building initiatives. Whether in Korea, South Asia, Central America, or the Pacific, there is a clear correlation between the types of measures being proposed, negotiated, or implemented and the CBMs developed in Europe. Though the selection and order of application may depart significantly from the European experience, CBMs have been perceived as relevant to the security concerns of regions characterized by diverse political, economic, historical, and cultural circumstances. Second, and more important, though the East-West conflict in Europe was in some ways unique (just as every regional conflict is seemingly unique), the roots of the cold war, as well as the factors that first prompted the European states to risk limited forms of cooperation, can be viewed in more generic terms that permit comparison to other conflicts. As definitive conclusions await a more complete record of CBM successes and failures in other regions, the European experience can provide a useful point of departure for assessing the general prerequisites of confidence-building.

Conflict, Cooperation, and Confidence-building

Though the negotiation and implementation of European CBMs have been thoroughly documented, our understanding of the confidence-building mechanism nevertheless remains incomplete. A number of analysts have identified various factors as having

contributed to the successful negotiation and implementation of CBMs, but a comprehensive assessment of their relative importance over time is lacking. Which conditions were essential and which merely facilitative? How do the preconditions for first-generation CBMs compare with those for subsequent refinements? The role that CBMs played in the resolution of the East-West conflict is undetermined as well. It is tempting to assume that CBMs and other arms control measures contributed significantly to a lessening of tensions in cold war Europe; a causal relationship between CBMs and the transformation of East-West political relations has not been clearly established. Did CBMs provoke a shift of perceptions, as some argue, or did they merely enhance a process of transformation already under way?6

To answer these questions, it is helpful to consider confidence-building as it relates to the sources of conflict and accommodation, and the processes of conflict management and resolution. Though Western theories of confidence-building viewed CBMs primarily in terms of arms control objectives, their contribution to the resolution of East-West differences was recognized implicitly. Beyond the specific function of greater military transparency, CBMs were intended, over time, to change perceptions of hostile intent. Confidence-building in the sense of greater certainty about military intentions was intended to build another type of confidence, that is, confidence as mutual trust. By requiring both sides to cooperate on minor military matters, CBMs could “embodie and project notions of shared interest—a concept of common security.”6  Specific military CBMs thus served a broader confidence-building process, whose purpose was to build an ethos of cooperation and a habit of trust between adversaries. The confidence-building process, like cooperation in the economic, cultural, or political sphere, was intended to reinforce the underlying forces for accommodation, encouraging states locked in conflict to intensify their cooperation, perhaps, over time, even contributing to a resolution of differences.

The notion of confidence-building assumes that states in conflict also share a potential for limited cooperation. Interests, experiences, and values, in other words, may prompt states not only to wage war but also to seek accommodation. In cold war Europe, for example, underlying cultural affinities, and a long history of shared experience between the two halves of the continent, could not be entirely obliterated by ideological differences or by the imposition of Soviet-style political and economic systems in Eastern and Central Europe. A potential for accommodation remained intact across the East-West divide. The “preconditions” for confidence-building in Europe, in this sense, were the set of factors or events that prompted each side to undertake cooperative steps, in spite of continuing conflict.

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In the study of negotiations, the point at which accommodation becomes possible marks the “ripening” of a conflict. Richard Haass identifies four essential conditions of “ripeness”: a shared perception that an accord is preferable to the absence of agreement; leaders who are able to agree to an accord; enough compromise on both sides to ensure that the accord is accepted at home; and a mutually acceptable approach or process for settling the conflict. Other studies argue that a disputed issue may not be negotiable before there has been a volitional change in the way a conflict situation is perceived; both parties to a conflict must perceive their common interest in a mutually agreed solution as exceeding conflicting interests. What these and other explorations of the negotiation process have in common is the notion that progress toward conflict resolution is not possible unless a critical set of conditions has been met, that is, until the conflict has ripened.

The ripening process can be triggered in many ways, with the degree of ripeness determining whether warring states can only agree to stabilize or manage the conflict between them, or whether gradual resolution of outstanding differences is possible. The realization that the status quo has become unbearable or that a unilateral solution is impossible, an indigenous change of government, or external pressure on the warring parties may all play a role in the ripening of a conflict. Limited cooperation does not require that the sources of conflict be eliminated, only that the factors favoring cooperation become strong enough for minor steps to be possible. In some instances, conditions may be only ripe enough to permit agreement on measures intended to prolong the next outbreak of war. More ambitious forms of cooperation, and progress toward resolution of a conflict, presumably require a greater degree of ripeness.

