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The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations

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Photo Credits: Lakhdar Brahimi presents the Report to Kofi Annan, UN/DPI Photo by Eskinder Debebe (2000); A UN peacekeeper is accompanied by local children while on security patrol in the Becora district of Dili, East Timor, UN/DPI Photo by Eskinder Debebe (2000); UNMEE personnel carriers conduct regular patrols in the area of Senafe, UN/DPI Photo by J. Aramburu (2001).

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List of Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
AU	African Union
Brahimi Report	Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations
BR	Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations
CANADEM	Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CITS	Communication and Information Technology Service
CivPol	Civilian police
CLJAU	Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development, United Kingdom
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EAD	Electoral Assistance Division
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPS	Executive Committee on Peace and Security
EISAS	ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat
EU	European Union
FALD	Field Administration and Logistics Division
GA	General Assembly
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
ICT	Information and Communications Technologies
IMIS	Integrated Management Information System
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IT	Information Technology
ITSD	Information Technology Services Department

JMC	Joint Military Commission
LOA	Letters of Assist
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OMS	Office of Mission Support
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBPU	Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit
PBU	Peacebuilding Unit
PI	Public information
PMSS	Personnel Management and Support Service
QIPs	Quick impact projects
RDL	Rapid Deployment Level
RDMHQ	Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters
RDT	Rapid Deployment Team
ROE	Rules of engagement
RRF	European Union Rapid Reaction Force
SAG	Senior Appointments Group
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks
S-G	Secretary-General
SGTM	Standard Generic Training Modules
SHIRBRIG	Stand-by High Readiness Brigade
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCC	Troop contributing country
TES	Training and Evaluation Service
UN	United Nations

UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNSAS	United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USG	Under-Secretary-General

Foreword

I am pleased to present *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*. This new study, led by William Durch and Victoria Holt, will assist both experts and generalists to deepen their understanding of how the UN and its peacekeeping department have worked to implement significant changes in its practices proposed three years ago. It is a story both encouraging and challenging. The UN community has taken many important steps to improve capacity and performance, but peace operations face enduring and daunting challenges if they are to meet the expectations and requirements of a constantly changing international security environment.

We hope that this study will enrich a larger conversation about the future of the United Nations. Our report addresses only one of the tools available to the international community as it copes with new demands, but with insufficient global consensus about means to best ensure peace and security. Peace operations will not substitute for smart diplomacy and efforts to deter or prevent conflict, but well-prepared, professionally staffed operations can increase the success rate of efforts to deal with such conflicts and threats to international peace. In the context of a broader political debate about the merits of multilateralism, it is useful to understand more fully what multilateral institutions can and cannot do, and our study should help build that understanding.

The Stimson Center is committed to providing analysis and fresh ideas for policy on ways to strengthen institutions—both national and international—for peace and security. The project team on UN peace operations draws on extensive academic and practical experience in assessing progress on reform and in judging ways to make peace operations a more effective and reliable tool for the international community. In its next phase, the Stimson Center's *Future of Peace Operations* project will build on this impressive record, considering additional aspects of needed change in the UN system and in regional institutions, to support effective responses to conflict.

Ellen Laipson
President and CEO
The Henry L. Stimson Center

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The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy institution committed to finding and promoting innovative, pragmatic solutions to security challenges confronting the United States and other nations in the twenty-first century.

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Special thanks go to the many officials, experts and practitioners who assisted us in this study. Numerous United Nations officials were both gracious and generous with their time, providing candid analysis and guiding and assisting us with official UN records. Our appreciation also goes to those current and former U.S. officials who provided helpful insights from their experience at the State Department, the Mission to the United Nations, the Department of Defense, the Congressional Research Service, and the General Accounting Office. We would also like to express our appreciation to knowledgeable colleagues at the United States Institute of Peace, in the non-governmental sector, in the diplomatic community, and in other governments.

Finally, we are grateful to our colleagues at the Stimson Center, particularly its president Ellen Laipson and its vice president Cheryl Ramp, for their patience and guidance. They provided unparalleled support, endured extensive discussions of UN minutiae, and believed that some day we would finish, even as our document piles threatened to make 11 Dupont Circle a fire hazard. Thanks also to Claudine McCarthy, Katherine Powers and Jessica Dang for taking the time to review the manuscript, to Jane Dorsey for financial analysis, and to Joshua Nichols for essential technical support.

Responsibility for the content of this study, and for any errors or omissions, rests solely with the authors. We welcome your comments.

Executive Summary

> "*There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.*"
>
> – Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 2000

In trying to meet many of the peacekeeping challenges thrust upon it in the mid-1990s, the United Nations experienced some dramatic failures. Determined not to repeat that experience as demand for peace operations surged again at the end of the decade, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked a high-level group of experts to assess the UN system's shortcomings and to make frank and realistic recommendations for change. Issued in August 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (known as the "Brahimi Report" after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi) offered an in-depth critique of the conduct of UN operations and made specific recommendations for change. Only by making such changes, the Panel argued, would the United Nations be able to meet the critical 21st century peacekeeping and peacebuilding challenges presented by its member states.

Three years after this landmark study, the United Nations finds itself at a pivotal point. Rancorous debate about the UN's global role has occupied New York, triggered first by the post-9/11 environment and spurred further by events in Iraq and Washington's assertive use of force there. Nevertheless, the UN continues to run fact-finding missions, 13 peacekeeping operations and 12 peacebuilding and political missions in post-conflict societies, with new operations on the horizon. For UN peacekeeping operations alone, more than 90 countries were contributing over 40,000 police and military personnel in the fall of 2003. Because key recommendations of the Brahimi Report are now in practice, the United Nations is better positioned today to meet these demands for peace operations than at any time in its history.

In general, the United Nations has demonstrated clear progress in implementing a majority of reforms recommended by the Panel on UN Peace Operations. The Report's more concrete and operational recommendations, implementable by the UN bureaucracy, fared better than those pitched at the level of doctrine or strategy or those addressed to the member states themselves. We summarize our study of the implementation of the Brahimi Report

recommendations here, organized by categories: Doctrine and Strategy, Capacity for Operations, and Rapid and Effective Deployment.

Issues of Doctrine and Strategy

The Need for Preventive Action and a Peacebuilding Strategy

The Secretary-General (S-G) and the Security Council both endorsed the Report's call for greater use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension. The Security Council has increased its own use of fact-finding visits and the S-G's use of these and related special political missions has grown, although funding and support for these missions varies. As urged by the Report, the S-G instructed the in-house Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) to craft a better-integrated UN peacebuilding strategy. The resulting November 2001 peacebuilding "Plan of Action" offered only general guidelines, however, and has lacked follow-up, demonstrating a need for a better internal driver of peacebuilding strategies.

The Need for Clear, Credible, and Achievable Mandates

The Brahimi Report urged the UN Secretariat not to pull its punches when laying out requirements for an operation in a potentially dangerous environment, and to tell the Security Council when a possible operation exceeded its capacity. The Secretariat has begun to operate this way, evidenced by its declining to take on a military role in Afghanistan in 2001 while embracing more doable mandates for robust operations in Liberia and in unsettled parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) in 2003. The Council promised, in a series of resolutions and presidential statements, to greatly increase its consultations with troop contributing countries when drafting mandates or weighing changes that could increase risks to troops in the field. While consultations have increased, the Council did not set up the standing subsidiary body recommended by the Panel for troop contributor consultations.

Requirements for Effective Peacekeeping in Complex Operations

The Panel urged recognition that effective peacekeeping in complex operations requires the will to use force if necessary to maintain a secure environment in which peacebuilding efforts can go forward. The member states' Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations agreed that "UN peacekeepers…once deployed, must be capable of accomplishing the mission's mandate and of defending themselves and, where mandated, other mission components," but did not endorse the Report's call for "robust" forces and rules

of engagement. This latter element was first tested with the new mandates for UN peacekeeping missions in the DR Congo and Liberia in 2003, which meet the Report's criteria for robust operations. Both operations also allow peacekeepers to act, within their means, to halt violence against civilians within their areas of operation—authority that the Report argued is implicit in the principles of the UN Charter.

Requirements for Effective Peacebuilding in Complex Operations

The Panel recognized the role that UN peacebuilding efforts play in consolidating a post-conflict peace. Peacekeepers protect peacebuilders, the substantive civilian members of a complex operation, who help create the conditions that enable peacekeepers to go home. Among the peacebuilding tools stressed by the Brahimi Report, quick impact projects (QIPs)—designed to generate early improvement in a local population's quality of life—are now a routine feature of first-year peacekeeping mission budgets, as urged. The recommendation to also fund disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in those budgets has been partially met—funding to reintegrate demobilized fighters and help them find productive work has only recently been added to a mission budget (Liberia). Delays in voluntary funding for reintegration can increase the risk of crime and violence in the mission area, making assessed start-up funds an urgent priority for all operations with DDR responsibilities.

The Report argued that international civilian police could not function effectively without support from a criminal justice system and close attention to and training in human rights. It called for a "doctrinal shift" toward "rule of law teams" in complex peace operations that combined police, judicial, legal, and human rights experts. The SG denied the need for a doctrinal shift, but the ECPS sponsored an in-house Rule of Law Task Force to survey UN capabilities in this area. A new, two-person staff in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is tasked with implementing the task force recommendations and drafting a "rule of law framework" for peace operations. Despite SG support for the Panel's measures to increase the capacity of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva to plan the human rights components of peace operations and use advanced information technology to support the field investigations, all but a few staffing increases were rebuffed by member states.

The Challenge of Transitional Civil Administration

By late 1999, the UN Secretariat had become a temporary trustee, in all but name, of Serbia's province of Kosovo and of East Timor (now Timor Leste).

The Brahimi Report argued that the Secretariat, which is wary of this role, nonetheless needed to prepare for it lest similar future assignments end badly. Leaders of the Kosovo and Timor missions stressed the need for interim legal tools for use by transitional administrations in failed states. The Report urged study of an interim criminal code for use in peace operations. A Secretariat panel reported that a code of criminal *procedure* could be valuable to future operations and responsibility for drafting such rules was deflected to an office with no funds or new staff to create it. The Rule of Law Program at the United States Institute of Peace has independently taken on the task of drafting a model criminal code and code of procedures, however, and was seeking outside comment as of late 2003.

Recommendations: Doctrine and Strategy

Emphasizing the unimplemented elements of what the Brahimi Report termed a "doctrinal shift" in the UN's approach to rule of law elements and support for peacebuilding, the United Nations and member states should:

- Review and assess the ability of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to backstop successfully the increased numbers of fact-finding missions and special political missions, and consider an outside management review for DPA comparable to that given DPKO in 2001.
- Include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration funding for ex-combatants in the first-year mission budgets of all peace operations with DDR responsibilities and allow unspent funds to roll over into subsequent years for missions like the peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUC) whose programs are delayed by local politics.
- Analyze the current roadblocks to UN capacity to support restoration of governance, transitional administration, civilian police (with or without executive authority), and other rule of law components in field operations. Address how best to integrate UN capacity in these areas with the capacity and programs of regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union.
- Address seriously the issue of a criminal code and code of procedures for transitional administrations to apply ad interim and for use in training prospective mission personnel.
- Create a reserve capacity to undertake transitional administration operations, expanding UN civilian recruitment rosters to include job descriptions unique to transitional administrations.

CAPACITY FOR ANTICIPATING, PLANNING, AND MANAGING OPERATIONS

Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Management

The United Nations has no single, co-located team dedicated to managing information, tracking multiple crisis and conflict trends, recommending preventive action based on those trends, or anticipating international UN requirements for either peacekeeping or peacebuilding. Repeated efforts to create such a capacity have been resisted by UN member states. The Panel recommended establishing an ECPS-based information and strategic analysis staff (EISAS) to tackle such tasks. Member states again opposed the measure, allowing only a small ECPS support secretariat. DPKO's Best Practices Unit and Situation Center, however, are evolving rapidly as part of a peace operations knowledge network, and DPA's Policy Planning Unit is developing support networks outside the UN system. Combined with the growing number of UN headquarters personnel with field experience, such offices may permit some of the Report's objectives to be met by widely dispersed people using a few common data libraries and joint reporting and analysis criteria. As recommended, an UN-wide Extranet is being developed to connect headquarters and UN missions worldwide with broadband communications. UN policies and procedures posted to the extranet will promote delegation of authority to missions and thus greater speed and efficiency in hiring, management, and procurement, plus rapid sharing of best practices.

Integrated Mission Task Forces

What DPKO called mission task forces, pre-Brahimi, were *ad hoc* groups that met infrequently and gave little voice to other, non-DPKO UN elements expected to contribute people and expertise to new missions. The Report stressed the need for real joint planning for operations through "Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs)," an attempt to push the UN, and the ECPS in particular, toward common decision-making. Since 2000, bodies called IMTFs have been created for UN missions (e.g., Afghanistan) and have improved horizontal discussion and planning. These IMTFs, however, have lacked decision authority and recourse to higher-level bodies for validation or appeal, serving more as brainstorming and drafting committees. The UN system still tends to resolve issues upward through a single chain of decision makers (e.g., from the DPKO Office of Operations to the head of DPKO to the Secretary-General), leaving other departments and agencies little say in the final decisions. Working mission leadership into the planning process effectively at an early stage has also proven difficult. Again, the tendency is to channel all decisions

through the designated leader rather than to delegate authority for solving pieces of the problem. These structural and cultural issues must be resolved if the UN is to plan and execute robust operations effectively.

Rebuilding the Secretariat

The Brahimi Report recognized the need to revitalize and reorganize the understaffed UN offices that support peace operations. The Panel's proposals to enlarge and restructure DPKO, seek emergency and sustained funding, and change its management culture were expanded upon by an independent management review conducted in the spring of 2001. Since then, DPKO has grown (191 new posts), military and civilian police planning and support have been separated and made organizationally coequal. As a result, the UN can do a far better job of supporting all aspects of peace operations, military and civilian, at both the political and operational levels, although DPKO remains short-staffed in the police/rule of law area and in planning for the civilian elements of peace operations.

The department has largely embraced "change management," although full implementation of a new management culture may have to await staff turnover in key places. Meanwhile, however, field-headquarters interactions now benefit from being more two-way: field leaders periodically come to New York for consultation at UN headquarters and desk officers swap assignments with field managers to experience each other's problems firsthand.

The UN Department of Political Affairs, the UN's closest analog to a foreign affairs ministry, lacks its own sources of political reporting from the field (except where special political missions are established) and until recently has largely lacked contact with area experts outside the UN system (some recent initiatives have begun to redress this gap). Born a decade ago as an amalgamation of older units and duties, DPA needs an outside management review comparable to that given DPKO in 2001. In 2002, DPA agreed to transfer to DPKO the management of all complex peace operations—including those, like Afghanistan, which lack troops or police. In turn, DPKO agreed to focus on operations and leave high politics to DPA. This agreement is largely being implemented and has helped to ensure mutual support, for example, by drawing DPKO representatives into ongoing peace negotiations.

The Brahimi Report addressed just two offices within DPA. It recommended establishing a pilot Peacebuilding Unit—whose status remains unresolved three years later—and regularized funding for the overbooked Electoral Affairs Division, where staff has increased modestly but which still receives more requests for electoral assistance than it can handle.

It is important that the UN's newly developed support capabilities be sustained through fluctuations in the intensity of UN operations. Expert staff takes time to find, train, and familiarize, and sustaining that expertise is the organization's most cost-effective option in the long run. Even after its recent growth, the cost of headquarters operational support is just five percent of the total cost of UN peacekeeping, a very reasonable "overhead" charge that few corporations could match. It reflects a long-overdue process of change and renewal that is well worth preserving.

Recommendations: Capacity for Anticipating, Planning, and Managing Operations

In this area, the United Nations and member states should:

- Reconsider the UN's pressing need for strategic information gathering and analysis in light of 9/11, the bombing of UN offices in Iraq, and other challenges facing field personnel; improving such capacity would promote both the safety and security of field personnel and effective mission planning and implementation.
- Fund fully Secretariat plans for creative use of advanced information technology, recognizing that UN spending in this area, as a fraction of total budget, lags far behind other international organizations such as the World Bank.
- Revise and if necessary relabel the IMTF concept to reflect an evolving, multi-tier planning process that both affirms the lead department concept and gives an effective voice to mission resource providers outside DPKO:
    - Create a *mission strategy group*, comprising the heads of DPA, DPKO, and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), chaired by DPA and with the participation of the mission Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), when appointed; enable this group to approve basic mission objectives for presentation to the Secretary-General and Security Council and also to function as the appeals board for issues unresolved by the IMTF.
    - Include in each IMTF the mission's technical assessment team; have IMTFs chaired by the mission's Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), when appointed, with a deputy chair designated jointly by DPKO's Assistant Secretaries-General (ASGs) for Operations and for Mission Support; have IMTFs create the detailed concept of operations and coordinate the contributions of mission asset

providers, with disputes referred to the mission strategy group for resolution.

- Give DPKO and other Secretariat elements that support peace operations a stable funding base to retain skilled, experienced staff as operations come and go and as the total mission budget fluctuates:
    - Establish current Peacekeeping Support Account staffing levels as a "floor" that will not be breached unless Support Account funding exceeds ten percent of mission budgets for two consecutive years.
    - Maintain, otherwise, Peacekeeping Support Account staff levels at five percent of total peacekeeping mission budgets, calculated on a five-year moving average, with provision for emergency staffing in years when mission budgets increase substantially.
    - Consider moving the Peacekeeping Support Account (now about $112 million/year) into the regular biennium budget, as recommended by the Brahimi Report, while moving peacekeeping operations (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) and special political missions that are now funded in the regular budget (at about $118 million/year) into a broadened "peace operations mission budget."
- Give the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights the people that it needs to improve the recruitment, selection, and training of human rights experts for complex peace operations and provide for their integration into mission planning and into rule of law teams.
- Support DPA's acquisition of voluntary money and people for the pilot Peacebuilding Unit to analyze how and why peacebuilding measures succeed or fail; have the unit work closely with the DPKO Best Practices Unit; make the PBU a regular budget item in the 2006-2007 biennium budget if the pilot program is productive.
- Give DPA's oversubscribed Electoral Assistance Division the support it needs to meet member states' requests for election-related advice, including assessed operational funding akin to that given special political missions.

Rapid and Effective Deployment

Defining Deployment Benchmarks

The Brahimi Report proposed the first rapid deployment benchmarks for peace operations, to aid peace negotiators, mission planners, and troop contributors alike. The SG and member states agreed to a UN definition of "rapid and effective deployment capabilities," identifying it as deploying a traditional (e.g., border monitoring) operation within 30 days and deploying a

complex operation within 90 days of receiving the mandate to do so. For planning purposes, these missions were defined to have 5,000 and 10,000 troops, respectively, with corresponding numbers of police and other civilian personnel.

Advance Planning and Spending Authority

The Brahimi Report recommended that mandates for new operations be held in draft until the necessary troops had been found to carry them out. The Council offered instead to create "planning mandates" that would let the S-G canvass states for troops, with full implementation deferred until the S-G received adequate commitments of troops. The $50 million pre-mandate spending authority recommended by the Report was found to exist already but without clear implementing mechanisms, which were finally developed in the summer of 2003 for use in planning the new UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia.

Improving Mission Leadership

The Brahimi Panel recommended measures to improve the recruitment, selection, training and guidance of mission leaders. The Secretary-General formed a Senior Appointments Group to establish a leadership profile, consolidate a roster of "eminent persons" available for rapid deployment, and identify senior UN personnel ready to take on field assignments. The Special Committee, however, insisted that political candidates for leadership posts be considered, roster or not, and failed to endorse the Report's emphasis on managerial talent and experience as qualifications for mission leadership. The Panel also urged, and the S-G endorsed, advance assembly of mission leaders at the United Nations, which has taken place. The DPKO has established standard briefings for them at UN headquarters two to three days before deployment. Pre-mission training for senior leaders still lags; there continue to be relatively few women in top leadership positions in field missions; and it is unclear whether headquarters has improved its "strategic guidance" to mission leaders.

Recruiting and Deploying Capable Military Forces

To support rapid deployment of UN operations, the Panel urged better use of DPKO's UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), the voluntary roster of member state forces that can be made available for peace operations. A reorganized UNSAS now includes four levels of commitment, including a new "Rapid Deployment Level" (RDL) for troop resources available within 30/90 days of a Security Council mandate, as specified in a detailed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the country and the United Nations. DPKO also

seeks quarterly updates from the more than 75 member states that list capabilities in UNSAS.

Progress is slowly being made toward the Panel goal of adding "brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces" to the Rapid Deployment Level. In addition to the primarily European Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG, on which the Report's recommendation was based), the European Union plans to have substantial, rapidly deployable peacekeeping forces; the African Union aims to create five multinational brigades; and four South Asian states (Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and India) have contributed forces to the UN's "Ituri Brigade" in DR Congo—a force created in the field rather than in advance, but a step forward nonetheless.

In line with the Brahimi Report, DPKO has created a Military On-Call List to facilitate rapid deployment of the military headquarters staffs of new missions. Nine key officers ("Group I") would be expected to arrive at UN headquarters within a week of call-up to aid mission planning. Group II personnel (the rest of the roster) would be expected to report to a mission staging area within two weeks of call-up. DPKO hopes that member states will name individuals to at least the Group I slots but for the most part states pledge "expertise," not people, to the list.

To ensure that pledged forces meet UN requirements and the terms of MOUs, DPKO uses pre-deployment inspections, followed by in-mission inspections and operational assessments once forces deploy. When countries' forces do not meet specifications, DPKO attempts to pair them with third-country equipment providers or may draw equipment from its new Strategic Deployment Stocks (see "Logistics" section below).

Finally, with input from troop contributors and regional organizations, DPKO has developed and published 16 "Standard Generic Training Modules" designed to help states configure their training programs to meet UN operational needs.

Recruiting and Deploying Capable Police and Other Criminal Justice Personnel

The Panel recommended that the United Nations create on-call lists comparable to those for the military to support rapid deployment of civilian police and other elements of operations' rule of law teams. The Report also urged member states to create national pools of police and other specialties ready for rapid deployment and engage in regional training of these personnel. Evidence is scant that member states have moved to create either national pools of candidates for international operations or, with the possible exception of the European Union, moved toward regional training partnerships. While a few

nations excel, many member states are still not providing qualified police candidates for operations, and bids to fill the police on-call list have been slow and relatively few. Overall, development of rapidly deployable rule of law teams remains in its infancy.

Recruiting and Deploying Capable Civilian Field Staff

Measures to increase the availability of civilian personnel for field operations have moved ahead with some speed. Online posting of DPKO's human resources handbook gives field missions instant access to current procedures and facilitates delegation of hiring authority to the field, which tends to speed up hiring considerably. The Secretariat-wide "Galaxy Project," though needing further refinement, has put job applications online and attracted 20,000 applicants per month in its first three months of operation. A refined program could allow a half-dozen staff to manage a civilian on-call list of 10,000 names—unlike the military and police rosters, DPKO can contact individuals on the civilian roster quickly and directly. Reflecting the Panel's recommendation for a centralized source of pre-vetted civilian staff, DPKO is also setting up three civilian Rapid Deployment Teams of about 120 UN staff members each whose supervisors agree in advance to release them for temporary duty on mission assessment teams and to initiate and support a field operation.

The Panel emphasized improving civilian staff conditions and incentives. The 2001 DPKO management review noted training for civilian personnel as a major unmet need. Mission training funds have since tripled but remain just a fraction of the total cost of field operations. Training within DPKO has also been institutionalized for the first time, funded at about three percent of its budget. The system has begun to treat civilian employees, at headquarters and in the field, as assets to be groomed instead of temps to be exploited.

Finally, the UN Field Service, created in 1949 to provide technical and security support to peacekeeping, now constitutes just 13 percent of UN international civilian staff employed in peacekeeping but is still the UN's only full-time team of "first responders." By moving to homogenize its field personnel policies, DPKO risks losing a chance to rebuild the Field Service as a flexible, updated first response team for critical elements of future operations.

Logistics Support for Rapid Deployment

To reduce the equipment bottlenecks that hampered rapid and effective deployment of past operations, the Report recommended additional equipment stocks and delegation of procurement authority to DPKO and to the field. The Secretariat exceeded the Panel's proposals, successfully creating ready-to-go Strategic Deployment Stocks to be maintained at a newly refurbished UN

Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, which have already been tapped for deployments. This $142 million equipment stock is replenished from mission budgets on a revolving basis; the base is also maintained through peacekeeping mission funds (about $22 million annually). The DPKO management review concluded that procurement authority should remain with the UN Department of Management, whose procurement division had adopted a number of improvements in systems and procedures. In 2001, nearly half of all peacekeeping procurement was done from the field, and DPKO has been working to increase the ability of field missions to implement and manage large contracts.

Promoting Fast and Effective Public Information in the Field

When a large peacekeeping operation deploys into a war-torn country, it needs to explain its presence locally and globally, and to sell its "products," from demobilization to free and fair elections. Radio has repeatedly proven to be an especially effective medium for doing so in low-literacy societies. Yet no unit within the UN was devoted to rapid and effective deployment of public information capabilities in peace operations and, three years after the Brahimi Report was published, that is largely still the case, despite two years of efforts by the Secretariat. In a relatively rare move, the General Assembly finally overruled the budget watchdog Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in July 2002 to approve two posts within the Department of Public Information to plan and support the public information needs of peace operations globally. This result falls short of what is needed and reflects a myopic view, on the part of UN member states, of what public information is and what it can do for a peace operation in difficult situations.

Recommendations: Rapid & Effective Deployment

To improve capacity for rapid, effective, and successful deployments, the UN and member states should:

- Improve the effectiveness of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System through increased member state participation at higher levels, including more accurate listings and greater availability of key enabling units required for effective deployments.
- Encourage and support further development of regional "brigade-sized forces" comparable to the multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and MONUC's largely South Asia-based "Ituri Brigade," recognizing their potential for effectiveness, especially if such forces have the opportunity to train together in advance of deployment.

- Encourage developed states with overseas military training capacity to help regional organizations such as the African Union implement their plans to develop brigade-level forces capable of contributing to UN and regional peace operations.
- Increase the capacity of the Civilian Police Division, which remains too small to develop standards and procedures, plan operations and manage a force of 4,000-8,000 officers who are individually recruited, vetted, and hired.
- Expand the staff of the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit within the Civilian Police Division, to give DPKO the capacity that it needs to evaluate the operational rule of law requirements of missions, collaborate in the design of effective rule of law teams for complex operations, and also find, recruit, deploy, and manage the criminal justice personnel that a complex peace operation needs.
- Recognize the value of member states contributing more highly skilled, named individuals to on-call lists for the rapid deployment of police and other rule of law personnel for peace operations; replace "bidding for slots" on these on-call lists with real candidates with professional experience and familiarity with UN rules, procedures, and operational requirements.
- Build a responsibility center within the UN Secretariat for public information strategies and rapid deployment for peace operations; this capacity remains weak despite reorganization of the UN Department of Public Information.

— 1 —

Introduction

> "*Without renewed commitment on the part of member states, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks that the member states assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them*."

This challenge to strengthen and revitalize UN peace operations was laid before the international community in August 2000 with the release of the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the "Brahimi Report"), a landmark document that recommended sweeping changes in the way that UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peacebuilding are conceived, planned, and executed.[1] The Report identified serious shortcomings in the UN's ability to "confront the lingering forces of war and violence," and helped launch an ongoing effort for institutional change within the United Nations that continues today.

Tackling such change and solving operational problems—from planning new missions to recruiting capable forces, deploying them rapidly and sustaining them in the field—are vital for the successful conduct of peace operations, a tool of international security policy that is likely to see heavy use for the indefinite future. Tracking and publicizing such change are also important if interested user communities are to keep abreast of the tools that they have at their disposal. The *Future of Peace Operations* project at the Henry L. Stimson Center undertook to track the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, identify which have been implemented so far and how well, assess what that means for UN peace operations capacity, and recommend next steps. This study assesses reforms through the summer of 2003, with emphasis on the official UN implementation record, supplemented by interviews with practitioners conducted by the project.

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[1] UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. In this paper, "Brahimi Report," "the Report" (capitalized), "the Brahimi Panel," and "the Panel" are terms used interchangeably simply for relief from constant repetition.

Sidebar 1:

Defining Peace Operations (from the Brahimi Report)

United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: *conflict prevention* and *peacemaking*; *peacekeeping*; and *peacebuilding*. Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low-profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether.

Peacemaking addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case, for example, in the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique. Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently.

Peacekeeping is a 50-year plus enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars to one that incorporates a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars.

Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peacebuilding includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.

Source: A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras 10-14.

1.1 ORIGINS OF THE BRAHIMI REPORT

The Brahimi Report was commissioned because UN peace operations, and peacekeeping in particular, were in crisis. In the 1990s, the United Nations had taken on dozens of peacekeeping missions, including complex operations with elements of peace enforcement.[3] Although, by the mid-1990s, UN peacekeeping had experienced both successes and failures, the failures were better remembered, including the inability of on-site UN peacekeepers to prevent either the 1994 genocide in Rwanda or the 1995 massacres in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Frustrated by these failures, UN members largely turned away from the organization for running major peacekeeping initiatives. Between 1995 and 1999, the UN launched just one robust operation, in eastern Croatia, and took on one police monitoring mission, in Bosnia. Ironically, both were successful, the Croatia operation from its inception and the Bosnia police mission toward its end. Other new UN peacekeeping deployments in the latter 1990s were small military observer missions (in Georgia, Tajikistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) or political missions.

As the number of troops deployed in UN peacekeeping declined through the latter 1990s, the UN General Assembly ordered an end to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) use of "gratis military personnel,"[2] who had helped the UN cope with the rapid growth in peacekeeping operations between 1992 and 1995. During that period, member states loaned more than 130 military officers to DPKO with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties, free of charge to the UN. Developed states, however, provided 85 percent of these officers to a department already heavily Western in staff makeup, being largely exempt from the geographic diversity requirements of other Secretariat offices.[3] By late February 1999, the departure of all the gratis officers left much of DPKO's operational support capacity and institutional memory for military and logistical planning severely depleted—only four months before UN peacekeeping experienced another bout of explosive growth.

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[3] For a full list of all past and current UN peace operations, see the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/.

[2] UN General Assembly, A/RES/51/243, 15 September 1997.

[3] UN General Assembly, *Gratis personnel provided by Governments and other entities, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/C.5/53/54, 26 February 1999.

Sidebar 2:

Complex Operations and the UN Charter

Unlike traditional peacekeeping, which uses military units and observers to implement cease-fires and force separations between states, complex operations usually address civil wars that are stalemated on the battlefield or terminated by outside political or military pressure—in short, wars that are unfinished from a local perspective. Such operations attempt in most cases to implement peace accords designed to divert those conflicts, and the agendas that drove them, from military to political channels.

Complex operations may be authorized in whole or in part under Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) of the UN Charter, which both affirms the right of UN member states to individual and collective self-defense (Art. 51) and gives the Security Council authority to define threats to the peace (Art. 39), apply sanctions (Art. 41), and "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Art. 42). Although Article 2(7) of the Charter stipulates that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . .," it also states that "this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

Most peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 1991 were established without reference to Chapter VII but all of the complex operations begun since 1999 function in whole or in part under Chapter VII. Even traditional peacekeeping, which can involve the use of force in self-defense, goes beyond the mediation/conciliation measures contemplated in the Charter's Chapter VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"). Thus, peacekeeping, the guiding principles and practices of which evolved one mission and one mandate at a time, became known as a "chapter six-and-a-half" measure—consistent with but not actually defined by the Charter.

Events began to escalate in June 1999, as, in rapid succession, the United Nations was called on to: administer Kosovo under the protection of NATO ground forces; to replace Australian-led forces in East Timor and provide a temporary government for that emerging nation; to replace Nigerian-led regional forces in Sierra Leone implementing a deeply flawed peace accord; and to oversee a shaky cease-fire in the regional war that had engulfed the vast Democratic Republic of Congo. Two-thirds of troops and police in UN

operations would be deployed to these four new missions by April 2000, as the total number of troops, police, and civilian personnel in UN operations more than tripled. In July 2000, the Security Council mandated a further new mission with 4,300 troops to help verify a ceasefire and support a force separation agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In short, after a four-year lull, the world community turned back to the UN for several path-breaking operations. As the new mandates mounted, old failures were once again highlighted. In late 1999, the Secretary-General released two very sobering reports assessing how the UN had dealt with the genocide in Rwanda and the massacres at Srebrenica.[4] These reports reopened some old wounds and, together with the operational difficulties faced by the freshly launched peace operations and an overstretched DPKO, suggested a potentially terminal crisis for UN peace operations.

The Secretary-General decided that piecemeal solutions to peacekeeping's problems would no longer suffice. In March 2000, he appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.[5]

1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT

The challenge to the Panel was clear: to identify and assess the weaknesses of the United Nations' best known tool for stabilizing recent zones of conflict, and to offer practical recommendations to remedy those weaknesses. The Secretary-General promised to implement what the Panel recommended, to the extent of his power to do so. UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi ably chaired the Panel and its report informally bears his name. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General pulled together its research and writing staff.[6]

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[4] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/55, entitled "The fall of Srebrenica,"* A/54/549, 15 November 1999; and UN Security Council, *Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, S/1999/1257, 15 December 1999.

