JAPAN’S NEW
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT:
INSTITUTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND
IMPLICATIONS

Yuki Tatsumi and
Andrew L. Oros

Editors

March 2007
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... v
Preface .................................................................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ viii

**INTRODUCTION** .......................................................................................................... 1

**CHAPTER 1: JAPAN’S EVOLVING DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT** ......................... 9

**CHAPTER 2: SELF DEFENSE FORCES TODAY—BEYOND AN EXCLUSIVELY DEFENSE–ORIENTED POSTURE?** ........... 23

**CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES’ OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS** ........................................... 47

**CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED STATES AND “ALLIANCE” ROLE IN JAPAN’S NEW DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT** ................................................................. 73

**CHAPTER 5: FROM “DOUBLE TRACK” TO “CONVERGENCE”: JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND AN EMERGING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION** ................................................................. 99

**CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION** ........................................................................................ 117

Biographies ......................................................................................................................... 125
Board of Directors ............................................................................................................... 127
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTAP</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTTF</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIH</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRI</td>
<td>Defense Policy Review Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East Asian Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPR</td>
<td>Global Posture Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSS</td>
<td>Institute of National Strategic Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J)ASDF</td>
<td>(Japan) Air Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J)GSDF</td>
<td>(Japan) Ground Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J)MSDF</td>
<td>(Japan) Maritime Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint Staff Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(J)SDF</td>
<td>(Japan) Self-Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Staff Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRM</td>
<td>Mutual Reassurance Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Mid-term Defense Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guideline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Police Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraq Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN Operations in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC</td>
<td>Post-Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACO</td>
<td>Special Action Committee on Okinawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPJ</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDP</td>
<td>United Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dear Colleague,

I am pleased to present Japan’s New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications, co-edited by Yuki Tatsumi, Research Fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center, and Andrew L. Oros, Assistant Professor at Washington College. This book is a timely and useful set of essays about Japan's evolving security policies and capabilities. The course of Japanese defense and security policy is a key factor that will help determine the geopolitical environment in Asia, and as such, is of some considerable consequence for international peace and security. This volume is an important addition to the Stimson Center's work on Japan, US-Japan relations, and regional security issues in the East Asia region.

The book tracks the changes in Japanese thinking, doctrine and action that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. It explains in depth the internal debate over the dispatch of Japanese forces to international troublespots and in support of humanitarian emergencies, resulting in significant incremental changes in Japan's international role. The authors, scholars of Japanese politics and defense, and of the US-Japan alliance, examine the new facts from distinct perspectives that provide rich insight into the thinking within Japan's national security community. The authors also provide their own analysis about how Japan's defense policy is likely to fit into broader regional trends.

We are grateful to the Raytheon Company and the Toshiba International Foundation for their support of this project.

Sincerely,

Ellen Laipson
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project is a product of true team work among the contributors and advisors. The project directors would like to thank Ken Jimbo for being a valuable team member of the project. Our deep gratitude goes to the project advisors, Tomoyuki Kojima (Keio University), Mike M. Mochizuki (George Washington University), Akihiko Tanaka (Tokyo University), and Marybeth Peterson Ulrich (US Army War College), for their advice and guidance throughout the project period. Additionally, we would like to thank Takako Hikotani for her early input in this project, the Tokyo and Washington members of the CSIS-Embassy of Japan/Ministry of Foreign Affairs next generation leaders working group for their feedback as the project progressed, and many of the senior scholars of Japanese security policy and the US-Japan alliance for reading and providing constructive criticism on earlier drafts.

Finally, we would like to recognize the important contributions and support provided by Stimson Center staff. Jane Dorsey and Marvin Lim provided critical administrative support throughout the publication process. East Asia Program research interns Junko Kobayashi, Kristin Melia, John Odle, and Stephanie Wang all played important roles by providing research and editorial support.

Yuki Tatsumi, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Andrew L. Oros, Washington College
INTRODUCTION
AKIHIKO TANAKA

In their joint statement on 29 June 2006, US president George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi referred to the US–Japan alliance as “the US–Japan global alliance.” The statement signifies the degree to which the alliance has evolved since 1951. Shinzo Abe, Japan’s new prime minister, has already made it clear that he will place the US–Japan alliance at the core of his government’s policy. Initiated as a framework to ensure that Japan would not be under the influence of the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War, the alliance has broadened in scope, and security relations between the two countries has been deepened since then.

Indeed, both sides celebrate the status of today’s US–Japan alliance as the best that it ever has been. Some point to a close personal relationship that Prime Minister Koizumi forged with President Bush during his tenure. Others attribute the deepening of the relations to the breadth of the shared security interests between Tokyo and Washington that extend well beyond East Asia.

While it is tempting to credit Prime Minister Koizumi for his leadership in bringing about the current condition of the US–Japan alliance, it is important to recognize that the achievements under Koizumi’s watch follow on the incremental evolution that has been taking place within the Japanese security policy community since the end of the Cold War. In fact, one can argue that the deepening of the US–Japan alliance was possible thanks to the developments in Japanese security policy over the last 10–15 years.

A decade ago, in April 1996, President William J. Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced the two countries’ new vision for their bilateral alliance in a joint statement, entitled Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century. In order to actualize the vision to reaffirm the US–Japan alliance as a stabilizing force in the Asia–Pacific region, defense officials of the two governments engaged in intense bilateral efforts. These efforts

---


culminated in revisions to the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation, which were announced in September 1997. In addition, the two governments worked to consolidate US military facilities in Okinawa through the efforts in the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) so that the US military presence in Japan, particularly that in Okinawa, could be sustained. The agreed plan was announced in December 1996 as the SACO Final Report. Even earlier, in 1995, Japan decided to begin joint technological research on missile defense with the United States.

Of course, the developments in Japanese defense policy in the 1990s and the bilateral efforts to redefine the US–Japan alliance were closely linked with one another. *Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, a report issued in August 1994 by the Advisory Council on Defense Issues (the so-called Higuchi Commission) was among the first of Japan’s own efforts to articulate the anticipated changes in post-Cold War Japanese security policy. In essence, the report argued that Japan must play an active role in shaping a new order in the post-Cold War era. Although a strengthened US–Japan alliance was anticipated to be one of the core principles in Japan’s such efforts, the report advocated that Japan should embrace multinational security cooperation at the same time. Specifically, the report proposed that Japan should reorganize the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) so that they could better prepare for the activities to support multinational security cooperation.

When Japan revised its *National Defense Program Outline* (NDPO) in 1995, many of the Higuchi Commission’s recommendations were incorporated. First set forth in 1976, the NDPO serves both as a policy document for Japanese security policy, and as a planning document for Japanese defense policy. The 1995 NDPO clearly differentiates itself from the 1976 original by adding “contribution to a more stable international environment” to Japanese security policy goals. It also set itself apart from the 1976 original NDPO by indicating that the SDF would be utilized in Japan’s engagement in international peacekeeping operations and other overseas humanitarian relief activities. In the context of how Japan should reorganize its defense posture to realize its security

---


7 When the Japanese government revised it again in 2004, its English translation was changed to the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG).
policy goals, the 1995 NDPO proposed that Japan should continue its efforts to enhance its capability to defend itself both through strengthening its alliance with the United States and contributing to the stability of the international community. In this context, it added “response to large-scale disaster and other emergencies” and “contribution to a more stable international security environment” to the goals of Japanese defense policy.8

In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, a new cycle of efforts to further upgrade the US–Japan alliance and revise Japanese security policy began. Again, the two processes were closely related.

Determined not to repeat the humiliation of the 1990–91 Gulf War, Japan dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in December 2001 while combat was still ongoing in Afghanistan. In addition, after the US-led coalition force ended its initial military campaign in Iraq, despite a number of criticisms and concerns for the security situation in Iraq, the Japanese government decided to deploy the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) to Iraq for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ADSF) to Kuwait and Qatar for a transport mission.9 While the Japanese government announced the withdrawal of GSDF troops from Iraq on 20 June 2006, the transport operation by ASDF has expanded the areas of its operation and continues today.10

As Japan tried to engage in international efforts to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, it also moved to ensure that the Japanese government has appropriate tools to respond to emergencies that may directly affect Japanese security. By 2001, Japan had already established a legal framework that allowed Japan to (a) dispatch the SDF overseas for the purpose of participating in UN-led peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian relief efforts, and (b) mobilize the SDF to support US military operations in case of regional contingencies. Between June 2003 and June 2004, the Japanese government passed a total of seven new laws and revised three existing laws to reinforce the legal framework to mobilize the SDF in such circumstances. The Japanese government also updated administrative guidance in October 2003 to clarify the SDF’s authority in the time of an armed attack against Japan.


In tandem with these adjustments, the Japanese government once again embarked on revising its NDPO. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (more commonly known in the United States as the Araki Commission) played a key role in shaping the debate to this end. Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense Capability, published by the Commission on 4 October 2004, argued that Japanese security policy goals should be defined as (1) defending Japan and (2) improving the international security environment to reduce the chances of threats emerging. The report also argued that Japan should pursue an “integrative” defense strategy by developing its own defense capability, cooperating with the United States, and working within the broader international community. Furthermore, it identified missile defense, defense of remote islands, low-intensity conflict, counter-terrorism, and capacity-building for the international community as the areas on which Japan needs to focus.\(^1\)

The revised National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), announced on 10 December 2004, was heavily influenced by Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense Capability. The degree of importance that the NDPG attached to SDF participation in international operations was noteworthy: compared with the 1995 NDPO in which the SDF engagement in international activities was of secondary importance, the 2004 NDPO addresses it as a mission that has equal significance to defense of the homeland and maintenance of a strong US–Japan alliance. The Mid-Term Defense Program that was revised with the 2004 NDPG included a more detailed proposal for JSDF reorganization. The Japanese government’s decision to introduce a ballistic missile defense system in December 2003 was another indicator of its intention to enhance its institutional capability to defend itself. Taken together, these developments all point to a Japan that is willing to play a more active role both within the context of the US–Japan alliance and the international community.

Parallel to these developments within Japan, the United States and Japan launched the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), a bilateral effort to reposition the US–Japan alliance as a global alliance beyond the Asia–Pacific region, in December 2002. After a negotiation of over two years, the two sides agreed on the common strategic objectives for the US–Japan alliance, which were announced in the joint statement at the conclusion of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting on 19 February 2005. The two governments’ follow-up discussions on updating the existing US–Japan alliance culminated in a joint document, US–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, that was announced at the SCC meeting on 29

---

October 2005. What was laid out there was essentially a blueprint for the US–Japan alliance—an alliance in which the United States and Japan play complementary roles in a wide range of operations, both military (air defense, ballistic missile defense) and non-military (search and rescue, humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and peacekeeping). As a part of the bilateral efforts to transform the modality of the alliance, Tokyo and Washington also agreed on the implementation of a plan to relocate US forces in Japan, which was announced as a SCC document, United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, on 1 May 2006.

Despite the generally anti-military and pacifist sentiment in Japan, the public’s confidence in the SDF has increased steadily. Recent opinion polls indicate that the SDF enjoys very high “trust” levels among the public, much higher than the central government, local government, the parliament, and political parties. Based on such confidence in the SDF, it was no accident that the law to upgrade the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense passed the Diet on 15 December 2006, with the support not just of the ruling parties but also the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the biggest opposition party in Japan. On 8 January 2007, the JDA became the Ministry of Defense (MOD), achieving a full-ministerial position in the Japanese government.

What do these changes in the last 10–15 years in Japanese security policy apparatus amount to? Are we witnessing an emergence of a “new defense establishment” in Japan that is fundamentally different from what it used to be? If not, does the accumulation of the incremental changes in the last decade and a half still amount to significant changes in Japanese security and defense policy? These are the questions that this volume of collective work attempts to answer.

Japan’s “defense establishment” that this volume considers essentially refers to two elements: civilian and military. Civilian institutions primarily consist of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)/Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and relevant Cabinet Offices. Together, these agencies and offices set priorities for Japanese security policy, and manage Japan’s external security relations including the alliance with the United States, and allocate

---


resources to support its security policy goals. In recent years, as the activities by the SDF extend beyond Japanese borders and the alliance relationship deepens, there have been changes in the dynamics among these agencies. Chapter One by Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi attempts to capture the recent developments that affect these civilian institutions, and how they have influenced the dynamics among them.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are the military component of Japan’s defense establishment. The SDF is the core organization that implements Japanese defense policy in support of Japan’s overarching security policy goals. SDF activities have long been restricted to within Japanese borders under the principle of maintaining an exclusive self-defense oriented defense posture, which was derived from the prohibition of the use of force “as a means to settle international disputes” enshrined in Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. However, as the pressure mounts on Japan to make a more visible contribution to international efforts in peace and security after the 1990–91 Gulf War, the scope of its activities has been expanded. In two separate chapters, Yuki Tatsumi analyzes the recent efforts to build up SDF capabilities to meet its changing expectations (Chapter Two), and the evolution in the legal and political frameworks that has allowed SDF participation in these efforts (Chapter Three).

The changes in Japan’s defense establishment will certainly impact Japan’s relations with the United States, its only treaty ally. But can one also argue that the impulse among Japanese policymakers to maintain the US–Japan alliance serves as one of the factors that influence changes in Japan’s defense establishment? In Chapter Four, Andrew Oros examines the presence of the US–Japan alliance as one of the shaping forces in Japanese security policy, and how that also affects the changes in Japan’s defense establishment.

How the changes in Japan’s defense establishment will be reflected in Japan’s attitude toward its security relations outside the US–Japan alliance is another issue that deserves closer examination. In Chapter Five, Ken Jimbo analyzes the recent emergence of multinational security cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region, and assesses how Japan’s view of the US’s shifting priorities in its security strategy affects its efforts to address its own concerns for transnational threats such as terrorism, and how they are reflected in its security policy toward Asia.

Despite all the incremental changes in recent years, Japan’s defense establishment still faces a formidable challenge in order to proactively shape its security policy priorities and to implement them. The volume concludes with a
chapter by Mike Mochizuki, with whom I served as one of the advisors for this volume, and Yuki Tatsumi that examines such challenges, and contemplates what Japan’s defense establishment needs to do to overcome them.

This volume is the product of intensive efforts by three up-and-coming experts on Japanese security policy to capture the rapid changes that we have seen in Japanese security policy since 1991. By closely examining different components that make up Japan’s defense establishment and changes that have occurred within them, the contributors have tried to set out what these changes mean to the Japanese defense establishment. In the wake of a nuclear test by North Korea, the debate over the future directions of Japanese security policy has intensified. The issues presented in this volume continue to pose challenges to policymakers in Tokyo as well as Washington, DC and elsewhere in the world. It is my hope that this volume will provide a useful window through which those who are interested in Japanese security policy can learn about the recent changes in Japan’s defense establishment, the challenges that the establishment faces, and the implications of such changes and the challenges they pose for the US–Japan alliance as well as Japan’s neighbors in the region.
Not too long ago the idea of composing a volume on Japan’s defense establishment, putting aside the question of “newness”, would have raised eyebrows. It was not surprising to hear even from those knowledgeable about Japan, “but Japan doesn’t have a military.” Even as recently as ten years ago, many Japanese—including those who are involved in security policymaking in Japan—shied away from openly discussing the subject of Japan’s national defense. Japanese universities, research institutions and charitable foundations also were reluctant to conduct analytical studies of Japan’s evolving defense needs, defense institutions, and defense strategy.

Today the situation has changed greatly. In the last several years, it has become quite common in Washington, in Tokyo, or elsewhere to see uniformed members of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) participating actively in discussions of Japan’s defense policy. It has also become commonplace to hear Japanese civilian bureaucrats, businessmen, academics and researchers opine about the necessary moves Japan must take in its security policy.

It is not just the visibility that has changed in recent years. Institutions that work toward the defense of Japan have evolved substantially over time, particularly in recent years. The goal of this volume is to provide in one slim volume a broad introduction to Japan’s defense establishment today, as it stands just after the historic creation of a Ministry of Defense, and to introduce a perspective through which one can understand the nature of the many changes that have taken place. Thus, this chapter aims to define “Japan’s defense establishment,” to provide an overview of how it has evolved and what has been driving the changes, and to examine some of the most recent developments in Japan’s defense establishment.

**Defining “Japan’s Defense Establishment”**

A country’s national security policy often extends beyond addressing traditional military security concerns in response to evolving threats. Such an evolution in the definition of the term “national security” is often reflected by which agencies are included in the country’s national security community. In the United States, for example, it goes well beyond a small group of agencies that deal with
conventional security threats such as the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of State (DOS), the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services. In the post-9/11 era in which everything from food safety, transportation safety and border security are considered critical to the country’s national security, the national security community in the United States now includes the agencies that have primary responsibilities to address non-conventional security threats such as the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and so on.

Japan is no different from the United States on the shifting definition of the concept of national security. What is unique about Japan is the process of its evolution. In contrast to the United States, where the term “national security” or “security” was first narrowly defined in terms of military security and was broadened later, the constitutional restriction on Japan’s military might have propelled Japan to first explore a broader concept for the term “anzen hosho” (security). Throughout most of the Cold War period, Japan’s external policy was anchored by the notion “keizai anzen hosho” (economic security). It was Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira that first put forward the term “sogo-teki anzen hosho” (comprehensive security). Furthermore, Japan put forward the notion of “ningen no anzen hosho” (human security) in the 1990s. In fact, it was not until very recently that the term “security” began to be used in the context of conventional military security. Furthermore, for most of the post-World War II years in Japan, the term security tended to be used in the context of public safety. In that vein, the National Policy Agency (NPA)—an agency that essentially controls all of the local police departments as well as has the primary jurisdiction over other national security issues such as counter-terrorism—played a significant role in Japanese security policy.

However, the change in the security environment examined below made Japanese—elite and public alike—aware of the importance of Japan having a sound military security policy that not only defends Japan from direct threats but also indirectly protects Japan from destabilizing forces in the world by actively contributing to the global security environment. The capabilities and evolution of the institutions that support Japan’s military security policy is the subject of this volume.

In this volume, therefore, “Japan’s defense establishment” is defined as the community of government institutions that are directly involved in shaping and executing Japanese military security policy. Japan’s defense establishment has two components: civilian and military. Civilian institutions consist of the Internal Bureau (IB) of the MOD, MOFA, and relevant Cabinet Offices, primarily the Office of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for National Security and Crisis Management and its previous reincarnations. The SDF comprises the military component of Japan’s defense establishment.

TOWARD A MORE “NORMAL” DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT?

In the security realm, Japan often has been seen from abroad as “abnormal” because it relies on another great power for its military security, it eschews offensive weapons it has the technological and economic capability to produce, and it refrains from using what military power it does have to compel states to follow its lead. Japan has also been seen as abnormal because it has not adequately come to terms with its militarist past—in sharp contrast to the model reformed state, postwar Germany. Japan’s “Self-Defense Forces,” its “peace constitution,” its lack of representation as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council primarily due to the absence of fundamental reconciliation with its neighbors in East Asia all strike many as examples of “abnormal” Japan.

Many Japanese also see their state as abnormal. For half a century prominent Japanese politicians, industrial leaders, intellectuals, and average citizens have decried Japan’s status as a “junior partner”, “little brother”, or “semi-sovereign state”. A political movement was sparked in the 1990s by the published work of a prominent Japanese politician, Ichiro Ozawa, calling literally for Japan to become a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni). The belief that Japan provided only “checkbook diplomacy” in response to the 1990–91 Gulf War haunts many Japanese, especially conservatives and policy elites, and motivated different actions in Japan’s response to the 2003 Iraq invasion.

Some in Japan—and abroad—believe that the United States is an example of a “normal” nation, and seek to elevate the military aspects of Japan’s security practices to approximate Japan’s position in other international realms such as

---


17 There is no unified definition of what makes a country “normal”. Here, the notion “normal country” can be defined as a country that does not hesitate to resort to its military force to exert its influence externally.
economic and technological prowess, a theme developed in chapter four of this volume. In the years immediately following Japan’s defeat in World War II, many others held a greatly different view—that a state that employed its military as a primary instrument for conducting foreign policy was not just abnormal, but dangerous. The tremendous damage to Japan—physically and psychologically—of World War II drove home this lesson to many. Disagreement over the appropriate role for Japan’s military both at home and abroad instigated an exhaustive political debate in early postwar Japan, and the debates continue to this day.  

Military security policy in Japan in recent years has clearly undergone a degree of “normalization” at home, beyond what long had been considered the scope of acceptable practice. In the twenty-first century, Japan’s new Ministry of Defense and its military forces (the SDF) are accepted as fully legitimate actors, often called on to play support roles at home and abroad; military strategy is the subject of scores of articles every month in Japan’s major opinion journals, news weeklies, and newspaper op-ed pages; and Japan’s broader security practices—from its attitude toward its constitution and defense cooperation with the United States to industrial policy over defense production and outer space use—recently have moved beyond the stale dogma that posed significant restrictions on such activities in the half century after Japan’s defeat in World War II.

Today, Japan has one of the largest military budgets in the world, and possesses military capability which, by many measures, ranks among the top few states in the world. Many observers of Japanese security practices have also noted a series of shifts in Japanese policy in the past decade, most dramatically the contrast between a hamstrung Diet (Japan’s parliament) unable to dispatch troops for the 1991 Iraq War to SDF participation in the coalition led by the United States in the 2003 Iraq War, albeit still in a non-combat and

18 In order to analyze the likely direction and ultimate nature of Japanese security policy today, it is not sufficient to look at changes only in the past decade. Instead, one must consider how Japan has responded to previous changes in its international environment. Contestation over the content, and later the contours, of Japan’s security policies has been an enduring facet of postwar Japan, experiencing ebbs and flows in line with substantial changes in Japan’s domestic and international environment. Oros, Andrew. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (forthcoming, 2007) proposes a broader framework for understanding Japanese security conceptually.

19 The domestic market for defense-related spending is second in the world only to the United States. In 2004 Japan spent US$42.4 billion on defense, ranking it as the fourth largest spender in the world. Japan’s defense spending roughly equals that of France (US$46.2b) and the United Kingdom (US$47.4b), though it spends a higher proportion of its budget on military equipment, making its domestic defense market second only to the United States. See SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook [Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm. Various years].

20 Lind, Jennifer. “Pacifism, or Passing the Buck?,” International Security Vol. 29 No. 1 (Summer 2004), 92-121.
largely humanitarian role. The SDF now has been dispatched abroad to fourteen countries or areas since their first overseas deployment to Cambodia in 1992. The SDF also has expanded its defense cooperation and training with the United States military in other areas, reflected in the revised 1997 US–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and other areas of increased cooperation in response to the emergence of the global war on terrorism. At home, the extent of SDF activity in disaster relief and other domestic assistance is a striking contrast to the delay experienced in authorizing the SDF to assist in a devastating earthquake in the Kobe area in 1995.

Beyond the issue of deployment, the image of the SDF also has risen in the past decade, particularly in the last five years in the context of a deepening defense cooperative relationship with its US counterpart. The Transformation and Realignment: the US–Japan Alliance in the 21st Century, issued by US and the Japanese governments at the conclusion of the October 2005 US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, speaks to the increasingly important role that the SDF has as one of the pillars that support the US–Japan alliance.

Japan has also modified its security practices in a number of ways, large and small, to respond to the new global and regional security environment. Table 1.1 provides a partial list of some of the most significant changes to Japanese security practice since the Taepodong overflight stirred the Diet into action after August 1998—including passing so-called “emergency legislation” in the Diet, the formal study of constitutional revision in both houses of the Diet, the decisions to deploy the SDF abroad for combat support missions to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, and greater defense cooperation with the United States.

---

21 The count of fourteen, as of May 2005, consists of two “special measures deployments” (to the Indian Ocean and to Iraq), eight instances of International Peace Cooperation Activities (Cambodia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Golan Heights, twice to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq), and six instances of International Disaster Relief Activities (Honduras, Turkey, India, Iran, Thailand, and Indonesia). East Timor and Iraq are counted only once each, and the Indian Ocean as a single region, to reach a total of fourteen. The JDA itself lists a higher count of SDF deployments due to multiple “missions” within many of the above-mentioned cases—for example, ASDF activities based in Kuwait, GSDF activities based in Samawah, and MSDF activities in the Persian Gulf are counted as three instances (and areas) of overseas deployment despite all being coordinated as assistance to the US-led coalition in Iraq. Further information about these deployments is provided in Defense of Japan 2005 (Japan Defense Agency, 2005).

Table 1.1 Important Security Policy Decisions Made by Japan, 1998–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 98</td>
<td>Cabinet announces decisions to develop surveillance satellites (IGS) and pursue joint research on missile defense with the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 99</td>
<td>New legislation on “situations in areas surrounding Japan” passes Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 99</td>
<td>Security Council approves investigation into mid-air refueling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 00</td>
<td>Constitutional research commissions set up in both Houses of the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 01</td>
<td>The Anti-terror Special Measures Law passes Diet, and the MSDF vessels were dispatched to Indian Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 01</td>
<td>International Peacekeeping Operations Law was revised to allow new activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 02</td>
<td>Defense Agency Establishment and SDF laws revised to establish a “ready reserve” for SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 03</td>
<td>Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Law passes the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 03</td>
<td>Three measures on “armed attack situations” pass the Diet expanding the regional contingency area and cooperation with the U.S. beyond 1999 law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 03</td>
<td>Introduction of the Ballistic Missile Defense system announced by Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 04</td>
<td>Cabinet announces the Basic Plan to dispatch the GSDF troops to Iraq, and the ASDF troops to Kuwait and Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 04</td>
<td>Seven pieces of “contingency response measures” pass the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 05</td>
<td>Cabinet approves the National Defense Program Guideline and the FY05-09 Mid-Term Defense Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 05</td>
<td>Diet Constitutional Research Commissions issue final reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 06</td>
<td>SDF officially takes part in multilateral Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 06</td>
<td>Joint operational structure was officially introduced to the SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 07</td>
<td>Government decides to withdraw GSDF troops from Iraq, and to expand the ASDF transport operations in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Japan Defense Agency is elevated to the Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This brief overview of important changes is offered to supplement more detailed discussion of specific issue areas which appear in the following chapters of this volume; for example, as discussed further in Chapter Three, the Diet has amended the Self Defense Force Law over fifty times since 1989, compared to only once from its adoption in 1954 through the end of the Cold War. The events that have triggered such changes to Japanese security policy in the past eight years similarly are much too numerous to include on one list, or even to examine fully in one book chapter, but an overview of important recent drivers of change in Japanese security policy is outlined in the following section.

