

Independent Progress Review on the  
**UN GLOBAL FOCAL POINT FOR  
POLICE, JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS**

JUNE 2014



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## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| ASG      | Assistant Secretary-General   |
| BCPR     | Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery   |
| CSP      | Country Support Plan  |
| CIVCAP   | UN's Civilian Capacities (Initiative)   |
| CLJAS    | Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service  |
| CPR TTF  | Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund  |
| DDR      | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration   |
| DFS      | Department of Field Support   |
| DIS      | Détachement intégré de sécurité (Chad)  |
| DM       | Department of Management  |
| DPA      | Department of Political Affairs   |
| DPKO     | Department of Peacekeeping Operations   |
| DRC      | Democratic Republic of the Congo  |
| DSRSG    | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General                                    |
| DSS      | Department of Staff Security  |
| EOSG     | Executive Office of the Secretary-General   |
| GFP      | Global Focal Point  |
| GFSS     | Global Field Support Strategy   |
| HR       | Human Resources   |
| HQ       | Headquarters  |
| IAP      | Integrated Assessment and Planning  |
| ICRC     | International Committee of the Red Cross  |
| MINURCAT | United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad                           |
| MINUSMA  | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali                  |
| MISCA    | African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic                 |
| MONUC    | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo               |
| MMSS     | Mission Management and Support Section  |
| MONUSCO  | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| MPTF     | Multi-Partner Trust Fund  |
| NAO      | Network Administrative Organization   |
| NAT      | Network Administrative Team   |
| OHCHR    | Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  |
| OROLSI   | Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions   |
| OSCE     | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe                                       |
| PBF      | Peacebuilding Fund  |
| PBSO     | Peacebuilding Support Office  |
| PD       | Police Division   |
| PJC      | Police, Justice and Corrections   |
| PKM      | Peacekeeping Mission  |
| RC       | Resident Coordinator  |
| RoL      | Rule of Law   |
| RoLCRG   | Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group   |
| RoLU     | Rule of Law Unit  |
| SAG      | Senior Advisory Group   |

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| SAM      | Strategic Assessment Mission   |
| S-G      | Secretary-General  |
| SPDS     | Strategic and Policy Development Section                               |
| SPM      | Special Political Mission  |
| SRS      | Selection and Recruitment Section                                      |
| SMSG     | Special Representative of the Secretary-General                        |
| SSR      | Security Sector Reform   |
| SSRTF    | Security Sector Reform Task Force                                      |
| TAM      | Technical Assessment Mission   |
| UN       | United Nations   |
| UNDAF    | United Nations Development Assistance Framework                        |
| UNCT     | United Nations Country Team  |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Programme                                   |
| UNHCR    | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                          |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children's Fund   |
| UNIOGBIS | United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau        |
| UNODC    | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime                               |
| UNMAS    | United Nations Mine Action Service                                     |
| UNMIS    | United Nations Mission in Sudan  |
| UNMISS   | United Nations Mission in South Sudan                                  |
| UNOPS    | United Nations Office for Project Services                             |
| UNPOL    | United Nations Police  |
| UNSOM    | United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia                           |
| USG      | Under-Secretary-General  |
| UN Women | United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women |



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United Nations (UN) Global Focal Point on Police, Justice and Corrections (GFP) is the most recent initiative in a decade of efforts to improve the coherence and quality of the UN's rule of law support to crisis- and conflict-affected countries. Its aim is to provide better police, justice and corrections (PJC) services from UN Headquarters to UN peacekeeping missions, special political missions and non-mission settings. Instead of establishing another institution, task force, coordination group or lead entity, the GFP innovatively focuses on creating more integrated ways of working among two key UN actors and with the broader UN system. In this way, the GFP could be considered as a business improvement initiative, in which the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP) have each convened a portion of their resources to deliver better PJC services together to the field, while keeping the door open for other UN actors to enter their joint venture. Such closer cooperation has inevitably run into bureaucratic barriers and their associated drag on efficiency in some areas. However, from a GFP perspective, these obstacles represent leadership challenges to be resolved rather than challenges to the GFP concept itself.

This report presents the results of an independent review of the progress that the GFP initiative has made since January 2012, conducted at the request of the GFP managers, by a joint research team from the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael), the Stimson Center and the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

Based on extensive document research and more than 150 interviews, conducted at UN Headquarters and in seven field settings, the report finds that the GFP can claim partial success, holds credible promise as an effective tool for the delivery of PJC assistance to the field, and is in need of significant improvement that will require increased support from senior UN management as well as UN Member States.

In less than two years, the GFP has achieved important results. At UN Headquarters (HQ), the arrangement has enhanced collaboration, improved working relations between DPKO and UNDP, and promoted a positive change of mentality and culture in which silos have been replaced with a team construct and sense of whole, at least within and for the GFP core partners. Interactions between UNDP and DPKO have become more structured and new institutional procedures have promoted more effective coordination, information sharing and mutual understanding of the working procedures of each organization. The decision to co-locate, a process that still has to be finalized, has contributed to these successes. In a system that works as much on the basis of relationships as it does on the basis of hierarchy and protocol, such changes represent an important step toward the provision of better coordinated support to the field in the areas of justice, police and corrections.

With 19 field visits conducted since inception, the GFP has created a broad base of prospective clients and opportunities to deepen and sustain future efforts. It has also delivered a modest number of practical solutions and begun to influence the way in which the UN delivers PJC activities in the field. For example, the GFP has developed a joint United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)-UNDP PJC framework that will be executed with integrated personnel and financial resources. This is a noteworthy first.

While the GFP has made an impressive start with the level of collaboration at HQ among its core members and the volume of its field visits, the initiative still has a long way to go in terms of impact in the delivery of high quality and timely PJC services to UN missions and country teams. There is significant room for improvement in several important areas. At UN Headquarters, the most pressing among these are: addressing gaps in management tools, in particular completing a business plan; clarifying and solidifying relationships with GFP partners and communications with the field and Member States; and

reassessing priorities for GFP focus on the field. Accommodating representatives of all GFP partners that wish to co-locate is a priority of equal importance.

In the field, the GFP has had a light impact on UN missions and country teams. A major hurdle to overcome is a perception in the field that the GFP is a supply-driven initiative that mainly exists to advance the state of play at UN Headquarters. Two factors have played an important role in creating this perception. First, the GFP has not made clear what value-added it can bring to the field, in particular its services, toolkit and the processes through which these can be mobilized by UN field entities. Second, on a number of occasions, GFP country visits have been experienced by the field as having been insufficiently prepared, cumbersome or lacking follow-up. This has diminished the GFP's nascent credibility. Nevertheless, field interviews indicated broad scope to garner stronger buy-in and reasonable enthusiasm for the GFP concept among field staff in certain countries, while it has been received with more skepticism in others.

Hence, while the GFP has made significant progress in promoting effective collaboration between the relevant HQ components of DPKO and UNDP and delivering a number of practical solutions in the field, realizing its potential more fully requires five interrelated actions over the next few months:

*1. Articulate a clear value proposition for the GFP to improve its support for the field.* This requires a strategic articulation at UN Headquarters – anchored in field experiences to date and an honest account of expected resources in the short to medium term – of what the GFP can concretely do for the field, a toolkit tailored so it can deliver such services and simple processes designed to mobilize them. The value proposition should also clarify what level of effort is required from the field in return. Notably, the ubiquitous need for start-up funding for integrated PJC activities and rapidly accessible PJC expertise has piqued field actors' interest in the GFP as a potential supplier. Capitalizing on this incipient interest means putting more urgency behind the completion of the GFP's business plan and making sure this plan includes a clear, operational service bundle, a field-tailored communications strategy with clarity of message and a realistic account of the resources and support necessary to operationalize the plan's roll out. Once developed, a value proposition can guide prioritization of support in view of the required resources, as well as more tailor-made preparation for GFP selected field visits.

However, increasing the GFP's ability to act as an effective and responsive service provider is contingent upon a few enabling factors. Developing a credible GFP value proposition requires devoting attention to the following:

*2. Resolve those key bureaucratic constraints that stand in the way of developing standardized PJC services and solutions.* Effective GFP support to UN rule of law field initiatives requires replicable and delivery-oriented support modalities that are easy to mobilize. Currently, contradictions, incompatibilities and impossibilities entrenched in different sets of rules, regulations and procedures in the areas of finance, personnel management and roster compatibility – few or none unique to the GFP – hinder integrated operations and constrict the flexibility that is required to create more dynamic processes for joint planning and resource mobilization. For example, placing UNDP staff on mission payrolls has proved difficult, given the differing personnel rules and rostering policies of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO and UNDP. DPA found it difficult to implement plans to slot two P5 UNDP officers into its Somalia mission, pay them from mission budget, but also let them retain access to UNDP financial authority to manage funds through UNDP mechanisms. Such obstacles require the immediate attention of senior leadership of DPKO, Department of Field Support (DFS), DPA, Department of Management (DM)

and UNDP. The GFP experience to date is sufficiently deep to compile an overview of key operational issues for discussion and resolution.

*3. Focus GFP resources on a select number of strategic countries* in which UN field actors see the GFP's potential added value and are willing to cooperate. This is necessary not only to avoid spreading the GFP thin (given resource constraints), but also to demonstrate convincingly the kind of impact the GFP can have. This requires strategic focus, a reduction in the spread of current GFP field visits and improvement of their quality. As different service levels can be offered to different field clients, this does not mean saying “no” to requests from countries that are less in focus. However, it will require exploring which field settings are most in need of GFP support and most amenable to it. This review identified both new missions and mission transition countries as having potentially the most to gain from GFP inputs and support.

*4. Put together a transitional package that consists of political, human and financial support measures by Member States to plug critical GFP capabilities gaps.* The GFP's instructions at creation amounted, in essence, to doing more with less. While this may be feasible in the medium term as the GFP's operations professionalize and its tools mature, in the short term it will not bring about the breakthrough improvement in field service delivery that its creators seek. It is especially important to recognize that the GFP arrangement does not have sufficient internal resource “mass” from which to pull all of the efficiency gains needed to offset the transaction costs of doing more (coordination, field visits, planning and reporting) without more (people, funds or time). Hence, a temporary package is needed that helps the GFP to succeed as a major change initiative. Such a package would include political support, such as the recent insertion of GFP language into the mandate of the stabilization mission for the Central African Republic; modifications to staff and/or financial rules as needed to facilitate innovative cross-posting of personnel in the field; giving the GFP arrangement time to mature; and endowing it with limited additional administrative resources. In addition, since UN field actors articulated that a key priority for the GFP is to provide start-up funding for PJC activities, a discussion is warranted on whether this requires new (GFP) funding sources or GFP facilitation of field access to existing sources.

*5. Create a small administrative nucleus, a “network administrative team” for the GFP.* For the GFP to function well, it has to serve three sets of interests: a) of the individual member agencies and organizations that it comprises, b) of the GFP itself as a working arrangement or network of partners, and c) of the UN field presences of various kinds drawing on its services. Working with these sometimes convergent, sometimes differing interests is taxing for a self-governing network like the GFP that lacks an administrative core to help it manage, for example, the deployment of experts and surge capacity, field visits, planning, fundraising, and fund management. Effective networks require such a core to resolve collaboration issues, reduce bureaucratic burdens and provide operational support to their members. A small network administrative team (NAT) focused on smoothing, standardizing and operationalizing the GFP's work, while the partners retain strategic oversight and focus on substantive matters, would help the GFP generate better PJC results in the field. The review team believes that the NAT should reflect agency-level support for the GFP, with a dual administrative reporting line to the chiefs of staff of DPKO and UNDP.

In sum, the GFP initiative has notched up some notable initial successes and shows promise. Its longer-term success will depend on its ability – and that of its senior champions within the UN as well as its Member State sponsors – to put a package together that will deliver most of the improvement measures outlined above. Failing that, the risk of the GFP arrangement lapsing into old ways of delivering PJC support without having made a sustainable, qualitative leap is real.

## INTRODUCTION

The strengthening and support of rule of law in fragile or crisis- and conflict-affected environments is critical to peace and security, human rights and the development of these societies.<sup>1</sup> The United Nations (UN) and its partners have put considerable resources into strengthening the rule of law in a range of fragile environments over the past 15 years.<sup>2</sup> These efforts have met with mixed results, however, as promoting rule of law is a highly political endeavor that may challenge local power structures.<sup>3</sup> It also involves many UN and non-UN actors with their own rules, goals and sources of funding that create a complex operational environment in which to compete or coexist, without essential transparency or a unifying strategy.

In June 2012, the UN's Civilian Capacity (CIVCAP) Steering Committee concluded that the existing rule of law arrangements had failed to bring much needed "clarity, capacity and accountability" to delivery of support in the areas of police, justice and corrections in particular.<sup>4</sup> It recommended that two major UN actors working on rule of law issues, namely the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "assume joint responsibility as [the] Global Focal Point (GFP) for police, justice and corrections in post-conflict and other crisis situations."<sup>5</sup> In September 2012, the Secretary-General's (S-G) Policy Committee endorsed the S-G's decision to create the GFP at UN Headquarters in New York and proposed a one-year review following inception.<sup>6</sup> This decision represented a ground-breaking approach to addressing the institutional problems associated with the UN's role in the delivery of rule of law support on the ground, and also tasked senior UN leaders on the ground to direct the development of cohesive rule of law strategies within their respective areas of responsibility.

Rather than creating a new entity in an environment of financial distress, the 2012 decision made DPKO and UNDP jointly responsible and accountable for responding to country-level requests in the areas of police, justice and corrections using existing resources and organizational structures. Following the S-G's decision, DPKO and UNDP developed the GFP into a working arrangement; its implementation is the basis of this progress review.

The objective of the progress review is to inform the conversation among GFP stakeholders, which include the two "core" entities as well as other GFP partners and interested Member States, concerning the performance of their partnership during its initial period of operation and how this arrangement can be strengthened moving forward. In this context, the progress review considers the circumstances (and the rationale) that led to the CIVCAP recommendation and the S-G's decision on the GFP in September 2012; the development of the GFP into a new institutional and working arrangement (as envisioned by DPKO and UNDP); and the results of the GFP since the S-G's decision until March 2014 (especially in relation to the promotion of coordination among stakeholders at UN Headquarters and the delivery of support to police, justice and corrections in the field). The report uses three analytical dimensions of organizational development (namely, policy and process, leadership and working culture) to inform the analysis of the GFP and identify achievements and gaps in its workings both at UN Headquarters and in the field.<sup>7</sup>

This report offers the first independent external review of the GFP. Based on the requirements identified by the CIVCAP Steering Committee and the S-G, and at the request of UNDP and DPKO, The Netherlands Institute of International Affairs (Clingendael), the Folke Bernadotte Academy and The Stimson Center have collaborated to undertake this review based on their research and policy expertise in the areas of the rule of law, conflict-affected environments and peace operations.

### ***Structure of the report***

Following the introduction, this report has four parts. Part 1 summarizes the initial conditions prompting the creation of the GFP and provides a historical context against which the work of the GFP arrangement is analyzed. It reviews the basic rationale for and the circumstances leading up to the creation of the GFP, the initial operational and organizational challenges faced by the GFP and the “state of play” among the main institutional stakeholders at its creation in 2012.

Part 2 reviews implementation of the GFP concept at UN Headquarters level, including activities to operationalize the decision and build a functioning Global Focal Point. Areas emphasized include the evolution of UNDP-DPKO working relations, interactions with other potential partners in the UN system, resource mobilization, and efforts to build “brand recognition” and an early record of accomplishment. This part of the report deals with headquarters-field relations from an HQ perspective. The work draws on roughly 60 semi-structured interviews conducted at UN Headquarters and desk review of internal UN documents related to GFP establishment and operation made available to the study team.

Part 3 reviews GFP implementation from the perspective of the field. The analysis draws on roughly 100 semi-structured interviews from team visits – coordinated with and assisted by the GFP – to Haiti, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau; remote interviews with mission and UN country team staff in Libya, Somalia, Mali and Côte d’Ivoire; and interviews with desk officers at UN Headquarters. The field study team also reviewed country and mission-related documents made available by the GFP partners. (For a more detailed review of the study’s methodology, please see Annex 1). Part 4 offers the study’s conclusions and recommendations.



# 1. BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE GFP CONCEPT

United Nations rule of law engagement dates to well before the turn of the century but has increased significantly since 1999. Until then, and the advent of two emergency UN “transitional administration” missions for Kosovo and East Timor, the UN system had not much been in the business of the wholesale reconstruction of the rule of law in crisis or post-conflict settings. However, in the early to mid-1990s, the UN did deploy observer missions in El Salvador and Guatemala for human rights monitoring and the oversight of military and police restructuring.<sup>8</sup> In late 1992, the UN joined the Organization of American States to create the International Civilian Mission in Haiti to monitor human rights and, subsequently, institutional development of police, prisons and the judiciary. In March 1993, the Organization was mandated to build a state in war-torn Somalia, but rapidly became entangled in Somali clan and warlord politics and withdrew within two years. From 1994, successive UN operations in Haiti worked to rebuild the Haitian National Police. From late 1995, the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a mandate first to monitor and then to reform police services there, but promoting broader rule of law issues after Bosnia’s bloody conflict was left to other aid agencies and to the Office of the High Representative established by the Dayton Accords that ended the war. The mandates for East Timor and Kosovo gave the United Nations temporary governing powers including over police, judicial and corrections functions, though development of local justice capacity was shared.<sup>9</sup> From at least the late 1990s, other UN entities such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the progenitors of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) were also engaged in support to rule of law.<sup>10</sup>

With the surge of complex operations in 2003-04, however, the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) became deeply and directly involved in restoring rule of law and rebuilding the local capacity to maintain it in Liberia, Haiti, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and subsequently the Democratic Republic of Congo.<sup>11</sup> Broad if not crisply defined mandates to undertake not only policing roles but capacity building for judicial and prison systems became increasingly common. As the decade unfolded, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) also became increasingly involved with Special Political Missions (SPM), some of which had significant police or justice advisory elements in their mandates.

At the same time, UNDP had become deeply involved in supporting rule of law in fragile and post-conflict countries, some hosting DPKO operations and some not. In East Timor (Timor Leste), for example, UNDP’s Justice System Programme, begun in 2003, has run a legal training center that has steadily rebuilt the Timorese judiciary and justice system.<sup>12</sup>

In 2004, in the midst of this buildup of UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued his first report on “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,” offering a definition of the rule of law that has become the UN standard:

The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.<sup>13</sup>



By 2006 it had become clear to practitioners and observers alike that the UN's peace operations were increasingly moving into rule of law-related areas, and that the tenures of these operations were growing longer.<sup>14</sup> In his 2006 report on the rule of law, the Secretary-General observed that,

Member States now almost universally recognize the re-enforcement of the rule of law as an important aspect of peace missions in order to achieve sustainable peace and security. ... Since 2003, the Secretariat has planned, selected and deployed police, judicial and corrections components in virtually all new missions: previously, judicial and prison system reform aspects were rarely found outside of executive missions.<sup>15</sup>

The report also announced the creation of a Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group (RoLCRG), chaired by the Deputy-Secretary-General, to serve as a high-level, strategic “Headquarters focal point for coordinating system wide attention on the rule of law so as to ensure quality, policy coherence and coordination.”<sup>16</sup> It described a new structure of lead entities for different elements of the rule of law in different contexts: at the international level, in conflict and post-conflict situations (with and without a UN peace-keeping or special political mission present), and for long-term development.