[5] Panel members included: Mr. J. Brian Atwood, Amb. Colin Granderson, Dame Ann Hercus, Mr. Richard Monk, Gen. (ret.) Klaus Naumann, Ms. Hisako Shimura, Amb. Vladimir Shustov, Gen. Philip Sibanda, and Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga.

[6] Three were based in New York and two in Washington, at the Henry L. Stimson Center. One Stimson Center staff member (William Durch) served as staff director in New York, working with UN Political Officer Salman Ahmed and Mr. Brahimi's personal assistant, Clare Kane, who pulled together all three Panel sessions and stitched together each of several drafts of the Report. The two Washington-based Stimson staff members, Caroline Earle and Edward Palmisano, contributed, respectively, to the Report's sections on information technology issues and legal issues related to transitional administration.

The Panel worked under a tight schedule, pressed to research and complete its findings in time for the fall Millennium Summit, the special year 2000 General Assembly session slated for September with heads of state and governments. With four months to research, analyze and produce the report, the Panel worked quickly to tap into the best thinking and experience on the subject. Although its terms of reference also encompassed conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding (see *sidebar 1* for detailed definitions of each), the Panel focused on peacekeeping as the most costly and visible aspect of peace operations, recognizing that further setbacks could destroy it, and that peacebuilding efforts often depended on the security provided by peacekeepers. Prevention, peacebuilding and issues related to the security of UN field personnel were each the focus of a separate UN study, so the Panel concentrated most of its attention on peacekeeping.

The Panel also focused on key areas within peacekeeping, including clarity of mandates and communication between UN officials, states and staff; planning, logistics, and mission leadership; rapid availability and deployment of troops, police, and civilian personnel; and issues related to human rights and rule of law. Nevertheless, not all issues within peacekeeping could be addressed adequately in the Panel's work. Other key questions, such as training, HIV/AIDS, medical care in the field, gender-related issues, security of UN field personnel, and the definition of exit strategy, were largely unaddressed in the Report. Many were picked up subsequently by the implementation process.

The Panel's report was sent to the General Assembly, Security Council, and heads of state by the Secretary-General on 21 August 2000.

1.3 RESPONSES TO THE REPORT

The Security Council, meeting at the head of state and government level in early September, "welcomed" the Report, promising to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations and to address its recommendations in detail, which it did in November 2000. In that later resolution, the Council endorsed the Report's recommendations on the content and character of mandates for operations; early and frequent Council consultations with troop contributing countries; UN Secretariat information gathering and analysis; integrated mission planning; and rapid deployment needs and benchmarks.[7]

[7] UN Security Council Resolution 1318, 7 September 2000; and UN Security Council Resolution 1327, 13 November 2000.

Table 1: A UN Budget Glossary

Type of Budget	What It Covers	Fiscal Year
Regular Biennium Budget Billed to member states according to the "regular scale of assessment" (see Appendix C).	General headquarters expenses, the costs of "special political missions," and the costs of the two oldest peacekeeping missions.	Two calendar years; current biennium runs from January 2002 to December 2003.
Peacekeeping Mission Budgets Billed to member states according to the "peacekeeping scale of assessment" (see Appendix C). *Includes funding for Peacekeeping Support Account and UN Logistics Base.*	Costs of operating peacekeeping missions (salaries, equipment, transport, reimbursements to troop contributors).	Separate one-year budgets for each mission running from 1 July to 30 June.
Peacekeeping Support Account Billed to member states as a pro-rated surcharge on peacekeeping mission budgets.	Headquarters-related costs of planning and supporting peacekeeping operations. Funds most of DPKO, supporting elements of the Department of Management, and a handful of posts in other headquarters offices.	One-year budget running from 1 July to 30 June.
UN Logistics Base (UNLB), Brindisi, Italy Billed to member states as a pro-rated surcharge on peacekeeping mission budgets.	Costs of operating the UN's equipment reserve designed to expedite deployment of new peacekeeping operations.	One-year budget running from 1 July to 30 June.

The General Assembly, meeting initially at the level of heads of state and government at the Millennium Summit, issued a Millennium Declaration on 18 September that "took note" of the Brahimi Report—a polite but noncommittal acknowledgment foreshadowing later struggle over some of the Report's recommendations.[8] While UN member states by and large welcomed

[8] UN General Assembly, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000.

them, developed states tended to be more enthusiastic, developing states more reserved. Some of this reserve derived from implicit linkages between the Report's call (discussed at length below) for more "robust" operations and speeches by the Secretary-General over the previous two years to the effect that states could no longer expect to hide behind a shield of sovereignty while abusing their citizens. The Panel had skirted any reference to so-called "humanitarian intervention" in an effort to avoid this controversy, but for several member states, limiting the UN's ability to support or plan for such action became a focus of their approach to implementing the Report, even though such limitations—on information and analysis, for example—would hamper the UN's ability to undertake effective conflict preventive action as well.

Inside the UN system, work on implementing the report began almost immediately following its release. The first implementation documents, seeking "emergency" increases in support for DPKO and other Secretariat offices involved in peacekeeping support, followed the Panel's report by just two months. The second round of implementation ensued and built upon a comprehensive management review of DPKO and several of its largest field operations, long called for by the UN General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,[9] that was conducted by outside consultants in the spring of 2001.[10] These implementation plans fleshed out the operational and financial implications of the Report's many recommendations and worked with the UN's complex network of inter-governmental bodies to win their approval.[11] Meanwhile, new leadership in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations pressed for the key changes in management culture that were stressed by the Panel as crucial to the longevity of all other reforms.

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[9] The Special Committee, established by the General Assembly in 1965, is composed of representatives of peacekeeping troop contributing countries. It holds regular meetings every spring, advising the General Assembly's Fourth (Special Political) Committee on peacekeeping issues. For more information online, see: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ctte/CTTEE.htm.

[10] The implementation reports were cast, as are most UN reports to the Council or the Assembly, in the voice of the Secretary-General. All arguments and recommendations within the reports are, formally, his arguments and recommendations, which permits convenient shorthand in referring to them that we use frequently in this paper. A complete list of implementation-related documents may be found in the bibliography of this report.

[11] The intergovernmental bodies are those composed of UN member states. Key bodies for purposes of implementing the Brahimi Report included, for policy matters, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, and for financial matters, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), a 16-member body that reviews and makes recommendations (that are usually accepted) on every budget-related document sent to the GA's Fifth (Financial) Committee of the whole. See UN General Assembly, *Appointment of members of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions: Note by the Secretary-General*, A/57/101, 10 July 2002.

1.4 THE CHANGING POLITICAL AND CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The Brahimi Report offered a roadmap for reforming UN peacekeeping operations and acknowledged candidly the need for such measures. Member states were a key audience for the report, since many of the reforms recommended by the Panel require their direct support, participation and funding. UN peacekeeping depends completely on the willingness of states to offer troops and police for operations, which imposes key limitations on those operations, especially when states decline to contribute forces, as has been the case with developed states and the newer missions in Africa. While European states have reduced their military spending and personnel, their troop commitments to NATO-led missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have not halted European contributions to older UN missions in the Middle East and Cyprus, or independent contributions of troops to African crisis situations, including by Great Britain in Sierra Leone or France in Côte d'Ivoire and, under European Union (EU) colors, Democratic Republic of Congo.

For whatever reason, experience from the mid- and late-1990s stimulated efforts to build greater regional capacity for peace operations, especially in Europe and Africa. In December 1999, the European Union agreed to create a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and a Civilian Crisis Management Capacity; in April 2001, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Team), to support timely deployment of police and other civilian expertise; and in November 2002, NATO decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF). The African Union (AU) has a nascent conflict management mechanism, the Peace and Security Council, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which sponsored peacekeeping forces of varying effectiveness in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s, has taken steps to establish a peacekeeping secretariat and a system for financing its forces. Whether these structures will complement or compete with the UN for troops, personnel, funding and logistical support is not clear.

The United States government largely welcomed the Brahimi Report, partly because it didn't mince words and offered a path to more successful future operations without prescribing when or where to conduct them. Better yet, the Report called for reform without a large requirement for money. The Clinton Administration supported most of the recommendations, as did traditional UN critics on Capitol Hill. The 2000 election of President George Bush, however, and the events of 9/11 wrenched the focus of American foreign policy away from the questions of the 1990s although, despite the new Administration's open disdain for nation-building and peacekeeping, it soon found itself sustaining ongoing UN operations and working with the United Nations to develop a

Sidebar 3:

Funding Gaps in the 1990s

The United Nations found itself financially strapped from the mid-1990s, borrowing money from peacekeeping accounts to cover shortages in the UN regular budget, which in turn delayed reimbursements to states that had contributed thousands of troops to UN peacekeeping operations. Many member states paid their dues for UN peacekeeping late or not in full, especially the United States. (During the Reagan Administration, the United States shifted to paying its regular budget assessments to the United Nations in the fiscal year following receipt of the bill from the UN—in other words, nearly a year late. Even when Congress approved full funding, annual appropriations bills were rarely passed before the start of the U.S. fiscal year [1 October], for assessments issued the previous January.)

While the early 1990s growth in UN operations was supported by U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, American support began to fade with perceived UN peacekeeping failure and increased U.S. costs. The U.S. share of UN assessments grew along with the difficult operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, creating a large U.S. bill of nearly $1 billion annually. The United States experienced fractious foreign policy disagreements between a Democrat-controlled White House and Republican-led Congress, which characterized the UN as inept and in need of reform. In this environment, peacekeeping's problems helped justify Congressional withholding of U.S. funding to the United Nations and ushered in a period of U.S. arrears that continued through the fall of 2001. While more financially sound today, the UN continues to face questions of funding for its peace operations.

strategy in Afghanistan that tackled the problems of terrorism and nation-building simultaneously. This honeymoon with the United Nations ended badly, however, in the fall of 2002 and early 2003 as the Bush Administration tried to win Security Council support for its use of force against Iraq and faced strong opposition from other Security Council members. Six difficult months later, as the U.S. sought UN authorization later in 2003 for the post-conflict operation in Iraq, its recognition if not appreciation for the many roles of the UN—as coordinator of the relief community, as convener of member states, as experts on governance, or (outside Iraq) as the organizer and authorizer of peace operations—was much clearer.

1.5 STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF THIS STUDY

The following chapters review how key recommendations of the Brahimi Report have fared to date, organized in three broad areas: doctrine and strategy, capacity to plan and support operations, and rapid and effective deployment.

Within each area, this study integrates a discussion of the main Brahimi report measures, generally but not always following the Report's original structure. (For example, we treat Secretariat restructuring as an enhancement to mission planning, which precedes mission deployment; the Report discussed deployment first). Within each section, this study identifies reasons for progress or delay, and distinguishes elements of recommendations for which the UN system or the Secretariat bore primary responsibility from elements whose implementation has depended primarily on the actions and engagement of UN member states. In addition to the 57 main recommendations of the Report, we also consider some of the 25 supplemental recommendations of the Panel, which were in the main text but not pulled into the summary list of recommendations that is the standard checklist (That list is reproduced in Appendix A). For a summary chart on progress in implementing each recommendation in the Report that is cross-referenced to this discussion, see Appendix B.)

Understanding how and why Report-related changes occurred (or did not) requires a detailed look at UN offices, tools, and capacities to organize, manage and run peace operations. In presenting the details, we highlight some very real challenges, indicate where progress is still needed, and hope to encourage member states to accelerate efforts to solve the tough remaining problems that face the UN and the conduct of peace operations. Many of these can only be addressed by states, which owe it to those who live in conflict situations and those who serve in peace operations that such operations function as effectively as possible. The truly hard questions, beyond this study, however, concern *when*, *where* and *how* the international community may be willing to use peace operations to help maintain or restore peace and security within or between war-torn societies. Answering those questions requires a solid understanding of what capacity is available, how it can be utilized effectively and, where it is lacking, what needs to be done to make it available.[12]

[2] For further information about the *Future of Peace Operations* project, see: www.stimson.org/fopo.

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Issues of Doctrine and Strategy

At most one quarter of the internal conflicts that ended in the 1990s incorporated international peace operations as part of the solution,[1] yet states were strapped to support even that many operations, most of which were in fairly small places. Only major increases in national and regional resources devoted to peace operations would permit that proportion to grow any larger. The Brahimi Report argued that it is therefore crucial that the UN Secretariat provide capable and forthright advice to the Security Council about potential operations; that the Council be selective about the operations that it authorizes; and that the mandates for authorized operations be clear, credible, and achievable with the resources available.

Because peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding address only the aftermath of war, not its outbreak, they represent only part of what is needed to reduce both the incidence of conflict and the damage that it does over the long term. The other element is conflict prevention.

2.1 The Need for Preventive Action

The Brahimi Report highlighted the need for effective measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict, noting the clear gap between verbal support and real financial and political support for conflict prevention.[2] It endorsed the conflict prevention elements of the Secretary-General's (S-G's) April 2000 Millennium Report and noted that a separate Secretariat report on conflict prevention was then under construction.[3] With this parallel effort underway, the Brahimi Report addressed prevention only briefly, focusing on an operational element of the Secretary-General's good offices function, namely, fact-finding missions to areas of tension.

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[1] Proportion of conflict resolution assisted by peace operations based on Stimson Center analysis of Uppsala Conflict Data Project data for internal conflicts rated as ending 1990-99. Nils Peter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946-2001, version 1.2" (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University). Available online at: www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict/ (downloaded 5 May 2003).

[2] A/55/305, para. 29.

[3] Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, A/54/2000, April 2000.

The Report urged more frequent use of such missions. The S-G and the Security Council both welcomed the recommendation and the "Prevention of Armed Conflict" report, issued in June 2001, noted the S-G's intent to use fact-finding missions and other good offices, confidence-building missions and prevention measures to promote conflict resolution.[4] The Council also increased the tempo of its own fact-finding missions to areas of tension, as advocated by the Panel.[5] In August 2001, the Security Council endorsed the use of UN fact-finding and confidence-building missions, and the development of strategies with regional partners.[6]

Fact-finding missions can, however, fall into a gray zone in terms of administration and financing. Such missions, dispatched by the S-G or Security Council, rely primarily on voluntary contributions. The *Trust Fund for Preventive Action*, created in 1997 and managed by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to enable the Secretary-General to take early action (such as fact-finding missions) to defuse potential conflicts and to prevent escalation of existing disputes, is chronically under-funded. Three years after its founding, seven governments had contributed less than $8 million to the Fund; it had $1 million in October 2003.[7] As the S-G reported in *Prevention of Armed Conflict*:

> The United Nations Secretariat has regularly encountered difficulties in securing financial and human resources in a timely fashion to support such missions. While most of the recommendations…will not require any new resources, there is a need for United Nations conflict prevention activities to be placed on a more stable and predictable financial basis…. I therefore intend to engage member states in a dialogue on how conflict prevention could be made a regular component of the United Nations budget.[8]

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[4] S/RES/1327 (2000), para. V; and UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Prevention of Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/55/985–S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, paras. 54-55.

[5] A/55/305, para. 276. Having undertaken one mission in 1999, to East Timor and Indonesia (the first such mission since mid-1995), Council members undertook five missions in 2000 (to Eritrea/Ethiopia, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, East Timor and Indonesia, and Kosovo); three missions in 2001 (to Africa's Great Lakes region, the DR Congo, and Kosovo); three in 2002 (the Great Lakes, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Kosovo and Belgrade); and three missions in 2003 through July (West Africa, Central Africa, and Kosovo/Belgrade). Mission reports are available online at: www.un.org/Docs/sc/missionreports/html.

[6] UN Security Council Resolution 1366, 30 August 2001, paras. 18-20.

[7] Interview, UN official, 23 October 2003.

[8] A/55/985, paras. 158-159.

DPA also backstops "special political missions" authorized by the Security Council or the General Assembly, which include various political offices and peacebuilding missions, panels of experts, special advisors, sanctions monitoring groups, and some envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General (see table 2; some special representatives are engaged only as needed and serve without reimbursement or staff.)[9] These DPA-managed missions and offices are funded primarily through the UN regular budget at about $193 million in the 2002-2003 biennium, plus some additional voluntary contributions from member states. The S-G initially proposed roughly a 10 percent increase in funding for such missions in 2004-2005 but the General Assembly set a ceiling of $170 million. With nearly $7 million to carry over into the new biennium, the S-G's final request was for $163 million in new funding, a 15 percent cut from the earlier biennium budget.[10]

So while the Panel's recommendation to increase the use of fact-finding and good office missions has been embraced, the lack of a sustained source of funding and support for either these increased missions or for management of the Council- or Assembly-mandated special political missions undermines their effectiveness and the UN's longer term capacity to succeed in preventive action.

2.2 THE NEED FOR A UN PEACEBUILDING STRATEGY

The Panel noted a "fundamental deficiency in the way [the UN] has conceived of, funded and implemented peacebuilding strategies and activities." It recommended that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to support peacebuilding.[11]

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[9] For a full list of UN Special and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, see: www.un.org/News/ossg/srsg.

[10] UN General Assembly, *Estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized, 18th report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/57/7/Add/17, 27 November 2002, annex I; and UN General Assembly, *Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005, Part II, Section 3: Political Affairs*, A/58/6 (Sect. 3), 17 March 2003, 28.

[11] ECPS is one of several "cabinet-level" bodies created by reforms introduced by Kofi Annan in 1997. It meets at the level of Under-Secretary-General and is chaired by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Other members include the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the UN Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts.

Table 2: UN Special Political Missions

General Assembly-mandated Missions	
Central American Peace Process United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala Special Envoy to Myanmar	
Security Council-mandated Missions	
United Nations Office in Somalia	Panel of Experts on Liberia
Panel of Experts on Somalia	United Nations Office in Burundi
Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373	Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Dem. Rep. of Congo
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Africa	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
United Nations Office in West Africa	United Nations Political Office in Bougainville
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia
Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus	Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Southern Lebanon
Office of the Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding
Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Africa
Monitoring Group on Afghanistan	

Source: UN GA, *Estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized, 18th report of the ACABQ, A/57/7/Add.17, 27 November 2002, annex I.*

The Secretary-General agreed that a better-integrated peacebuilding strategy was needed and instructed ECPS to formulate one by the end of March 2001. The Security Council welcomed the effort.[12] The S-G's second implementation report in June 2001 noted that the effort was still underway and promised a "more conceptual paper" on peacebuilding before the end of 2001.[13] The ECPS, the UN Development Group and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs produced a "United Nations Plan of Action on Peacebuilding," which was submitted to the S-G in October 2001 and endorsed in November.[14]

[12] S/RES/1327 (2000), para. V.

[13] UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/55/977, 1 June 2001, para. 2. The Department of Political Affairs was the designated focal point for this effort (Ibid., para. 23).

[14] UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/56/732, 21 December 2001, para. 81.

Aimed at providing "general guidelines on ways to work more effectively," this white paper built on earlier efforts that year to conduct field reviews of peacebuilding offices and restated recommendations from earlier reports, including the Brahimi Panel's support for a peacebuilding unit (see section 3.3.2.1). It also identified funding as a problem for UN peacebuilding activities in the current structure. The strategy to accomplish its list of action items, however, was not clear.[15] Follow-up has suffered without a clear internal driver to implement the Plan's action items, further reflecting the basic problem that drew attention to the need for a strategy in the first place.

2.3 THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CREDIBLE, AND ACHIEVABLE MANDATES

In the 1990s, the Security Council sent peacekeepers into countries with active civil wars (for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and to implement peace accords crafted either with insufficient input from experienced peacekeepers or with insufficient knowledge of signatories' motives (for example, Rwanda and Sierra Leone).[16] So, in addressing the question of mandates, the Panel went beyond the usual exhortations for clarity and consistency to recommend specific criteria for UN peace operations: that peace agreements to be implemented by the UN comply at least minimally with international humanitarian law; that UN advisors with peacekeeping experience be available to negotiators who are considering such operations; and that Security Council resolutions promote clear command and control and unity of effort by troop contributors.

The Brahimi Report also urged the Secretariat not to pull its punches when laying out requirements for an operation in a potentially dangerous environment

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[15] White paper, *United Nations Plan of Action on Peacebuilding*, 31 October 2001, para. 3 and annex V. Also refers to work by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the FAFO Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution on financing of Peacebuilding Missions.

[16] Dozens of resolutions gave peacekeepers a long list of jobs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, none of which directly addressed the central problem of ongoing warfare and some of which created false hopes among vulnerable populations. Chief among the latter were the "safe areas" for which the Council failed to authorize adequate protection forces. The 1993 Arusha Accords for Rwanda called for full deployment of a peacekeeping force within six weeks of signature, by which point the operation had not even been authorized by the Council. UN officials objected to the amnesties contained in the 1999 Lomé Accord for Sierra Leone, which pardoned the butchers of the Revolutionary United Front, but the UN was asked to implement it anyway. See William J. Durch and James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, edited by W. J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996): 230-31, 245; Christopher Clapham, "Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research*, v. 35, no. 2 (1998): 193–210; and John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001): 16.

("The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear…."[17]), and to acknowledge the UN's limits in such environments. In planning for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Afghanistan—Lakhdar Brahimi—used the opportunity to do just that. They stressed that Afghanistan in late 2001 was too dangerous and unstable a place for a "blue helmet" operation (that is, a peacekeeping operation run by the UN) and that the UN's role should emphasize the political and economic reconstruction of the country. The Council agreed.[18]

Nearly two years later, the Secretary-General determined that both the need and the capacity existed for a stronger UN response, first in the DR Congo and then in Liberia. Responding to ethnic massacres in northeastern Congo, he urged the Security Council to authorize first an emergency multinational coalition force and then an expanded and more robust mandate for MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in the country. The larger UN force began to deploy in August 2003, replacing French-led Operation Artemis at the end of that month.

In early October 2003, the UN assumed command of peacekeeping in Liberia. A shaky ceasefire and peace accord reached in Accra, Ghana, by Liberia's several political/military factions the previous June soon broke down, necessitating the rapid deployment of West African peacekeepers with UN blessing. This force was given logistical support by the well-established UN operation in neighboring Sierra Leone and temporary air support by an American amphibious ready group offshore. West African troops were mostly re-hatted as blue helmets when the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) got underway.

In both cases, the United Nations responded faster and more effectively to challenging operational environments than would have been the case three years prior, and the Security Council adopted strong mandates matched to the needs of both situations.

The Council also promised, in a sequence of statements, reports, and resolutions over an 18-month period, to greatly increase its consultations with troop contributors in the drafting of mandates and when considering changes in mandate that could pose increased risks to troops.[19] Indeed, relations between troop-contributing countries, the Secretariat, and the Security Council have been

[17] A/55/305, para. 64d.

[18] UN News Center, "Brahimi Lays Out Plan for Afghanistan," 13 November 2001; and UN Security Council Resolution 1378, 14 November 2001. Available online at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.

[19] S/RES/1378 (2001), 11-13, para. Ig.

a central feature of Brahimi implementation. The Security Council formed a working group to address this issue and a series of resolutions and presidential statements have set in motion a process of formal consultations that have given troop contributors greater input to the Council's deliberations and decision making.[20] Troop contributors are, in essence, making the point that they no longer wish to be treated as hired help by the Council. Rather, they desire clear consultation and a role as co-managers, with the Council, of the UN's responses to post-conflict situations—at least insofar as those responses relate to the provision of security and the management of risk.

The Brahimi Report asked the Security Council to leave its mandates for new operations in draft form until the Secretary-General had secured sufficient commitments of troops from member states to carry out those mandates.[21] The Council demurred, with some members concerned that political support for a decision might dissipate while waiting for the S-G to certify troop commitments. Instead, the Council offered "planning mandates" that would allow the Secretariat to canvass states for troops, with full mandate and deployment following receipt of commitments and the evolution of conditions in the field. A mandate sequence of this type already had been used in establishing MONUC.[22]

2.4 REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING IN COMPLEX OPERATIONS

Three principles underpinned traditional UN peacekeeping: Local consent to the UN's presence, impartial implementation of mandates, and resort to force only in self-defense. The first and third principles derive from the UN's original, border-monitoring missions where UN forces possessed a fraction of the strength of the national forces that they monitored and were not involved in implementing a peace settlement. The second principle—needed for mission safety and credibility under conditions of relative vulnerability—was usually operationalized as strictly evenhanded relations with local forces.

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[20] UN Security Council, *Letter from the Chairman of the SC Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations*, S/2001/546, 31 May 2001; S/RES/1353, 13 June 2001; and *Note by the President of the Security Council*, S/2002/56, 14 January 2002.

[21] A/55/305, para. 60.

[22] S/RES/1327 (2000), paras. Ia, Ic, Ig, and Ij; and S/RES/1279 (1999), 30 November, paras. 6-9.

Table 3: UN Peacekeeping Operations, 30 September 2003

Acronym	Location	Date Begun	Chapter VII	Troops	Military Observers or Liaison Officers	Civilian Police	International Civilian Staff * (with Field Service)
UNTSO	Middle East	5/48		---	154	---	112
UNMOGIP	India & Pakistan	1/49		---	45	---	22
UNFICYP	Cyprus	3/64		1,351	---	35	44
UNDOF	Golan Heights	6/74		1,043	---	---	37
UNIFIL	Lebanon	3/78		1,983	---	---	118
MINURSO	Western Sahara	4/91		27	195	16	159
UNIKOM**	Iraq & Kuwait	4/91	✓	1	4	---	38
UNOMIG	Georgia	8/93		1	121	---	101
UNMIK	Kosovo (Serbia)	6/99	✓	---	37	3,657	1005
UNMEE	Ethiopia & Eritrea	7/99		3,855	213	---	238
UNMISET	Timor Leste	10/99	✓	3,359	96	496	438
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	10/99	✓	12,075	256	126	326
MONUC	DR Congo	11/99	✓	8,445	551	102	606
MINUCI	Cote d'Ivoire	5/03		---	32	---	38
Total				*32,140*	*1,704*	*4,432*	*3,282*
Complex Political Missions Managed by DPKO							
UNAMA	Afghanistan	3/02			8	1	337
UNAMI	Iraq	8/03					<150

Sources: UN DPKO website, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ (for UNMIK: www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf); A/57/7/Add.17, 27 November 2002, paras. 29-30; and S/2003/715, 17 July 2003. *Civilian staff numbers as of 31 August 2003. **Mission ended 6 October 2003; Chapter VII authorization from 9/93.

The Panel argued that these principles, while generally valid, required adaptation to the more complex conditions of internal conflicts where the UN is called upon to implement the peace. In such situations, consent may partially decay with time and circumstance or be uncertain from the outset. Impartiality needs to be anchored in evenhanded implementation of the peace and relations with local parties must depend on their compliance with the peace accords they have signed. And military rules of engagement may need to allow for response to the threat as well as the use of force against the operation. The Panel also argued that UN peacekeepers have an implicit duty, under the Charter, to protect civilian victims of violence to the extent they have the ability to do so. [23]

2.4.1 Robust Forces and Rules of Engagement

Effective peacekeeping in complex operations requires competent, well-trained and well-equipped troops in sufficient numbers to maintain a secure environment in which peacebuilding efforts can go forward. It also requires the will to use force if necessary to maintain that environment when challenged. The Brahimi Report was drafted during the May-June 2000 peacekeeper hostage crisis in Sierra Leone, with that crisis very much in mind. Experience in the 1990s had also amply demonstrated that undersized and under-equipped forces with weak or muddled mandates could neither deter rogue political factions nor contain the well-armed gangs that readily arise in the power and legitimacy vacuums that follow the nominal endings of civil wars.[24] In general, the Report argued, if UN forces sent to maintain security in a post-conflict situation cannot effectively contain what it called "the lingering forces of war and violence" then their deployment is a waste of money and effort and an affront to those local people and leaders who do wish to work for peace. Moreover, the sort of equidistant neutrality essential to traditional operations could fatally *undermine* the credibility of complex operations. Instead, operations committed to implementing a peace accord should resist behavior inimical to that accord and should do so consistently, regardless of the perpetrator.

Professional, well-supported troops will constitute an effective force, however, only if their governments agree that national interests and mission objectives coincide sufficiently to offset the risk of casualties, and if all governments contributing troops agree on common strategic objectives for the

[23] A/55/305, paras. 48-50.

[24] Such was the case, for example, in Angola, Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda between 1991 and 1994. Such would likely be the case in Bosnia and Kosovo today without ongoing NATO military presence, although that presence has been drawn down steadily over time.

operation. Only such unity of effort can reduce later second-guessing from capitals should the operation need to take timely, coordinated military action.

In weighing the Panel's recommendations for more robust UN operations, UN member states recalled both NATO's 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia and the Secretary-General's speeches arguing that sovereignty could no longer be considered a shield behind which a country's citizens might be abused or killed with impunity.[25] After publication of the Report, the Secretary-General affirmed the need for robust forces and mandates but sought to reassure member states that:

> The Panel's recommendations regarding the use of force apply only to those operations in which armed United Nations peacekeepers have deployed with the consent of the parties concerned. I therefore do not interpret any portions of the Panel's report as a recommendation to turn the United Nations into a war-fighting machine or to fundamentally change the principles according to which peacekeepers use force. The Panel's recommendations for clear mandates, "robust" rules of engagement, and bigger and better equipped forces must be seen in that light. They are practical measures to achieve deterrence through strength, with the ultimate purpose of diminishing, not increasing, the likelihood for the need to use force, which should always be seen as a measure of last resort.[26]

The Special Committee responded that "UN peacekeepers…once deployed, must be capable of accomplishing the mission's mandate and of defending themselves and, where mandated, other mission components."[27] However, the Committee avoided endorsing the Report's call for "robust" forces and rules of engagement (ROE) and bridled at revising UN peacekeeping "doctrine."[28] The Security Council, on the other hand, urged DPKO to come up with new doctrine as quickly as possible and recognized the "critical importance of a credible deterrent capability" and "the possibility that some parties may seek to undermine peace through violence."[29] As TCCs, then, states appear worried that

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[25] Kofi A. Annan, *The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations Publications, 1999); and "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, 18 September 1999.

[26] A/55/502, para. 7f.

[27] A/C.4/55/6, 4 December 2000, para. 8.

[28] Ibid., para. 45.

[29] UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole questions of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, Report of the Special Political and Decolonisation Committee (Fourth Committee)*, A/55/572, 6 December 2000, paras. 1b and 2a.

they could be asked to undertake robust operations; as decision makers (Council members) they appear worried that no one would answer the call.

The first operational test of these new principles and force requirements awaited the Security Council's July 2003 expansion of MONUC's mandate to "use all necessary means" in the DR Congo's northeastern district of Ituri, where extreme inter-ethnic violence had erupted in the wake of Ugandan Army withdrawal in compliance with peace agreements and international pressure. A temporary EU-sponsored, French-led multinational force maintained order through the summer, as the UN prepared its replacement by a brigade-sized task force composed largely of South Asian units (mechanized battalions from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal; engineering units from Nepal, Indonesia, and Uruguay; and a detachment of attack helicopters from India).[30]

The Report also called for better intelligence capabilities in complex operations[31] but this proposal was not highlighted in the summary list of recommendations and received little explicit attention from member states. It is difficult for many states to argue publicly either against field intelligence (since a lack of it could endanger their troops) or for it (since intelligence is generally a sore point in UN circles). Silence in this case may be interpreted to leave military planners and field commanders flexibility to build the intelligence capacity that they need to accomplish their missions. The bombing of UN offices in Baghdad in September 2003 may have made member states more open to risk assessments and intelligence for field missions.

2.4.2 Implied Authority to Halt Violence against Civilians

The Report singled out violence against civilians in post-conflict settings as something that peacekeepers could ignore only at some peril to their relationship with the local population:

> [P]eacekeepers—troops or police—who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles and, as stated in the report of the Independent Inquiry on Rwanda, with 'the perception and the expectation of protection created by [an operation's] very presence.' [32]

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[30] UN Security Council, S/RES/1493, 28 July 2003; and Interviews, MONUC Sector 6 headquarters, Bunia, DRC, 29-30 July 2003.

[31] A/55/305, para. 51.