JAPAN’S NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

What has been driving changes in Japanese security and defense policy in the post-Cold War era? There is no single answer to this question. Shocks to past

---

23 Based on data provided at: [http://www.houko.com/00/FS_ON.HTM](http://www.houko.com/00/FS_ON.HTM).

24 In the past year alone, literally dozens of articles have offered different perspectives on this question, including by noted specialists Michael Green, Mike Mochizuki, Chris Preble, Kenneth Pyle, Richard Samuels. Two monographs published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also provide useful overviews.
Japanese security practices date to even before the end of the Cold War, and continue throughout the post-Cold War period. Lingering instability in East Asia contributes greatly to movement in Japanese security policy. A changing domestic legal and political environment certainly has played a significant formative role. Pressure from the United States has also played a defining role. As a background, this section examines briefly the changed international environment Japan has faced in recent years that has triggered changes in Japan’s defense establishment for the last fifteen years.

Security “shocks” are not new to Japan—in fact, the 1990s were littered with them. The 1990–91 Gulf War, a sarin gas attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, a Taepodong missile overflight from North Korea in 1998 and the incursion by “unidentified ships” from North Korea in 1999—all underscore the uncertain world Japan has faced since the end of the Cold War. More importantly, the Japanese public has perceived that threats have been increasing. This new series of security shocks to Japan has also made Japan—elite and general populace alike—aware of the inadequacy of the government’s capacity to address these security challenges. Such a sense of realization resulted in Japan’s renewed efforts to question the viability of Japan’s security policy, and its current military capabilities and posture. The Japanese government’s decision to revise the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1995 was the first concrete outcome of such efforts.

In the twenty-first century, Japan seems to face both a global and regional security environment that looks more uncertain than ever. Table 1.2 shows the major security shocks that pushed Japan to further consider its security practices in the past decade. Table 1.2 illustrates that Japan not only now faces an uncertain global security environment, but also faces serious security concerns in East Asia itself. Following shortly after the 1998 Taepodong missile launch by North Korea, a suspected North Korean spy ship was detected off the Noto Peninsula in the Sea of Japan in March 1999. The incident was followed in 2001 by another suspicious ship incursion into Japanese waters in southern Japan. Furthermore, a Chinese nuclear submarine was detected to have entered Japanese waters as recently as November 2004. Japan’s threat perception was also aggravated by the September 2002 North Korean revelation of its previous abductions of Japanese citizens from Japanese territory and Pyongyang’s behavior around its suspected nuclear programs. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in August 2004 (after a Japan–China soccer match) and in April 2005

---

(in response to numerous emotional issues related to past history and territorial disputes) as well as trade tensions and continuing barbs over each nations’ treatment of past history add to the growing sense of threat. Apart from such discrete events, China’s steady economic and military rise continues to concern Japanese security planners, and is now noted with rising concern in Japanese defense white papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 98</td>
<td>North Korea launches Taepodong missile over Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 99</td>
<td>Spy ship off the Noto Peninsula leads to Coast Guard intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 01</td>
<td>Terrorist attacks on the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 01</td>
<td>Suspicious boat intercepted by the Maritime Self-Defense Force off coast of Kyushu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 02</td>
<td>North Korea admits to past abductions of Japanese citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 03</td>
<td>North Korea withdraws from Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 03</td>
<td>US and UK forces initiate military operations in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 03</td>
<td>First round of “six-party talks” to solve North Korea nuclear issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 03</td>
<td>North Korea completes reprocessing of nuclear fuel rods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 03</td>
<td>Two Japanese diplomats shot to death in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 04</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia terrorist bombings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 04</td>
<td>Three Japanese taken hostage in Iraq, later released unharmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 04</td>
<td>Two Japanese journalists killed in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 04</td>
<td>Fiftieth anniversary of the JDA/SDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 04</td>
<td>Chinese nuclear submarine detected to have entered into Japanese waters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 05</td>
<td>Japanese ship attacked in Straits of Malacca, three crew abducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 05</td>
<td>Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 05</td>
<td>North Korea announces unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 06</td>
<td>North Korea conducts missile tests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 06</td>
<td>North Korea conducts nuclear test</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This leaves Japan in the position to have to address not only these security concerns in the region but also to contribute to the security efforts and initiatives of its primary ally, the United States—in particular, activities related to the global war against terrorism in the post-9/11 world. Once Japan chose to participate in these latter operations, subsequent shocks included the fatal shooting of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq, the kidnapping of three Japanese aid workers, and, later, two Japanese journalists. Fortunately and importantly, though, the SDF deployed to the Middle East has so far suffered no causalities.

These post-1999 developments in the global and regional security environments prompted Japan to further revise its security and defense policy priorities. The recent effort culminated first in the form of the report issued by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (better known as the Araki Commission) in
October 2004 and was followed by the Japanese government’s adoption of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).26

Developments in the global and regional security environments have also compelled Japan to take measures to enhance Tokyo’s alliance relationship with the United States. Japanese officials realized that the only way for Japan to ensure its own security in the post-Cold War security environment is to maintain a solid alliance relationship with the United States, its only treaty ally and the only country that is committed to defend Japan when it comes under an armed attack.

Responding to Changes: Institutional Evolution and Innovation

How has Japan’s defense establishment been adjusting to the changes in its security environment, and adapting its practice of its military security policy so far? Until five years ago, there was very little change in the dynamics within Japan’s defense establishment. For most of the post-World War II years, it had been hoped that the civilian institutions of the defense establishment—MOFA, JDA, and the Cabinet Office in charge of national security and crisis management—would work together to form Japanese national security strategy, set priorities for its security and defense policies, manage Japan’s external security relations including the alliance with the United States, and appropriate necessary resources for the SDF. The SDF had been expected to shape a defense strategy that supports the goals identified in the national security strategy and come up with a force build-up plan that is consistent with these policy goals.

In reality, however, for most of Japan’s post-World War II history, Japan’s defense establishment worked quite differently from the above expectation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)—North American Affairs Bureau, in particular—played the primary role in shaping Japanese security policy, and was the primary counterpart to the United States in managing the US–Japan alliance. This was because the focus of Japanese postwar security policy was anchored in maintaining the alliance relationship with the United States.

The Cabinet Office in charge of national security and crisis management, which would have been an ideal and logical office to take charge in shaping Japan’s national security priority, historically has played a mere coordinating role in the

26 Note that the terminology for this plan has changed from “Outline” to “Guideline”, though the basic function of the planning remains the same. Moreover, this should not be confused with the US–Japan Defense Guidelines, first passed in 1978 and later revised in 1997 (as discussed in Chapter Three).
process of security policymaking in Japan. Since its first establishment in 1986 with the name of Cabinet National Security Affairs (ないかく 安全 署 (naikaku anzenhosho shitsu) under the Nakasone cabinet, the office was filled with seconded officials from the National Police Agency (NPA), MOFA, and JDA, and intense inter-agency rivalry among them forced the Cabinet Office to play a mere coordinating role among these three powerful institutions. Due to MOFA’s predominant role in security policy and NPA’s leading role in the issues related to Japan’s internal security, the role of the JDA was limited to (1) ensuring that the SDF was prepared to repel limited-scale invasion attempts by foreign countries, and (2) addressing the grievances expressed by the local communities that host the SDF and US forces, and (3) keeping a “lid” on the activities by the SDF under the name of “maintaining civilian control”.

The SDF, as the military component of Japan’s defense establishment, would have been expected to give “teeth” to Japanese defense policy in support of Japan’s national security policy goals. But its activities were long restricted to within Japanese borders under the principle of maintaining an exclusive self-defense oriented defense posture derived from the prohibition of the use of force “as a means to settle international disputes” enshrined in Article Nine of the Japanese constitution. Therefore, it built up its forces based on the notion that Japan would only have a basic defense capability that would demonstrate just enough deterrent capability so as not to make the area around Japan into a power vacuum—the concept that came to be known as the Basic Defense Capability Concept (基本的 戦力 設立 (Kiban-teki Bouei-ryoku Kousou)).

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense establishment has begun to undergo a great deal of change. The pace of change seems to have accelerated in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. Drivers of change include shifting domestic political forces, new demands and challenges from important international actors such as the United States and China, and, more broadly, a changed international environment posing new threats—issues outlined briefly above and in greater detail in the following chapters of the volume.

At the policy level, Japan has twice embarked on a comprehensive revision of its security and defense policy in the past fifteen years, as the Japanese government’s adoption of the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) followed by the approval of the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) indicates. In addition, the Japanese government has begun to actively consider revision of some of its long-held principles in Japanese security policy. Such principles under re-consideration include Article Nine of the postwar constitution (in particular Japan’s self-imposed ban on the exercise of the right
of collective self-defense), the Basic Principles of National Defense (*kokubo no kihon honshin*), the Basic Defense Capability Concept, the three principles on arms exports, non-nuclear policy, and the peaceful use of outer space policy.

Moreover, institutional frameworks and practices within both civilian and military components of Japan’s defense establishment have been re-organized and re-oriented to reflect new missions and priorities. On the civilian side, MOFA has undergone several reorganization efforts in the past decade to allow a more integrated policy-making process within the ministry, in particular as part of broader government-wide administrative reform implemented in 2001. As noted above, the North American Bureau historically has been the key player in shaping Japanese security policy by managing Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States. A weak point of this practice, however, has been that the views on security policy issues presented by MOFA often are not part of a unified MOFA position. For instance, while the North American Affairs Bureau tends to take relatively more forward-leaning positions on the issue in Japanese security policy, other bureaus within MOFA such as the Treaties Bureau and the Asian Affairs Bureau often take a more cautious position. Disagreements among the major bureaus often delay the policy- and decision-making process within MOFA, which has placed the Japanese government in the mode of constantly reacting to external events rather than proactively putting Japan’s own agenda forward.

In order to improve the inter-bureau coordination and make the policymaking process more efficient, MOFA abolished the United Nations Bureau and replaced it with the Foreign Policy Bureau (*Sogo Gaikou Seisaku Kyoku*) in 1993. The Bureau’s Director-General (DG) was granted more seniority vis-à-vis other DG-level positions within MOFA so that he/she could muster greater bureaucratic prowess in the policy-making process. Also, the Security Policy Division within the Foreign Policy Bureau was granted the primary responsibility to address all security issues that are not bilateral in nature.

The JDA, now Ministry of Defense (MOD), also has begun to play a greater role in shaping Japanese security and defense policies, including the management of the US–Japan alliance. The trend is evident when one compares the JDA’s role in the first round of efforts to redefine the US–Japan alliance in the mid-1990s with that during the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) which took place from December 2002 to May 2006. While MOFA played a predominant role in the negotiation with the United States in the former, it was clear in the case of the DPRI that the JDA, particularly the IB, took the lead in the negotiation.

---

27 Green, Michael J. *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*. (Palgrave, New York, 2001), 35–75.
The elevation of the JDA’s profile in Japan’s defense establishment is intimately linked with Japan’s deepening alliance with the United States and the SDF’s increasing role both in ensuring Japan’s internal and external security. In the context of the US–Japan alliance, the JDA’s voices began to be heard more loudly as the nature of the alliance consultation between Tokyo and Washington evolves into a discussion that focuses on how US forces and the SDF can operate together more effectively in the defense of Japan, regional contingencies, and multinational activities beyond “the Far East”. In response to increasing pressure from the international community for Japan dispatching the SDF to participate in various multinational operations, the JDA, as a supervisory institution of the SDF, began to have greater input in the deliberation of whether Japan should dispatch the SDF for certain overseas missions. A series of corruption charges in acquisition and procurement offices also prompted the JDA to implement an extensive reorganization in the summer of 2005. Further reorganization was implemented when the JDA formally became a cabinet ministry and assumed the name of the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, which included the consolidation of acquisition and procurement offices. JDA’s elevation to the MOD, thereby achieving a bureaucratic status that is on par with MOFA, its arch-rival in the bureaucratic security policymaking process, will no doubt affect inter-agency dynamics, possibly fueling further rivalry between the MOD and MOFA.

Most importantly, the role to be played by the Cabinet in Japanese security policy is in the greatest flux at the time of this writing. When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe assumed office in September 2006, he put “enhancement of the function of the cabinet in national security affairs” as one of his policy priorities.²⁸ He showed his eagerness to lessen his dependence on bureaucrats by creating five new positions of Special Assistant for the Prime Minister, one of which is the Special Assistant for the Prime Minister for National Security Affairs. Abe also launched two advisory groups that would explore ways to strengthen the Cabinet’s leadership in the area of national security policy. One advisory group will explore the utility of an office that would function similarly to the US National Security Council (NSC), reporting directly to the prime minister. The other group will examine ways for the cabinet to enhance its capacity to gather and analyze intelligence that would help the Prime Minister make timely decisions in time of crisis. Both advisory groups are expected to submit their recommendations to Prime Minister Abe in February 2007. Should the recommendations of the advisory groups be implemented and a Japanese version of a US-style National Security Council and some form of an

²⁸ Policy Speech by Shinzo Abe to the 165th Session of the Diet. 29 September 2006.  
intelligence organization that reports directly to the prime minister be created, they will bring additional institutional changes to Japan’s defense establishment.

The SDF has also begun an earnest effort to transform itself to better adapt to the changes both in the security environment and the mission that they are now expected to fulfill. The JDA’s decision to transition the SDF into a joint operational system was one of the highlights of these efforts. With this decision, the Joint Staff Council—which had functioned merely as the coordinator among the Air, Ground and Maritime Staff Offices with no real authority—was replaced with the Joint Staff Office. The chairman of the Joint Staff Council now holds authority to make decisions on all issues related to SDF operations.29

**CONCLUSION**

In the last fifteen years, Japan’s defense establishment has acquired a new face. Indeed, what we see today in Japan’s defense policy community is an accumulation of fifteen years of struggle to respond to shifting security inputs both domestically and from abroad. While these developments remain intriguing, they are still within the realm of the incremental changes that have been happening in Japan.

Still, the efforts in the last fifteen years have resulted in a substantive change in Japan’s existing defense establishment. Thus, while it may not be fundamentally “new”, the Japanese defense establishment that we see today at minimum has a new face. But does the new face mean new functions? Does it result in changes in the way security matters are conceptualized, debated, and handled in the Japanese political system more broadly? As examined above, a great deal of uncertainty exists in the current and future roles of the civilian institutions of Japan’s defense establishment in this regard. But what about other elements in Japan’s defense establishment? The following chapters in this volume will attempt to answer this very question in relation to four areas of dynamic change in Japan’s defense establishment: the capabilities of the SDF, the political debate over—and actual dispatch of—the SDF going abroad, Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States, and Japan’s role in a broader security architecture for East Asia.

---

The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) originated in the National Police Reserve (Keisatsu Yobi-tai) that was established in 1950. After first being renamed as a Safety Force (Hoantai) in 1952, the SDF was officially inaugurated with its current name in 1954 when the Japanese Diet passed the legislation that established the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the SDF. Thus, the SDF celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2004, an occasion which coincided with a sweeping review of its central missions and capabilities.

Article Nine of the Japanese constitution prohibits Japan from possessing a military force. Thus, for most of the SDF’s five-decade-long history, the Japanese government took great pains in justifying how the SDF is constitutional and therefore a legitimate entity. The Japanese government argued that Japan, as a sovereign state, is entitled to exercise the right of self-defense (jieitai). The SDF, Japanese government officials suggested, existed for that very purpose—Japan’s own defense. Such a basic nature of the SDF was also legally enshrined: Article Three of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Law defined the SDF mission as “to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression in order to maintain Japan’s peace and security and, if necessary, to take charge of maintaining public order.” Such limitations greatly constrained the role of the SDF in Japan’s overall defense establishment.

In addition, a strong anti-military sentiment prevailed in postwar Japan. In fact, the Japanese government was so sensitive to its people’s anti-military sentiment that it went out of its way even to create special names to describe the SDF equipment. Using “special vehicle” (toku-sha) instead of tank, and “ordinary unit” (futsu-ka) instead of infantry, are a few examples of the Japanese government’s attempt in this regard. The SDF’s civilian support activities such

---


as search and rescue and other relief efforts in the aftermath of both manmade and natural disasters in Japan were publicized as if to impress upon the Japanese public that the SDF is an entirely different organization from the pre-World War II armed forces in Imperial Japan. However, SDF operations to defend the homeland (such as intercepting aerial/maritime incursions, as well as aerial/maritime surveillance and patrol) were largely kept out of the public eye. In short, the Japanese government had focused on demilitarizing and containing the SDF within Japan’s borders for the most of its history.

But pressure on Japan to change its practice of not allowing the SDF to operate beyond Japanese borders began to build outside Japan with the end of the Cold War. Overwhelming criticism against Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” that limited Japan’s contribution to financial and humanitarian aid at the time of the 1990–91 Gulf War prompted Japan to search for ways to make a more visible personnel contribution to international efforts to maintain peace and security. Japan’s dispatches of Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) minesweepers to the Persian Gulf on 26 April 1991 became the first of many overseas dispatches of the SDF that would follow in the next fifteen years.

Throughout the 1990s, the SDF participated in several UN-led peacekeeping operations and international humanitarian relief activities. Japan has also expanded its non-combat roles within the framework of the US–Japan alliance, particularly in the role it plays in regional contingencies. Finally, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, and a sense of urgency shared among the Japanese leadership regarding Japan having to “show the flag” and “put boots on the ground,” led the Japanese government to allow the SDF to participate in high-profile overseas non-combat operations by the multinational forces without an explicit mandate from the United Nations, and even before a cease-fire settlement.

Today, the SDF faces the expectation to play much wider roles. On one hand, while the December 2006 Bouei Sho Secchi Ho (The Law to Establish the Ministry of Defense) and the accompanying revisions of the SDF Law included international activities in the SDF’s “core mission” (hontai gyomu), the defense of Japan remains one of the SDF’s primary roles. On the other hand, the post-9/11 security environment may demand that the SDF assume additional roles beyond ongoing participation in a wide variety of multinational force operations as well as its ongoing efforts to deepen bilateral defense relations with the United States. The revision of the SDF Law to include “international activities” to SDF core mission, which took effect in January 2007 when the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was elevated to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), now provides a solid legal ground for such activities.
This chapter will analyze today’s SDF missions, and whether the current force build-up plan will provide the capabilities necessary to perform them. It starts by identifying SDF missions articulated in the 2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) and the October 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) document. Then, the current capability of the SDF is examined, followed by an analysis of whether the current force build-up plan is designed to help the SDF achieve the capabilities to fulfill the mission. The FY 2005–09 Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) and the Appendix of the 2004 NDPG will be primarily used for this assessment. The factors that constrain a more thorough discussion of the SDF missions and capabilities will be addressed before final observations are made regarding what these developments mean for the SDF.

**EVOLUTION OF SDF MISSIONS**

The primary mission for the SDF was defined as “to defend Japan from direct and indirect aggression and to maintain public order as appropriate.” Specifically, it meant that the SDF was expected to fulfill two missions: (1) to respond quickly to repel enemies in case of small or limited-scale attacks; and (2) to engage with enemies until the United States could come to its rescue if attacks were beyond the SDF’s ability to counter alone. But for most of its history, the SDF was expected not to go overseas. It was not until 1991 that Japan began to deploy the SDF overseas, and even then only to conduct non-combat missions.

With an expectation that Japan would have to rely on the United States to repel full-scale attacks against Japanese territory, it was long considered sufficient for the SDF to build up capabilities that exclusively focus on defending Japan from invasion attempts. Based on these assumptions, the required capability for each service of the SDF was set as follows:

- **Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF):** counter ground invasion attempts and defend Japan from other threats to its internal security;

---

33 The Japanese title of this document is *Bouei keikaku no taiko.* The Japanese government has translated it as the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in the past, but they gave this new translation along with its revision in December 2004. In this chapter, the term NDPO will be used to refer to the 1976 (original) and 1995 versions of this document, and the NDPG will be used in reference to the document that was revised in December 2004.

34 SDF Law, Article Three. [http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmidata/S29/S29HO165.html](http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmidata/S29/S29HO165.html). Note however, that with the enactment of the newly approved *Bouei Sho Secchi Ho* (The Law to Establish the Ministry of Defense), participation in international peacekeeping and other non-combat operations is now also considered SDF’s primary mission.

Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF): defeat invading enemies at sea; defend Japanese coastlines; clear mines; and patrol surrounding waters for any potential threats;

Air-Self-Defense Force (ASDF): support GSDF and MSDF operations from the air; provide air surveillance; transport forces; and intercept incoming enemy aircraft and missiles.36

With the end of the Cold War, however, the expectation for the SDF began to change. First, demands for Japan’s more “visible” (personnel) participation in UN-led multinational activities began to rise following the 1990–91 Gulf War. Second, Japan’s deepening defense cooperation with the United States, including in ballistic missile defense, began to push domestic debate on the SDF’s role in defending Japan in the post-Cold War security environment, particularly in East Asia. Third, a series of external events throughout the 1990s—Chinese missile exercises across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, North Korea’s Taepodong missile launch in 1998, incursion by a North Korean spy ship in Japanese territorial waters in 1999, to name a few—and the 9/11 terrorist attacks had the cumulative effect of heightening Japan’s sense of vulnerability, reminding it not only of conventional military threats facing the country but also a real possibility that the SDF may need to operate outside Japanese territory in case of regional emergencies. Finally, SDF participation in a number of non-combatant missions overseas throughout the 1990s considerably improved the image of the SDF operating overseas.

As a result, the Japanese government intensified its efforts to revise its defense policy, including the SDF’s future missions. Its efforts were twofold: promoting discussion within Japan (as reflected in the revision of the 2004 NDPG); and providing the SDF with a greater mandate within the framework of the US–Japan alliance (as seen in the October 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Document).

The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)

The Japanese government announced the revised NDPG on 10 December 2004. The 2004 NDPG defines the basic goals of Japanese defense policy to be (1) defense of Japan, and (2) improvement of the international security environment. It proposes that Japan would attempt to realize these goals by relying on three approaches—Japan’s own effort, alliance cooperation with the United States, and cooperation with the international community.37

36 Ibid.

The 2004 NDPG strongly argues that Japan should revise its force structure in a fundamental manner. It proposes that Japan should have a “multi-functional, flexible and effective force with high level of readiness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose capability, and is equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities comparable to global military-technological level (sic).” It points out that the probability of Japan being threatened by a full-scale invasion attempt is at its lowest ever, and therefore Japan should conduct “a sweeping review” of the existing SDF personnel and equipment allocated for this type of operation.

The 2004 NDPG defines the primary missions of the SDF as:

1. Responding to new threats;
2. Defending the homeland; and
3. Participating in international efforts to improve the security environment.

The emphasis on responses to “new threats and various situations” in the 2004 NDPG is particularly noteworthy. It identifies the following five categories as the mission areas in which the SDF should focus in its effort to reorient its capability and force structure:

1. Response to ballistic missiles;
2. Response to attacks by guerrillas and special forces;
3. Response to attempted invasions of offshore islands;
4. Surveillance and interception in airspace and territorial waters; and
5. Response to large-scale natural and manmade disasters.

In all of these areas, mobility, responsiveness, and timeliness are the key characteristics of the required capabilities. The 2004 NDPG also identified “basic principles”—enhancing joint operation capability, enhancing intelligence-gathering/communication capability, and maximizing the usage of advanced technologies—as the basis upon which the SDF should build its future capabilities. In this context, the 2004 NDPG encourages the SDF to reduce the conventional platforms that could be useful only in homeland defense and to

---

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
move forward a new conceptual approach that focuses more on flexibility, mobility and agility of the force.\textsuperscript{43}

**The October 2005 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Document**

As Japan revised its defense policy goals, it also embarked on an effort with the United States to revise its role within the US–Japan defense relationship.\textsuperscript{44} The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched by the US and Japanese governments in December 2002, became a venue for bilateral discussion to this end.

Common strategic objectives were announced at the SCC meeting in February 2005. Then on 29 October 2005, the US and Japanese governments announced a joint report *US–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future* (SCC Document) at the conclusion of the SCC meeting. In this document, the two governments laid out a concrete plan to enhance bilateral defense relations to better support the countries’ common strategic objectives.

