Rapid and Effective Deployment

Deploying operations swiftly and effectively is a fundamental challenge for the United Nations. Tardy deployments plagued every major complex UN peace operation started from 1991 to 1999. Long lag times occurred between the Security Council’s authorization of a new mission and the subsequent Secretariat action to organize and deploy member states’ offers of peacekeeping forces, observers, police, equipment and logistics. These lags had serious consequences, often reducing a mission’s political impact and operational effectiveness, cooling local commitments to peace accords, and undermining their delicate political balance.

Rapid deployment alone was not the answer, however; such deployment also needed to be effective. As the Panel stressed:

The speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job. To be effective, the missions’ personnel need materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services), information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political “centre of gravity” sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties’ second thoughts about taking a peace process forward.1

To provide for both rapid and effective deployment, the Brahimi Report proposed rapid deployment benchmarks for new missions and a number of measures needed to meet those benchmarks. These included advance planning and spending authority; rapid selection of quality mission leadership; improved quality and availability of security forces; capable civilian staff able to deploy quickly; effective logistics; and rapidly deployable capacity for public information.

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1 A/55/305, para. 87.
4.1 DEFINING DEPLOYMENT BENCHMARKS

Prior to the Brahimi Report, there were no standard timelines for the deployment of UN peace operations. No benchmarks assisted negotiators in crafting new peace agreements or helped planners preparing for future operations. Further, there was no formal link between Security Council action and the timing of actual deployments to guide member states’ or the public’s expectations. Yet experienced mission leaders know that the actions taken in the first six to twelve weeks following signature of a cease-fire or peace accord are critical to an operation’s subsequent local credibility.

The Panel recommended that the United Nations define “rapid and effective deployment capacity” as the ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. It warned that these goals would be difficult to achieve without substantial changes in how the UN and its member states prepared for support of peace operations.2

The Secretary-General observed, in the first implementation report, that the 30/90-day timelines were ambitious, but supported them both as an operational goal and as the basis for evaluating UN planning and support capacity. The Security Council and the Special Committee endorsed both applications.3

In his second implementation report (June 2001), the Secretary-General stressed the need for specialized military units (communications, engineering, transport, maintenance, and medical) to be available on short notice. He noted that “most national contingents now require the majority of their support from the United Nations directly or through a letter of assist with other member states,” including substantial strategic lift and service support. This was true even when forces deployed with a support package, as did units from the largely Europe-based Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), which deployed to help establish UNMEE in late 2000.4

That report also laid out UN planning assumptions for rapid deployment within the 30/90-day timeframe. For a traditional mission, it posited a requirement to provide for 5,000 troops (50 percent of which were assumed to be self-sustaining); 100 substantive staff; 200 military observers and police; and 200 administrative staff (international civil servants plus local hires). For a complex mission, it posited a requirement to provide for 10,000 troops (25

2 Ibid., paras. 88-90.
4 A/55/977, paras. 112-113.
percent self-sustaining); 300 substantive staff; 1,000 military observers and police; and 1,000 administrative staff. Both plans assumed limited local support infrastructure, emphasizing the need for member state units and personnel to be well supplied and the need for the UN to have a larger standing stock of supplies and equipment.  

4.2 ADVANCE PLANNING AND SPENDING AUTHORITY

The Brahimi Report asked the Security Council to leave its mandates for new operations in draft form until the Secretary-General had secured sufficient commitments of troops from member states to carry out those mandates. The Council demurred, with some members concerned that political support for a decision might dissipate while waiting for the S-G to certify troop commitments. Instead, the Council offered “planning mandates” that would allow the Secretariat to canvass states for troops, with full mandate and deployment following receipt of commitments and the evolution of conditions in the field. A mandate sequence of this type was used in establishing MONUC in the DR Congo.