[32] A/55/305, para. 62. Two Dutch analysts took the Panel to task for the "presumed to be authorized"

The Panel recognized that the demand for protection could greatly exceed the capacity of an operation to provide it. It had in mind MONUC, where civilian protection is part of the mandate. Security Council Resolution 1291, passed in late February 2000, included the following paragraph:

> 8. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides that MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. . . .[33]

Only this paragraph was linked explicitly at that time to the enforcement chapter of the UN Charter. It allowed discretionary use of force to protect the operation, its facilities, its freedom of movement, and directly threatened Congolese civilians. Forty years ago, another UN operation in the Congo used a similar mandate to act forcefully against secessionist elements in Katanga (Shaba) province and to run protective camps for persons displaced by the fighting. As of mid-August 2003, MONUC troops were protecting roughly 20,000 displaced persons adjacent to their camp at the Bunia, Ituri, airport and a brigade-sized force was deploying to the area, as noted. The forces that MONUC faced in Ituri were informal, splinter-prone rebel groups and tribal forces neither familiar with nor constrained by the international laws of war. Only this brigade-sized force, focused on a select area, allowed MONUC to intervene on behalf of civilians with some confidence in its ability to fend off retaliation against itself and them. Ultimately, however, pacification of Ituri (and of the equally violent Kivu provinces) would depend on a complex arrangement of local political deals, national power-sharing, international pressure on neighboring states, competent government security institutions—including a national army—and a mix of local and international processes to couple peace with justice. Civilian protection will remain a dilemma for any future operation

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language, arguing that, if protecting civilians is not part of an operation's mandate, then the Panel has potentially invited soldiers who witness atrocities to violate lawful national orders not to intervene. But they also note that *force majeure* "in the sense of a collision of duties," where "the necessity of choice is inevitable," may offer a path by which peacekeepers, in specific emergency circumstances, may act outside their mandate, drawing on the ethical imperative to protect civilians that is implied or imposed by international humanitarian law. The distinction they draw is between an implicit, blanket authority to act and an emergency imperative that is justified case by case. Ted Van Baarda and Fred Van Iersel, "The Uneasy Relationship between Conscience and Military Law: The Brahimi Report's Unresolved Dilemma," *International Peacekeeping*, 9:3 (Autumn 2002): 25-50.

[33] UN Security Council Resolution 1291, 24 February 2000.

that faces outbreaks of conflict with too little force to protect itself *and* the rest of the international community *and* the population at large.[34] TCCs, moreover, may insist on rules of engagement that exclude such responsibility.

2.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEBUILDING IN COMPLEX OPERATIONS

The Brahimi Report urged the United Nations to update its doctrine and strategy for peacekeeping, which were rooted in the traditional operations of the Cold War and, as just noted, to develop a better strategy for peacebuilding. These revised strategies for peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to combine in the field to produce more effective complex peace operations.

The Panel recognized the role that UN peacebuilding efforts could play in helping to consolidate peace in post-conflict environments, and recommended specific ways to work in this area with both governmental and non-governmental parties, complementary to development work.[35] The Panel highlighted structural changes needed in offices outside the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, such as DPA (see section 3.3.2), and recommended building some funding for peacebuilding work into the assessed budgets and design of complex peacekeeping operations.

Specifically, the Panel recommended adding budget support into peacekeeping missions for quick impact projects (QIPs) and for initial work in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) to strengthen the UN capacity for peacebuilding in the field. The Panel also stressed that electoral support needed integration into broader democratic institution-building; that support for rule of law required more than a Civilian Police (CivPol) component; and that human rights personnel and objectives should be more effectively integrated into mission implementation and the training of mission staff.[36]

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[34] Civilian protection is considered extensively in the "The Responsibility to Protect," *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, (Ottawa, Ontario: December 2001). The Commission was established by Canada as an independent body to advance debate in this area after a call by S-G Kofi Annan in his Millennium report to the General Assembly to address the issues of sovereignty and international responsibility in humanitarian crises.

[35] A/55/305, para. 36.

[36] A/55/305, paras. 37-43.

2.5.1 Quick Impact Projects

The Panel recommended use of QIPs, funded as a small percentage of a new UN peacekeeping mission's first year budget, to help improve the local quality of life, establish the credibility of a new mission and demonstrate immediate results.[37] Projects were to be established by the head of mission in coordination with the UN country team to assure effectiveness. The S-G, Security Council, and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations all endorsed QIPs, with the Special Committee stressing local consultations in project selection as well as "impartial and transparent" project implementation. In June 2001, the Secretary-General reported that, with legislative approval, he would budget for QIPs wherever operationally useful. By December 2001, missions had begun implementing QIPs.[38] Allocations were included in the peacekeeping budgets of the UN missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (for $700,000) and the Democratic Republic of Congo ($1 million over two years, 2000-2002, with a further $1 million requested for 2003-2004).

QIPs money was intended only for first-year mission budgets as a pump-priming mechanism to attract future voluntary support, recognizing donors' reluctance to fund humanitarian or development work with assessed contributions. QIPs have worked well, especially in UNMEE (see *sidebar 4*). Without follow-on funding, however, the goodwill that such projects build in the first year might dissipate. Therefore, careful thought must be given to how QIP programs can make the transition either to follow-on donors or to other organizations' development programs after a mission plans their initial use. Already this question has been raised: an internal budget request for $300,000 in QIPs funds for year two of UNAMA was denied by the ACABQ in November 2002, with the committee arguing that such funds were intended by the Brahimi Report only for the first year of a mission and were redundant to other development efforts.[39]

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[37] A/55/305, para. 37.

[38] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/502, 20 October 2000, para. 25; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/C.4/55/6, 4 December 2000, para. 6; A/55/977, annex A (Chart on Status of Implementation); and A/56/732, 4-5.

[39] UN, *Estimates in respect of matters of which the Security Council is seized, 18th report of the ACABQ*, A/57/7/Add.17, 27 November 2002, para. 36.

Sidebar 4:

Quick Impact Projects: Success in UNMEE

A year after the Panel's report, implementation of multiple QIPs as part of the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) was underway. With costs ranging from $100 to $15,000 each, potential QIPs were submitted by UN agencies, NGOs, government and local officials for activities ranging from water and sanitation to education, health and social services. Fifteen projects in Ethiopia and 28 in Eritrea were approved and have helped to establish a closer relationship between UNMEE field units, local administrations, and communities.

To supplement the initial budget of $700,000, a *Trust Fund to Support the Peace Process in Ethiopia and Eritrea* was approved in July 2001; both the Security Council and the S-G urged member states to contribute. Funding from Norway supported another 13 projects, and more contributions were received from Denmark and Ireland, for a total addition of $200,000. By December 2002, 32 projects had been completed, 28 were nearing completion and 10 were still being implemented, while 70 new proposals awaited funding. Having completed nearly 81 UNMEE projects by March 2003, the Secretary-General praised QIPS as having "gone a long way toward re-establishing war-torn communities in the border region," with funds from both the assessed contributions and the Trust Fund. He argued, however, that new projects needed additional funding, especially as humanitarian and drought conditions in the area of UNMEE needed great support.

Sources: UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea*, S/2001/843, 5 September 2001, para. 31-33; S/RES/1369 (2001), 14 September, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea;* S/2001/1194, 13 December 2001, page 7; S/2002/245, 8 March 2002, para. 35; S/2002/393, 20 December 2002, para. 22; *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea*, S/2003/257, 6 March 2003, para. 28.

2.5.2 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-combatants

DDR programs are essential elements of post-conflict stability that reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict. UN operations' DDR mandates, however, have typically covered disarmament and initial demobilization activities (e.g., setup of reception centers and identification of combatants), while partners such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) or World Bank address reintegration. Relying on voluntary funding to complete demobilization and begin reintegration runs the risk that such programs will start late and not finish. The Panel's

recommendation was to add demobilization and reintegration start-up funding to the assessed peacekeeping mission budget during a mission's "first phase."[40] Like the recommendation for QIPs, it was intended to create early results that might attract the attention of development and reconstruction donors.

The Secretary-General pledged to seek funds in assessed mission budgets for DDR on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate. The Special Committee supported the concept, if part of a "strategy for the combined use of voluntary and assessed funds" and properly coordinated within the UN system and with potential donors. Coordination with DDR implementation partners is particularly important since assessed funds can only be applied to tasks specifically listed in the peacekeeping mandate, and were envisaged by the Panel to be replaced after a year or so by voluntary funds in any case.

To increase DPKO's capacity to support DDR in peace operations and to coordinate with its partners, the Special Committee endorsed the addition of a DDR-related post in DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU), and the post was authorized in July 2002. The position was filled in mid-2003 and will take the lead in planning and implementing DDR when needed in future peace operations.[41]

In the field, however, the funding picture did not change much until the fall of 2003: mission budget funding for DDR remained voluntary. Thus, when MONUC received a new mandate for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration of foreign-armed groups in the DR Congo in late 2002, its role and funding were still limited to disarmament and initial demobilization. The "three R's" were to be voluntarily funded. This discrepancy can pose security risks, as the Brahimi Report warned and as the sidebar on DDR in Sierra Leone illustrates (*sidebar 5*). As this study went to press, the new UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) received the first ACABQ endorsement of assessed funding for reintegration, in what hopefully marks significant improvement in DDR support.

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[40] A/55/305, para. 42.

[41] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/55/1024, 31 July 2001, para. 129; UN General Assembly, *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/56/885, 22 March 2002, para. 17; UN General Assembly, *Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 for the support account for peacekeeping operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/56/941, 9 May 2002, para. 23; UN General Assembly Resolution 293, A/RES/56/293 (2002), 30 July 2002, para. 4; and Interview, DPKO Official, October 2003.

2.5.3 A Team-based Approach to the Rule of Law

No town, province, or country would think of creating a police force without also establishing the laws they would enforce, the courts to adjudicate crimes, at least one jail, and the judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and jailers needed to run the system. Yet for much of the 1990s, the UN was asked to deploy CivPol in this way, as a kind of freestanding source of public order that could function without these other elements of the "rule of law." Thus, UN police monitors were sent into Bosnia with no writ to reform its corrupt judiciary (or its police, until recent years). Armed UN police were sent into Kosovo to enforce the law without much thought as to *what* law and without international jurists who could render fair judgments in tense inter-ethnic cases. The Brahimi Report spoke to this reluctance to commit to the complete rule of law package in its call for the concerted teaming of police, judicial, legal, and human rights experts in future complex peace operations, which would amount to a "doctrinal shift" in the way in which the rule of law was pursued in such operations.[42]

In his first Brahimi implementation report, the S-G argued that, since heads of state at the Millennium Summit had declared their support for democracy and human rights, "there is no 'doctrinal shift' required, but rather, a need to review how CivPol, human rights experts and related specialists can work more closely together in peace operations."[43]

In the second implementation report (June 2001), there is no reference to any doctrinal shift. Rule of law arises explicitly only in the context of training arrangements with Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).[44] In February 2002, however, the General Assembly approved a small Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit in DPKO to help develop comprehensive rule of law strategies. That spring, the ECPS commissioned an in-house Rule of Law Task Force to survey UN-wide programs and capabilities

[42] A/55/305, para. 40.

[43] A/55/503, para. 27.

[44] A/55/977, para. 247.

in this area. Its report made a number of operational recommendations to improve support for rule of law-related activities in peace operations.[45]

Sidebar 5:

DDR in Sierra Leone: A Qualified Success

Between mid-May 2001 and mid-January 2002, the DDR program administered by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) and supported by United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) voluntarily demobilized 47,000 ex-combatants, nationwide. The program rolled out in stages, focusing on a few districts at a time, which enabled UNAMSIL to shift limited support and security resources from place to place. The phased demobilization required an equally nimble reintegration program but shortages in voluntary funding and administrative problems within the NCDDR caused delays. Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and the European Union committed the equivalent of $13.9 million to the World Bank's Multi-Donor Trust Fund for DDR in Sierra Leone in June 2001, but this was less than half of the funds estimated to be needed for reintegration programs. Two-thirds of the 16,000 ex-combatants demobilized by September 2001 had received some form of reintegration assistance, but little more than a third (about 18,000) had received any assistance by the official end of demobilization in January 2002. Ex-combatants not reached by the reintegration program began to pose security problems, mobilizing for protests, migrating toward the diamond-producing areas (where they challenged the turf of resident "youth groups"), and being recruited from there to fight in Liberia. UNDP, UK/DFID, and UNAMSIL (using its voluntary Human Security Fund) created "stop-gap" quick impact projects in the spring of 2002 to employ ex-combatants (UNAMSIL implemented 33 such projects employing 2,000). The improved security resulting from these programs contributed to the success of national elections held in May 2002. By March 2003, continuing reintegration efforts had reached over 40,000 ex-combatants with some form of assistance and nearly 46,000 by June 2003 (as against 55,000 who had registered for reintegration, including those demobilized prior to the May 2000 hostage crisis, which disrupted earlier DDR efforts).

Sources: "Presentation by the Executive Secretary, NCDDR, To the Donor Mission to Sierra Leone," February 8, 2002. Mark Malan, Phenyo Rakate, Angel McIntyre, *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL Hits the Home Straight, Institute for Security Studies*, Monograph No. 68, January 2002. UN Security Council, *Reports of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone*, S/2001/627, 25 June 2001; S/2001/857, 7 September 2001; S/2002/679, 19 June 2002; S/2002/987, 5 September 2002; S/2002/1417, 24 December 2002; S/2003/321, 17 March 2003; S/2003/663, 23 June 2003. UN Security Council, S/RES/1470 (2003) 28 March.

[45] UN General Assembly, *Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.4/55/L.23*, A/C.5/55/46/Add.*1*, 8 August 2001, para. 5.125; UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/56/478, 16 October 2001, para. 58; UN General Assembly, A/RES/56/241 (2002); and United Nations, *Executive Committee on Peace and Security, Final Report of the ECPS Task Force for Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations*, 15 August 2002.

Implementing those recommendations is the responsibility primarily of the new, two-person Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (CLJAU) in DPKO's Civilian Police Division. The Unit also provides operational and technical support for criminal law and judicial needs in peacekeeping operations that have civilian policing components (see also discussion of rule of law measures in section 4.5).

The Task Force report recommended that the Unit leverage expertise within and outside the UN, creating *ad hoc* working groups to help support mission planning. By late spring 2003, interagency memoranda of understanding (MOUs) were drawn up and the staff ("rule of law focal points") were selected for these working groups; meetings were held later in 2003, helping plan UN operations in Liberia and DR Congo. Member states were approached regarding possible contributions to support this work and the unit began to create a rule of law framework for peace operations. The Task Force recommended that, since the DPKO "Multidimensional Handbook for Peace Operations" was already in train, the rule of law focal points should work with the Handbook designers to ensure that any guidelines they put forward be integrated into the larger work. The Task Force also suggested that the focal points conduct a review, two to three years after publication of the Handbook, to ensure that rule of law guidelines are well-represented in peace operations mission plans. The Handbook was expected to be released in late 2003 and reportedly includes civilian policing and rule of law guidelines.[46] Other Task Force recommendations, such as creation of a DPKO/DPA trust fund to support development of rule of law institutions in the field, have seen less progress.

2.5.4 Human Rights in Peace Operations

OHCHR and DPKO signed a memorandum of understanding in 1999 that allows OHCHR to provide backstopping and training for UN human rights workers in field missions. It was updated in 2002 to regulate recruitment for the human rights components of peace operations and human rights training for mission personnel. The Brahimi Report recommended that OHCHR's capacity to support peace operations be significantly increased and the S-G's first implementation report agreed, arguing that human rights needed to be more effectively integrated into prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding strategies, and proposed $1.7 million in additional funding.[47] OHCHR needed to

[46] Phone interviews with Civilian Police Division, DPKO, May 2003 and October 2003; and *Final Report of the ECPS Task Force*, paras. 12 and 24-26. The Handbook was originally due for release in mid-2003.

[47] A/55/507, para. 25.

be able to contribute to mission planning task forces and mission needs assessments; to coordinate the human rights fieldwork undertaken in peace operations; to organize and conduct human rights training for all personnel in those operations; and to better analyze its own field experience, draw lessons from it, and generate best practices. It needed standard personnel profiles and standby arrangements for rapid deployment to field operations, as well as a standardized data management system for information gathered by human rights workers in peace operations that protected the confidentiality of that information.[48] The ACABQ deferred these requests until 2001, following the comprehensive review.

The SG returned in 2001 with a larger request to strengthen OHCHR, proposing a mix of six regular budget and nine peacekeeping support account posts.[49] Human rights backstopping of peace operations previously had been funded through the regular budget or voluntary contributions rather than from the support account. ACABQ denied all of the support account posts and approved just four regular posts—not for database construction, deriving best practices, contributing to mission planning, or enhancing rapid deployment, but for training. OHCHR needs to be able to train others in human rights law but it also needs to do all these other things if it is to effectively shape, support, and implement the human rights components of peace operations. Without the necessary people, it cannot.

2.5.5 Elections and the Institutions of Democracy

Elections became a focus of strategy for complex peace operations in the early 1990s in part because they are visible, public, symbolic events with a clear start and finish, around which a time-limited and schedule-driven peace operation might be built. Voter education campaigns and orderly balloting judged free and fair by international monitors imply a return to normal life and an end to the politics of the gun. But elections alone are Potemkin democracy, determining who governs, not how they govern, and not even the "who" if key players are unwilling to accept a loss peacefully, as post-election events in Angola and Cambodia attested. As the Brahimi Report observed:

> Elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a

[48] A/55/502, paras. 145, 247-248, and 250-251.

[49] A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, paras. 22.1, 22.15, and 22.25-22.28.

> tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.[50]

Elections can still be an exit strategy for peace operations if the country in question already has the basic institutions in place to support democratic governance and the rule of law, or if its former belligerents are determined to leave war behind and rebuild governing institutions from scratch. Yet it is rarely the case that some continuing international support is not needed once initial peace implementation ends, whether in the form of a UN political mission, UN or other development assistance, or just NGO training for political parties.

More recent peace operations—from East Timor and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq—have become much more milestone-driven and focused on institution-building, laying foundations upon which elections can build, first at the local, then the provincial, and lastly the national level. This is a potentially more costly and certainly more time-consuming strategy than "vote and scoot," but also less prone to catastrophic failure if donors and their implementing partners keep the needed resources flowing and take the damage-limiting actions necessary to give a post-conflict transition a chance of success. These actions include maintaining a security presence sufficient to deter would-be "spoilers" of the peace; containing black markets in "spoils" (portable high-value commodities like diamonds or drugs); enlisting the support of neighboring states in both of these efforts, while reducing their opportunities to undermine the peace process; and effectively disarming and demobilizing the country's fighting factions while finding them productive new roles in society.

Beyond the realm of formal peace operations, UN resources for electoral assistance are oversubscribed. We discuss funding for the UN's Electoral Assistance Division in section 3.3.2.2.

2.6 THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSITIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

When the United Nations was founded, one of its principal organs was the Trusteeship Council, created to manage leftover League of Nations mandates for "non-self-governing territories" managed "in trust" temporarily by UN member states. The right to self-determination was for years applied only to such territories and to former European colonies, within their existing borders. From the UN's founding until the end of the Cold War, only one breakaway state—Bangladesh—was admitted to UN membership. The barriers to the admission of

[50] A/55/305, paras. 42 and 47c.

breakaway states fell with the breakup, first, of Yugoslavia and then of the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the longstanding refusal of trustees like South Africa to relinquish control of places like Namibia made trusteeship look like rebranded colonialism to the UN's majority of recently independent states.[51] As the Cold War thawed, however, many trusteeships, including South Africa's, came to an end with the assistance of UN peacekeepers.

By late 1999, the UN Secretariat had itself become a trustee in all but name, assigned by the Security Council to temporarily govern one would-be breakaway state (Serbia's province of Kosovo) that was a victim of attempted ethnic cleansing by its parent state, and one post-colonial territory (Timor Leste) whose transition to independence had been interrupted by a quarter-century of brutal Indonesian occupation.[52] Although these were prominent operations with unique mandates, the Secretariat and its leadership were reluctant to address the needs of such missions in the Brahimi Report, viewing "transitional administration" as *ultra vires*, that is, beyond the scope of peace operations. This reluctance within the Secretariat to take on a role so close to trusteeship and so redolent, therefore, of colonialism, North-South politics, and "humanitarian intervention" is difficult to overestimate.[53]

As a result, the Report discussed transitional administration not as part of rapid and effective deployment—how to perform key tasks better—but as an element of the section on doctrine, strategy and decision-making, and focused on an issue that UN field people view as crucial but that the UN at large would just as soon avoid, namely, the issue of "applicable law."

As the Report noted, in Kosovo and East Timor "local judicial and legal capacity was found to be non-existent, out of practice or subject to intimidation by armed elements ….the law and legal systems prevailing prior to the conflict were questioned or rejected by key groups considered to be the victims of the conflicts."[54] In other words, there was no agreed legal code and no one to reliably enforce it. Moreover, even if the choice of local legal code was clear, a

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[51] UN General Assembly, *Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples*, Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.

[52] William G. O'Neill, *Kosovo: An Unfininished Peace* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 2002); and Michael G. Smith, *East Timor* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner for the International Peace Academy, 2003).

[53] For an assessment of UN performance in civil administration, see Richard Caplan, "A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-Torn Territories," *Adelphi Paper* no. 341 (London: IISS, 2002).

[54] A/55/305, para. 79.

transitional mission's criminal justice or rule of law team would face the prospect of learning that code and its associated procedures—in translation—well enough to prosecute and adjudicate cases in court. Differences in language, culture, custom and experience mean that the learning process could easily take six months or longer. The United Nations currently has no answer to the question of what such an operation should do while its rule of law team inches up such a learning curve.[55]

The Report noted the potential utility to such UN missions of a temporary criminal code, carried as part of a standard mission "kit," together with personnel pre-trained to enforce it, and compared this approach to the present grab-bag of law enforcement personnel schooled in 40 or 50 different legal standards who serve in missions with large police contingents. The Report recommended that the Secretary-General appoint an expert panel to investigate the feasibility of creating "an interim criminal code" for use by such missions "pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity."[56]

The S-G appointed a working group that declared an interim legal code to be infeasible in practice but also suggested that common rules of criminal *procedure* might be valuable. Work on those rules was delegated to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2001, and one post was sought to support the work but not approved by the Fifth Committee.[57]

The Rule of Law Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) took up the issue, however, drafting an interim legal code and code of procedures that were vetted at a June 2003 workshop in Geneva, hosted by OHCHR, with review sessions including 80 experts from 24 countries, including judges, legal affairs officers, police, prosecutors, and corrections officers. The USIP program plans to work with partner organizations to conduct regional review meetings and expert consultations after further revision and drafting of commentaries.[58]

The Secretary-General's first implementation report further highlighted "work that could be done to better prepare for potential future transitional administration missions," but deferred doing it unless the General Assembly indicated "its interest in pursuing the matter further."[59] The Special Committee

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[55] Ibid., para. 80.

[56] Ibid., para. 83.

[57] A/C.5/55/46/add.1, paras. 22.14-22.16; and A/56/478, para. 70.

[58] Interviews, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, October 2002, May 2003, and September 2003.

[59] A/55/502, para. 35.

further counseled against extracting lessons from these missions unless "the GA has indicated its interest," which it did not.[60] So the Secretariat left the lessons to be gathered by others and is little better prepared, legally or psychologically, to meet the needs of transitional administration in 2003 than it was in 1999.[61]

[60] A/C.4/55/6, para. 14.

[61] The International Peace Academy sponsored a conference on lessons learned in Kosovo and Timor in mid-October 2002, with several former SRSGs and many former mission staff in attendance. One of the continuing needs in such missions, participants stressed, was the need to get a handle on the applicable law issue. See the conference summary, *You the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2003). The stress on applicable law matched responses from both missions to queries sent to them by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in the spring of 2000 on behalf of the Brahimi Panel.

— 3 —

Capacity for Anticipating, Planning and Managing Operations

To be able to do more than react to daily events, United Nations offices in the peace and security field need the ability to scan their environment; absorb, analyze, and share information; anticipate the direction of new work; and collaborate in the planning and execution of tasks that span the expertise of more than one department or agency. There have to be enough well-managed, well-trained people to get the job done when the work surges, and effective use of information and communications technologies. This section examines the implementation of the Brahimi Report's recommendations in these vital areas.

3.1 Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Management

Any organization attempting to function in a global environment must be continuously aware of that environment to function effectively. The United Nations functions globally and its many constituent parts generate reporting streams from their slices of the environment on a daily or weekly basis. Information also floods in from the news media, think tanks, and private voluntary organizations working in areas that the United Nations cares about, including human rights, humanitarian relief, and political, social, and economic development. Many of these organizations operate in areas of recent, ongoing, or potential conflict.

Parts of the UN system collect and post valuable information on the World Wide Web. OCHA's Internet site, Relief Web, provides outstanding service in that regard, as do its online information services for Afghanistan, Iraq, and other regions with humanitarian emergencies.[1] Moreover, parts of the UN system produce very good—even courageous—analyses. Some of these are updated annually, like the UN Development Program's *Human Development Report*, which indexes and rank-orders states' achievements on a wide range of social and economic development measures. Others are one-time efforts, such as Secretary-General's 1998 report on the causes of conflict and promotion of peace in Africa—which laid much responsibility at the feet of the region's

[1] UN OCHA Relief Web, see: www.reliefweb.int; Afghanistan Information Management System, see: www.hic.org.pk; and the Humanitarian Information Center for Iraq, see: www.agoodplacetostart.org.

national leaders—or the 2002 *Arab Development Report*, which addressed politically sensitive issues hindering human development in the Arab world.[2]

Still, the political and security-focused elements of UN headquarters are not structured or equipped to rapidly and routinely meld, exploit, and learn from the social, economic, political, and other data that flow into the system. This is not for want of earlier attempts to do so, however. In the late 1980s, Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar created a small (fewer than six-person) Office for Research and Collection of Information, which had limited resources and rapidly withered. In the mid-1990s, the new Situation Center within DPKO had a small Intelligence and Research unit, staffed by gratis military officers, but it went away when the gratis officers left DPKO. In 1997, a report on reform of the Secretariat by Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding proposed an information unit much like what the Brahimi Panel would later propose, but his concept was not implemented.[3]

3.1.1 The Arc of EISAS

To support UN conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, to correlate and channel information to desk officers, and to extend the planning horizon for peace operations, the Brahimi Panel recommended the creation of a new office—the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). It was also intended to improve the Secretariat's ability to provide well-grounded advice to the Security Council.

The Secretary-General supported this recommendation and detailed the structure and functions of EISAS in his first implementation report, proposing to hire 16 new staff and transfer 37 others to EISAS from elsewhere in the UN system. The staff as proposed would have had three primary functions: strategic planning and analysis; information management; and peacebuilding support.[4]

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[2] United Nations, *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/52/871, 13 April 1998; and *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, E.02.III.B.9, see: www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr. The latter report identified "three areas where Arab institutional structures are hindering performance and crippling human development: governance, women's empowerment, and knowledge."

[3] Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, *Practical Measures to Enhance the United Nations' Effectiveness in the Field of Peace and Security, A Report Submitted to the Secretary-General* (New York: United Nations, 30 June 1997).

[4] A/55/502, paras. 45-48.

The Security Council welcomed this innovation but the Special Committee reacted coolly, arguing to defer implementation and to use "existing resources" instead, resources that the Panel had characterized as wholly inadequate.[5]

The Secretariat tried a second time in 2001, halving the size of the proposed analytical staff. The Special Committee still counseled delay. Moreover, it urged that any existing in-house analytic capacity be used only to support current field missions as tasked by "mission leadership"—restrictions designed to cripple look-ahead planning and analysis.[6]

EISAS drew suspicions, especially among members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Some may have feared that it would function as a selective conduit for national intelligence. Others may have worried that analyses highlighting risks of internal conflict or instability might raise the risk of military intervention or other threats to their sovereignty, even if EISAS based its work only on open-source materials.[7] In any event, member states agreed to support only the element that would support the meetings of the ECPS (one Director-level post, one professional staff member, and one support post), reporting to the Under-Secretary-General of DPA.

Thus, the United Nations still has no single, co-located team dedicated to managing information, tracking multiple crisis and conflict trends, recommending preventive action based on those trends, or anticipating global UN requirements for either peacekeeping or peacebuilding. Without an effort from member states, status quo political interests will easily block formation of so visible an analytic capability. Yet the proliferation of information networks, the evolution of DPKO's Best Practices Unit and its Situation Center as information resource hubs, outreach efforts by DPA (see section 3.3.2.4), and the growing number of headquarters personnel with field experience may permit

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[5] A/55/305, paras. 65-74; A/C.4/55/6, para. 13; and S/RES/1327 (2000), para. 3a. In general, developed states tended to favor EISAS while developing states' reactions were mixed.

[6] UN General Assembly, *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, A/56/863, 11 March 2002, paras. 31, 70, and 121.

[7] There is a long and not very glorious history of some member states using their nationals within the Secretariat during the Cold War to collect intelligence on one another, giving characterizations of the UN as a "glass house" more than architectural meaning, and notwithstanding the effective prohibition on such activities contained in Article 100 of the UN Charter. The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) had access to member state intelligence and allegations of its co-optation for intelligence-gathering purposes may have reinforced concerns in some quarters about how EISAS might function. For discussion, see Susan Wright, "The hijacking of UNSCOM," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, v. 55, no. 4 (July/August 1999). Available online at: www.thebulletin.org/issues/1999/mj99/mj99wright.html.

some of the objectives of EISAS to be met in a virtual form, with widely-dispersed people using a few common data libraries and common reporting and analysis criteria to share operations-relevant data and analyses that are timely and useful to decision makers and implementers alike.

3.1.2 Peacekeeping Best Practices

Upgrading and revitalizing DPKO's ability to learn from its field experience, to retain that knowledge in its institutional memory, and to make use of it to improve doctrine, planning, procedures, and operations, was a low-key but essential recommendation of the Brahimi Report.[8] The activities of DPKO's small "lessons learned" unit had been funded since the mid-1990s largely by outside money (e.g., voluntary state contributions or foundation grants). Its mission reports were largely written long after the fact and there was no mechanism to capture and share best practices within DPKO, or within missions, let alone between headquarters and field, or between missions directly.

The rapid advance of information technology offered an opportunity to change that situation radically, if (a) the proper tools were developed to record, compile, share and, as needed, shield the source(s) of contributions to the system, and (b) management were committed to turning DPKO and its operations into learning organizations. These tasks are not easy for a private company and even harder for an international bureaucracy, because best practices have their counterpart in worst practices, some of which can be laid at the feet of troop contributing countries and the personnel they have contributed to UN operations. It is very difficult for the Secretariat to criticize member states by name (though not impossible).[9] Despite the intense interest of DPKO Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the effort to revolutionize the work of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU) took more than two years and several rotations in staff.

By early 2003, however, the unit was under newly appointed and field-experienced leadership, and is to have nine professional staff, including advisers on DDR and on gender issues in conflict and peace operations.[10] In 2003, the

[8] A/55/305, paras. 229-230.

[9] Good examples of naming names include *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549, 15 November 1999; *Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda*, 15 December 1999; and *Note by the President of the Security Council, Final report of the monitoring mechanism on Angola sanctions*, S/2000/1225, 21 December 2000.

[10] UN General Assembly, *Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, Report of the [ACABQ]*, A/57/776, 4 April 2003, para. 31.

PBPU began to build the kind of knowledge network for peace operations that the Brahimi Report advocated, within the larger UN framework for information and communications technology and applications. Objectives included compilation of lessons learned case studies from missions in Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Timor Leste, and Ethiopia-Eritrea; compilation of best practices in key functional areas (corrections, police, rule of law, military planning, and mission evacuation); completion of a *Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations*; creation of a reference guide for desk officers in the Office of Operations (still the most traditionalist element of DPKO); and training modules for DDR and gender mainstreaming.[11]

The PBPU will assemble these best practices documents, together with other resource materials (for example, standard operating procedures, briefing materials, seminar reports, and country studies), into a searchable electronic database that will serve, along with a library of hardcopy materials, as a Resource Center for headquarters, field missions, member states, other UN agencies, regional organizations, and academic and training institutions worldwide. The database will also contain contact information—searchable by name, region, activities, or keyword—for field missions and DPKO's various "peacekeeping partners," and for research and training organizations with interests in peacekeeping, giving background information on each.[12] When operational, the Resource Center will represent a major step toward the global information connectivity that the Brahimi Report strongly emphasized.

3.1.3 Information Networks

The Brahimi Report urged the UN to address serious gaps in strategies, policies and practices regarding information technology (IT) for peace operations. More effective use of IT, the Panel argued, would be crucial to efficient implementation of many of the Report's other recommendations. Key elements included the creation of IT responsibility centers within DPKO and in the missions; common headquarters and field access to information (such as databases, analyses and lessons learned) through a global Peace Operations

[11] "Gender mainstreaming is a strategy that emphasizes the importance of considering the contributions of both women and men, as well as the differential impact of activities on women and men, in all sectors, including peace support activities." The emphasis derives from "the significant contributions of women to peace processes and the ways in which women and men, and girls and boys are affected differently by armed conflict and its aftermath." UN General Assembly, *Gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping activities, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/731, 13 February 2003.

[12] UN DPKO, "Peacekeeping Best Practices: Knowledge Management Project," 30 April 2003. Briefing provided courtesy of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit.