In the case of confidence-building, it is most often assumed that the preconditions are less stringent than those for conflict resolution, since CBMs are viewed as precursors to arms control, or tools designed to “work toward the day when solution-oriented diplomacy can work.” Nevertheless, some set of minimal conditions presumably is necessary to initiate the confidence-building process; different conditions may be required to sustain the process.

**The Preconditions of European Confidence-building**

The evolution of European confidence-building measures can roughly be divided into three phases (see Table 3, 42-45). Important precursors to the Helsinki CBMs included a series of bilateral arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union, whose primary purpose was to create more reliable communication channels for the exchange of information, particularly following unforeseen incidents or accidents.

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Table 1: Contextual and Processual Factors in the Negotiation of 
European Confidence-building Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Factors</th>
<th>Processual Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural and religious affinities</td>
<td>Integrated strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal and political organization</td>
<td>“Secondary” priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong states</td>
<td>Evolutionary approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable governments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian control over military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective multilateral institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of nuclear weapons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second phase introduced a packet of multilateral, mostly voluntary CBMs. Codified in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, these “groundbreakers” were of minor military significance. The Stockholm accord (1986) and the Vienna agreement (1990) marked a significant turning point in the development of CBMs. The notification, observation, and access provisions contained in the two accords, as well as further development of East-West communication and consultation mechanisms, represented significant steps toward greater military significance, verifiability, and formal political commitment.

In general, negotiators and analysts of European CBMs identify three types of factors as having contributed to the successful negotiation and implementation of the Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna agreements (see Tables 1 and 2). The first category encompasses all contextual factors—important historical, cultural, political, institutional, and technological characteristics of the East-West conflict in Europe. The second category consists of processual factors, defined as characteristics of the negotiation or confidence-building process itself. Factors that appear to have been decisive during specific phases of European confidence-building can be grouped into a third category, that of political developments in East-West relations.

Contextual Factors.

Cold war Europe was characterized by a unique set of historical, cultural, political, institutional, and technological conditions and circumstances. Centuries of shared history, cultural affinities, and religious ties provided an important potential for accommodation, despite the important ideological and other differences dividing the two blocs. Over the centuries, a more or less stable system of states had evolved. In Western Europe the arduous task of state-building was largely complete. In Eastern and Central Europe the system of postwar states was less stable, but the iron hand of Stalinist regimes effectively prevented simmering ethnic differences from exploding into armed conflict. Though governments in the West might falter, political systems and the leaders they produced were generally strong enough to negotiate CBM agreements, and to ensure that such agreements were implemented and adhered to by successor governments. Civilian control over most national militaries doubtless played a decisive role as well. Finally, at least in the West, modern infrastructures of communication, political organization, and opportunities and means to travel may have also played a role in developing public
Table 2: Key Political Developments in East-West Relations and Phases in European Confidence-Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confidence-building Phase</th>
<th>Key Events and Political Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-CBMgs</td>
<td>Cuban missile crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tacit recognition of postwar spheres of influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Generation CBMs:</td>
<td>Formal recognition of inviolability of postwar borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundbreakers (Helsinki)</td>
<td>Stabilization of German division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmel formula of defense and détente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Generation CBMs:</td>
<td>Strong public and elite support in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-building Measures</td>
<td>New political leadership in USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Stockholm, Vienna)</td>
<td>Institutionalization of CSCE and CBM negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-Generation CBMs:</td>
<td>Resolution of East-West conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Security Measures</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

awareness of confidence-building “successes” beyond the narrow circles of political and military elites, thus building a broader-based consensus in favor of further cooperative initiatives.

Certain institutional features of the European landscape contributed to the evolution of confidence-building as well. In contrast to many regions, the European states had at their disposal a system of interlocking and overlapping multilateral institutions that could facilitate communication and coordination among states. Aside from their formally designated functions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community, as well as their now defunct Eastern counterparts, the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), provided Europe with a degree of stability and organization unknown in other conflict-torn regions. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided an institutional home to dialogue across divided Europe and helped to create a habit of negotiation and cooperation among the member states. A grouping of neutral and nonaligned states outside the East-West institutional structure provided an important impetus to the process of European reconciliation.