The SCC Document reaffirms that US forces and the SDF should work together both in defense of Japan and efforts to improve the international security environment. The SCC Document also identified the missions in which US forces and the SDF can cooperate as follows:

- Air defense
- Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
- Counter-proliferation
- Maritime security activities (i.e. minesweeping, maritime interdiction, etc.)
- ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
- Humanitarian relief
- Reconstruction assistance
- Peacekeeping operations
- Critical infrastructure protection
- Counter-WMD attacks
- Logistical support
- Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO)

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Further discussion of the role of the alliance in the development of the SDF is offered in Chapter Four of this volume.
• Use of facilities and other resources.\textsuperscript{45}

While the SCC Document states that the list is not exhaustive, it certainly highlights the areas in which the Japanese and US governments are interested in prioritizing when they discuss the ways to deepen defense cooperation. It also indicates that the two governments are mindful of recent decisions by the Japanese government (including regarding BMD), the contents of the 2004 NDPG, and US defense policy laid out in the \textit{2006 Quadrennial Defense Review} (QDR). The SCC Document also reiterates that Japan would take the lead in providing for its own defense.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{SDF Missions at a Glance}

An examination of the 2004 NDPG and the October 2005 SCC Document makes it clear that the two main goals of Japanese defense policy today are: (1) to defend Japan from direct external security threats; and (2) to contribute to international efforts to maintain peace and security. In order to achieve these goals, there are three types of missions that the SDF is expected to perform—defense of Japan and its vicinity, alliance cooperation with the United States, and participation in broader international efforts for peace and security. Specific operations that are anticipated in each mission area can be seen in Table 2.1 below:


\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
Two important observations can be made from the information presented in Table 2.1. First, the mission areas that are identified in the NDPG as necessary for Japan’s efforts to face new threats actually also contribute to enhance the defense of Japan. For example, the NDPG lists ballistic missile defense as one

---

47 The author would like to thank Sugio Takahashi of the National Institute of Defense Studies for his permission to incorporate this chart from “Globalization of the Japan–US Alliance: From the Beginning of the Change and the Beginning of the End” (unpublished paper)
example of Japan’s response to “new and emerging threats”; the system ultimately will be used in an operation to defend Japanese territory against incoming ballistic missiles. Similarly, the NDPG includes responses to WMD disasters as efforts in addressing new threats. Of course, such a counter-WMD capability can be useful for Japan to participate in international WMD counter-proliferation operations. But one can also argue that such a capability is equally or more useful for Japan as it prepares itself for potential sabotage attempts and terrorist attacks that might use WMD agents against Japan. This suggests that the Japanese government recognizes the transnational nature of security challenges in the 21st century.

Second, many of Japan’s efforts to defend itself also help Japan to strengthen the US–Japan alliance. Table 2.1 demonstrates that the missions that are identified in the NDPG and the SCC Document often overlap: in many areas, Japan’s efforts to enhance its national defense capability are considered also as efforts to strengthen defense cooperation with the United States. For instance, by enhancing its capability to respond to invasion and/or sabotage attempts that use asymmetrical capabilities, Japan can also contribute to its efforts in strengthening alliance capabilities in counter-terrorism. Japan’s improvement of its capability to patrol the seas and airspace surrounding Japan can also contribute to increasing the alliance capability for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Similarly, Japan’s effort in buttressing its capability to contribute to multinational efforts for peace and security is largely derived from its efforts in homeland defense or in alliance cooperation. This reflects the policy set forth in the 2004 NDPG that identifies alliance cooperation as one of the means through which Japan should achieve its security policy goals.

Ultimately, the 2004 NDPG envisions the SDF as having “multi-functional, flexible, and effective…with high level of readiness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose capability” while upholding the principle that the primary mission of the SDF is national defense.\textsuperscript{48} Given the current security challenges that Japan faces, this makes sense. Today, the distinction between the capabilities required for homeland defense and for other missions have blurred considerably. For instance, the security threat posed by North Korea comes not only from its missiles (conventional military threats) but also from its capability to use asymmetrical threats against Japan (unconventional threats). Security concerns vis-à-vis China are based not only on rapid modernization of air force and navy platforms (conventional military capability) by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also its increasing capability in non-traditional security areas such as

\textsuperscript{48} National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005–, op. cit.
cyber-warfare.\textsuperscript{49} This requires the SDF to maintain the capability that not only provides sufficient conventional deterrence but that also offers the flexibility to utilize these platforms in non-traditional operations.

**CAN A NEW PLAN TRANSFORM THE SDF?**

When Japan officially inaugurated the SDF in 1954, it was predominantly a ground force—130,000 out of approximately 152,000 active personnel belonged to the GSDF in 1954.\textsuperscript{50} Since then, while continuing to be a predominantly ground force,\textsuperscript{51} the SDF has made great strides. Today, Japan has an annual defense budget of approximately US $45 billion (FY 2005), which is the second largest trailing only behind the United States.\textsuperscript{52} Its total manpower of approximately 240,000 personnel ranks approximately 24\textsuperscript{th} in the world and 11\textsuperscript{th} in Asia.\textsuperscript{53}

Looking at the inventory of both current and anticipated SDF hardware, the SDF compares very well with the world’s best equipped militaries in conventional sense. The GSDF owns an impressive number of heavy tanks and artillery for a small army of 160,000 personnel (currently, it has approximately 950 tanks and over 750 heavy artillery).\textsuperscript{54} By 2007, the MSDF will have the second largest Aegis inventory in the world only after the United States. Its submarine fleet is also one of the most modern among the world’s advanced navies. The ASDF also possess over 300 aircrafts, including 200 F-15s, 13 E-2Cs and four E-767s, and F-2s (advanced aircraft similar to the US F-16).\textsuperscript{55}

However, even this hardware often has been the subject of criticism by analysts for lack of operational utility. For instance, only less than one-third of the tanks owned by the SDF are third generation tanks (Type-90) which can effectively

\textsuperscript{49} For concerns about Chinese military capability, see, for example, US Department of Defense, Military Capability of the People’s Republic of China, February 2006. \texttt{http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%202006.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{51} Today, out of 240,000 personnel, approximately 160,000 belong to the Ground Self-Defense Force.

\textsuperscript{52} If one goes by a conventional notion that China’s actual defense spending is twice the size of the publicly announced figure, Japan ranks the third.


\textsuperscript{54} Ebata, \textit{op. cit.}, 235–40.

\textsuperscript{55} Lind, Jennifer. “Pacifism, or Passing the Buck?,” \textit{International Security} Vol. 29 No. 1 (Summer 2004), 97; Ebata, \textit{op. cit.}, 235-6.
fight in modern warfare. The remaining two-thirds—Type-74—are second
generation tanks with three-decade-old technology and shorter range arms, poor
precision in long-range firing, and not adapted for nighttime operations. Even
the combat survivability of the more advanced Type-90 tanks is questionable,
given its insufficient armor and lack of mobility in Japan due to its physical size.
ASDF aircraft have not even been painted in low-visibility color schemes to
make them less vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles.\(^\text{56}\) In short, despite its
impressive list of military hardware, even the actual capability for the SDF to
defend the homeland is sometimes questioned.

The current SDF capability to operate in areas outside Japan is an even more
serious question.\(^\text{57}\) Since the SDF was not expected to operate beyond Japanese
borders, it does not have a logistical system that can support its long-term
overseas deployment. This also makes the SDF participation in international
activities inefficient, as the troops often end up spending an equal amount of
time between moving to and from their assigned areas of operations and actually
conducting the assigned missions. Does the new SDF capability build-up plan
bring the SDF closer to be able to fulfill its missions more efficiently and
effectively? This section looks into this question.

\textit{Toward a Greater Mobility and Flexibility?—the 2004 National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the FY 2005-2009 Mid-Term Defense Program}

The 2004 NDPG envisions that the SDF develops multi-functional, mobile and
flexible capabilities so that the SDF can defend the homeland, cooperate
effectively with the United States, and participate in peacekeeping operations
and other international activities effectively. In this context, the Appendix of the
2004 NDPG demonstrates how the Japanese government’s vision for the future
SDF can be reflected in the SDF force structure (See Table 2.2):

\footnote{Ebata, \textit{op. cit.}, 245-257.}

\footnote{Ebata, \textit{op. cit.}, 288.}
Table 2.2
Comparison between the Anticipated SDF Force Structure in the 2004 NDPG and the 1995 NDPO Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>2004 NDPG</th>
<th>1995 NDPO</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Reserve</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>-5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>148,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>-3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>+8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core Units</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed during peacetime</td>
<td>8 Divisions 6 Brigades</td>
<td>8 Divisions 6 Brigades</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile operation units</td>
<td>1 Armored Division</td>
<td>1 Armored Division</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air guided missile units</td>
<td>8 groups</td>
<td>8 groups</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ربة</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Platform</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle tanks</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy artillery</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MSDF</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer units (mobile operations)</td>
<td>4 flotillas</td>
<td>4 flotillas</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer units (regional district units)</td>
<td>5 divisions</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>-3 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine units</td>
<td>4 divisions</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>-2 divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper units</td>
<td>1 flotillas</td>
<td>1 flotillas</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol aircrafts units</td>
<td>9 squadrons</td>
<td>13 squadrons</td>
<td>-4 squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main platform</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Approx. 50</td>
<td>Approx. -3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 150</td>
<td>Approx. 170</td>
<td>Approx. -20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Core Units</td>
<td>Aircraft control and warning units</td>
<td>8 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 early-warning squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>squadron (2 squadrons)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interceptor units</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Reconnaisance units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transport units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-air refuel/transport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ground-to-air missile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>Platforms</td>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 350*1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Aegis destroyers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air Patrol Control</td>
<td>7 groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surface-to-air guidance missile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 260 are fighters

In addition to the force structure goal set forth in its appendix, the 2004 NDPG emphasizes new elements in the force structure for each SDF service. The GSDF has consolidated its functional units such as airborne units, nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) protection units and special operation units under the single command of Central Readiness Force to improve its responsiveness to deployment requests. Further, the GSDF will give diversity to the force construct of its regional armies. For example, the troops stationed in Hokkaido will continue to have heavy artillery and tanks, while the troops stationed in the southern Japan will have equipment that allows greater mobility, such as smaller armored vehicles.58

The MSDF will transition to a fleet operation plan under which its vessels can be used more flexibly. The MSDF will reorganize its destroyer groups for mobile operations units so that they can be flexible enough to undertake peacetime surveillance as well as other missions including ballistic missile defense. The number of the MSDF fixed-wing surveillance aircrafts (currently the P-3Cs) will be reduced in the attempt to shift the operational focus away from anti-submarine warfare. Its submarine units will focus its surveillance on the East China Sea and maritime traffic route across the Sea of Japan.59

The ASDF will augment its long-range transportation capability by creating one squadron of mid-air refueling and transportation aircraft. It will also reduce the number of its combat aircraft, given that the growing demand for the transportation mission and the budgetary requirement for ballistic missile defense will severely constrain the resources available for expensive aircraft. The next-generation cargo aircraft that will replace the ASDF’s C-1s currently in service will have a longer flight range, augmenting ASDF’s transport capability. The ASDF also has consolidated fighter squadrons which were divided between interceptor units and support fighter units in the 1995 NDPD. It also holds the primary responsibility for operating Japanese BMD system.60

The FY05–09 MTDP, approved by the cabinet on 10 December 2004, along with the 2004 NDPG, further elaborates on how the Japanese government plans to equip the SDF to achieve the force posture goal set out in the 2004 NDPG for the next five years (Table 2.3).

59 Ibid., 101–103.

60 Ibid., 103–104.
Table 2.3: Acquisition Plan under the FY 2005–2009 Mid-Term Defense Program (in comparison to the FY 2000–2004 MTDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Platforms</th>
<th>FY00–04 MTDP</th>
<th>FY05–09 MTDP</th>
<th>+/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Tanks</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Artillery</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple rocket launcher</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat helicopters (AH-64D)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation helicopters (CH-47JA)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM (Hawk) upgrade</td>
<td>0.25 group</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-range surface-to-air guided missiles</td>
<td>1.25 group</td>
<td>8 batteries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Improvement of capability of Aegis system equipped</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vessels (Total tonnage)</td>
<td>15 (Approx. 86000 tons)</td>
<td>11 (Approx. 59000 tons)</td>
<td>-27,000 ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeping/transportation helicopters (MCH-101)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15 modernization</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>+14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next generation fighter</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next generation cargo aircraft</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport helicopters (CH-47J)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankers/transport aircraft (KC-767)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.3 illustrates that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is shifting resources away from acquiring Cold War-era platform and redirecting it to the force modernization. For instance, the GSDF is significantly reducing the acquisition of battle tanks and heavy artillery under the FY2005–2009 MTDP. The MSDF will continue to prioritize in enhancing its Aegis system and patrol capability, reflecting MSDF's increasing role in ballistic missile defense architecture, as
well as an increasing demand for the MSDF’s capability in humanitarian operations. For the ASDF, improvement of its Patriot system at the expense of reducing acquisition of F-2 stands out in the FY2005–2009 MTDP, demonstrating that acquisition of ballistic missile defense capability continues to be the top priority for the ASDF. The acquisition of next-generation cargo aircraft planned under the FY 2005–2009 MTDP supports the goal in the 2004 NDPG for the ASDF to augment its long-range transport capability.

In addition to the above acquisition plan, the FY 2005–2009 MTDP includes an important commitment that will have a lasting impact on the SDF operational structure—introduction of a joint operational structure for the JSDF. In April 2006, the Joint Staff Office (JSO) replaced the Joint Staff Council and took control of all SDF operations. This changed the status of the staff offices of each SDF service to be a force provider, which has resulted in some organizational changes. Namely, the operations divisions of each service have been absorbed into the JSO’s operations directorate (J-3); other divisions—policy and programs, education and training, and acquisition—remain in each service. With this change in the SDF structure, the status of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), which had been placed under the Joint Staff Council, has been upgraded to the central intelligence organization within the JDA, and its director reports directly to the Director-General of JDA. With the DIH becoming an organization separate from the Self-Defense Forces, the JSO no longer had its own intelligence apparatus. To fill this void, JSO Communication and Intelligence Directorate (J-6) was established. The JSO J-6 Directorate is expected to centrally collect and disseminate all the information and intelligence necessary for the SDF operations.61

The 2004 NDPG and FY 2005-2009 MTDP demonstrates the Japanese government’s will to change the SDF force posture and adapt its capability to the post-9/11 security environment. But questions remain whether the new plan outlined in these two documents indeed brings about the intended result.

For instance, the GSDF, despite its current plan of becoming a more agile force, still has an excess of heavy tanks and artillery. Reduction of both Typ-74 and T-90 tanks should be accelerated so that resources can be freed up to acquire smaller armored vehicles that can be used more flexibly. The MSDF and the ASDF respectively should reexamine whether indigenous developments of next-generation patrol helicopter and cargo aircraft are fiscally feasible. The ASDF should also reexamine the size of its fighter fleet it wants to maintain, provided there is an increasing need to enhance transport and air-to-air refueling capabilities. Most of all, in the spirit of promoting “jointness” among the three

61 Ibid., 124–126.
SDF services as well as minimizing unnecessary expenditure in the defense budget, Japan must look into efforts to identify potentially “joint” capabilities (i.e., transport and surveillance). In short, the 2004 NDPG and the FY 2005–2009 MTDP have stopped short of transforming the SDF.

**WHY DID THE SDF TRANSFORMATION FAIL?**

Why did Japan fail to transform the SDF? Some in the Japanese defense establishment pointed out that Japan’s commitment to the United States to introduce BMD and the anticipated budgetary impact, rather than a rational assessment of the future requirement for the JSDF, drove its consideration of the SDF capabilities. In other words, the rationalization of the SDF was driven by the need to free up resources to ensure that Japan can uphold its commitment of introducing BMD rather than the willingness to enable the SDF respond better to new security concerns by transforming it.\(^2\) Those who made this argument all pointed to the Japanese government’s December 2003 announcement to introduce the BMD system as evidence that supports their contention. The announcement, along with the expression of Japanese will to introduce the BMD, unveiled the Japanese government’s idea for the future SDF capability:

- **GSDF**: move away from the force structure that had primarily focused on anti-tank warfare; become more mobile; reduce tank and heavy artillery as appropriate.
- **MSDF**: shift focus away from anti-submarine warfare; become more responsive to new threats, including from ballistic missiles; reduce surface ships and fixed-wing surveillance and intercept aircrafts.
- **ASDF**: change its force structure from the current one that is primarily focused on air-to-air combat, including airspace incursion; become more responsive to new threats, including that of ballistic missiles.\(^3\)

This announcement came almost one year prior to the announcement of the 2004 NDPG. It even preceded the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report in October 2004, a report by the prime minister’s advisory group which set the tone for the 2004 NDPG. They argue that this suggests that the Japanese government determined the introduction of BMD first, then thought about how to realign the SDF to allow the acquisition of this big and expensive system.

---

\(^{2}\) The author interviewed a number of JDA civilian officials and SDF officers during her trips to Tokyo in December 2005 and March 2006. There was a near consensus on this point among those whom she interviewed.

Others disagreed. Some maintained that the particular security environment in Northeast Asia was the primary factor that prevented Japan from fundamentally transforming the SDF. They argued that while the rest of the world had moved into the post-9/11 world, legacies of the Cold War are still very present in this region. Even though the probability of invasion by a hostile nation is significantly lower than before, given the tension on the Korean Peninsula and potential for conflict across the Taiwan Strait, a risk of direct military attacks against Japan cannot be completely ruled out. For example, if a hostile nation decides to attack US military facilities in Japan in retaliation against US military operations, even though the target is US facilities, in reality it becomes an attack against Japan. If a hostile nation attempts to take over an island that is Japanese territory as a part of its military operations in a regional contingency, that also is a direct military attack against Japanese territory. Therefore, they argue, the SDF cannot make a complete shift in its operational focus away from defending Japanese territory. This means that the planners in the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF do not feel that they can go too far in refocusing SDF capability away from missions for homeland defense. For instance, the GSDF argues that, while it acutely feels the need to better respond to the requests for its overseas deployment for various international activities, it still has to be able to maintain enough conventional military capabilities and personnel so that it can retain its preparedness for domestic emergencies. The MSDF and ASDF, as well, argue that while they need to be able to contribute more to the US-Japan alliance, coalition and other international efforts, their primary focus remains repelling an invasion of Japan.

What is troublesome is that the series of efforts in 2004 was not the first time that Japan failed to bring its defense posture in line with its defense policy priorities. In fact, prior to 2004, there were two other occasions in which Japan failed to reexamine (a) what the SDF missions should be, and (b) whether the SDF is appropriately sized, organized and equipped for these missions. The first occasion was when Japan set the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1976, and the other was the NDPO revision in 1995. In the former, Japan failed to seize the opportunity that was provided by the change in US security strategy toward East Asia described in its introduction of the Guam Doctrine. On the second occasion, despite the recognition that a new post-Cold War security environment will present Japan with security challenges that would

64 Interview with a SDF officer, March 3, 2006.
65 Interview with a SDF officer, March 3, 2006.
be qualitatively different from the Cold War-era, Japan failed to transform its realization into changes in the SDF force posture. At both times, Japan’s decisions were constrained by the prevailing view of what was considered political and fiscally acceptable at the time, not on which capabilities the SDF really need to effectively perform its missions.68

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

Japan failed to take the opportunity to dramatically reorient the SDF force posture in its most recent attempt in 2004. Looking into the future, the JSDF continues to face difficult challenges as it transforms.

The most immediate as well as formidable short-term challenge is budgetary. After the Cold War, the scope of SDF activities has considerably expanded, despite no revision of its constitutional status or mission. As the list of operations that the SDF is expected to conduct grows, so does its acquisition and modernization needs. In addition to the expenses related to the introduction of BMD, the acquisition and modernization programs for each SDF service include:

- GSDF: acquisition of tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles, combat helicopters (AH-64D), and transport helicopters (CH-47JA);
- MSDF: acquisition of vessels (destroyers, submarines and others), next generation patrol aircraft, patrol helicopters, and minesweeping and transport helicopters; and
- ASDF: modernization of F-15s, acquisition of fighters (F-2), replacement of F-4 with new fighters, new transport aircrafts, transport helicopters (CH-47J), and air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767).69

Some analysts point out that Japan is one of the top defense spenders in the world.70 But their arguments overlook the fact that Japan spends almost 45% of its defense spending on salaries and benefits (Table 2.4).

---

68 Tanaka, Akihiko. Anzen Hosho (Security) (Yomiuri Shimbun-sha. 1997.)


70 For example, see Lind, op.cit.
Table 2.4  Japan’s defense budget FY 1996–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>Amount (¥ 100 million)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>% in GDP (%)</th>
<th>Personnel (%)</th>
<th>Acquisition (%)</th>
<th>R&amp;D (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>48,455</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>49,475</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>49,397</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>49,322</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>49,358</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>49,553</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49,560</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>49,530</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.993</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>49,030</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48,564</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48,139</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In fact, Table 2.4 shows a worrisome fiscal trend for future resources for the SDF. First, in the last decade, except for 1996, Japan’s defense budget has suffered from low growth. In particular, it should be noted that although Japan decided to introduce ballistic missile defense in December 2003, it has been actually cutting its defense spending since then. According to former JDA chief Taku Yamasaki, this downward trend in Japanese defense spending is likely to continue.71

Furthermore, acquisition has occupied less than 20% of this restricted budget. It is within this limit that the JSDF will need to pay for BMD-related equipment, next generation aircraft, helicopters and other hardware, as well as paying for the hardware that it had already committed to buy in the preceding MTDP. The proportion of the budget that is allocated to research and development (R&D) is even smaller—it has consistently hovered between two to three percent of the defense budget in the past ten years. It is within this budget that Japan pursues “indigenous development” of its hardware.

To make matters potentially even worse, recent developments in the US–Japan alliance suggest that there will be another factor that will strain an already limited budget even further—relocation costs for US forces. In 2006, the Japanese government agreed to share the total cost of approximately US $6 billion of the cost associated with the Marines’ relocation to Guam, of which US

$2.8 billion will be directly funded by the national budget.\textsuperscript{72} In addition, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless indicated during a press conference on 25 April 2006, that the total financial burden on the Japanese government associated with the realignment of the US forces in Japan would amount to approximately $20 billion.\textsuperscript{73} Since the realignment of US forces in Japan needs to be completed within the next five to six years, the relocation costs will have to be front-loaded. One SDF officer lamented that such a fiscal reality not only would slow down the SDF transformation process, but it also could result in deterioration of SDF capabilities.\textsuperscript{74} Although the JDA and the Ministry of Treasury reached an agreement in December 2006 to organize a budget for the cost of US force relocation separately from defense budget, the agreement came at the expense of JDA agreeing to revise the FY 2005–2009 MTDP.\textsuperscript{75}

Further, the lack of political guidance will continue to constrain effective and efficient SDF capability build-up. In particular, without meaningful progress in the debate on whether Japan can exercise the right of collective self-defense, discussion over these issues in Japanese defense policy cannot deepen. Since 1960, the Japanese government has taken a position that Japan possesses a right of collective self-defense, but the Japanese constitution does not allow Japan to exercise this right.\textsuperscript{76} This self-imposed ban on the right of collective self-defense has limited the scope of discussion on what types of missions that the SDF could engage in. For instance, the SDF can only be dispatched to non-combat areas because its deployed personnel are only allowed to use weapons when they are attacked with the exception of very limited circumstances. Japan’s ballistic missile defense system must remain autonomous from the US system, because integrating the two may be regarded as exercising the right of collective self-defense. In short, from the SDF’s participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations to Japan’s cooperation with the United States in ballistic missile defense system, anything that the SDF does has been subjected to the debate over whether a certain action by the SDF would be interpreted as exercising the right of collective self-defense. Despite Junichiro Koizumi’s statement shortly after he first became the prime minister in April 2001, the debate on Japan’s right of collective self-defense did not show much progress.

\textsuperscript{72} Asahi Shimbun, 24 April 2006.
\textsuperscript{73} Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 April 2006.
\textsuperscript{74} A comment by a SDF officer, in response to the author’s e-mail inquiry. 2 April 2006.
\textsuperscript{75} Nishi Nippon Shimbun, 26 April 2006; Nihon Keizai Shimbun 31 May 2006.
under his watch. Although Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expresses a strong interest in advancing this debate, how much progress can be realistically made remains unclear. But as the SDF is expected to perform missions beyond homeland defense, Japan’s inability to exercise the right of collective self-defense will increasingly handicap the SDF. In this way, one can question whether there really is a “new” defense establishment in Japan today, and even whether one is likely to emerge at all—barring a dramatic shift in the political environment in which Japan’s defense policy is formulated.

Without strategic guidance from political leadership, all three services of the SDF face triple burdens of (1) acquiring platforms to support BMD, (2) upgrading current platforms, and (3) enhancing capabilities in response to increasing security challenges. The 2004 NDPG did not provide planning guidance beyond making a general point that the SDF should become a “multi-functional, flexible and effective force with high level of readiness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose capability, and is equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities comparable to global military-technological level.”

A lack of political guidance also affects the process of developing future SDF force posture. Because of the differences in types of challenges each service faces, each service currently has separate visions for the future. For instance, the GSDF proposes that it needs to become a force that is capable of responding to new security challenges while maintaining the capability to assume homeland defense obligations, advocating a “qualitative” change that includes the improvement in its responsiveness, mobility, flexibility, and multi-functionality. The MSDF has a different set of priorities: as the US navy’s strategy undergoes considerable change parallel to US military transformation, (i.e., promotion of the sea-basing concept, networked forces, focus on littoral and riverline warfare), the MSDF is struggling to find operational and capability areas in which the MSDF can complement the US Navy. The ASDF faces the challenge of balancing increasing needs for its transport capability in international operations with the capabilities that are more closely related to defending Japanese airspace, such as BMD and air defense capabilities.

---


79 Ground Staff Office, Rikujou jieitai no kaikaku no houkou: Arata na rikujou jieitai no souzou (The Direction of the JGSDF’s Reform: Creation of a new JGSDF) (2005).
Without a unifying vision that can bring three services together, each SDF service has no choice but to proceed with its own modernization plan.

**CONCLUSION**

For most of its history, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) had built up its capabilities to fulfill homeland defense missions. After the end of the Cold War, the SDF began to search for its new identity, with new missions and capabilities.

The SDF today is an entity that is very different from what it was when it was established in 1954. What began with the SDF’s mission restricted to homeland defense has become an organization that commands state-of-the-art weapon platforms that maximizes today’s advanced technology with the expectation that it will be engaged in a variety of new missions: homeland defense; international peacekeeping; humanitarian support for the victims of large-scale disasters; and provision of support as a member of the international coalition against terror.