To help meet the 30/90-day deployment goals, the Panel recommended giving the S-G advance authority to draw up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund to procure essential goods and services when a new mission appeared likely, prior to Security Council action but with ACABQ approval. (The Reserve Fund, originally set up in December 1992, was designed to help make cash available for more rapid deployment of new or expanding missions.) The Secretary-General concurred, seeking such authority for “imminent” situations where rapid deployment would maximize success. The S-G recognized some risk in procuring goods and services in advance of mission authorization, but noted that most such items could be used in other missions if the anticipated operation failed to materialize. For example, “the quick deployment of UNMEE in 2000 was partly attributable to the availability of goods and services initially acquired for MONUC” that were unused due to

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5 Ibid., para. 113.
6 A/55/305, para. 64b.
8 As of 30 June 2002, the fund level was nearly $200 million, exceeding its authorized level of $150 million, and the excess funds were made available to support the new strategic deployments stocks at Brindisi. Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, Note by the Secretary-General, A/57/798, 17 April 2003, para. 2.
delays in MONUC deployment; other MONUC-earmarked equipment was diverted to meet urgent needs in UNAMSIL. 9

In July 2001, the Special Committee endorsed SG authority to formally canvass member states regarding their willingness to contribute forces to a potential operation and supported pre-mandate commitment authority for the Secretary-General. In December, the S-G stressed the importance of such authority as a tool for rapid deployment, needed to acquire long-lead items not in stock at UNLB. In March 2002, the Special Committee again emphasized its support. 10 In April, however, the ACABQ turned down the request for new spending authority, arguing that the S-G already had the necessary commitment authority under GA resolutions on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. The S-G’s discretion to draw upon funds for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses is limited to no more than $8 million per year; additional amounts require ACABQ concurrence. Use of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, as recommended by the Panel, requires the S-G first to seek and receive written concurrence from the Security Council. The ACABQ concluded that a letter from the President of the Security Council to the S-G concurring with his intent to plan and prepare for a possible new mission would suffice to trigger the necessary authority. 11 The General Assembly adopted the ACABQ’s recommendations in July 2002. 12 A clear implementing mechanism, however, had yet to be devised.

The need to deploy a small observer mission to Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in the spring of 2003 focused attention on the issue, and it came to a head in the planning for Liberia (UNMIL) that summer. MINUCI planners tapped the unforeseen and extraordinary expenses account. 13 However, a June 2003 after action report by DPKO’s Best Practices Unit urged review of existing

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9 A/55/977, paras. 112 and 118.
10 S/RES/1327, para. II; A/55/1024, para. 70; and A/56/732, paras. 33-34 and 86-87.
11 UN General Assembly, The concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation, Report of the ACABQ, A/56/902, para. 20-25. The S-G can commit up to $8 million in any one year from the contingency fund for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, for activities related to maintenance of international peace and security. He can make higher commitments with the concurrence of the ACABQ, not to exceed $10 million without GA approval. For the biennium 2002-03, the total contingency fund was set at 0.75 percent of the regular budget, or just under $19 million, of which about $855,000 was allocated to the International Court of Justice. UN General Assembly, Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the biennium 2002-2003, A/RES/56/256, 12 February 2002.
procedures. It recommended using the SG’s report to the Council on a likely new mission to trigger notification of the need for pre-commitment authority to use the Reserve Fund. It also laid out a sequence of steps for seeking allocation of funds, based on the size of the request.\textsuperscript{14} DPKO subsequently won ACABQ approval of $47 million in pre-mandate commitment authority for UNMIL.\textsuperscript{15}

4.3 IMPROVING MISSION LEADERSHIP

The Brahimi Panel stressed that, in addition to having forces, experts, and equipment on hand or on call, rapid and effective deployment required effective mission leadership. Mission leaders needed to participate early in a mission planning process that was far more integrated and inclusive than DPKO had implemented to date. The Panel therefore recommended measures to improve their recruitment, selection, training, and operational guidance. Mission leaders—including heads of mission, representatives and special representatives of the S-G, force commanders, civilian police commissioners, and their deputies—often have been selected on an \textit{ad hoc} basis, might not meet one another before reaching the field, and rarely have left headquarters with “mission-specific policy or operational guidance in hand.”