At the societal level, strong public and elite support for the arms control process helped to sustain the confidence-building negotiations even as East-West political relations worsened steadily during the early 1980s. In many Western European countries, and in the Federal Republic in particular, large peace movements and political parties and organizations pressured leaders for progress at the negotiating table. For many governments, sustaining the arms control process seemed to become an end in itself, or at least an important means of reassuring a public uneasy at the prospect of the growing number of nuclear weapons deployed on the European continent. After the collapse in late 1983 of the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) and of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), the CSBM talks were the only East-West arms control forum still alive, due in large part to committted European leaders who saw in the Stockholm negotiations a way to preserve vestiges of East-West détente despite tensions between the superpowers.

Finally, the presence of nuclear weapons may have influenced the development of CBMs decisively. The dangers and risks posed by the presence of nuclear weapons
provided each side with a strong incentive to reduce the threat of nuclear war through miscalculation or accident. Since any conflict in Europe might escalate to a nuclear exchange, risk reduction also entailed regulation of other activities that could be easily misinterpreted by the other side. In this sense, nuclear weapons may have compelled each alliance to risk cooperation in the hope of diminishing the even greater perils of unregulated competition.

Processual Factors.

Three aspects of the confidence-building process appear to have been important to the evolution of CBMs in Europe. First, military confidence-building measures were embedded in a broader strategy of East-West economic cooperation and political dialogue. At the negotiating table, this integrated approach created important opportunities for trade-offs among the various “baskets” of the CSCE process. Moreover, under the CSCE umbrella, confidence-building in the military realm, at least in theory, could receive new impetus from gains in economic or political confidence-building, in turn reinforcing the benefits of any one element of cooperation. Second, the relatively minor importance assigned to confidence-building—in relation to other East-West arms control negotiations—for the most part prevented the CSCE negotiations on confidence-building measures from becoming overly politicized. Public attention, particularly in the United States, was focused more intensely on the negotiations to reduce strategic (SALT, START) and theater nuclear weapons (INF), possibly allowing CBM negotiators more latitude to seek mutually satisfactory solutions. Finally, the European approach to confidence-building was gradualistic and evolutionary in nature. Progress from so-called “pre-CBMs” to third generation “cooperative security” measures under negotiation in the early 1990s stretched over a period of almost thirty years.

Political Developments in East-West Relations and Confidence-building.

If the contextual and processual factors described above have been necessary for success in confidence-building, they do not appear to have been sufficient by themselves either to start the process of confidence-building or to propel both sides toward more militarily significant steps. Rather, both the initiation of the process and its continuation and refinement appear to have been closely linked to key political developments in East-West relations. Although it is impossible to determine with certainty which events or developments were most decisive, certain prominent political developments stand out as possible precursors to successive phases in European confidence-building (see Table 2).

“Pre-CBMs” — Soviet-American agreements. Early bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as the hotline agreement and the Incidents at Sea Agreement, share a common intent: the desire to reduce the risks of inadvertent or accidental conflict that, in turn, might escalate into nuclear conflagration. The Cuban missile crisis heightened awareness of the threat of mutual annihilation, perhaps providing the necessary impetus for these first cooperative steps.

“Groundbreakers” — The Helsinki CBMs. The European experiment in confidence-building, initiated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, was preceded by an important shift in thinking about European security, codified in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's 1967 Harmel Report. The report stated that Western defense efforts and détente were no longer incompatible but complementary paths to greater security. The idea that accommodation was possible, despite continuing competition, had been born. The gradual reestablishment of trade ties and communication links during the détente of the 1970s may have reawakened consciousness on both sides of the East-West divide of shared experiences and values that transcended ideological differences, providing indirect support for cooperative actions in the military sphere. Stabilization of the German question and recognition of the inviolability of postwar borders in Europe were of critical importance in this process of rapprochement. Landmark agreements included West Germany's renunciation-of-force treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

"Security-building Measures" — The Stockhom and Vienna Accords. The 1986 Stockholm Accord marked a further refinement of the Helsinki CBMs—a progression captured in the change of terminology from confidence-building to confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The strong support of West European political elites and publics for the CSCE process, and the persistence of European diplomats in Stockholm, were important factors in the completion of the 1986 accord. The gradual routinization and institutionalization of the CSCE process may have offered indirect support to the efforts of the West European allies and nonaligned states to achieve a new CSBM agreement. The breakthrough in East-West relations, set in motion by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, paved the way for the pathbreaking provisions contained in the 1990 Vienna agreement.