Today, the SDF is desperately trying to transform itself into a force that is mobile and capable of carrying out diverse missions. However, such changes have been taking place in the absence of a concrete strategy for how such development should take place. Still constrained by its limitations on the right of collective self-defense, Japan’s past efforts to build SDF capability have been more budget-driven than strategy or policy-driven. The continued ban on exercising the right of collective self-defense also has put the SDF in an impossible position of having to adapt itself to the twenty-first century security environment using the mid-twentieth century practices that preclude any political and strategic guidance from the civilian leadership. Such a situation benefits neither Japan’s own interests nor its alliance with the United States. The inability to make decisions over what kind of capability the SDF wants to have today can lead to a significant delay in proceeding with its transformation, which would lead to a gap between the SDF missions and its capability to conduct them. This indecisiveness also can lead to unwise investment in unnecessary platforms and equipment, thereby wasting already limited resources.

The outcome of the debate over Article Nine of the constitution, particularly the debate over Japan’s right of collective self-defense, will be critical in resolving the SDF’s present dilemma. Unless this dilemma can be resolved, the Japanese government will continue to spend more time justifying its decisions on the SDF rather than proactively deliberating the real issues that the SDF faces.
Japan’s quest to play a more visible role in international security affairs began in earnest after the 1990–91 Gulf War. Japan was severely criticized by the international community for its tardy response during the Gulf War, particularly its reluctance to send its people to support the multinational force operations. This humiliating experience has stayed in the memory of the Japanese leaders ever since, and has made “menimieru” (tangible) or “jinteki” (manpower) contribution their mantra when discussing Japan’s future role in the international community.

Political leaders have been compelled to utilize the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to make such a “jinteki” (manpower) contribution. Indeed, since Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF) minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, Japan began to send SDF personnel to overseas missions. As of August 2006, the SDF has participated in ten UN peacekeeping activities and eight international disaster relief operations. Today, SDF personnel are deployed across the globe, and the activities they engage in range from post-reconstruction assistance in Iraq, to cease-fire monitoring in Mozambique to disaster relief in Indonesia.

An increasing number of Japanese political leaders and government officials today argue that the domestic environment has grown more favorable toward a more active use of the SDF by the Japanese government. They argue that the Japanese people are more used to seeing the SDF operating overseas. They also contend that incidents such as the Taepodong launch by North Korea (1998), incursion of North Korean spy boats (1999), the 9/11 terrorist attacks (2001) and the incursion by Chinese submarines into Japanese territorial waters (2004) have made the public more sensitive to external threats, which in turn has helped

---

YUKI TATSUMI

---

Japan’s quest to play a more visible role in international security affairs began in earnest after the 1990–91 Gulf War. Japan was severely criticized by the international community for its tardy response during the Gulf War, particularly its reluctance to send its people to support the multinational force operations. This humiliating experience has stayed in the memory of the Japanese leaders ever since, and has made “menimieru” (tangible) or “jinteki” (manpower) contribution their mantra when discussing Japan’s future role in the international community.

Political leaders have been compelled to utilize the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to make such a “jinteki” (manpower) contribution. Indeed, since Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (MSDF) minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf after the Gulf War, Japan began to send SDF personnel to overseas missions. As of August 2006, the SDF has participated in ten UN peacekeeping activities and eight international disaster relief operations. Today, SDF personnel are deployed across the globe, and the activities they engage in range from post-reconstruction assistance in Iraq, to cease-fire monitoring in Mozambique to disaster relief in Indonesia.

An increasing number of Japanese political leaders and government officials today argue that the domestic environment has grown more favorable toward a more active use of the SDF by the Japanese government. They argue that the Japanese people are more used to seeing the SDF operating overseas. They also contend that incidents such as the Taepodong launch by North Korea (1998), incursion of North Korean spy boats (1999), the 9/11 terrorist attacks (2001) and the incursion by Chinese submarines into Japanese territorial waters (2004) have made the public more sensitive to external threats, which in turn has helped

---

create a politically permissible environment for the Japanese government to send the SDF overseas.

Is such an assertion true? Is the domestic environment really growing more permissive to the SDF playing a more visible role, particularly overseas? This chapter aims to challenge the proposition and argue that the environment in Japan is not necessarily growing more receptive to SDF playing a more visible role overseas. In order to do so, this chapter looks at two factors. The first is how the substance of debate in the Diet has changed during the same period. The second is how the Japanese Diet has debated to modify the legal framework to allow the SDF overseas dispatch since 1991. By examining these factors, this chapter attempts to illustrate whether the Japanese political environment has indeed grown more receptive to the SDF participating in overseas activities. This one important case provides a concrete basis upon which to judge the level of “newness” in Japan’s defense establishment today.

**EVOlUTION OF POLITICAL DEBATE OVER OVERSEAS DISPATCH OF THE SDF**

The Japanese government’s effort to allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)’s overseas deployment for its participation in international non-combat activities has been accompanied by a fierce political debate on the Diet floor. Except for the SDF deployment to provide international disaster relief, SDF overseas deployments became the subject of intense political debate between those who wanted to promote the SDF operations overseas and those who considered such deployments as violations of the spirit and wording of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution that prohibits Japan from even owning armed forces. Examining these political debates, three key issues were raised in all the major debates over the SDF overseas deployment in the past: (1) should the SDF be dispatched internationally; (2) what should be the conditions for the SDF’s overseas deployment; and (3) why should Japan deploy the SDF?

**Issue One: Should the SDF be dispatched internationally?**

Those in Japan who wanted to send the SDF in support of the multinational operations during the Gulf War had to overcome the opposition to the idea that the SDF can and should be dispatched overseas when it contributes to international peace and security. Throughout the Cold War, the Japanese government had taken the position that the SDF should not be dispatched overseas, even at the request of the United Nations (UN) or as a part of UN forces. Even Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, a bona fide hawk who bulldozed the revision of the US–Japan Security Treaty through the Diet in 1960, steadfastly maintained this position in his argument in the Diet debate. In fact,
his argument against the SDF’s overseas deployment was quite restrictive. He argued “no matter how closely peace and security of the Far East is related to that of Japan, it is simply not admissible for the SDF to go abroad and operate,” thereby ruling out the potential for the SDF to operate outside Japanese territory.81

The Suzuki cabinet (July 1980–November 1982) took the position that SDF participation in a UN force is permissible if it does not involve the use of force. It made a distinction between kaigai haken (overseas dispatch) from hahei (overseas troop deployment) and argued that the constitution allows the former because the SDF dispatch under this category “does not have the purpose of use of force.” Still, the Japanese government under the Suzuki cabinet argued, the SDF could not participate in such missions because the SDF Law did not provide legal grounds for the SDF to do so.82 This line of argument continued as the PKO Cooperation Law was debated in the Diet in 1992. Atsuo Kudo (Director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau) argued that the SDF’s participation in PKO would not be considered kaigai hahei (overseas troop deployment), because the missions to be taken by the SDF would not be regarded as the use of force.83

The 1990–91 Gulf War forced the Japanese government and public to face the issue of how the SDF should be used in the aftermath of the Cold War. When the Japanese Diet debated the dispatch of the SDF minesweepers in 1991, no consensus existed among political leaders over whether such a mission was permissible. Those who support the dispatch argued that the SDF can and should participate in international cooperation efforts. Ichiro Ozawa, one of the leading proponents of such an idea, often argued that while Japan’s unilateral use of force is prohibited by Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, Japan’s participation in international efforts to act against the countries that disturb international order should be treated as a separate issue.84 There are some, like former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, who were cautious about the SDF troops dispatched to directly participate in peacekeeping forces, but still thought the SDF can be sent abroad to provide logistical support for those activities.85

---


82 Suzuki cabinet’s statement to answer the question presented by Seiichi Inaba, 28 October 28 1980. Cited in Maeda and Iijima, eds. op. cit. 139–140.

83 Atsuo Kudo (Director, Cabinet Legislative Bureau) at the PKO Special Committee, House of Councillors, 28 April 1992. Cited in Maeda and Iijima, eds. op. cit. 141–142.


But as reflected in the comments made by Nobuaki Futami of the Komeito (Clean Government Party), there was still a significant number who considered the SDF dispatch abroad, even if it were as part of a UN peacekeeping force, as an action that would provoke suspicion among the Japanese public, as well as Japan’s neighbors.86

When the Diet debated passing the PKO Cooperation Bill in 1992, it was apparent that deep political divisions still remained over whether to allow the SDF to go overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. On the one hand, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) argued that Japan, as the world’s second largest economy, would have to play a greater political security role in the world.87 On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the United Social Democratic Party (USDP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) vehemently opposed the bill, arguing that such a bill would open the door for Japan to revert to pre-World War II militarism. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Komeito, although reluctant at first, came to support the bill after the LDP agreed to amend the bill to address their concern on the potential of use of force by the SDF during its participation in UN peacekeeping operations; and (2) the SDF’s participation in the missions that could lead to use of force by the SDF (i.e. cease-fire monitoring) would be prohibited.88

While the House of Representatives, in which the ruling LDP held the majority, voted to approve the bill in late 1991, the House of Councillors, controlled by the opposition centered around the SDPJ stonewalled and refused to put the bill to a vote for several months. But as Komeito and the DSP came around to support the bill after the LDP agreed to revise the bill to address their concern on the potential of use of force by the SDF during its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, the opposition lost the votes to reject the bill. Following a series of tactics tried by the SDPJ and the JCP, the bill was approved in the House of Councillors on 9 June 1992 and sent back to the House of Representatives for a final vote. As a last-ditch attempt to stop the bill from being brought to a vote on the plenary session of the House of Representatives, the SDPJ and USDP Diet members even turned in their letters of resignation to the speaker of the House of Representatives on the morning of the voting.89

---


Once it became clear that they could not block voting, the SDPJ and USDP boycotted the plenary session of the House of Representative on 15 June 1992, while the JCP used a “ox-walk strategy” to prolong voting.90

Bitter political fighting over the passage of the bill aside, the enactment of the 1992 PKO Cooperation Law carries a great deal of significance, because the law explicitly provided a legal foundation based on which the Japanese government could legally dispatch the SDF overseas for the first time. The law still symbolized an important political decision by the Japanese government that it is, in principle, legal for Japan to send the SDF overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.

Furthermore, through the deliberation of the bill, it became apparent that Japanese politicians, particularly those in the SDPJ, were still unable to grasp the reality that the end of the Cold War brought significant change to the international order, and that Japan would have to adjust to such a change. The measures taken by the SDPJ to block the bill were severely criticized by the Japanese business community as damaging the authority of the Diet.91 Even Asahi Shimbun, which put ultimate blame on the LDP for the handling of the bill, argued in one of its articles that immediately followed the enactment of the PKO Cooperation Law that “it is only because the world has become interdependent that it has become necessary, and possible, for Japan to earnestly consider participating in the UN peacekeeping operations.”92 The article also argued that while “an image of sensible national consensus” on Japan’s role in the post-Cold War era was about to come along, the emergence of such consensus was hindered by the anachronism that plagued both the ruling party as well as opposition parties.93

Issue Two: What should be the conditions for the SDF dispatch overseas?

As important as its enactment, the 1992 PKO Cooperation Law still left other major problems unsolved. In particular, the issue of appropriate conditions for the SDF participation in the UN peacekeeping operations remained controversial.


93 Ibid.
In order to pass the 1992 PKO Cooperation Law through the Diet, the Japanese government essentially argued that the SDF overseas dispatch is constitutional as long as such a dispatch does not involve the use of force. Such an argument was necessary for the Japanese government at that time not only to ensure that the law would not contradict Article Nine of its constitution, but also to alleviate the discomfort of the Komeito and the DSP regarding the risk of the SDF using force; their support was critical for the law’s passage in the Diet. The government’s efforts eventually resulted in establishing the PKO Five Principles as follows:

- Existence of a cease-fire agreement;
- Agreement of all the parties involved on Japan’s participation in the PKO in question;
- Neutrality of the PKO forces in place;
- Japan’s right to withdraw the SDF when these conditions are no longer met; and
- Minimum use of weapons.

In addition to these principles, the original PKO Cooperation Law “froze” the SDF participation in what it described as the “PKO core mission (hontai gyomu)—the activities such as cease-fire monitoring, redeployment of the military, stationing and patrolling of buffer zone, weapon inspection, collection of abandoned weapons, assistance in defining cease-fire line, and assistance in prisoner exchanges. Moreover, the SDF can only be dispatched to non-combat areas, as it only performs non-combat missions during deployment.

But the argument used by the Japanese government to justify the SDF dispatch overseas—it is constitutional as long as it does not involve the use of force—opened the door to the debate over the issues such as defining a ‘non-combat area’, defining the minimum use of weapons, the conditions under which use of weapons is considered possible, and determining who sets the conditions for when weapon use are met.

These issues became particularly controversial when the Japanese Diet debated the SDF dispatch in East Timor. Because of the political divisiveness of these issues, it took Japan almost two and a half years before the Japanese government finally decided to send the SDF ground troops to take part in the UN PKO mission in East Timor in February 2002. Due to the Japanese government’s concern for the security situation on the ground, political attention was directed at whether and to what extent SDF personnel were allowed to use weapons while on duty.

---

The 1992 PKO Cooperation Law originally stipulated that the SDF personnel could use weapons only to protect themselves, and restricted the types of weapons that the SDF personnel could carry to small arms. This raised a question over whether the standard for the use of weapons by the SDF personnel should be reviewed, so that they would be allowed to protect refugees or forces from other countries visiting the SDF compound. Further, this led to the debate over whether the ban on the SDP participation in PKO “core missions” should be lifted.

Prime Minister Koizumi led the debate over this issue. He argued that the PKO Cooperation Law should be revised with the aim of “expanding the scope of SDF activities for international peace and cooperation, and securing smooth implementation of such activities.” He also called for discontinuing “mythological debate” over the finest details of the condition under which the SDF personnel would be allowed to use weapons.

By this time, even those in the LDP who have been cautious about the SDF participation in peacekeeping operations such as Koichi Kato have called for a revision of the PKO Five Principles so that the standard of the SDF participation in the UN peacekeeping operations would be brought up in line with “international standards.” Komeito leader Takenori Kanzaki also hinted that his party would be open to discuss the necessary revision of the PKO Cooperation Law. Opposition leaders such as Yukio Hatoyama of the DPJ also expressed his view that “it is irrational that Japan can’t participate in the peacekeeping operation in East Timor because of legal restrictions.” As a result of the debate, Article Twenty-Four of the PKO Cooperation Law was revised in December 2001 to allow the SDF to use weapons to protect themselves as well as other SDF personnel and those who fall under their protection. The restriction on the SDF participation in PKO’s “core mission” was also lifted at this time.

---


98 Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the Special Committee on Terrorism, 11 October 2001.

99 Kyodo News, 16 September 1999.

100 Kyodo News, 4 December 2000.

However, these revisions in the SDF Law did not end the debate on these issues. In fact, the debate on the definition of non-combat area and the extent of weapon use allowed for deployed SDF personnel reemerged when Japan deliberated on its dispatch of the SDF in support of the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

In both cases, the Japanese government firmly insisted that the anticipated areas of operation for the SDF would be considered non-combat zones. However, the comments made by Prime Minister Koizumi during the Diet debate over the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq revealed that the distinction between “combat” and “non-combat” zones may no longer be tenable. What his comment revealed was that the concept of “non-combat area” does not necessarily mean “safe area” (i.e. there can be non-combat areas that are dangerous). Koizumi’s comment suggested that a simplistic argument that a “non-combat zone is safe” may be unrealistic.

The issue of the criteria for the use of force by the SDF personnel was raised during the debate over the SDF dispatch to Iraq. When asked whether Japan’s decision on the criteria for its personnel’s use of weapons will be affected by the agreement among the countries involved or the framework established by the UN, the Japanese government responded that the revision of standards for Japanese personnel weapon use would have to be done within the framework of the Constitution. While the Japanese government considered it a prerequisite that the suggested criteria for weapon use would not be considered as a use of force by the SDF, it also argued that the safety of the SDF personnel must not be compromised by overly restrictive criteria of weapon use.

In the end, the Iraq Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Special Measure Law followed the model of Article 24 of the PKO Cooperation Law and stipulated that SDF soldiers would be allowed to use weapons to “protect the lives and property of themselves, the SDF personnel that co-exist with them, and those who are under their management…within reasonable scope within the

---

102 For instance, Koizumi mentioned once that it “would not make sense if the SDF was not allowed to be dispatched to dangerous areas.” *Daily Yomiuri*, 25 October 2001.


Basic Plan.” The weapons that the SDF contingent was allowed to carry included light-armored vehicles, handguns, small guns, machine guns, anti-tank artillery and other weapons.

In both cases, the Japanese government succeeded in dispatching the SDF by enacting two separate pieces of special legislation. To be sure, these dispatches indicated that the Japanese political atmosphere definitely had become more amenable to the notion that Japan’s manpower contribution to the activities that affect global security often includes the dispatch of the SDF. These examples also demonstrated that Japan could send the SDF overseas even while the combat is still ongoing. Still, the debate that was carried out during the decision-making process showed that there was far less consensus on the issues such as the conditions under which the SDF should be dispatched. In fact, although Japan dispatched the SDF to the Indian Ocean under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and to Kuwait and Iraq under the Iraqi Reconstruction Humanitarian Assistance Law, the issue of weapon use by the SDF personnel remains unresolved today.

Issue Three: Why Should Japan Dispatch the SDF?

In 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu, in his attempt to argue for the SDF dispatch to support Operation Dessert Storm, argued that Japan must make a visible contribution to the efforts of the international community—*Japan will be isolated otherwise*. Almost exactly a decade later, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the wake of 9/11 made the case for Japan’s participation in the war on terror with the almost identically-worded statement: “Unless Japan takes responsible action in the international community against these acts of terrorism, we will be isolated from the international community (emphasis added by the author).”

This shows that despite the developments that brought about significant changes in the legal framework that dictates the terms of SDF overseas dispatch between 1991 and 2001, virtually no progress has been made in the debate over why Japan should dispatch the SDF for overseas operation. There can be several explanations for the lack of progress in the debate, but the biggest reason may be the way Japanese political leaders framed the past debates on SDF dispatches.

---

105 Iraq Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Special Measures Law, Article Seventeen. 


That is, from the SDF minesweepers dispatch to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq after 2001, Japanese political leaders framed the SDF dispatch to the overseas missions as a means of kokusai kouken (international contribution), not as a means that contributes to advancing Japan’s own national interests or to enhance Japan’s own security.

For instance, when the Japanese government approved the SDF dispatch to UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa issued a statement, characterizing the dispatch as “jinteki kouken” (personnel contribution). When Japan mulled over the option of the SDF dispatch to Mozambique to take part in UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lobbied for the dispatch as an opportunity to show Japan’s willingness to “contribute to the international community” even when Japanese national interest is not involved in the area to which it sends its troops. In some cases, the Japanese government tried and failed to send civilian police officers prior to dispatching the SDF officers to show Japan’s determination to “contribute” personnel to peacekeeping activities.

When Japanese political leaders discussed the specific cases of the SDF overseas dispatch, the focus of their discussion was not over why Japan should send the SDF to these missions. Instead, the debate primarily focused on the conditions of the countries and areas to which the SDF was proposed to be dispatched, and whether there was a possibility for the SDF to engage in use of force during the deployment. In particular, concerns for the SDF’s use of force have often led to the government’s micromanaging of the equipment that the SDF is allowed to carry. For example, when SDF troops were dispatched to Cambodia in 1992, they were only allowed to carry handguns and rifles by the government ordinance issued for the operation. In the case of the SDF dispatch to Zaire to provide the assistance for refugees from Rwanda, the Japanese government also got involved in determining the number of light machine guns that the SDF personnel could carry due to the concerns expressed by the SDPJ which was a part of the ruling coalition then.

111 “Peacekeepers to carry only rifles, handguns,” Daily Yomiuri, 4 August 1992.
Prime Minister Koizumi tried to break this pattern, framing the debate differently when he argued for the SDF dispatch to support reconstruction efforts in Iraq. When the US-led coalition force began its military action against Iraq in March, he expressed Japan’s support for the US decision “as a responsible member of international community, as well as based on our national interest.” He argued that Japan’s participation in reconstruction efforts in Iraq will be in Japan’s national interests. In this context, he repeatedly referred to the necessity for Japan’s “autonomous” (shutaiteki) or “proactive” (sekkyokuteki) responses as it deliberates on how to participate in international efforts to recover peace and stability in Iraq and its surrounding areas. He also discussed the importance of support the United States, Japan’s only ally, because doing so would be in Japan’s national interests.

When Koizumi’s cabinet submitted the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law, the purpose of the legislation was explained as legislation that would enable Japan to “contribute autonomously and proactively to international efforts to assist and promote Iraqi’s own efforts for the stabilization and improvement of their lives…” However, due to the nature of the questions that were submitted by lawmakers both from the ruling coalition as well as the opposition at the time of Diet deliberation, the debate again focused primarily on whether the SDF is expected to transport ammunition and weapons, whether the Japanese government can designate non-combat zones and whether Iraq is too dangerous to have a non-combat

---

113 Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 20 March 2003. 

114 Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 9 December 2003. 

115 Interview with Prime Minister Koizumi, 18 March 2003. 


117 Explanation of Submitting the Legislation by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda at the Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 24 June 2003. Cited in Maeda and Iijima, eds. op. cit. 316.


The debate over why Japan should dispatch the SDF did not deepen beyond Prime Minister Koizumi’s argument that (1) contributing to the international efforts to stabilize the Middle East is in Japan’s national interest, and (2) assisting the United States by dispatching the SDF for reconstruction efforts is in Japan’s national interest.

The above examination demonstrates that, after over a decade-long debate, little political consensus exists on the desirability of SDF overseas deployment, its condition, and its reason. While Japanese political leaders by and large agree that SDF deployment is a good way to tangibly demonstrate Japan’s willingness to play a role in international activities, strong differences remain on how much activities the SDF should be engaged in, and more importantly, why Japan should allow the SDF to participate in these activities to begin with.

How is such a low level of consensus reflected in the evolution of the legal framework that allows the SDF overseas dispatch? This issue will be tackled in the following section.

**EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN POST-COLD WAR JAPAN**

When examining how the legal framework for the SDF overseas deployment has evolved in the past, one has to first understand what the SDF was originally allowed to do when it was first inaugurated in 1954.

As described in Chapter Two, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) was officially launched in 1954 with the enactment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (SDF Law). At that time, the House of Councillors (Upper House) passed the resolution that expressed their determination not to allow the SDF to expand its activities beyond Japanese borders. The resolution reads:

> At the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces, given the provisions in the Constitution and our people’s strong love and support for peace, this House hereby reconfirms that the SDF will not engage in overseas activities.121

---


As reflected in the above resolution, the Japanese leaders had no desire or expectation to allow the SDF to operate overseas when the SDF was first established. The SDF Law as of July 1975 reveals that Japan did not anticipate the SDF’s going overseas with the exception of cooperation in the observation of Antarctica. Transportation of VIPs was later added to this list of exceptions.

The SDF Law also authorizes the SDF to sweep mines at sea in Article Ninety-Nine of the SDF Law. However, the Japanese government originally interpreted this provision as only authorizing the SDF to sweep mines in the vicinity of Japan. The Japanese government changed this interpretation when the US government requested Japan to examine the possibility of sending Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to ensure the safe passage of vessels during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War. Although the Japanese government did not dispatch MSDF vessels, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone argued that minesweeping in the high seas would not constitute a use of force because such an activity should be regarded as a means to ensure maritime safety, thereby paving the way for the Japanese government to dispatch MSDF vessels for similar missions in the future. This statement by Nakasone became critical when the Japanese government was pressured to make a contribution for the multinational force beyond financial assistance. In 1991, the Japanese government decided to dispatch MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, using Article Ninety-Nine of the SDF Law as the legal ground for its decision. When challenged at the Diet, the government built on Nakasone’s statement in 1987 and argued that the purpose of the mission would be to sweep mines to ensure the safe passage of vessels, and that it should not be regarded as a use of force.

Japan modified the International Disaster Assistance Law in 1987 to allow its government to dispatch the SDF for disaster relief activities including provision


of medical treatment, reconstruction assistance, search and rescue of disaster victims, and transportation of non-SDF personnel and materials that were sent to the affected area. The SDF Law was revised then to reflect these changes. In reality, however, Japan did not dispatch the SDF for disaster relief operations until after 1991.

After the 1990–91 Gulf War, the Japanese government began to revisit its position on a strict ban on the SDF’s overseas activities. As new laws were passed to authorize the SDF to engage in new types of activities abroad, the SDF Law was also revised to reflect such legislative changes. As of 2006, in addition to the minesweeping and disaster/humanitarian relief, the following activities are authorized under the current legal framework: participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, activities to respond to regional security contingencies, and other activities that were specified under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law. This section looks at the evolution of the legal framework that authorizes the SDF to engage in these overseas activities.

**Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations**

In 1992, the Japanese government enacted the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Cooperation Law. Under this law, the SDF is authorized to undertake the following tasks:

- Cease-fire monitoring and disarmament monitoring;
- Patrolling of buffer zone;
- Inspection of illegal weapon possession;
- Collection, storage or ridding of abandoned weapons;
- Assistance in defining a cease-fire line;
- Assistance in exchange of prisoners;
- Provision of medical services;
- Evacuation of victims of disasters and assistance of their return;
- Provision of sustenance (food, water, etc.) to disaster victims;
- Construction of the facilities for the evacuees;
- Reconstruction of damaged facilities and infrastructure;
- Decontamination of environment in the affected areas; and

---


• Provision of transportation as well as installation of storage, communication equipments, construction equipments and other machineries, as well as their inspection and repair.