The Panel recommended more systematic identification and selection of leaders; early assembly of mission leadership at UN headquarters prior to deployment for planning and coordination; and consistent provision of “strategic guidance and plans for anticipating and overcoming challenges to mandate implementation.” Whenever possible, the Report urged that headquarters and mission leadership, in consultation with the resident UN country team, should formulate such guidance and plans jointly. The Panel acknowledged that leadership choices should reflect the mission’s location and the geographic distribution of its principal troop and police contributors, but argued that “managerial talent and experience must be accorded at least equal priority” in such decisions.\textsuperscript{16}

4.3.1 Selecting Mission Leaders

In response, the Secretary-General formed a senior appointments group (SAG) with representatives from DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP, OHCHR, the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), and the Office of Gender Special Advisor to establish a profile of leadership qualities, “including area and

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Interview, DPKO, September 2003.
\textsuperscript{16} A/55/305, paras. 93-98.
management expertise;” update and consolidate a roster of eminent persons available for rapid deployment to peace operations; identify UN personnel ready to take on senior field assignments; and prepare a short list of those to be considered for senior mission positions. Member state delegations were invited to forward names for the roster and the Secretary-General directed the SAG to undertake a “rigorous and systematic review” of possible candidates. Initially DPKO, now OHRM, receives nominations from member states and keeps the roster up to date.17

The Special Committee “took note” of the SAG process but encouraged the Secretariat to enable countries to provide alternative candidates if those selected proved unavailable (over 40 nations had put forward names for consideration by 2003). The Committee also wanted candidates interviewed irrespective of the on-call lists and wanted senior field positions to reflect levels of contributions to a mission’s forces.18 The Special Committee thus very much preferred the old, heavily political process of appointing mission leadership and failed to endorse the Report’s emphasis on managerial talent and experience as qualifications for mission leadership. Defining the specific qualities needed for leadership positions is a challenging task and selection will in most cases remain a highly sensitive and ultimately political question.

As a further issue in mission leadership, there are still relatively few women in top decision-making positions. The Secretary-General’s October 2002 report on women, peace, and security noted that the first female Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed in 1992 and that, ten years later, there was still just one female SRSG.19

4.3.2 Early Assembly of Mission Leadership

The Secretary-General endorsed the concept of advance assembly of mission leadership at headquarters, but noted that it was difficult. He proposed a complementary system of on-site training for senior and middle managers as they arrived for a new mission, and recommended that funds for training cells be

17 A/55/502, para. 70; A/55/977, para. 95; and A/56/855, part X, table 3. DPKO’s Personnel Management and Support Service was tapped initially to manage and update the “eminent persons roster” together with other rosters of civilian personnel vetted and available for rapid mission deployment. See also Dyan Mazurana and Eugenia Piza Lopez, Gender Mainstreaming in Peace Support Operations: Moving Beyond Rhetoric to Practice (London: International Alert, July 2002): 47; and Interview, UN official, Spring 2003.

18 A/55/1024, paras. 14 and 62; and A/56/863, para. 22.

built into each mission budget. The S-G also suggested appointing mission leaders to the IMTF for that operation (see section 3.2) until the operation deployed, whereupon mission planning would revert to the field. While the Special Committee embraced the prior assembly of mission leaders, it viewed their leadership of IMTFs as impractical. In the case of the Afghanistan mission (UNAMA), senior mission leadership did participate in meetings and planning before their deployment, including, notably, Lakhdar Brahimi. SRSG Jacques Klein participated in planning for the new UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) but did not use its IMTF as a key planning asset.

The first implementation report noted the lack of standard briefing and training procedures for senior staff and that, while the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) was building a program for briefing and debriefing SRSGs, these efforts would be supported only by voluntary contributions. By 2002, although the Training and Evaluation Service within DPKO’s Military Division had established “mission training cells” in four operations and proposed to implement a “Mission headquarters Orientation Program” for senior military personnel, civilian leadership training still lagged badly.

By 2003, DPKO had established that all heads of mission, force commanders and deputy SRSGs should come to headquarters prior to deployment for two to three days of standardized briefings with headquarters leadership and the headquarters personnel who would be supporting their mission.