Extranet; more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology; and co-management of mission websites by headquarters and field missions (co-management has since been implemented).[13]

3.1.3.1 Responsibility Centers for IT Strategy

Although DPKO had developed and fielded cutting edge systems for global communications and did reasonably well at wiring up field missions, DPKO software applications served the IT and logistics support community almost exclusively. The support services had enough people and energy to define and support their own needs but not enough to survey or support the needs of the substantive/policy offices, either at headquarters or in the field. Nor did the substantive offices have much sense of what IT could or should do for them. Thus the Report recommended that a headquarters-based responsibility center—a chief information officer (CIO)—supervise the development and implementation of IT strategy and user standards, and that counterpart positions be established in the head offices of each mission, to oversee implementation of these standards.[14]

DPKO has taken up this recommendation and its new director of change management will also serve as chief information officer for the department, identifying IT needs and setting priorities for meeting them.[15] The Communications and Information Technology Service (CITS) in the Office of Mission Support is the focal point for developing and implementing DPKO's Information Technology Strategic Plan, and for building and maintaining the information and communications networks that link headquarters and field offices.[16] DPKO's IT plan is part of a larger UN effort to devise and implement a global IT strategy, with common equipment standards and protocols that will enable information sharing and collaboration throughout the system.[17]

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[13] A/55/305, paras. 246-263.

[14] A/55/305, paras. 247-251.

[15] A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, paras. 5.3 and 5.7. ACABQ would like to review this post in 2004, on the grounds that management changes ought to be complete by then, while the Special Committee supports a permanent post. A/56/478, paras. 25-28; and A/56/863, para. 62.

[16] A/C.5/55/46/Add. 1, paras. 5.91-5.93; and A/56/478, para. 52.

[17] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General, Information Technology in the Secretariat: a plan of action*, A/55/780, 13 February 2001, para. 59; UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General, Information Technology Strategy*, A/57/620, 20 November 2002; and Interview, Chair of the UN Information and Communications Technology Board, Michael Laing, 17 March 2003.

Results regarding the recommendation to create leadership-level IT responsibility centers in each field mission are muddier. Every operation has had electronics and communications technical staff in its administrative branch but it is unclear whether missions also have the sort of high-level direction that the Report envisioned to guide substantive applications of IT (to DDR program tracking, human rights investigations, police records, census-taking, or voter registration, for example, as opposed to budget and finance, personnel management, logistics, and property management).

3.1.3.2 Enhanced Intranet/Extranet Connectivity

The UN Department of Management's Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) will develop and manage a UN-wide Extranet in consultation with users (including DPKO) and will connect it to the existing UN intranet. Six new posts within ITSD were approved to support connection of peacekeeping missions to this network.[18]

Connecting peacekeeping missions to the UN's Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) has been a priority, and IMIS itself is undergoing major re-engineering that is long overdue. Development of the system began in the late 1980s, under contract to the U.S. accounting firm Price-Waterhouse, to handle personnel, pay, procurement, and financial data for the Secretariat. As a "batch-processing" system, it could not update its records in real time; instead, this was done overnight. Since IMIS servers are situated in New York and Geneva, UN offices worldwide that did have access to IMIS could conduct business with it only during New York or Geneva office hours, depending on which servers they used. Until 2002, peace operations lacked access to IMIS altogether, meaning that DPKO of necessity developed its own personnel and financial applications for use in the field, connected them to headquarters via Lotus Notes, and eventually *re-keyed* the data into IMIS. Other UN offices did the same, keeping books in more efficient software and manually transferring it to IMIS when necessary, making IMIS the software that UN staff loved to hate.[19]

Major changes in IMIS are in train, however, with the current UN information and communications technology strategy. Changes include a new database architecture and a re-engineered user interface with Web-based access,

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[18] A/55/780, paras. 33-34 and 50; A/56/885, paras. 106-07; A/56/941, paras. 37 and 39; and A/RES/56/293, para. 4. An Extranet is a data network to which multiple, widely-dispersed user nodes are connected and that all users can access in common via password or compara.ble security measure. An Extranet may join together several intranets—self-contained, access-controlled local networks.

[19] Interviews, UN offices, New York and Geneva, April-May 2000; and A/57/620, table 1.1.

which, when completed, will leave only the name of the system unaltered. Global, 24-hour, Web-based access to IMIS, as presently planned, would remedy the system's most costly limitations and give UN missions and offices around the world as-needed, when-needed access to the system.

By the end of 2002, IMIS had been made available to five peace operations (Cyprus, Lebanon, Kosovo, Guatemala, and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization) and to the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) at Brindisi, Italy, via virtual private network (VPN), a two-way encrypted data link that allows a remote user to interact with a centrally-located program as though they were a local user.[20] Next steps include 24-hour remote access to IMIS by UN offices worldwide and secure, Web-based access via the extranet. Web access will make things easier for technicians and users alike because there is no need to construct a special communications link, as is the case with VPN. Because the Web sends images together with text, users will require much greater data transmission capacity (or "bandwidth") than with VPN.[21] Extending IMIS Web access to the field may therefore require greater investment in satellite transponders and ground links.[22]

Beyond IMIS, field missions will be able to connect to a wide variety of data and applications via the extranet, and to each other. UN and departmental guidelines and procedures manuals, posted to the extranet, will facilitate delegation of authority to the field in hiring, personnel management, and procurement (the manual of standard operating procedures for personnel, for example, went online in mid-January 2003).[23] The online best practices resource center will give UN personnel access not only to historical lessons learned but also to colleagues doing the same jobs in other missions, for peer advice on common problems in near-real-time.

In late 2001, the General Assembly significantly reduced funding for IT projects in the 2002-2003 UN regular budget, delaying many of the above

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[20] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Post-implementation review of the Integrated Management Information System at United Nations headquarters*, A/56/879, 26 March 2002, paras. 31-34; General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, A/57/1, 28 August 2002, para. 188; and A/57/620, para. 74.

[21] Interview, UN Information and Communications Technology Board, 17 March 2003.

[22] DPKO maintains a satellite antenna farm at Brindisi, Italy, that can link UN headquarters in New York with far-flung peacekeeping missions, via line of sight communications to satellites over the Atlantic, Africa, and the Indian Ocean that in turn have line of sight links to UN field missions in Latin America, Africa, and Central, South, and Southeast Asia.

[23] Interview, DPKO Personnel Management and Support Service, March 2003.

improvements. The 2004-2005 budget request, to be considered by the General Assembly at its 58th session in fall 2003, seeks a substantial increase for information technology support to make up the shortfall. Even with that boost, the UN would be spending, proportionately, only about half as much on IT as a comparable institution such as the World Bank.[24]

3.1.3.3 Better Use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Technology

GIS allows information from a large number of sources to be mixed with geographic data to create maps that are powerful tools for peace operations. Specific field applications of GIS include border monitoring, demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring, refugee return, and reconstruction. Although the Secretariat and UN inter-governmental bodies embraced better use of GIS, they disagreed on specific staffing and restructuring needs.

In the first round of implementation, the S-G proposed that the Cartographic Section—purveyor of maps and producer of GIS products for the UN system—be moved out of the Department of Public Information (DPI) into EISAS. With EISAS unimplemented, the decision was made to move the section into DPKO's Situation Center. The General Assembly approved the move in December 2002.[25]

DPKO has also sought to establish a geographic information system Unit within its Engineering Service that would tailor GIS applications for peace operations; coordinate geographic analysis requirements in DPKO; collect, evaluate and disseminate geographic information on peace operations; and prepare GIS-related elements of policies, guidelines and standard operating procedures. The ACABQ put the request on hold, however, pending the outcome of GIS pilot programs underway in UNMEE, UNAMSIL, and MONUC that were to be completed by the end of 2002.[26]

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[24] UN General Assembly, *Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005, Section 29D, Office of Central Support Services*, A/58/6 (Sect. 29D), 18 March 2003, table 29D.11; and A/57/620, paras. 87-90. The Secretariat spends about five percent of its regular budget on IT. The World Bank spends about 11 percent.

[25] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Secretary-General Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change*, A/57/587, 9 September 2002, para. 64d; UN Press Release, GA/10126, 20 December 2002; and UN General Assembly, A/RES/57/300, 20 December 2002.

[26] A/C.5/55/46/Add. 1, paras. 5.98, 5.99d, and 5.100b; and A/56/478, para. 55. For a summary of the pilot programs, see United Nations, *Financing of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report of the ACABQ*, A/56/887/Add.3, 3 April 2002, annex II.

UNMEE, for example, has a Geographic Cell that supports the mission as well as the local Mine Action Coordination Center. The Coordination Center in turn has used GIS to conduct landmine impact surveys, document de-mining, plan transport routes for food and water supply for returning refugees, and to support UNMEE itself.[27]

This project has given impetus to the concept of mission headquarters-based "Joint GeoCells" that would draw on geographic information resources from UN headquarters in New York and in the field, interacting with the proposed Geographic Information System Unit at DPKO, as well as other providers and users of geographic-based information. As conceived in the UNMEE pilot project, the Joint GeoCell is the field-based focal point for all geographic information needs of the peacekeeping mission, providing data to troops, military observers and CivPol and training peacekeepers to use GIS for their daily duties. Such a cell could also support Humanitarian Information Centers comparable to the center set up in Kosovo in conjunction with UNMIK, as well as other UN agencies and NGOs in a mission area. Future plans include locating a GIS center in a Rapid Deployment Facility such as UNLB.[28]

3.1.3.4 Better IT Planning and Support for CivPol and Human Rights

Recognizing that certain mission components, such as CivPol, criminal justice units and human rights investigators have special needs for secure information technology, the Panel recommended that more attention be paid to meeting those needs.[29] Some headway has been made. The Civilian Police Division now has an information management and roster development officer who will develop the unique IT policies and tools needed by CivPol, and will put together the stand-by arrangements and roster system to enable rapid deployment of CivPol (see section 4.5).[30] However, OHCHR failed to get the

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[27] "ER Mapper Donated to UN Landmine Clearance Program," *GIS Monitor* (June 2002). Available online at: www.gismonitor.com/news/pr/062002_ERM.php and "Policy for Issue of Information from UNMEE MACC" 07/02/2002, Mine Action web site, see: www.mineaction.org/countries and Bob Kudyba, "Ethiopia and Eritrea Mine Action Coordination: UNMEE-MACC," Issue 6.1 National Mine Action Centers, Journal of Mine Action. Available online at: maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.1/focus/kudyba/kudyba.htm.

[28] Francisco Jose Igualada and Mohammad Al-Enizat, "A New Challenge to Exploit Image-derived Information and GIS for Contingency Planning and Disaster Management: UN DPKO Perspective." Presented at the UN Regional Workshop on the Use of Space Technology for Disaster Management for Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1-5 July 2002. Available online at: www.oosa.unvienna.org/SAP/stdm/2002_africa/presentations/session06/speaker04.pdf.

[29] A/55/305, para. 257.

[30] UN General Assembly, *Resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel on United*

personnel that it sought to implement a standardized knowledge management system and extranet access for human rights data gathered in peace operations.[31]

3.2 INTEGRATED MISSION TASK FORCES

UN offices outside DPKO interviewed by Brahimi Panel staff often felt excluded from planning for peace operations, consulted at the margins. Within DPKO, the logisticians, communication and transport planners in the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) complained that desk officers in the Office of Operations—who drafted the mandates for Security Council approval—provided too few details for FALD to build a mission and had only the haziest notion of what was involved in sending people, vehicles, food, water, communications equipment and computers to a mission area and making it all work. The desk officers in turn argued they were too stretched for such excursions into the "weeds." DPKO's capable Military Planning Service knew that complex UN field operations needed heavy civil-military cooperation, but saw little high-end civilian planning capacity to cooperate with. Thus, what DPKO called mission task forces, pre-Brahimi, were generally *ad hoc* groupings that met infrequently, and were used as sounding boards by desk officers, not as joint decision-making teams. Contact points for the field in substantive areas were, moreover, scattered around DPKO, the Secretariat, and the larger UN system.

The Brahimi Report argued that missions needed one place that answered all their questions, an "entity that includes all of the backstopping people and expertise for the mission, drawn from an array of headquarters elements that mirrors the functions of the mission itself. The Panel would call that entity an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF)." Indeed, "the notion of integrated, one-stop support for United Nations peace-and-security field activities should extend across the whole range of peace operations," to include political and peacebuilding missions, "with the size, substantive composition, meeting venue and leadership matching the needs of the operation."[32] The notion was that task force members from different parts of DPKO, DPA, and OCHA, as well as the

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Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/507/Add.1, 27 October 2000, para. 5.125d; UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/55/676, 8 December 2000, para. 73; and UN General Assembly, A/RES/55/238, 8 February 2001, para. 3.

[31] That data would have been linked with the HURICANE (Human Rights Computerized Analysis Environment) information system. A/55/507/Add.1, paras. 22.8-22.23; A/55/676, paras. 78 and 80; A/C.5/55/46/Add. 1, paras. 22.2, 22.10-13, 22.31, and 22.34; and A/56/478, paras. 67-72.

[32] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 202 and 204.

UN's family of humanitarian and development agencies, would be brought together when an operation seemed imminent to begin advance planning. They would work together, be joined by a new mission's senior leadership, make critical decisions on behalf of their departments and agencies, and be the initial central point of contact for a new field mission once it began to deploy. The IMTF would be a one-stop shop for strategic guidance, operational plans, and field queries on all mission-related subjects.

The *concept* proved popular and the S-G's implementation reports endorsed it. The 2001 comprehensive review endorsed it. The Special Committee and Security Council both endorsed it. Implementation has proven to be at least as difficult as anticipated, however, as illustrated by the work of the IMTF for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA; see *sidebar 6*) in late 2001-early 2002. An IMTF for Liberia that was formed in the summer of 2003 attracted a large number of participants (too many: upwards of 50), but again devolved into a briefing and discussion format.

DPKO instead chaired a Liberia Working Group that shared many of the participants and attributes of an IMTF, but not the label. Participants from DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, OCHA, and the office of the SRSG for West Africa participated in daily afternoon meetings of the working group. Although efforts to draft a joint "strategy" for Liberia failed to produce an integrated product, the group fared better in laying out a concept of operations for UNMIL and working out differences between military and police division concepts. Chaired at the Director level with membership from the upper level professional staff, the working group fed into daily meetings of DPKO senior management and decisions taken by the Assistant Secretary-General who runs DPKO's Office of Operations. As such, the working group is an augmented version of the old concept of cooperation, helping DPKO rather than managing UN-wide contributions to mission planning. If used consistently, however, with multi-agency participation, it will at least increase the flow of current information to UN elements outside DPKO who contribute to or work closely in parallel with DPKO, but in the end it works to reinforce the primacy of traditional decision-making channels. It may be that the updated "lead department" concept—the UN equivalent of "lead nation" in coalition military operations—used by the Liberia Working Group is as good as it gets in terms of systemwide UN mission planning. On the other hand, an IMTF for a looming UN peace operation in Sudan, chaired by DPA, had just been set up as this study went to press, suggesting that the Panel's concept has life in it yet.

Sidebar 6:

The Integrated Mission Task Force for Afghanistan

The first IMTF was set up to plan the UN field response in Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban. Because no UN peacekeepers or police were to be involved, DPA chaired the task force. Its core group, which met daily for four months, drew from 13 UN departments and agencies (including DPKO, OCHA, UNICEF, UNDP, the offices of the high commissioners for human rights and for refugees, the World Food Program, the division for the advancement of women [in the office of the UN gender adviser], the UN Office for Project Services [UNOPS], and the office of the special representative for children and armed conflict).

Ultimately, the IMTF played an advisory rather than decision-making role with UNAMA. Working against the latter sort of role were the very newness of the concept; a team with an average UN civil service rank of P4 or P5 (in military terms, a lieutenant colonel or colonel), which tended to exclude it from political decision-making; the lack of IMTF direct contact with a pre-existing country team based in the region; and a New York-based Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan (Special Representative Brahimi himself) that supported him in the run-up to the December conference in Bonn, Germany, without much input from the IMTF. At Bonn, Afghan factions created a roadmap for a peace accord and the rebuilding of government. After Bonn, the IMTF fell to crafting a mission structure and operational plan for UNAMA, which became the basis for the actual mission plan.

Envisaged as a key tool for building an operation and consolidating headquarters support for it, the IMTF lacked logistical support of its own: office space for members seconded from other places (e.g., Geneva), dedicated collective meeting/workspace, or dedicated secretarial or research support.

DPKO has also experienced problems internally with its departmental Integrated Mission Planning Process, which was to promote a common mission planning effort among political desk officers, military and police planners, and logisticians. The same problem that afflicted the Afghanistan and later IMTFs besets this DPKO initiative: how to resolve issues upward in a system that traditionally does so through a single chain of decision makers rather than collective decision-making at successively higher levels.

Finally, working mission leadership into the planning process at an early stage has proven difficult. When it has happened, it has suffered from the same tendency to channel all decisions through the designated leader rather than to delegate authority for solving pieces of the problem. Without such delegation, a

new SRSG cannot lead mission planning *and* stay engaged in the larger peace process *and* engage potential contributors to the operation simultaneously. He or she must be willing to trust one or more of these areas to others most of the time. The more dynamic the SRSG (good for gaining and maintaining an edge on the ground), the more easily frustrated with joint planning and more likely to circumvent the formal process with *ad hoc* fixes drawing on personal networks and relationships. What looks and feels tactically effective to the leader can, however, make the larger tasks of mission set-up that much harder to accomplish.

To be a more authoritative decision-maker or the universal point of contact at headquarters for the field, as the Panel envisaged, IMTFs need more senior representation and access to an appeals process that engages UN decision-makers collectively, at successively higher levels, for authoritative choices and to resolve disagreements that rise up from the working level. Without such backup, any serious point of disagreement within an IMTF could dissolve into a fight over whose higher-ups get to be the stovepipe of last resort.

3.3 REBUILDING THE UN SECRETARIAT

> Brilliant folks can make a dysfunctional system work. Average people can make a well-structured system work. We have to aim to enable average folks to do good jobs under trying circumstances by giving them support structures and procedures that help them do their jobs.[33]

From the late 1940s through the mid-1990s, UN headquarters support for peacekeeping operations was the job of a relative handful of bright and increasingly hardworking people. The job of planning and support became more complex along with the operations themselves. There was never quite enough time in between fighting fires to compile the guidelines, set down the lessons, find the best people, or design the best structures and processes in which to work. Old tasks and priorities (keeping member states' New York missions happy and tending to the wants and needs of the intergovernmental bodies) tended to overshadow new ones (like meeting field missions' needs). For too long as well, field mission personnel were treated like "temps" by the permanent staff. Rarely did headquarters seek their advice on policy matters or consult them on how missions ought to be structured or run. A cable to missions during the research phase of the Brahimi process, which asked them to relate the three best and three worst things about their situations and what they would change to

[33] Interview, UN, New York, 19 April 2000.

Sidebar 7:

Gender and Peace Operations

Gender issues (especially the roles and rights of women) in peace operations were not directly addressed by the Brahimi Report but figured prominently during implementation. DPKO initially sought a three-person gender unit for the department, then several gender-related posts for Best Practices Unit, then a single post. Despite the support of the Security Council and the Special Committee, these proposals all foundered in the ACABQ, citing the lack of "coherent policy in the Secretariat regarding…gender issues." In 2003, DPKO made its case again, buttressed by separate reports on *Women, Peace, and Security*, and on *Gender Mainstreaming.* The ACABQ relented.

Having such a post in DPKO is no mere question of political correctness. Women and children are by far the greatest victims of internal conflicts and far outnumber men in most camps for refugees and displaced persons. In the post-conflict situations where UN operations are most likely to deploy, concepts of women's rights may have just begun to filter into local culture, mores, and laws, and years of war may have set back whatever progress had been made earlier. The (mostly male) troops, police, and international civil servants who deploy into such situations to implement a peace accord can make a bad situation worse unless their behavior comports with the highest standards of propriety. To its credit, while working toward a dedicated post at headquarters, DPKO developed gender awareness training modules for the field and appointed gender advisers or created gender units in five UN peace operations (Kosovo, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, and Bosnia).

Sources: A/55/502, para 142; A/C4/55/6, para 41; A/55/977, paras 62, 148, 265-269; and A/56/732, paras 46-50. Dyan Mazurana and Eugenia Piza Lopez, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations* (London: International Alert, July 2002), pp. 42-45. UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace, and security*, S/2002/1154, 16 October 2002, paras 42, 44; and *Gender Mainstreaming in peacekeeping activities, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/731, 13 February 2003.

make things better, was the first time that headquarters had ever solicited field input in such a concerted and open-ended manner.

Since then, the interaction between field and headquarters has become much more two-way, with field leaders brought in periodically for consultation and training, and with desk officers and field managers swapping duties for three months in order to experience each other's problems first-hand. Now more field-experienced people are serving in headquarters posts, and the restructuring and growth underway for nearly three years have enabled DPKO in particular to strive for the kind of excellence and efficiency that might eventually allow it to effectively plan and support field operations with relatively fewer people: Good

people working in a well-managed environment with increasing help from smart technology.

In this section, we look at how the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been restructured and expanded since the Brahimi Report was released. We then look more briefly at the Department of Political Affairs before addressing the issues of management culture and long-term sustainability of the headquarters capacity that has been built, post-Brahimi.

3.3.1 Building Up the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

One of the greatest challenges is to develop and sustain a sufficiently large, highly professional headquarters staff for peacekeeping operations. In early 1999, with UN peacekeeping operations at one-fourth the level of their mid-nineties peaks, member states argued that the number of support staff in New York should shrink proportionately. DPKO had only partially convinced the ACABQ to fill the voids left by departing gratis officers when the new missions began to arrive in mid-1999 and two of them (Kosovo and East Timor) had a higher ratio of civilians to troops and many more police than UN peace operations of the past. Recruiting and deploying civilians is headquarters labor-intensive, as they are hired, transported, trained, paid, and rotated out one at a time by DPKO. While paramilitary police come as national units, the bulk of UN police components are built a few officers at a time. Staffing and supporting these two missions alone argued for more people in DPKO and, in December 1999, the General Assembly approved 67 new support account posts for DPKO. In the spring and summer of 2000, as the Brahimi Report was being written, most of these posts were still being filled.

The Panel recommended a substantial increase in UN headquarters support for peacekeeping operations, urging the S-G to submit proposals to the General Assembly for both emergency funding and longer-term support. *Table 4* summarizes five years of changes in headquarters staff support for peace operations. Numbers are broken out by department and, within DPKO, by office. DPKO has undergone some degree of reorganization every year since 1997, especially in the areas of lessons learned/best practices, in administrative and logistical support, and in military and civilian police planning and support, as reflected in the changing titles of those offices. (For an organizational diagram, see Appendix E). Overall, DPKO gained 191 posts.

Table 4: UN Secretariat Personnel Changes, 1997-2003

	1997-98				1999-00			2002-03		
	Regular Budget	Support Account	Total Authorized	Added Gratis Personnel	Regular Budget	Support Account	Total Authorized	Regular Budget	Support Account	Total Authorized
Grand total	**55**	**346**	**401**	**138**	**56**	**467**	**523**	**63**	**683**	**746**
Professional, Director, ASG, USG	35	169	204	127	36	268	304	41	419	460
General Service	20	177	197	11	20	199	219	22	264	286
Dept. of Political Affairs					**1**		**1**	**3**		**3**
Professional					1		1	2		2
General Service					0		0	1		1
Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations	**55**	**224**	**279**	**134**	**55**	**347**	**402**	**56**	**537**	**593**
Professional, Director, ASG, USG	35	94	129	123	35	195	230	36	334	370
General Service	20	130	150	11	20	152	172	20	203	223
Ofc of Under-Sect. General	**10**	**23**	**33**	**23**	**7**	**24**	**31**	**7**	**43**	**50**
Professional, Director	7	10	17	8	5	10	15	5	23	28
General Service	3	13	16	5	2	14	16	2	20	22
Ofc of Operations (ASG)	**18**	**30**	**48**	**20**	**18**	**40**	**58**	**19**	**60**	**79**
Professional, Director, ASG	13	19	32	18	13	25	38	14	45	59
General Service	5	11	16	2	5	15	20	5	15	20
Ofc of Mission Support (ASG)[1]	**27**	**171**	**198**	**101**	**26**	**232**	**258**	**26**	**331**	**357**
Professional, Director, ASG	15	65	80	97	15	120	135	15	185	200
General Service	12	106	118	4	11	112	123	11	146	157
Military Division[2]	**1**	**12**	**13**	**27**	**4**	**51**	**55**	**4**	**79**	**83**
Professional, Director	0	7	7	25	2	40	42	2	61	63
General Service	1	5	6	2	2	11	13	2	18	20
Civilian Police Division[3]		**2**	**2**	**5**		**11**	**11**		**24**	**24**
Professional, Director		1	1	5		9	9		20	20
General Service		1	1	0		2	2		4	4
Dept. of Management		**104**	**104**	**4**		**97**	**97**		**132**	**132**
Professional, Director		59	59	4		52	52		66	66
General Service		45	45	0		45	45		66	66
Exec Ofc of the Secretary-General		**3**	**3**			**3**	**3**		**3**	**3**
Professional, Director		2	2			2	2		2	2
General Service		1	1			1	1		1	1
Ofc of Internal Oversight Services		**11**	**11**			**12**	**12**		**16**	**16**
Professional, Director		10	10			11	11		13	13
General Service		1	1			1	1		3	3
Ofc of Legal Affairs		**3**	**3**			**5**	**5**		**5**	**5**
Professional		3	3			5	5		5	5
General Service		0	0			0	0		0	0
UN Security Coordinator		**1**	**1**			**3**	**3**		**3**	**3**
Professional		1	1			3	3		3	3
General Service		0	0			0	0		0	0
Ofc of High Commissioner for Human Rights								**4**	**0**	**4**
Professional								3	0	3
General Service								1	0	1
Dept. of Public Information									**2**	**2**
Professional									2	2
General Service									0	0

[1] Office of Planning & Support (1999); Logistics, Management, & Mine Action (2000); Mission Support (2001+) (ASG)

[2] Planning Division (1997-98); Military and Civilian Police Division (1999-00), Military Division (2001+)

[3] Civilian Police Unit (thru 2000); Civilian Police Division (2001+)

3.3.1.1 The Office of Operations

DPKO's Office of Operations is home to the desk officers who are the department's primary mission managers once an operation has deployed. They field political queries and provide guidance in return. When the Brahimi Report was written, Operations had 19 desk officers to cover 15 operations and virtually all worked without backup. One of the puzzles at the time was why DPKO desk officers could not or did not draw more upon the expertise of counterparts in the Department of Political Affairs. Interviews suggested that DPKO personnel viewed their DPA counterparts as slow to respond or insufficiently versed in up to the minute details on the country of interest. DPA officers found their DPKO counterparts unreceptive to advice, protective of turf, and thus unwilling to share the load.

With 17 new posts now assigned to its regional divisions, effectively doubling the number of desk officers, Operations has been able to create sub-regional teams whose members can, to some extent, back each other up. Plans to move DPKO and DPA regional offices physically closer to one another have run afoul of the Secretariat's office space constraints and, at the top, Operations remains reluctant to participate fully in the program of reform underway within DPKO, especially as it relates to changing the management culture of the department, an issue to which we return shortly.

3.3.1.2 The Office of Mission Support

The Office of Mission Support (OMS) contains the Administrative Support Division and the Logistics Support Division, the dividends from splitting the old Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), as recommended in the Brahimi Report. In March 1998, FALD had 135 professional staff (69 UN and 66 gratis) plus 111 support staff. In July 1999, it had 100 UN professional staff and no gratis, for a net loss of 35 percent over 15 months despite hiring. By mid-2002, FALD's two successor divisions in OMS had 198 professional staff and 155 support staff, 43 percent larger than at the start of the gratis purge and able to better handle their workloads within normal office hours. Within OMS, the Administrative Support Division had new elements to manage online recruiting of personnel, civilian training, and career development, while the Logistics Support Division had an upgraded communications and information technology service, enhanced support for geographic information systems, and had embarked upon building the Strategic Deployment Stocks at Brindisi. The Panel had also recommended more extensive use of the UN Office for Project Services

(UNOPS)[34] to support smaller peacebuilding missions and to relieve demand on the FALD and DPA. While discussions were reported by the S-G, there is little evidence of efforts to implement this idea, which may have been overtaken by other measures, such as FALD and DPKO reorganization and the agreement between DPA and DPKO on management of complex and political missions.[35]

3.3.1.3 The Military and Civilian Police Divisions

Civilian police personnel were, until 2001, in the same division as most of DPKO's military officers, but for clarity table 5 counts them separately in all years. The military staff has grown the most in percentage terms, from seven UN professional staff and 25 gratis officers in 1998, to 42 UN professionals in 2000 (32 of them serving military officers but on the UN payroll), and 63 professionals in 2002. Funded CivPol staff have similarly increased from one professional in 1998, to nine in 2000, to twenty in 2002, now in their own division, together with the two-person Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit. The Brahimi Report recommendation for a rule of law unit in DPKO contemplated more than two persons and the S-G's initial implementation report sought six posts: four professional and two support.

Table 5: Comparisons of DPKO Military and Civilian Police Staffing in 2000 and 2003

	Respective Strengths in mid-2000 (Brahimi Report, Table 4.2)*		Respective Strengths as of 30 September 2003	
	Military personnel	Civilian police	Military personnel	Civilian police
In peacekeeping operations	27,365	8,641	33,852	4,435
Authorized at headquarters	32	9	63	20
Headquarters-to-field ratio	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%

* Authorized military strength as of 15 June 2000 and civilian police as of 1 August 2000.

[34] A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 241. UNOPS is a self-supporting spin-off of the UN Development Program with a business model more like the private sector than the typical international organization that provided considerable support to UNTAET in East Timor.

[35] A/55/977, annex C, 65.

3.3.1.4 A Third Assistant Secretary-General for DPKO

The Report recommended that the General Assembly consider the appointment of a third Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for DPKO. The S-G's first and second implementation reports both proposed this new position to oversee and coordinate the work of the military and civilian police divisions, which otherwise report directly to an Under-Secretary-General who has many responsibilities other than divisional management. The Special Committee reacted coolly, however, "unconvinced of the exact role of new ASG" (although that role was plain enough) and not wanting "to see the role of the Military Advisor or of the Civilian Police Advisor diminished."[36] Troop and police contributors, in other words, wished to maintain direct access to the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO through the directors of these divisions. The S-G subsequently dropped the third ASG from his August 2001 request for posts.

The Panel's proposed designation of a "principal ASG" within DPKO who could "function as deputy to the Under-Secretary-General" was intended as a compromise between those who wanted to appoint a "Deputy Under-Secretary-General" (the United States) or a "Chief of Staff" for the department (the United Kingdom), and others leery of a possible attempt to wrest day-to-day control of DPKO away from its French Under-Secretary-General. Although, within UN headquarters, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has a "Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General," and such positions are common in other UN agencies, funds, and programs, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations had for some months been pressing other member states to support the concept of a Deputy in DPKO. The U.S. officials had an American in mind for the post, and this generated lasting political resistance. In the end, the ASG for Operations, a long-serving, senior, and non-American official was named "principal ASG," but for the first time an American was named ASG for Mission Support, overseeing 60 percent of DPKO's personnel, financial, personnel, logistics, and communications support functions. That job has now transitioned to a second American, establishing a trend and defining it, in the time-honored UN tradition, as an "American post."

3.3.2 Revitalizing the Department of Political Affairs

As part of then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's first attempt at structural reform of the UN Secretariat, DPA was assembled in 1993 from bits of the Secretariat that had been set up years, even decades earlier to cater to niche interests of various blocs of states. Although many of these offices were disestablished in the merger that produced DPA, the political sensitivity of the

[36] A/55/1024, para. 80.

process was highlighted by the initial appointment of two Under-Secretaries-General to run it: one to manage Africa-focused work and the other to deal with the rest of the world. The department's political heritage also shows in the continued allocation of 16 professional posts to the Division of Palestinian Rights, more than are assigned to any of its four regional divisions, which have 50 professionals altogether. DPA also manages the Security Council Affairs Division, which has 50 interpreters, translators, meeting managers, and archivists to support the work of the Council and to maintain its records. In short, DPA operates on several different political and functional levels simultaneously, making it harder to promote the kind of unity of effort that DPKO is trying to achieve in planning and supporting peace operations.

Detailed assessment of DPA is largely absent from the Brahimi Report; lack of time precluded a more thorough analysis and recommendations, and through the entire Brahimi implementation process, 1999–2003, DPA received only two additional posts. Yet DPA's overall workload has grown substantially over that period, supporting, for example, increased numbers of fact-finding missions, UN special representatives and special political missions.[37] The Report did look at aspects of DPA, however, including two specific elements, the pilot Peacebuilding Unit and the Electoral Assistance Division. Subsequent efforts have spelled out more clearly the division of labor between DPA and DPKO, and offered recommendations for revitalizing the department. Even with this effort, DPA could benefit from an outside management review comparable to that given to DPKO in 2001.

3.3.2.1 The Peacebuilding Unit

As conceived in the late 1990s, a Peacebuilding Unit (PBU) in DPA would assist mission planning and support for peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding support offices, special political missions and peacemaking/diplomatic activities. It would also build and maintain a peacebuilding information system and establish contacts for the department with academic institutions and research centers.[38] Initially denied regular budget funding in 1999, DPA elicited donations in 2000 from several member states for a pilot implementation with a director, three professional and three support staff.