### **1.1 S-G Decisions on Rule of Law (2006) and Security Sector Reform (2007)**

The 2006 rule of law report drew upon “S-G Decision 2006/47 – Rule of Law,” issued in early November 2006, which assigned to DPKO the lead role in police, prisons, and legal and judicial institutions wherever there were DPKO-led missions. UNDP would assume the lead in rule of law for the UN system in places where there was no DPKO mission, and would at all times take the lead in supporting courts administration, civil law, land disputes, customary dispute resolution, strengthening justice institutions “in the context of long-term development,” and managing trust funds. OHCHR would lead on transitional justice and human rights-related topics, while UNODC would lead on organized crime, corruption, and victim and witness protection.<sup>17</sup>

After the leadership transition from Kofi Annan to Ban Ki-moon in 2007, a further S-G decision applied the mission, non-mission distinction to lead roles in security sector reform and established an inter-agency task force to coordinate those roles. Unlike RoLCRG, the Security Sector Reform Task Force (SSRTF) was given operational tasking to:

Assist, as requested, UN entities and/or field missions in early identification of security needs and establishment of national security strategies and priorities [and] provide, as requested, strategic planning and technical advice to UN entities and/or field missions and/or integrated planning processes on design, implementation and review of SSR support, in liaison with relevant operational lead entities.<sup>18</sup>

Although Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the SSRTF do not form part of the terms of reference for this review, a number of interviewees and discussants raised the topic of the relationship of the SSR Task Force and the GFP, inasmuch as both arrangements are co-led by DPKO and UNDP. In terms of substantive scope, the SSR Task Force has a remit that extends to military forces and defense sector reform, which the GFP does not, but it does not address criminal justice per se, which the GFP does. The secretary-general's reports on security sector reform stress a sector wide rather than component-specific focus. In his most recent report of August 2013, the Secretary-General stressed that SSR is both “a distinct discipline with specific expertise to engage at the sector wide level and an integrative function,” the success of which is “predicated on a combination of reform of individual components of the security sector ... and sector wide initiatives that address the strategic, policy and architectural framework of the sector.”<sup>19</sup>

In a similar vein, the Security Council's recent (April 2014) resolution on SSR acknowledged, the necessity for the United Nations to balance its support for the reform of individual components of the security sector, which in some contexts include defence, police, corrections, and border and immigration services, with sector-wide initiatives that address strategic governance, management and oversight aspects in order to ensure their long-term sustainability based on the particular needs and conditions of the country in question.<sup>20</sup>

In sum, the rule of law (RoL) decision stressed responsibility for individual components of the rule of law, some of which touch security sector reform. The SSR decision stressed linkages across components of the security sector, some of which touch rule of law, but with emphasis on the kinds of initiatives noted in the Security Council resolution such as sector wide governance, management and oversight, as opposed to specific institutional capacity-building or direct support to public security. We discuss the relationship of the SSRTF and GFP further in Parts II and III.

DPKO largely embraced its lead roles and built a new Office around them in August 2007. The Assistant Secretary-General for the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) manages the Security Sector Reform Unit that is secretariat to the SSR Task Force; the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Section; the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS); the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS) and the UN Police Division, which in turn plans and staffs UN police field components. The last two elements ultimately came to form part of the GFP.

CLJAS covers both justice and corrections issues, provides strategic planning inputs for operations, provides operational support to justice, corrections and rule of law components in DPKO operations, conducts periodic reviews of those components' work, and develops and distributes guidance, training, lessons learned and best practices materials.<sup>21</sup>

The Strategic and Policy Development Section (SPDS) in Police Division develops and reviews technical guidelines, directives and standard operating procedures for mission police components; conducts police strategic planning and develops concepts of operations and mandate and implementation plans in coordination with the integrated operational teams in DPKO's Office of Operations; and supports the efforts of other UN system partners concerning police and law enforcement issues.<sup>22</sup>

In January 2008, UNDP's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) launched the Global Programme on the Rule of Law based on Justice and Security in Conflict/Post-Conflict Situations (the Global Programme) to "make a difference ... in societies dispossessed of justice and security as a consequence of armed conflict."<sup>23</sup> By the end of 2010, the Global Programme was considered fully rolled out, providing support both to access to justice and to police development in 21 countries with and without UN peacekeepers present. In South Sudan, for example, UNDP's Community Security and Arms Control Programme "supported the construction of local police posts in 'crime hotspots' " in 50 communities.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, it did so in direct competition with the police development programming of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).<sup>25</sup>

UNDP initially agreed to the 2006 RoL decision but was not as keen on an arrangement that seemed to reinforce DPKO's growing presence and influence on rule of law issues in the places where its missions deployed. Not being a part of the UN Secretariat, UNDP has greater autonomy in its programming and interviewees indicated that UNDP declined to participate in the new system of leads. As noted, in Sudan, UNDP and DPKO competed for influence with the South Sudan Police Service, in parallel programs.<sup>26</sup> In March 2009, UNDP received a new Administrator who was not disposed to support the lead entities arrangement. During the 2009–2011 timeframe UNDP and DPKO arranged several collaborative programs

in police, justice and corrections in the field (for example, in Liberia, Timor Leste and Chad)<sup>27</sup> but interviews indicated that relations between the two entities at the level of UN Headquarters became “tense.”<sup>28</sup>

In June 2009, the Secretary-General released the report, *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, which set in motion a system wide effort to improve the quality and timeliness of UN field personnel recruitment and deployment.<sup>29</sup> At about the same time, DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) launched their “New Horizon” initiative looking at the future of peace operations and stressing in particular the need for DPKO to seek out and cement partnerships for peacebuilding.<sup>30</sup>

## 1.2 The Senior Advisory Group and CIVCAP, 2011+

The early peacebuilding report launched a broad-ranging search for ideas and solutions to the UN’s capacity problems. One of these was a Senior Advisory Group (SAG) chaired by the former head of DPKO, Jean-Marie Guehenno. The report of the SAG, released in February 2011, called for a number of reforms in the recruitment and assignment of civilian staff for field missions, leading not long after to the creation of CIVCAP by the Secretary-General, with a multi-agency Working Group headed by an Assistant Secretary-General and a Steering Committee chaired by an Under-Secretary-General. The SAG also recommended a refinement of the lead entities arrangement for rule of law, exchanging the contextual assignment of leads for a model that assigned DPKO the lead of a “basic safety and security” cluster structure borrowed from the humanitarian community that included protection of civilians but not criminal justice or judicial and legal reform, which the SAG recommended be allocated to UNDP.<sup>31</sup> The S-G’s reply to the SAG moved to implement many of its recommendations, including CIVCAP, but did not reopen the leads issue.<sup>32</sup>

As 2011 rounded the corner to 2012, however, it became clear that something needed to be done about the system of leads and the character of DPKO-UNDP relations, especially as Member States – including those that contribute extra-budgetary funds for DPKO and funding for rule of law work by UNDP – had begun to take note. The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report, released that spring, had focused on fragile and conflict-affected states and also noted “disconnects” between the international community’s relatively generous support to military and police development and its far less forthcoming and more fragmented support to criminal justice systems and access to justice.<sup>33</sup> Lead roles notwithstanding, UNDP and DPKO operate under different personnel and financial rules and approaches to field work.<sup>34</sup> UNDP can raise voluntary funds for field programming, but must wait for donor funds before programs can start, which may mean substantial delays. DPKO works on the basis of assessed budgets from the General Assembly.<sup>35</sup> It may even obtain limited advance spending authority to prepare to implement an anticipated Security Council mandate.<sup>36</sup> DPKO is, however, constrained by the terms of its budgets to limit the capacity-building activities of its missions to training, advice and mentoring and may not offer such services outside specific, mandated, DPKO-led missions.<sup>37</sup>

Since the proximate problem was the system of leads, an obvious solution was to end it. However, that system had been set up to create a better and clearer division of labor and responsibility for an increasingly broad range of rule of law tasks being shouldered by the Secretariat and much of the rest of the UN’s field-focused agencies, funds and programs. Something had to replace it, and in December 2011, the Policy Committee asked RoLCRG to look for alternatives.<sup>38</sup>

Subsequent discussions by “all relevant UN agencies,” DPKO, UNDP and the CIVCAP team in particular, took several months. Alternatives reviewed ranged from provision of non-exclusive leads to DPKO and UNDP on police, judiciary and corrections in post-conflict and non-conflict settings, respectively, to the creation of a new department involving all relevant areas of RoL currently under different UN entities (including UNODC services on criminal justice and OHCHR capacities on transitional justice).<sup>39</sup> Three

particular arrangements were discussed in more depth. The first option considered DPKO as the global focal point for police, justice and corrections in mission settings and UNDP in non-mission settings. This arrangement – the closest to the status quo – was, however, believed to provide few visible changes on the ground (and UNDP was opposed to it). The second option under consideration drew from the report of the Senior Advisory Group and its proposed framework for a UNDP global focal point for justice and a DPKO global focal point for police and corrections. While this option provided clear responsibilities and accountability chains, it risked overstressing DPKO capacities in non-mission settings and UNDP capacities in mission countries. Cooperation and collaboration between DPKO and UNDP would still be required in order to avoid losing synergies between police and justice (which the 2011 World Development Report had identified as a risk).

Ultimately, the third and final option, namely a joint, co-located DPKO-UNDP global focal point for police, justice and corrections was agreed to have “the greatest potential to bring together complementary capacities across the UN system and strengthen results on the ground.”<sup>40</sup>

### 1.3 The S-G’s Decision of 2012

Following upon the recommendations of the CIVCAP Steering Committee, in September 2012 the Secretary-General directed DPKO and UNDP to establish the GFP for police, justice and corrections in post-conflict and other crisis situations (covering peacekeeping mission countries, special political missions and non-mission countries), mandating GFP to respond to country-level requests “channeled through UN entities on the ground, with timely and quality police, justice and corrections assistance in terms of global knowledge, people and advice on assessments, planning, funding and partnerships.”<sup>41</sup> Under this framework, the GFP would combine both DPKO and UNDP capacities in post-conflict and other crisis situations, with a view to using DPKO operational expertise in non-mission settings – should suitable sources of funding become available – and providing UNDP programming and institution-building skills to DPKO in mission settings.<sup>42</sup> The S-G’s decision made UNDP and DPKO jointly responsible and accountable for responding to country-level requests in police, justice and corrections in all crisis- and conflict-affected countries, but did not specify how they were to do that, save the Steering Committee’s stress on co-location of an unspecified number and mix of personnel. The two entities were also tasked to ensure closer collaboration with other UN partners through joint country-level assessments, planning, programming and monitoring, but they were not given specific guidance as to how to implement any of the tasks.<sup>43</sup>

The S-G’s decision specified two tiers of accountability: headquarters and field. Global focal points at HQ became responsible for identifying information, expertise and knowledge and for ensuring “adequate, timely capacities” delivered to the field either from their own resources or from other entities within or outside the UN system, in response to country-level requests.<sup>44</sup> UN senior leadership in the field remained “responsible and accountable for guiding and overseeing UN rule of law strategies, for resolving political obstacles and for coordinating UN country support on the rule of law.” UN entities in country were required to keep the senior leadership in the field fully informed of their activities and to participate “in relevant assessment, planning and coordination processes, and in implementing relevant guidance of the senior official.”<sup>45</sup>

Within this new framework, the RoLCRG constituted, in effect, a third tier of accountability for ensuring “a strategic approach by the Organization” to the rule of law and promoting it “at the international level.” RoLCRG has responsibility for strategic coordination in rule of law across the UN system, “taking into account” the work of task forces and other coordinating mechanisms already in place, acting as a repository of knowledge on rule of law issues for the UN system, maintaining a clearinghouse of information about the different actors working on rule of law and discussing strategic challenges in the application of the rule of law.<sup>46</sup> RoLCRG does not have a direct operational role nor does it deal directly with the field.

## 1.4 UN Rule of Law as a Question of Network Governance

Both the 2006 and 2012 S-G decisions on rule of law aimed to induce order in a loosely organized global system of autonomous legal and bureaucratic entities that answers to no single vested authority. Beyond the Secretariat, the S-G's best hope is to effect the willing collaboration of the agencies, funds and programs that are beyond his direct administrative control. Therefore, looking at UN management through the lens of network governance can be very helpful in understanding the limits and achievements of inter-agency coordination, in this case regarding the GFP and its antecedents.

In a much-cited analysis, Keith Provan and Patrick Kenis distinguished three forms of network governance, each of which has a counterpart in the story of the UN's recent efforts to manage its rule of law field work.<sup>47</sup> The first form is "participant-governed" with no central leadership and no lead entity, just a group of organizations collaborating toward more or less common goals. This model corresponds to the present-day GFP and its consensus-based management decision-making.

The second model is lead organization-governed, akin to the initial system of UN RoL segment leads established in 2006. It is especially prevalent where a "core provider agency" "assumes the role of network leader because of its central position in the flow of clients and key resources." This is a rough description of DPKO as lead agent for UN peacekeeping operations.

The third model uses a network administrative organization (NAO) that may be large or small – or very small; what we later call a network administrative team (NAT). Depending on its assigned coordination tasks, the NAO may have considerable authority over a specific range of functions related to network operation and effectiveness but it belongs to no one member of the network, and its primary function is the governance of the network on behalf of its members and its mission.

The GFP meets the working definition of a "participant-governed network" inasmuch as the core partners are legally autonomous entities, there are more than two partners (counting core, co-located, and others), and their intent is to provide community services (in this case to the field) in ways "that could not have been achieved through the uncoordinated provision of services by fragmented and autonomous agencies."<sup>48</sup> Such networks engage and balance three often competing sets of interests: those of the communities or clients they serve, those of the network itself, and those of its constituent organizations. That is, creating network-level interests does not make the other levels dissipate, for example, constituent organizations may need to work harder to maintain distinct identities.

A second paper by Provan and Brinton Milward addressed the dynamics of a new participant-governed network:

Ties among member agencies will be tentative and calculated. The network is new and agencies that have operated largely independently or only informally with other agencies are now expected to share resources, information, and clients. ... All organizations are likely to experience a period of transitional commitment as they move from informal, casual and easily broken ties to relationships that are either formalized or ... based on trust and commitment built on a history of interactions.<sup>49</sup>

In other words, at least some wariness experienced by UNDP and DPKO in the GFP arrangement can be viewed as a byproduct of the arrangement itself. "The task for network organizers is to minimally satisfy the needs and interests of stakeholders at network and organization levels, while emphasizing the broader needs of the community and the clients the network must serve.... Overall network effectiveness will ultimately be judged by community-level stakeholders."<sup>50</sup> Such "community" orientation is consistent with the CIVCAP Steering Committee's admonition that the focus and evaluation of the GFP be field-driven.

| Table 1: Key Predictors of Network Governance Forms |  |                     |                 |                                     |
|---|--|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Governance Form                                     | Trust                                      | No. of Participants | Goal Consensus  | Need for Network Level Competencies |
| Shared Governance                                   | High density                               | Few                 | High            | Low                                 |
| Lead organization                                   | Low density, highly centralized            | Moderate number     | Moderately low  | Moderate                            |
| Network Administrative Organization                 | Moderate density, NAO monitored by members | Moderate to many    | Moderately high | High                                |

Source: Provan, Keith G. and Patrick Kenis. "Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness." *Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory* 18, no. 2 (August 2007): 237.

While that has not quite been the case during its initial phase of operations (as related in Part 3), the GFP must meet field needs and support field programming if it is to be viable over the medium to long term.

The network governance frame does more than help categorize the working relationships of the GFP. It also helps to assess which kind of network governance arrangement may be the best suited to address a particular coordination problem. Table 1 lays out the membership and relationship characteristics that typify or underlie each mode of network governance.

The GFP arose in part out of an unsatisfactory attempt to use lead organizations to manage UN work on rule of law. On the rebound from this experience, the CIVCAP Steering Committee specified shared governance for the GFP. The chief message from the network governance field, however, is that shared governance networks, to be sustainable, require high interagency trust and goal consensus. When the GFP was established, interagency trust between the core partners was not especially high, and part of the GFP's job was to build it and develop common rule of law goals. In other words, its managers and other participants had to build the trust and consensus that the chosen governance framework required to function well. The implications of this choice of framework echo through subsequent efforts to build the GFP into a smoothly working and effective tool, as will be seen in the following parts of this report.



## 2. IMPLEMENTATION OF GFP AT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL

Part II of the review analyzes in detail the implementation of the GFP at UN Headquarters. Section 2.1 gives a brief overview of implementation with a focus on key activities that operationalized the SG's decision and built a functional GFP. Section 2.2 analyzes some of the key results achieved by the GFP at UN Headquarters to date, with a particular focus on management issues. Section 2.3 suggests a number of improvements from the UN Headquarters perspective to increase the GFP's potential for delivery of assistance in justice, police and corrections to the field.

### 2.1 How Has the GFP Operated to Date at Headquarters Level?

The GFP was established to enhance UNDP-DPKO cooperation with the intent of improving UN Headquarters' PJC support to the field, at field request, or at least that is what one can infer from the language of the 2012 S-G's decision and Steering Committee note. The decision left leeway for interpreting the primary function of the GFP. Some see this mostly as a way to get UNDP and DPKO to talk to each other on PJC issues on a regular basis, which they are now doing, and to coordinate their PJC planning and field programming. Others see GFP strictly as a vehicle for enhancing support to the field, at field request. These are, of course, not mutually exclusive objectives – cooperation can and should enhance coherence of field support – but which interpretation of the GFP interlocutors emphasized seemed to reflect their organizational interests. Partner organization personnel also expressed some confusion about GFP purposes and their potential role(s) in it, suggesting that, after more than a year in business, the GFP has either not worked out its identity to the point that it is easily explained to others, or it has not had, or taken, the time to explain what it has worked out to partners, clients and Member States (more on this further on and in Part 3.)

Operationally, the GFP is a somewhat amorphous, self-governing network arrangement that neither merged existing entities nor created a new office. The S-G's decision positioned the GFP between the two governing spheres of the UN system: the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programs.<sup>51</sup> Both the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO and the Administrator of UNDP are accountable for the GFP, which they oversee through principals – the Assistant-Secretary-General for Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).<sup>52</sup> Though UNDP and DPKO constitute the core of the GFP, they are responsible for consulting and convening other members of RoLCRG,<sup>53</sup> based on those members' respective PJC capacities, to enhance system wide coherence.

Below the level of the GFP principals, the GFP management team has set to work to ensure progress in delivering PJC objectives. As noted, the management team comprises the heads of the BCPR Rule of Law, Justice and Security Team, DPKO/OROLSI's Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service and the Police Division's Strategic Policy and Development Section (SPDS). These individuals meet regularly, exercise shared leadership and have managerial responsibility and accountability for the effective functioning of the GFP. Their teams were envisioned to be co-located,<sup>54</sup> which has taken place to a certain extent. Since June 2013 the teams have occupied adjacent floors of a single building but with technical issues, including different Secretariat and UNDP IT and access systems. Finding funds to make them technically compatible, and arrangements to make the fixes, has delayed full co-location on the same floor up for almost a year.<sup>55</sup> The co-location option has also been opened to other RoLCRG actors with a role in PJC, and is "to be mirrored, where possible" by co-located PJC teams in the field.<sup>56</sup> Though co-located, the staff and managers of the GFP maintain their existing management reporting lines, helping to make the GFP a form of self-governing network. The managers make decisions by consensus and report jointly to no single principal. That is why **Figure 1** depicts the GFP not as its own organizational box but as field of connectivity among the units of the GFP managers. It also indirectly involves the PJC elements of the UN system, some of which have designated liaison officers to sit with the GFP core teams.<sup>57</sup>




Fig. 1: GFP and Immediate Partners

Based upon the S-G's decision, UNDP and DPKO developed an initial joint “modalities and work plan” in November 2012 to outline working procedures at the managerial and technical levels.<sup>58</sup> Information sharing and collaboration was to be institutionalized and promoted through regular consultations and advice on communications and requests to and from the field; support for the development and implementation of joint country plans; video-teleconferences with in-country staff; and performance evaluations based on collaborative efforts. As substantiated further on, this review contends that such arrangements and modalities have, on the whole, worked to enhance cooperation among UN Headquarters working-level GFP partners, particularly within and between the offices operating under the GFP management team.<sup>59</sup>

In addition to outlining working procedures, the 2012 work plan introduced the concept of “focus country” as a management tool to provide a “sense of clarity” to joint efforts.<sup>60</sup> The list of focus countries covered a relatively broad sample of country presences, representing a wide array of mission stages and operating mandates. Soon after agreement on the 2012 work plan, however, the GFP transitioned from its initial list of focus countries to a larger pool, without appreciably prioritizing the potential for GFP engagement. Thus it appears the GFP managers, while still in the early phase of consolidating GFP's Headquarters network, thought it better to cast a wider net in order to show results vis à vis the field and engage as many partners as possible. As will be discussed further in Part 3, this decision has resulted



in broad GFP engagement across different field settings in which depth of involvement was traded for breadth of exposure.