The history of confidence-building in Europe suggests that key political events may be decisive to initiating the process of confidence-building; further progress may depend on critical contextual and processual factors. The looming threat of mutual nuclear annihilation, accentuated by the Cuban missile crisis, led to the realization that a continuation of the status quo was no longer acceptable. The first step in superpower confidence-building—the so-called hotline agreement—followed. In Europe new thinking about security, captured in the Harmel formula of “defense plus détente,” facilitated agreement on postwar borders and on a modus vivendi for the German question. With the principle of territorial inviolability formally recognized, the thirty-five members of the CSCE began to explore the possibilities for cooperation, in the process building on a foundation of shared but slumbering historical, cultural, and religious heritage. The availability of effective structures of regional cooperation, the urgings of the neutral and nonaligned states, and the diffusion of support for East-West cooperation throughout a broad segment of the European population no doubt facilitated success in confidence-building. Over time, and virtually unnoticed, the CSCE process, with its military, economic, and political components, worked gradually and unobtrusively to plant the seeds of a new notion of cooperative security.

Confidence-building in Regions of Conflict: Adapting the Lessons of Europe

The evolution of confidence-building measures in Europe was shaped by a complex combination of contextual, processual, and political factors unlikely to be duplicated in other regions of the world. Cold war Europe comprised a system of relatively strong states
and stable alliances, both of which possessed nuclear weapons. The first formal confidence-building measures were preceded by recognition of the inviolability of postwar borders and years of modest, informal economic and political exchanges. In contrast, many conflict-torn regions of the world are characterized by relatively weak states that may be burdened with the dual challenges of state formation and economic development, in which the military may function as an important symbol of national sovereignty or as an tool of domestic repression, significantly complicating agreement on CBMs.

The mixed record of regional confidence-building measures indeed exhibits striking departures from the European model. First-generation CBMs in other regions have not been identical to the measures negotiated in Helsinki. In Europe important precursors to CBMs included the establishment of communication hotlines and agreement on rules-of-the-road for naval vessels, whereas agreement aerial inspections was not reached until after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, by contrast, aerial inspections were among the first CBMs to be implemented.

The conditions under which CBM agreements have been negotiated in other regions appear to vary significantly from the European pattern as well. As noted above, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had tacitly recognized the division of influence and inviolability of postwar borders before agreement on first-generation CBMs was reached. In contrast, neither India and Pakistan nor the countries of the Middle East have recognized, tacitly or otherwise, the territorial claims of adversaries, yet modest CBMs have been implemented in both regions.

Such important differences underscore the need for caution in extrapolating general conclusions regarding the preconditions for confidence-building from one historical case. The European experience in confidence-building nevertheless may hold a number of general lessons for other regions of conflict.

First, confidence-building must be adapted to the unique cultural, historical, political, and economic conditions of different regions. Rather than merely transplant European tools to other regions, a pragmatic approach to regional confidence-building would begin by considering the roots of conflict and the potential sources of accommodation, and then craft a confidence-building strategy appropriate to the conflict.

In some instances, adaptation may require expanding conventional notions of confidence-building beyond the military realm. As noted above, non-Western perspectives often emphasize the need for a concept of confidence-building that encompasses a broader spectrum of security concerns. Where the threats to security are primarily military in nature, concrete technical tools are appropriate. Where conflicts have deep historical roots, cooperation in the military realm may not be feasible. In such instances, nonmilitary measures such as the joint exploitation of resources, cooperative development programs, and mutual efforts to stem environmental degradation might supplant first-generation military CBMs. In other cases, a package of tools that pairs military CBMs with political, economic, or environmental CBMs might be more suitable to local needs. The European experience indeed suggests that integrated approaches to confidence-building are most effective in strengthening the sources of accommodation. If military CBMs are implemented in isolation, animosity and mistrust may effectively short-circuit
the confidence-building process, largely neutralizing the positive influence of CBMs on perceptions of hostile intent.