However, the original PKO Cooperation Law “froze” the SDF participation in what it described as the “PKO core mission” (hontai gyomu)—activities such as cease-fire monitoring, redeployment of the military, stationing and patrolling of buffer zone, weapon inspection, collection of abandoned weapons, assistance in defining cease-fire line, and assistance in prisoner exchanges. This “freeze” on the SDF participation in PKO “core missions” was not eliminated until Japan revised the 1992 PKO Cooperation Law in 2001 in the context of the debate over the SDF dispatch to East Timor.131 Even after the ban on SDF participation in “core missions” was lifted, considerable political sensitivity remains over whether a SDF contingent deployed to participate in UN-led peacekeeping operations will face the situation under which they may have to use force in the area of its operation.

In any case, the addition of these activities to what the SDF is legally allowed to undertake was reflected in the SDF Law. A new provision was added to SDF Law. It stated that the Director-General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) may allow the SDF to participate in international peacekeeping operations on the condition that such participations would not interfere with the primary mission of the SDF, the defense of Japan.132

**Supporting US Military Operations in Case of Regional Contingencies**

In 1997, Japan and the United States clarified their respective roles and missions by revising the US–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (Guidelines hereafter), which were originally established in 1979. The revision of the bilateral Guidelines began in earnest when US and Japanese government officials realized after the 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis that there was very little clarity in what Japan could do to support the United States in case of security contingencies in East Asia. The revised Guidelines clarified the role to be expected by the SDF under three circumstances—peacetime, shuhen hitai (“situation in the areas surrounding Japan”) which is roughly interpreted as regional contingencies), and direct attacks against Japan. Among the three categories, what Japan should do in case of shuhen hitai was the most politically controversial, as it was not a clear case of armed attack against Japan, yet it called for Japanese assistance to US military action.


After several years of debate, what the Japanese government is authorized to do in case of situations in the areas surrounding Japan (shuhen jitai) was legislated into the Law to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan (so-called shuhen jitai ho). Enacted in May 1999, this legislation provides a domestic legal foundation based on which the SDF could be mobilized in case of regional contingencies. In essence, the law authorizes the SDF to engage in the following activities at sea and airspace in the area surrounding Japanese territory: logistical support, rear-area search-and-rescue operations and ship inspections.\footnote{Shuhen Jitai ni Saishite Waga Kuni no Heiwa to Anzen wo Kakuho Suru Tame no Sochi ni Kansuru Houritsu (The Law to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan)Article Two. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html}.} The appendix charts that accompany the law clarify the definition of the terms that describe specific actions to be taken by the SDF. For instance, the term “medical” is defined as “the treatment of casualties, provision of sanitary instruments, as well as other related materials and services.”\footnote{Ibid., Appendix Chart 1. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html}.} While the law authorizes the SDF to use force in order to protect their lives and possessions as well as that of their colleagues engaged in the same activities,\footnote{Ibid., Article Eleven. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html}.} the SDF is explicitly prohibited from taking measures that can appear to be construed as use of force.\footnote{Ibid., Article Two. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H11/H11HO060.html}.}

Following the enactment of the shuhen jitai ho, the United States and Japan signed an agreement on revising the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) in 1998, which entered into effect in September 1999. This agreement enabled the Self-Defense Forces to provide and receive goods and services from US forces in case of regional contingencies, in addition to when the SDF participates in joint training with US forces, UN peacekeeping operations, and international relief activities.\footnote{An Agreement to Revise the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement between Japan and the United States, Article Three. \url{http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/treaty/acsa/acsa2.html}.}

**Participation in Non-UN-led Overseas Operations: Special Measures Laws**

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Japan has pushed its legal framework one step further, making it possible for the SDF to essentially participate in multinational military operations that are not led by the United Nations. Japan did so by passing two special measures laws (tokubetsu sochi ho), one to support the Operation Enduring Freedom related to
Afghanistan, and the other to support the coalition forces’ reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

**The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States presented Japan with a challenge that was greater than the Gulf War. It was clear that neither Japan’s legal system nor political atmosphere was permissive of sending the SDF to play an active role in the global war on terror that the United States declared. However, it was equally clear that had Japan been unable to make a recognizable contribution to US-led efforts against terrorism, Japan would be exposed to an even harsher criticism by the international community than the time of the 1990–91 Gulf War. Moreover, decision-makers in Tokyo worried greatly about the damage Japan’s inaction would cause to its security relations with Washington. The “Gulf War trauma” was very much alive among senior policymakers in Japan.138 If Japan, as a US treaty ally, did not come to aid the United States when it faced “the biggest crisis since the Civil War,” what would become of the US–Japan alliance which Japan relies so much for its security?

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi instinctively understood the gravity of the situation, and the weight of the decisions he was going to make for the US–Japan alliance. In stark contrast to then Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s response to the 1990–91 Gulf War, Koizumi announced Japan’s seven-point plan of assistance for the United States within ten days.139 The plan was critical because it included a SDF dispatch to support the military operations that would be led by the United States.

There was no precedent for the SDF to participate in multinational forces without an explicit mandate by the United Nations. SDF contingents had never been sent on a mission during combat either. But a strong political will shown by Koizumi led Japan to enact the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. This set an important precedent for future SDF participation in non-UN-led multinational operations while active combat is ongoing, ultimately paving the way for Japan’s decision in 2003 to deploy the SDF to Iraq.

The Anti-Terror Special Measures Law passed in November 2001 authorizes Japan to engage in (1) cooperative assistance, (2) search-and-rescue, (3) relief of the affected population and other necessary activities in order to support

---

138 For instance, Shunji Yanai, who was Director-General of the Treaty Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1990–91 Gulf War, was serving as the Japanese ambassador to the United States at that time.

activities by the militaries of the United States and other countries, and to respond to the request by international organizations including the United Nations.\textsuperscript{140} The law roots the legitimacy of Japan engaging in these activities in the UN Security Council resolutions that denounce international terrorism, specifically UN Security Council Resolution 1368 that acknowledges the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 to be a threat to peace and security.\textsuperscript{141}

The law authorizes SDF participation in providing material assistance and other support services to the multinational forces, and in engaging in search-and-rescue activities.\textsuperscript{142} More specifically, activities that the SDF is authorized to conduct are: provision of water, fuel oil, and meals; transport of personnel, and materials; repair and maintenance of machinery; provision of medical and sanitary services; provision of means of telecommunication and accommodation; support activities at airports and seaports; and basic administrative services for the bases.\textsuperscript{143}

Although the list of activities is quite extensive, several conditions are attached to them. First, the SDF was to operate only on the high seas and the airspace above it—it would not be able to operate on foreign soil without explicit consent from the host country.\textsuperscript{144} Secondly, SDF activities could not include the use of force.\textsuperscript{145} Finally, no combat should be ongoing in the areas in which the SDF is anticipated to operate.\textsuperscript{146}

**The Iraqi Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law**

When the United States invaded Iraq to topple the Saddam Hussein regime in March 2003, Japan did not move as quickly as it did in the case of the Operation Enduring Freedom. While some in the Japanese government first explored the possibility of deploying the SDF to provide rear-area support for the coalition forces, it initially decided against pursuing this option for three reasons: it is difficult to justify the deployment within the PKO Cooperation Law; it is

\textsuperscript{140} Tero Taisaku Tokubetsu Sochi Ho (Anti-Terror Special Measures Law) Articles One. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H13/H13HO113.html}

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., Article Two. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H13/H13HO113.html}

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., Appendices One. \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H13/H13HO113.html}

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., Articles Two \url{http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H13/H13HO113.html}

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
equally difficult to justify the deployment by the shuhen jitai ho; and most importantly, the government placed higher priority on passing the contingency legislation. Still, Japan immediately expressed its support for US military action in Iraq. It also announced its intention to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the affected areas, as well as other indirect measures, including enhancing the security of US military facilities in Japan.

Once President Bush declared the end of a major combat mission on 1 May 2003, the possibility of deploying the SDF to take part in the reconstruction assistance efforts quickly emerged as a realistic possibility. The deliberation by the government accelerated after Prime Minister Koizumi indicated that Japan was ready to consider the deployment of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)’s C-130 transport aircrafts to provide support in transport of goods in the region, and examine what would be possible in order to make “contribution that commiserates with Japanese national power” in his meeting with President Bush during his visit to the United States on 23 May 2003.

The Special Measures Law regarding Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Activities and the Activities to Support Ensuring Safety (usually shortened and referred as the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law) was submitted to the Diet on 13 June 2003, and was enacted on 1 August 2003. The law authorized Japan to engage in activities of humanitarian reconstruction as well as ensuring safety. The scope of activities permissible under the law was also defined. According to the law, humanitarian reconstruction activities are defined as:

- Medical services;
- Assistance for the return of the affected people to their homes, provision of food, clothes, medicines and other daily sustenance, and establishment of boarding facilities for the affected people;
- Advice or guidance on administrative matters; and

---

147 Maeda and Iijima eds. op. cit. 306.
149 Maeda and Iijima, op. cit., 306.
Other activities to save the victims, repair the damage, or support the reconstruction of Iraq, including transport, storage, construction, repair or maintenance, supply and sanitation.152

“The activities to assist ensuring safety” were defined as the activities that assist the United Nations and other countries to restore safety and security in Iraq, including transport, storage, communication, construction, repair or maintenance, supply and sanitation.153 It required the prime minister to obtain the cabinet’s approval for the basic plan for any activity under this law, including when an SDF deployment is involved.154 The law also required that the prime minister would have to notify the Diet of the basic plan for its approval, and terminate the activity in case the Diet rejects the plan.155

The law also imposed several restrictions on the operations that the SDF would conduct. First, the law required that the SDF contingents would be sent to non-combatant areas, and in case fighting breaks out near the area of the SDF operations, their activities need to be suspended and the personnel need to be evacuated.156 The SDF was also prohibited from transporting weapons (including munitions),157 as well as providing fuel and maintenance to the aircraft that are stand-by prior to departing to engage in combat.158 Furthermore, their use of weapons was authorized only when it was absolutely necessary in order to protect their lives or properties, their fellow SDF soldiers and other reconstruction assistance personnel and those who came under their protection.159

Summary: The Evolving Legal Framework

When the Cold War ended in 1989, the SDF was allowed to go overseas only when: (1) an ASDF aircraft transport VIPs for their foreign visits; (2) a MSDF vessel was sent to explore Antarctica; and (3) the SDF is sent to provide

153 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
international relief. Except for (3), the SDF was not allowed to do anything proactive in international settings, as there was no legal framework for it.

Since then, the legal framework for the SDF overseas deployment has evolved significantly. Under the current legal framework, the SDF can be dispatched to take part in most non-combat overseas operations based on one law or another. Considering that SDF activities were confined within Japanese territory only fifteen years ago, this is a significant change.

After the end of the Cold War, Japan has revised the SDF Law frequently as new legislative frameworks were established to expand the scope of the SDF overseas activities.

As a result of these revisions, in addition to what was authorized until the end of the Cold War, the SDF Law today authorizes the SDF to undertake the following non-combat activities in the areas outside Japanese territory:

- Participation in peacekeeping operations;\(^{160}\)
- Emergency evacuation of Japanese and other civilians residing overseas;\(^{161}\)
- Rear-area support in the situation in the areas surrounding Japan;\(^{162}\)
- Ship inspection during the situation in the areas surrounding Japan;\(^{163}\) and
- Provision of goods and services to the US armed forces in the situations in the areas surrounding Japan.\(^{164}\)

In particular, the two special measures laws that were enacted after 2001 serve as useful legal precedents for the Japanese government when it examines the SDF dispatch to future multinational forces operations that cannot be considered within the scope of either the UN PKO Cooperation Law or the International Disaster Relief Law.

But while the list of what the SDF can do legally became longer, two constraints—the ban on SDF participation in combat missions, and severe restrictions on the use of force—remained in place. In particular, the Japanese government placed a stringent set of rules on weapons to be used by the SDF so

---


that the SDF’s use of weapons would not be regarded as use of force. To this end, the existing legislation, including the revised SDF Law, define in detail what the SDF is authorized to do. What is noticeable about the relevant provisions in these laws is that the use of weapons by the SDF is dictated by the laws that govern the conduct of Japanese police and its coast guard, and the use of weapons is prohibited in many cases. For instance, the SDF is authorized to use weapons “necessary to defend Japan” in case it was mobilized to respond to armed attacks against Japan, but their weapons use must not exceed “what is determined to be necessary based on reasonable judgments. In case of the SDF mobilization to maintain public safety, its conduct would be subject to the provisions in the Law Regarding the Conduct of Policemen and the Coast Guard Agency Establishment Law in execution of its mission, including the standard for the use of its weapons. The law further provides that the use of weapons by the SDF must be determined by the unit commander unless the situation grants the use of weapons based on a certain provision of the Criminal Code (self-defense, emergency evacuation and no criminal intent).

Two developments are noteworthy when one looks into the future developments on the legal framework for the SDF overseas deployment. One is an ongoing debate on what is generally referred to as “general law” (ippan ho) or “permanent law” (kokyu ho). After the Japanese government struggled to pass two special measures laws within three years, an increasing number of political leaders have begun to call for legislation that sets conditions for the SDF overseas deployment that are outside the existing framework under the International Disaster Relief Law, PKO Cooperation Law and the Laws Regarding the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan. The law, if passed, is envisioned to provide criteria upon which Japan would determine whether to deploy the SDF when Japan is asked to contribute the SDF troops to coalition forces that are formed neither for UN-led peacekeeping operations nor for humanitarian disaster relief operations. It is also expected to provide comprehensive rules of engagement for the SDF troops that are dispatched overseas.

166 Ibid.
169 Keiho (Criminal Code), Articles Thirty-Five, Thirty Six, and Thirty Seven. http://www.houko.com/00/FS_ON.HTM.
In fact, questions have been raised about the JDA’s aggressive quest to obtain ministerial status. The Japanese government submitted the legislation that would grant a ministerial status to the JDA, which is currently one of the agencies under the Cabinet Offices, in the last days of the Koizumi Cabinet in September 2006. The legislation was approved by the Diet on 15 December 2006, and the JDA became the Ministry of Defense (MOD) on 9 January 2007. In the approved legislation, provisions to designate the SDF’s participation in international activities as its core mission are included, transferring the existing relevant provisions in Article 100 of the SDF Law to Article Three.

But many non-government analysts—and even some within the JDA—have pointed out that the JDA should have prioritized enactment of a permanent law. They argue that while ministerial status is important for its symbolism and the JDA’s status within the Japanese government, establishing an overarching legal framework that clearly defines the overseas activities that are permissible for the SDF as well as the constraints that may be attached to the SDF’s participation in overseas activities is far more important for JDA’s day-to-day operations. They worry that the Japanese government, having spent much of its political capital on upgrading the JDA to the MOD, may not be ready to tackle enacting a permanent law for some time, thereby allowing the decision-making process for the SDF overseas dispatch to remain cumbersome and time-consuming.

CONCLUSION: IS THE JAPANESE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT MORE RECEPTIVE TO THE SDF OPERATIONS?

This chapter has examined the evolution of the legal framework in Japan to justify the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas, as well as the evolution of political debate on the issue. Legally, Japan made a great deal of progress in enacting the legislation to justify SDF activities overseas. In less than two decades, Japan has broken out of the legal framework that had existed over the previous three decades which banned the SDF from engaging in any type of overseas activities. Under the legal framework today, the SDF can now engage in international disaster relief operations, a full range of UN-led peacekeeping operations, and operations to support the US military in case of regional contingencies. The enactment of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the 2003 Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law further opened the door for the possibility of SDF participation in multinational force operations that are not led by the United Nations (UN). In addition, inclusion of SDF participation in international activities in its core mission with the enactment of the Law to Establish the

---

170 A comment by a former US government official to a group of JDA officials, 13 March 2006; an interview with a SDF official, 17 November 2006.
Ministry of Defense, the legal grounds for the SDF’s overseas activities is more solid than ever.

Contrary to the steady development in the legal framework, however, changes in the political environment surrounding the SDF overseas dispatch were far more limited. Of course, it is important to note that the enactment of the 1992 PKO Cooperation Law should indeed be regarded as an important juncture. Even with the constraints of the Five Principles discussed above, the law reflects Japan’s decision to accept SDF participation in peacekeeping operations as a part of Japan’s contribution to improve the global security environment.

However, this choice was not made as a result of political debate on what is in Japan’s national interest. Rather, the examination of past political debates illustrates that fear of international isolation shared among the Japanese political leadership was the primary driver of Japan’s past decisions. While the outcome of the debates turned out to be very different, it should be noted that Prime Ministers Kaifu and Koizumi used the same logic—if Japan does not do its share, it will face international isolation—to present their respective cases for the SDF dispatch at the floor of the Diet. The initial comment made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda on Japan’s role in war on terror, “(w)hat support we can give [to the US] will depend on what we are asked to do. We will consider Japan’s actions after evaluating the responses of other nations,” is also a telltale sign of Japan’s inherently passive approach in determining whether it should dispatch the SDF overseas in any given situation. Except for Prime Minister Koizumi’s attempt to frame his argument to lobby for Japan’s support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the context of Japan’s national interest, the fear of international isolation has been the dominant factor for Japan’s decisions on dispatching the SDF overseas.

The passive mentality of Japan behind its decision of the SDF dispatch for overseas activities leads to the second point: because Japan faces this choice out of its sense of obligation and fear of international isolation, it continues to take a minimalist approach in deciding the specifics of its action. In other words, in the debate over the role to be played by the SDF, the focus of the debate has not been what the most useful contribution Japan can make by sending the SDF. Rather, the debate has focused almost exclusively on what the SDF can do without contradicting past precedents. The examination of the debate over the conditions for the SDF dispatch illustrates that the debate essentially has not progressed on the conditions for the SDF dispatch overseas. Even the shock of 9/11 terrorist attacks did not help move the debate forward significantly.

It is evident that Japan has not been able to step away from its *modus operandi* for the SDF dispatch overseas other than disaster relief since 1991. On one hand, those who want to dispatch the SDF pull those who are reluctant along by using the logic that invokes their fear of Japan’s international isolation and their sense of humiliation at the time of the 1990–91 Gulf War. On the other hand, those who are reluctant to see the SDF expand its roles overseas but do not want to appear as obstructionists try to slow the pace of the debate by limiting the SDF’s participation in certain types of activities (i.e. “freeze” on PKO “core missions”), imposing restrictive conditions for its participation (PKO Five Principles), or constraining the SDF operating conditions to the smallest details (i.e. what type of weapons the SDF can carry). Despite the repeated claim that Japan must be proactive, the above examination shows that Japanese political leaders have been hopelessly reactive in the past debates over the issues relevant to the SDF’s overseas dispatch. Even less progress has been made in the political debate on why Japan should dispatch the SDF overseas for these activities. Almost fifteen years after Japan dispatched the SDF for the first time, the debate on this issue remains at a standstill, not moving much beyond the argument that Japan needs to act as a purveyor of “international contribution.”

This leaves Japan in a half-hearted situation in which its legal framework suggests that Japan can send the SDF contingents to a wide variety of overseas activities short of active combat operations without political consensus to utilize the existing framework to its maximum potential. Lack of political consensus often leads to inefficiency in the decision-making process, which can be problematic in cases of emergencies when timely responses are essential. Rectifying this situation will not be easy, because the cause of this problem is not in the institutional framework but rather in the mentality of the political leaders. But if Japan aspires to act proactively in the international security sphere, it has to break out of the existing mold. A mere acceptance of the SDF overseas dispatch as a means of international contribution is not enough. Its leaders must begin to debate the issue from the perspective of whether the SDF dispatch will help advance Japan’s national interest. As the former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa once said in an interview, “the handling of the SDF should be a political decision by the government, not a subject of legal discourse.” Such a lack of change in the substance of the political debate over the SDF overseas dispatch again places serious questions over whether the defense establishment in today’s Japan today is indeed “new”.

---

The United States has contributed substantially to the development of Japan’s defense establishment from the time of the initial development of new military structures in the wake of World War II through the considerable deepening of the military alliance between the two states taking place today. So substantial is the role of the United States in Japan’s defense establishment that much analysis of Japan’s defense policy—its development, its strategy, its future direction—begins by examining the role that the US–Japan alliance played in shaping Japanese security policy, and the contributions of the United States in particular. This volume takes a different approach, focusing on Japan’s indigenous defense institutions, capabilities, and development. Nevertheless it is not possible to understand any of these three areas—institutions, capabilities, and development—without reference to the United States. Indeed, previous chapters already have included many such references. This chapter focuses on the role of the United States—both as an independent actor and, distinctly, as a formal alliance partner—in the recent development of Japan’s defense establishment. This discussion of the role of the United States in a bilateral defense relationship is then further expanded to consider the evolving regional and multilateral context of Japan’s defense establishment in the following Chapter Five.

Despite fears of US disengagement with the Asia–Pacific region in the early 1990s, in recent years Japan and the United States have embarked upon a substantial broadening and deepening of their military alliance. Today the alliance’s goals and functions evolve in tandem with the security environment in the Asia–Pacific region and globally. By redefining the US–Japan alliance to be “the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia,” Tokyo and Washington have transformed their bilateral alliance from a Cold War-era anti-Soviet bloc alliance to the core of a web of US bilateral alliances in the Asia–Pacific region and even worldwide. As a result, Japan’s indigenous defense establishment, particularly its military institutions, has had to adapt to a substantial degree—as discussed in chapter Two. Current US initiatives to pursue “jointness”,

“interoperability”, and the “revolution in military affairs” inevitably continue to force Japan’s defense establishment to consider carefully how it too will address such issues—both to respond to the wishes of its alliance partner, and to develop its own Self-Defense Forces in the most effective manner. Both before and after the shift in US security policy after 11 September 2001, the United States has sought to influence Japanese domestic debates on Japan’s future security role, and continues to do so in relation to country-specific issues like North Korea and China as well as to capability and process issues such as interoperability of US and Japanese forces and the joint development of ballistic missile defense.

It is often perceived in both countries that, within the context of long-standing constraints on policy action, the United States works with a conservative elite in Japan to push the envelope of Japan’s public opinion in responding to new security threats as they emerge. Under this interpretation, the rise of China and continuing instability on the Korean peninsula, combined with a new frame of an international war on terror, allow political elites in both Japan and the United States to advance a long-standing agenda to boost Japanese military capabilities and practices. In reality, however, the ways in which the United States affects the development of Japan’s defense establishment is much more complicated and, indeed, diverse: through the provision of advanced weapons technology and institutional expertise, joint participation in strategic planning, formal negotiations, and informal daily interaction through alliance institutions as well as ad hoc cooperative exercises and commercial ventures.

This chapter examines such US influence on the evolution of Japan’s defense establishment for a new security era by beginning with a discussion of American security objectives in the region and vis-à-vis Japan, and how these objectives have evolved over time and are adapting to a new era of emerging threats. Next, the numerous ways in which the United States influences the development of Japan’s defense establishment—both formally and informally—is considered. The contemporary case of missile defense cooperation is offered as one concrete example of the multiple aspects of American influence on Japan. Finally, the somewhat more abstract issue of the development of shared goals and perceptions as a result of deepening cooperation is examined. A substantial body of theoretical literature on the joint development and evolution of preferences is just beginning to be applied formally to a consideration of military alliances, a topic of substantial relevance to the US role on Japan’s

174 This is the impression one would have from reading much of the news analysis on Japan’s recent defense policy, and the United States’ relation to it. As Richard Lowry writes: “Japan has slowly been emerging from its shell over the last decade, and it is one of the diplomatic strengths of the Bush administration that it has helped accelerate this process.” See Lowry, Richard. “Time for the Sun to Rise.” *National Review*, Vol. 57 Issue 12 (4 July 2005): 29-31.
evolving defense institutions and capabilities and one worthy of future consideration given the likely future of deepening and broadening US–Japan military cooperation. A brief overview of outstanding areas of US concern over the course of development of Japan’s defense establishment concludes this chapter.

When examining the US role in the development of Japan’s new defense establishment, it is important to keep in mind that US and Japanese interests are not identical despite a large degree of commonality which forms the basis of the long-standing alliance. Three broad security objectives characterize US policy towards Japan and its defense establishment, as summarized on Table 4.1 below. First, the United States seeks to ensure peace and stability in the East Asia region, and looks to Japan to support this objective. Second, more broadly, the United States seeks diplomatic and logistical reinforcement of US initiatives and policy preferences both in the region and world-wide. Third, more concretely, the United States seeks in Japan a partner to share the “burden” of supplying such security deliverables—both directly financial (such as the thirteen-billion-dollar payment Japan contributed to the costs of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War and the “host-nation support” Japan contributes to off-set the cost of US forces permanently based in Japan) as well as “in-kind” offsets of US military roles (for example, the Japanese MSDF patrolling of sea lanes in East Asia, and refueling support in Operation Enduring Freedom related to Afghanistan).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Three Broad US Policy Objectives vis-à-vis Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Japanese support for major US political and diplomatic objectives world-wide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Material, financial, as well as personnel contributions from Japan to support major US security objectives worldwide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three US policy objectives vis-à-vis Japan have a long lineage that in part shapes how Japan’s defense establishment interprets US requests for assistance in the present day, as discussed in the following sections below.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO CURRENT US DEMANDS ON JAPAN’S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a history of past US interaction with Japan over security planning. Nevertheless it is important to be aware of the existence of this long and often contentious history when attempting to understand contemporary US–Japan interaction over security issues.

As a starting point, the long-term US military relationship with Japan fundamentally was shaped by past war experiences, in particular World War II and the Cold War. As outlined briefly in Chapter Two, the United States played the leading role first in Japan’s disarmament after Japan’s surrender to end World War II, and then, conversely, in Japan’s re-armament after the outbreak of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, China). The United States insisted on an unconditional surrender of Japan to end World War II, and required a complete demilitarization of Japanese forces during the first years of the postwar occupation of Japan. The United States played the leading role in drafting a new postwar constitution for Japan that enshrined the principle of Japanese non-aggression in the now-famous Article Nine of the postwar constitution, which proclaims, in part, “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”

As the security situation in East Asia deteriorated in the immediate postwar years, however, it was the United States that strongly pressured Japan to re-build military forces—under the entirely different institutional framework of a Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces, rather than a more powerful ministry of defense or recreation of an Imperial army and navy. Even a politically weak Japan—recently defeated and heavily dependent on US assistance—was able to resist to some extent strong US pressure to build up military forces to a far greater degree than actually developed, however, a strategy typically credited to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, and elevated in much defense discourse to comprise part of the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine.”