The GFP finalized a new work plan in October 2013 for the period 2013-2016 which fine-tuned GFP activities in country-support and laid out a strategy to deliver results in four activity areas:<sup>61</sup>

1. *Providing advice* on assessments, planning, financing, and partnerships (with Country Support Plans becoming the GFP's central activity);<sup>62</sup>
2. *Accessing people* for rapid and flexible deployment of police, justice and corrections expertise, and the development of mechanisms to help identify and deploy such personnel through partner networks within and outside the UN system;
3. *Increasing knowledge* and improving policies, guidance and training tools, including the creation of an electronic platform of good practices, lessons learned, case studies, etc.;
4. *Managing effectively* at HQ-level to improve system wide coherence not only through co-location but also through the development of a business plan.

The business plan, expected to be finalized by the end of 2014 and as defined thus far, aims to reconcile UNDP and DPKO working procedures, develop an effective communication and outreach plan, and engage the broader UN system in country support (with regularly scheduled meetings of the ASGs, monthly meetings with GFP partners, fortnightly meetings of the GFP managers, and country-specific meetings convened on a needs basis).<sup>63</sup>

The business plan is an urgent deliverable given that the absence of basic management tools – as well as a joint fundraising and resource mobilization strategy for HQ and the field – has contributed to a persistent lack of clarity in the field regarding the GFP's practical added value and to the less-than-optimal performance of some of its field visits. The absence of key management tools also suggests a need for more pro-active oversight and strategic focus by the GFP principals.<sup>64</sup>

Progress on work plan activity areas one through three is generally captured in Part 3 of the report, while the fourth activity area, effective management, is the focus of the following two sections regarding GFP results and areas for improvement at the UN Headquarters level.

## 2.2 What Results Has the GFP Achieved at HQ?

In broad terms, and based on a thorough examination of internal documents and interviews conducted at UN Headquarters, the review team concluded that the GFP has promoted new and more consistent interactions between UNDP and DPKO personnel directly involved with the GFP at Headquarters, and improved working relations. However, the pressure on the GFP to demonstrate results in delivering PJC assistance to the field during its initial period of operations has resulted in an ambitious agenda of field-related activities.<sup>65</sup> This ambition has not been adequately matched by efforts at Headquarters to reconcile DPKO and UNDP business processes that hamper more efficient and innovative collaboration.

### ***Coordination between UNDP and DPKO at Headquarters Level***

#### **More institutionalized UNDP-DPKO interaction**

Overall, the institutionalization of interaction between UNDP and DPKO through the GFP seems to have contributed to improved coordination and working relations. A DPKO/PD staff member indicated the GFP's positive role in bringing about this unprecedented situation, stating “before it was based on personalities ... without the meetings, we wouldn't have a professional relationship.”<sup>66</sup> Such views were generally

echoed by UNDP staff members, one of whom stated, “Before the creation of the GFP, the system had no forum to discuss country support. DPKO would plan alone; UNDP would plan alone.”<sup>67</sup> Particular appreciation was given to the opportunity to jointly plan, take decisions collectively and, to a certain extent, implement them together.<sup>68</sup> Interlocutors repeatedly reflected on the novelty of the situation, which had not been brought about by any previous coordination attempts or structures. A DPKO staff member indicated that the improved channels of communication between DPKO and UNDP have allowed DPKO to learn more about the activities of country teams in the field and vice versa.<sup>69</sup> On the whole, the arrangement has begun to standardize coordination, consultation and information sharing. “The expectation now is that we’ll do it together.”<sup>70</sup>

At the same time, this institutionalization of interaction carries significant costs because all existing entities, management structures, fora and reporting lines were left intact. An unavoidable consequence of more regular interaction within the existing organizational parameters has been an increase in the transaction cost of doing business.<sup>71</sup> This ranges from co-signing code cables to getting joint documents approved. The joint UNDP-DPKO front presented in field visits comes at the cost of having to match schedules months in advance through time-consuming consultation. For many, GFP represents an additional burden, suggesting the need either to endow the GFP with a firmer nucleus or to increase its level of organizational alignment through, for example, directives reconciling UNDP and DPKO working procedures and business processes.<sup>72</sup> Despite the high levels of goodwill expressed within the core of the GFP, “the problem is that there are two fundamentally different organizational, conceptual, policy and funding approaches. ... We didn’t know this was going to be so problematic.”<sup>73</sup> The GFP involves directly a relatively small number of UNDP and DPKO personnel – relatively small tails on relatively large dogs. The realignments needed in the larger entities’ financial and personnel rules, security procedures and information technology protocols in order to make the GFP work as intended are substantial and are discussed later (for HQ levels) and in Part 3 (for the field).

### **An improved UNDP-DPKO working culture within the GFP**

Most UN staff interviewed at UN Headquarters for this review agreed that the GFP initiative has given rise to a new working culture and a new way of “doing things” in the relevant components of UNDP and DPKO. While field-level cooperation may have existed prior to GFP in certain contexts, this did not extend to UN Headquarters. As a UNDP staff member stated, “When I joined [UNDP] ... there was a strong sense of competition [with DPKO]. We were trying to show what had been done in the field and show that we were ahead of the curve. There was a lot of distrust, too. Not so much now... We’re committed. There is an interest in making this work and seeing how you can help your team.”<sup>74</sup> DPKO interviewees concurred.

Improved coordination and working relations between UNDP and DPKO are, according to interviewees, largely attributable to physical and institutionalized interactions (something that was also echoed in conversations with field offices). The degree of co-location achieved thus far has promoted more frequent interaction and also made it easier for staff to organize activities aimed at improving work relations and fostering a sense of “team.” What is more, it appears to have appreciably improved both cognizance and conscientiousness of actors’ respective roles. This in turn has produced a certain level of trust among the participants that did not exist before the GFP.

### **Clear management and leadership**

Commitment to the GFP at the managerial level was considered to have a positive effect on coordination and working relations. Working level staff widely appreciated managers’ commitment to making the GFP work and the encouragement they receive to work together with (and consult) their GFP colleagues.<sup>75</sup> The commitment from the USGs was also considered appropriate; although coordination at this level is more

difficult, given the density and complexity of demands on the USGs' time. This has, in some cases, affected some GFP outreach activities in the field.<sup>76</sup> Relations at the ASG level were reported as challenging at times, but this was not considered by staff to have affected GFP relations at the working level.

### ***Co-location and Convening of UN Partners beyond the GFP Core***

Co-location of representatives of other UN entities working with GFP core partners is a key GFP objective. As of April 2014, only UN Women has co-located with the GFP. While various GFP staff noted good synergies, there was also confusion with respect to the role of the UN Women representative within the GFP, although that role, as liaison, is clearly described in the position's terms of reference.<sup>77</sup> While it is encouraging that both UNODC and OHCHR have committed to co-location, recruitment and fundraising for new positions is taking longer than expected. Other GFP partners questioned co-location in a period of continuing financial distress, especially as the benefits of co-location seemed unclear to them. Some may also be waiting to see if the GFP moves beyond the "testing ground" phase.<sup>78</sup> The GFP is seeking to establish partnerships with, inter alia, the World Bank, the European Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Open Society Foundation, and with police, justice, and corrections support providers such as Norway, Sweden, Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom. The nature of these partnerships is diverse and involves knowledge tools, access to experts, the development of joint programs, and the acquisition of extra-budgetary resources to support UN Headquarters functions.

The GFP convenes partners on both a regular and an as-needed basis. Relatively effective collaboration and coordination was reported at the technical level in country-specific meetings, which are called as needed to deal with crises and other country-level events. Scheduled meetings include the ASG level (two meetings as of this writing, in March and December 2013);<sup>79</sup> and monthly video conference meetings at lower levels, since at least September 2013, with other UN entities working on PJC – including DPA, UN Women, OHCHR, UNODC, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Rule of Law Unit/ Executive Office of the Secretary-General (RoLU/EOSG), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the Team of Experts on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the World Bank).<sup>80</sup>

### **Resource Mobilization**

The GFP has managed to operate at HQ with existing capacities and limited additional resources – an important accomplishment – and the areas to which some of these resources may be applied have been clearly delineated by Member States. DPKO, for example, cannot meet expenses associated with the GFP that are not directly tied to its mandate to support UN peacekeeping operations. While some interlocutors saw the resource issue as a rationale for DPKO's limiting its engagement with the GFP, DPKO personnel stressed both the constraints placed on staff travel funds to visit even those operations for which they were responsible prior to and since the creation of the GFP, and the legal barriers to using its assessed peacekeeping budget for non-peacekeeping-mission support.<sup>81</sup> Although the GFP did manage to do more with the resources it had, including active engagement with the field, by accessing UNDP-managed resources, its relatively fixed resource boundary has arguably also limited its impact.<sup>82</sup>

Both raising and managing resources proved difficult, initially. Member States are reluctant, according to some GFP interviewees, to contribute to the GFP in a context of financial scarcity or because they are waiting to see if the GFP would prove sustainable over the medium term before making solid financial commitments. Nonetheless, by 2014 several extra-budgetary support commitments had been made.<sup>83</sup>

The review team noted some DPKO-UNDP wariness around the control and administration of joint GFP resources. Encouragingly, an agreement on the financial management of the GFP was reached in April 2014 (subject to review in one year), following months of consultations. The agreement establishes a joint

approval process for fund expenditures by the three GFP managers as well as transparency in allocation and reporting, a key element stressed by DPKO personnel in UN Headquarters interviews the previous November. This agreement also represents an important accomplishment in the development of the GFP as it will lay the basis for smoother functioning and better service delivery to the field. It allows the GFP to step beyond a time-consuming case-by-case approach to resource allocation and releases scarce management time to support other improvement initiatives.<sup>84</sup>

In terms of expenditures, GFP funds are intended to be used to support the field deployment of experts or consultants, assessment or support visits to the field, and emergency or catalytic country-level projects (up to \$100,000),<sup>85</sup> staff recruitment, and knowledge management tools. This will slowly enable the GFP to start providing what the field most wants from it: funds and expertise (further elaborated in Part 3).

### ***Communications and Outreach***

GFP staff has been effective in building GFP brand name recognition at Headquarters through efforts that range from speeches, informal briefings and presentations (including to the C-34), to bilateral and multilateral meetings, and naming in UN documents. Other UN entities and Member States generally have now heard of the GFP, but few know what the GFP is about or what services it provides. Part of the problem is that the GFP has yet to develop a coherent communication strategy for both UN Headquarters and the field.<sup>86</sup>

In addition, the review team noted that the GFP's corporate communications strategy is geared toward brand recognition and demonstrating early outputs to GFP stakeholders. It is much less focused on articulating a clear added value proposition to the field and how its services can be mobilized. This is further explored in Part 3.

### ***Summarizing Headquarters-level Results***

In its initial period, the GFP has achieved some strong results at Headquarters, which notably include strengthened institutional interaction, an improved working culture and critical relations of trust between the relevant elements of UNDP and DPKO. In a UN system that functions at least as much on the basis of personal relations and trust as it does on the basis of hierarchy and command, this is an important achievement. To this can be added an impressive set of activities, especially with regard to the field (as discussed in Part 3), undertaken within a largely fixed resource envelope.

Results still in process are the co-location of core GFP personnel, across-the-system convening of UN partners required to give the new PJC partnership broader meaning beyond UNDP and DPKO, and clearer communication of how GFP can add value directly to the work of the field. These and other features of the GFP are areas for improvement, as detailed further in the following section.

## **2.3 Areas for Improvement at Headquarters Level**

The GFP core team has realized a number of notable achievements at Headquarters, especially in New York in terms of mutual interaction and teamwork in a relatively short period of time with initially fixed resources. This does not mean that it could not do better in several important respects. Doing better requires not just addressing gaps in management processes and tools or clarifying and solidifying relationships with partners, but more clearly defining and communicating its strategic concept and re-examining its underlying resource premises.

### ***Strategic Approach and Effective Communication of that Approach***

In the course of its work, the review team heard the GFP described as different things, from a UNDP-DPKO Headquarters coordination mechanism to a system wide coordination mechanism, to a vehicle

for joined-up service delivery to the field, only at field request, or on its own initiative as well. It is all of these things, in practice; but the GFP appears to have devoted much more energy to establishing a track record of outputs than it has to defining for itself and others what it is, can be or wants to be. Developing a detailed consensus on the purpose and focus of the GFP among the managers and principals will go far in assuaging puzzlement about the arrangement as expressed by many interlocutors.

Part of the difficulty in clearly defining a singular strategic approach/concept for the GFP lies in the legacy duties and responsibilities still borne by its managers and technical staff. Responsibility for oversight of field activities, conduct of assessments and evaluation of field performance all require HQ initiative vis à vis the field and coexist, somewhat uneasily, with the standing instruction to the GFP to *respond* to requests for support from the field. This co-habitation of old and new undoubtedly contributed to some of the uncertainties expressed by field interlocutors – as related in Part 3 – regarding what services and support the GFP was offering that were different and/or stood apart from what had already been available from pre-GFP arrangements for PJC support.

The expectations of the GFP's viewing public also need to be grounded more firmly in the realities of the efforts and time required to effect changes in policies, rules and working culture that ultimately may generate a new HQ service package. If the GFP really is to embody a new business model, that model will take time to replace the old one, and such change must be championed both internally and from outside. Managers, technical-level staff, principals, partners and Member States that support the new model also need to give it a chance to work – and to fail, learn, recover and ultimately succeed.

#### **Recommendations:**

*1. Define a clear strategic concept/approach* for the GFP that addresses definitively what it is and how it functions at UN Headquarters and as regards the field (suggested lead: GFP management team).

*2. Develop a communication strategy in support of the strategic concept* that include clear descriptions of GFP product services as well as how to access those services, either by direct contact with desks or by dialing/logging into a user-friendly website that classifies inquiries, directs them to the appropriate parties, indicates what can be expected when contact is made, and emphasizes follow-through (suggested lead: GFP management team).

*3. Member States should support the GFP's role* by promoting increased awareness of GFP in their own assistance programs and emphasizing GFP-linked arrangements in Security Council resolutions and/or General Assembly budgets (suggested lead: UN Member States).

#### **Workability of Resource Premises**

The GFP was premised on doing more (coordination, field visits, planning, reporting and resource mobilizing) without more (people, funds or time). The contrast between it and the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), another UN exercise in improved service delivery with efficiency gains, is instructive. GFSS involved 14 missions with a composite budget of \$7.3 billion and considerable “organizational slack” spread across thousands of support posts and hundreds of supply chains from which cost, drag or duplication could be removed.<sup>87</sup> The GFP arrangement, in contrast, is on the order of 40 persons. Its core teams have kept their day jobs, and they bear the transaction costs of coordination as well as reap some of its benefits. Stretched by its two-layer tasking (old jobs and new), the GFP has neither sufficient internal resource “mass” nor the necessary organizational slack from which to pull the efficiency gains needed to offset the transaction costs of doing more without more. If the GFP is to continue and mature as a new way of delivering multi-agency resource support to the field, some of its basic underlying premises will need to change.

Chief among these, the formula of “doing more with less” needs re-examination. At this point in time it looks unlikely that a fundamental shift in the quality of PJC services to the field can be realized without additional resources – even if those resources are only temporary and used to smooth the wheels of transition that can lead to more integrated approaches and better tools. The most feasible way forward might be to agree on a package of Member State-provided support in exchange for firm commitments by GFP management and its senior sponsors to make the changes that will enable the GFP to deliver rapid and scalable solutions to field colleagues in terms of funds, personnel and knowledge. This approach conflicts with the founding principles of the GFP, which were: no new structures, no more resources, but improved PJC services from HQ to field. Should budgetary and resource parameters continue to prove this inflexible, senior UN management and Member States will have to anticipate the risk of the GFP failing to make the desired, sustainable, qualitative leap to a new way of operating. This theme is further elaborated in Section 3.3.

**Recommendation:**

*4. Re-examine the formula for the GFP of “doing more with less” and develop a joint resource mobilization strategy*, so that the arrangement is better able to achieve and sustain its goal of improved support to the field in police, justice and corrections (suggested leads: USG of DPKO and UNDP Administrator).

***Managerial Foundation and Structures***

Problems associated with different working styles, though mitigated somewhat by proximity, remained a challenge for the GFP in the absence of unity of command.<sup>88</sup> Management tools that might ease these burdens have yet to be put in place. Interviewees attributed the lag not to lack of intent but to lack of time. GFP core teams continue to fulfill original duties while engaging with new partners and planning and conducting GFP-specific activities. As discussed in Part 3, a high priority on output generation via field visits and the development of field support ties also postponed the realization of a business plan or a joint resource mobilization strategy.

Given the no-new-structures premise of the S-G’s 2012 decision, the GFP has thus far functioned as a largely self-governing network of core participants. Self-governance takes time and negotiation and consensus-building. The trust that it requires has increased over time but that gain is offset by the growing complexity of GFP interactions with its parent entities, partners and field presences, and growing need for administrative competencies separate from substantive rule of law expertise.

As a self-governing network, the GFP lacks an administrative nucleus. Interviews indicated that the GFP has not managed to attract and hold the attention of the administrative offices (budget, personnel, logistics and communications) of the Department of Field Support (DFS) or of the higher support echelons of UNDP. In consequence, its managers and substantive specialists spend a significant part of their time resolving financial, regulatory and personnel issues instead of applying their expertise toward improving the impact of PJC activities in the field.

Differences in rules and procedures between Secretariat departments and UNDP have also blocked or delayed constructive innovations in the field (including mission reimbursements for staff hired by UNDP in consultation with the Mission) and need immediate, high-level attention from both sides, and likely also the Department of Management (DM) (see Box 2 for an example from Somalia). Innovation at Headquarters can be similarly stalled and requires similar high-level attention. Consider, for example, that the identity cards of the almost-co-located core members of the GFP cannot admit one entity’s staff to the other’s floor space; that core members still cannot fully access relevant parts of one another’s IT systems; or that, in the research team’s experience, a UNDP identity card cannot get the holder past the 42<sup>nd</sup> Street staff






Fig. 2: GFP, Partners, and Network Administrative Team

gates of the Secretariat compound even if the holder is a member of the core GFP technical team, working under a directive of the Secretary-General. The team understands identity cards to be the responsibility of the Department of Staff Security (DSS) and hopes that issues such as those just described receive adequate and urgent attention.

Inasmuch as updated UN Staff Rules are issued at regular intervals by the Secretary-General, it seems unreasonable to the review team that rules (whether Secretariat or UNDP) could not be adapted as needed to meet the requirements of an arrangement that has been advertised not just as a way to make DPKO and UNDP work better together but as a new way of doing business for the Organization.<sup>89</sup>

**Recommendations:**

*5. Complete a GFP business plan:* The promise of a business plan by year’s end constitutes an essential deliverable and should be a high GFP priority. Additional resources and expertise, as well as engagement of DFS, DM, the DPKO Executive Office and the corresponding UNDP departments will be essential to complete this endeavor (suggested lead: GFP management team).<sup>90</sup>

**6. Complete co-location of the managers and core technical staff for the GFP at the earliest possible date.**

High-level interventions with the cognizant units of DM, DSS, DPKO and UNDP should be made to finally finish a process of co-location and routine mutual access to space and to data files that the GFP core team has been waiting on for more than a year (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

**7. Ensure common overhead costs and joint program implementation.** The S-G's 2012 report on civilian capacity and several interviews for this study indicated that the Secretariat can, if pressed, match the 7 percent overhead rate levied on trust fund contributions by UNDP. Clarifying and ensuring such parity would help make contributions to GFP HQ funding and mission trust funds more attractive to donors, such that either mission or UNDP funds could be used to best advantage according to need and circumstance, in either case with UNDP appointees working with missions as program managers (suggested leads: USG of DPKO and UNDP Administrator).

**8. Create a GFP-focused administrative capacity, a network administrative team (NAT) that is focused on smoothing, standardizing and operationalizing the GFP's work,** with principals and managers retaining strategic oversight and substantive control over all GFP work in the service of supporting better PJC results in the field. The NAT should be devoted solely to supporting and enabling GFP operations but should also represent entity-level support for the arrangement, and for that reason the review team recommends dual administrative reporting lines for the NAT to the chiefs of staff of DPKO and UNDP and technical reporting to the GFP managers. Financial support may derive from a dedicated window in the resource options proposed in Section 3.3. See Figure 2 (and Annex II for more detailed organizational context) (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

**9. Encourage Member States to press for the resolution of technical blockages to innovation,** from co-location to cross-posting of personnel, encouraging the adaptation and harmonization of Staff Rules as required to meet the needs of the new business model, and addressing changes to Staff Regulations that may be needed to facilitate the adaptation of such rules. Member States can also recognize and support the need for specialized administrative competence within the GFP that keeps it centered as more partners join and also keeps it within sight of the leadership of UNDP and DPKO (suggested lead: dedicated core of UN Member States).