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[37] Interview, DPA, August 2003, citing OIOS Consulting Engagement for DPA, June 1999-March 2000. The number of special envoys or representatives increased, for example, from 29 in 1997 to more than 50 in 2002; of these, DPA supported about 22.

[38] A/55/977, paras. 301-302 and 306.

The Brahimi Report recommended that another effort be made to secure regular budget funding if the pilot program worked. The PBU's launch was complicated when the S-G's first Brahimi implementation report proposed incorporating it into EISAS.[39] When EISAS was deferred, DPA worked to re-establish the PBU as a freestanding entity within the department, seeking the requisite ACABQ approval for an extra-budgetary, director-level (D-1) post to head it. In May 2002, the ACABQ said no. DPA continues to assess its options, with interest from some donors, to create an in-house capacity to focus on peacebuilding.

3.3.2.2 The Electoral Affairs Division

The Brahimi Panel recommended more secure funding for DPA's Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). EAD provides technical advice on electoral matters at the request of member states. Most of its operational funding comes from a heavily earmarked trust fund (that is, donors specify how it is to be used).[40] In 2000, owing to limited staff and its largely voluntary, largely inflexible funding, EAD had a substantial number of unmet requests for assistance and demand for its services was growing. The Panel recommended that it be enlarged and that funding be provided from the regular budget "in lieu of" voluntary contributions to provide more reliable support. The Secretary-General agreed with the Panel that EAD needed a "more secure footing" to respond to demands for electoral support, and sought two more regular budget posts for it. The ACABQ approved the posts, together with roughly $204,000 for electoral consultants and travel for use in 2000 and 2001.[41]

EAD received no additional regular budget posts in either the 2002-2003 regular budget or proposals for 2004-2005. It estimates steady demand for its services from member states: 22-23 requests per year, with a carry-over of nine or ten per year that cannot be met. To help reduce that unmet demand, EAD sought a 26 percent increase in travel and consulting support for 2004-2005.[42] Nevertheless, the Panel's recommendation that regular budget support replace voluntary funding has not been implemented.

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[39] A/55/502, para. 47.

[40] Only eight percent of its operational funding was not earmarked. A/55/305, para. 242.

[41] A/55/502, para. 143; A/55/507/Add.1, paras. 3.30-3.35; and A/55/676, para. 26.

[42] A/58/6 (Sect. 3), 16-18.

3.3.2.3 DPA and DPKO

DPA, over the years, has been asked repeatedly by the General Assembly to differentiate itself more clearly from DPKO. For awhile, that became more difficult to do, as the department became more "operational," supporting, managing, and promoting the establishment of special political missions, especially following much larger DPKO-managed operations. At the same time, DPKO guarded its role as principal political adviser to those operations and as principal UN interlocutor with member states who raised questions about them.

In a recent interdepartmental memorandum of understanding, DPA has agreed to be more political and less operational and DPKO has agreed to dial down its political role and to focus on running operations. This arrangement is reflected in the decision, announced in October 2002, that UN peacebuilding operations managed by DPA in Angola and Afghanistan would, henceforth, be managed by DPKO—despite the lack of troops or any significant number of police in either mission.[43] This agreement is largely being implemented and has helped to ensure mutual support, for example, by drawing DPKO representatives into ongoing peace negotiations.

3.3.2.4 Other Structural Issues and Opportunities

DPA is the closest analog within the United Nations to a foreign affairs ministry. However, the UN lacks embassies to generate political reporting from the field, although DPA does have reporting from special political missions. DPA desk officers have too few opportunities for familiarization visits to their countries of responsibility or to serve in the field (although some have prior experience in peace operations). DPA lacks a research department and some states are, in any case, "suspicious of UN staff seeking certain types of information."[44] EISAS would have filled the role of research department but ran afoul of some of the same suspicions. DPA's Policy Planning Unit has, however, begun to build a support network outside the UN system to enhance its capacity and meet some of these research needs.

DPA could still benefit from better internal sharing and central archiving of information, as its institutional memory now tends to rest with individual desk officers. A department-wide policy on utilization of outside information sources

[43] The dividing line between DPA and DPKO responsibility will be the "complexity" of a mission, the definition of which will be decided case by case by the two departments' respective Under-Secretaries-General.

[44] Elizabeth Sellwood, "Informing the United Nations: The practice of analysis in the Department of Political Affairs," 16 December 2002, 12-14, 18. Mimeo. Sellwood's analysis is based upon extensive interviewing within DPA in August and September 2002.

and experts and sharing the results of such contacts would benefit analysts who appear not to be encouraged to establish them yet are expected to function as authorities on their assigned countries.[45]

In an interview-based analysis of DPA, Elizabeth Sellwood has argued that, within its current budget, structure, and mandate, DPA could also improve its day-to-day functioning by giving its analysts responsibility for maintaining the UN's *strategic* perspective on countries with major peace operations underway (which DPKO desk officers caught up in crisis management may not be able to do); by creating a "record of experts within the UN system" that desk officers would know to tap; and by bringing field staff into policy deliberations via email and the creation of a "thinking network." Sellwood also stresses the need to deal with bureaucratic instincts that tend to fear the political ramifications of seeking knowledge more than they value the results of attaining it.[46]

3.3.3 Changing the Management Culture

Toward the end of its report, the Brahimi Panel warned that a serious change in UN culture would be needed to sustain the reforms it had recommended. It observed that:

> The United Nations is far from being a meritocracy today, and unless it takes steps to become one it will not be able to reverse the alarming trend of qualified personnel, the young among them in particular, leaving the Organization. . . . Unless managers at all levels, beginning with the Secretary-General and his senior staff, seriously address this problem on a priority basis, reward excellence and remove incompetent staff, additional resources will be wasted and lasting reform will become impossible.[47]

Early in the implementation process, DPKO's top leadership changed; thereafter, changing the management culture and how the department works and relates to field operations and other parts of the UN system became as important as adding staff and altering the organization chart. During his first two years as Under-Secretary-General, Jean Marie Guéhenno has pressed for these more fundamental changes, first within DPKO and then in the field operations themselves. After several runs at the funding bodies, he has in place a high-ranking director of change management to oversee departmental reform and

[45] Ibid., 21-24.

[46] Ibid., 25-28.

[47] A/55/305, para. 270.

renewal, a revived best practices unit with a good strategy, annual business plans and results-based budgeting that, while a work in progress, still gives his funders, the UN's member states, a better sense of what DPKO intends to accomplish with their money and a way to measure its performance at the end of the year. He himself submits an annual business plan to the Secretary-General and his senior managers submit plans to him, and these are the basis for their respective annual performance evaluations.[48]

Guéhenno has surveyed the staff to find out what they like and don't like about how the department is managed and has taken steps to correct its worst flaws. He has insisted that DPKO grade those evaluations on a bell curve like the rest of the UN, so that DPKO is no longer a kind of international Lake Woebegone where everyone is above average. Full implementation of a new management culture may have to await staff turnover in key places, however.

The requirement for performance reviews was to be applied to the field missions beginning in 2003, together with the People Management Program from OHRM, which tells managers what their role is, provides management training, and also involves anonymous, "360-degree reviews" for managers by four to five peers and four to five subordinates (chosen by the review team, not the reviewee), plus a review by their immediate boss. Results from peers and subordinates are to be consolidated into two ratings and each manager will sit down with a management consultant to discuss the results. Eight missions had completed this review process by early spring 2003.

In fall 2002, staff surveys were conducted in the field at all levels and the results were presented to mission leaders to promote awareness of managerial problems within their operations and to encourage more direct engagement with their staffs. Needed changes were to be implemented in 2003.

3.3.4 Sustaining Capacity

DPKO and the other elements of the UN that support and participate in peace operations face an ongoing problem of "right sizing" their support capacity. The ACABQ has already begun to question whether staffing levels prompted by the Brahimi reforms remain necessary.[49]

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[48] The rest of the Secretariat is also implementing modern management techniques. The UN's inspectorate, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, has concluded that the system is moving in the right direction. See UN General Assembly, *Implementation of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management*, A/57/726, 10 February 2003. The annex succinctly summarizes the implementation status of each element of the human resources reform effort.

[49] A/57/776, para. 24.

It is a fair question.

The Brahimi Report suggested that headquarters peacekeeping support spending be tied to a five-year moving average of peacekeeping mission budgets and be pegged at five percent of total mission budget. A follow-on "comprehensive management review," which had also been sought by the Special Committee, took up this question of the so-called "baseline budget." The comprehensive review recommended that DPKO be routinely staffed at 650 posts, altogether. As of winter 2003, it had 593 regular budget and support account funded posts; 612 if one counts the trust fund-supported positions in the Mine Action Service. The review's reasonable argument was that the department should have enough people to handle common workloads within a 40-hour workweek. Surge capacity could then be had not by emergency hiring but by asking current personnel to work overtime—which they had been doing for some years prior to the current round of staffing increases. If DPKO fully implemented the information technology programs now under development and boosted staff productivity to the point that fewer people could handle the workload, then the department might well get by with fewer: the Brahimi Report did argue for more people based on prevailing staff productivity. The Report, however, also stressed that the time required to hire and train personnel and make them proficient at their jobs makes staff reductions difficult to reverse if peacekeeping demand were to once again increase sharply. At roughly $112 million a year, the Peacekeeping Support Account is still only five percent of the cost of UN peacekeeping. This is very reasonable "overhead," and a long-overdue achievement that is well worth preserving.

The Brahimi Report also recommended that peacekeeping support costs be folded into the regular biennium budget.[50] This has been a sensitive issue, given the "no-growth" politics surrounding the regular budget. There is, however, about $118 million per year in the regular budget that funds the old observer missions UNTSO and UNMOGIP and special political missions. These funds could be shifted into a broadened, annual "peace operations mission budget," together with other peacekeeping operations. This swap would allow the funding for headquarters staff supporting peace operations—now contained in the Peacekeeping Support Account—to be provided through the regular budget without raising the budget ceiling, thus enabling peace operations support, a core function of the Organization, to be funded from its core budget.

[50] A/55/305, paras 193-194.

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Rapid and Effective Deployment

Deploying operations swiftly and effectively is a fundamental challenge for the United Nations. Tardy deployments plagued every major complex UN peace operation started from 1991 to 1999. Long lag times occurred between the Security Council's authorization of a new mission and the subsequent Secretariat action to organize and deploy member states' offers of peacekeeping forces, observers, police, equipment and logistics. These lags had serious consequences, often reducing a mission's political impact and operational effectiveness, cooling local commitments to peace accords, and undermining their delicate political balance.

Rapid deployment alone was not the answer, however; such deployment also needed to be *effective*. As the Panel stressed:

> The speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be effective, the missions' personnel need materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services), information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political "centre of gravity" sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties' second thoughts about taking a peace process forward.[1]

To provide for both rapid and effective deployment, the Brahimi Report proposed rapid deployment benchmarks for new missions and a number of measures needed to meet those benchmarks. These included advance planning and spending authority; rapid selection of quality mission leadership; improved quality and availability of security forces; capable civilian staff able to deploy quickly; effective logistics; and rapidly deployable capacity for public information.

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[1] A/55/305, para. 87.

4.1 DEFINING DEPLOYMENT BENCHMARKS

Prior to the Brahimi Report, there were no standard timelines for the deployment of UN peace operations. No benchmarks assisted negotiators in crafting new peace agreements or helped planners preparing for future operations. Further, there was no formal link between Security Council action and the timing of actual deployments to guide member states' or the public's expectations. Yet experienced mission leaders know that the actions taken in the first six to twelve weeks following signature of a cease-fire or peace accord are critical to an operation's subsequent local credibility.

The Panel recommended that the United Nations define "rapid and effective deployment capacity" as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. It warned that these goals would be difficult to achieve without substantial changes in how the UN and its member states prepared for support of peace operations.[2]

The Secretary-General observed, in the first implementation report, that the 30/90-day timelines were ambitious, but supported them both as an operational goal and as the basis for evaluating UN planning and support capacity. The Security Council and the Special Committee endorsed both applications.[3]

In his second implementation report (June 2001), the Secretary-General stressed the need for specialized military units (communications, engineering, transport, maintenance, and medical) to be available on short notice. He noted that "most national contingents now require the majority of their support from the United Nations directly or through a letter of assist with other member states," including substantial strategic lift and service support. This was true even when forces deployed with a support package, as did units from the largely Europe-based Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which deployed to help establish UNMEE in late 2000.[4]

That report also laid out UN planning assumptions for rapid deployment within the 30/90-day timeframe. For a traditional mission, it posited a requirement to provide for 5,000 troops (50 percent of which were assumed to be self-sustaining); 100 substantive staff; 200 military observers and police; and 200 administrative staff (international civil servants plus local hires). For a complex mission, it posited a requirement to provide for 10,000 troops (25

[2] Ibid., paras. 88-90.

[3] A/55/502, paras. 67-68; S/RES/1327 (2000), para. IVa; and A/C.4/55/6, paras. 15-16.

[4] A/55/977, paras. 112-113.

percent self-sustaining); 300 substantive staff; 1,000 military observers and police; and 1,000 administrative staff. Both plans assumed limited local support infrastructure, emphasizing the need for member state units and personnel to be well supplied and the need for the UN to have a larger standing stock of supplies and equipment.[5]

4.2 ADVANCE PLANNING AND SPENDING AUTHORITY

The Brahimi Report asked the Security Council to leave its mandates for new operations in draft form until the Secretary-General had secured sufficient commitments of troops from member states to carry out those mandates.[6] The Council demurred, with some members concerned that political support for a decision might dissipate while waiting for the S-G to certify troop commitments. Instead, the Council offered "planning mandates" that would allow the Secretariat to canvass states for troops, with full mandate and deployment following receipt of commitments and the evolution of conditions in the field. A mandate sequence of this type was used in establishing MONUC in the DR Congo.[7]

To help meet the 30/90-day deployment goals, the Panel recommended giving the S-G advance authority to draw up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to procure essential goods and services when a new mission appeared likely, *prior* to Security Council action but with ACABQ approval. (The Reserve Fund, originally set up in December 1992, was designed to help make cash available for more rapid deployment of new or expanding missions.[8]) The Secretary-General concurred, seeking such authority for "imminent" situations where rapid deployment would maximize success. The S-G recognized some risk in procuring goods and services in advance of mission authorization, but noted that most such items could be used in other missions if the anticipated operation failed to materialize. For example, "the quick deployment of UNMEE in 2000 was partly attributable to the availability of goods and services initially acquired for MONUC" that were unused due to

[5] Ibid., para. 113.

[6] A/55/305, para. 64b.

[7] S/RES/1327 (2000), paras. Ia, Ic, Ig, and Ij; and S/RES/1279, 30 November 1999.

[8] As of 30 June 2002, the fund level was nearly $200 million, exceeding its authorized level of $150 million, and the excess funds were made available to support the new strategic deployments stocks at Brindisi. *Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, Note by the Secretary-General*, A/57/798, 17 April 2003, para. 2.

delays in MONUC deployment; other MONUC-earmarked equipment was diverted to meet urgent needs in UNAMSIL.[9]

In July 2001, the Special Committee endorsed S-G authority to formally canvass member states regarding their willingness to contribute forces to a potential operation and supported pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-General. In December, the S-G stressed the importance of such authority as a tool for rapid deployment, needed to acquire long-lead items not in stock at UNLB. In March 2002, the Special Committee again emphasized its support.[10] In April, however, the ACABQ turned down the request for *new* spending authority, arguing that the S-G already had the necessary commitment authority under GA resolutions on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. The S-G's discretion to draw upon funds for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses is limited to no more than $8 million per year; additional amounts require ACABQ concurrence. Use of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, as recommended by the Panel, requires the S-G first to seek and receive written concurrence from the Security Council. The ACABQ concluded that a letter from the President of the Security Council to the S-G concurring with his intent to plan and prepare for a possible new mission would suffice to trigger the necessary authority.[11] The General Assembly adopted the ACABQ's recommendations in July 2002.[12] A clear implementing mechanism, however, had yet to be devised.

The need to deploy a small observer mission to Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI) in the spring of 2003 focused attention on the issue, and it came to a head in the planning for Liberia (UNMIL) that summer. MINUCI planners tapped the unforeseen and extraordinary expenses account.[13] However, a June 2003 after action report by DPKO's Best Practices Unit urged review of existing

[9] A/55/977, paras. 112 and 118.

[10] S/RES/1327, para. IL; A/55/1024, para. 70; and A/56/732, paras. 33-34 and 86-87.

[11] UN General Assembly, *The concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation, Report of the ACABQ*, A/56/902, para. 20-25. The S-G can commit up to $8 million in any one year fromthe contingency fund for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, for activities related to maintenance of international peace and security. He can make higher commitments with the concurrence of the ACABQ, not to exceed $10 million without GA approval. For the biennium 2002-03, the total contingency fund was set at 0.75 percent of the regular budget, or just under $19 million, of which about $855,000 was allocated to the International Court of Justice. UN General Assembly, *Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the biennium 2002-2003*, A/RES/56/256, 12 February 2002.

[12] UN General Assembly, *Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, The concept of strategic deployment stocks and their implementation*, A/RES/56/292, 11 July 2002, para. 15.

[13] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire*, S/2003/374, para. 87; and UN DPKO, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, *MINUCI: Use of Pre-Mandate Commitment Authority for Rapid Deployment*, After Action Report, #1/2003, 5 June 2003.

procedures. It recommended using the S-G's report to the Council on a likely new mission to trigger notification of the need for pre-commitment authority to use the Reserve Fund. It also laid out a sequence of steps for seeking allocation of funds, based on the size of the request.[14] DPKO subsequently won ACABQ approval of $47 million in pre-mandate commitment authority for UNMIL.[15]

4.3 IMPROVING MISSION LEADERSHIP

The Brahimi Panel stressed that, in addition to having forces, experts, and equipment on hand or on call, rapid and effective deployment required effective mission leadership. Mission leaders needed to participate early in a mission planning process that was far more integrated and inclusive than DPKO had implemented to date. The Panel therefore recommended measures to improve their recruitment, selection, training, and operational guidance. Mission leaders—including heads of mission, representatives and special representatives of the S-G, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies—often have been selected on an *ad hoc* basis, might not meet one another before reaching the field, and rarely have left headquarters with "mission-specific policy or operational guidance in hand."

The Panel recommended more systematic identification and selection of leaders; early assembly of mission leadership at UN headquarters prior to deployment for planning and coordination; and consistent provision of "strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation." Whenever possible, the Report urged that headquarters and mission leadership, in consultation with the resident UN country team, should formulate such guidance and plans jointly. The Panel acknowledged that leadership choices should reflect the mission's location and the geographic distribution of its principal troop and police contributors, but argued that "managerial talent and experience must be accorded at least equal priority" in such decisions.[16]

4.3.1 Selecting Mission Leaders

In response, the Secretary-General formed a senior appointments group (SAG) with representatives from DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP, OHCHR, the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), and the Office of Gender Special Advisor to establish a profile of leadership qualities, "including area and

[14] Ibid.

[15] Interview, DPKO, September 2003.

[16] A/55/305, paras. 93-98.

management expertise;" update and consolidate a roster of eminent persons available for rapid deployment to peace operations; identify UN personnel ready to take on senior field assignments; and prepare a short list of those to be considered for senior mission positions. Member state delegations were invited to forward names for the roster and the Secretary-General directed the SAG to undertake a "rigorous and systematic review" of possible candidates. Initially DPKO, now OHRM, receives nominations from member states and keeps the roster up to date.[17]

The Special Committee "took note" of the SAG process but encouraged the Secretariat to enable countries to provide alternative candidates if those selected proved unavailable (over 40 nations had put forward names for consideration by 2003). The Committee also wanted candidates interviewed irrespective of the on-call lists and wanted senior field positions to reflect levels of contributions to a mission's forces.[18] The Special Committee thus very much preferred the old, heavily political process of appointing mission leadership and failed to endorse the Report's emphasis on managerial talent and experience as qualifications for mission leadership. Defining the specific qualities needed for leadership positions is a challenging task and selection will in most cases remain a highly sensitive and ultimately political question.

As a further issue in mission leadership, there are still relatively few women in top decision-making positions. The Secretary-General's October 2002 report on women, peace, and security noted that the first female Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed in 1992 and that, ten years later, there was still just one female SRSG.[19]

4.3.2 Early Assembly of Mission Leadership

The Secretary-General endorsed the concept of advance assembly of mission leadership at headquarters, but noted that it was difficult. He proposed a complementary system of on-site training for senior and middle managers as they arrived for a new mission, and recommended that funds for training cells be

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[17] A/55/502, para. 70; A/55/977, para. 95; and A/56/855, part X, table 3. DPKO's Personnel Management and Support Service was tapped initially to manage and update the "eminent persons roster" together with other rosters of civilian personnel vetted and available for rapid mission deployment. See also Dyan Mazurana and Eugenia Piza Lopez, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations: Moving Beyond Rhetoric to Practice* (London: International Alert, July 2002): 47; and Interview, UN official, Spring 2003.

[18] A/55/1024, paras. 14 and 62; and A/56/863, para. 22.

[19] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on women, peace, and security*, S/2002/1154, 16 October 2002, paras. 42 and 44.

built into each mission budget. The S-G also suggested appointing mission leaders to the IMTF for that operation (see section 3.2) until the operation deployed, whereupon mission planning would revert to the field.[20] While the Special Committee embraced the prior assembly of mission leaders, it viewed their leadership of IMTFs as impractical. In the case of the Afghanistan mission (UNAMA), senior mission leadership did participate in meetings and planning before their deployment, including, notably, Lakhdar Brahimi. SRSG Jacques Klein participated in planning for the new UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) but did not use its IMTF as a key planning asset.[21]

The first implementation report noted the lack of standard briefing and training procedures for senior staff and that, while the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was building a program for briefing and debriefing SRSGs, these efforts would be supported only by voluntary contributions.[22] By 2002, although the Training and Evaluation Service within DPKO's Military Division had established "mission training cells" in four operations and proposed to implement a "Mission headquarters Orientation Program" for senior military personnel, civilian leadership training still lagged badly.[23]

By 2003, DPKO had established that all heads of mission, force commanders and deputy SRSGs should come to headquarters prior to deployment for two to three days of standardized briefings with headquarters leadership and the headquarters personnel who would be supporting their mission.[24]

4.3.3 Providing Better Strategic Guidance

The Security Council, the Special Committee, and the External Review Board assembled to advise the spring 2001 comprehensive review all endorsed the need for better headquarters strategic guidance to mission leaders. The S-G's first implementation report chose to interpret this as a need for better "long-term strategizing." The Report, however, had asked that mission leaders be given

[20] A/55/502, para. 74; and A/55/977, para. 94.

[21] As the chair of the Panel, Brahimi's leadership role in the planning for and execution of the UN diplomatic efforts and political mission (UNAMA) in Afghanistan also reflected his belief in pressing for the measures that bore his name.

[22] A/55/502, paras. 72, 75, and 96. UNITAR held its first seminar for current special and personal representatives and envoys in Switzerland 28-30 March 2001 with funding from Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

[23] A/56/885, part X, table 3, 69; and A/55/977, para. 93.

[24] Interview, DPKO, April 2003.

clear initial instructions on how to implement their mandate and a strategy for dealing with potential "spoilers," so as to promote early unity of effort in the field, between the field and headquarters, and amongst the various headquarters and agency elements involved in mission backstopping.[25] The SG noted the potentially "fundamental" role of EISAS in supporting mission leadership but even this more generalized capacity has not been realized.[26] The extent to which strategic guidance has been formulated for ongoing missions, as well as new ones, is also not clear.

4.4 RECRUITING AND DEPLOYING CAPABLE MILITARY FORCES

Only states can provide the military forces (and police) needed in UN peace operations. Their decisions to provide them are based on a calculus of interest and capability. Throughout the 1990s, some states calculated that it was in their interest to mooch capability from other states or the UN, sending:

> Soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations and… some units have no personnel who can speak the mission language.[27]

The Brahimi Report argued that:

> Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms of their memoranda of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations, and must not deploy. To that end, the Secretary-General should be given the resources and support needed to assess potential troop contributors' preparedness prior to deployment, and to confirm that the provisions of the memoranda will be met.[28]

These recommendations affecting troop quality are among the most important in the Brahimi Report: without well-equipped and well-trained troops the UN cannot meet the Report's standards for robust operations and could waste member states' money supporting low-performing troops.

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[25] A/55/502, para. 76; A/C.4/55/6, para. 18; S/RES/1327 (2000), para. IVe; and A/55/977, para. 93, 97, and 294.

[26] A/55/977, paras. 294, 301, 302, and 306.

[27] A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 108.

[28] Ibid., para. 109.

The need for quality assurance is especially serious now that most UN forces come from developing states. Although a number of developing countries send capable, professional forces to UN missions, few can provide enough of the specialized "enabling" units (engineering, communications, logistics, transport, intelligence, or medical) that complex peace operations often need, and "strategic lift" (long-distance transport) is at a premium. Some of the logistical deficit can be made up via private sector contracts: the United States funded Pacific Architects and Engineers to provide logistical support to ECOMOG forces in Liberia in the 1990s, for example. Even if the operational deficit could be reduced in this manner, a political deficit remains: it is hard for the UN to think, plan, and function as a global organization if only some of its member states are willing to carry operational burdens. The trend toward "regionalization" of peacekeeping, reinforced by the present U.S. administration's preference for ad hoc coalitions over almost any permanent alliance or institution, suggests that this imbalance in operational burden sharing in UN operations will not be corrected any time soon.

The Panel recommended a number of improvements in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System managed by DPKO; greater emphasis on the formation of multinational brigade-sized forces by member states; and the development of on-call lists to reduce deployment times for key mission personnel. The Panel also urged DPKO to develop programs to assess the readiness of troops offered to the UN, in advance of their deployment.

4.4.1 Enhancing Stand-by Arrangements

In the mid-1990s, DPKO established the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary roster of capabilities that UN member states might be willing to commit to a future peacekeeping operation, if asked by the Secretary-General. A tool for planning and organizing contributors to a peacekeeping operation, 87 states were participating in UNSAS at the time of the Panel's report. The system had little reliability, however, as a predictor of contributions or as a useful means to plan an operation. Improvement of UNSAS was widely endorsed and the S-G and DPKO urged its reorganization, and a re-assessment of what member states were willing to list. To meet the 30/90-day deployment timeline, the UN needed a more reliable and sophisticated accounting of capabilities in UNSAS.

Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno asked member states to respond by 1 July 2001 regarding the current status of assets they had listed in UNSAS, their contributions to on-call lists, and their ability to provide valuable enabling forces. By late 2001, the response was lackluster—only nine countries had submitted updated information. DPKO persisted, however, and by December

2002 Guéhenno reported they had "turned a significant corner" in the redesign of UNSAS toward the readiness envisioned by the Panel. The new organization entails quarterly updates from member states on the capabilities they have listed in UNSAS, and a fourth level of readiness has been added to indicate resources deployable within 30/90-days of a Council mandate, with appropriate national approval:

- *Level I* (provision of a list of capabilities describing resources that may be made available upon request by the UN);
- *Level II* (provision of a detailed list describing the contribution, including a list of major equipment, a table of organization of the unit(s), the level of self-sufficiency, transportation data, and data on individuals);
- *Level III* (signing an MOU that specifies resources to be provided, response times, and conditions for employment);
- *Rapid Deployment Level (RDL*, established July 2002, with an MOU detailing the forces to be provided, with pre-deployment planning and preparation that converts agreed equipment lists into "load lists," determines the proposed contingents' sustainment capabilities and requirements, and pre-arranges support from the Brindisi Strategic Deployment Stocks as necessary).

For units offered at Levels I-III, the offer of forces is considered provisional until a visit from DPKO verifies suitability. For the Rapid Deployment Level, DPKO may deploy a staff assistance team to verify the equipment pledged as well as the levels of training and self-sustainment of personnel. Where DPKO identifies equipment deficiencies, it may try to arrange for that need to be met by the UN or through bilateral support.

As of 15 July 2003, 77 countries were participating in the system; 25 (including the United States) at Level I, 11 at Level II, and 41 at Level III. States participating at Level III included Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the UK. Only two countries, Jordan and Uruguay, had joined the Rapid Deployment Level, pledging a total of six units.[29] By fall 2003, however, efforts were underway to have nations in SHIRBRIG join the RDL.[30] Yet specialized enabling resources and strategic lift capabilities still lag; as of

[29] UN DPKO, "Annual Update on the UNSAS," para. 9; and "UN Stand-by Arrangements System, Status Report as of 19 February 2003." Available online at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/StatusReport.html.

[30] Interview, UN Official, October 2003.

January 2003, the S-G reported there were no firm pledges.[31] The Panel's goal of rapid deployment, he noted, could not be met, even with the best technical work by the UN Secretariat, without "the members states' political will to deploy well-trained and equipped troops and police in a timely manner." That, he argued, is a "determining factor."[32]

Sidebar 8:

Where Are the Developed States?

Since the mid-1990s, developed states have substantially reduced their contributions of troops to UN operations, particularly in Africa. Most contributions went instead to the NATO-led Implementation Force (1995-96) and Stabilization Force (1997-) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later to the NATO-led force in Kosovo (1999-). Several NATO states have also contributed forces to the UN-mandated (but not UN-run) International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, which became a NATO operation as of 11 August 2003. Several NATO members have also contributed forces to help maintain stability, under U.S. leadership, in post-conflict Iraq (2003-).

Exceptions include contributions to the longstanding UN-led operations in Cyprus and the Middle East, the previously-noted deployment of SHIRBRIG to UNMEE on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, Australia's role as lead troop contributor to both coalition and UN peace operations in Timor Leste, Portugal's contribution of an infantry battalion to that operation, and Japan's contribution of an engineering battalion. None of these are particularly high-risk operations.

The UK and France have sent battalion-sized forces (on the order of 1,000 troops) to serve temporarily in high-risk African contexts, working alongside UN operations in Sierra Leone and DR Congo, respectively. France also sent troops to help maintain a ceasefire in Côte d'Ivoire, and the United States briefly deployed a company of Marines in Liberia, both in parallel with West African peacekeepers. In all these instances, Western troops remained under their own chain of command. Developed states have not sent major military units to serve under UN operational control in complex operations in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1994.

[31] UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General,* A/57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 35.

[32] A/57/711, para. 30.

4.4.2 Building "Brigade-Sized Forces" for UN Operations

The Brahimi Report's remedies encouraged developed and developing states to collaborate in training and equipping peacekeepers, and urged that states volunteer—or collaborate—to create "brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces" able to meet the 30/90-day rapid deployment guidelines, and to associate them with UNSAS.[33] In the newly designed UNSAS system, DPKO evaluates member states' offers and, with their concurrence, will suggest brigade-size groupings using forces in UNSAS that are at least in Level II, have been visited by a team from the DPKO Force Generation Service, have received UN training standards and materials, and have arranged to remedy any equipment deficiencies.[34]

DPKO consulted with UNSAS participants about the proposed "brigade-sized forces," receiving roughly a dozen replies but no offers to form such forces. In January 2003, the SG reported that no new commitments for pre-formed brigade groups had been received, but welcomed offers from SHIRBRIG members to share their experience in establishing brigade level forces[35] and to list their capacity as part of UNSAS. SHIRBRIG members agreed in late 2002 to consider participation in robust UN operations on a case-by-case basis and sent a planning unit to UNMIL; they may also deploy to a peacekeeping mission in Sudan. DPKO's 2003 Military Handbook for UNSAS notes how creating regionally-based coherent units can utilize common procedures, reduce response time, create real rapid deployment capacity and reduce UN costs.[36] In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defense staff adopted a policy framework for the African Union that moved in this direction, recommending the earmarking of a brigade-sized contribution to a regional stand-by arrangement from each of the five African sub-regions, starting with identifying about 500 trained military and civilian observers.[37]

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[33] A/55/305, para. 115.

[34] UN DPKO, Military Division, *UN Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook*, 9 March 2001. Available online at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/Handbook.html (downloaded May 2003).

[35] A/57/711, para. 36.

[36] UN DPKO, Military Division, *UN Stand-by Arrangements System Military Handbook*, 2003 edition, 14 April 2003. Available online at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/rapid/UNSASHandbook2003.pdf (downloaded August 2003).

[37] African Union, "Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Stand-by Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)," Exp/ASF-MSC/2 (I), Addis Ababa, 15-16 May 2003.

The European Union is also creating its own military capacity for peace operations, with a small initial deployment to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The deteriorating security situation in the northeastern DR Congo in May-June 2003 led the EU to take the unprecedented step of committing forces outside of Europe with French-led Operation Artemis, under Chapter VII authorization from the Security Council.[38] That force was replaced in turn by a brigade-sized, three-battalion task force made up of ground troops from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, with protection from Indian attack helicopters, also functioning under Chapter VII.[39] In effect, the UN has created, in this South Asia-based reinforcement for MONUC, the sort of regional multinational brigade that the Brahimi Report advocated, though not exercised in advance.