As these examples indicate, for quite some time the United States has sought actively to “normalize” Japan’s security practices—that is, to re-create among

---

175 Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin (eds), The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999) provides a good overview of this history.

176 Green, Michael J. Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave 2001) and Samuels, Richard J. Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2003) both develop this commonly-asserted line of argument. In sum, however, three pillars of the Yoshida doctrine are argued to be: (1) military alliance with the United States, (2) limited rearmament, and (3) a focus on economic development and commercial relations abroad.
Japanese leadership at least, and preferably among the Japanese public as well, a belief that the use of military force is a “normal” means of statecraft and the pursuit of expanded military capabilities for the state is a “normal” objective of political leadership. As early as Korean War (1950–53) and as recently as Iraq War (2003–present)—with a number of specific and general Cold War conflicts in between—the United States has sought a concrete Japanese contribution to the maintenance of international security. Table 4.2 chronicles major milestones in this relationship during the Cold War period. Current Japanese defense planners are well aware of this history and—as discussed in chapter three in the context of debate over the overseas deployment of the SDF—often are haunted by past inability to satisfy the United States’ seemingly insatiable demand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Japan surrenders unconditionally in WWII; Occupation begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Occupation of Japan ends, apart from administrative control over Okinawa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>US president Nixon declares a new “doctrine” in Guam calling for greater reliance on Asian allies, in particular Japan, for their own security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Administrative control of Okinawa returns to Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Prime Minister Suzuki pledges to extend MSDF patrol of sea lanes to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Prime Minister Nakasone refers to Japan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in his meeting with US president Reagan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Prime Minister Nakasone indicates that Japan can send MSDF minesweepers out of East Asia if it is to contribute to create peace and stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Japan sends MSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, after declining to send the SDF to participate in Operation Desert Storm.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, another important historical antecedent to understanding the current US role in the development of Japan’s new defense establishment was the simultaneous US desire to contain Japan—to prevent Japan from the development of sufficient military capacity to once again challenge the United States militarily, or to thwart US security objectives in the region. The pursuit of permanent US bases in Japan is the most visible policy legacy of this strategy of containment, but more broadly the care taken in selecting which military technology to share with Japan and what type of capabilities to encourage the
SDF to develop equally derive from the strategy of containment.177 Although the vestiges of this strategy remain in the major documents that govern the US–Japan military alliance, the explicit (or even implicit) idea of US containment of Japan is almost wholly absent in current US strategic thinking regarding Japan. However, the United States continues to follow a clear policy course which nevertheless seeks to achieve a similar result—a seamless meshing of US and Japanese military forces that are fully interoperable and have clearly delineated roles and missions that, on the one hand, avoids duplication of effort on either side but, on the other, may result in Japanese military forces that are incapable of operating beyond Japanese territory on their own. This result of alliance deepening—constraints on independent Japanese military action—is an acknowledged item of discussion in defense circles in Japan, and seen as a benefit to some, and a drawback to others.178

Beyond the two principal strands of historical development of US–Japan security cooperation—the incessant US pressure for Japan to increase its military roles and missions and the simultaneous desire to contain Japanese ambitions—a third area of important historical precedent is the expanded military role Japan began to play in the later years of the Cold War. Two distinct aspects of Japan’s defense development today— alliance deepening and increased capabilities for the SDF—have their genesis in the late 1970s and 1980s, symbolized by such important developments (noted in Table 4.2) as the signing of the first US–Japan guidelines for defense cooperation in 1978 and the expanded Japanese role in patrolling sea lanes promised in the early 1980s and delivered over the course of that decade.

**Three Broad US Objectives vis-à-vis Japan**

The three broad US objectives vis-à-vis Japan (listed in Table 4.1) are evident in past US policy toward Japan noted above as well as in contemporary discussion with Japan about its future security role. Most directly related to Japan is the first category, to ensure peace and stability in the East Asia region.

---

177 In later years, decisions over which military technologies to share with Japan also were affected by the desire to contain Japan’s economic expansion and commercial technology base, but this is a separate issue—and one that at times came in conflict with US security objectives.

Peace and Stability in East Asia

During the Cold War, the principal objective of US policy toward Asia was to avert a communist takeover of capitalist states including Japan, which would have meant the expansion of the Soviet influence in the world. In the post-Cold War era, this goal has shifted to encourage Japan to partner with the United States in the regional as well as global war on terror, to help check a rising China and belligerent North Korea, and to promote transparency in security planning in Asia overall. In the immediate post-Cold War period, there was a palpable fear in Japan and elsewhere in the region that the United States would reduce its security role in the region, leading to possible instability resulting from expanded military roles played by other powers in the region to fill the vacuum. The United States tried to alleviate such concern in both official and semi-official documents that have contributed to shape US alliance policy in the Asia–Pacific region in the post-Cold War era. For instance, the 1995 US Security Strategy for the Asia–Pacific Region (so-called East Asia Strategy Report but better known as Nye Report), sought to address this concern by indicating that the United States would maintain a troop presence of 100,000 personnel in order to ensure peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region.179 Particularly in regard to the US–Japan alliance as well, the Report indicated that the United States would consider this alliance as the lynchpin of peace and stability in the region.180

US emphasis on the centrality of the US–Japan alliance was further pronounced in the Special Report issued by the Institute of National Strategic Studies (INSS) in October 2000, better known as “the Armitage Report”.181 The Armitage Report’s encouragement of the US government to nurture its relationship with Japan toward the kind of a “special relationship” which Washington currently enjoys only with Great Britain was largely incorporated into the Bush administration’s policy toward Asia. For instance, the National Security Strategy of the United States issued in 2002 and in 2006 by the White House stresses the importance of nurturing relationships with US allies worldwide.182 The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) by the Department of


180 Ibid.


Defense (DOD) specifically refers to the enhancement of US alliance in the Asia–Pacific region, including the US–Japan alliance. Lastly, one of the critical components of the Global Posture Review (GPR), which was formally launched in 2004, is a large-scale US force realignment in Japan, and the transformation of the roles and missions between US forces and the SDF that will accompany the realignment.

**Diplomatic Reinforcement of US Initiatives**

Beyond peace and stability in the East Asian region, the United States seeks from Japan diplomatic reinforcement of US initiatives and policy preferences beyond the security realm in East Asia, and in the world as a whole. Moreover, the United States seeks a partner in Japan that not only will support US policy objectives, but also will lend its own substantial political resources and weight to help to achieve these objectives—be they to balance against a rising China, contain a belligerent North Korea, help to monitor and manage political Islam in Southeast Asia, or to assist in international problems outside of East Asia, such as the growing crisis with Iran.

In the East Asian region, the United States often has called on Japan to coordinate its approach to interacting with China with that of the United States—attempting a delicate balance of engagement and military balancing. The US successfully pressured Japan to limit relations with China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, for example, and more recently has coordinated a values and political freedom agenda in Asia with Japan in an attempt to influence Chinese behavior. The fact that Japan now conducts more trade with China than does the United States, and long has invested far more in China than the United States gives Japan additional leverage over China that—if coordinated successfully—can help expand US influence over China. Such coordination is not without a cost, nor without political risks, to Japan. Japanese leaders must satisfy their own domestic political constituencies vis-à-vis China as well as their own conceptions of Japanese national interest. Some quarters perceive that Japan’s military alliance with the United States gets in the way of better Japanese relations with China, either due to too much of a military role for Japan, or too little independent Japanese military capability.

---


185 See Self, Benjamin L. *The Dragon’s Shadow: The Rise of China and Japan’s New Nationalism.* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006) for a compelling argument that Japan’s very national identity is inextricably linked to Japan’s relations with, and notions of, China.
The case of US–Japan missile defense cooperation—expanded upon below—is one possible such example where Japan appears to have experienced at least a short-term worsening of its relations with China as a result of strong US pressure for Japan to work with the United States on developing an effective missile defense system for Japan and US forces in the region. On the other hand, some in the United States fear that US interests vis-à-vis China may be compromised by too close an American relationship with Japan. Przystup and Saunders, for example, note the long and successful strategic partnership with China during the later years of the Cold War in achieving a strategic balance against Soviet expansion, as well as during the early post-Cold War period of strategic partnership under President Bill Clinton and more recently in the global war on terror under President George W. Bush. They fear that growing tension between Japan and China over history issues and other questions of military and economic competition could jeopardize such cooperation between the United States and China in the future.

The United States also actively has sought Japanese support for US policy initiatives with North Korea—particularly in the areas of counter-proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. Through the institutional structure of the Six-Party Talks (the United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea), the United States seeks to coordinate with Japan to lead other members of the talks to follow a harder line with North Korea. In the wake of North Korean missile tests in July 2006 which was followed by nuclear tests in October 2006, the United States and Japan together pursued an even harder line with North Korea, jointly pressuring China to support sanctions against North Korea in the United Nations, and agreeing to accelerate deployment of joint missile defense systems.

In Southeast Asia as well, the United States has sought an active partner in Japan to leverage substantial Japanese assets (both financial and knowledge-based) in the region. Although not as high profile as Japan’s overseas military deployments to the Indian Ocean or to Iraq, Japanese military cooperation with the United States to combat terrorism in Southeast Asia has developed surprisingly quickly and deeply considering historical concerns about Japanese military activity in the region. Under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) discussed in chapter five, Japan has stepped forward to train and equip the maritime security forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

---


187 Ibid.

cooperation with other states in the region, as well as multilateral cooperation among such states, is eminent—advancing critical US security aims in the region and globally.

Outside the Asia–Pacific region, the United States has sought Japanese diplomatic and material support for US military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq for diffusing the growing concern over Iranian nuclear development, and for a large range of issues the United States seeks to pursue in the United Nations. Japan was the first ally to deploy in support of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001\textsuperscript{189}, and one of the 27 states forming the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq in 2003. Moreover, Japan was one of only two states to support the US contention at that time that even if United Nations inspections were strengthened and expanded, they were unlikely to lead to the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{190}

**Material Support of US Security Operations**

Finally, beyond rhetorical support for US objectives, the United States seeks a concrete contribution from Japan to provide security deliverables in the region and worldwide, such as the cases of SDF cooperation with US forces in the Indian Ocean, in Iraq, and in Southeast Asia through PSI noted above. In the early Cold War years, such a contribution was conceptualized as a new type of armed forces—the Self Defense Forces—which would protect Japan in the event of an attack, freeing up US forces based in Japan to concentrate on other areas. The multiple defense build-ups of the SDF in the Cold War years—discussed in chapter two—were a testament to this strategy, as illustrated by a growing number of tanks, fighter planes, and ships across the three branches of the SDF. As the capabilities of the SDF increased over time, the United States increasingly sought a regional security role for the SDF, for example, the MSDF through the patrolling of sea lanes in areas surrounding Japan. In the post-Cold War era, joint weapons development entered the agenda.\textsuperscript{191} More recently, the United States has sought even more greatly expanded roles for Japan’s SDF to provide for regional security and to participate in the front lines of the war on terror—both based in Japan as well as abroad, such as the foreign dispatch of the

\textsuperscript{189} West, \textit{Ibid.} 16.


SDF discussed in chapter three and the greater participation on Japan in international security forums discussed in chapter Five.

Japan’s political and defense establishments have responded concretely to steady US demands for burden sharing, sometimes in dramatic ways. For example, the “host-nation support” to provide financial off-sets for the cost of US forces stationed in Japan is unparalleled among the dozens of countries in which US forces are based,\(^{192}\) amounting to $4.4 billion in direct and indirect support in 2004—estimated at seventy-five percent of the total cost of maintaining US troops in Japan.\(^{193}\) In May 2006, Japan agreed to cover over half of the estimated cost of redeployment of US forces from Okinawa to Guam, to the tune of $6 billion.\(^{194}\) As well, Japan was the only country to increase taxes explicitly to make a financial contribution to the first Persian Gulf War of 1990–91, ultimately contributing over $13 billion to that conflict.

Beyond a financial contribution, the expanded patrolling of sea lanes in Asia by the MSDF and the refueling operations by the MSDF in support of OEF in Afghanistan are two additional areas of concrete support provided by Japan at the instigation of the United States. It is estimated that the MSDF provided half of the total fuel required by the United States in that theater as of November 2005, at a cost of over $150 million.\(^{195}\)

These latter areas of in-kind support provided by the SDF in support of broader American military objectives exemplify the deep influence of the United States on the development of Japan’s defense establishment. Certainly it is the Japanese themselves who make decisions about how their own defense institutions should evolve in response to changing global conditions. However, often it is difficult to separate Japanese conceptions of security challenges and their appropriate responses from the overt and also indirect influence of Japan’s long-standing (and only) alliance partner. Still, such divergence is clear in some areas, and the attempts to reconcile these sometimes different conceptions of Japanese and American interest is instructive when examining the US role in Japan’s defense development.


\(^{194}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{195}\) *Ibid.*, 16.
Bridging Complementary and Other Interests

It is not uncommon for joint statements and other comments from officials on both sides of the Pacific to seek to paper over real differences in policy objectives, threat perception, and defense goals—evidenced most recently by recent SCC joint statements announced in February and October 2005 as well as May 2006. At each stage of the alliance partnership—today as well as in the past—domestic politics on both sides, different geopolitical and geo-strategic circumstances, and differing perceptions of threat all contribute to the position of the United States not just as a partner but also as an advocate for a particular agenda. As such, it is important to consider carefully the United States as a discrete political actor within Japan’s defense establishment. Because US policy objectives globally and in the Asian region require substantial Japanese cooperation and support, heavy political pressure often is put on Japan by the United States. As such, the crafting of joint statements or the issuing of public statements from either side can serve as much as opportunities to push favored agenda items and policy outcomes as to reflect genuine agreement on the stated policy.

Differences are not limited to those between the United States and Japan. There often are substantial disagreements over defense objectives within each state, among policymakers, strategists, and the general public. At times, divisive foreign policy issues are elevated to the center of national political debate, and can form a basis for differentiation of political party platforms or individual candidates for office in both countries. The degree of military capability of the SDF discussed in Chapter Two of this volume and the conditions under which the SDF might be deployed overseas discussed in Chapter Three illustrate well how different constituencies within Japan can hold very different views about security policy. The United States also has experienced instances of foreign policy questions generating substantial public disagreements, the recent Iraq War being the most striking recent example, but even past policy towards Japan (in particular during the 1970s and 1980s when tense bilateral trade relations plagued US–Japan relations) provides another illustration of this phenomenon, having generated very public attempts by each side to discredit the other with labels such as “Japan basher”, “Chrysanthemum clubber”, and the like.

---


Moreover, these two “levels” of disagreement—among groups within states as well as between states—can interact, forming a “two-level game” of diplomacy and political maneuvering among actors holding common objectives across national boundaries.\(^{198}\) As formal alliance cooperation mechanisms deepen between the United States and Japan, such cross-national coalition-building opportunities expand, creating broader and deeper avenues for the United States to influence the development of Japan’s defense establishment. Despite a much larger role for Japan contributing to alliance decisions, and for acting on its own vision of its security interests, the era of American *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) is far from over.\(^{199}\) Moreover, the United States influences Japan’s defense establishment in a great variety of ways, some more overt and transparent than others.

**TYPES OF US INFLUENCE ON THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN’S DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT**

The United States contributes, and has contributed, to the development of Japan’s defense establishment in a large and diverse number of ways. Such influence has deeply affected the core functions of Japan’s defense establishment in ways that have evolved over time. At the most basic level, the existence of a formal military alliance between the United States and Japan led to less need for military capabilities than otherwise would have been pursued by the Japanese state in the postwar period. As noted above, and by many analysts of postwar Japanese defense policy, the United States has pressured Japan to play a greater role in its defense for decades, with only limited success—though there seems to be growing successes in more recent years.

**Sharing Equipment and Technology: Moves toward Joint Development**

Beyond defense planning under a military alliance, the United States also has provided a great range of military technologies and equipment to Japan over the years.\(^{200}\) The result of these transfers not only is a lessened cost of weapons

---

\(^{198}\) Robert Putnam coined this phrase in the context of economic policy negotiations, spawning a large literature devoted to this topic from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. See Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” *International Organization* 42: 3 (Summer 1988) 427-60.

\(^{199}\) The most notable studies of *gaiatsu* in Japanese foreign policy all derive from economic cases and have not been applied systematically to the security realm. See, for example, Schoppa, Leonard. *Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) and Yasutomo, Dennis T. *The New Multilateralism in Japan’s Foreign Policy*. (London: Macmillan. 1995).

development by the Japanese state, but also a broader influence on Japanese defense planners by the United States in terms of the type of equipment purchased and the level of interoperability between Japanese and American armed forces.

Beginning in the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s and more recently, such cooperation on weapons development has moved to a new level through the joint development of weapons and related technology for use by the armed forces of both states—the controversial FSX (now F2) fighter plane being one early attempt, and the equally controversial (at least initially) recent missile defense development being a more recent example. Table 4.3 lists several other recent examples of joint pursuit of weapons development, and indicates at one level how the United States has influenced the defense planning of the Japanese state. The converse, Japanese influence on American weapons development, still appears fairly far away on the horizon.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Formal Initiation</th>
<th>Date of Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ducted rocket engine</td>
<td>September 1992</td>
<td>January 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced steel technology</td>
<td>October 1995</td>
<td>January 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials</td>
<td>October 1995</td>
<td>October 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eye-safe laser radar</td>
<td>September 1995</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ejection seat</td>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance hybrid propulsion technology</td>
<td>May 1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow water acoustic technology</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>February 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense technology</td>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>January 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avionics abroad the follow-on aircraft to the P-3C</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software radio</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced hull material/structural technology</td>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Defense of Japan 2005, 175-76.

**Institutional Convergence and Interactive Socialization**

Another discrete area of influence by the United States on Japan’s defense establishment is through the regular interaction of defense-related officials of the two states—beyond the formal planning of defense doctrine specified under the formal alliance to the day-to-day consultation and influence on standard procedures, institutional structures, and personal attitudes and beliefs. The

---

201 1992 was the first year of such projects; therefore this table includes all projects to this point.
demonstration effect of the United States is quite strong and arguably deepening as the United States and Japan work closely together in an increasing number of areas. The establishment in Japan of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in 1995, for example, mirrored the earlier establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the United States, and for similar purposes—to promote sharing of intelligence across the military services and civilian defense organizations. The more recent creation and strengthening of a National Security Council under the Prime Minister’s Office in Japan similarly is modeled on the US National Security Council, with even more recent efforts under Prime Minister Abe to further mirror US functions.202 The US decision to move towards a greater “jointness” among the military services in the planning and execution of their missions similarly has been a recent export of the United States to Japan’s defense establishment.

Person-to-person interaction also is increasing between Americans and Japanese in areas related to defense—through the growth in the number of formal Japanese “defense attachés” and SDF officers in Washington to, on the other side, a growing number of American civilian and uniformed defense-related personnel visiting and residing in Japan from the Department of Defense, the military services, and other government agencies involved in the war on terror. As such interactions increase, individuals on both sides are socialized into perceiving threats and solutions in a common manner.203

Formal Discussions of Bilateral Defense Planning and Development

In addition to an increasing number of informal and personal-level exchanges between the American and Japanese defense establishment, formal institutional consultation also has increased in frequency and depth in the past decade, as indicated in Table 4.4 below.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Security Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>New Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) proclaimed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Security Consultative Committee (SCC) releases revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Japan offers to send MSDF ships to Indian Ocean to assist the US-led coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Japan offers to send SDF troops to Iraq to join the US-led coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Japan agrees to co-development of missile defense with the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>SCC reports released (February and October) on “common strategic objectives” and on realignment of the alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>SCC report released on the implementation plan for the realignment of US forces in Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed in previous chapters, Japan and United States formally clarified and augmented their respective roles and missions in their military alliance in 1997 by revising the US–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation (Guidelines hereafter), modifying an earlier agreement originally established in 1978. The revision of the bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation began in earnest when US and Japanese government officials realized after the 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis that there was very little clarity in what Japan could do to support the United States in a military conflict in East Asia. The revised Guidelines clarified the roles expected of Japan under three different circumstances—in peacetime, at a time of direct attacks against Japan, and a new middle ground in the event of a regional security contingency (the so-called shuhen jitai—“situation in the areas surrounding Japan”). Agreement in each of these areas had notable implications for the evolution of Japan’s defense establishment overall.

Among the three categories, what Japan should do in shuhen jitai was the most politically controversial, as it was not a clear case of armed attack against Japan and yet Japanese assistance to US military action was called for. After several years of debate, new “guidelines” as to what the Japanese government is authorized to do in case of contingencies in situations in the areas surrounding Japan was legislated in May 1999 into the Law to Ensure Japan’s Peace and Security in the Situations in the Areas Surrounding Japan (the shuhenjitai-hou). As discussed in greater detail in chapter Two, the law authorizes the SDF to engage in the following activities at sea and in the airspace in the area surrounding Japanese territory: logistical support, rear-area search-and-rescue operations, and ship inspections.204 Although this expanded regional security

---

role for Japan was motivated by a new post-Cold War security environment Japan faced, the role of the United States in driving this reconsideration should not be minimized.

Around the same time, in 1996, the United States and Japan signed an agreement that revised Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA). This agreement enabled the Self-Defense Forces to provide and receive goods and services from US forces when the SDF participates in joint training, UN peacekeeping operations, international relief activities, and regional contingencies, further placing the United States in a driving role in pushing Japan to modernize and deepen its defense commitments and capabilities.

One institutionalized aspect of greater US–Japan defense cooperation that helped to facilitate these broader agreements was the upgrading of the long-standing Security Consultative Committee to an equal exchange of US and Japanese officials under a “two plus two” framework of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense (now Minister of Defense) and the US Secretaries of State and Defense (upgraded from the previous practice of the US Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command). It is this body that declared formally the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in 1997, and more recently announced a series of new agreements in reports issued in February 2005, October 2005, and May 2006.

Recent SCC reports have announced the intention to increase missions to be completed by the SDF in conjunction with the US military and the capabilities of the SDF itself, augmenting the cooperative framework set out in the revised 1997 Guidelines related to security contingencies in areas surrounding Japan and those related to fighting terrorism. Moreover, the reports have emphasized an even greater degree of shared goals and values of the US and Japanese international policy.

---


206 Miyaoka, Isao. op. cit. Although this change was agreed to in December 1990, the SCC did not meet with these new actors in place until March 1994, and even then only with the US Under secretary of Defense.

In terms of cost, regional implications, and implications for the evolution of Japan’s defense establishment itself, joint development and operation of ballistic missile defense together with the United States—a process propelled further forward in recent SCC consultations and by other recent regional events—underscores the transformative role the United States plays in Japan’s defense policy. It is therefore worth exploring in some detail to illustrate the varied ways that the United States influences the evolution of Japan’s defense establishment.

**Ballistic Missile Defense: An Illustration of Multiple Types of Influence and Convergence**

Japan’s gradual embrace of ballistic missile defense (BMD) in response to persistent US pressure and a changing security environment in the East Asia and globally is one notable recent example of the US role in the shaping of Japan’s new defense establishment, beginning in earnest with the December 1998 decision by the Japanese government to embark on joint research with the United States on the development of a missile defense system and subsequent December 2003 decision by Japan to develop a related, individually-operated missile defense system.\(^{208}\) The decision to intensify joint research and to move to the development phase in FY2006 deepens interest in this question. US pressure on Japan to share development costs and technical hurdles of missile defense not only led to Japan’s adoption of missile defense as an important new capability for the SDF, but also led to a reconsideration and re-articulation of core security practices in early twenty-first century Japan, including such issues as preemption, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, the use of outer space, the export of weapons technology and components, and the interoperability of US and Japanese forces and equipment.\(^{209}\)

Despite changes in the US conception of missile defense over time, its goals *vis-à-vis* Japan have remained fairly constant—and mirror broader US security objectives regarding Japan.\(^{210}\) First, the United States seeks a financial contribution to the development of missile defense, and to its eventual deployment (*i.e.*, the MOD as a funder and customer). Second, it seeks access

\(^{208}\) The decision to embark on joint research with the United States on missile defense was announced by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on 25 December 1998. The Memorandum of Understanding between Japan and the United States was signed the following August. The decision to deploy an initial missile defense system was announced on 19 December 2003.

\(^{209}\) These issues are discussed in greater detail in Oros op. cit., Chapter Six.

\(^{210}\) Each of these goals is elaborated upon in Swaine, Michael, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami. *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001).
Japan’s missile defense policy is a direct response by Japan to US initiative, US planning, and US pressure. Although some obstacles to development of missile defense appear to have been overcome (as evidenced by the deployment of an initial system), further moves toward deployment of a joint system are bound to raise additional issues related to Japan’s evolving security practices. Indeed, in interviews with JDA officials conducted in December 2005 and January 2006, missile defense was repeatedly referred to as an “engine of change” for Japanese defense policy as well as for Japan’s alliance relations with the United States. This is not to say that Japanese officials also have independently determined that development of a workable ballistic missile defense shield is in the Japanese national interest. Japanese defense planners dragged their feet in cooperating with the United States in the early stages of missile defense consultation due to lack of interest, only warming to increased cooperation (and funding) after the “Taepodong shock” of August 1998.211 The point, however, is that a core interest of US defense policy—especially under US President George W. Bush—was exported to Japan and ultimately penetrated Japanese defense planning and helped to shape Japan’s new defense establishment.