Second, even when a confidence-building strategy has been finely tuned to the unique contextual characteristics of a particular regional conflict, the experience of Europe suggests that timing is critical. Unless conditions are ripe for confidence-building, even limited attempts at accommodation may end in failure.

A definitive assessment of the preconditions of CBMs will require a composite view of confidence-building, based on insights drawn not only from the European example but from the perspectives and experiences of non-European states as well. Descriptions and analyses of European CBMs abound; comparable systematic and comprehensive treatments of regional confidence-building would doubtless enhance our understanding of how, and under what circumstances, CBMs do or do not work.

What kinds of CBMs have been attempted in other parts of the world? With what results? What factors appear to have prompted conflicting parties to undertake cooperative steps? What political, economic, cultural, or other factors contributed to the success or failure of these efforts? Even if there are no universally applicable preconditions for confidence-building, a more complete understanding of CBM successes and failures around the world might yield new insights and lessons relevant to other non-European regions.

Third, the European experience underscores the need to consider the linkages between CBMs and other processes of conflict management when crafting confidence-building strategies. Confidence-building, in short, must be viewed not only in terms of traditional arms control objectives, but in relation to negotiation, mediation, and peacekeeping efforts. In many conflict-torn areas of the world, unripe conditions or the pressures of time may preclude traditional, negotiated approaches to confidence-building. In such instances, a third party may be necessary to jump-start the confidence-building process. The most obvious candidates to play the role of third party confidence builder would be the United Nations and other regional mediating organizations. The introduction, for example, of a peacekeeping regime into an area of conflict might be accompanied

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by CBMs. Alternatively, in regions where states are unable or unwilling to negotiate and implement CBMs of their own accord, peace-keeping itself might be considered an important form of confidence-building.11

Finally, if there is any broader lesson to be drawn from the European experience, it is the importance of modest expectations, patience, and an appreciation of small gains in trust. Skeptics of regional confidence-building efforts, in other words, would be wise to remember the shortcomings and setbacks that accompanied the evolution of European CBMs. The first negotiated CBMs were preceded by two decades of small tests of trust; further refinements unfolded over an additional two decades. Progress was achieved in increments, and the outcome was often criticized for failing to live up to original expectations. Viewed in this context, the first steps in regional confidence-building, faults and shortcomings notwithstanding, are a promising beginning. In the final analysis, the question is not whether CBMs are relevant and applicable to other regions, but how much adaptation and creativity will be required in order to meet the unique confidence-building needs of particular regions and conflicts.