***Relationships with Non-Co-located Partners, Including within UNDP & DPKO***

One of the findings of the review is that there is a need for clearer rules of engagement for GFP partners. The GFP works with 10 UN entities (and governments of some seven countries, and think tanks), yet it is not clear how the various partners are or can become engaged in activities. There are meetings, but a clear process for convening is not yet available or clear to these partners. It is also not clear to them what their role in the GFP is, nor what exactly is being asked of them at which stage.

Nor is this a matter only for relations outside UNDP and DPKO. For example, the Mission Management and Support Section (MMSS) and the Selection and Recruitment Section (SRS) of the Police Division have been less engaged with the GFP than has the Strategic and Policy Development Section (SPDS), which provides one of the GFP's three managing partners. The sections attend GFP meetings when their expertise is requested,<sup>91</sup> as do other non-co-located GFP partners. However, they need to adapt to the notion that UNDP can recruit for and fill some police posts in peacekeeping and political missions. This has led to a certain amount of friction. MMSS and SRS may also be getting more queries from police elements in political missions or non-mission settings through the GFP. They will need a protocol for handling these queries that is consistent with the constraints of their budgetary authority and staffing. Overall, there is a need to better integrate the non-co-located police sections into GFP goals and processes.<sup>92</sup>



Issues raised in interviews with GFP partners suggest the need for: deeper investigation of the sources of bottlenecks in partner co-location; re-examination of the broader value of co-location beyond the core partners; and further operational directives to better define the specific roles of co-located personnel, of reporting lines between the GFP and co-located entities, and of respective spheres of autonomy. For example, can the co-located staff make decisions related to collaboration with GFP without pre-approval of their respective organizations?

Feedback from interviewees also suggested that the more-inclusive video conference meetings were insufficiently strategic and substantive and could be better prepared. As a result, prospective GFP partners did not engage to the extent they might have and a majority of partner interlocutors interviewed expressed a sense of exclusion – consistent with a “we call you when we need you” sentiment within the core of the GFP that sees partners as resources to be tapped in support of a DPKO-UNDP mechanism. These two stances toward partnership – co-contributor versus as-needed source of specialist knowledge – reflect different views of what the GFP is and how it works or should work. The two views will need to be reconciled if the GFP is to mature and succeed over the longer haul.<sup>93</sup>

DPKO and UNDP also work together productively as co-chairs of the Inter-agency SSR Task Force (SSRTF), together with partners such as UNODC, UN Women and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The work of the SSRTF can be taken as an example for engaging effectively with partners, sharing information and identifying options for added value toward the field. While the specific focus and emphasis of the SSRTF and the GFP differ, areas of SSR-related work support the rule of law and the rule of law can be deepened by the effective reform of security institutions, making it worthwhile for DPKO and UNDP to consider how these two arrangements could make use of one another’s strengths on behalf of missions and country teams. An interesting entry point for such collaboration could be the SSRTF’s mandate to develop innovative projects, and \$1 million earmarked annually for such projects in the UNDP Global Fund for the Rule of Law. Some of these funds might productively be used as seed money for innovative activities where the interests of the SSRTF and the GFP coincide in the field. As a promising example, in Guinea-Bissau a GFP field visit prompted the development of a joint proposal of UNDP, UNODC, UNICEF, and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to support the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Judiciary Police, which was submitted to the SSRTF for funding.

#### **Recommendations:**

*10. Develop more structure relationships between the GFP with partners outside UNDP and DPKO, in part through a “convening protocol”* that could help to bridge partner differences with the core team and among the partners on a given field support question. To do so it should address at least four questions: What are the standards (i.e., ‘rights and duties’) for UN entities’ involvement in GFP work at Headquarters and for their participation in GFP-led field visits? What format and focus for GFP-led meetings would make them a better venue for inputs from partners on the formulation of strategic advice? What incentives are required to make such standards and formats effective? What can be learned from the convening protocol and practices of the SSRTF? (Suggested leads: GFP management team and GFP partners.)

*11. Articulate a consensus with partners on specific GFP goals* to help the GFP make a more compelling case to current and potential partners about why the inevitable transaction costs of coordinating with the GFP are merited. This may benefit from conducting a series of stakeholder consultations to take stock of different interests and priorities, as well as their common denominator, possibly culminating in a round table. These actions will serve the GFP in leveraging a broader network to better convene PJC expertise across the UN system.<sup>94</sup> (Suggested lead: GFP management team and partner agencies.)

*12. Seek out areas of collaboration with the inter-agency SSRTF* in support of field projects of mutual interest that may then draw upon task force funds earmarked within the UNDP Global Fund for the Rule of Law (suggested lead: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR; SSRTF co-chairs).

Making the needed Headquarters-level improvements will require strong leadership among the GFP principals and managers, the cooperation of the leadership and administrative elements of the two core GFP entities and other UN administrative departments and bodies, more reasonable expectations on the part of stakeholders, and additional resources to match even the somewhat narrower but deeper field-related ambitions suggested above.

### 3. INTERACTIONS WITH AND VIEWS FROM THE FIELD

This section offers consolidated “views from the field” on the progress the GFP has made in serving its key clients since its creation in 2012. It complements the headquarters component of the research. Concretely, the section analyzes the perceptions and experiences of a number of UN missions and country teams (hereafter referred to as “the field”) with the GFP in terms of their interaction and the support they have received. It is grounded in 94 interviews that were conducted with field staff in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali and Somalia (see Annex 1 for further detail on methodology).

Section 3.1 describes how the GFP has worked in and with the field to date. Section 3.2 analyzes the results that the GFP has contributed to so far, while Section 3.3 takes stock of the improvements that can be made to enhance the GFP’s value added. All three sections are written on the basis of views and information acquired from field interlocutors.

Since the field is the GFP’s key stated customer but had little role in its design, the findings of this section provide important markers to develop further and mature the GFP in a client-focused direction. Table 2 offers a birds’ eye view of how the GFP concept and its operations have been perceived in the field and aims to help the GFP identify its next steps in dealing with its main clients.

#### 3.1 How Has the GFP Worked in and with the Field to Date?

This section briefly outlines the volume, nature and approach of the GFP’s mission activity. To start with, the pace of GFP mission activity is impressive. The 19 GFP-labeled field visits undertaken to date took place within a period of a year and a half, with Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC having several visits each. In addition, the GFP has engaged with UN missions or United Nations Country Teams (UNCT) in Afghanistan, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago without fielding a visit. The sheer range of GFP field visits can be considered positively from the perspective of building up a client base for future work and reference, especially given the field’s absence in the process of the GFP’s creation. Table 3 provides a brief overview of the nature and purpose of the field visits conducted by the GFP. It suggests that the field has mainly come to know and experience the GFP through the prism of field visit activity.

|               | Is the GFP’s basic concept clear to the field? | Can the field articulate the GFP’s added value to it? | Are the GFP’s services and tools clear to the field? | Were GFP visits seen as well organized? |
|---------------|--|---|--|---|
| Guinea        | Green  | Red   | Red  | Red                                     |
| Guinea-Bissau | Green  | Orange  | Red  | Orange                                  |
| Haiti         | Green  | Red   | Red  | Red                                     |
| Côte d’Ivoire | Green  | Red   | Red  | N/A                                     |
| Libya         | Green  | Orange  | Red  | Green                                   |
| Mali          | Green  | Green   | Red  | Green                                   |
| Somalia       | Green  | Orange  | Red  | Orange                                  |

**LEGEND:** Red = to a limited extent; Orange = to a moderate extent. Green = to a significant extent. N/A= not appropriate or no information available. **NOTE:** The table reflects average responses to about 90 semi-structured interviews conducted for the field component of the research.

| Table 3: Overview of Country Support with GFP Involvement |                   |  |  |                     |  |
|---|-------------------|--|--|---------------------|--|
|   | # of field visits | Field visit dates                        | UN field visit participants                          | Initiator **        | Purposes of Contact  |
| <b>Afghanistan (SPM)</b>                                  | 0                 | n/a                                      | n/a  | HQ                  | Support development of a UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF)  |
| <b>Burundi (SPM)</b>                                      | 1                 | Nov 2013                                 | UNDP, DPKO, OHCHR, PBSO and DPA (12)                 | HQ (SAM)            | Support development of common Rule of law plan as part of mission reconfiguration  |
| <b>Central African Republic (SPM)</b>                     | 1                 | Nov 2013                                 | DPKO   | HQ (TAM)            | Planning of the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA)  |
| <b>Côte D'Ivoire* (PKM)</b>                               | 1                 | June 2013                                | DPKO, UNDP (4)                                       | HQ                  | Discuss and support mission priorities, needs, mechanisms and work plans in the area of justice and corrections  |
| <b>DRC (PKM)</b>  | 2                 | July 2013<br>Feb 2014                    | DPKO, UNDP, UNODC, UNICEF, OHCHR, UNMAS              | HQ                  | Identify the needs and opportunities for the UN's rule of law programming in the transition context  |
| <b>Guinea-Bissau* (SPM)</b>                               | 1                 | Oct 2013                                 | DPKO, UNDP (2)                                       | HQ                  | Improve the alignment of the current justice program with country priorities and UN Strategy 2013-2017   |
| <b>Guinea* (UNCT)</b>                                     | 1                 | Feb 2014                                 | UNDP, DPKO, UNICEF, UN Women, OHCHR, DPA, UNODC (13) | President of Guinea | Gather input for the S-G's response to the president's request for justice support   |
| <b>Haiti* (PKM)</b>                                       | 1                 | April 2013                               | UNDP, DPKO, OHCHR (8-14)                             | HQ                  | Assess current rule of law programs and provide recommendations on future plans with a focus on cooperation between agencies   |
| <b>Jamaica (UNCT)</b>                                     | 0                 | n/a                                      | n/a  | Field               | Assess whether UNPOL short- and long-term support is needed  |
| <b>Liberia (PKM)</b>                                      | 1                 | March 2013                               | (2)  | HQ                  | Develop program on strengthening the Rule of Law and Administration of Justice in Liberia  |
| <b>Libya* (SPM)</b>                                       | 1                 | Feb 2013                                 | DPKO, UNDP (4)                                       | HQ                  | Assess action gaps in international assistance in police, justice and corrections  |
| <b>Mali* (PKM)</b>  | 1                 | Feb 2014                                 | UNDP, DPKO, UN Women, UNODC, OHCHR (10)              | HQ                  | GFP assessment of police justice activities  |
| <b>Sierra Leone (PKM)</b>                                 | 1                 | Jan 2013                                 | DPKO, UNDP (4)                                       | HQ                  | Review mission progress and assess gaps in the transition and exit strategy with respect to SSR  |
| <b>Somalia* (SPM)</b>                                     | 4                 | Oct 2012<br>April/Nov 2013<br>March 2014 | UNDP, DPKO, UN Women (5)                             | Mixed               | Draft rule of law plans for 2014-2019 and agree on co-ordination agreements by Somali authorities and development partners; Support UNDP and UNSOM in designing a MPTF supporting gender and rule of law program |
| <b>South Sudan (PKM)</b>                                  | 2                 | November 2012/2013                       | DPKO, UNDP, UN Women (3)                             | HQ                  | UNMISS review mission  |
| <b>Trinidad &amp; Tobago (UNCT)</b>                       | 0                 | n/a                                      | n/a  | Field               | Analysis of strengths and weaknesses of police service and support for national action plan on gang and homicide crime reduction.  |

Source: Authors based on information provided by GFP managers and comments on draft report.

\* Denotes the seven countries that were included in the field component of the progress review's research. The narrative text of section 3 only reflects analysis of these countries

\*\* Headquarter interlocutors expressed different views as to who initiated particular field visits; cell entries reflect review team's weighing of those views and available documentation.

Most GFP visits conducted joint assessments, worked on country support plans or identified/designed country-level PJC activities.<sup>95</sup> This reflects a focus on generating early and concrete results, which mostly happened through the use of tried and tested operational approaches such as applying the methods and formats of technical assessment missions. A number of the GFP missions pragmatically joined field visits that were already planned or added partners and relabeled such visits as GFP. Some were rather large (see table 3), which at times made them outwardly less coherent and increased the burden they put on hosting staff. In some instances, field actors subsequently observed large GFP visiting teams splitting up along organizational lines to make meetings more practical, but this was seen to undermine the GFP's core message. Large visiting teams also suggest that the working methods and relations of trust between GFP partners have not yet been fully established, as these would allow for smaller teams to represent the collective GFP. In other words, participants seem to have taken the view that their presence in the mission is indispensable to secure their role in the subsequent PJC initiatives or solutions that may result from it.

In addition, many of the visiting teams of the GFP advocated strongly for more joint work in the countries they visited. This happened to the extent that field staff in several missions expressed concern that working "jointly" had become a first-order priority. While appreciative of the general relevance of joint work, most field actors urged form to follow function on the basis of an honest and rigorous assessment of when and how coordination works toward the goal of delivering better PJC results. This may take the form of joint as well as complementary work, with the latter typically being described in terms of working on the basis of aligned priorities, sequenced interventions and a division of labor based on comparative advantage.<sup>96</sup> Complementary approaches could include joint work, but would not elevate joint work as a success in its own right or assume its value outright.

This nuance, between complementarity and joint work, was most often articulated by agency partners. In particular, agencies with a smaller representation and fewer resources stressed the cost of "jointness," cooperation and coordination. Hence, if the GFP aims for closer involvement of such agencies, there will need to be budget-friendly strategies for achieving it. For example, standardized and simple request procedures for GFP services would enable smaller agencies to engage the GFP while also respecting their resource constraints on coordination. This is further explored in Section 3.3.

Moreover, the "pressure" on field entities and staff to co-locate triggered a broad range of reactions, from very positive to very negative. Such reactions were often based on feelings, concerns or territory issues, rapidly turning the issue into an article of belief instead of purpose and fact. It became clear from the interviews that meaningful co-location will require demonstrating its added value, managing the required change in culture appropriately and providing an operational concept that can surmount the associated administrative hurdles.

Finally, GFP field visits logically paid close attention to briefing the field on the GFP concept and its objectives, but significant ambiguity surrounding the GFP remained among field interlocutors after such visits. This pertained in particular to its actual nature (an initiative, a strategy, an office?), its composition and governing structures, its implementation mechanics and services (what does the GFP have to offer, and how are field actors to request its support?), and its relationship to similar coordination groups. The Inter-agency SSR Task Force, the SSR Unit of OROLSI/DPKO, and the RoLCRG, for example, were all mentioned in this regard, constantly pulling into question the unique added value of the GFP. GFP missions did not manage to dispel the confusion about the parallel existence of these bodies and their respective value added. In a similar vein, interlocutors were often not clear about how the GFP's remit relates to the UN's wider rule of law agenda, especially the way in which PJC activities fit in and contribute to broader rule of law strategies.

In sum, it is fair to say that the high volume of GFP field visits can be characterized as having served the dual purpose of generating business and delivering early results. Making this possible has required taking shortcuts such as reverting to existing methods, approaches and planned field visits without much by way of extra resources. While this has generated an incredible hive of activity, it has not necessarily optimized the focus of this activity (for example, on countries where the GFP could make the greatest difference), directed it strategically on the basis of a clear GFP added-value proposition or conducted it in a sustainable fashion. The next section turns to the strengths and kind of results these GFP field visits have generated while Section 3.3 discusses their weaknesses and areas for improvement.

## 3.2 What Results Has the GFP Achieved in the Field?

Before discussing the results that the GFP has achieved to date, the question as to what a GFP result amounts to in the context of its set-up and current state of maturity deserves consideration.

### ***What are the Implications of the GFP Set-up for the Results It Can Achieve?***

At the time of the GFP's creation, no structured and sustained effort was made to solicit field perspectives on the functionality required to ensure the GFP's added value to the field. Hence, the GFP was neither well known in the field at its creation, nor particularly appreciated for the difference it could make. In addition, the GFP has been under strong pressure to deliver from the start. The pressure has emanated in particular from Member States and Headquarters. These two design parameters, limited early field consultation and high pressure for initial results, have had several consequences:

- A high volume of field visits was in many ways necessary for the GFP to generate business and to build its client base. Yet, the spread of these visits over a broad range of countries has made it more difficult for the GFP to concentrate its resources sufficiently to generate deeper and more sustained added value for missions and country offices.
- The pressure to deliver has meant that the GFP needed to take pragmatic recourse to joining Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) and other familiar approaches. While this has helped produce tangible results, such as joint products and quick resource inputs, it has also resulted in the GFP bringing much less attention to bear on creating conceptual clarity, more integrated ways of working and an expanded toolkit that field clients could identify as innovative and valuable. In other words, it has to some extent prevented a fresh rethink of methods and of the GFP's added value with comparatively little attention to sustaining the initial achievements of field visits. For example, field interlocutors remain unclear as to the added value of their dedicated GFP focal points compared to their original BCPR or DPKO contacts (particularly as they are often the same individuals). As such, the high volume of GFP field visit activity has not necessarily been embedded in improved headquarter-field communication structures to prepare and sustain these visits.<sup>97</sup>
- The high-volume approach has inevitably also turned the stipulation of the S-G's decision, CIVCAP framing and the GFP's own work plan "to respond to and support requests from the field"<sup>98</sup> somewhat on its head by stimulating pro-active assessment and advice from HQ teams.

The upshot of these developments is that – despite the volume of missions – the GFP is generally seen to have had a light impact on mission and UNCT PJC activities in terms of the volume and quality of support it has contributed to date.

In addition, the interviews suggest that a major hurdle that needs to be overcome is addressing the field's perception that the GFP is a supply-driven initiative that mainly exists to advance interests at Headquarter-

ters. Two factors have played an important role in creating this perception. First, reasonable familiarity with the term GFP and what it seeks to achieve at Headquarters co-exists with a general lack of clarity on its value proposition in the form of the services and toolkit it has to offer, and the processes through which these can be requested by field entities and staff. Second, a number of GFP missions have been experienced as insufficiently prepared, cumbersome or lacking in follow-up from the perspective of the field. This has diminished the value of the GFP in the view of field staff.

However, caught between a lack of time to develop a differentiating value proposition and toolkit to set the GFP apart from the sum of its constituent elements and the need to demonstrate results, there were not many alternative options. On the upside, there is scope to increase the GFP’s contribution; there is also good buy-in and reasonable enthusiasm for the GFP concept among field staff in certain countries while it has been received with more skepticism in others.

The foregoing suggests a need for the GFP and its key internal and external stakeholders (i.e., ASGs and Member States, respectively) to reflect on what success will look like for the GFP, and in particular what kind of approach and resources are required to deliver success as so defined. In this context, the review team would suggest that the moment is ripe to focus GFP resources on those countries where UN field actors see the GFP’s potential added value and would welcome its support. This is necessary to avoid spreading the GFP thin given resource constraints, as well as to generate “success stories” that convincingly demonstrate the kind of impact the GFP can have. This requires strategic focus, a reduction in the spread of current GFP field visits, and improvement of their quality (see Section 3.3). As different service levels can be offered to different field clients, this does not mean saying “no” to requests from countries that are less in focus.

**Recommendation:**

*13. Develop an operational concept for the GFP that focuses resources on countries where its value-added may be high, to demonstrate the impact potential of the arrangement.* Notably, field demand for GFP involvement appears to be elevated during critical junctures of the mission cycle. Start-up phases provide opportunities to embed common PJC priorities and coordination structures early on, while anticipated mission withdrawals invite GFP support for strengthening the ability of UNCT partners to continue PJC strategies and activities that are expected to continue post-mission (suggested lead: GFP management team).