Two separate issues face Japan regarding missile defense. First are Japan’s own strategic concerns based on the new post-Cold War security environment. These concerns differ from those of the United States because Japan’s security environment and interests differ from its super-power ally, despite efforts of elites to play up the “common agenda” of the two states.212 The second issue

---

211 This argument is developed further in Oros op. cit., Chapter Six.
212 For the JDA rationale for the introduction of missile defense in 2004, see Defense of Japan 2005, 186-98.
facing Japan is the limitations imposed by numerous codified constraints on Japan’s security practices (such as the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and arms export restrictions), as well as other domestic factors such as bureaucratic politics, industry pressure, and budgetary concerns over responding to US initiatives on missile defense in particular, and broader strategic concerns in general. As noted by Hughes: “BMD may finally tip Japan toward collective self-defense, which would lead to a radical transformation in Japan’s military security policy and participation in nearly all forms of military operations, especially in cooperation with the United States.”

Japanese researchers will work together with their U.S. counterparts to develop four components of a potential missile defense system for use in East Asia. The Japanese government initially budgeted twenty-two billion yen (over $204 million) through FY2003 on this joint research, with actual spending from FY1999-2004 totaling ¥25.3 billion. The FY2005 budget allocates a further ¥900 million to cover testing costs. The total cost of the envisioned system is expected to exceed one trillion yen—a cost to be shared between the United States and Japan, with Japan having committed over one billion dollars for the first nine years of the project. By contrast, the yearly expenditure for total equipment purchases by the JDA has not exceeded one trillion yen since 1994.

An explanation based on gaiatsu alone, however, can explain neither the timing nor the limitations placed on Japan’s missile defense program to date. The new policy priorities of Japan’s own defense establishment also are evident. Japan partnered with the United States on the precursor to missile defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), in 1983. In 1993, Japan joined a joint study group with the United States to examine cooperation on missile defense. By 2006, however, despite great pressure from the United States throughout the preceding twenty-six years, all that Japanese policymakers would commit to a jointly-pursued missile defense was further research into only four components

214 Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 August 1999.
216 Ibid.
217 Chanlett-Avery et al. op. cit., 11.
of one part of a future missile defense system, the interceptor missile, and cost sharing of about twenty-six billion yen of a total cost of over ten trillion yen the United States has invested in missile defense to date.219 While US policy and pressure on Japan regarding SDI/missile defense/NMD has varied in its character over the years, the United States consistently has pushed Japan to assume a larger role in development of a missile defense system, with substantial success appearing only recently. The case of missile defense does, however, show how foreign pressure not only can result in some shift in individual security policies such as with missile defense, but also can contribute to a broader reconsideration of the security practices themselves.

As with a number of analysts of the US–Japan relations and its likely future direction, Umemoto cautions that the deepening of alliance cooperation in the area of missile defense also runs risks, including the development of greater willingness to cooperate with Japan beyond missile defense among the American public, the need for “real consultation” to coordinate missile defense policy and the friction that might engender, and the pressure missile defense development would place on Japan to alter its current security prohibitions.220 This is only one of many concerns that have been voiced when looking forward in US–Japan security cooperation and its impact on Japan’s evolving defense establishment, other are considered in the following section below.

**LOOKING FORWARD: US INFLUENCE ON JAPAN’S FUTURE CHOICES**

Despite multiple areas to monitor in the future development of Japan’s relationship with the United States, all indications are that Japan’s defense establishment will continue to evolve under the close guidance and cooperation of its core American ally. Japan’s alliance relationship with the United States will hasten further capacity and capability development in Japan’s defense establishment in four areas in particular. First, the US goal of greater interoperability and joint capabilities of the SDF and US forces will build capacity on the part of Japan. Areas of particular note would include the fore-mentioned missile defense, greater sharing of intelligence, increased cooperation in antiterrorism and counter-proliferation activities (as discussed in chapter Five below), and further development of naval cooperation.221 Second, Japan will develop more experience working in third countries together with its American ally, building on recent experiences in the Indian Ocean and in areas around

---


220 Umemoto, *op. cit.*, 201-203.

221 See Isozaki and Szechenyi, *op. cit.*, for further discussion of likely developments in these areas.
Iraq. Third, the SDF is quite likely to play a greater role in the managing of military bases within Japan, including the assumption of full responsibility for some bases currently operated largely by the United States, as well as a growing number of jointly-operated bases. Fourth, the MOD and SDF are poised to play enhanced leadership roles within the alliance, including as leaders in regional security forums—a topic developed further in chapter Five below. All of these areas will lead to a more confident and capable Japan in the coming decade, exemplified by a truly new defense establishment overall. Still, in conclusion, it is worth considering other scenarios, and also a few areas of special concern in Japan’s defense evolution vis-à-vis the United States.

The Greatest (and Unlikely) Concern: Alliance Rupture

The conventional wisdom regarding the US–Japan security alliance, particularly in recent years, has been to assume that the US–Japan Security Treaty will remain in effect, that US forces will remain in Japan for the medium-term at least, and that Japan will work actively to support—even to deepen—its security relationship with the United States. By all indications, each of these assumptions reflects the most likely scenario. However, there are unlikely but possible circumstances that would lead to these assumptions not proving correct—and which would underscore in the opposite manner to what has been presented above how central the United States has become to Japan’s defense planning and evolving defense establishment. As recently as the mid-1990s it was a mainstream position to question the longevity of the US–Japan security alliance; most recently, under the warm Bush-Koizumi friendship, the relationship has been so strong, and so many mechanisms have been put into place to solidify and deepen the alliance, nearly all bets are on this relationship moving forward as today. As with the quadruple shocks of 1989–91, however—a declining economy, death of the Showa emperor, end of the Cold War, and loss of LDP control of the Diet—a similar combination of shocks to Japan’s domestic and international environment could once again call the alliance into question.

A rupture in the US–Japan alliance could serve as a catalyst for substantial policy change within Japan’s defense establishment. In 1995, anti-American riots over the rape of a school-age girl by US marines in Okinawa spread throughout Japan and exerted considerable political pressure on the United States for a major force realignment. At that time, the aggravation of the US-Japan alliance was arguably averted more as a result of a worsening international environment (first with North Korea, then with the 9/11 attacks, and with a rising China in the background) than due to resolution of longstanding grievances of the Japanese public regarding US forces in Japan. It also was not that long ago (in 1998) that Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister in
nearly forty years published an article in *Foreign Affairs* calling for “an alliance without bases”—i.e., a continued US–Japan alliance, but one without permanent American forces stationed in Japan. 222 While not overtly calling for such a policy, the DPJ (the biggest opposition party in today’s Japanese politics) also flirts with such rhetoric, leaving open the possibility that it would pursue such a line if it were to come into power. A rising nationalism in Japan—a factor being watched closely by many analysts—also could in future potentially latch onto the presence of US bases in Japan and a deepening interoperability of US and Japanese military forces as unacceptable affronts to Japanese national pride or sovereignty. That concerns about the apparent permanence of US forces in Japan, about US pressure on Japan further to increase military activities and capabilities, and about the increased threat that the presence of US forces on Japanese soil may cause Japan are heard not only from those on the far right (those traditionally associated with nationalism) but also among many on the left and even among government officials themselves also suggests that this scenario be considered seriously.

The More Likely Future: Deepening…to a Degree

More likely than the above cautionary scenario is that a troublesome Japanese nationalism will be kept in check and that US–Japan defense cooperation will move forward in the areas spelled out at the beginning of this section. Recent alliance deepening is not the result of limited and temporary situational events but rather of long-term challenges to the security of Japan and the United States that provide an enduring rationale for continued cooperation. 223 Still, even cooperation under a logical rationale will require close coordination among political leaders and operational-level bureaucrats and military personnel on both sides.

Moreover, both countries are displaying more open concern about entrapment in a security contingency beyond what each states’ national interest can justify. Japan long has displayed concern over entrapment into the larger geo-strategic conflicts in which its superpower ally often found itself entangled in, and continues to fear such entrapment both regionally (particularly related to China) and globally (with Iran and the broader war on terror, in particular). More recently, the United States also is showing evidence of such fears, particularly as


Japan’s relations with China have soured in recent years. Mochizuki argues, for example, that in examining Japan’s post-Cold War security strategy, two legs of a deepening US–Japan alliance and a deepening of Japan’s relations in Asia should be considered. He expresses concern about recent negative developments in Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors may eventually blow back to weaken the first.  

This “hedging” strategy—or “Goldilocks strategy” as Samuels calls it—sets a limit for how interoperable, how deep, and how extensive the alliance between the United States and Japan can grow, posing real challenges to the future development of Japan’s defense establishment. Ultimately, a bilateral US–Japan alliance is unlikely to prove sufficient for either party in providing adequate security for East Asia. As East Asia and the international system as a whole adjusts to such macro-level, systemic shifts as the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States globally and of Japan economically, greater institutionalization of the security apparatus in the region beyond the “hard bilateralism and soft multilateralism” of the past decades will be required—a view apparently shared by Japanese security planners, who increasingly have sought to expand security cooperation beyond their bilateral alliance with the United States, the subject of chapter Five below.

CONCLUSION

The gradual evolution of Japan’s military posture towards greater capabilities and assertiveness is not the result solely of domestic political forces responding to a changing international environment. External actors also play an important role in how Japan conceives of and crafts its defense posture. Foremost among such actors is the United States, as a collective entity and alliance partner and also as individual bureaucratic actors within the United States, most importantly the Department of Defense and the individual military services working through the mechanism of the US–Japan alliance. US pressure for Japan to share in the development challenges and costs of creating a workable ballistic missile defense system is one case in point. Coordination with the United States in this important and costly defense initiative—as well as other, similar joint initiatives

---


– propels Japan forward in addressing numerous limitations of its Cold War and early post-Cold War security practices. Although Japan itself, naturally, determines the course of its own security policy, an examination of Japan’s new defense establishment would not be complete without careful consideration of the role of the United States in its creation, its maintenance, and its future development.
— 5 —
FROM “DOUBLE TRACK” TO “CONVERGENCE”:
JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND
AN EMERGING SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION
KEN JIMBO

The security impact of the end of the Cold War has been much more profound in Europe than in the Asia–Pacific region. While institutions of international security in Europe have undergone fundamental changes, comparable changes have yet to reach Asia. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has transformed both its membership and functions by virtually eliminating its east–west border and making far-reaching decisions in regard to its role in the future, including the creation of the cutting-edge NATO Responsive Force. In contrast, although the US–Japan alliance has adapted its concept, roles and missions to the post-Cold War environment to serve as the foundation of a US-centric alliance in the Asia–Pacific region, the basic structure of the bilateral alliance networks based on the “hub-and-spokes” model created during the Cold War remains the same.227

THE NATURE OF A “DOUBLE TRACK” APPROACH TO ASIA–PACIFIC SECURITY

In the area of multilateral security, the enhanced European multilateral effort took place especially in the context of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) within the European Union (EU), including the establishment of the military committee and the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in 2004. In Asia, a comparable development could hardly be imaginable in the near future. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, or ARF, is the major multilateral security forum in the region and also serves as the framework for cooperative security. While ARF has been entrusted to enhance dialogue and security cooperation, it has only just begun its effort to promote measures for preventive diplomacy. Thus, US and Japanese policymakers have regarded a “double track” approach as the best model for

meeting security needs in the Asia–Pacific region. Under this approach, the US-Japan alliance provides the principal deterrence and response capability as the one track, while the second track of multilateral security cooperation serves to complement the alliance by increasing comfort levels and creating an atmosphere that is conducive to cooperative security in the region.

The “double track” approach gradually took shape in the course of the review process of the US–Japan alliance in the mid-1990s. On the part of the United States, after several years of being reluctant to promote a multinational approach to regional security within the framework of the ARF, the Clinton Administration in 1993 began to view multilateral security dialogue as complementary to its bilateral alliance networks, so long as it did not impede its forward-deployment strategy in the Asia–Pacific region. On Japan’s part, Tokyo has been supportive of the idea of creating multilateral security in the Asia–Pacific region since 1991 when then-Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama put forward the so-called “Nakayama proposal” at his speech at the ASEAN post-ministerial conference (PMC) that year. In his speech, Nakayama advocated that the Asia–Pacific region create ‘a sense of mutual reassurance’ and called for the establishment of a framework for regular high-level dialogue among the leaders of the countries in the region on their security concerns. Key phrases, such as “mutual reassurance measures” (MRM) and “trust building measures” (TBM), were carefully chosen to deliberately exclude the concept of ‘confidence building’ that originated in Europe. This was because the term ‘confidence-building’ was regarded among Japanese policymakers as a process to enter into only with adversaries. In this context, Japan considered the forum such as the ARF to be a vehicle for fostering a sense of trust, however fragile, on the basis of providing and sharing quality information about China, Japan, and the United States, without undermining the existing security arrangements, including the US–Japan alliance.

Since then, the approach has been repeatedly emphasized within official documents issued by both nations:


230 Yukio Sato, ibid.

“Some in the United States have been reluctant to enter into regional security dialogues in Asia, but I see this as a way to supplement our alliances and forward military presence, not to supplant them.”

—US Department of Defense

“Japan believes that one practical and appropriate measure for securing peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region is to improve and strengthen layers of bilateral and multilateral frameworks for dialogue, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), while securing the presence and involvement of the US in this region as its cornerstone.”

—Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan

Recent developments in the region, however, pose considerable challenges to the very nature of the decade-long “double track” approach. Momentum is growing now to create more coordinated networks between US-led bilateral alliances that can be better characterized as “web networks” rather than “hub-and-spokes.” The Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG) among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, and other multilateral security cooperative frameworks among US allies in the Asia–Pacific region, are primary examples. The United States also has begun to emphasize its focus on intensifying the military-to-military cooperation with countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania, especially the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia under the concept of “comprehensive engagement.”

In the area of multilateral security, the ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 2001 adopted three key papers as basic platforms to introduce additional measures: Definitions and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy, Enhanced Role of ARF Chairman, and Co-Chair’s Paper on the Registration System for ARF Experts. As these measures materialize, the ARF has been making slow but

---

232 US Department of Defense. op. cit.


234 US Department of Defense. op. cit.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/g_seimei_d.html

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/g_seimei_b.html

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/arf/g_seimei_c.html
steady progress in developing its institutional scope to evolve into a more action-oriented regime. In addition to the ARF, the defense officials’ exchanges have also increasingly flourished in recent years, most notably through the so-called Shangri-la Dialogue, an annual meeting of defense ministers in the Asia–Pacific region that is hosted by the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore.

In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the necessity for anti-terrorism cooperation created an incentive for a broader multilateral security cooperative framework in the Asia–Pacific region. There are also other types of multinational security cooperation emerging in East Asia that are not necessarily based on geographical groupings, but rather on common security concerns and the need to combine capabilities among the affected countries to address them. This has often led to the formation of a “regional security complex” or new forms of the “coalition of the willing.” In particular, such ‘function (or capability)-based’ security cooperation frameworks quickly emerged particularly in the area of counterterrorism cooperation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These multi-dimensional developments indicate that security cooperation in East Asia is much more complex today than a traditional bilateral/multilateral nexus model.

This chapter demonstrates that Japan’s engagement in the ‘double track’ approach in the area of regional security cooperation is entering into a new phase, especially in the wake of the various forms of multilateral security mechanisms that have been emerging in recent years in the Asia–Pacific region. This chapter also examines how such changes may affect Japan’s new defense establishment and the policy that comes out of Tokyo. By reviewing the emerging characteristics of the security environment in the Asia–Pacific region, with particular focus on the development of these new features, this chapter argues that the emerging features of security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region will cement the foundation for the concept of ‘convergent security’ as the alternative to replace the ‘double track’ approach that Japan has engaged in.239


239 The concept of ‘convergent security’ is most elaborated by William T. Tow. He defines the convergent security as “a managed transition from a regional security system based predominantly on realist-oriented bilateral security to one based increasingly upon regional multilateral arrangement”. Tow assessed the evolving trends of ‘convergence’ by examining the applicability of realist and liberal arguments: realism including maximal realism, minimal realism, neo-isolationism and power balancing, and liberalism including multilateralism and neo-liberal institutionalism. William T. Tow, Asia–Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 9. The author’s view on ‘convergent security’ echoes Tow’s view, however,
Finally, the chapter assesses how such a change in the regional security environment may affect the thinking within Japan’s defense establishment which, in turn, may potentially result in shifting Japan’s approach toward regional security cooperation.


When discussing a multilateral approach, there should be a distinction between two types of multilateral security for analytical purposes. One is multilateral security cooperation based on a network of preexisting bilateral relations (expanded bilateralism), and the other is multilateral security cooperation in a genuinely multilateral setting (enhanced multilateralism).²⁴⁰

**Multilateral Military Exercises**

“Expanded bilateralism” is one of the emerging features of multilateral security in the Asia–Pacific region. The concept is based on the belief that bilateralism would be the best form of cooperation, but it could also serve as a base for multilateral cooperation.²⁴¹ In the United States, the primary driver of expanded bilateralism has been the US Pacific Command (PACOM), which has been advocating the creation of a “security community” based on “enriched bilateralism.”²⁴² Admiral Dennis Blair, former PACOM commander, argues that it is essential for the Asia–Pacific region to develop a multilateral approach to the region’s common security challenges. He believes that the most effective method is to develop policy coordination mechanisms, including combined military cooperation, whether it be to respond to a particular issue or to address a series of related security issues. For that purpose, he suggests that the US military, in conjunction with its allies and partners in the region, should undertake to enhance regional readiness for combined operations.

Evolution in the PACOM-led multilateral military exercises provides a good example of how to develop expanded bilateralism. For instance, PACOM held a...
multinational joint exercise, Team Challenge (TC-01), between April and May in 2001. This came about as a result of combining Cobra Gold (a bilateral military exercise between the United States and Thailand) with two other existing US bilateral military exercises—Tandem Thrust with Australia and Balikatan with the Philippines—based on the concept outlined above. The United States, Thailand, Australia, the Philippines and Singapore participated in this umbrella exercise while twenty-two countries sent observers. The purpose of linking existing exercises under TC-01 was to improve readiness and interoperability and to increase security cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region. The multilateral cooperative framework such as TC-01 can serve to complement existing bilateral relationships throughout the region and also provide additional training and engagement opportunities. TC-01 also set an ambitious two-phase plan for future development, including the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) that is composed of the respective maritime, air and army forces of the participating countries.

The focus of PACOM-led military exercises has shifted toward counterterrorism operations especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Increased commitment by the US military to provide security assistance to the countries in the region labeled as the ‘second front in the global war on terror’ are particularly underscored. For instance, the primary focus of the operations in the multinational exercise Balikatan in 2002 was virtually the “search and hunt” of the anti-government group Abu Sayaff, which is suspected to have strong links with Al-Qaeda. The future premise of Team Challenge is yet to be given, but these examples demonstrate the growing potential for the web of US-led military cooperation to evolve into a solid foundation for multilateral security cooperation.

**Counterproliferation Operations: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)**

The concept of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) first appeared in the Bush Administration’s *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* that was released in December 2002. Under the PSI concept, interdiction is listed first among various counter proliferation measures which, in turn, were given prominence over more traditional nonproliferation efforts.243

After President Bush formally announced the launching of the PSI in May 2003, following the meetings in Madrid (12 June), Brisbane (9-10 July), and Paris (4

---

September) that all occurred in 2003, the core participants developed the principles for the PSI, which culminated in the Paris Agreement in September 2003. Currently, more than 60 countries support the PSI, including Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The PSI is aimed at:

- pre-emptive interdiction, including detaining and searching ships and aircrafts as soon as they enter the territorial waters or national airspace of PSI member countries;
- denial of suspicious aircraft over flight rights;
- grounding of airplanes when they stop to refuel in member countries or in states willing to cooperate on a case-by-case basis; and,
- boarding and searching ships registered in a PSI member nation or operating under a ‘flag of convenience’ of another state prepared to authorize an interdiction in a particular instance.

The White House emphasized that the PSI “reinforces, not replaces” existing nonproliferation regimes to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles and related technology to “state and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”

From 13-15 September 2003, a multinational exercise called Pacific Protector took place in the Coral Sea. Led by Australia, the exercise focused on the interdiction of WMD and related materials, with the goal of enhancing the collective capabilities among the participants to cooperate in actual sea, air and ground interdiction operations. As part of Pacific Protector, France provided military assets. Japan offered its Coast Guard and law enforcement capabilities. Australia and the United States provided military equipment. Other PSI-participating nations joined the exercise as observers. Pacific Protector sought to “improve the modalities, the processes, the standard operating procedures, the intelligence exchanges—all those things that allow us to think and react and act more quickly because often times when you get actionable intelligence, you have to move quickly.” It was also hoped to serve as a confidence-building measure for the PSI countries to be able to work together collectively.

---


247 Ibid.
Team Samurai 2004, the twelfth PSI training exercise, was hosted by Japan in October 2004. Japan was hailed as the first Asian nation to take the lead in weapons of mass destruction deterrence. The United States, Japan, Australia, and France participated in the exercise, while other countries (including Cambodia, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) sent observers. Singapore led a maritime and ground interdiction exercise, Deep Sabre, that occurred in the South China Sea in August 2005 and England hosted another maritime and ground interdiction exercise, Exploring Themis, in November 2005.

Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

As the United States continues to propel multinational security cooperation based on the existing bilateral relations between the United States and the countries in the Asia–Pacific region, some existing multinational cooperative frameworks in the region began to promote cooperation in common security concerns among the countries in the region. The emergence of anti-terrorism cooperation within these multinational frameworks is a prime example that demonstrates how a common security concern can be a vehicle for regional security cooperation.

For instance, ASEAN has brought terrorism to the center stage of the security dialogue among the member states. In November 2001, ASEAN adopted the Declaration on Joint Actions to Counter Terrorism, which included practical measures to “review and strengthen...[a] national mechanism to combat terrorism” and to establish “regional capacity building programmes to enhance existing capabilities of ASEAN member countries to investigate, detect, monitor, and report on terrorist acts.” Measures taken by the ASEAN to combat terrorism also include cooperation among law enforcement agencies and exchange of information and intelligence on terrorist organizations, their movement and funding. Following the adoption of the Declaration on Joint Actions to Counter Terrorism, the Special ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting for Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in Malaysia in May 2002 adopted a joint communiqué that envisaged the establishment of national focal points for information exchange and the sharing of technical expertise and best practices through training workshops.


The ARF has also responded to the emerging threat of international terrorism. The ARF first adopted the Statement on Measures against Terrorist Financing in July 2003, expressing the members’ commitment to freeze terrorist assets, exchange information, conduct outreach activities, and provide technical assistance “in developing and implementing necessary laws, regulations and policies to combat terrorist financing and money laundering.”250 Shortly after the adoption of the statement, the ARF launched the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM on CT-TC). At its first meeting in May 2003, the ISM on CT-TC proposed that the ARF adopt a statement on border security.251 This proposal was accepted at the ARF ministerial meeting in June 2003 and the ARF issued the Statement on Cooperative Counter-Terrorist Actions on Border Security.252 Furthermore, the ARF issued the Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism at its ministerial meeting in July 2004. It was agreed that the implementation of the statement would be reviewed every year.253

In addition, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which began as a forum for dialogue on economic issues, responded to the developments in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks by taking up international terrorism as part of its agenda. For example, at the 2002 APEC Summit, the leaders announced the Los Cabos Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth. In this statement, APEC leaders declared their commitment to block the financing of terrorist organizations, promote cyber security, and cooperate in capacity building.254 This statement led to the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) in February 2003 which, since its creation, has held three meetings, most recently in Vietnam in September 2006. The statement also led to the adoption of the APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAP) that set clear benchmarks for APEC member states to acquire key capacity to counter


the threat of terrorism in the areas such as cargo security, cyber security, energy security, and measures to halt the financing of terrorism.255

Counter-terrorism cooperation, however, has had a mixed impact on China’s agenda within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On the one hand, the war on terror has certainly provided significant opportunities for confidence-building between the United States and China. On the other hand, the ascendance of terrorism as a major security concern has also resulted in drawing greater international attention to the status of minorities in China or the movements of domestically violent groups such as the Falun Gong. China’s engagement in Central Asia has also developed with institutionalization of the SCO, with counter-terrorism occupying its central agenda.

**“COALITION OF THE WILLING”: NEW FORMS OF MULTINATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION**

In recent years, security cooperation has been increasingly pursued in the existing multinational frameworks such as the ASEAN+3, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in addition to other venues of bilateral and multilateral security cooperation. The premise of multilateral security by multilateralism such as the ARF is based on inclusiveness and equality among the member states, where countries in the region are free to participate in the forum. The membership of the regime is based on the countries’ geographical location, not on the nature of their governments or their policy toward specific issues. In these institutions, engagement is the core principle. As such, the ARF, for instance, has successfully engaged an expanded ASEAN that includes China, Russia, India, and North Korea.

What we have been witnessing in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is the emergence of the notion of a “coalition of the willing” in the Asia-Pacific region as a form of multinational security cooperation. Multilateral security cooperation that takes place under this concept does not necessarily adhere to the unequivocal inclusive nature offered by the existing multinational institutions in the region. The framework for cooperation is based on the capability and willingness of the respective countries. Most of the existing coalitions have principles of open membership and do not exclude future participation by non-members. But the tacit understanding among the members of the “coalition of the willing” is that they do not want the participation of

255 APEC Counter-Terrorism Action Plans
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism_action_plans.html
countries that are reluctant to accept the norms that are shared by other member countries. This unstated, but clear, preference sometimes leads to the politics of exclusion.256

The primary benefit of the ‘coalition of the willing’ is that it could foster security cooperation with like-minded states to ensure increased cooperation. It could be even regarded as an alternative to the existing multinational institutions that are based on inclusiveness and geographical location (such as ARF) because they usually cannot respond to dynamic developments for security cooperation because of their consensus-based nature. Instead, the ‘coalition of the willing’ can launch higher levels of cooperation without interference by dissenting voices. Non-members can be invited to participate after the coalition members have agreed on the agenda. This model provides new opportunities for security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region, as well as a breakthrough for enhancing meaningful measures to be materialized.