### Table 3: Stages in East-West Confidence-building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Agreement (Year)</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Type of CBM/CBM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Forerunners</td>
<td>Hotline Agreement (1963)</td>
<td>Created direct communications link</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement to Reduce Risks of Nuclear War (1971)</td>
<td>Commitment to improving national safeguards against accidental or unauthorized launch</td>
<td>Declaratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Notification of accidental or unauthorized nuclear incident</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prenotification of missile launches beyond national territory</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incidents at Sea Agreement (1972)</td>
<td>Regulation of dangerous maneuvers</td>
<td>Rules-of-Conduct</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Restrictions on harassment</td>
<td>Rules-of-Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Signalling guidelines</td>
<td>Rules-of-Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prenotification of dangerous activities on the high seas</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultations between naval attaches</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Groundbreakers/Confidence-building Measures</td>
<td>Helsinki Final Act (1975)</td>
<td>Obligatory prenotification of maneuvers with 25,000+ troops, 21 days in advance</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory information exchange on notifiable military activities</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory invitations to send observers</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of annual calendars of military activities</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Verification through on-site inspections</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stockholm Agreement (1986)</td>
<td>Obligatory prenotification of maneuvers with 17,000+ troops or 5000 amphibious or airborne paratroopers</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory invitations to send observers</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of information on dangerous activities or incidents</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of Joint Military Commission</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement to Establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) (1987)</td>
<td>High-speed data links</td>
<td>Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (1989)</td>
<td>Regulation of dangerous military activities</td>
<td>Rules-of-Conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Guidelines for unintended entry into national territory</td>
<td>Rules-of-Conduct</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Exchange of information on dangerous activities or incidents</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Stages in East-West Confidence-building (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Agreement (Year)</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Type of CBM/CBM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence-and</td>
<td>Agreement on</td>
<td>Prenotification of strategic</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-building</td>
<td>Notification of</td>
<td>exercises 14 days in advance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Measures (cont.)</td>
<td>Strategic Exercises</td>
<td>through NRRC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultations on implementation</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Vienna Document</td>
<td>Annual exchange of information</td>
<td>Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence-and</td>
<td>(1990)</td>
<td>on military forces, major weapon</td>
<td>exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-building</td>
<td></td>
<td>deployments, and military budgets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Measures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultation mechanisms on unusual military activities</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Visits to air bases, military contacts</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<td>Obligatory prenotification of</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>certain military activities concerning 17,000+ troops or 5000 amphibious or airborne paratroopers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Obligatory invitations to observers for notifiable military activities</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Exchange of annual calendars</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<td>Verification through on-site inspections</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of communications network</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual implementation assessment meeting at Conflict Prevention Center</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CFE Treaty (1990)</td>
<td>Annual exchange of information on artillery, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective ceilings for groups of state parties for Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE)-battle tanks, artillery pieces, ACV's, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>State party ceilings for TLE</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Individual country ceilings for TLE</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective flank limitations for tanks, ACV's, and artillery</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Notification and exchange of information</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limit of 740 armored vehicle launched bridges in active units</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Constraints on equipment for paramilitary formations</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
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</table>
### Table 3: Stages in East-West Confidence-building (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Agreement (Year)</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Type of CBM/CBM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV  Confidence-and Security-building Measures (cont.)</td>
<td>CFE Treaty (1990)</td>
<td>Three phased reduction of equipment and personnel by means of destruction, recategorization or reclassification; subject to on-site inspection</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Verification and inspection to monitor holdings, reductions, and destruction of equipment</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Designated permanent storage sites for armaments and equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Commitment outside of treaty to limit land-based combat naval aircraft</td>
<td>Declaratory</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of a Joint Consultative Group</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agreement to move destroyed equipment east of Urals prior to treaty signature</td>
<td>Declaratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No restricted areas except for safety</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cameras, infra-red and synthetic aperture radars</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Document (1992)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Data available to all parties</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Constraints on the number of large and medium sized military exercises</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory prenotification of certain military activities involving 9,000+ troops or 250+ tanks</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory invitations to observers for notifiable military activities involving 13,000 troops, 800 tanks, or 3,500 amphibious or airborne paratroopers</td>
<td>Notification</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory annual exchange of detailed technical data on military forces, weapons, equipment, and personnel strength</td>
<td>Information exchange</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary invitations to observers for notifiable military activities within CBM Zone of Application</td>
<td>Access</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Verification by multinational inspection teams</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary aerial inspections</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Demonstration to all participating states of new types of major weapon systems</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Stages in East-West Confidence-building (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Agreement (Year)</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Type of CBM/CSBM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV Confidence-and Security-building Measures (cont.)</td>
<td>CFE (1A) Agreement 1992</td>
<td>Obligatory prenotification of any permanent increase in personnel strength (brigade/regiment ((1000+)), wing/air regiment ((500+)) or equivalent level, 42 days in advance</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory prenotification of any call up of army reserve personnel ((35,000+)) 42 days in advance</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Declared national ceilings for personnel strength of conventional armed forces</td>
<td>Constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange of annual calendars for strength of individual units at or above the level of brigade/regiment</td>
<td>Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inspections of CFE weapons</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obligatory access to information on personnel serving at inspection site</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consultative Commission composed of participating states for treaty verification</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary aerial inspections</td>
<td>Access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Confidence-building Measures between Pakistan and India

India and Pakistan have not yet arrived at a peaceful settlement of the grievances created at the time of British withdrawal and the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and 1948. The sharp differences over the founding principles of each state and over Kashmir have not softened through the years. The countries have gone to war twice over Kashmir and once over what is now Bangladesh. In 1986-87, and again in 1989-90, military exercises near the Rajasthan-Sindh border led to acute levels of tension.

The situation between India and Pakistan is not one of unrelenting hostility, however. Their wars have been fought with considerable restraint, civilian targets have been spared, casualties have been limited, and prisoners of war have been well treated. Moreover, both sides have successfully negotiated a number of agreements intended to limit tensions and avoid unwanted wars. Unlike the high-profile Helsinki confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other measures styled by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, many of the Indo-Pakistani measures have not been negotiated in intricate detail and have not been publicly released.