Figure 3: Value Chain of GFP Support to Field PJC Efforts as it Matures<sup>100</sup>



### ***What Type of Results Can Be Expected at the Current Stage of Maturity of the GFP?***

As said, early results have been seen as critical to the ability of the GFP to increase its credibility, resource base and level of professionalism. Yet the GFP can at best deliver intermediate results; it cannot itself deliver better police, justice or corrections results in the field. What the GFP can provide is better PJC support to UN field actors, enhancing *their* contribution to the ultimate results of improving rule of law systems in fragile environments and conflict-affected countries. Moreover, the GFP is a recent initiative that has not yet accumulated the resources, procedures, clout and experience necessary for delivering more complex services to field actors. Its ability to do so undoubtedly will grow with time, but this should not be the benchmark for success today.

With these two caveats in mind, one way of conceptualizing how the GFP can improve the ability of field actors to work toward better PJC results is its gradual operationalization of a set of services of increasing complexity, comprehensiveness and added value that correspond to its level of maturity and available resources. Figure 3 introduces four stages through which the GFP progressively can increase its added value to field actors. This is used as a framework for understanding GFP results that have been realized so far throughout the remainder of this section.

The results that the GFP has been able to achieve on each of these dimensions in support of PJC efforts of missions and country offices have typically depended on two factors and their interaction. The first is the quality of GFP's own efforts, as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.3.<sup>99</sup> The second is the extent to which the UN field setting and dynamics in country are amenable to GFP involvement. Newer political or peace-keeping missions (for example Somalia, Mali and Libya) were generally more open and flexible to engaging with the GFP and in particular to formative input on structural issues such as the organization of PJC pillars or co-location options. As stated by one interlocutor based in Somalia, integration was eased by the fact that "DPKO saw the advantages of UNDP and UNDP were willing to play."<sup>100</sup> Presumably this is in part because their mandate and structure, more than older missions, reflect the type of integrated thinking that also led to the creation of the GFP, and because they were developed under the new Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP) process.<sup>101</sup> Older missions (for example Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire), which often feature longstanding PJC coordination structures and approaches, proved less convinced of the GFP's added value and considered its advice potentially disruptive. These more established missions resisted GFP input that sought to assess country dynamics or steer programming, preferring instead to focus on policy guidance or strategic-level input. Missions with less capacity were understandably more receptive to the GFP's programming support.

For example, the GFP field visit to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) – a relatively new mission – in February 2014 proved a welcome stimulus for joint work by a mission team inclined to be pro-active in its approach to integration. The mission team used the GFP visit to bring all relevant in-country staff together to enable a conversation covering all PJC aspects. Using this example, a standard protocol could be developed for GFP visits that encourage prior coordination among field actors, with the aim of continuing such coordination during and after the visit.<sup>102</sup> This would require advance understanding of the nature, level and challenges of coordination in-country prior to GFP arrival and perhaps also agreement between GFP management and the country mission or UNCT leadership on how the GFP visit will seek to improve mission or CT performance.

### ***Setting an Example***

The aim of the GFP is not just to produce tangible joint outputs. It also works to develop intangibles such as establishing new relationships, new opportunities for dialogue and bridges between working cultures.



### **Box 1. Haiti: Promoting better-coordinated work**

Despite directives, in a long-established mission such as Haiti with a robust UNPOL contingent, police sections can lack direct incentives to engage and coordinate with other RoL actors. Simultaneously, field leadership may face compelling incentives to pursue “concrete” quantitative policing outputs that detract attention from the importance of more qualitative gains. Such operational challenges present opportunities for important strategic discussions regarding the role and responsibility of UN PJC actors as contributors to broader RoL reform strategies. Field interlocutors see these as discussions that the GFP can help trigger and guide. The GFP is better positioned to manage the politics of such discussions, which can touch sensitive nerves running from the field all the way up to New York.

Source: Review team interviews in Haiti, January 2014.

It has a key symbolic function in showing that working together is both logical and feasible. Field interlocutors suggest that the GFP has generally performed strongly on this dimension, with the caveat that the level of rigor and professionalism of its missions can be improved (see Section 3.3).

The value of UNDP and DPKO staff visibly working together has resonated with field staff who have positively appreciated the lead-by-example approach. In this way, the GFP has demonstrated that interactive and practical coordination is not only feasible but also has much to recommend it. Interviewees across each mission acknowledged that the GFP visits had convened an opportunity for joint discussions, and in some cases encouraged cooperative behavior, among PJC field actors. This was especially the case in Libya, Guinea, Mali and Somalia.

The arrival of a GFP field visit from headquarters that approaches PJC programming in an integrated manner requires field representatives to “level up” in terms of their own approach and contacts within country, as it is by no means a given that different agencies, agencies and mission, or even units within an agency are on the same page on PJC issues. GFP field visits can have the healthy effect of enforcing a more integrated conversation and more joint work.<sup>103</sup> An open question is how sustainable this is since GFP field visit missions typically have a short duration and long between-visit intervals.

One possible solution could involve knitting PJC collaboration and resource mobilization closer together, as in Guinea-Bissau, where UNDP, UNIOGBIS, UNODC and UNICEF have submitted a joint proposal to the SSR Task Force for a common project to strengthen the Judicial Police. This action was prompted by the GFP in close collaboration with the coordination mechanisms in the ground, namely the OG4 (Outcome Group 4), under the United Nation Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF+). More of it would be welcome from a field perspective.<sup>104</sup>

While such gains as outlined above may appear small and are difficult to measure, they constitute a significant change in both headquarters and field behavior with good potential for enabling better PJC results.

### ***Creating Joint Starting Points***

Although the inspirational value of experiencing DPKO and UNDP working side-by-side certainly is one type of result achieved by the GFP, creating joint starting points for further PJC work (and especially receiving resources for PJC activities – see next subsection) proved to be the subject of greater interest among field partners.

The GFP appears to have focused most of its mission efforts on supporting the development of integrated PJC strategies, plans or frameworks, shaping PJC activities for specific programs, sectors or countries, and identifying opportunities for joint projects.<sup>105</sup> Such inputs were appreciated by field interlocutors, as they provide valuable anchoring points for longer-term processes of collaboration and can be realized with GFP resources already available. They are also appropriate as field actors stressed the need for an “honest broker” to help identify common goals, comparative advantages and complementary strengths for addressing PJC issues in a particular context.<sup>106</sup> If developed into a common framework, such input could be used to anchor common priorities among UN field partners and guide budgeting decisions.<sup>107</sup>

Thus far, while a number of PJC strategies, frameworks and Country Support Plans (CSPs) produced after GFP field visits were considered useful, the CSPs in particular were seen to fall short of field expectations. More concretely, according to field actors, the CSPs have not prompted more concrete inputs, nor have the recommendations therein appreciably influenced budgeting processes. Moreover, many partners were disappointed that the plans amounted to country context summaries, which were deemed unhelpful for actors “living the context” on a daily basis.

It was difficult to uncover through interviews the extent to which GFP involvement has continued after initial strategizing and planning. The impression that emerges from the fieldwork is that the GFP needs to be able to contribute concrete human or financial resources in support of the delivery of such strategies to retain GFP-identified value added during the process of their implementation. “Intelligent input” in the form of expert advice, while appreciated in most contexts, is not sufficient to capitalize on gains made and to make these more sustainable. In part this is the case because there can be a tendency among field interlocutors to assume that they know best, and in part because expert advice is simply not enough to turn ideas into action in the absence of critical enablers such as human and financial resources.

In general, the policy guidance and technical advice that the GFP team has provided so far was appreciated by field interlocutors. In fact, they expressed a desire for more such guidance and advice, as long as it stays clear of efforts to micromanage country-level decision-making and programming choices.

### ***Providing Resource Inputs***

Sustaining collaboration and pursuing joint starting points requires more and better resource inputs from the GFP to the field. It will take time to acquire the necessary means and to organize processes for dealing with field requests appropriately. GFP performance in this regard has so far been modest and its improvement over the next months and years is its litmus test in the eyes of most field interlocutors.

GFP support in this area consists of activity-related resource inputs on the basis of specific country needs or requests. The interviews suggest that the GFP has only contributed such enablers on a limited scale so far and mainly in the form of a small number of consultants deployed to the field on PJC issues – the most notable example being GFP support to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) (see box 2).<sup>108</sup> The review team was also informed of plans to deploy a co-funded (UNDP and DPKO) consultant to Mali to assist with planning and project management and the expected support was clearly “appreciated in advance” by the Mali in-country team. In other missions, it was foreseen that a mechanism to rapidly deploy GFP consultants upon request could be interesting, as long as such responses prioritized field needs above Headquarters preferences.

A rough comparison of the few examples of short-term, GFP-provided expertise that the review team was able to correlate with field demand (in Mali and Somalia, for instance) and with GFP staffing outlays confirm the impression of GFP resource support having been fairly modest to date. Ideas raised to increase it included rosters that are easier for the field to pull expertise from and double-hatting some GFP staff as

### **Box 2. Somalia: Innovating UN PJC coherence versus administrative inertia**

The special political mission in Somalia (UNSOM) offers one of the clearest examples of the UN delivering integrated PJC initiatives. Here a joint UNDP-DPKO co-located team works under a single DPA-led rule of law strategy and program with the financial support of a multi-partner trust fund. The breakthrough element of this arrangement is the way it plans to organize its staff. Two UNDP officers (both P5\*, one for police and one for justice) will unite UNDP and UNSOM staff to work on a single program from within the mission. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows UNSOM to exercise substantive control (both P5s report to a D1\* within the mission), while also enabling program implementation and fund management to take place through UNDP (both P5s also report up to the RC through the UNDP reporting line). In addition, this innovative structure permits mission and UNDP staff to take up projects and subthemes of the program according to their comparative advantage and expertise, rather than their organizational affiliation. It is clear that aggregating human resources in this way enables the unit to leverage both the substantial personnel and political assets of the mission in conjunction with the program management expertise, longer-term presence and resources of UNDP to deliver on the PJC elements of the mission's mandate.

The difficulty has been to reconcile the rules and procedures of UNDP and DPKO. For UNDP staff to function in the manner outlined above, they have to be brought on the mission's budget. This was resolved by UNDP agreeing to loan its personnel on a reimbursable loan agreement basis to UNSOM with UNDP billing UNSOM regularly for the staff involved. However, there were two snags. First, UNDP has had to front the money for these positions from its own accounts for the entire year as per its current regulations. Second, UNDP has had to waive the default of its staff losing their Atlas access (UNDP's system that allows for project management and handling associated finances) that normally kicks-in when UNDP officers are loaned to a mission. In short, in a funds-constrained situation or in a situation in which a waiver would not have been granted, this arrangement would not have worked out.

Moreover, the period for sorting this out amounted to 10 months, throughout which staff and senior leaders struggled to find a solution all the way up to the chief of staff level of UNDP and DPKO. While a short-term and one-off solution was found in this case in the form of a waiver, the GFP will need precedent-setting, structural solutions to deliver such support at scale. This includes countenance from member states to allow for more flexibility in hiring and transferring staff across the UN system.

There are comparable issues regarding DPKO's ability to contribute to the GFP's success.

Source: Interviews conducted with UNSOM staff and GFP headquarters staff.

\* P5 and D1 represent UN professional- and director-level career categories.

short-term surge capacity that can be made available to missions and country teams, for example, for periods up to three months (which would support a strategy of bringing more GFP focus to bear on selected countries). Initiatives of this kind would benefit from a brief check as to whether the skills that are most in demand from the field are actually in-house in the GFP's current setup (existing roster or staff). A future GFP funding facility would also contribute significantly to continuous GFP engagement that follows up on initial strategy, planning or programming work.

### **Feeding in Cumulative Knowledge**

While the context and particularities of every country are unique, the challenges that most PJC activities face are not. Field interlocutors recognize this and expressed a strong desire to learn from experiences elsewhere.

While the GFP is intended to operate as a knowledge broker that tailors lessons and comparative programming experiences to concrete operational challenges in specific countries, it has not really entered this area of support yet.

### **Summarizing Field-level Results**

It is fair to say that field actors were generally better able to discuss potential GFP contributions than actual results achieved to date. However, given the relative newness of the GFP this finding represents an opportunity as much as a shortcoming. If nothing else, field interviews demonstrated that the GFP has a reasonable client base to tap, a number of whom wish to hear more about the services the GFP intends to provide. Moreover, conversations with field staff surfaced many interesting discussions on how the GFP can improve its value added, which should inform future decisions about the levels and approaches for operationalizing GFP services. It is to this topic that the next section turns.

## **3.3 Improving the GFP's Added Value to the Field**

A key question for the future development and relevance of the GFP is how it can improve its ability to act as a PJC service provider to UN missions and country teams. This section reflects the views from the field on how the GFP can increase its added value. Across the seven countries in which interviews were conducted, five very concrete and consistent suggestions for GFP improvement stood out. As these elements give voice to the perspective of the client, they represent key routes through which the GFP can become a more credible service provider in the joint endeavor to generate better and timelier PJC initiatives that make a difference to those in fragile environments facing acute shortages of security and justice. A joint effort of donors, GFP staff and DPKO/UNDP management will be essential to enable the GFP initiative to explore, operationalize and deliver on these suggestions. This is discussed further in the report's concluding section.

Table 4 maps those five suggestions for how the field would like the GFP to improve its added value against the four outcome areas of the GFP's work plan for 2013-2016. They are unpacked in the following subsections. The table triggers a key observation, namely that an important dimension of what the GFP could offer the field – program funding – is not currently covered as a major item or in great detail by the GFP's work plan,<sup>109</sup> indicating a partial mismatch between what the field expects from the GFP and what the GFP intends to deliver.

| <b>How the field thinks the GFP's added value should be increased</b>   | <b>Matching GFP work plan outcome area</b>                                      |
|---|---|
| 1. Create a source of funding that can kick start in-country PJC initiatives                                  | Subsumed under "providing advice" from the perspective of country-support plans |
| 2. Provide tailor-made human resource services in the PJC area  | Accessing people  |
| 3. Leverage comparative experiences and lessons to the benefit of in-country PJC activities and programs      | Providing advice and increasing knowledge                                       |
| 4. Develop a clear value proposition in the form of a service bundle, toolkit and standard request procedures | Effective management  |
| 5. Professionalize GFP missions   | Effective management  |

### ***Create a Source of Funding That Can Kick-start In-country PJC Initiatives***

By far the most frequently mentioned service that field staff would appreciate from the GFP is a facility to obtain funding for PJC-related activities. Field actors pointed out that practical collaboration is best realized through joint projects. The recommendations from GFP field visits appear to endorse this strategy. However, funds have not been forthcoming in most cases.<sup>110</sup> This does not have to be full-fledged program funding but could, akin to BCPR's Global Rule of Law program or the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), take the form of seed funding to get PJC initiatives started rapidly. A mechanism for seed-funding would enable field actors to build small, innovative projects, and those with compelling initial results could then be submitted to donors to scale up with more structural funding.

While this may seem to risk reducing the GFP to an intra-UN financial operation, it became clear from interviews that the ability to provide start-up funding would greatly increase the GFP's leverage with missions in respect of its other support capacities: expert advice, innovative program design and promoting closer coordination and joined-up projects. Field staff realized that such funding facility would not amount to the issuing of blank checks without further GFP involvement. In fact, more of such involvement would be appreciated, especially if it led to feasible new activities with initial financial coverage. It would be reasonable to infer that this is a deal-maker or -breaker for the GFP.

#### **Recommendations:**

***14. Create a new, GFP managed, joint financing mechanism to provide UN missions and country teams with start-up funding for PJC programs.*** Such a fund should be set up as a pilot and benefit from both DPKO and UNDP funds, in the spirit of the GFP partnership, supplemented by Member States' funding. Its explicit aim should be to provide seed-funding for GFP-supported PJC activities in the field only, which will require clear upfront agreement with UN field actors on how additional fundraising efforts will be undertaken and programming continuity assured. This has the additional benefit of helping to build the GFP's relation and interaction with the field. The GFP should commit a priori to an evaluation of the initial results and added value of the fund after two to three years. Practically, the GFP should enlist the support of the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) office to produce clear and simple fund procedures (i.e. rules and procedures for fund allocations, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities of fund stakeholders), while the GFP managers can act as its decision-making body and the network administrative team (see section 2.3) as its secretariat (suggested lead: GFP management team).

***15. Alternatively, create a partnership between the GFP and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, endorsed by donors, that results in a percentage of the PBF being dedicated to providing seed funding for GFP-supported PJC field activities.*** Both the theme (PJC) and nature (seed funding) of GFP activities match well with the PBF's aims (in particular under its Priority Area 1<sup>111</sup>). Because UNDP and DPKO already receive funds through the PBF – and UNDP, in fact, is the main recipient of PBF funding – relations of trust already exist that can be built on. In addition, this option offers an opportunity to involve the Peacebuilding Support Office more closely in the GFP. This approach would, however, likely take more time to move from request to disbursement and the GFP would have less control over the associated resources – and hence its own success. (Suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR.)

***16. In parallel, provide seed funding through a dedicated line in mission budgets.*** This can be done by changing the "Quick Impact Projects" line in mission budgets to a "Multi-partner program launch funds" line and by increasing the amount to, for example, 3–4 percent of a mission's budget. This change could create additional funds for PJC and other project-seeding activities through the assessed budget. A comparable a priori commitment to evaluation would seem appropriate. Critical conditions for success are that the UNDP Country Office has an equal role in the decision-making on how such funds are used, that other



agencies/funds with relevant competencies are consulted, and that UNDP personnel are brought into the mission – on mission budget – to manage these funds (see Box 2 for the Somali example). Note that this approach would not cover non-mission settings (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

### ***Provide Tailor-made Human Resource Services in the PJC Area***

The second most highly valued service that the GFP could provide to field colleagues is faster mobilization of better PJC expert resources. The dimension of speed is about providing such expertise fast, on-demand. Many interlocutors voiced significant general frustration with the speed of resourcing throughout the UN. Should the GFP manage to become an operational example of how this can be done more swiftly, it would gain plaudits in many places. This would not require just having experts already lined up who can move quickly, but also to have initial financing sources in place, as well as standards for cost-sharing modalities between headquarters and field, insurance arrangements and other administrative procedures.<sup>112</sup> The objective is not to create new rosters but to focus on facilitating the sourcing of expertise that is already available within the system (ranging from, e.g., DPKO standing capacities to Government Provided Personnel and UNDP consultants). In the foreseen setup, each entity remains confined within its administrative and HR rules. This implies that the GFP will have to attempt to make the existing modalities more interoperable to facilitate expert deployments.

There is, however, also a quality dimension that needs to be taken into account. To begin with, many interlocutors observed that individuals with experience in both mission and non-mission elements of the UN system tended to be more willing and able to coordinate with other UN partners. Hence, this is an important profile component that should influence resourcing choices. In addition, improving the possibilities for transferring UN mission staff to similar roles in the UNCT during/after a mission drawdown was seen as highly instrumental to increase personnel incentives to collaborate from the outset. It could also help mitigate capacity gaps after a mission departs.

Finally, it was generally felt that external PJC experts supporting missions tend to be strong in terms of substantive knowledge, but rather weaker on soft skills and regional familiarity. The need is clearly for experts who command both substantive and soft skill sets and who have built their experience in the relevant region. Naturally, all of this requires resources and it is worth considering setting up a GFP resourcing budget line – next to a programmatic seed funding budget line – through which the GFP can provide field actors with resources that cannot be currently delivered adequately through regular recruitment channels (e.g. speed, certain skill mixes and temporarily plugging critical PJC vacancies).

#### **Recommendations:**

*17. As a matter of urgency: use the Somalia case (and other relevant experiences) to identify structural staffing and associated financial issues that need to be resolved for DPKO and UNDP staff jointly to deliver PJC services in the field under the GFP banner.* Such issues should be collected and presented concretely and concisely to impel action at the necessary levels. (Suggested leads: GFP desk officers and GFP management.)

*18. In the short-term: consider creating an in-house surge capacity using a combination of DPKO standing capacities and the double-hatting of a number of GFP staff for quick support to the field* with clearly defined projects for a period of up to, say, three months. This could also be extended to include PJC staff on a short-term surge roster from missions that are in the process of closing-down with the additional benefit of retaining their expertise a while longer (suggested lead: GFP management team, involving UNPOL MMSS and SRS units).