4.4.3 On-call Rosters for Rapid Deployment

Effective deployment of a complex UN operation requires a rapidly-deployable command and control staff that can be in position to receive and direct deploying troops. In drafting the Brahimi Report, consideration was given to broadening the UN Field Service, which currently provides technical support to field operations, to include 100 military officers on two to three year UN appointments whose job it would be to set up a new mission's military headquarters. But cost and precedent argued instead for a revolving, stand-by roster of 100 military specialists who, ideally, would get to know UN procedures and one another better by first serving together in an operational mission for 90 days before returning home to remain on call. The original concept required member states to place individuals on call.[40]

DPKO developed initial "profiles of expertise" for a Military On-Call List that was larger than the Panel proposed, dividing it into Group I (subject to call-

[38] For discussion of the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force, see Caroline R. Earle, "EU Contributions to Peace Operations," May 2002. Available online at: www.stimson.org/fopo/.

[39] UN Security Council Resolution 1493, 28 July 2003.

[40] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 110-113. The on-call list has a long and difficult pedigree. In 1995, the Special Committee called for creation of a rapidly deployable headquarters team. Two years later, the Secretariat presented plans for a Rapidly Deployable Mission headquarters (RDMHQ) of eight full-time staff, plus 29 other Secretariat staff and 24 member state personnel on stand-by to form the nucleus of a new mission headquarters. Failing to attract voluntary funding for this concept, in 1998 DPKO sought support account funds. (United Nations, *Support Account for Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/52/837, 29 March 1998, paras. 9-10 and 73-76.) The ACABQ approved just two of the positions, directing that the others be found from among staff on hand. Since DPKO was rapidly losing military staff capacity at the time, such "redeployment" was infeasible and it opted instead to use the positions to manage a rapid deployment roster, which had not been implemented by the time the Brahimi Report was released.

up on seven days notice) and Group II (14 days notice). Group I initially contained 33 positions but was pared down by late 2002 to just nine: the mission chief of staff, the chiefs of military personnel, information, operations, and logistics, and four staff officers. Nominees for the Group I positions were to be called to headquarters when an operation seemed likely, to review preliminary concepts of operations, participate in the technical mission survey, and create the detailed mission plan in collaboration with the Military Division's Mission Planning Service. Group **I** personnel (145 positions) would be expected to report to a staging area, such as the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, within two weeks of call-up. For Group II, states were asked to fill positions in the roster, with names desirable but optional.

DPKO's implementation of the on-call list resembles an earlier DPKO "Rapidly Deployable Mission headquarters" (RDMHQ) concept but with better-specified skill sets and a far more ambitious roster concept (in which an already much larger military list would be matched by comparable police/justice and civilian rosters; see sections 4.5 and 4.6, below). Like the RDMHQ, the on-call list supports rapid deployment of one mission at a time. In a pinch, it could support a new mission every three or four months, if other rapid deployment elements were in place. Although the Panel envisioned a more flexible deployment capacity with two or more teams maintained at the equivalent of Group I readiness, the implemented version is more operational in design.

In the spring of 2001, the S-G canvassed member states for support of the on-call list. By the end of 2001 he had 22 replies and just seven more by October 2002.[41] Fewer than ten states nominated individuals. In March 2002, the Special Committee observed that, "Many delegations shared the Secretariat's concern regarding the limited response to the United Nations stand-by arrangements system…. [Yet, t]hey underlined their preference for pledging expertise rather than names to the on-call lists."[42] By the end of 2002, DPKO had received "bids for positions" on the on-call list from 32 member states, covering each of the positions on the list with "at least two nominations." Few states nominated individuals, however, posing "particular challenges, particularly in gaining coherence prior to deployment."[43] If DPKO can just find sufficient names to fill a couple sets of Group I rosters with coherent teams (all it needs is 18 names), it will have both a lean and an efficient design for rapid military operational planning.

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[41] A/56/732, para. 24; and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, "Remarks to the Fourth Committee," UN Press Release, GA/SPD/244, 18 October 2002.

[42] A/56/732, para. 24.

[43] Guéhenno (2003), annex, 5.

4.4.4 Pre-deployment assessments for troop contributors

The S-G's first implementation report endorsed unreservedly the Brahimi Report's recommendation that the UN evaluate troop offers before deployment, and proposed "to send a team from DPKO to each mission every 6 months to ensure that standards are continuing to be met."[44] The Special Committee endorsed it more warily, provided it was "administered impartially, without geographic bias."[45] In essence, the Committee wanted developed and developing countries to receive assessment teams with about equal frequency. The Security Council, meeting at heads of state level, pledged to "take steps to assist the UN to obtain trained and properly equipped peacekeeping personnel."[46]

At the end of 2001, DPKO's Training and Evaluation Service (TES) was still hiring personnel to do the assessments and aimed to undertake pilot assessments that spring. In its year-end report to the Secretary-General, DPKO said that in 2002 it "established training assessment criteria to direct and assist member states with pre-deployment training," but did not set a goal of conducting such assessments in 2003.[47]

On the other hand, DPKO's Force Generation Service, which maintains UNSAS, has undertaken about two dozen voluntary "pre-deployment visits" to troop contributing countries since 2001 as part of the process of negotiating an MOU regarding a country's specific contributions to a peace operation, who will support it in the field (95 percent of MOUs now entail reimbursable self-support—a so-called "wet lease"), and agreement on reimbursement for wear and tear on contingent-owned equipment.[48] UN auditors noted, however, that in 2001 and 2002, only three to four percent of mission MOUs were signed before troop contingents deployed and that the average MOU was signed three months after deployment. Some countries took advantage of that fact to chisel on what they had promised the UN, as determined by subsequent, mandatory in-mission arrival and inspection reports ("What was actually sent?") and operational

[44] A/55/502, para. 91.

[45] A/C.4/55/6, para. 21.

[46] S/RES/1318, para. III.b.3.

[47] A/56/732, para. 65; Col. Annette Leijenaar, Chief, UNDPKO Training and Evaluation Service, "Remarks to the Annual Meeting of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers," UN University, Tokyo, 24 October 2001; and Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Programme Management Plan for the year 2003," Memo to the Secretary-General, 12 March 2003, annex, 4.

[48] UN General Assembly, *Practical aspects of wet-lease, dry-lease and self-sustainment arrangements, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/397, 11 September 2002, paras. 26-29.

readiness reports ("Does it work?"). Pre-deployment inspections are also slated to become mandatory for troop contributors.[49]

Sidebar 9:

HIV/AIDS and Peacekeeping

Security Council Resolution 1308 (17 July 2000) recognized "that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability, which increase the risk of exposure to the disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care." With over 28 million individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa living with HIV/AIDS and estimates that infection rates within uniformed services are two-to-five times higher than in the general population, the General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (June 2001) urged UN member states, by 2003, to "have in place national strategies to address the spread of HIV among national unformed services…and consider ways of using personnel from these services who are educated and trained in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention to assist with HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention activities…."

DPKO promotes HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention among UN peacekeepers, in collaboration with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Former DPKO Assistant Secretary-General Michael Sheehan noted that, "DPKO is committed to working with our partners to support HIV/AIDS awareness among our peacekeeping forces. It is crucial that peacekeepers have the knowledge to protect themselves and the communities they serve." By mid-2003, DPKO had in place an HIV/AIDS Policy Advisor in New York to "coordinate a comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS within peacekeeping operations," in addition to Policy Advisors placed with UN peace operations in Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Timor Leste (with a fifth advisor planned for Liberia).

UNAIDS developed an HIV/AIDS Awareness Card for peacekeepers that contains basic facts on HIV/AIDS, a code of conduct, prevention instructions, and a condom. After field-testing in Sierra Leone, it is now standard issue in all peacekeeping operations, produced in 10 languages that cover 90 percent of all nationalities currently serving in UN operations.

Sources: UNSCR 1308, 17 July 2000; UN Press Release SC/6890, 17 July 2000; UNSC Presidential Statement, Press Release SC/7086, 28 June 2001; UNAIDS Initiative on HIV/AIDS and Security, Third Quarterly Report 2002; UNFPA Press Release, 6 March 2003; UNGA Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 2001, New York.

[49] UN General Assembly, *Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,* A/57/772, 3 April 2003, paras. 69-70.

DPKO has developed a standard sequence of options to remedy equipment and sustainability shortfalls. Pairing of troop contributors with third-country equipment donors, and the Brindisi Strategic Deployment Stocks, are jointly intended to meet emergency equipment needs for urgent operations.[50]

If TES and the Force Generation and Military Personnel Service, which manages UNSAS, can combine pre-deployment visits with operational readiness reports and training evaluations, DPKO will eventually have a powerful tool for assuring quality in the military contributions made to UN peacekeeping. This is a politically sensitive task, but the risk of failing an assessment may deter some countries from offering substandard troops and equipment to DPKO, and the department is likely in any case to work with potential contributors in an iterative fashion to avoid such direct confrontations.

4.4.5 UN "Standard Generic Training Modules"

Potential troop contributors will have a better idea of the capabilities DPKO is looking for now that the department is distributing its initial Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM). In 2002, TES collaborated with national and regional peacekeeping training centers and "delegates of more than 75 member states and regional organizations" at four regional seminars to evaluate the SGTM project. Having absorbed that regional input, the project is making available on CD-ROM a compilation of UN training standards and practices as part of the UN Peacekeeping Training Standardization Project, with 16 "level one" training modules distributed so far. In 2003, TES is developing SGTM to address the training needs of middle level military officers who serve as military observers, staff officers, or unit leaders. Modules for senior military leaders will be developed in 2004 and 2005.[51]

4.5 RECRUITING AND DEPLOYING CAPABLE POLICE AND OTHER CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSONNEL

To facilitate rapid and effective deployment of well-qualified and trained CivPol in peace operations, the Panel urged member states:

- To establish national pools of civilian police officers, ready for deployment on short notice;

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[50] A/57/397, paras. 28-29.

[51] UN DPKO, Military Division, Training and Evaluation Service, "Training and Standardization Project," see: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm_home.htm TES's presence on the web is, as of mid-2003, still quite scant with none of the completed modules uploaded and few of any page's links activated.

- To enter into regional partnerships for civilian police training and promote conformance with training standards promulgated by the United Nations;
- To designate a single point of contact within governments for the provision of civilian police to UN peace operations; and
- To establish national pools, regional training and focal points for judicial, penal and human rights specialists to support the creation of "collegial rule of law teams."

The Panel recommended that the UN, in turn, create on-call lists comparable to those created for the military to support rapid deployment of civilian police and the other elements of these rule of law teams.[52]

Compared to the military side of the house, less significant progress has been made toward rapid deployment of CivPol. While some member states provide skilled civilian police and are committed to improving UN capacity for rule of law teams, too few states have created either national pools of candidates for international operations or, with the possible exception of the European Union, moved toward regional training partnerships. At a time when the CivPol Division is seeking more highly skilled individuals for deployment, many CivPol candidates offered to the UN are still fundamentally unqualified. For the UN deployment to Liberia in fall 2003, a majority of those interviewed for CivPol positions failed to meet basic UN standards, which include skills such as driving an automobile and speaking English (the mission language).[53] Some member states may fail to appreciate the skills needed for CivPol, may not have capacity to provide highly skilled candidates, or many choose not to send them. Other impediments to providing better police may include the lack of a common set of standards and doctrine for training civilian police, or funding for national training programs.

The UN Secretariat had expressed the intention to draft standardized CivPol rules and procedures but has been hampered by a lack of member state feedback. Some regional training programs, such as those of the European Union, are being developed in close coordination with DPKO, however, and the department has helped to arrange some bilateral donor training assistance (e.g., from Norway and Sweden for Jordan). Primary DPKO CivPol training still falls under the purview of TES, raising concerns that CivPol training may not garner

[52] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 118-126.

[53] Interview, UN DPKO, October 2003. English is the most common mission language in UN peace operations.

attention comparable to that devoted to military training or be structured appropriately.[54]

Meanwhile, the Panel's proposal for a single point of contact for CivPol in member governments caused immediate bureaucratic reactions from some permanent missions to the UN, which stressed that they already served as focal points for police requests. The S-G's first implementation report reinterpreted this Panel recommendation as addressing contacts between member states, not member states and the UN; the Special Committee welcomed the clarification and discussion ended.[55] The quality of contact, however, is uneven. A few member states' missions at the United Nations include police advisors, but DPKO also maintains working contacts with key officials in capitals, or liaises with Civilian Police Advisors who sit in Departments of Interior. The Division additionally works with military officers in Departments of Foreign Affairs or Defense whose portfolios include responsibility for police as well as military matters.[56] This inconsistent national attention to civilian policing roughly matches the inconsistent quality of CivPol contributed to UN operations and suggests there is still a long way to go before the United Nations can expect consistent and timely contributions of well-trained and well-qualified police for its operations.

By late 2001, the Civilian Police Division developed a model CivPol headquarters as well as generic job descriptions for 100 posts for initial field deployments.[57] In February 2002, Finland hosted a CivPol Experts Conference where DPKO, 47 member states, and two regional organizations discussed rapid deployment and the development of rosters to support it. In August 2002, the Division distributed to member states a draft proposal for the CivPol On-Call roster. Two months later, however, DPKO had received no offers of expertise for the roster.[58] Since then, many candidates have been offered, but the numbers of qualified candidates are not sufficient to quickly field CivPol without further, individual consultations with member states who require re-vetting their own nominees to the on-call rosters. Such a lengthy review process can delay rapid deployment.[59]

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[54] Interviews, UN DPKO, March, May, and October 2003.

[55] A/55/502, para. 100; and A/C.4/55/6, para. 23.

[56] Interviews, UN DPKO, March and May 2003.

[57] A/56/732, para. 28.

[58] A/56/863, para. 81; UN DPKO, "Annual Update on the UNSAS (2002)"; and UN Press Release, GA/SPD/244, USG/DPKO, "Remarks to the Fourth Committee," 18 October 2002.

[59] Interviews, UN DPKO, May and October 2003.

The lack of progress is mirrored on the Police Division's web page. While useful web data is available from other DPKO offices, the CivPol pages merely describe what the division is supposed to do, with less evidence of policy or product development or history of recent activities. This is disturbing and perhaps reflective of the difficulty that the Civilian Police Division has had in gaining and maintaining effective leadership since its creation as a separate entity in 2001. Although DPKO received over 10,000 applications for the 91 new posts approved by the General Assembly in January 2002, the position of Civilian Police Advisor (and division director) had to be re-advertised in the fall, presumably due to a lack of suitable initial candidates. A new advisor was finally announced in January 2003.[60]

The division has since been able to move forward with planning and staffing, with 18 of 20 professional posts filled as of May 2003. The new Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (referred to in section 2.5.3) became operational with a Judicial Officer and a Corrections Officer to formulate and implement rule of law strategies in peace operations. The Unit conducted a fact-finding mission to Kosovo in April 2003, the basis for working with the DPKO's Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit to produce a lessons learned report on the rule of law and peace operations. After further consultations within the UN and with member states, the aim is to create an operations-focused framework for rule of law, training guidelines, and on-call lists.[61] Unit staff also traveled to the DR Congo and Liberia to help with mission planning later in 2003.

With only two officers, however, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit is clearly understaffed to both handle the development of *specific* mission plans (the UN mandate in Liberia alone requires development of police, police training, a national legal framework, and judicial and correctional institutions) and the development of a *broader* UN capacity to manage, recruit, coordinate, and integrate rule of law components for all UN operations.[62] DPKO has a three-year-old MOU with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the selection of human rights officers for peace operations that anticipated the creation of a stand-by roster of human rights specialists for such operations but there, too, OHCHR lacks the staff to develop this capacity.[63]

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[60] UN News Center, "Kiran Bedi Appointed Civilian Police Adviser in Department of Peacekeeping Operations," UN Press Release, SG/A/827, PKO/100, 10 January 2003.

[61] Interviews, DPKO, March, May, and October 2003.

[62] UN Security Council Resolution 1509, 19 September 2003.

[63] Interview, UN DPKO, March 2003.

New efforts, however, may help push the development of rapidly deployable rule of law teams. In September 2003, Great Britain chaired Security Council sessions on the need for rule of law components, welcoming remarks by member states and the S-G that urged a "comprehensive approach" to "quickly deployable personnel," including police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers. The Council welcomed development of an S-G report on how to build such a capacity; a report is expected early in 2004, building on the Rule of Law Task Force findings.

4.6 RECRUITING AND DEPLOYING CAPABLE CIVILIAN FIELD STAFF

Historically, DPKO has had a difficult time recruiting and deploying well-qualified civilians with special skills to field missions in a timely manner, partly because of the lack of a stand-by system for civilian staff and partly because recruitment was channeled through a few headquarters recruiting officers. Lacking a standard recruitment system or stand-by roster, DPKO has been overwhelmed repeatedly by job applications in recent years: first for field positions in 1999-2000 and then during its own period of 50 percent growth (2001-2002), when as many as 500 persons applied for every new job in the department. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the ACABQ criticized DPKO for long average lead times in filling advertised posts in 2001 (362 days for regular vacancies within DPKO and 264 days for the "emergency" posts authorized in round one of Brahimi implementation).[64]

The process of growing the department mirrored the ills highlighted by the Brahimi Report, since it was still the old, overstretched organization that had to handle the thousands of applications for "Brahimi" posts in the first round of recruiting. In 2002 it did somewhat better, cutting the average hiring lag to 180 days, filling twice as many positions at headquarters and in the field (about 600) as the rest of the Secretariat combined, and reassigning three times as many people (about 400) as the rest of the Secretariat. DPKO's goal in 2003 was to reduce the average hiring lag time to 95 days, emphasizing automated rosters accessible by field missions as well as headquarters.[65]

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[64] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of the policies and procedures for recruiting staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Note by the Secretary-General,* A/57/224, 19 July 2002, paras. 1-5.

[65] Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003; and UN General Assembly, *Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/723, 6 February 2003, para. 21.

Delegating some hiring authority to the field in 2002 improved both the speed and competitiveness of the process, but general delegation of hiring authority required field access to the latest policies and procedures. On 15 January 2003, the DPKO human resources handbook went online and all operations now have instant access to the same rulebook. DPKO can now begin to delegate more hiring and management authority to the field and may as a result be able to reduce the number of "processing people" at headquarters.[66]

4.6.1 The Galaxy Project

The Brahimi Report recommended that the Secretariat establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-qualified civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice; and that field missions should have access to the roster and the authority to recruit from it in accordance with Secretariat guidelines.[67] DPKO has taken major steps toward implementing this recommendation in partnership with the UN Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), which is modifying OHRM's "Galaxy Project" for online job announcements and applications to meet peace operations requirements.[68]

The Galaxy Project aspires to be a Web-based system for Secretariat-wide recruitment, appointment, post management and roster management. Eventually it will give program managers tools for evaluating candidates in accordance with pre-approved evaluation criteria, although the December 2002 release permitted sorting only by gender and national origin.[69]

The Special Committee and ACABQ like Galaxy and hope that it will help reduce hiring lag times, Secretariat-wide.[70] The prototype system was released at the end of 2001, with the first operational release in May 2002. Vacancy

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[66] Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003.

[67] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 128-132.

[68] United Nations General Assembly, *Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of policies and procedures of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for recruiting international civilian staff for field missions*, A/56/202, 20 July 2001, paras. 13-14 and 53-55; and A/56/732, para. 35.

[69] A/57/224, para. 32; and UN General Assembly, *First report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/56/73, 3 August 2001, para. 98a.

[70] A/56/863, para. 91; UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/56/478, 16 October 2001, para. 45; and UN General Assembly Resolution 241, A/RES/56/241 (2002), 1 February 2002, para. 14.

announcements for DPKO have been posted since December 2002 on two Galaxy-linked websites: one for UN job profiles in 16 occupational groups at all professional levels, and the other for all current field mission vacancies. Positions are posted for two weeks each. In its first three months of use, posted DPKO jobs attracted 63,000 applications.[71]

Electronic job applications have replaced dozens of boxes of resumes that used to litter the floor of the DPKO Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS). Until Galaxy permits more sophisticated sorting of applications, however, PMSS staff still must review each application received in some detail but can triage and bundle applications electronically for forwarding to managers. UN staff pointed to CANADEM, which the Canadian government uses to maintain a roster of potential candidates for field employment, as a model online recruiting system that allows five or six staff members to maintain a roster of 10,000 names, which indicates the kind of staff productivity that appropriately designed information technology can generate.[72]

4.6.2 Civilian Rapid Deployment Teams

Galaxy's own roster module is under development. When complete, it will support DPKO's civilian Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) concept, which is based on the "range of jobs required to undertake a technical survey and initiate and support a field operation for the first 90 days."[73] There are to be three RDTs of about 120 persons each, drawn from volunteers in DPKO and field missions who have been pre-cleared by their supervisors for quick, temporary release from their full-time post (thereby removing a traditional obstacle to rapid staff deployment, especially of high-performing staff members). Each volunteer will remain on the roster and subject to call-up for 12 months. Each technical area of the department reviews candidates and assesses who should participate in which team. The first command post exercise to test the RDT concept was held in

[71] Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003. Overall, in Galaxy's first nine months of operation (May 2002-January 2003) 608 posted job vacancies attracted 155,000 applications from 198 countries, more than double the number of applications received by the UN in 2000 and 2001 combined. UN General Assembly, *Implications of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management, Note by the Secretary-General*, A/57/726, 10 February 2003, para. 20.

[72] CANADEM allows applicants to indicate type, level, and locale of job experience, offering 30 experience categories each with several subcategories to choose from, including indications of field experience, plus language skills, level of education, and availability (how soon, and how long), see: www.canadem.ca.

[73] UN General Assembly, *Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 46.

January 2003, using staff from the logistics, personnel, and finance services. Starting in February, staff could apply for the RDT online.[74]

4.6.3 Civilian Training and Support Programs

For many years, finding expertise for peace operations was a matter of hope more than planning or programming: The UN hoped that states would send them well-trained trained troops and, later, police. When it needed a chief administrative officer to keep the books in a new operation, it hoped it could find an experienced staff member to take the job. As missions became more complex, it recruited a wider variety of job specialties from outside the system, but training to fit them into the system and acculturate them to its rules and procedures, or to the dangers and objectives of the mission, was not as high a priority as getting the mission assembled. Staff recruited for field operations were given little orientation ("induction") training and may not have been told the precise job they were to fill before reaching the field, while field managers may or may not have been told they were coming or what jobs they were to fill. In general, the urgent need to *do* the mission stole time from *teaching* the mission: imparting critical information about the operating environment to international hires, and essential information about UN policies and procedures to international and local hires alike.

Although the Brahimi Report placed great stress on alleviating the roadblocks to recruiting and deploying capable civilian staff to peace operations, the issue of training for civilians seemed to fall between the cracks. The issue was picked up, however, by the consultants who undertook the 2001 comprehensive review. They were "dismayed" at the poor treatment of field staff in particular, whether in terms of salaries, training, life support, or evacuation and security plans.[75] Between 1996 and 1999, the annual training budget in the peacekeeping support account was about $400,000, all of which was directed toward seminars and courses for member states' military and civilian police trainers. None was directed internally. Money for training within field operations, meanwhile, amounted to just $1.4 million as late as 2000-2001,

[74] The Human Resources Management and Development Section of PMSS manages Galaxy and the RDTs for DPKO, and creates medium- and long-term staffing plans. The Information Management Unit coordinates information technology requirements and defines enhancements to the peace operations elements of Galaxy and other electronic systems for managing people, sharing information, and monitoring delegation of authority to the field. A/C.5/55/46, 9 August 2001, paras. 19b-c; and A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, paras. 5.50-5.51, 5.54, and 5.56.

[75] A/55/977, paras. 146-149.

or about *six hundredths of one percent* of the $2.4 billion those operations cost that year.[76]

This situation has changed a great deal in three years. DPKO's military training support for member states increased to $1.75 million in 2003-2004. Training programs for civilian staff in missions grew to $3.8 million, or three times per capita what it was in 2000. Nearly one quarter of that effort will support training in management skills, which has previously lagged badly behind technical training. Staff training money now also appears within the peacekeeping support account: $1.2 million in 2002 and $2.3 million in 2003, so about 2.5 percent of the support account's civilian staff costs now relate to training.[77] Responsible for planning and managing these expenditures is the new Civilian Training Section in PMSS, set up after the second round of Brahimi implementation. This section will, for the first time, institutionalize civilian training within DPKO and coordinate peacekeeping-related training for civilians at headquarters and in the field.

Taking a step beyond job training, DPKO is for the first time instituting a career development program, run by the new Human Resources Management and Development Section in PMSS, and is taking steps to retain a growing pool of mostly young, field-experienced civilian personnel. Staff exchange programs will also bring field staff to headquarters for 90-day assignments and send headquarters staff into the field to experience firsthand the operations for which they are providing support or drafting guidance.[78] Such exchanges will help to bridge perceptual and cultural divides between headquarters and the field, changing a sometimes "us-them" relationship into something more like teamwork, with greater appreciation in both directions of the needs and constraints imposed by their respective operating environments.

DPKO is simultaneously making a greater effort to retain and reassign staff whose missions are downsized or closed. Currently it is emphasizing the finance and budget, procurement, and human resources occupational groups. Comparable efforts presumably are made to retain and reassign information and communications technology specialists who are responsible for creating and maintaining the electronic links that support everything from decentralized management to video teleconferencing.[79] These are the mission-critical support

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[76] UN General Assembly, *Financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Report of the ACABQ*, A/55/874, 6 April 2001, annexes II and IV.

[77] A/57/723, tables 12 and 13.

[78] A/57/723, para. 26.

[79] A/57/723, para. 22.

specialties that DPKO's Office of Mission Support needs to make the wheels of an operation turn.

Seemingly less emphasized, however, are recruitment, training, and retention of mission-oriented staff. These are the people whom the finance, budget, personnel, and ICT people exist to support, whose primary job it is to implement the substance of the mandate. DPKO's support elements must be ready, willing, and able to perform their duties but getting there is only half the fun. Good mission support enables mission success but cannot create it.

This emphasis on support elements may reflect in part the respective cultures of DPKO's Office of Mission Support—can-do, nuts and bolts, operator-oriented—and its Office of Operations—analytical, conceptual, conservative, and oriented toward meeting the needs of UN higher-ups, the demands of the Security Council, and the queries of member states' diplomatic missions. The Office of Operations includes all of the country desk officers who are the nominal first points of contact for operations that have political queries for headquarters. It also includes the Situation Center, the 24/7 switchboard for emergency messages from the field that also hosts DPKO's video teleconferencing facility. Historically, Operations has tended not to involve itself either early or deeply enough in the details of mission planning, which is precisely when military, police, logistics and transport planners need political context for the plans they are asked to make. Because Operations pays less attention to the nuts and bolts of the field (or the department) the nuts and bolts are designed and assembled by others.

Building up a roster of substantive capabilities for possible new missions would also put the Secretariat out ahead of the Security Council, where it would run the risk of displeasing states that oppose a pro-active role for the UN in either short-term conflict prevention or in managing conflict transitions—especially authoritative management on the order of East Timor or Kosovo. Not to prepare for such contingencies, however, runs the risk of falling flat when given the job or of being ready to move but having nothing to say on arrival. Politics aside, this is a problem for DPKO because, while support requirements are fairly generic and adaptable to the needs of a new operation, substantive requirements are not generic—they may be unique—so banking the right kinds of expertise in advance would not be easy. But DPKO could build on its relationship with the UN Volunteers program, from which about half of the civilian staff for Kosovo and East Timor were initially drawn.[80] It could also reach out to universities and think tanks to build up a network of advisers and

[80] See Executive Board of the UN Development Program and UN Population Fund, *UN Volunteers, Report of the Administrator*, DP/2002/18, 8 April 2002, paras. 31-34.

potential mission recruits. There are many ways in which the information technologies now being tapped, and the outreach programs now being planned by the Best Practices Unit, could make the UN more ready to shoulder the substantive burdens of complex operations without exorbitant stand-by expense or undue political risk.

4.6.4 Reforming the UN Field Service

The UN Field Service was created in 1949 to support peacekeeping missions by providing "land transport; radio communications maintenance; security of premises, mission personnel, supplies and records; and maintenance of order during meetings, hearings, and investigations." At the end of 2000, the composition of the Field Service reflected the need for reform: The average age of Field Service Officers was 47 with none under 30, partly due to a hiring freeze since 1993. It is overwhelmingly (85 percent) male in composition, reflecting its original recruitment among developed state militaries. Given a lack of major training or career development opportunities, the Field Service skill base has fallen behind the times. In 1997, the Office of Internal Oversight Services proposed to phase it out entirely. By 2000, its 460 personnel constituted just 13 percent of the international civilian staff employed in UN peacekeeping.[81]

Yet the Field Service, the only UN staff category "exclusively oriented to the field and to peace operations,"[82] has remained the UN's only corps of first responders for new operations who do that job full-time. The Brahimi Report thus encouraged "the urgent revision of the Field Service's composition and *raison d'etre*, to better match the present and future demands of field operations, with particular emphasis on mid- to senior-level managers in key administrative and logistics areas."[83] Although not recommended by the Report, a revamped Field Service structure could be home to other key field-oriented capacity, such as rapidly deployable planning and management staffs for the military and rule of law components of peace operations.

Integration of the Field Service into the global civilian staffing strategy recommended by the Panel appears to have lagged, however. In a May 2002 report, DPKO said that it was:

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[81] UN General Assembly, *Report of the Joint Inspection Unit on reforming the Field Service category of personnel in the United Nations peace operations*, A/57/78, 15 May 2002, paras. 11 and 13-20.

[82] Ibid., para. 12.

[83] A/55/305, para. 140.

> …In consultation with the Field Service Staff Union and the Office of Human Resources Management, on the concept and structure of a revised Field Service category. In order to define the core operational requirements, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has *started* collecting and analyzing the necessary demographic and other data of personnel serving in the field as well as occupational groups currently used in field operations. Once the profile…is completed, …a managed mobility system, selection criteria and procedures, as well as issues related to the conditions of service, need to be discussed and agreed upon.[84] [emphasis added]

The Field Service is thus being handled as an element of the larger problem of field staff conditions of service and career development opportunities. Addressing the Field Service in this larger context makes sense, but in moving to homogenize its field personnel policies, DPKO risks losing the opportunity to rebuild the Field Service as a flexible, updated, full-time first response team for critical elements of future peace operations.

4.7 LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The Panel spelled out substantial logistical roadblocks to rapid mission deployment, with delays caused by depleted UN equipment reserves, internal procurement bottlenecks, long delivery lead-times, and difficulty getting cash for procurement into the field. To help meet the 30-90/day deployment timelines, the Panel supported a global logistics support strategy that included additional "mission start up kits" at UN Logistics Base, Brindisi. The Panel also recommended updating the unwieldy UN procurement system; shifting procurement authority for peacekeeping on a trial basis from the Department of Management to DPKO; and delegating more purchasing authority from headquarters to the field. Finally, the Panel urged giving the Secretary-General authority to use up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund in advance of Security Council action authorizing a new mission, with ACABQ approval, as discussed earlier (see section 4.2).[85]

4.7.1 Building Strategic Deployment Stocks

During the mid 1990s, DPKO created and successfully used small start-up kits of basic mission equipment at the UNLB. That equipment was often not replaced and, as new operations outpaced mission closures, UNLB was left without many long-lead items needed for full mission deployment. While

[84] A/57/78/add.1, 29 May 2002, para. 5.

[85] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 84, 151, 153, 156, 164, 168, and 226-227.

standing contracts gave the UN high production priority, filling and shipping UN orders for major equipment can take months. A fairly straightforward item like a four-wheel-drive light truck in UN colors might take three months to slot into the production line, build, and ship. Specialty vehicles like airport fire trucks (critical safety items for air-dependent operations) might take nine months. Armored vehicles require three to four months and digital microwave links (towers, antennas, and supporting equipment that connect the elements of widely-dispersed operations) two to four months.[86]

Resolving these delays required more than what the Panel recommended. Following the 2001 comprehensive review of DPKO, the S-G proposed that the UN create Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) pre-positioned at UNLB. The second implementation report presented three options involving tradeoffs between the cost of UN acquisition and maintenance of equipment and the cost of having manufacturers maintain inventories of certain equipment on the UN's behalf, for an annual fee.

The "light" option relied heavily on such "retainer contracts." DPKO concluded that, while the up-front costs of the light option would be relatively low (about $30 million), the retainer fees could amount to 30 percent of the value of the inventory maintained, drive recurring costs to $100 million per year, and make it a very costly option over time.[87]

The "heavy" option put the onus on the UN itself to stockpile essentially all of the equipment and service capacity that a complex operation would need to deploy rapidly. DPKO concluded that this option would not only be costly ($350 million up front) but would probably deploy equipment faster and in greater volume than troops, police, and other mission personnel could be assembled and trained to make effective use of it.[88]

The "medium" option turned out to be just right. Sized initially by DPKO to support one complex and one traditional operation simultaneously, it was reduced by the ACABQ to support just one complex operation, the traditional operation being viewed as a lesser-included subset.[89] As long as DPKO is not called upon to launch a complex mission within six months or so of initiating a traditional one, this concept is largely valid but it gives DPKO reduced surge

[86] For an extensive list of equipment and lead times, see A/56/902, annex.