Most of the CBMs now in effect were prompted by the 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 wars and by periods of high tension associated with the military exercises conducted between 1986-1991. These flare-ups prompted a series of foreign secretary-level meetings to be held. These have produced a number of useful measures. Several of these and other agreed CBMs were prompted by superpower initiatives or by the encouragement of international organizations. Because, documentation on the negotiation and implementation of CBM agreements is scarce, the list that follows may well be incomplete.

Communication Measures

- A dedicated communication link (DCL), or "hotline," between the Pakistani and Indian director generals of military operations (DGMOs) was established in December 1971. Earlier that month, India and Pakistan fought a two-front war.

- In December 1990, following a period of heightened tension, it was agreed that both DGMOs would use the hotline on a weekly basis if only to exchange routine information. Many observers believe that during these periods in 1986-87 and the spring of 1990, important information was not being communicated over the hotline in a timely fashion. On the other hand, skirmishes and stand-offs have been diffused on a number of occasions by contact over the hotline.

- DGMOs are also in place between sector commanders along the western sectors of the line of control (LOC) that divides Kashmir. These links do not appear to be permanently "on-line" but can be activated quickly.

- The Neemrana Group, named after a fort in Rajasthan where the group's first meeting was held in 1991, provides a nongovernmental forum where academics and retired officials and military officers can discuss Indo-Pakistani relations and possible CBMs. Related efforts have been undertaken by the United States Information Service through WorldNet teleconferencing, and by Professor O. P. Shah of the University of Calcutta, who has convened the Indo-Pakistani Dialogues.

Notification Measures

- An Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises was completed in April 1991. Notification is apparently required for exercises involving ten thousand or more troops in specified locations. Troop maneuvers directed toward the international border are proscribed. Exercises at the corps level must be held forty-five kilometers away from the border. At the division level, exercises must be held twenty-five kilometers away from the border. No military activity is permitted within five kilometers of the border.

Transparency Measures

- When Pakistan undertook its 1989 military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin, Indian and other foreign military attaches were invited to observe, in order to confirm nonhostile intent.
• To defuse tensions arising from its spring 1990 exercises, India invited U.S. observers to monitor troop and equipment deployments as an assurance of nonhostile intent.

**Border Security Measures**

• The *Karachi Agreement* of 1949 established an eight-hundred-mile cease-fire line (CFL), obligated troops to keep a distance of five hundred yards from the line, and sought to freeze force levels around the CFL. After the 1965 and 1971 wars, the CFL was re-established, albeit with some changes. The goal of freezing force levels at the line was illusory.

• The 1960 *Indo-Pakistani Agreement on Border Disputes in the West* established "ground rules which would be operative on the West Pakistan-India border," and settled some outstanding border disputes in the Punjab sector.

• The Rann of Kutch on the Gujarat-Sindh border was the scene of early hostilities before the 1965 war. India and Pakistan had long disagreed over the demarcation of their border in the area. After the war, however, both sides agreed to refer the case to binding international arbitration in order to limit tensions and remove an irritant to relations. The result was the *Rann of Kutch Tribunal Award*. Unfortunately, there was no ruling on the demarcation of Sir Creek, a disputed area that remains a source of friction.

• At a time of elevated tensions in the spring of 1990, in order to demonstrate nonhostile intent, India chose not to deploy tanks across a major canal that closely parallels the Pakistani border.

• An *Agreement on the Violation of Airspace*, signed in April 1991, and ratified in August 1992, apparently stipulates that armed fixed-wing aircraft are not to fly within ten nautical miles of the international border. Armed rotary aircraft are not permitted within one nautical mile, and no aircraft of any kind may fly within one thousand meters of the border. There have been claims that the airspace agreement has been violated on a number of occasions, but both sides appear interested in maintaining the accord.

**Consultation Measures**

• The *Indo-Pakistani Joint Commission* was established in 1982 to facilitate discussion at the ministerial level and by sub-ministerial subcommittees dealing with a wide range of issues, including trade, tourism, technology, and communications. Meetings took place between 1982 and 1989.