*19. In the medium-term: inventory what steps are necessary to enable mutual recognition of UNDP and DPKO rosters and stimulate the decision-making required to achieve such recognition in a way that also allows for cross-funding* (e.g. UNDP hiring someone from a DPKO roster and paying for him/her). This may well require a limited joint training program for different rosters to help improve the skills compatibility of their members (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

*20. In the long-term: work with human resources toward more integrated UNDP – DPKO careers whereby it becomes easy for staff from either organization to work stints as “dual citizens”* for the other without loss of job security, pay and prospects. Ensure that this concept, in time, can be extended to other UN partners (suggested lead: the proposed network administrative team under the lead of the GFP management team).

### **Leverage Comparative Experiences and Lessons to the Benefit of In-country PJC Activities and Programs**

A number of field interlocutors expressed the hope that the GFP will be able to help them to learn from experiences elsewhere in a more structured and accessible fashion. They mainly seek operational solutions to concrete programming challenges on the basis of best available evidence. Several ideas were offered, including setting up regular events or structures to identify and share comparative experiences in the PJC area, putting a PJC-focused knowledge management platform in place or creating a PJC community of practice. These suggestions seem to suggest two things. The first is that the existing array of UN PJC-related guidance, portals and communities of practice is either not that well known in the field or not considered sufficiently fit-for-purpose. The second is that there is a role for the GFP to step into this area of high demand and assist field staff in learning from programmatic PJC experiences across the globe.

Some field interlocutors expressed a particular demand for tailor-made guidance on how normative dilemmas can be dealt with operationally on the basis of UN policies (e.g. between human rights and political stability). Guidance that is based on comparative experience from across the globe on how such issues can be navigated, what approaches have worked and can be swiftly tailored to a particular country situation would be very much welcomed. While this is certainly not just the GFP's remit – as it goes far beyond PJC issues – it could usefully provide such a function within the PJC area. Naturally, it would place significant demand on the GFP's ability to gather such experiences, extract relevant learning and manage such information accessibly. The GFP would also need to develop the skills necessary to share the resulting insights beyond individual contacts and anchor them institutionally in the field mission or agency it is advising. This may constitute a possible area for cooperation with the Interagency SSR Task Force.

#### **Recommendations:**

*21. In the medium-term: develop a strategy for identifying lessons, operational insights and good practices across UN PJC activities* and develop a process for how these can be mobilized in a fit-for-purpose manner in response to field requests or perceived needs (suggested lead: GFP desk officers and management team).

*22. In the long-term: consider creating a partnership with a few selected think tanks and, perhaps, universities to engage in a continuous process of reflection on the larger unresolved issues that UN PJC efforts confront on a daily basis.* For example, the question of how PJC initiatives can be organized to deal effectively with elite interests that influence the provision of PJC as services, and gradually increase the scope for positive change (suggested lead: GFP management team).



### ***Develop a Clear Value Proposition in the Form of a Service Bundle, Toolkit and Standard Request Procedures***

The common denominator that runs through all the field suggestions on how the GFP can be improved is for it to articulate a much clearer value proposition. What can the GFP add to what the field is already doing? While most field interlocutors understand the main concept behind the GFP, i.e., to improve UN performance on PJC initiatives and the rule of law more broadly, they were generally at a loss at what the GFP could do for them. Many considered the GFP to be mostly a Headquarters initiative with little practical relevance to the field. The more abstract pitch of what the GFP seeks to achieve does not cut it in the field, as it immediately raises much more concrete and operational questions. For example, the topic of co-location tended to trigger a slew of questions on how different administrative systems would be synchronized and associated hurdles surmounted. Pitches that the GFP would be able to provide more and better expertise were generally welcome, but absent concrete modalities, skepticism prevails in respect of the GFP's actual ability to do this. It will be important for the GFP to make its value proposition tangible in the form of a concrete service bundle and assorted toolkit that specifies what it can do for field colleagues, what the parameters (such as lead times and financial contributions) are and how such services can be requested by the field. Especially on this latter point, confusion prevails in the field: quite literally no one knew how to make a request to the GFP in a correct procedural fashion (i.e. not dependent on individual contacts) that would trigger a swift response.

#### **Recommendation:**

*23. Develop a detailed and specific value proposition for the services and products that the GFP can deliver, how these can be mobilized, by whom and under which conditions.* The latter should include clarity on the contribution that UN field actors might need to make such as, for example, co-funding GFP expert field visits on the basis of a more customer-oriented relationship (suggested lead: GFP desk officers and management team).

### ***Improve the Effectiveness of GFP Field Visits***

While field staff have much appreciated GFP visits in a number of instances, they have also mixed experiences with these missions and their performance. The common denominator of the critical aspects of their experience can be summarized along four main lines:

#### **Several GFP missions were considered to have been run in an inadequate fashion, leading to suboptimal engagement.**

In a number of countries, GFP missions were experienced as needing more rigorous preparation and a clearer focus on outcomes. This manifested itself in different forms prior to and during their stay in country. Prior to their arrival, some GFP missions were felt to have developed overly ambitious terms of reference (for example in Somalia), inadequately familiarized themselves with the general political and specific UN situation in-country (for example in Guinea and Somalia) or insufficiently cut down on their number of participants (for example in Haiti and Guinea). During missions, the visiting team management was on occasion seen as untidy in the sense that the agenda was unclear and daily preparations/debriefings did not take place, thus reducing the opportunity for field staff and mission participations to get and remain on the same page (for example in Guinea). Also, local counterparts were not always adequately consulted ahead of the mission or involved during the mission, leading to irritation or the feeling of being sidelined, which in turn may reduce the potential for future cooperation between the GFP and the field (for example in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Haiti). Finally, in some cases GFP mission participants insisted on conversations with national counterparts (e.g., in the case of Haiti) or conducted these in an overly harsh fashion in the view of field staff (for example in Guinea). This created tension as field staff felt their carefully built relations were put at risk.

**A number of GFP missions functioned as in-mission learning trajectories and were seen by field colleagues as “missions from Headquarters for Headquarters.”**

A significant number of field interlocutors considered the primary function of GFP missions to be to improve how different UN agencies and actors work at headquarters. To put it in slightly exaggerated terms, they felt that they were supporting more integrated ways of working at Headquarters by receiving a GFP mission instead of benefiting from GFP support to that effect.<sup>113</sup> Examples include Libya, Somalia and Mali. Furthermore, it became clear from a number of interviews that mission preparation and pre-mission coordination at Headquarters had not brought everyone participating in GFP missions on the same page. As a result, some missions experienced a steep in-mission learning curve in terms of creating a sense of unity of purpose and esprit de corps, sometimes by going through moments of open disagreement during their stay in country with colleagues or external partners. Guinea appears to have been a more extreme example of this dynamic. This suggests that more thought and/or time should probably be invested in developing a shared idea of what a GFP mission is to achieve prior to its departure; not as the sum of its participants but as a representation of the GFP as a new initiative.

**Some missions were perceived as micromanaging in-country PJC activities and decisions.**

Perhaps it has been because of their desire for early results, but a number of GFP missions were experienced as attempting to micromanage PJC activities by field colleagues.<sup>114</sup> Field interlocutors made it clear that the challenge for GFP missions is to walk the fine line between providing compelling and punchy advice and avoiding the impression of imposing, second-guessing or micromanaging field colleagues or activities. The latter all reduce GFP credibility and acceptance very rapidly. Haiti was by far the most pronounced example of this sentiment dominating among field staff. This suggests that the GFP will do well in making sure its mission preparation process, and indeed its recruitment procedure, select staff on the basis of their diplomatic, partnership-building and collaborative skills.

**The recommendations of a number of missions were not adequately followed up on.**

A few missions suffered from either lacking an agreed set of next steps immediately after departure (for example in Guinea) or a lack of follow-up on the actions it did agree to (for example in Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Libya). This resulted in either a loss of momentum or in unmet expectations among field staff. Both diminished how the GFP is regarded. Field interlocutors assumed in part that this “implementation gap” is related to the GFP’s modest ability to follow through with human and financial resources. Yet many also expressed the view that the GFP has a window of opportunity it should not miss and that it could therefore not afford to drop any balls in terms of commitments made during its missions. This suggests that more rigorous review may be in order of the extent to which the recommendations and agreed actions of GFP missions are implemented.

**Recommendation:**

*24. Make the process for designing, running and following up on GFP missions much more rigorous by introducing a standard operating procedure with more robust management checks* on the clarity of mission objectives, remit, level of preparation, size, leadership and mechanism(s) for follow-up that take place before a mission is actually authorized to take place. As field visits are the GFP’s main business card of the moment, more rigor and focus will help ensure they are used to optimal effect and avoid creating expectations they cannot meet (suggested lead: GFP management team and desk officers).

**Broader issues**

Apart from the views from the field outlined above on how the GFP can increase its added value by making improvements that are largely within its scope of control, field staff also expressed concern, and sometimes frustration, about some broader challenges. In their view, the dominance of peacekeeping missions over

UNCTs and the absence of coordination between these two “entities” on, for example, PJC strategies and initiatives, inhibits the overall UN system’s effectiveness. This proved particularly pronounced where there was a lack of clarity within the country team on how different entities’ mandates were supposed to interact in the context of, for example, the achievement of particular PJC objectives,<sup>115</sup> and where there was a lack of strategic UNCT involvement in mission planning and activities. Another area of frustration concerned the lack of coherence among police, justice and corrections activities at country-level, the slowness and checkered quality of the UN’s recruitment system(s) and the administrative hurdles between and within missions and agencies. All of these problems were reported to make working together more difficult. Finally, the parallel existence at Headquarters of different bodies with (perceived) similar or overlapping mandates and clients, in particular the GFP, the Interagency SSR Task Force and RoLCRG, was a source of reported confusion among field actors as well. The differences among them generally were not understood.

The conundrum for GFP management and staff is that they run up against these issues without having the direct ability to undertake corrective action, the exception being the SSR Task Force that DPKO and UNDP co-chair. (Refer also to discussion of this relationship in section 2.3.)

In this context, UNSG decision no. 2012/13, which explicitly conferred the responsibility for guiding, overseeing, coordinating and implementing in-country UN rule of law strategies to senior UN officials (Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Executive Representatives of the Secretary-General and Resident Coordinators), might have provided the GFP with an additional lever had these officials consistently reported since 2012 that a number of administrative and service-related issues would need to be resolved at HQ for them to exercise this role effectively.

However, the decision does not seem to have materially altered the field leadership’s understanding of their roles or mandates. The main reason senior UN officials in the field gave, when queried, was that they are already answerable for every aspect of the UN’s in country work as senior leaders and therefore the prevailing perception of the decision is that it merely restated an aspect of the existing situation. They did not link GFP support to new responsibilities or roles emerging from the decision. Yet, in New York there is a palpable communis opinio that rule of law (or, more narrowly, PJC) issues are not typically senior field leaders’ top priorities. If true, the consequences would be that PJC issues are pushed with less vigor in the field than they could be, and that administrative and operational challenges to undertaking better PJC initiatives do not get flagged by the field with the urgency and focus that would help stimulate change at Headquarters.

#### **Recommendations:**

*25. Encourage senior UN management at the Under-Secretary-General level to agree on a clear division of labor between the GFP, the SSRTF and RoLCRG that details the relevance, role and services of each body vis-à-vis UN field actors (suggested lead: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR, supported by the GFP management team).*

*26. Conduct a dedicated inquiry into the mismatch of perceptions between Headquarters and senior UN officials in the field in respect of S-G Decision 2012/13 with the aim of either improving their accountability and/or establishing an action plan to enable them to perform better against this decision (suggested lead: RoLCRG).*

## 4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND THE WAY AHEAD

The GFP was established in September 2012 in response to shortfalls in the UN’s performance in supporting or restoring the rule of law – especially in the areas of police, justice, and corrections – in crisis- or conflict-affected territories. Previous attempts at performance improvement, in particular the introduction of the system of “leads” created in late 2006, did not bring about the desired results. In consequence, the GFP’s stated aim is to operate as a service provider for UN missions and country teams in such a way that its services support police, justice and corrections activities in the field in a timely and fit-for-purpose manner with a view to increasing their impact.

The form chosen for the GFP, namely an informal pooling of DPKO and UNDP resources as the nucleus for a larger network with UN PJC stakeholders, neither trampled on other entities’ turf nor added to the formal budgets of either partner. The GFP being an overlay on the current duties of those tabbed to run it, its formal budgetary impact is negligible. This largely reflects the reality of having been established on the receding edge of a global financial crisis that made it difficult to gain commitment to anything with an upward budget impact.

Since its establishment, the GFP has made significant strides establishing a sense of joint purpose between DPKO and UNDP as its core components, as well as in creating the operational coherence, “jointness” and standardization that is necessary to increase the quality of HQ support to UN field actors. This is essential for delivering tailored services to the field at scale. However, the GFP has only traversed part of this rocky terrain and has not yet reached its true purpose of servicing the field in force. UN field actors largely remain unclear as to its value proposition, services and the processes for mobilizing or requesting these.

In part this is because of a theme that has stood out in this review, namely the real and multi-faceted nature of the procedural and administrative barriers within the Organization– and especially between its Secretariat-based and non-Secretariat entities – that can make joint work between DPKO and UNDP and innovation in PJC service delivery very difficult (see Box 2 for a concrete example from Somalia). The barriers are so difficult, that a number of these issues need to be surmounted if the GFP is to make the qualitative leap necessary for providing the services its clients want within its current resources. Too much time and effort are currently spent on finding one-off, non-replicable, non-scalable solutions to the financial, human resource and administrative issues that stand in the way of more effective PJC activities.

The challenge here is that the GFP is a small initiative encountering big obstacles – “above the pay grade” of those directly involved – as it tries to engage across institutional boundaries. If the United Nations really hopes to “deliver as one” in the concrete case of the GFP, then its senior leaders and Member States must address these obstacles with some urgency and remove them.

In fact, the size and scope of this challenge is so significant that a more traditional solution might seem warranted, namely the creation of a dedicated entity under single leadership with a dual administrative reporting line to the ASGs of OROLSI and BCPR. It would create the visibility and clarity of structure that clients can understand and appreciate, as well as a clear lead who can take on more responsibility for GFP performance. Over time, this may evolve into an even more robust structure as demand for GFP services grows and its reputation increases: an Office led by an ASG who would report to both the Under-Secretary-General for DPKO and the Administrator of UNDP.

Although a tempting recommendation, the review team believes that at the present stage of experience with the GFP arrangement, it would be premature, as well as out of reach. Yet, the issue remains that what is being requested of the GFP probably requires more than the current partnership and cooperation

arrangement can deliver. This has to change in order for the GFP to show its added value to clients, and thereby the real difference between the new arrangement and the old ways of getting things done.

The analysis and recommendations in this report suggest a middle way that enables the evolution of the GFP from informal and consensus-based facilitation of the UN's PJC network of agencies to greater capacity for active management of a specific range of functions related to network operation and effectiveness while leaving substantive direction and strategy to network members. If the GFP's management, senior DPKO and UNDP leaders, GFP partners and Member States can agree on a package to execute the majority of the practical improvements suggested by this report, the GFP will receive the boost it needs to mature beyond its inception period while building on its strength as an informal network initiative that improves working culture, approaches and methods without recourse to the traditional UN method of creating a new institution in the formal sense. The report's recommendations (highlighted in Table 5 and listed in Annex 3) offer the range of elements that could go into such a package, but at a minimum it would need to:

1. Articulate a clear value proposition for the GFP to improve its support for the field in human resources, knowledge and seed funding for PJC programming, building that value proposition on a clear strategic concept and executing it with well-defined operating procedures.
2. Resolve those key bureaucratic constraints that stand in the way of developing standardized police, justice and corrections services and solutions.
3. Focus GFP resources on a select number of strategic countries, especially new or transitioning missions, or crisis-affected areas.
4. Put together a transitional package for the GFP itself consisting of political, human resource and financial support measures by Member States to plug critical GFP capabilities gaps.
5. Use such support to create a small "network administrative team" for the GFP to be its administrative nucleus for effective and well-coordinated service delivery to the field.

Some of the recommendations summarized in Table 5 address system wide issues that the GFP team cannot tackle effectively on its own, but it can develop standard operating procedures and negotiate standard waivers that are DPKO-, DPA- and UNDP-sanctioned to facilitate mobilization of resource inputs (knowledge, personnel and finance) in support of joint PJC work and effective field support. The experience so far suggests that more operational and administrative change is necessary than might have been anticipated when the GFP arrangement was initiated. But the GFP offers an opportunity to make such changes practically and concretely, and in the service of better police, justice and corrections results in the field.

Table 5: Recommendations for Improving GFP Performance

|                                    | HQ-level   | Field-related  |
|------------------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Operations or Tools-related</b> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Define a clear strategic concept/approach for the GFP.</li> <li>2. Develop a communication strategy in support of the strategic concept</li> <li>3. Member States support the GFP's role by promoting increased awareness of the GFP in their own assistance programs and by emphasizing GFP-linked arrangements in Security Council resolutions and/or General Assembly budgets</li> <li>5. Complete the GFP business plan</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>13. Develop an operational concept for the GFP that focuses resources on a select number of countries</li> <li>14. Create a GFP-managed, joint financing mechanism</li> <li>21. Develop a strategy for identifying lessons, operational insights and good practices across UN PJC activities</li> <li>22. Consider creating a partnership with selected think tanks and, perhaps, universities</li> <li>23. Develop a detailed and specific value proposition for the services and products that the GFP can deliver</li> <li>24. Make the process for designing, running and following up on GFP missions much more rigorous by introducing a standard operating procedure with more robust management checks</li> <li>26. Conduct a dedicated inquiry into the mismatch of perceptions between Headquarters and senior UN officials in the field in respect to S-G's decision 2012/13</li> </ol>  |
| <b>Structural</b>                  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. Re-examine the formula for the GFP of "doing more with less" and develop a joint resource mobilization strategy</li> <li>6. Complete co-location of the managers and core technical staff for the GFP at the earliest possible date</li> <li>7. Ensure common overhead costs and joint program implementation</li> <li>8. Create a GFP-focused administrative capacity, a network administrative team (NAT)</li> <li>9. Encourage Member States to press for the resolution of technical blockages to innovation</li> <li>10. Develop more structured relationships by GFP management with partners outside UNDP and DPKO, in part through a "convening protocol"</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. Articulate a consensus with partners on specific GFP goals</li> <li>12. Seek out areas of collaboration with the Inter-agency SSRTF in support of field projects of mutual interest</li> <li>15. Create a partnership between the GFP and the UN Peacebuilding Fund</li> <li>16. Provide project seed funding through a dedicated line in mission budgets</li> <li>17. Use the Somalia case (and other relevant experiences) to identify structural staffing and associated financial/administrative issues that need to be resolved</li> <li>18. Consider creating an in-house surge capacity</li> <li>19. Inventory the steps necessary to enable mutual recognition of UNDP and DPKO rosters</li> <li>20. Work with human resources toward more integrated UNDP - DPKO careers</li> <li>25. Encourage senior UN management at the USG level to agree on a clear division of labor between the GFP, the SSRTF and RoLCRG</li> </ol> |



## ANNEX 1: METHODOLOGY

This review used a four-part methodology combining desk review, headquarters and field interviews, survey research and stakeholder consultations. Each of these parts is discussed briefly below:

### *Desk review*

A thorough desk review of primary and secondary material was undertaken at the beginning of the research. This involved an initial literature review of existing studies on the role of the UN in supporting police, justice and corrections in fragile situations and analysis of primary records and documents provided by UNDP and DPKO pertaining to the origins, emergence, development and implementation of the GFP. The primary documentation made available to the research team involved inter alia conceptual background documents, internal working documents (including GFP work plans), various meeting memoranda pertaining to different aspects of the development of the GFP, GFP meeting and action point reports, funding-related memoranda, country-related documents (including mission reports, country plans, etc.) and relevant communications between the field and Headquarters. The goal of the desk review was both to understand how the GFP was created and to map out the development of the GFP from its inception.