[87] A/55/977, para. 123.

[88] A/55/977, para. 122.

[89] A/56/902, para. 15.

capacity by comparison to the original plan, which aimed to promote rapid response to average demand.[90]

Under the medium option:

> The Secretariat will procure key items, such as vehicles, communications and engineering equipment, accommodations and ablution units, and store them at UNLB as strategic deployment stocks. Other critical items and services, such as strategic lift, fuel, rations and water, will be procured through contractual arrangements before the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new mission.[91]

Such contractual arrangements include "letters of assist" (LOAs) with governments for key services. Strategic airlift, for example, is critical for rapid delivery of equipment and personnel to the mission area. In addition to LOAs for provision of medium-size (IL-76) cargo aircraft, DPKO has investigated long-term LOAs for large cargo aircraft (AN-124).[92]

To launch the SDS, the GA approved $142 million for 2002-2003 for the initial investment, financed through funds remaining from closed peacekeeping missions ($81 million), the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund ($14 million) and new assessments ($47 million). This is a one-time expenditure to finance the stocks. Replacement equipment will be paid for out of the budgets of peacekeeping missions that draw upon the stocks. Additional SDS resources include equipment transferred from DPKO's mission reserve and surplus stocks (worth $21 million) and Italy's donated construction of three warehouses, beginning in January 2003. The upgraded base itself will cost about $22 million a year to operate.[93]

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[90] Periods of peak demand, historically, have involved the simultaneous launch of up to four major operations within a few months of one another: in 1991-92 and again in 1999-2000. DPKO's original plan was geared, essentially, to launch 1.5 major operations at once.

[91] UN General Assembly, *The concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/56/870, 14 March 2002, para. 5.

[92] A/56/732, para. 32. The UN Procurement Division also has looked into stand-by contracts with commercial AN-124 operators. Roughly 29 percent of the UN Procurement Division's contracts in 2002, by value, were for air transport. See the Procurement Division website at: www.un.org/Depts/ptd/02pie.htm.

[93] UN, *Budget for the United Nations logistics base at Brindisi for the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/670, 18 December 2002; UN General Assembly, *Status of the implementation of the strategic deployments stocks, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/57/751, 12 March 2003, paras. 2, 4, and 8; and *Financial performance report for [2002-03] and proposed budget for [2003-04] of the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi [and] Status of the implementation of the strategic deployments stocks, Report of the ACABQ*, A/57/772/Add.9, 3 April 2003, para. 27.

DPKO met a major milestone in December 2002: Brindisi stocks could support deployment of a headquarters for a traditional peacekeeping mission. (The next milestones are creating capacity for deploying one traditional mission and, finally, the capacity to support one complex mission.) By March 2003, however, the UN had disbursed just seven percent of the SDS budget for 2002-2003 (that is, goods or services had been bought and paid for). Another 22 percent had been obligated (that is, contracts had been let) and requisitions were in train to obligate a further 52 percent. A major pacing factor was the construction of the necessary climate-controlled storage facilities, including the donated warehouses, which fell behind schedule causing DPKO to seek and receive an extension on its spending authority for the SDS until the end of June 2004. A pilot exercise in rapid deployment using Brindisi and the SDS, with personnel from the missions and headquarters participating, was held in January 2003 to validate the SDS concept and integrate it into DPKO mission planning.[94]

4.7.2 Other Procurement-Related Recommendations and Actions

The Brahimi Panel recommended that the Department of Management transfer authority and responsibility for peacekeeping procurement to DPKO on a two-year trial basis.[95] The subsequent comprehensive review concluded, however, that "a centralized headquarters procurement process can yield synergies, and furthermore that the Procurement Division in the Department of Management has made considerable improvements to its systems and procedures, as has been recognized by member states." The S-G concurred and decided not to implement the Brahimi Report's recommendation.[96]

UN Secretariat procurement of goods and services is big business and in 2001, peacekeeping operations represented 80 percent of it. Just before the end-decade surge in UN operations in 1998, peacekeeping procurement totaled $174 million, just 20 percent higher than purchases for UN headquarters and other UN offices. By 2001, however, the value of procurement for peacekeeping operations had risen to more than four times that of headquarters. It subsided a bit in 2002, to $640 million.[97]

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[94] A/57/751, table 3 and para. 12; A/57/772/Add.9, para. 33; and A/57/751, para. 7.

[95] A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (d).

[96] A/55/977, para. 205.

[97] UN purchases of humanitarian and emergency relief supplies are in addition to these amounts and are funded by voluntary contributions.

Sidebar 10:

Rapid Response for Mine Action

"Building on the lessons learned from humanitarian emergencies such as Kosovo in 1999 and Eritrea in 2000, the United Nations has developed a Rapid Response Plan. The plan consists of two fixed components—a Fact Finding Team and a Coordination Team—and a number of optional capabilities (including emergency survey, manual/dog mine detection teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team, mechanical equipment and mine risk education) that can be deployed depending on the situation, and will be made available on a stand-by basis by partner organizations."

Source: Martin Barber, Chief, United Nations Mine Action Service, at the 4th Meeting of States Parties to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, Geneva, 16-20 September 2002. Online at: www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/4msp/Update_day3_docs/4MSP_UNMAS_180902.pdf.

Table 6 lists the top 15 national recipients of UN headquarters and peacekeeping-related procurement contracts. For every dollar that the U.S. government contributes in assessments to the UN regular budget, U.S. companies receive back nearly 50 cents in headquarters purchase orders. American firms received 77 percent of those orders, by value, in 2002, reflecting the New York City location of UN Headquarters.

Peacekeeping purchases are more widely distributed, as are peacekeeping operations. U.S. firms are still the number two national recipients of UN orders, however, at nearly 10 percent of the total, but Russian firms lead all others by a fairly wide margin owing largely to heavy lift air transport contracts, which are peacekeeping operations' single most costly support item. (Russia, Ukraine, and the United States are the only countries that fly cargo aircraft as large as the AN-124 or the C-5. All C-5s are operated by the U.S. military, however, and hence are very expensive to borrow.)

Other countries of interest in table 6 include the DR Congo and Sierra Leone, which appear prominently in the 2002 listings, indicating local purchases by the large peacekeeping operations begun in those states in 1999. The two countries that seem to have the best balance of UN payments and procurement income are South Africa and India, which receive in headquarters purchase orders a substantial fraction of what they pay into the UN regular budget, and receive in peacekeeping purchase orders roughly ten times what they pay in peacekeeping assessments. Both, however, are also substantial troop contributors.[98]

[98] As of October 2003, India was the fourth largest contributor of troops to UN operations and South Africa was number ten. UN DPKO, "Monthly Summary of Contributors," see:

In 2001, the last year for which the UN has published data breaking out the share of procurement decisions made in the field, peacekeeping missions themselves allocated 43 percent of the money. DPKO and the UN Procurement Division allocated the rest. The average headquarters purchase order, based largely on standing systems contracts, was ten times larger than the average order placed from the field, which cannot exceed $200,000 for any contractor or purchase order in a given year without approval of the headquarters Committee on Contracts. Because mission purchase orders do not draw on standing contracts (which are, almost by definition, managed from headquarters), large orders must pass through the eight-step process for new requisitions that was outlined in the Brahimi Report.[99]

The Report argued in favor of raising this ceiling to as much as $1 million "depending on mission size and need," where accompanied by appropriate training of field staff, provision up to date procurement manuals, and appropriate procedures for accountability.[100] The ceiling has not changed but DPKO has been working to increase the ability of field missions to implement and manage large contracts, with technical assistance, training, quality assurance programs to monitor vendor compliance with contract terms, annual meetings of chief procurement officers and an Extranet site for the sharing of best practices, online procurement manuals, and electronic requisition tracking tools that allow headquarters monitoring of field procurement decisions. Wet-lease arrangements with troop contributors and greater emphasis on pre-deployment equipment inspections should also reduce the amount of UN bulk logistics support needed for military contingents in UN operations.[101]

Over the years, the UN's majority of developing states have been keen to receive a greater share of UN procurement. Table 6 indicates that the share of peacekeeping-related contracts going to developing and "transitional" (former communist) economies has risen from 47 to 59 percent since 1998. Deducting the two main transitional recipients (Russia and Ukraine), developing economies' *share* of peacekeeping procurement has dropped slightly since 1998, from 41 to 38 percent, but the *value* of that share has grown by $172 million.

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www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/index.htm.

[99] A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 152.

[100] Ibid., para. 168.

[101] A/57/187, paras. 16-22. As of April 2002, operations in the DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo, and East Timor had been delegated authority for purchases up to $200,000. A/56/887, paras. 56-60.

Table 6: UN Procurement, 1998 and 2002

	1998 Procurement				2002 Procurement			
	Headquarters Offices		Peacekeeping		Headquarters Offices		Peacekeeping	
Source: UNGA, *Procurement Reform*, A/57/187, 2 July 2002, Annex II; and UN Procurement Division, www.un.org/Depts/ptd	**Total**	**Pct**	**Total**	**Pct.**	**Total**	**Pct.**	**Total (Rank ordered)**	**Pct**
Russian Federation	$5,095,740	3.5%	$6,883,484	4.0%	$2,048,971	1.2%	$106,235,458	16.6%
United States	$86,005,648	59.8%	$12,839,043	7.4%	$132,491,375	76.8%	$61,903,013	9.7%
United Kingdom	$18,668,607	13.0%	$12,116,299	7.0%	$2,209,262	1.3%	$37,443,044	5.9%
Congo, DR	$0	0.0%	$0	0.0%	$0	0.0%	$34,184,416	5.3%
France	$4,129,947	2.9%	$5,126,414	2.9%	$458,248	0.3%	$32,857,518	5.1%
Italy	$313,123	0.2%	$13,035,038	7.5%	$3,059,493	1.8%	$32,555,406	5.1%
Ukraine	$0	0.0%	$4,239,043	2.4%	$0	0.0%	$24,145,168	3.8%
South Africa	$3,625	0.0%	$8,964,028	5.1%	$5,128,578	3.0%	$23,941,389	3.7%
Angola	$2,870,000	2.0%	$13,003,874	7.5%	$0	0.0%	$19,727,577	3.1%
India	$2,692,430	1.9%	$4,106,060	2.4%	$3,449,464	2.0%	$17,083,719	2.7%
Sierra Leone	$0	0.0%	$0	0.0%	$0	0.0%	$17,077,439	2.7%
Monaco	$0	0.0%	$3,829,000	2.2%	$0	0.0%	$15,229,195	2.4%
Denmark	$8,164,006	5.7%	$3,175,186	1.8%	$216,276	0.1%	$14,948,130	2.3%
Australia	$79,491	0.1%	$0	0.0%	$28,560	0.0%	$14,519,847	2.3%
Egypt	$500,000	0.3%	$4,251,800	2.4%	$89,550	0.1%	$13,420,262	2.1%
Totals, all states:	$143,785,117		$174,240,342		$172,623,857		$639,998,083	
Total, developing & transitional economies:	$25,694,790		$82,022,028		$12,932,351		$376,394,074	
Percent, developing & transitional economies:	17.87%		47.07%		7.49%		58.81%	

Sidebar 11:

Rapid Response for Other Humanitarian Action

In addition to housing DPKO's strategic deployment stocks, since March 2001 the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, has been home to the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD). UNHRD contains stocks of emergency food aid and mobile cooking facilities, medicine, shelter materials, electric generators, water treatment systems and personal safety provisions, plus rapid response equipment including trucks, shipping containers, emergency telecommunications equipment, and mobile offices. The World Food Program (WFP), the UN's primary transport arm for humanitarian aid, manages UNHRD on behalf of partners that include the Italian government, non-governmental organizations, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Health Organization.

At any one time, WFP's Ocean Transportation Service has 40 ships at sea, transporting two million tons of food annually, plus 20 cargo aircraft ranging in size from de Havilland Twin Otters to Ilyushin-76 heavy airlifters. In 2001, WFP operating expenses totaled $1.74 billion.

Other agencies and programs of the United Nations with emergency response programs include OCHA (Emergency Services Branch, Geneva), UNHCR, UNICEF (Office of Emergency Operations and Operations Center, New York), WHO (Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action), UNDP (Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery), and the International Labor Organization (Infocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction).

Sources: UN OCHA, Annual Report for 2002, online at: www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/OCHA_Annual_Report_2002.pdf , accessed 18 August 2003. UNICEF, "Overview of UNICEF's Humanitarian Mandate and Activities" (New York: April 2001). World Food Program, online at: www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=1, accessed 18 August 2003.

4.8 PROMOTING FAST AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION IN THE FIELD

When a large peacekeeping operation deploys into a war-torn country, an important early task is to explain its presence to the local parties and the local population, who may or may not have heard that another army was due in town and may not recognize it as friendly. Later, the operation may have to sell its "products" (such as free and fair elections) over the heads of local factions' propaganda machines. Such oppositional activity has been an ongoing problem

for many UN operations as well as for NATO and other organizations operating in the Balkans. It is a hazard of opening up political processes in very recently violent, grievance-steeped societies that have not yet worked out the boundaries of acceptable political behavior, including what is acceptable on the airwaves.

The Panel recommended that public information strategies and personnel be included in pre-mission planning; that experienced spokespeople be integrated into the leadership team; that start-up kits of equipment be created for rapid deployment of PI teams; that DPKO or DPI set up a roster of pre-screened experts with field experience who could be deployed on short notice; and that information technology be used to keep field operations staff informed of key events in the mission area. The Report originally proposed a distinct unit, housed within DPI or DPKO, for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations. It would contribute to Integrated Mission Task Forces, ensuring that peacekeeping and political missions were fully staffed for public information and that such capabilities were rapidly deployable, were able to meet mission information needs, and that PI field staff received full support and guidance from headquarters.[102]

The first implementation report proposed a distinct unit in DPKO, with seven regular budget posts to be shifted from DPI.[103] The ACABQ deferred this move until after the comprehensive review and, following that review, the S-G proposed to add four posts to DPKO's newly revamped Best Practices Unit, funded by the peacekeeping support account.[104] Failing to win the support of the ACABQ for these four posts, the S-G came back in 2002 with a request for two positions within the Peace and Security Section of DPI, the first support account posts for that department. He made the case that the eight person section could not otherwise do what was being asked of it: surveying and planning for new missions; designing strategy and structure for PI field components; developing deployment timetables, equipment and budget requirements for new missions; maintaining and screening a roster of PI mission candidates; producing all promotional information and publications for peace operations; and maintaining mission and headquarters websites for DPKO. In a relatively rare move, the GA overruled the ACABQ in July 2002, approving the posts.[105]

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[102] A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 146-149 and 235-237; and A/55/502, paras. 136-137.

[103] A/55/502, paras. 134-135.

[104] A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, para. 5.12.

[105] UN General Assembly, *Substantive questions: Role of the Department of Public Information in United Nations Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General*, A/AC/198/2002/5, 4 March 2002; and UN General Assembly, A/RES/56/293, 30 July 2002, operative para. 7.

So the effort to improve planning, rapid deployment, and support for public information in UN peace operations shrank from seven people, to four, to two, and the ACABQ still seems to object to them.[106] On the other hand, as part of a program of departmental changes begun in 2002, DPI decided to close nine UN Information Centers in Europe, consolidating operations in Brussels, Geneva, and Vienna.[107] With a growing proportion of the UN's official documents available on the Web and CD-ROM, walk-in centers in developed countries seem less needed and the regular budget posts thus freed up could be redeployed to more pressing matters—like planning and support for public information in peace operations.

One solution to bureaucratic (and member state) reluctance to build such rapid-response capacity into the UN itself has been the creation of non-profit institutions outside the UN system that help to implement radio networks in collaboration with UN operations like MONUC, whose "Radio Okapi" reaches a substantial percentage of Congo's population with a combination of news, music, and public affairs programming. MONUC's collaboration with Fondation Hirondelle in Switzerland has been quite productive, permitting rapid acquisition of radio broadcast equipment, for example. Over time, MONUC has built up a substantial public information office, now planned to total some 192 persons, of whom 70 percent are national staff (Congolese). MONUC broadcasts in shortwave and FM from Kinshasa and 14 cities around the country, in French and four national languages. It provides training to Congolese journalists and broadcasters, its reporters and on-air presenters are Congolese, and it will leave behind a working infrastructure and a skilled work force.[108]

[106] In the spring 2003 budget cycle, in a seeming fit of pique, the ACABQ zeroed out a request for computers and office supplies for the two new PI positions and cut by two-thirds DPI's request to fund field visits by these officials to peacekeeping operations. A/57/776, paras. 77-78.

[107] UN News Service, "Annan decides to downsize UN information centres in Western Europe," 12 June 2003.

[108] Fondation Hirondelle's website is www.hirondelle.org.. Click on Radio Okapi. See also UN, *Budget for [MONUC] for the period 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004*, A/58/381, 19 September 2003, p. 27.

— 5 —

Assessing Implementation and Recommending Next Steps

When the Brahimi Report was commissioned in March 2000, memories of Rwanda and Srebrenica had just been refreshed by two searing UN reports, and none of the four big operations begun in 1999 looked like a winner: UNAMSIL, in Sierra Leone, seemed hamstrung by thugs. UNMIK, in Kosovo, was pleased merely to be able to say that nobody froze to death during its first winter in charge of the territory. UNTAET, in East Timor, was still finding its footing and MONUC's military observers were starting an operation that few believed could accomplish even its limited task of monitoring withdrawal of foreign armies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Yet each of these operations has since found its footing. While all received able third-country military assistance—Australian-led forces in East Timor, NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo, British forces in Sierra Leone, and temporary EU-sponsored, French-led forces in the DRC—these operations also reaped the benefits of the growing UN ability to plan, recruit for, support, and lead large, complex peace operations, growth spurred by release of the Brahimi Report. Persistent, change-minded UN leaders and staff members promoted, refined, and built upon recommendations in the Report and the follow-on comprehensive management review, and filled some gaps left by the Report, for example, on gender-related issues and HIV/AIDS.

Much of the UN's emphasis, consistent with the emphasis in the Brahimi Report, has been on improving performance in peacekeeping, where change has been significant. In other areas, change has been less marked. In particular, the United Nations and its members need to devote comparable energy and resources to the softer side of peace operations: the peacebuilding elements that promote acceptable conditions for mission drawdown and exit.

5.1 Doctrine and Strategy

Since the release of the Brahimi Report, UN leaders have more often spoken truth to power, telling the Security Council that some jobs are too hard for the Organization but that others must be done. The Secretariat advised that the United Nations not get involved in peacekeeping in Afghanistan, for example, but strongly supported a forceful upgrade to the peacekeeping mission

in DR Congo and deployment of a robust new operation in Liberia. The experience of the past three years confirms, in other words, that the United Nations needs to do both robust peacekeeping and complex peacebuilding well.

Many of the changes provoked by the Brahimi Report and the tools since created and refined to support peacekeeping operations—in information technology and networks, management, recruitment, and logistics—could be applied equally well to the needs of peacebuilding, whether as a component of complex peace operations or in smaller, special political missions. But some key Panel recommendations have not been implemented, and the capacity of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to support peacebuilding remains underfunded.

DPKO's recent assumption of responsibility for managing all complex peacebuilding operations indicates that the Secretariat is adapting to a new collaborative model—call it post-enforcement peacebuilding—where a coalition force maintains order while the UN addresses other pressing needs. These can include relief and economic development; political reconstruction, democratization and human rights; and "security sector reform" (involving police retraining, judicial reform, and the application of international standards of democratic policing and justice). Dialed up, such responsibilities become a transitional civil administration mandate like that in Kosovo; dialed down, they look like UN responsibilities in Afghanistan or Iraq; dialed down further, they become the mandate for a resident or visiting mission giving technical advice to governments and their loyal oppositions in new democracies.

At the higher end of that scale, however, the UN may now be only marginally more capable than it was in 1999. Addressed as a "strategic" issue by the Report, transitional administration remains a touchy subject within the United Nations, even though the Organization has weathered the demands placed upon it by East Timor and Kosovo. Both the UN bureaucracy and the majority of UN member states associate such governance responsibilities with colonial legacies and have been reluctant to promote the tools and capacities needed to mount such missions rapidly. The missing tools include civilian technical and administrative specialists for governing a territory temporarily; an interim legal code and code of criminal procedures to apply pending revival of an agreed local legal system; and mechanisms to support the development of, and phased handover of responsibility to, local rule of law institutions. Especially without legal clarity, every future transitional administration mission will initially flounder trying to find, translate, understand, and train its personnel to uphold a local code that may have no post-war legitimacy in the eyes of one or more local groups. Valuable time and credibility will be lost in the process.

5.1.1 Recommendations: Doctrine and Strategy

Given the unimplemented elements of what the Brahimi Report termed a "doctrinal shift" in the UN's approach to rule of law elements of peacebuilding, the United Nations and member states should:

- Review and assess the ability of the Department of Political Affairs to backstop successfully the increased numbers of fact-finding missions and special political missions, and consider an outside management review for DPA comparable to that given DPKO in 2001.
- Include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) funding for ex-combatants in the first-year mission budgets of all peace operations with DDR responsibilities and allow unspent funds to roll over into subsequent years for missions like MONUC whose programs are delayed by local politics.
- Analyze the current roadblocks to UN capacity to support restoration of governance, transitional administration, civilian police (with or without executive authority), and other rule of law components in field operations. Address how best to integrate UN capacity in these areas with the capacity and programs of regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union.
- Address seriously the issue of a criminal code and code of procedures for transitional administrations to apply ad interim and for use in training prospective mission personnel.
- Create a reserve capacity to undertake transitional administration operations, expanding UN civilian recruitment rosters to include job descriptions unique to transitional administrations.

5.2 CAPACITY FOR ANTICIPATING, PLANNING AND MANAGING OPERATIONS

The centralized analytic capability recommended by the Report was resisted by key developing states but other, major improvements in UN knowledge management have been implemented. Some of the knowledge and analytical capability that "EISAS" was supposed to provide may evolve as a byproduct of improved networking among operations and between operations and Headquarters; the growing capacity of the DPKO Best Practices Unit to assess operational experience and disseminate information useful to ongoing operations; and the collaboration of UN offices with one another and with outside experts to undertake periodic strategic assessments of the conflict environment. Such capacity will remain critical to UN early warning and early action for conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping alike.

The Integrated Mission Task Force concept, first tried in planning for Afghanistan (UNAMA) and used since, was broadly embraced by the Secretary-General and by member states but has not yet succeeded as a management practice. Something like an IMTF is critical, however, to planning complex operations that involve major civilian substantive components, as DPKO is not and should not become the system's reservoir of all expertise on all possible operational subjects. The UN will remain a highly distributed enterprise and the objective of operational planning and support should be an efficient and well-coordinated division of labor, drawing on necessary skills from the dominant pools of those skills, as and when needed, to launch an operation that will need the support of many organizational entities working in concert. Advancing the IMTF concept further will require unaccustomed ventures into joint decision-making, but ventures that are necessary, nonetheless.

Other elements of the UN system that have a voice in peace operations also need help. These include the mission support and analytical capabilities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and key elements of the Department of Political Affairs.

5.2.1 Recommendations: Capacity for Anticipating, Planning, and Managing Operations

In this area, the United Nations and member states should:

- Reconsider the UN's pressing need for strategic information gathering and analysis in light of 9/11, the bombing of UN offices in Iraq, and other challenges facing field personnel; improving such capacity would promote both the safety and security of field personnel and effective mission planning and implementation.
- Fund fully Secretariat plans for creative use of advanced information technology, recognizing that UN spending in this area, as a fraction of total budget, lags far behind other international organizations such as the World Bank.
- Revise and if necessary relabel the IMTF concept to reflect an evolving, multi-tier planning process that both affirms the lead department concept and gives an effective voice to mission resource providers outside DPKO:
    - Create a *mission strategy group*, comprising the heads of DPA, DPKO, and OCHA, chaired by DPA and with the participation of the mission SRSG, when appointed; this group would approve basic mission objectives for presentation to the Secretary-General and Security Council and also function as the appeals board for issues unresolved by the IMTF.

  - Include in each IMTF the mission's technical assessment team; have IMTFs chaired by the mission's Deputy SRSG, when appointed, with a deputy chair designated jointly by DPKO's ASGs for Operations and for Mission Support; have IMTFs create the detailed concept of operations and coordinate the contributions of mission asset providers, with disputes referred to the mission strategy group for resolution.
- Give DPKO and other Secretariat elements that support peace operations a stable funding base to retain skilled, experienced Headquarters staff as operations come and go and as the total mission budget fluctuates:
  - Establish current Headquarters staffing levels for peace operations as a "floor" that will not be breached unless Headquarters support costs exceed ten percent of mission budgets for two consecutive years;
  - Maintain, otherwise, Headquarters support at five percent of the total peacekeeping mission budget, calculated on a five-year moving average, with provision for emergency staffing in years when mission budgets increase substantially; and
  - Consider moving the Peacekeeping Support Account (now about $112 million/year) into the regular biennium budget, as recommended by the Brahimi Report, while moving peacekeeping operations (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) and special political missions that are now funded in the regular budget (at about $118 million/year) into a broadened "peace operations mission budget."
- Give the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights the people that it needs to improve the recruitment, selection, and training of human rights experts for complex peace operations and provide for their integration into mission planning and into rule of law teams.
- Support DPA's acquisition of voluntary money and people for the pilot Peacebuilding Unit to analyze how and why peace-building measures succeed or fail; have the Unit work closely with the DPA Policy Planning Unit and with the DPKO Best Practices Unit; make the PBU a regular budget item in the 2006-2007 biennium budget if the pilot program is productive.
- Give DPA's oversubscribed Electoral Assistance Division the support it needs to meet member states' requests for election-related advice, including assessed operational funding akin to that given special political missions.

5.3 RAPID AND EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT

Having received essential budget support from member states, elements of the UN—particularly the Department of Peacekeeping Operations—are now faster, better, and maybe cheaper at fielding complex operations (cheaper because quicker starts and more robust initial forces mean quicker stabilization and potentially briefer missions). The United Nations now has specific deployment benchmarks against which to plan and prepare peace operations, larger logistics stockpiles, and more effective rosters of stand-by forces. Serious shortfalls in capabilities remain, however.

To realize the goal of deploying a complex operation within 90 days, the United Nations needs additional member state participation at the highest levels of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System, especially provision of key enabling and specialized units (e.g., medical, transportation, engineering, and signals).

The Civilian Police Division's—indeed, the UN's—capacity to recruit and deploy in the rule of law area still falls short of what is needed to meet present, let alone future, mission demands rapidly and effectively. Everywhere that complex operations have deployed into almost-post-conflict situations like DR Congo, Liberia, or Iraq, the singular shortage in international capacity has not so much been troops but police or constabulary forces to take on the sorts of tasks that infantry dislike. The shortage of police and other rule of law capacity in post-conflict settings is global, and it is not getting any better, because states do not see fit to maintain larger standing police forces than they need instantaneously. Because states routinely maintain military forces that are larger than peacetime requirements, they have excess capacity to send abroad to keep the peace, but they maintain no such surplus of skilled, internationally oriented police and other rule of law-related personnel. Thus states not only need to build capacity in rule of law but also to *change how they define "excess" capacity* in this area.

Further, integration of rule of law-related components of peace operation also seems to be badly lagging and, if not, then badly advertised. DPKO received just two of the six posts that it sought to integrate rule of law people and practice into future field operations, yet operational planning expertise for rule of law exists nowhere else in the UN system. Although the Task Force on Rule of Law very helpfully highlighted the various elements of the UN system that can assist DPKO by addressing parts of the issue (local training, development funding, or technical advice), it remains the case that the United Nations, if asked to deploy another mission with a substantial criminal justice component (police, prosecutors, judges, corrections), is nearly as hard-pressed to do so now as it was three years ago.

Public information also continues to need help. It is one of those functions that everybody, in principle, realizes is important to a peace operation—yet no one assigns it the highest priority. When mission planners or, especially, mission financiers must choose between public information and other capabilities, public information is usually what gets left behind on the dock. Yet a mission needs to be able to explain itself and the evolving situation to the local population, and often will be the only objective source of news to which a post-conflict population has access.

5.3.1 Recommendations: Rapid & Effective Deployment

To improve capacity for rapid, effective, and successful deployments, the UN and member states should:

- Improve the effectiveness of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System through increased member state participation at higher levels, including more accurate listings and greater availability of key enabling units required for effective deployments.
- Encourage and support further development of regional "brigade-sized forces" comparable to the multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and MONUC's largely South Asia-based Ituri Brigade, recognizing their potential for effectiveness, especially if such forces have the opportunity to train together in advance of deployment.
- Encourage developed states with overseas military training capacity to help regional organizations such as the African Union implement their plans to develop brigade-level forces capable of contributing to UN and regional peace operations.
- Increase the capacity of the Civilian Police Division, which remains too small to develop standards and procedures, plan operations and manage a force of 4,000-8,000 officers who are individually recruited, vetted, and hired.
- Expand the staff of the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit within the Civilian Police Division, to give DPKO the capacity that it needs to evaluate the operational rule of law requirements of missions, collaborate in the design of effective rule of law teams for complex operations, and also find, recruit, deploy, and manage the criminal justice personnel that a complex peace operation needs.
- Recognize the value of member states contributing more highly skilled, named individuals to on-call lists for the rapid deployment of police and other rule of law personnel for peace operations; replace "bidding for slots"

on these on-call lists with real candidates with professional experience and familiarity with UN rules, procedures, and operational requirements.

- Build a responsibility center within the UN Secretariat for public information strategies and rapid deployment for peace operations; this capacity remains weak despite reorganization of the UN Department of Public Information.

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The ambition of the Brahimi Report and of this study was to assess the operational and organizational capacity of the United Nations. The challenges of reform and revitalization are never fully met, of course. They evolve with time and events, and accomplishments can be constrained by both money and politics. But efforts to date demonstrate that change within the UN system is not only possible but can be quite effective. Improvements in UN peace operations capacity have given the international community a more useful instrument for international peace and security, and recent experience has begun to validate the last three years of change with tough peace operations that hold significant promise of real life success stories.

But while the UN can now move faster and plan better, it is only as strong and effective as the national forces put at its disposal, and trends in that area are potentially—but not necessarily—troubling. Growing regional capacity for peace operations may be well-coordinated with the United Nations and made available to it or be devoted largely to regionally-initiated and regionally-focused efforts. UN-regional collaboration can and has taken several forms, sometimes working in sequence (with coalition forces succeeded by UN peacekeepers) and sometimes in parallel (with coalition peacekeepers, UN peacebuilders, police, and/or administrators working alongside one another). Around the world, there is and will be sufficient damage to repair and to prevent in war-prone and war-torn regions that all available institutional capacity will likely be needed to take on these tasks. In building global capacity to deal with war and its aftermath, we should leave no organization behind.