### 4.3.3 Providing Better Strategic Guidance

The Security Council, the Special Committee, and the External Review Board assembled to advise the spring 2001 comprehensive review all endorsed the need for better headquarters strategic guidance to mission leaders. The S-G’s first implementation report chose to interpret this as a need for better “long-term strategizing.” The Report, however, had asked that mission leaders be given

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20 A/55/502, para. 74; and A/55/977, para. 94.

21 As the chair of the Panel, Brahimi’s leadership role in the planning for and execution of the UN diplomatic efforts and political mission (UNAMA) in Afghanistan also reflected his belief in pressing for the measures that bore his name.

22 A/55/502, paras. 72, 75, and 96. UNITAR held its first seminar for current special and personal representatives and envoys in Switzerland 28–30 March 2001 with funding from Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

23 A/56/885, part X, table 3, 69; and A/55/977, para. 93.

24 Interview, DPKO, April 2003.
clear initial instructions on how to implement their mandate and a strategy for
dealing with potential “spoilers,” so as to promote early unity of effort in the
field, between the field and headquarters, and amongst the various headquarters
and agency elements involved in mission backstopping.25 The SG noted the
potentially “fundamental” role of EISAS in supporting mission leadership but
even this more generalized capacity has not been realized.26 The extent to which
strategic guidance has been formulated for ongoing missions, as well as new
ones, is also not clear.

4.4 RECRUITING AND DEPLOYING CAPABLE MILITARY FORCES

Only states can provide the military forces (and police) needed in UN peace
operations. Their decisions to provide them are based on a calculus of interest
and capability. Throughout the 1990s, some states calculated that it was in their
interest to mooch capability from other states or the UN, sending:

Soldiers without rifles, or with rifles but no helmets, or with helmets
but no flak jackets, or with no organic transport capability (trucks or
troops carriers). Troops may be untrained in peacekeeping operations
and… some units have no personnel who can speak the mission
language.27

The Brahimi Report argued that:

Troop-contributing countries that cannot meet the terms of their
memoranda of understanding should so indicate to the United Nations,
and must not deploy. To that end, the Secretary-General should be
given the resources and support needed to assess potential troop
contributors’ preparedness prior to deployment, and to confirm that the
provisions of the memoranda will be met.28

These recommendations affecting troop quality are among the most
important in the Brahimi Report: without well-equipped and well-trained troops
the UN cannot meet the Report’s standards for robust operations and could
waste member states’ money supporting low-performing troops.

25 A/55/502, para. 76; A/C.4/55/6, para. 18; S/RES/1327 (2000), para. IVe; and A/55/977, para. 93, 97, and
294.

26 A/55/977, paras. 294, 301, 302, and 306.


28 Ibid., para. 109.
The need for quality assurance is especially serious now that most UN forces come from developing states. Although a number of developing countries send capable, professional forces to UN missions, few can provide enough of the specialized “enabling” units (engineering, communications, logistics, transport, intelligence, or medical) that complex peace operations often need, and “strategic lift” (long-distance transport) is at a premium. Some of the logistical deficit can be made up via private sector contracts: the United States funded Pacific Architects and Engineers to provide logistical support to ECOMOG forces in Liberia in the 1990s, for example. Even if the operational deficit could be reduced in this manner, a political deficit remains: it is hard for the UN to think, plan, and function as a global organization if only some of its member states are willing to carry operational burdens. The trend toward “regionalization” of peacekeeping, reinforced by the present U.S. administration’s preference for ad hoc coalitions over almost any permanent alliance or institution, suggests that this imbalance in operational burden sharing in UN operations will not be corrected any time soon.

The Panel recommended a number of improvements in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System managed by DPKO; greater emphasis on the formation of multinational brigade-sized forces by member states; and the development of on-call lists to reduce deployment times for key mission personnel. The Panel also urged DPKO to develop programs to assess the readiness of troops offered to the UN, in advance of their deployment.