### *Headquarter interviews*

The research team also conducted 62 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in New York from Nov. 4 through 26, 2013, and from Jan. 20 through 24, 2014, as well as remotely via telephone through March 2014. Interviews were conducted with the GFP's working level staff and managers and officials from UNDP, DPKO, the Policy Committee, the Rule of Law Unit, UNICEF, UNODC, UNCHR, UN Women, PBSO, DPA, OHCHR and the CIVCAP team. Members of the research team were also invited as observers to attend a GFP meeting on Nov. 12, 2013.

| Country or Agency | UNDP | DPKO* | DPA | UN Women | OHCHR | UNODC | UNICEF | Other** | TOTAL |
|-------------------|------|-------|-----|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------|-------|
| Côte d'Ivoire     | 2    | 3     | n/a | n/a      | n/a   | 1     | n/a    | n/a     | 6     |
| Guinea-Bissau     | 5    | 2     | 5   | 1        | 1     | 1     | 3      | 2       | 20    |
| Guinea            | 3    | n/a   | n/a | 1        | 1     | n/a   | 1      | 10      | 16    |
| Haiti             | 6    | 8     | n/a | 1        | 2     | n/a   | 2      | 6       | 25    |
| Libya             | 4    | 3     | 2   | n/a      | n/a   | 2     | n/a    | 1       | 12    |
| Mali              | 2    | 3     | n/a | n/a      | 1     | n/a   | n/a    | 1       | 7     |
| Somalia           | 3    | 1     | 2   | n/a      | 1     | 1     | n/a    | 2       | 10    |
| Total field       | 25   | 20    | 9   | 3        | 6     | 5     | 6      | 22      | 96    |
| NY/Geneva/Vienna  | 17   | 19    | 5   | 1        | 2     | 2     | 2      | 14      | 62    |
| Total             | 42   | 39    | 14  | 4        | 8     | 7     | 8      | 36      | 158   |

\* UNPOL staff (inter alia Police Advisory Section, Brindisi Standing Capacity, members of Formed Police Units and GPP) are counted here as part of DPKO, even in cases in which they are deployed into DPA missions.

\*\* "Other" includes: UN field leadership (SRSG, DSRSG or RC), Office of the Secretary-General (Rule of Law Unit, Peacebuilding Support Office, Policy Committee Secretariat, CIVCAP team), Department for Field Support, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UN Population Fund, UN Mine Action Service, JSCS, UN Office for West-Africa, International Organization for Migration, External Donor Offices, Member State Diplomatic Representatives & Host Government Representatives



### ***Field interviews***

The field part of the GFP progress review had two components. To begin with, 61 interviews were conducted with representatives of UN agencies and missions as well as selected external donor stakeholders and a few national representatives during separate field visits to Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and Guinea<sup>116</sup>. Interviews typically took place in the office of the interviewee and lasted between 30 and 75 minutes. In addition, 35 interviews were conducted remotely with representatives of UN agencies and missions in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Libya and Somalia. These interviews typically took place by telephone and lasted 30 to 60 minutes each.

All field cases were selected by GFP management in consultation with the research team on the basis of the nature of the UN presence, the existence of a GFP track-record, feasibility and security considerations. Field visits initially planned to Libya and Somalia proved impossible for reasons of security and mission work load (Libya) and logistical / security constraints (Somalia). Thus, staff in these countries were interviewed remotely. Interviews in Côte d'Ivoire did not include senior management because no response was received to repeated requests for interviews. Table 6 provides a breakdown of the interviews on an agency and country basis.

### ***Survey***

To support the oral interviews, an online survey – in both French and English – was distributed through the mission / UNCT to working level UN staff in the seven field settings under study. The survey used closed-ended questions with Likert scale response options and some open-ended questions inviting narrative comments. The questions addressed the expectations of the GFP's added value and experiences since its inception. Also, the survey questions aimed at identifying the changes and potential effects of the GFP in the field. The survey was distributed electronically in March and April 2014 after the field visits and the remote interviews had been finalized in the respective countries. Despite reminders, only 29 survey responses were received and thus the response rate was insufficient for statistical inferences.<sup>117</sup>

### ***Stakeholder consultations***

The review conducted five stakeholder consultations to ensure the analysis is factually correct and reflective of the many different perspectives available on the GFP. To begin, the research team discussed the progress review with GFP management on May 1, 2014, followed by a conversation with the GFP's UN partners and stakeholders on May 7, the informal group of member states that support the GFP followed on May 8 (at the invitation of the British mission), the wider UN membership on 9 May and finally the ASGs of UNDP/BCPR and UNDPKO/OROLSI on the same day. In addition, all UN entities (secretariat, agencies, UNCTs and UN missions) involved in the review were given the opportunity to provide their feedback between May 2 and 14, which a number of them did.

All comments received were reviewed and considered in the final draft.

## ANNEX 2: ORGANIZATION CHARTS




Figure 4: Global Focal Point in Larger Context




Figure 5: Global Focal Point with Network Administrative Team

## ANNEX 3: CONSOLIDATED LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

### From Section 2.3 of Main Text

#### ***Strategic Approach and Effective Communication of That Approach***

1. *Define a clear strategic concept/approach* for the GFP that addresses definitively what it is and how it functions at UN Headquarters and as regards the field (suggested lead: GFP management team).
2. *Develop a communication strategy in support of the strategic concept* that include clear descriptions of GFP product services as well as how to access those services, either by direct contact with desks or by dialing/logging into a user-friendly website that classifies inquiries, directs them to the appropriate parties, indicates what can be expected when contact is made and emphasizes follow-through (suggested lead: GFP management team).
3. *Member States should support the GFP's role by promoting increased awareness of GFP in their own assistance programs and emphasizing GFP-linked arrangements in Security Council resolutions and/or General Assembly budgets* (suggested lead: UN Member States).

#### ***Workability of Resource Premises***

4. *Re-examine the formula for the GFP of "doing more with less" and develop a joint resource mobilization strategy* so that the arrangement is better able to achieve and sustain its goal of improved support to the field in police, justice and corrections (suggested leads: USG of DPKO and UNDP administrator).

#### ***Managerial Foundation and Structures***

5. *Complete a GFP business plan*: The promise of a business plan by year's end constitutes an essential deliverable and should be a high GFP priority. Additional resources and expertise, as well as engagement of DFS, DM, the DPKO Executive Office and the corresponding UNDP departments will be essential to complete this endeavor (suggested lead: GFP management team).
6. *Complete co-location of the managers and core technical staff for the GFP at the earliest possible date*. High-level interventions with the cognizant units of DM, DSS, DFS, DPKO and UNDP should be made to finish finally a process of co-location and routine mutual access to space and to data files that the GFP core team has been waiting on for more than a year (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/ OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).
7. *Ensure common overhead costs and joint program implementation*. The S-G's 2012 report on civilian capacity and several interviews for this study indicated that the Secretariat can, if pressed, match the 7 percent overhead rate levied on trust fund contributions by UNDP. Clarifying and ensuring such parity would help make contributions to GFP Headquarters funding and mission trust funds more attractive to donors, such that either mission or UNDP funds could be used to best advantage according to need and circumstance, in either case with UNDP appointees working with missions as program managers (suggested leads: USG of DPKO and UNDP administrator).
8. *Create a GFP-focused administrative capacity, a network administrative team (NAT) that is focused on smoothing, standardizing, and operationalizing the GFP's work*, with principals and managers retaining strategic oversight and substantive control over all GFP work in the service of supporting better PJC results in the field. The NAT should be devoted solely to supporting and enabling GFP operations but should also represent entity-level support for the arrangement, and for that reason the review team

recommends dual administrative reporting lines for the NAT to the chiefs of staff of DPKO and UNDP and technical reporting to the GFP managers. Financial support may derive from a dedicated window in the resource options proposed in Section 3.3. See Figure 2 (and Annex II for more detailed organizational context) (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

9. *Encourage Member States to press for the resolution of technical blockages to innovation, from co-location to cross-posting of personnel, encouraging the adaptation and harmonization of Staff Rules as required to meet the needs of the new business model, and addressing changes to Staff Regulations that may be needed to facilitate the adaptation of such rules. Member States can also recognize and support the need for specialized administrative competence within the GFP that keeps it centered as more partners join and also keeps it within sight of the leadership of UNDP and DPKO (suggested lead: dedicated core of UN Member States).*

### ***Relationships with Non-Co-located Partners, Including within UNDP & DPKO***

10. *Develop more structured relationships between the GFP arrangement and partners outside UNDP and DPKO, in part through a “convening protocol” that could help to bridge partner differences with the core team and among the partners on a given field support question. To do so GFP should address at least four questions: What are the standards (i.e., “rights and duties”) for UN entities’ involvement in GFP work at Headquarters and for their participation in GFP-led field visits? What format and focus for GFP-led meetings would make them a better venue for inputs from partners on the formulation of strategic advice? What incentives are required to make such standards and formats effective? What can be learned from the convening protocol and practices of the SSRTF? (Suggested leads: GFP management team and GFP partners.)*

11. *Articulate a consensus with partners on specific GFP goals to help the GFP make a more compelling case to current and potential partners about why the inevitable transaction costs of coordinating with the GFP are merited. This may benefit from conducting a series of stakeholder interviews to take stock of different interests and priorities, as well as their common denominator, possibly culminating in a round table. These actions will serve the GFP in leveraging a broader network to convene PJC expertise better across the UN system. (Suggested lead: GFP management team and partner agencies.)*

12. *Seek out areas of collaboration with the Interagency SSRTF in support of field projects of mutual interest that may then draw upon task force funds earmarked within the UNDP Global Fund for the Rule of Law (suggested lead: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR; SSRTF co-chairs).*

## **From Section 3.2 of Main Text**

### ***What are the Implications of the GFP Set-up for the Results It Can Achieve?***

13. *Develop an operational concept for the GFP that focuses resources on countries where its value-added may be high, to demonstrate the impact potential of the arrangement. Notably, field demand for GFP involvement appears to be elevated during critical junctures of the mission cycle. Start-up phases provide opportunities to embed common PJC priorities and coordination structures early on, while anticipated mission withdrawals invite GFP support for strengthening the ability of UNCT partners to continue PJC strategies and activities that are expected to continue post-mission (suggested lead: GFP management team).*

## **From Section 3.3 of Main Text**

### ***Create a Source of Funding That Can Kick-start In-country PJC Initiatives***

14. *Create a new, GFP-managed, joint financing mechanism to provide UN missions and country teams with start-up funding for PJC programs. Such a fund should be set up as a pilot and benefit from both*



DPKO and UNDP funds, in the spirit of the GFP partnership, supplemented by Member States' funding. Its explicit aim should be to provide seed-funding for GFP-supported PJC activities in the field only, which will require clear upfront agreement with UN field actors on how additional fundraising efforts will be undertaken and programming continuity assured. This has the additional benefit of helping to build the GFP's relation and interaction with the field. The GFP should commit a priori to an evaluation of the initial results and added value of the fund after two to three years. Practically, the GFP should enlist the support of the MPTF office to produce clear and simple fund procedures (i.e. rules and procedures for fund allocations, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities of fund stakeholders), while the GFP managers can act as its decision-making body and the network administrative team (see section 2.3) as its secretariat (suggested lead: GFP management team).

*15. Alternatively, create a partnership between the GFP and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, endorsed by donors, that results in a percentage of the PBF being dedicated to providing seed funding for GFP-supported PJC field activities.* Both the theme (PJC) and nature (seed funding) of GFP activities match well with the PBF's aims (in particular under its Priority Area 1<sup>118</sup>). Because UNDP and DPKO already receive funds through the PBF – and UNDP, in fact, is the main recipient of PBF funding – relations of trust already exist that can be built on. In addition, this option offers an opportunity to involve the Peacebuilding Support Office more closely in the GFP. This approach would, however, likely take more time to move from request to disbursement and the GFP would have less control over the associated resources – and hence its own success. (Suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR.)

*16. In parallel, provide seed funding through a dedicated line in mission budgets.* This can be done by changing the “Quick Impact Projects” line in mission budgets to a “Multi-partner program launch funds” line and by increasing the amount to, for example, 3–4 percent of a mission's budget. This change could create additional funds for PJC and other project-seeding activities through the assessed budget. A comparable a priori commitment to evaluation would seem appropriate. Critical conditions for success are that the UNDP Country Office has an equal role in the decision-making on how such funds are used, that other agencies/funds with relevant competencies are consulted, and that UNDP personnel are brought into the mission – on mission budget – to manage these funds (see Box 2 for the Somali example). Note that this approach would not cover non-mission settings (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

### **Provide Tailor-made Human Resource Services in the PJC Area**

*17. As a matter of urgency: use the Somalia case (and other relevant experiences) to identify structural staffing and associated financial issues that need to be resolved for DPKO and UNDP staff jointly to deliver PJC services in the field under the GFP banner.* Such issues should be collected and presented concretely and concisely to impel action at the necessary levels. (Suggested leads: GFP desk officers and GFP management).

*18. In the short-term: consider creating an in-house surge capacity using a combination of DPKO standing capacities and the double-hatting of a number of GFP staff for quick support to the field* with clearly defined projects for a period of up to, say, three months. This could also be extended to include PJC staff on a short-term surge roster from missions that are in the process of closing-down with the additional benefit of retaining their expertise a while longer (suggested lead: GFP management team, involving UNPOL MMSS and SRS units).

*19. In the medium-term: inventory what steps are necessary to enable mutual recognition of UNDP and DPKO rosters and stimulate the decision-making required to achieve such recognition in a way that also allows for cross-funding* (e.g. UNDP hiring someone from a DPKO roster and paying for him/her). This may

well require a limited joint training program for different rosters to help improve the skills compatibility of their members (suggested leads: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR).

20. *In the long-term: work with human resources toward more integrated UNDP- DPKO careers whereby it becomes easy for staff from either organization to work stints as “dual citizens” for the other without loss of job security, pay and prospects. Ensure that this concept can in time be extended to other UN partners (suggested lead: the proposed network administrative team under the lead of the GFP management team).*

### **Leverage Comparative Experiences and Lessons to the Benefit of In-country PJC Activities and Programs**

21. *In the medium-term: develop a strategy for identifying lessons, operational insights and good practices across UN PJC activities and develop a process for how these can be mobilized in a fit-for-purpose manner in response to field requests or perceived needs (suggested lead: GFP desk officers and management team).*

22. *In the long-term: consider creating a partnership with a few selected think tanks and, perhaps, universities to engage in a continuous process of reflection on the larger unresolved issues that UN PJC efforts confront on a daily basis. For example, the question of how PJC initiatives can be organized to deal effectively with elite interests that influence the provision of PJC as services, and gradually increase the scope for positive change (suggested lead: GFP management team).*

### **Develop a Clear Value Proposition in the Form of a Service Bundle, Toolkit and Standard Request Procedures**

23. *Develop a detailed and specific value proposition for the services and products that the GFP can deliver, how these can be mobilized, by whom and under which conditions. The latter should include clarity on the contribution that UN field actors might need to make, such as, for example, co-funding GFP expert field visits on the basis of a more customer-oriented relationship (suggested lead: GFP desk officers and management team).*

### **Improve the Effectiveness of GFP Field Visits**

24. *Make the process for designing, running and following up on GFP missions much more rigorous by introducing a standard operating procedure with more robust management checks on the clarity of mission objectives, remit, level of preparation, size, leadership and mechanism(s) for follow-up that take place before a mission actually is authorized to take place. As field visits are the GFP’s main business card of the moment, more rigor and focus will help ensure they are used to optimal effect and avoid creating expectations they cannot meet (suggested lead: GFP management team and desk officers).*

### **Broader issues**

25. *Encourage senior UN management at the Under-Secretary-General level to agree on a clear division of labor between the GFP, the SSRTF and RoLCRG that details the relevance, role and services of each body vis-à-vis UN field actors (suggested lead: ASGs of DPKO/OROLSI and UNDP/BCPR, supported by the GFP management team).*

26. *Conduct a dedicated inquiry into the mismatch of perceptions between Headquarters and senior UN officials in the field in respect to S-G’s decision 2012/13 with the aim either of improving their accountability and/or establishing an action plan to enable them to perform better against this decision (suggested lead: RoLCRG).*



## NOTES

1. World Bank. *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 2011. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011.
2. Zajac-Sannerholm, Richard, Frida Möller, Kristina Simion and Hanna Hallonsten. *UN Peace Operations and Rule of Law Assistance in Africa 1989-2010: Data, Patterns and Questions for the Future*. Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2011.
3. Durch, William, Madeline England, and Fiona Mangan with Michelle Ker. *Understanding Impact of Police, Justice and Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations*, Report. Rev. 0.1. Washington, DC: The Stimson Center, July 2012; Jones, Bruce and Camino Kavanagh. *Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of the UN's Rule of Law Support Agenda*. New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2011.
4. United Nations. Secretary-General. *Decision No. 2012/13 – Rule of Law Arrangements*. 11 September 2012, Annex 1, para. 1–2; Price, Megan, Kevin Steeves and Luc van de Goor. *Soldering the Link: The UN Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', August 2012.
5. Secretary-General, *Decision No. 2012/13*, Annex 1, para. 1–2.
6. Secretary-General, *Decision No. 2012/13*, para. (x).
7. The policy/process dimension addresses the organizational firmware that supports GFP's working procedures, such as mandates, policies and resources. Leadership focuses on strategic goals, strategic direction, and problem solving related to the development and implementation of the GFP ("leaders" are individuals in a position to manage resources such as staff, funds in order to deliver organizational objectives on the basis of a specific vision and/or strategy, as well as individuals with an important agenda-setting role). The working culture dimension examines less visible aspects of interaction and collaboration within (and between) organizations, including attitudes toward outlined objectives and responsibilities, perceptions of other entities and organizations, incentives and disincentives to working with other organizations/actors, adherence to agency-specific "codes of conduct" (formal or informal), and ways of "getting things done around here."
8. For sobering accounts of how post-conflict governance was overwhelmed by organized crime in both cases, see Call, Charles T. "The Mugging of a Success Story: Justice and Security Reform in El Salvador." In *Constructing Justice and Security after War*, edited by Charles T. Call, 29–67. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007; Stanley, William. *Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of Minugua*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.
9. In Kosovo, for example, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established both a Kosovo police service school and a judicial institute.
10. For information on the histories and current practices of UN departments, agencies, funds and programs engaged in the rule of law area, see the website of the UN Rule of Law Coordinating and Resource Group. Accessed May 25, 2014. [unrol.org/article.aspx?article\\_id=6](http://unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=6).
11. The mandate of the UN's mission in the DRC expanded over time from monitoring foreign forces to peace- and state-building and stabilization.
12. "UNDP and Australia partner to strengthen coordination in the Justice System," February 12, 2014. Accessed May 28, 2014. [www.tl.undp.org/content/timor\\_leste/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/02/10/undp-and-australia-partner-to-strengthen-coordination-and-cooperation-in-the-justice-system/](http://www.tl.undp.org/content/timor_leste/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/02/10/undp-and-australia-partner-to-strengthen-coordination-and-cooperation-in-the-justice-system/).
13. United Nations. Security Council. *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Report of the Secretary-General*. S/2004/616. August 23, 2004, para. 6.
14. In the 1990s, UN multidimensional peace operations lasted about two years on average. The average duration of complex operations (counting virtual transitions-in-place like MONUC/MONUSCO and UNMIS/UNMISS as continuous operations) currently approaches nine years.
15. United Nations. General Assembly and Security Council. *Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law. Report of the Secretary-General*. A/61/636 - S/2006/980. December 14, 2006, para. 7.
16. Ibid.
17. Decided at the November 7, 2006 meeting of the S-G's Policy Committee, issued November 24th; Annex 2.