In summary, we have been witnessing the emergence of multifaceted security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region since 2001. The inter-relationships among the various cooperative frameworks are illustrated in Table 5.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Inclusive/Regional (Geographical Cooperation)</th>
<th>Exclusive/Functional (Regional Security Complex)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forceful Competitive (Deterrence/Response)</td>
<td>(Convergence of Security Cooperation?)</td>
<td>Japan-US Alliance, Japan-Korea Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Cooperation (CBM/PD)</td>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>PSI Anti-Terrorism Cooperation Non-Traditional Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARF, Shangri-la Dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIEW OF MAJOR PLAYERS ON MULTINATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA–PACIFIC REGION

When analyzing any type of multinational security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region, there are two countries whose role cannot be overlooked—China and the United States. In fact, the emergence of multinational security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region cannot be discussed without reviewing how the views of these two countries toward the concept of multinational security cooperation in the region have evolved in recent years.

China: A Search for a ‘New Security Concept’

China first looked at multinational security institutions in the Asia–Pacific region with suspicion. Today, it still struggles to adjust to the emerging structure of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region and thus the process of adjustment has been gradual.

The “New Security Concept” that China first advocated in 1997 emphasized multilateral efforts based on confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as the ones between China and Russia on border issues and the initiatives for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But China’s latest position paper on the New Security Concept published in 2002 insists that China would emphasize expanding security cooperation on non-traditional fields, such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes. China also has begun to show more flexible responses to the notion of regional security cooperation. For example, it sent observers to the US-Thai bilateral military exercise Cobra-Gold for the first time in May 2002. The Chinese military’s recent contacts with their interlocutors in the region are becoming increasingly richer and more flexible.

China’s National Defense, published in 2002 stated that, “China intends to selectively and gradually participate in more multilateral joint military exercises in the non-traditional fields.” One official from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said, “China will no longer oppose these military exercises even by the US, if the purposes of these exercises are for non-traditional missions, such as peace-keeping and disaster relief.”

These episodes suggest how the convergence of multiple forms of security cooperation could serve as a platform for working with China and other major


259 Interview with official from the People’s Liberation Army, 29 April 2002, Tokyo.
powers in the region. China, the United States and Japan may find reason to expand the role of multilateral security cooperation in the different but intertwined context. China’s willingness to join the “coalition of the willing” in non-traditional security issues could help in setting up the norms and cooperative frameworks without lowering the targeted goals. The United States, in turn, may find that the ARF and other mechanisms could serve as complementary frameworks to the alliance in more visible terms. If low-intensity conflicts such as the case of East Timor, political crises, and small-border skirmishes can be dealt with by an autonomous framework in the Asia–Pacific region, then it may give the United States more flexibility in its policy toward regional affairs. In this context, China would be able to play active roles in security cooperation in terms of: (a) the mechanism in which the United States, Japan and other major regional actors are participating; and, (b) the framework led by China that excludes the participation of the United States and Japan. Unless China willingly takes part in the process, ASEAN countries will tend to rely more on the US-led “web” of security that may exclude China, which in effect becomes a US-led “China encircling” security system. If China wants to avoid this scenario, it would likely join efforts to create more viable multilateral security mechanisms. This may lead to the convergence of existing security cooperation that would help create a more promising architecture for a multi-layered security network in the Asia–Pacific region.

The United States: “Pacific Community” versus “East Asian Community”?

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made a speech on US–Asia policy on 19 March 2005 during her visit to Japan at Sophia University in Tokyo. The “Pacific Community” and “openness and choice” were her key words when she outlined a US vision of the regional architecture in the Asia–Pacific region:

“The future of Asia and the Pacific community will be defined around two great themes—openness and choice. Instead of closed societies or economies, instead of spheres of influence, we stand for an open world. Instead of an exclusive club of powers, we stand for a community open to all. But states must choose. They must choose whether to be a part of that community of openness, accepting the responsibilities that go with it. The United States and Japan have already made that choice, and we are honored to have a democratic Japan as a friend” (italics added by author)261

Prior to that speech, Japan and the United States issued a *Joint Statement* at the conclusion of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on 19 February 2005. In the statement, the two countries recognized and welcomed the “development of various forms of regional cooperation” while stressing the “importance of open, inclusive and transparent regional mechanisms” as a bilateral common strategic objective in the region. The term “regional cooperation” clearly included recent efforts to develop multinational frameworks in East Asia. In Rice’s speech in Tokyo, however, such an embrace of other forms of regional cooperation was not reiterated. Instead, the “Pacific community” was the only concept that she used to describe the US vision for the region.

It remains unclear whether the United States perceives the emergence of a closer cooperative relationship among the countries in East Asia as a phenomenon that would serve US interests in the region. Many in the United States, including former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, openly oppose the idea of an East Asian community (and thereby opposed the concept of an East Asian Summit). The concerns raised by those who oppose this concept seem to be based on three points. First, the East Asian Community (EAC) could potentially create or increase Chinese influence in the region. Given China’s growing economy and political influence, building a regional framework without the United States might result in the creation of a China-led community that could compromise US engagement in East Asia. Second, the EAC would challenge the flexibility of the US-led “hub-and-spokes” system based on bilateral relations between the United States and countries in the region, and thus could increase the transaction costs in both security and economic relations for Washington. Finally, the EAC might serve as an excuse to delay the democratic transition of authoritarian regimes in the region by introducing an Asian model of governance.

Given these factors, the United States seems to have decided not to apply the analogy of trans-Atlantic relations, where NATO and the EU play complementary roles in the Asia–Pacific region. Washington’s logic becomes clearer whenever the United States tries to emphasize the trans-Atlantic relations as a “community of democracies” in contrast with the trans-Pacific relations.

**Implications for Japan’s Perspectives on “Strategic Convergence”**

Japan has long been a proponent of multilateral security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region, while maintaining the strong US–Japan alliance as a

---

linchpin of its defense and regional security. It prioritized the US–Japan alliance as a vehicle that allows Japan to address the security concerns in the Asia–Pacific region, while focusing on multilateral security cooperation as the mechanism that complements the alliance. In other words, Japan has used a ‘double track approach’ in its security policy toward the Asia–Pacific region.

In the wake of emerging multinational security cooperative frameworks as outlined above, Japan can be in the position to support the potential convergence of various security cooperative frameworks vigorously. To do so, however, Japan will have to overcome certain constraints that are unique to Japan. First, the Japanese government may want to shape its policy in such a way that Japan will play greater roles in security cooperation in “non-traditional” security areas such as anti-terrorism and low intensity contingencies. Such a policy would likely be more politically accepted than military operations, which could be controversial. Second, the future plan for US forward-deployment strategy, as articulated by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), stresses the importance of the US–Japan alliance to play a more global role. In the context of the Asia–Pacific region, it also underscores the importance of gaining military access points in Southeast Asia. This concept may push Japan to support the US–Japan alliance in a broader geographical context beyond Northeast Asia to include Southeast Asia. Finally, the notion of “strategic convergence” (convergence of various security cooperative frameworks) would allow Japan to maintain its policy priorities toward Asia–Pacific security of continuing the strong alliance and expanding multilateral cooperation. Thus, Japan has a strong reason to be in favor of bridging the alliance and the concepts of multinational security cooperation.

As noted in Chapter Two, Japan adopted the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG) in December 2004. The NDPG has outlined the two main objectives of Japanese security policy to be: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and (b) to improve the international security environment. It further argued that Japan would attempt to achieve these goals by using three approaches: (a) Japan’s own efforts; (b) cooperation with alliance partners; and, (c) cooperation with the international community.

It is important that the concept of ‘international contribution’ that was put forth in the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was replaced by

---


‘improving international security environment’ through “systematic collaboration of the security-related measures” in the 2004 NDPG. In fact, one of the most significant undertakings of the 2004 NDPG was that it positioned the improvement of the international security environment as one of the two core objectives of Japanese defense policy. This means that Japan will, from now on, regard global security issues (including transnational threats) as the factor that has potential impact on Japan’s national security. It should also be noted that the 2004 NDPG pays particular attention to “new threats and various situations (i.e., terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” as the threats that Japan will have to focus in the current global security environment.265

Furthermore, the 2004 NDPG upgrades the importance of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) participation in international operations and granted an equal importance to the defense of Japan and the maintenance of the US–Japan alliance, which have been the SDF’s primary duty since its establishment. It also called for Japan to have a defense capability that is “multi-functional, flexible, and effective…with a high level of readiness, mobility, and adaptability and intelligence capabilities compared to the global military technological level.”266 This reasoning would allow Japan to become more actively engaged in global security affairs and also enable the SDF to play a more proactive role in regional security, while improving the connectivity between national defense and regional security affairs (Table 5.2).

265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
Table 5.2 Geographical/Functional Focus of NDPG

Based on the policy priorities outlined in the 2004 NDPG 9 (see Table 5.2), it is reasonable to conclude that Japan will likely become an active player in the process of security community building in East Asia. In today’s Japan, the only institutional, legal, and policy framework that can transcend these categories is the cooperation that exists within the framework of the US–Japan alliance. This makes the management of the US–Japan alliance even more important for Japan in the coming years.

However, given the multifaceted nature of multinational security cooperation in the Asia–Pacific region, it is desirable for Japan to enhance its own capacity to respond to evolving security situations flexibly and timely. If the Asia–Pacific region fails to bridge the gaps among global, regional, and bilateral security cooperative frameworks, it could recede into “stagnant regionalism”. Should the region successfully develop a regional architecture that enhances regional security, fosters regional economic growth, and promotes the global values of democracy and human rights, it can lead to the establishment of a regional community that will have better relations with the United States in the future. Japan will be well advised to take the initiative in setting higher goals for such a regional framework to bridge the gap that exists among global, regional, and bilateral cooperative frameworks to address regional security as well as non-security concerns.
CONCLUSION

MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI AND YUKI TATSUMI

Japan’s defense establishment has changed tremendously since the end of the Cold War. As the previous chapters have illustrated, changes in Japanese security policy and Japan’s defense establishment began in the 1990s and accelerated in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Today, Japan’s defense establishment has a structure and functions that are very different from when it was created fifty years ago. Previous chapters identified three important changes in Japan’s defense establishment since the end of the Cold War—centralization of the decision-making process, elevation of the status of the JDA (evidenced most recently by its becoming the Ministry of Defense), and expansion of the operational scope of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

Centralization of the decision-making process came partly as a result of the Japanese government’s overall efforts in administrative reform and partly in response to the domestic and international demand for a more timely Japanese government response to crises. As examined in Chapter One, there is a clear trend toward a more centralized decision-making process both in the civilian and the military institutions in Japan’s defense establishment. Reorganization efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as well as the JDA in the last fifteen years, efforts to enhance the role of the Cabinet in the management of Japanese security policy, and introduction of the more joint (and hence centralized) command structure to the SDF are all part of the Japanese government’s efforts to enhance its security policy-making, decision-making, and implementation capacity. With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s keen interest in enhancing the Cabinet’s information-gathering and analysis, as well as policy-making, capability—embodied by the recent developments toward creating an US-style National Security Council—this trend will no doubt continue.

Furthermore, contrary to earlier years when Japan’s sole security policy priority was its territorial defense, Japan today claims that it also seeks to make more tangible military contributions to the US-Japan alliance and to play a more than token role in international efforts to maintain global peace and security. As the scope of Japanese security policy has broadened beyond territorial defense as such, the status of the JDA within Japan’s defense establishment—vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA),267 in particular—has begun to rise. As

267 As discussed in Chapter One of this volume, the MOFA, which usually is not including in the defense establishment in other countries, have long played a central role in setting Japanese security and defense policy priorities in postwar Japan.
discussed in Chapter One, JDA’s elevation to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in January 2007, accompanied by the broadening of the SDF’s core mission to include non-combat international activities, is a culmination of change in the bureaucratic dynamics within Japan’s defense establishment. While the MOD still faces formidable challenges to evolve into a government institution that can proactively participate in the security policy-making process in Japan,\(^{268}\) the rise in the MOD’s profile as well as status within Japan’s defense establishment will continue to affect the overall function of Japan’s defense establishment.

As Japanese security policy priorities evolve, the SDF in particular—as the core military institution in the Japanese defense establishment—have been given new missions after the Cold War, with the geographical scope of their activities expanded far beyond Japan’s borders. Japan’s cooperation with the United States (as examined in Chapter Four) and Tokyo’s successes in dispatching SDF contingents to the Gulf region in support of US-led global war against terrorism (as examined in Chapter Three) were illustrative of the expanding scope of SDF missions, which in turn supports a rise in the SDF’s importance in Japan’s defense establishment. As Chapter Five discussed, such an expanded scope of Japanese security policy also pressed Japan to take a “dual-track” approach in its security policy—putting a greater emphasis on multinational security cooperation while maintaining its priority on strengthening the US–Japan alliance.

In short, Japan’s defense establishment, started as a system that focused exclusively on defending Japan by ultimately relying on the United States for its security through the maintenance of the US–Japan alliance, has evolved into a system in which Japan not only seeks to play a substantially larger role in ensuring its own security but also explores ways to play a more meaningful role within the US–Japan alliance and to participate in international efforts to maintain global peace and security.

Can Japan’s defense establishment we see today be called “new”? The observations made in Chapters One and Two suggest that the institutions involved do look different. Its capabilities are also evolving. The JDA (now MOD), as shown in Chapter One, has grown to exercise more influence in shaping Japanese security policy priorities, particularly through its efforts to establish itself as a lead agency in alliance consultations with the United States. Chapter Two further illustrates that the SDF, despite its ongoing struggle to transform itself to better adapt to the post-9/11 security environment, is clearly

attempting to depart from the Cold War-era force posture and build-up. Chapter Three demonstrates that the legal framework has also been evolving in support of such a change in the capability of Japan’s defense establishment. Based on these analyses, it is clear that the incremental changes in Japan in the last fifteen years amounts to considerable change in the way Japan’s defense establishment looks and functions today. In this sense, Japan’s defense establishment that we see today is indeed “new,” as it has policy priorities and missions that are clearly different from those during the Cold War.

If Japan now has a “new” defense establishment, what are the implications? A Japan that is more willing to boost its defense relationship with Washington? A Japan that is more nationalistic and will try to be more independent from the United States? Analyses in Chapter Four and Five seem to suggest that Japan, at least for the time being, will continue to anchor its security policy to its alliance with the United States. While the broadening scope of Japanese security policy goals provides Japan with imperatives to seek a somewhat independent role in the Asia–Pacific region (as discussed in Chapter Five), the critical role played by the United States in encouraging the above changes (examined in Chapter Four) will continue to shape Japan’s defense establishment to prioritize deepening cooperation with the United States.

Despite these changes, however, one critical element is still lacking: Japan has yet to develop a process to shape a national security strategy that can be used by its leaders to provide strategic guidance to this new defense establishment. The security policy objectives and goals that that have been articulated remain largely generalities with little substantive content. Without a strategic vision of how Japan will utilize its defense establishment—particularly the SDF—to deepen the US–Japan alliance and enhance regional and global security environment, this new establishment is left hanging without a clear sense of purpose or goal.

This absence of strategic guidance has necessitated that the changes in Japan’s defense establishment be incremental. It also has prevented Japan from capitalizing on those changes in Japan’s defense establishment in shaping Japanese security and defense policies in two important ways.

First, because the changes have been taking place without Japan presenting a clear vision for its future, they created unreasonable suspicion among some of Japan’s neighbors in Asia (in particular China). Without a cogent presentation of the vision of Japan’s future and the role of security policy in it, a phrase such as “normal country” begins to have a life of its own, with the interpretation of such phrases left to those who use them. Against the backdrop of former Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeatedly visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, Japan’s decision to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean and to Iraq, to deploy a BMD system, and to revise its national defense program outline in support of expanding Japan’s role in security affairs have been interpreted as the sign of Japan becoming a “normal” nation—that is, a country that is shedding its postwar pacifism and even remilitarizing with destabilizing consequences for regional security.

More importantly, the lack of strategic guidance from the political leadership has made Japan’s *modus operandi* in the security realm reactive and minimalist when there is demand for Japan’s participation in international security affairs. Without strategic issues debated and decided at the highest level of the government, the national security bureaucracy has had no choice but to rely on past precedents, justifications based on extremely detailed legal arguments, and external pressure from the United States as well as the broader international community to make decisions on critical issues in security policy. The call for Japan to “show the flag” and to put “boots on the ground” reportedly put forward by a senior US government official playing a critical role in pushing the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq is a good example of how Japan’s defense establishment failed to take initiative even when then-Prime Minister Koizumi repeatedly claimed that Japan would respond to such a situation proactively.

Will the status quo continue? There are signs that there may be more changes in the offing. In fact, the transformation of Japan’s defense establishment is far from over. Many follow-on moves toward further evolution of Japan’s defense establishment have come since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power in September 2006. As noted above, the JDA became MOD in January 2007, and a prime minister’s advisory group has proposed the creation of an US-style NSC under the Prime Minister in February 2007. Following the recommendations by the advisory group, the Japanese government intends to introduce legislation that revises the *Anzen Hosho Kaigi Setchi-ho* (Security Council Law) in the 166th Session of the Diet. Parallel to the deliberation by the advisory council on the utility of an US-style NSC in Japan, another advisory council chaired by

269 Several US and Japanese government officials argued that Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State, never made such remarks. See, for example, Hisae, Masahiko. *9/11 to Nihon Gaiko* (9/11 and Japanese diplomacy) (Kodan-sha, 2002).

270 *Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 29 October 2001.*

the Chief Cabinet Secretary has been looking at the ways to enhance the Cabinet’s own intelligence capability. One can expect more changes in the institutional structure and the legal framework of Japan’s defense establishment when the Council on Intelligence Capability puts forth its recommendations.

Prime Minister Abe also has expressed his willingness to tackle one fundamental issue that Japan’s defense establishment has left unchanged until now: the issue of the right of collective self-defense. Soon after becoming the prime minister, Abe stated that his government would begin case studies to explore the conditions under which Japan should be able to exercise the right of collective self-defense.272 He also mentioned that he would plan to put constitutional reform on the political schedule for his government.273 Abe reiterated his commitment to constitutional revision in his New Year’s remarks on 1 January 2007.274

While these developments are intriguing, their outcomes are not expected to go beyond the continuation of incremental changes in Japan’s defense establishment. It may be true that Japan has been chipping away at its postwar anti-war, pacifist tradition—after all, the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq would have been unimaginable fifteen years ago.275 In fact, since the end of the Cold War, there is a growing recognition in Japan that military power is useful for national defense, and as long as war is a possibility, Japan should prepare for it.276 However, in the absence of strategic vision, future changes in Japan’s defense establishment will continue to be slow and incremental.

How, then, can Japan change the status quo and its perpetual lack of a strategic vision?

First, Japan needs to clearly identify the security challenges and opportunities facing it. The list of challenges is fairly obvious: North Korean nuclear weapons as well as its proliferation of missiles and possibly weapons of mass destruction (WMD); the rise of China; security instability that is triggered by failed states;

---


273 Ibid.


civil conflicts; terrorist networks. Potential opportunities include promotion of regional economic integration and enhancement of multinational institutions in the Asia–Pacific region, and active participation in regional dialogues.

Second, Japan needs to conduct assessments of the best tools to address such challenges and to capitalize on potential opportunities. As Chapters Two and Four discuss, Japan’s new defense establishment gives Japan two new tools: a robust US–Japan alliance and a SDF that has a broader geographic reach. It is obvious that these new tools strengthening Japan’s deterrence against real threats such as North Korea and other uncertainties in Asia. But that is only a part of the answer. Japan needs to spend more time figuring out whether these new tools are among the best to respond to the needs of humanitarian interventions, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, a great deal of thinking needs to be done on issues such as the role of the United Nations and other multinational institutions in international security and Japan’s role therein, security cooperation at the operational level both with and beyond US allies, and how the SDF can be used together with other policy tools such as economic assistance and diplomatic efforts to create a comprehensive security policy approach. In this context, a vision of regional security order that is derived from the “dual-track” approach (discussed in Chapter Five) may deserve further consideration.

Third, any effort by Japan to expand and deepen its role in the security realm needs to be accepted internationally, particularly by its Asian neighbors. But when any such moves made by Japan are met with vocal expression of concern for Japan’s reversion to its pre-World War II militarism, Japan needs to develop an answer that can win regional support (or at least acceptance) for its larger security role. From promoting confidence-building measures to vigorously pursuing historical reconciliation, there are several policy options to be considered. In particular, the role of Japan’s new defense establishment and the tools at its disposal for fostering a regional political environment that is more receptive to Tokyo’s greater security profile needs to be identified and explored.

Finally, any strategic vision requires the support of the Japanese public to be sustainable and effective. However, despite the recent emergence of so-called Japanese nationalism277, there is a great deal of uncertainty about how much consensus exists among the Japanese public for a robust security role outside Japan. While the events since the 1990s have certainly made the Japanese public see the utility of having a robust capability to defend their country, the majority of the Japanese public remains hesitant about the SDF engaging in

military activities abroad—especially those that might involve the use of force. This a gap between the will of political elites and the public attitudes over the notion of the use of force, as demonstrated in the debate regarding Japan’s dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) to Iraq, continues today, with little sign of dramatic change. If that remains the case, it can work as a considerable constraint to Japan maximizing the capability of its new defense establishment.

These challenges are formidable and they all will require a concerted efforts by the Japanese government and its political leaders for a long period of time to address sufficiently. The paradigms that have shaped the identity of postwar Japan—pacifism, mercantilism, and the post-World War II settlement—are steadily fading with no alternative vision yet to replace them. Only when the Japanese people, elite and public alike, reach a consensus on a new paradigm to frame Japan’s approach to security can Japan begin to effectively maximize the capability of Japan’s new defense establishment.

---

278 Midford, Paul. op. cit.
BIOGRAPHIES

PROJECT ADVISORS

Tomoyuki Kojima is Professor and Dean of the Policy Management Department of Keio University. Previously, he has taught at Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, Kyoto Sangyo University, and University of Tokyo. In addition, Dr. Kojima served as Special Assistant at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong and Embassy of Japan in the People’s Republic of China. He has written extensively on East Asian affairs, China, and Japan–China relations. Dr. Kojima holds B.A., M.A. and Ph.D from Keio University.

Mike M. Mochizuki holds the Elliott School’s endowed chair in Japan–US Relations in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the George Washington University. Previously Dr. Mochizuki conducted research at the Brookings Institution where he served as co-director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. He has taught at the University of Southern California and at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. His most recent publications include Japan Reorients: The Quest for Wealth and Security in East Asia (2000), Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (1997), and Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (1995). He is now writing a book entitled The New Strategic Triangle: the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Rise of China.

Akihiko Tanaka is Professor of International Politics and is currently the Director of the Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo. Dr. Tanaka's specialties include theories of international politics, contemporary international relations in East Asia, and issues in Japan–Urelations. He has written numerous books and articles in Japanese and English, including The New Middle Ages: The World System in the 21st Century. He obtained his BA in International Relations at the University of Tokyo's College of Arts and Sciences in 1977 and his PhD in Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981.

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich is Associate Professor of Government at US Army War College. She has taught civil-military relations theory, international politics, and comparative politics at US Army War College since 1999. She has written extensively on theory of civil-military relations and has contributed chapters to the publications such as Foreign and Security Policy in the New Europe, (Roger Kanet, ed. (Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Press 2005), and Handbook on Military and Social Sciences (Sven Gareis and Paul Klein, eds., Berlin: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaft, 2004.) Dr. Ulrich received a B.S. in international affairs from US Air Force Academy, an M.A. in political science
from University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana) and Ph.D. in political science also from University of Illinois (Champaign-Urbana).

**PROJECT CONTRIBUTORS**

*Ken Jimbo* is Assistant Professor of the Faculty of Policy Studies at Keio University. Prior to joining Keio University, Mr. Jimbo has served as Director of Research at the Japan Forum on International Relations Inc. (JFIR). Prior to joining JFIR, he was a research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). He received his Ph.D from the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University.

*Andrew Oros* is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Washington College. Previously, he has worked as the editor of *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* and as Japan Task Force Manager for the Pacific Council on International Relations. He also is an editor of and contributor to *Culture in World Politics* (Macmillan Press, 1998) and has published articles in a number of academic journals, including *Millennium, Public and International Affairs, Japan Forum, Intelligence and National Security*, and the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. Dr. Oros earned his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

*Yuki Tatsumi* is a Research Fellow at the East Asia Program of the Henry L. Stimson Center. In February 2004, she was named adjunct fellow in the CSIS International Security Program. Prior to CSIS, she was a research associate for the Japan Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. She also served at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C., from 1996 to 1999 as special assistant for political affairs. Ms. Tatsumi holds her M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Barry Blechman, Chairman 1989–
Charles Bailey 1991–2004
Avis T. Bohlen, 2004–
Linda Banton 2001–
Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr. 2005–
K. David Boyer 2001–2002
Richard Clarke 1997–
Elmer Cooper 1991–1995
Barbara Davis Blum 2001–
Alton Frye 1990–
William Harrop 2001–
Arnold Kanter 1994–2005
Farooq Kathwari 2003–
Michael Krepon 1989–
Roger Leeds 1990–2005
Leo Mackay 1998–2001
Norman P. Neureiter 2005–
Phil Odeen 2001–
Thomas Pickering 2001–
Condoleezza Rice 1991–2001
Anne C. Richard 2006–
Rozanne Ridgway 1997–2000
Enid C.B. Schoettle 1992–
Jeffery Smith 1990–
Howard Stoertz 1991–1997
Larry Welch 1997–
Carroll Wetzel 2000–
Susan Williams 1990–2002
Willard Wirtz 1991–1993