4.4.1 Enhancing Stand-by Arrangements

In the mid-1990s, DPKO established the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary roster of capabilities that UN member states might be willing to commit to a future peacekeeping operation, if asked by the Secretary-General. A tool for planning and organizing contributors to a peacekeeping operation, 87 states were participating in UNSAS at the time of the Panel’s report. The system had little reliability, however, as a predictor of contributions or as a useful means to plan an operation. Improvement of UNSAS was widely endorsed and the S-G and DPKO urged its reorganization, and a reassessment of what member states were willing to list. To meet the 30/90-day deployment timeline, the UN needed a more reliable and sophisticated accounting of capabilities in UNSAS.

Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno asked member states to respond by 1 July 2001 regarding the current status of assets they had listed in UNSAS, their contributions to on-call lists, and their ability to provide valuable enabling forces. By late 2001, the response was lackluster—only nine countries had submitted updated information. DPKO persisted, however, and by December
2002 Guéhenno reported they had “turned a significant corner” in the redesign of UNSAS toward the readiness envisioned by the Panel. The new organization entails quarterly updates from member states on the capabilities they have listed in UNSAS, and a fourth level of readiness has been added to indicate resources deployable within 30/90-days of a Council mandate, with appropriate national approval:

- **Level I** (provision of a list of capabilities describing resources that may be made available upon request by the UN);
- **Level II** (provision of a detailed list describing the contribution, including a list of major equipment, a table of organization of the unit(s), the level of self-sufficiency, transportation data, and data on individuals);
- **Level III** (signing an MOU that specifies resources to be provided, response times, and conditions for employment);
- **Rapid Deployment Level** (RDL, established July 2002, with an MOU detailing the forces to be provided, with pre-deployment planning and preparation that converts agreed equipment lists into “load lists,” determines the proposed contingents’ sustainment capabilities and requirements, and pre-arranges support from the Brindisi Strategic Deployment Stocks as necessary).

For units offered at Levels I-III, the offer of forces is considered provisional until a visit from DPKO verifies suitability. For the Rapid Deployment Level, DPKO may deploy a staff assistance team to verify the equipment pledged as well as the levels of training and self-sustainment of personnel. Where DPKO identifies equipment deficiencies, it may try to arrange for that need to be met by the UN or through bilateral support.

As of 15 July 2003, 77 countries were participating in the system: 25 (including the United States) at Level I, 11 at Level II, and 41 at Level III. States participating at Level II included Bangladesh, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, and the UK. Only two countries, Jordan and Uruguay, had joined the Rapid Deployment Level, pledging a total of six units. By fall 2003, however, efforts were underway to have nations in SHIRBRIG join the RDL. Yet specialized enabling resources and strategic lift capabilities still lag; as of

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30 Interview, UN Official, October 2003.
January 2003, the S-G reported there were no firm pledges.\textsuperscript{31} The Panel’s goal of rapid deployment, he noted, could not be met, even with the best technical work by the UN Secretariat, without “the members states’ political will to deploy well-trained and equipped troops and police in a timely manner.” That, he argued, is a “determining factor.”\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{sidebar}
\textbf{Sidebar 8: Where Are the Developed States?}

Since the mid-1990s, developed states have substantially reduced their contributions of troops to UN operations, particularly in Africa. Most contributions went instead to the NATO-led Implementation Force (1995-96) and Stabilization Force (1997-) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later to the NATO-led force in Kosovo (1999-). Several NATO states have also contributed forces to the UN-mandated (but not UN-run) International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, which became a NATO operation as of 11 August 2003. Several NATO members have also contributed forces to help maintain stability, under U.S. leadership, in post-conflict Iraq (2003-).

Exceptions include contributions to the longstanding UN-led operations in Cyprus and the Middle East, the previously-noted deployment of SHIRBRIG to UNMEE on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, Australia’s role as lead troop contributor to both coalition and UN peace operations in Timor Leste, Portugal’s contribution of an infantry battalion to that operation, and Japan’s contribution of an engineering battalion. None of these are particularly high-risk operations.