18. United Nations, Secretary-General. *Decision No. 2007/11 – Security Sector Reform*. February 16, 2007.
19. United Nations. General Assembly. Security Council. *Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform. Report of the Secretary-General. A/67/970 - S/2013/480*. August 13, 2013, paras. 54 and 61(e).
20. United Nations. Security Council. *Resolution 2151 (2014) adopted by the Security Council at its 7161<sup>st</sup> meeting. S/RES/2151 (2014)*, April 28, 2014, 3.
21. United Nations. Secretary-General's Bulletin. *Organization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations*. ST-SGB-2010-1. February 5, 2010, para. 8.16. The Head of CLJAS is also one of three managers of the GFP.
22. Secretary-General's Bulletin. *Peacekeeping Operations*, para. 8.10. The Head of SPDS is the other DPKO manager for the GFP.
23. Within BCPR, the head of the Governance and Rule of Law Group oversees the Bureau's management of the GFP. The head of the Rule of Law, Justice and Security team within that group is day-to-day manager of GFP for BCPR.
24. United Nations Development Programme. *Strengthening the Rule of Law in Crisis-affected and Fragile Situations*. Global Programme Annual Report 2011, 24.
25. The Stimson Center. *UN Police, Justice and Corrections Programming in South Sudan: a compact case study*. Washington D.C.: The Stimson Center, 2011.
26. UN peacekeepers were deployed to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan (2005) and to help quell genocidal violence in Sudan's western Darfur region (2007).
27. As an example of interagency collaboration in the field, a UN police development mission, MINURCAT, initially protected by European Union troops, deployed to Chad from 2008 to 2010 near the border with Sudan/Darfur, to build a specialized police service (the Détachement intégré de sécurité, DIS), protect refugee and displaced persons camps and their aid suppliers and re-introduce a formal justice and corrections system to the virtually lawless region. Upon drawdown of MINURCAT at the government's request at the end of 2010, the government, UNDP and UNHCR reached agreement on a program to continue DIS operations with initial support from the Peacebuilding Fund. Managing the "Programme Conjoint d'appui au DIS" became the responsibility of a strengthened Office of the Resident Coordinator. It continued through mid-2013 when DIS responsibilities were transferred by the government to the national gendarmerie (See Takadji, Edouard. "Dissolution du DIS: la gendarmerie nationale prend le commandement." *JournalduTchad.com*. July 18, 2013. <http://www.journaldutchad.com/article.php?aid=4917>; Joint Programme Chad DIS Security – Programme Factsheet (2011). <http://mdtf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/JTD00>. Both accessed April 18, 2013).
28. This is the most succinct summary of the relationship gleaned from multiple interviews conducted for this review in late 2013, within and beyond UNDP and DPKO.
29. United Nations. General Assembly. Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict. A/63/881–S/2009/304*. June 11, 2009.
30. United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *A New Partnership Agenda—Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*. Non-paper, New York, July 2009. Also, United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 2*. New York, December 2011.
31. United Nations. General Assembly and Security Council. *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group. A/65/747 – S/2011/85*. February 22, 2011, 27–28.
32. United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council. *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General. A/67/312-- S/2012/645*. August 12, 2012, para. 62.
33. World Bank, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 201.
34. UNDP provides advice and capacity building capabilities. It relies on a country-driven business model whereby program needs for assistance are identified jointly with national authorities. DPKO is mandated by the Security Council to provide advice and the delivery of expertise in police, justice and corrections. DPKO develops central strategic guidance for the missions it leads and these, in contrast to UNDP programs, have very large personnel components. DPKO relies heavily on Member State secondments of uniformed personnel (military and police) for deployments of a year or more, whereas UNDP tends to rely on short-term consultancies and in-country implementing partners. DPKO has limited standing capacity, however, excepting the roughly 40 members of the Standing Police Capacity and six members of the Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity, a cadre of which

can deploy on as little as 72 hours notice. In its 2014-15 budget request, DPKO proposed that the Standing Police Capacity be “integrated into all day-to-day activities of the Police Adviser and engaged in the early planning, rapid deployment and start-up of operational activities undertaken to support field-based police components,” and thus be better positioned to support the field-related needs of the GFP (United Nations. General Assembly. *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. Report of the Secretary-General. A/68/742.* February 10, 2014, para. 115).

35. UN Member States are required to fund assessed budgets, passed by resolution of the General Assembly, as “expenses of the Organization,” according to a scale of assessments that is updated every three years. The regular budget scale of assessments may be found in, United Nations. General Assembly. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2012... 67/238. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations.* A/RES/67/238. February 11, 2013. The scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations is based on the regular budget scale (see United Nations. General Assembly. *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2012... 67/239. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.* A/RES/67/239. February 11, 2013).

36. DPKO may be authorized by letter from the President of the Security Council and the concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to draw funds from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund that are replenished when the mission budget has been approved. Advance spending authority for a DPKO operation can be substantial: about \$84 million in the case of the new operation in Mali (see United Nations. General Assembly. *Financing arrangements for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013. Note by the Secretary-General. A/67/863.* May 2013, 14, para. 9).

37. Five Power non-paper, June 2012 (in authors’ records); personal interviews with DPKO and UNDP staff in New York.

38. “The Policy Committee in December 2011 decided that the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group would evaluate and report back on the system of non-exclusive leads set out in Policy Committee decision 2006/47” (“Focal points for the rule of law,” non-paper, May 30, 2012, fn. 3, in authors’ records).

39. The option of a single, merged department/agency was considered to be “a good long-term option for delivery, but would have significant short-term disruption” (“Focal points for the rule of law.”) A proposal for bringing OHCHR and UN rule of law entities together under one field-oriented UN department/pillar was made public unofficially in October 2013 (see “The Third Pillar”, October 4, 2013. Accessed May 14, 2014. [www.innerecitypress.com/un3pillaricp100413.docx](http://www.innerecitypress.com/un3pillaricp100413.docx)).

40. The last option was also favored by UDNP and DPKO. (“Focal points for the rule of law”).

41. United Nations. Secretary-General. *Decision No. 2012/13*, Annex I.

42. Until very recently, DPKO missions have had little access to “program” funding and little experience with program management, especially on a large scale. (Most mission-funded efforts are Quick Impact Projects costing less than \$100,000; usually much less.)

43. *Civilian capacity. Report of the Secretary-General*, para. 38.

44. *Ibid.*, para. 36.

45. Secretary-General, *Decision 2012/13*, paras. ii – iii.

46. *Ibid.*, Annex II. RoLCRG is the high-level inter-agency coordination mechanism to GFP’s operational arrangement for support to the field (*Ibid.*, Annex I).

47. Provan, Keith G. and Patrick Kenis. “Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness.” *Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory* 18, no. 2 (August 2007): 229–252.

48. Provan, Keith G. and H. Brinton Milward, “Do Networks Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public-Sector Organizational Networks.” *Public Administration Review* 61, no.4 (July/August 2001): 416-417.

49. Provan and Milward, “Do Networks Really Work?”, citing Peter Smith Ring and Andrew H. Van de Ven, “Developmental Processes of Cooperative Interorganizational Relationships.” *Academy of Management Review* 19, no.1 (1994): 90–118.

50. Provan and Milward, “Do Networks Really Work?”, 422–423.

51. The following paragraphs reflect key elements of *Civilian capacity. Report of the Secretary-General*, paras. 36–42.

52. Together, the DPKO-USG and the UNDP-Administrator co-chair annual meetings to review progress, address challenges and consider new requirements for the functioning of the GFP, while the ASGs meet roughly twice a year to oversee progress.

53. In particular, UNODC, OHCHR, UN Women, UNICEF, and UNHCR.
54. Co-location's goal is to help "create a sense of partnership and collaboration" in order to provide more effective country-level support, including joint programming (United Nations, *Civilian capacity. Report of the Secretary-General*, para.39).
55. Personal interviews with GFP staff, New York, November 2013.
56. Several interlocutors noted that co-location, especially in the field need not entail joint program planning or implementation although such may arise from increased interaction and discovery of common programming interests and complementary potential contributions.
57. Fig. 1 anticipates that all partners currently recruiting for personnel to co-locate will in fact co-locate. For a more detailed schematic, depicting a more complete organizational environment, see Annex II.
58. DPKO-UNDP Joint Global Focal Point, "Modalities and Initial Workplan." Nov. 15, 2012.
59. Regular consultations include co-chaired, bi-annual meetings at the ASG level with all UN entities engaged in RoL; periodic working group meetings (including videoconferences) at the technical level; and periodic meetings from operational rule of law entities (including the Office of Operations in DPKO, the Regional Bureaux in UNDP, etc.).
60. Internal UN documents provided to the research team. The GFP Management Team produced an internal list of focus countries for field engagement during the initial phases of GFP operation. These countries included: Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Timor Leste, Haiti, Mali and South Sudan (all with DPKO-led missions); Somalia, Libya, Central African Republic and Burundi (special political missions, SPMs); and non-mission settings such as Yemen, Guinea and Chad.
61. Global Focal Point. Work plan 2013–16 (in authors' records). The work plan describes the following key GFP deliverables: (1) rapid deployment of police, justice and corrections experts to the field; (2) development and implementation of Country Support Plans; and (3) joint programmes, training and projects.
62. Country Support Plans (CSPs) generally include a situational analysis, the identification of areas and/or programmes in need of GFP support, and a plan of GFP action to provide needed support. By the end of 2013, CSPs were listed as agreed with Libya, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, with some disagreement as to whether the Haiti plan has been finalized ("Overview of HQ support and country-level activities under the GFP arrangement, February 10, 2014," document made available to the authors by GFP managers; Headquarters-level comments received on an earlier draft of this report).
63. "GFP Protocols and Procedures" (in authors' records) defines three tiers of GFP partners: "jointly responsible" (DPKO and UNDP); "co-located partners" (UN Women, OHCHR [forthcoming]); and "other partner entities" (DPA, PBSO, ROLU/EOSG, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNODC, UNOPS, and the World Bank). The document does not spell out what the different partnerships may entail within the GFP arrangement.
64. GFP staff noted lack of spare capacity rather than lack of intent to undertake business plan development.
65. See Part 3 for a list and discussion of GFP activities in the field.
66. Personal interview with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013.
67. Personal interview with UNDP staff, New York, November 2013.
68. Personal interview with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013.
69. As DPKO staff noted, it was very difficult for DPKO to get information from the country team and to learn about what the country team was doing before the creation of the GFP.
70. Personal interview with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013.
71. Personal interviews with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013.
72. Personal interview with UNDP staff, New York, November 2013.
73. Personal interview with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013.
74. Personal interview with UNDP staff, New York, November 2013.
75. GFP managers enjoy a high degree of autonomy within the GFP arrangement. When there is a disagreement at the managerial level, the issue is taken to the ASG level for consultation and settlement.

76. A High Level visit to Mali with DPKO Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous and UNDP Administrator Helen Clark had to be cancelled in 2013 as a result of conflicting schedules. It is unclear whether the visit will be rescheduled in 2014.

77. Terms of Reference for the position established that the UN Women representative is responsible to coordinate between GFP and UN Women and within and outside the UN system on existing gender capacities; work with the GFP to respond to country-level requests; support gender-mainstreaming into country-level assessments, planning and programming; participate in joint-level missions; and represent UN Women in GFP meetings.

78. Most interviewees from partner entities did not feel the need to be part of the GFP leadership but did want to have input on its decisions; have an information sharing arrangement; and have the option of considering their role and involvement at a later stage.

79. The first meeting was devoted to providing an updated overview of the implementation of the GFP and plans for the period 2013–2016; a discussion on country support and needs; and a discussion of the different modalities for convening the UN system to support the field on PJC. The second meeting focused on achievements and the way forward. No specific directives have resulted from these meetings, however. This raises the question of whether these meetings are effectively a venue for UN-wide strategic guidance and oversight or merely an instrument for information sharing and brand building.

80. Two members of the review team participated in one of the GFP meetings on November 12, 2013.

81. All initial GFP activities at HQ were supported by existing human resources within UNDP and DPKO. HQ-related activities were supported through the Peacekeeping Support Account (for DPKO participants), through DPA (for SMPs) or, for such activities as visits to the field, through the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund - CPRTTF (personal interviews with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013).

82. This is further discussed in Part 3 of this report.

83. For further GFP activities, extra-budgetary resources have been secured as follows: in-kind support from Germany and others for P-4 level secondments to HQ (contractual negotiations are still under way); \$1.5 million from Switzerland for three years; and \$1 million from the United Kingdom for two years.

84. According to the agreement, earmarked GFP funds will be administered by the UNDP Conflict Prevention & Recovery Thematic Trust Fund, based on existing UNDP rules and procedures.

85. The goal of a catalytic project is “to inject urgently required support to currently unfunded country-level activities in furtherance of the GFP arrangement as identified by the GFP management” (“GFP Procedures on the Management and Administration of GFP Funds,” April 8, 2014, in authors’ records).

86. The GFP has so far only developed joint messages and GFP fact sheets but not a concrete outreach strategy for either HQ or the field.

87. United Nations. General Assembly. *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013. Note by the Secretary-General.* A/C.5/67/16. January 15, 2013; United Nations. General Assembly. *Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2012 to 20 June 2013 and budget for the period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015. Report of the Secretary-General.* A/68/731. January 31, 2014, 108. In 2012–13, GFSS generated about 5 percent net savings against total authorized spending for peacekeeping (15 percent against support costs). Most of the savings came from “consumption efficiencies” (e.g., fuel savings) and deferred hardware acquisition, rather than personnel. Generating the savings cost about \$18 million.

88. As noted by a UN staff member, “When everybody is in charge, nobody is in charge” (personal interview with DPKO staff, New York, November 2013).

89. The latest issuance of UN staff rules and regulations is January 1, 2014. “Under the Charter of the United Nations, the General Assembly provides Staff Regulations which set out the broad principles of human resources policy for the staffing and administration of the Secretariat and the separately administered funds and programmes. The Secretary-General is required by the Staff Regulations to provide and enforce such Staff Rules, consistent with these principles, as he considers necessary. ... The present bulletin abolishes Secretary-General’s bulletin ST/SGB/2013/3 and Amend.1” (see United Nations. Secretary-General’s Bulletin. *Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations. Secretary-General’s bulletin.* ST/SGB/2014/1. January 1, 2014). Lest readers consider the Staff Regulations unchanged or unchangeable, the January 2014 Secretary-General’s bulletin also lists 79 updates/reissuances of the Staff Regulations, the latest being GA Resolution [68/253](#), December 27, 2013.

90. According to information provided to the review team, five new staff will come on board in 2014 to assist with work plan-related activities.

91. PD Interim Guidance Note on the GFP, in authors' records.
92. Personal interviews with UN staff, New York, November 2013;
93. Some GFP partners, for example, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the way in which the GFP core partners had developed a joint program of rule of law with a co-located team in Somalia (see Box 2 in section 3.2). They regretted non-involvement despite voicing strong concerns in that regard.
94. Subsequent to New York interviews for this report, the review team was informed that a new process for organizing partners' meetings had been instituted to promote more strategic discussions in partners meetings on country developments and plans by sharing agendas, country briefs and related documentation ahead of meetings, thereby contributing to more effective involvement of GFP partners and better discussions during meetings. The team trusts that this is the case but was not able to confirm it with GFP partners.
95. Field actors generally welcomed GFP support for strategic planning and priority setting efforts, better programmatic coordination and resource mobilization in the PJC area. However, they also felt strongly that decision-making, in particular on how to implement, should remain devolved to field actors. As stated by one field interlocutor, "People who can make a difference in the field, are in the field" (personal interview with UN field staff, March 2014).
96. In this light, the risk of blurring mandates and roles among different UN partners was frequently a point of concern, among agencies in particular. It was felt that if different UN actors were seen to be performing the same or similar roles, it would become increasingly difficult to exploit (or indeed justify) partners' unique added value.
97. While there are examples of better communication (for example, UNDP staff in Mali reported communicating with UNDP and CLJAS directly, receiving timely and coherent responses), in other missions (for example Somalia and Libya) old problems of mixed messages between UNDP and DPKO are said to persist. Where communication between HQ agencies and departments has demonstrably improved, for example, in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, it is lauded by field staff and appears to garner confidence that the GFP is effecting enhanced coordination. Haiti, perhaps by virtue of its proximity and shared time zone, receives a great deal of attention from headquarters. It is thus more sensitive to any perceived or implied changes in New York's structural arrangements. Here the confusion surrounding the new GFP arrangement has left many field staff in Port-au-Prince wondering "who" they are speaking to when corresponding with their regular headquarters counterparts. The notion that a person was now "wearing multiple hats" has been the source of unnecessary confusion and consternation.
98. *Civilian capacity. Report of the Secretary-General; Secretary-General, Decision no. 2012/13.*
99. This mostly amounts to the level of professionalism displayed by its field visits, the clarity of its added value and the efficacy of its toolkit.
100. Authors' interview with UN field staff, March 2014. In the particular case of Somalia, the security situation also played a large role in making co-location both possible and necessary.
101. IAP Working Group. *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook*. New York: IAP Working Group, December 2013.
102. This should take place on an "as appropriate" basis since many missions and field offices already have functioning mechanisms in place that do not need duplication.
103. Such visibly joint work also makes it easier for the GFP legitimately to challenge the status quo or "turf" protectionism that can plague field offices and missions, something that field actors clearly recognized and in fact welcomed. The aim hereof is stimulating better cooperation in the field. Clarifying respective mandates and conducting comparative advantage assessments were seen to be useful headquarter inputs that are more readily received when undertaken jointly by GFP partners (for example in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau).
104. In addition, quite a few GFP missions have sensibly worked on joint assessments, strategies and plans, which should be helpful in putting markers and objectives down for joint work that can continue after a mission has left. However, a number of field interlocutors queried the extent to which such plans and strategies really anchor collaboration. The view prevailed that joint – and at least partially GFP funded – follow-on programs are key to sustain momentum after a mission has departed.
105. This observation was supported by a review of pre- and post-mission documents outlining the objectives of the GFP field visits. For example, in Haiti emphasis was placed on addressing the recent Secretary-General's Decision (2013/17) which called for the refinement of a UN rule of law strategy in Haiti, including the development of a GFP support plan. In Somalia, the show-cased outcome of the joint GFP-World Bank-donor visit was a "ONE RoL Framework" supported by all international actors under the aegis of the New Deal. In Guinea-Bissau, attention was focused on the identification of common (UNDP-UNIOGBIS) results on which to base joint projects and/or programmes responding to country needs. In Côte d'Ivoire, focus was placed on

finalizing a community policing project document and producing a RoL programme document to provide the foundation for a more comprehensive, long-term approach.

106. The report of the GFP field visit to Haiti (in authors' records) contained a line referring to the lack of progress in justice and corrections as undermining the comparatively stronger gains made in police. This note was applauded by many in the field, though the lack of follow-up deflated the initial impact.

107. In the case of Mali, the focus of the GFP mission included developing a common framework for joint programming on RoL. The framework was to specify the necessary coordination and financing structures to support joint implementation, including a possible MPTF on Rule of Law.

108. "Overview of HQ support and country-level activities under the GFP arrangement" January 20, 2014 (in authors' records). Listed examples of deployed specialized expertise could not necessarily be corroborated with field interlocutors, suggesting either unawareness or a different understanding of support mobilized.

109. There is indication that such funding arrangements are being consolidated, as covered in the financial protocol ("Procedures on the Management and Administration of GFP Funds," in authors' records). See also section 2.2, above.

110. Practical workarounds have been found in some cases, such as UNDP (not GFP) contributing \$400,000 in Libya to enable an initial set of GFP-sponsored PJC activities. In addition, there are plans for using GFP funding to stimulate catalytic projects at country level up to \$100,000 ("Procedures on the Management and Administration of GFP Funds").

111. For an overview of PBF funding priority areas, see <http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/>, accessed May 28, 2014.

112. Work on this issue seems to be in process, as evidenced by a draft memorandum of understanding among UNDP, DPA and DPKO with regards to the Global Focal Point for the rule of law (undated).

113. As one field interlocutor remarked, "The purpose of the GFP is to improve collaboration between UNDP and DPKO regarding coordination of rule of law interventions."

114. For example, the involvement of the GFP in hiring decisions or local programming choices evoked strong resistance to a perceived risk for micromanagement.

115. Interlocutors expressed great interest in guidance that can help clarify different actors' mandates in mixed mission – UNCT settings. While this is partially out of scope for the GFP, it might be able to provide useful clarity on the PJC element of this issue. In general, the idea that such guidance could now be provided jointly by GFP partners was seen as having significant potential for improving the quality and coherence of field initiatives and avoiding "mixed messages."

116. This selection sought to balance a country with both a DPKO-led mission and a UNCT, a country with a DPA-led mission and a UNCT, and a country with a UNCT only.

117. Surveys received by country: Côte d'Ivoire: 1, Guinea-Bissau: 7, Guinea-Conakry: 1, Haiti: 12, Libya: 0 (distribution proved not to be possible due to a lack of cooperation), Mali: 1, Somalia: 7. Surveys received by agency: missions: 12, UNCT: 17.

118. For an overview of PBF funding priority areas, see <http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/>, accessed May 28, 2014.