Appendix A

BRAHIMI REPORT KEY RECOMMENDATIONS, CROSS-REFERENCED TO SECTIONS OF THIS STUDY

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
1. Preventive action:	
(a) The Panel endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General with respect to conflict prevention contained in the Millennium Report and in his remarks before the Security Council's second open meeting on conflict prevention in July 2000, in particular his appeal to "all who are engaged in conflict prevention and development — the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, Governments and civil society organizations — [to] address these challenges in a more integrated fashion";	**(2.1)**
(b) The Panel supports the Secretary-General's more frequent use of fact-finding missions to areas of tension, and stresses Member States' obligations, under Article 2(5) of the Charter, to give "every assistance" to such activities of the United Nations.	
2. Peacebuilding strategy:	
(a) A small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator;	**(2.51)**
(b) The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;	**(2.54)**
(c) The Panel recommends that the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;	**(2.52)**
(d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peacebuilding strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies.	**(2.2)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
3. Peacekeeping doctrine and strategy:	
Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.	**(2.41)**
4. Clear, credible and achievable mandates:	
(a) The Panel recommends that, before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks and timelines;	**(2.3)**
(b) The Security Council should leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements, including peacebuilding elements, from Member States;	
(c) Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort;	
(d) The Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates, and countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meetings with implications for a mission's use of force.	
5. Information and strategic analysis:	
The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).	**(3.1)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
6. Transitional civil administration:	
The Panel recommends that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts, including individuals with experience in United Nations operations that have transitional administration mandates, to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code, including any regional adaptations potentially required, for use by such operations pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity.	**(2.6)**
7. Determining deployment timelines:	
The United Nations should define "rapid and effective deployment capacities" as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.	**(4.1)**
8. Mission leadership:	
(a) The Secretary-General should systematize the method of selecting mission leaders, beginning with the compilation of a comprehensive list of potential representatives or special representatives of the Secretary-General, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies and other heads of substantive and administrative components, within a fair geographic and gender distribution and with input from Member States;	**(4.3.1)**
(b) The entire leadership of a mission should be selected and assembled at Headquarters as early as possible in order to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, for briefings on the situation in the mission area and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership;	**(4.3.2)**
(c) The Secretariat should routinely provide the mission leadership with strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation, and whenever possible should formulate such guidance and plans together with the mission leadership.	**(4.3.3)**
9. Military personnel:	
(a) Member States should be encouraged, where appropriate, to enter into partnerships with one another, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), to form several coherent brigade-size forces, with necessary enabling forces, ready for effective deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a traditional peacekeeping operation and within 90 days for complex peacekeeping operations;	**(4.4.2)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
(b) The Secretary-General should be given the authority to formally canvass Member States participating in UNSAS regarding their willingness to contribute troops to a potential operation, once it appeared likely that a ceasefire accord or agreement envisaging an implementing role for the United Nations, might be reached;	**(4.2)**
(c) The Secretariat should, as a standard practice, send a team to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor to meet the provisions of the memoranda of understanding on the requisite training and equipment requirements, prior to deployment; those that do not meet the requirements must not deploy;	**(4.4.4)**
(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving "on-call list" of about 100 military officers be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice to augment nuclei of DPKO planners with teams trained to create a mission headquarters for a new peacekeeping operation.	**(4.4.3)**
10. Civilian police personnel:	
(a) Member States are encouraged to each establish a national pool of civilian police officers that would be ready for deployment to United Nations peace operations on short notice, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;	**(4.5)**
(b) Member States are encouraged to enter into regional training partnerships for civilian police in the respective national pools, to promote a common level of preparedness in accordance with guidelines, standard operating procedures and performance standards to be promulgated by the United Nations;	
(c) Members States are encouraged to designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations;	
(d) The Panel recommends that a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts be created in UNSAS to be available on seven days' notice with teams trained to create the civilian police component of a new peacekeeping operation, train incoming personnel and give the component greater coherence at an early date;	
(e) The Panel recommends that parallel arrangements to recommendations (a), (b) and (c) above be established for judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police will make up collegial "rule of law" teams.	**(2.5.3)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
11. Civilian specialists:	
(a) The Secretariat should establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice. The field missions should be granted access to and delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat;	**(4.6.1)**
(b) The Field Service category of personnel should be reformed to mirror the recurrent demands faced by all peace operations, especially at the mid- to senior-levels in the administrative and logistics areas;	**(4.6.4)**
(c) Conditions of service for externally recruited civilian staff should be revised to enable the United Nations to attract the most highly qualified candidates, and to then offer those who have served with distinction greater career prospects;	**(4.6.3)**
(d) DPKO should formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, outlining, among other issues, the use of United Nations Volunteers, standby arrangements for the provision of civilian personnel on 72 hours' notice to facilitate mission start-up, and the divisions of responsibility among the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security for implementing that strategy.	**(4.7)**
12. Rapidly deployable capacity for public information:	
Additional resources should be devoted in mission budgets to public information and the associated personnel and information technology required to get an operation's message out and build effective internal communications links.	**(4.8)**
13. Logistics support and expenditure management:	
(a) The Secretariat should prepare a global logistics support strategy to enable rapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines proposed and corresponding to planning assumptions established by the substantive offices of DPKO;	**(4.7)**
(b) The General Assembly should authorize and approve a one-time expenditure to maintain at least five mission start-up kits in Brindisi, which should include rapidly deployable communications equipment. These start-up kits should then be routinely replenished with funding from the assessed contributions to the operations that drew on them;	**(4.7.1)**
(c) The Secretary-General should be given authority to draw up to US$50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, once it became clear that an operation was likely to be established, with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) but prior to the adoption of a Security Council resolution;	**(4.2)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
(d) The Secretariat should undertake a review of the entire procurement policies and procedures (with proposals to the General Assembly for amendments to the Financial Rules and Regulations, as required), to facilitate in particular the rapid and full deployment of an operation within the proposed timelines;	**(4.7)**
(e) The Secretariat should conduct a review of the policies and procedures governing the management of financial resources in the field missions with a view to providing field missions with much greater flexibility in the management of their budgets;	**(4.7)**
(f) The Secretariat should increase the level of procurement authority delegated to the field missions (from $200,000 to as high as $1 million, depending on mission size and needs) for all goods and services that are available locally and are not covered under systems contracts or standing commercial services contracts.	**(4.7.2)**
14. Funding Headquarters support for peacekeeping operations:	
(a) The Panel recommends a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to submit a proposal to the General Assembly outlining his requirements in full;	**(3.3.1)**
(b) Headquarters support for peacekeeping should be treated as a core activity of the United Nations, and as such the majority of its resource requirements for this purpose should be funded through the mechanism of the regular biennial programme budget of the Organization;	**(3.3.4)**
(c) Pending the preparation of the next regular budget submission, the Panel recommends that the Secretary-General approach the General Assembly with a request for an emergency supplemental increase to the Support Account to allow immediate recruitment of additional personnel, particularly in DPKO.	**(1.3)**
15. Integrated mission planning and support:	
Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, should be the standard vehicle for mission-specific planning and support. IMTFs should serve as the first point of contact for all such support, and IMTF leaders should have temporary line authority over seconded personnel, in accordance with agreements between DPKO, DPA and other contributing departments, programmes, funds and agencies.	**(3.2)**
16. Other structural adjustments in DPKO:	
(a) The current Military and Civilian Police Division should be restructured, moving the Civilian Police Unit out of the military reporting chain. Consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser;	**(3.3.1.3)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
(b) The Military Adviser's Office in DPKO should be restructured to correspond more closely to the way in which the military field headquarters in United Nations peacekeeping operations are structured;	**(3.3.1.3)**
(c) A new unit should be established in DPKO and staffed with the relevant expertise for the provision of advice on criminal law issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in the United Nations peace operations;	**(3.3.1.3)**
(d) The Under-Secretary-General for Management should delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping-related budgeting and procurement functions to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period;	**(4.7.2)**
(e) The Lessons Learned Unit should be substantially enhanced and moved into a revamped DPKO Office of Operations;	**(3.1.2)**
(f) Consideration should be given to increasing the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO from two to three, with one of the three designated as the "Principal Assistant Secretary-General" and functioning as the deputy to the Under-Secretary-General.	**(3.3.1.4)**
17. Operational support for public information: A unit for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations should be established, either within DPKO or within a new Peace and Security Information Service in the Department of Public Information (DPI) reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communication and Public Information.	**(4.8)**
18. Peacebuilding support in the Department of Political Affairs:	
(a) The Panel supports the Secretariat's effort to create a pilot Peacebuilding Unit within DPA, in cooperation with other integral United Nations elements, and suggests that regular budgetary support for this unit be revisited by the membership if the pilot programme works well. This programme should be evaluated in the context of guidance the Panel has provided in paragraph 46 above, and if considered the best available option for strengthening United Nations peacebuilding capacity it should be presented to the Secretary-General within the context of the Panel's recommendation contained in paragraph 47 (d) above;	**(3.3.2.1)**
(b) The Panel recommends that regular budget resources for Electoral Assistance Division programmatic expenses be substantially increased to meet the rapidly growing demand for its services, in lieu of voluntary contributions;	**(3.3.2.2)**

Brahimi Recommendation	*Study Section*
(c) To relieve demand on the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) and the executive office of DPA, and to improve support services rendered to smaller political and peacebuilding field offices, the Panel recommends that procurement, logistics, staff recruitment and other support services for all such smaller, non-military field missions be provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).	**(3.3.1.2)**
19. Peace operations support in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:	**(2.5.4)**
The Panel recommends substantially enhancing the field mission planning and preparation capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with funding partly from the regular budget and partly from peace operations mission budgets.	
20. Peace operations and the information age:	
(a) Headquarters peace and security departments need a responsibility centre to devise and oversee the implementation of common information technology strategy and training for peace operations, residing in EISAS. Mission counterparts to the responsibility centre should also be appointed to serve in the offices of the special representatives of the Secretary-General in complex peace operations to oversee the implementation of that strategy;	**(3.1.3.1)**
(b) EISAS, in cooperation with the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD), should implement an enhanced peace operatio ns element on the current United Nations Intranet and link it to the missions through a Peace Operations Extranet (POE);	**(3.1.3.2)**
(c) Peace operations could benefit greatly from more extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) technology, which quickly integrates operational information with electronic maps of the mission area, for applications as diverse as demobilization, civilian policing, voter registration, human rights monitoring and reconstruction;	**(3.1.3.3)**
(d) The IT needs of mission components with unique information technology needs, such as civilian police and human rights, should be anticipated and met more consistently in mission planning and implementation;	**(3.1.3.4)**
(e) The Panel encourages the development of web site co-management by Headquarters and the field missions, in which Headquarters would maintain oversight but individual missions would have staff authorized to produce and post web content that conforms to basic presentational standards and policy.	**(3.1.3)**

Appendix B

RATING IMPLEMENTATION

The chart that begins on the following page (table B-2) summarizes the *Future of Peace Operations* project assessment of the implementation status of Brahimi Report recommendations, identifying the actor(s) responsible for implementing each. Key recommendations (those listed in Appendix A) are shaded in the table. Supplemental recommendations (those embedded in the main text of the Report or that grew out of the implementation process itself) are marked with an "s" in column 3. The chart scores the level of implementation for each recommendation based on our evaluation of the actions by each of the implementing actors, averaging their performance, which is shown in the rightmost column. Scoring criteria are given in table B-1, below.

Table B-1: Implementation Scoring Criteria

Score	Definition	Score	Definition
0	Recommendation unimplemented.	**3**	Partly implemented (partial funding; partial staff; reduced concept).
1	Proposed by Secretariat; rejected by intergovernmental bodies.	**4**	Implemented, with capacity equivalent to Report recommendation.
2	Proposed by Secretariat; action deferred by intergovernmental bodies or is mission-specific and awaits application.	**5**	Implementation exceeds Report recommendation.

Table B-2: Rating Implementation

					Responsibility for Implementation									
Stimson Publication Heading No.	Original Brahimi Report Recc. No.	Brahimi Report Sub-recc.	Abbreviated Recommendations	Brahimi Report Para. No.	S-G	GA, admin approval	SC cooperation	GA, regular budget	GA, PK budgets	Other UN agencies	SC mandate	UN & States implement	States implement	Score
2.1	1	a	Endorsement of Secretary General's (S-G's) conflict prevention plans	29-30	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
2.1	1	b	Encourage S-G fact-finding missions	32	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
2.51	2	a	Quick impact projects (QIPs) funding in 1st year mission budgets	37	....	....	....	....	X	....	X	....	....	4.0
2.53	2	b	Need doctrinal shift in use of Rule of Law and Human Rights mission elements	39-41	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	X	....	2.0
2.52	2	c	Put disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) funding in 1st phase of assessed mission budgets	42-43	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	2.0
2.2	2	d	Peacebuilding Strategy should be developed by the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS)	44-46	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
2.41	3	a	Peacekeeping Doctrine and Strategy must include self-defense, robust rules of engagement (ROE)	48-54	....	....	X	....	....	....	X	X	....	3.5
2.41	3	s1	ROE must be clear and robust	49	X	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	....	3.0
2.41	3	s2	Impartiality does not equal neutrality but adherence to the Charter and mandate	50	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	....	3.0
2.41	3	s3	Peacekeeping forces must be able to deal with spoilers	51	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
2.41	3	s4	Peacekeeping forces must have intelligence capabilities	51	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	2.5
-	3	s5	UN should be cautious in its peacekeeping cooperation with regional or subregional organizations, but is encouraged to provide training, equipment, and logistical support for future cooperation	54	X	....	X	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
2.3	4	a	Peace agreements must meet threshold conditions	57-58	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	X	2.0
2.3	4	b	Security Council (SC) should not finalize mission resolution until troop contributors are secured	60	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
2.3	4	c	SC resolutions shoud meet mission needs for clear command & control and unity of effort	56, 59, 276	....	....	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	2.5
2.3	4	d	S-G should tell SC what it needs to know, troop contributors should have a greater voice, better coordination	59, 61	X	....	X	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
2.42	4	s1	Peacekeepers should be presumed to have authority to halt violence against civilians, and given required resources	62-63	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	2.0
3.1	5	a	Better information gathering, analysis, and strategic planning (EISAS)	65-74	X	.....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	2.5
2.6	6	a	Evaluate feasibility of interim criminal code for transitional civil adminstrations	76-82	X	....	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	1.0

					Responsibility for Implementation									
Stimson Publication Heading No.	Original Brahimi Report Recc. No.	Brahimi Report Sub-recc.	Abbreviated Recommendations	Brahimi Report Para. No.	S-G	GA, admin approval	SC cooperation	GA, regular budget	GA, PK budgets	Other UN agencies	SC mandate	UN & States implement	States implement	Score
4.1	7	a	Defining deployment timelines of 30/90 days for peace operations	86-90	....	X	X	....	X	....	....	X	X	3.5
4.3	8	a	S-G should systematically select mission leadership	93-96	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
4.32	8	b	Mission leadership should be assembled early-on at Headquarters	95-96	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
4.33	8	c	Secretariat should provide strategic guidance to mission leadership	97	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	2.5
4.31	8	s1	Managerial talent should count at least as much as national origin for mission leadership positions	95	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	2.0
-	8	s2	Resident/Humanitarian coordinators should be used as Deputy Special Representatives of the S-G (DSRSG)	99	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
4.42	9	a	Member states should form brigade-size multinational forces for peacekeeping	114-116	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	2.5
4.2	9	b	S-G should canvass states for troops before SC resolution	108	X	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
4.44	9	c	Secretariat should confirm troop contributor readiness, unprepared troops should not deploy	108-109	X	X	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
4.43	9	d	Create military on-call list	110-113	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
4.5	10	a	Member states should establish national pools of civilian police (Civpol) for UN deployments	120-122	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	2.0
4.5	10	b	Member states should train regionally for Civpol	123	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	2.0
4.5	10	c	Member states should designate single point of contact for Civpol	124	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	3.0
4.5	10	d	Create Civpol on-call list	125	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	2.5
4.5	10	e	Members states should create ROL (judicial, penal, human rights) equivalent of Civpol capabilities	125	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	2.0
4.61	11	a	Create internet roster of civilian candidates	128-132	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
4.64	11	b	Reform UN Field Service	139-140	....	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.63	11	c	Revise conditions of service for externally recruited civilians	133-135	X	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.6	11	d	Create DPKO staffing strategy	141-144	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
-	11	s1	Remove field deployment penalties	137-138	X	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.5
4.8	12	a	Create rapidly deployable capacity for public information	146-149	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.7	13	a	Create DPKO logistics strategy	151-153, 162	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	5.0
4.71	13	b	General Assembly (GA) should approve Brindisi funding for start-up kits	154-156, 163	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	5.0
4.2	13	c	Allow S-G to draw (with ACABQ approval) $50 million from Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for upcoming missions	159-161, 164	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0

					Responsibility for Implementation									
Stimson Publication Heading No.	Original Brahimi Report Recc. No.	Brahimi Report Sub-recc.	Abbreviated Recommendations	Brahimi Report Para. No.	S-G	GA, admin approval	SC cooperation	GA, regular budget	GA, PK budgets	Other UN agencies	SC mandate	UN & States implement	States implement	Score
4.7	13	d	Secretariat should review procurement policy	167	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
-	13	e	Secretariat should review mission financial management policy	166, 168	X	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.72	13	f	Secretariant should increase level of procurement authority for missions	165	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	2.0
3.31	14	a	Increase peacekeeping Headquarters staff	172-191	....	X	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
6.3	14	b	Treat Headquarters peacekeeping support as core activity and shift to funding to regular budget	192-193	....	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	0.0
1.3	14	c	S-G should approach the GA for emergency funding	191	....	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
3.34	14	s1	Set a 5-year moving average as baseline cost of doing peacekeeping, add a percentage surcharge to average mission costs for Headquarters support	194-196	....	X	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	0.0
3.2	14	s2	Coordinate and integrate planning and training activities in DPKO	---	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
3.2	15	a	Create Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs)	198-216	X	....	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	3.0
3.313	16	a	Restructure Military/Civilian Policy Divisions	219-225	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.313	16	b	Restructure Military Adviser's Office	222	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.313	16	c	Create DPKO Criminal Law Unit	224	....	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.2	16	d	Under S-G for Peacekeeping should be given budget and procurement authority on a trial basis	227	X	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	0.0
3.12	16	e	Enhance Lessons Learned Unit and move it to Office of Operations	229-230	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.5
3.314	16	f	Consider 3rd Assistant S-G (ASG) for DPKO	232	....	X	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	1.0
3.3	16	s1	Gender issues	---	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	4.5
3.312	16	s1	Separate Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) into two divisions	228	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.314	16	s2	Designate a Principal ASG	232	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.323	16	s3	Rationalize tasks across departments	---	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.8	17	a	Create operations support for public information, add a specific unit	235-237	....	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	2.0

					Responsibility for Implementation									
Stimson Publication Heading No.	Original Brahimi Report Recc. No.	Brahimi Report Sub-recc.	Abbreviated Recommendations	Brahimi Report Para. No.	S-G	GA, admin approval	SC cooperation	GA, regular budget	GA, PK budgets	Other UN agencies	SC mandate	UN & States implement	States implement	Score
3.321	18	a	Make the 3-year pilot Peacebuilding Unit (PBU) within DPA, a regular budget item if successful	239-240	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	2.0
3.322	18	b	Give Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) more regular budget funding	242	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
-	18	c	Use UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) for smaller, non-military field missions	241	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
2.55	18	s1	Elections should be part of broader democratization efforts and civil society building, with attention to human rights	38	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	X	....	3.0
2.54	19	a	Enhance Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights support for peacekeeping	244	....	....	....	X	X	X	....	....	....	3.0
3.131	20	a	Headquarters needs a responsibility center for information technology strategy and training, with mission counterparts	251	....	X	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
3.132	20	b	EISAS and Information Technology and Services Division (ITSD) should enhance peace operations on the intranet/extranet	255-256	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	....	3.5
3.133	20	c	Use more geographic information systems (GIS) technology	252-253	....	X	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.134	20	d	Address unique Civpol and human rights information technology needs	257	....	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	2.5
3.13	20	e	Headquarters and missions should co-manage a website	259- 262	X	....	....	X	X	....	....	....	....	4.0
-	21	s1	Appoint a senior official to oversee implementation of these recommendations	268	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	4.0
3.33	22	s1	UN management culture has to change if reform efforts are not to be wasted	270	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	3.0
3.33	22	s2	Field mission personnel must be held to high standards and removed for nonperformance	272-273	X	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	....	3.0
-	22	s3	Member states need to talk less and do more in support of peacekeeping operations and make sure rhetoric is matched by tangible contributions	274-275	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	3.0
6.32	22	s4	Encourage member states to resolve scale of assessments issue	278	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	X	4.0
-	22	s5	Hope member states can resolve Security Council representation issue	278	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	....	X	0.0
-	23	s1	Troop contributors need prompt reimbursement	---	....	....	....	....	X	....	....	....	....	3.0
4.4	24	s1	Addressing HIV/AIDS	---	X	....	X	....	....	X	....	X	....	4.5

Appendix C

REGULAR BUDGET AND PEACEKEEPING SCALES OF ASSESSMENT

UN member states are billed for the costs of peacekeeping operations according to the peacekeeping scale of assessment, which is derived from the UN's regular budget scale of assessment. The regular scale, revised every three years by the UN's Committee on Contributions, roughly reflects ability to pay, as derived from a state's share of global gross national income (GNI), adjusted for national indebtedness, low per capita GNI, and other indicators. The principle behind the peacekeeping scale from its inception in 1973 has been to shift some of the financial burden of peacekeeping from the UN's poorer members to the permanent members of the Security Council, given those states' leadership responsibility for international peace and security and their ability to veto any operations that they do not support.

From 1973 to 2000, the peacekeeping scale was an informal arrangement, continued from mission to mission, that had just four payment groups: *Group A* (permanent members of the Security Council, paying a 20-22 percent higher share than they did for the regular budget); *Group B* (developed industrial states, paying the same share as for the regular budget); *Group C* (developing states, paying 80 percent less than their shares of the regular budget); and *Group D* (least developed states, paying 90 percent less). Over time, a number of states in *Group C* became rather wealthy, per capita. In 2000, the U.S. mission to the United Nations led a campaign to formalize the peacekeeping scale of assessments, revise and expand its groupings, and renegotiate a new distribution of payments. That reform is being implemented over a number of years, to ease the transition to what will be, for some states, substantially higher payments for UN peacekeeping. The chief beneficiaries of the new arrangement are the members of *Group A*, which will be relieved of about two percent of UN peacekeeping costs by the new arrangements.

Table C-1 shows all UN member states' shares of the UN regular budget as of January 2004 and their shares of peacekeeping costs (under the old peacekeeping scale and under the new scale as of January 2004).

Table C-1: Regular Budget and Peacekeeping Scales of Assessment

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	**Budget Percentage**	**Budget Percentage**	**Difference from Regular Scale**	**Category**
China	2.07	2.5228	22%	A
France	6.08	7.4098	22%	A
Russian Federation	0.466	0.5679	22%	A
United Kingdom	6.178	7.5414	22%	A
United States of America	22.000	26.8119	22%	A
Andorra	0.005	0.0050	0%	B
Australia	1.606	1.6060	0%	B
Austria	0.867	0.8670	0%	B
Belgium	1.078	1.0780	0%	B
Canada	2.837	2.8370	0%	B
Cyprus	0.039	0.0390	0%	B
Denmark	0.724	0.7240	0%	B
Estonia	0.012	0.0120	0%	B
Finland	0.535	0.5350	0%	B
Germany	8.733	8.7330	0%	B
Greece	0.534	0.5340	0%	B
Iceland	0.034	0.0340	0%	B
Ireland	0.353	0.3530	0%	B
Israel	0.471	0.4710	0%	B
Italy	4.926	4.9260	0%	B
Japan	19.629	19.6290	0%	B
Liechtenstein	0.006	0.0060	0%	B
Luxembourg	0.078	0.0780	0%	B
Malta	0.014	0.0140	0%	B
Monaco	0.003	0.0030	0%	B
Netherlands	1.695	1.6950	0%	B
New Zealand	0.223	0.2230	0%	B
Norway	0.685	0.6850	0%	B
Portugal	0.474	0.474	0%	B
San Marino	0.003	0.0030	0%	B
Slovenia	0.083	0.0830	0%	B
Spain	2.520	2.5200	0%	B

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	**Budget Percentage**	**Budget Percentage**	**Difference from Regular Scale**	**Category**
Sweden	1.001	1.0010	0%	B
Switzerland	1.207	1.2070	0%	B
Bahamas	0.013	0.0117	-10%	B*
Bahrain	0.030	0.0220	-27%	B*
Hungary	0.127	0.0762	-40%	B*
Brunei Darussalam	0.034	0.0315	-7%	C
Kuwait	0.163	0.1508	-7%	C
Qatar	0.064	0.0592	-8%	C
Singapore	0.391	0.3617	-7%	C
United Arab Emirates	0.237	0.2192	-8%	C
Korea, Republic of	1.808	1.5187	-16%	D*
Antigua and Barbuda	0.003	0.0018	-40%	E
Barbados	0.010	0.006	-40%	E
Palau	0.001	0.0005	-50%	E*
Saudi Arabia	0.719	0.2876	-60%	F
Seychelles	0.002	0.0008	-60%	F
Argentina	0.964	0.2876	-70%	G
Oman	0.071	0.0213	-70%	G
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	0.0003	-70%	G
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0.133	0.0333	-75%	G*
Uruguay	0.048	0.0096	-80%	H
Bulgaria	0.017	0.0051	-70%	H*
Czech Republic	0.184	0.0552	-70%	H*
Latvia	0.015	0.0045	-70%	H*
Lithuania	0.024	0.0072	-70%	H*
Philippines	0.096	0.0288	-70%	H*
Poland	0.464	0.1392	-70%	H*
Romania	0.061	0.0183	-70%	H*
Slovakia	0.051	0.0153	-70%	H*
Albania	0.005	0.0010	-80%	I
Algeria	0.076	0.0152	-80%	I
Armenia	0.002	0.0004	-80%	I
Azerbaijan	0.005	0.001	-80%	I
Belarus	0.018	0.0036	-80%	I

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	Budget Percentage	Budget Percentage	Difference from Regular Scale	Category
Belize	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Bolivia	0.009	0.0018	-80%	I
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.003	0.0006	-80%	I
Botswana	0.012	0.0024	-80%	I
Brazil	1.534	0.3068	-80%	I
Cameroon	0.008	0.0016	-80%	I
Chile	0.225	0.0450	-80%	I
Colombia	0.156	0.0312	-80%	I
Congo, Republic of	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Costa Rica	0.039	0.0078	-80%	I
Cote d'Ivoire	0.010	0.0020	-80%	I
Croatia	0.038	0.0076	-80%	I
Cuba	0.043	0.0086	-80%	I
Dominica	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Dominican Republic	0.035	0.0070	-80%	I
Ecuador	0.019	0.0038	-80%	I
Egypt	0.12	0.0240	-80%	I
El Salvador	0.022	0.0044	-80%	I
Fiji	0.004	0.0008	-80%	I
Gabon	0.009	0.0018	-80%	I
Georgia	0.003	0.0006	-80%	I
Ghana	0.004	0.0008	-80%	I
Grenada	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Guatemala	0.030	0.0060	-80%	I
Guyana	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Honduras	0.005	0.0010	-80%	I
India	0.424	0.0848	-80%	I
Indonesia	0.143	0.0286	-80%	I
Iran, Islamic Republic of	0.158	0.0316	-80%	I
Iraq	0.016	0.0032	-80%	I
Jamaica	0.015	0.0030	-80%	I
Jordan	0.011	0.0022	-80%	I
Kazakhstan	0.025	0.0050	-80%	I
Kenya	0.009	0.0018	-80%	I

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	**Budget Percentage**	**Budget Percentage**	**Difference from Regular Scale**	**Category**
Korea, Dem. People's Republic of	0.0100	0.0020	-80%	I
Kyrgyzstan	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Lebanon	0.044	0.0088	-80%	I
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of	0.006	0.0012	-80%	I
Malaysia	0.205	0.0410	-80%	I
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Mauritius	0.011	0.0022	-80%	I
Mexico	1.899	0.3798	-80%	I
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Mongolia	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Morocco	0.047	0.0094	-80%	I
Namibia	0.006	0.0012	-80%	I
Nauru	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Nicaragua	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Nigeria	0.043	0.0086	-80%	I
Pakistan	0.056	0.0112	-80%	I
Panama	0.019	0.0038	-80%	I
Papua New Guinea	0.003	0.0006	-80%	I
Paraguay	0.012	0.0024	-80%	I
Peru	0.093	0.0186	-80%	I
Republic of Moldova	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Saint Lucia	0.002	0.0004	-80%	I
Serbia and Montenegro	0.019	0.0038	-80%	I
South Africa	0.294	0.0588	-80%	I
Sri Lanka	0.017	0.0034	-80%	I
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Suriname	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Swaziland	0.002	0.0004	-80%	I
Syrian Arab Republic	0.038	0.0076	-80%	I
Tajikistan	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Thailand	0.211	0.0422	-80%	I
Timor-Leste	0.001	0.0002	-80%	I
Tonga	0.027	0.0054	-80%	I

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	Budget Percentage	Budget Percentage	Difference from Regular Scale	Category
Trinidad and Tobago	0.027	0.0054	-80%	I
Tunisia	0.032	0.0064	-80%	I
Turkey	0.376	0.0752	-80%	I
Turkmenistan	0.005	0.001	-80%	I
Ukraine	0.04	0.008	-80%	I
Uzbekistan	0.014	0.0028	-80%	I
Venezuela	0.173	0.0346	-80%	I
Viet Nam	0.021	0.0042	-80%	I
Zimbabwe	0.007	0.0014	-80%	I
Afghanistan	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Angola	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Bangladesh	0.010	0.0010	-90%	J
Benin	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Bhutan	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Burkina Faso	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Burundi	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Cambodia	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Cape Verde	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Central African Republic	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Chad	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Comoros	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.003	0.0003	-90%	J
Djibouti	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Equatorial Guinea	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Eritrea	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Ethiopia	0.004	0.0004	-90%	J
Gambia	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Guinea	0.003	0.0003	-90%	J
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Haiti	0.003	0.0003	-90%	J
Kiribati	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Laos People's Dem. Rep.	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Lesotho	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Liberia	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J

(As of January 2004)	Regular Scale	Peacekeeping Scale		
Country	Budget Percentage	Budget Percentage	Difference from Regular Scale	Category
Madagascar	0.003	0.0003	-90%	J
Malawi	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Maldives	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Mali	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Mauritania	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Mozambique	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J
Myanmar	0.010	0.0010	-90%	J
Nepal	0.004	0.0004	-90%	J
Niger	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Rwanda	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Samoa	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Senegal	0.005	0.0005	-90%	J
Sierra Leone	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Solomon Islands	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Somalia	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Sudan	0.008	0.0008	-90%	J
Tanzania, United Rep. of	0.006	0.0006	-90%	J
Togo	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Tuvalu	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Uganda	0.006	0.0006	-90%	J
Vanuatu	0.001	0.0001	-90%	J
Yemen	0.006	0.0006	-90%	J
Zambia	0.002	0.0002	-90%	J

Source: UN General Assembly, Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 55/235 and 55/236, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/157, 15 July 2003, Annex IV.
*Indicates transitional category.

Appendix D

PEACEKEEPING COSTS, 1998-2004

Table D-1 tracks the total cost of UN peacekeeping, pre- and post-Brahimi Report, by peacekeeping fiscal year, which runs from July 1st to June 30th. The Peacekeeping Support Account and virtually all peacekeeping mission budgets (see definitions, table 1, main text) use this fiscal year. The regular UN biennium budget, however, uses a fiscal year running from January to December. Peacekeeping-related funds in the regular budget include a small proportion of funding for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the budgets for two peacekeeping operations, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Both were established in the late 1940s and have been funded since then from the regular budget.

In Table D-1, we have chosen to portray the year-to-year costs of UN peacekeeping by peacekeeping fiscal year because that is how the bulk of peacekeeping-related funds are budgeted. Column totals for those items funded from the regular budget have been annualized to match the peacekeeping fiscal year; columns that straddle regular budget biennia (1999-00 and 2001-02) therefore draw their data from both. These allocations of regular budget spending are necessarily estimates and the UN itself does not break out spending in this way. Nonetheless, we thought it useful to have all peacekeeping expenditures normed to the same time periods, for comparison purposes.

Table D-1: Cost of UN Peacekeeping

(millions of current US dollars)

Peacekeeping Fiscal Years:		1 July 1998 - 30 June 1999 [a]	1 July 1999 - 30 June 2000 [a]	1 July 2000 - 30 June 2001 [a]	1 July 2001 - 30 June 2002 [a]	1 July 2002 - 30 June 2003 [b]	1 July 2003 - 30 June 2004 [b]
Headquarters Costs	Peacekeeping Support Account	$32.8	$38.4	$62.0	$84.3	$100.9	$112.1 [c]
	Regular Budget	$5.4	$6.1	$6.8	$6.3	$5.8	$7.2
	Subtotal:	$38.2	$44.5	$68.9	$90.7	$106.7	$119.2
Logistics Base, Brindisi	**Subtotal:**	$4.0	$7.0	$7.8	$9.0	$14.3	$22.2
Mission Budgets	UNTSO & UNMOGIP [d]	$28.8	$29.0	$29.1	$30.5	$31.8	$33.7
	Other peacekeeping operations	$764.2	$1,530.0	$2,308.0	$2,455.1	$2,491.3	$2,170.0
	Subtotal:	$793.0	$1,559.0	$2,337.1	$2,485.6	$2,523.1	$2,203.7
Total Annual Cost of UN Peacekeeping:		$835.2	$1,610.5	$2,377.8	$2,548.4	$2,606.5	$2,304.3
Headquarters Costs As a Percentage of the Total Annual Cost of Peacekeeping		4.58%	2.76%	2.90%	3.56%	4.09%	5.17%

Notes: [a] Estimated expenditures. **[b]** Appropriations. **[c]** The increase from 2002-03 includes roughly $7 million for "resident auditors" from the Office of Internal Oversight Services that used to be lodged in mission budgets. **[d]** UNTSO and UNMOGIP are presently funded from the regular biennium budget.

Sources: A/53/854, 4 March 1999, para 20, A/54/832, para 2, A/54/841, Annex I, A/55/830, A/55/874, Annex I, A/55/882 para 3, A/56/674, A/56/760, A/56/882, p. 8, A/56/887, Annex I, A/57/723, A/57/725, A/Res/54/243B, A/Res/54/247 A-B, A/Res/56/289, A/RES/56/293, A/RES/56/293 27 June 2002, para 22, A/RES/57/318, A/RES/57/320, GAO 02-294. Multiple General Assembly resolutions of 18 June 2003, reported by UN Wire (UNF).

Appendix E

DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ORGANIZATION CHART



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ORGANIZATION CHART



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