• Since 1990, the Indo-Pakistani Joint Commission has been superseded by a series of *Foreign Secretary-Level Discussions*. These meetings have produced the prenotification agreement, the airspace agreement, and the bilateral chemical weapons declaration.

**Water Rights**

• The 1962 *Indus-Waters Treaty*, brokered by the World Bank, helped to resolve a severe resource distribution problem caused by the partition of India and Pakistan. Under the terms of the agreement, the two countries agreed to cooperate in the management and sharing of the rivers in the Indus basin, including regular data exchanges, routine consultation, arbitration of any disagreements, and assurances not to interfere with, or in any way change, the agreed distribution of water resources. The World Bank agreed to help administer and guarantee the installation of the water management infrastructure needed to make effective use of the rivers. Despite some minor disagreements, the river sharing arrangement has worked well and has survived several wars and periods of high tension.

**Declaratory Measures**

• The *Tashkent Declaration* of 1966, facilitated by the Soviet Union, formally concluded the 1965 war. It stipulated that “relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other.” Implementation has been limited.
The Simla Accord which followed the 1971 war, obliges both countries to renounce the use of force as a means of settling outstanding disputes. Both sides agreed to resolve their disputes in bilateral forums. The cease-fire line in Kashmir was upgraded to an LOC established on a series of maps initialed by local military commanders, with both sides pledging not to seek to alter or breach it through unilateral action. Aside from the LOC provisions, very little of the accord's letter or spirit has been implemented.

An Agreement on the Non-attack of Nuclear Facilities was signed by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1988. It was ratified in 1991 and implemented in January 1992. The agreement requires an annual exchange of lists detailing the location of all nuclear-related facilities in each country. The measure further pledges both sides not to attack listed facilities. When lists were exchanged in 1992, each side reportedly left off one enrichment facility.

A Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons was concluded in August 1992. Both countries agreed not to develop, produce, acquire, or use chemical weapons.
Sino-Indian Confidence-building Measures

In October and November 1962, India and China fought a two-front war along the eastern and western sector of their mountainous border. After pushing Indian forces back and occupying a large portion of disputed territory, China unilaterally called for a cease-fire and offered to withdraw its forces twenty kilometers from the line of control creating a demilitarized zone in the west. In the east the two countries were to respect a mutually acceptable "line of control" without a demilitarized zone. Both countries understood that these arrangements were not to prejudice a future settlement of the border dispute.

There was no improvement in bilateral relations, until the reestablishment of full diplomatic ties in 1976. Between the spring of 1986 and the spring of 1987, another territorial misunderstanding in the east, followed by large Indian military exercises in the same area, increased tension over a period of twelve to eighteen months.

Although relations between the two Asian giants have improved since former-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s December 1988 trip to China, the border question remains unresolved and a point of contention, limiting the process of rapprochement. Even in the absence of a formal settlement, however, both countries have been willing to negotiate confidence-building measures to avoid unwanted conflict and to provide the basis for increased cooperation.

In 1981, for example, China unilaterally allowed Indians access to pilgrimage sites in Tibet. Between 1981 and 1988 a series of eight official discussions of the border issues and Sino-Indian relations took place. Following the Rajiv Gandhi visit, an India-China Joint Working Group (JWG) on boundary issues was established. By August 1993, it had met six times.

The mandate of the JWG is to settle the border issue and to promote peace and tranquility along the frontier. Measures negotiated by the JWG so far include the following:

- Military-to-military meetings are to be held twice a year, in June and October, along both the eastern and western sectors of the border at Bum La Pass and Spanggur Gap.
- Military-to-military communication links are being installed at key points along both the eastern and western sectors of the border.
- An agreement has been reached on the establishment of dedicated communication links, or "hotlines," between military headquarters.
- Local commanders are encouraged to conduct meetings, as needed, using color-coded flags to initiate contact.
- Both sides have agreed that there should be mutual transparency on the location of military positions along the line of actual control.
- An agreement has been reached on the prior notification of military maneuvers and troop movements along the border.
- An agreement has been reached on the prevention of airspace violations.
- Exchanges between defense educational institutions and between strategic studies research institutes have been arranged.
- Exchanges between high-level defense officials have begun with then-Indian defense minister Sharad Pawar’s visit Beijing in July 1992.
- Another working group was established in 1988 to cover issues related to economic cooperation, trade, science, and technology.

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