The UK and France have sent battalion-sized forces (on the order of 1,000 troops) to serve temporarily in high-risk African contexts, working alongside UN operations in Sierra Leone and DR Congo, respectively. France also sent troops to help maintain a ceasefire in Côte d’Ivoire, and the United States briefly deployed a company of Marines in Liberia, both in parallel with West African peacekeepers. In all these instances, Western troops remained under their own chain of command. Developed states have not sent major military units to serve under UN operational control in complex operations in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1994.
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\textsuperscript{31} UN General Assembly, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 35.

\textsuperscript{32} A/57/711, para. 30.
4.4.2 Building “Brigade-Sized Forces” for UN Operations

The Brahimi Report’s remedies encouraged developed and developing states to collaborate in training and equipping peacekeepers, and urged that states volunteer—or collaborate—to create “brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces” able to meet the 30/90-day rapid deployment guidelines, and to associate them with UNSAS. In the newly designed UNSAS system, DPKO evaluates member states’ offers and, with their concurrence, will suggest brigade-size groupings using forces in UNSAS that are at least in Level II, have been visited by a team from the DPKO Force Generation Service, have received UN training standards and materials, and have arranged to remedy any equipment deficiencies.

DPKO consulted with UNSAS participants about the proposed “brigade-sized forces,” receiving roughly a dozen replies but no offers to form such forces. In January 2003, the SG reported that no new commitments for pre-formed brigade groups had been received, but welcomed offers from SHIRBRIG members to share their experience in establishing brigade level forces and to list their capacity as part of UNSAS. SHIRBRIG members agreed in late 2002 to consider participation in robust UN operations on a case-by-case basis and sent a planning unit to UNMIL; they may also deploy to a peacekeeping mission in Sudan. DPKO’s 2003 Military Handbook for UNSAS notes how creating regionally-based coherent units can utilize common procedures, reduce response time, create real rapid deployment capacity and reduce UN costs. In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defense staff adopted a policy framework for the African Union that moved in this direction, recommending the earmarking of a brigade-sized contribution to a regional stand-by arrangement from each of the five African sub-regions, starting with identifying about 500 trained military and civilian observers.

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33 A/55/305, para. 115.
35 A/57/711, para. 36.
The European Union is also creating its own military capacity for peace operations, with a small initial deployment to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The deteriorating security situation in the northeastern DR Congo in May-June 2003 led the EU to take the unprecedented step of committing forces outside of Europe with French-led Operation Artemis, under Chapter VII authorization from the Security Council. That force was replaced in turn by a brigade-sized, three-battalion task force made up of ground troops from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal, with protection from Indian attack helicopters, also functioning under Chapter VII. In effect, the UN has created, in this South Asia-based reinforcement for MONUC, the sort of regional multinational brigade that the Brahimi Report advocated, though not exercised in advance.

4.4.3 On-call Rosters for Rapid Deployment

Effective deployment of a complex UN operation requires a rapidly-deployable command and control staff that can be in position to receive and direct deploying troops. In drafting the Brahimi Report, consideration was given to broadening the UN Field Service, which currently provides technical support to field operations, to include 100 military officers on two to three year UN appointments whose job it would be to set up a new mission’s military headquarters. But cost and precedent argued instead for a revolving, stand-by roster of 100 military specialists who, ideally, would get to know UN procedures and one another better by first serving together in an operational mission for 90 days before returning home to remain on call. The original concept required member states to place individuals on call.

DPKO developed initial “profiles of expertise” for a Military On-Call List that was larger than the Panel proposed, dividing it into Group I (subject to call-
up on seven days notice) and Group II (14 days notice). Group I initially contained 33 positions but was pared down by late 2002 to just nine: the mission chief of staff, the chiefs of military personnel, information, operations, and logistics, and four staff officers. Nominees for the Group I positions were to be called to headquarters when an operation seemed likely, to review preliminary concepts of operations, participate in the technical mission survey, and create the detailed mission plan in collaboration with the Military Division’s Mission Planning Service. Group I personnel (145 positions) would be expected to report to a staging area, such as the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, within two weeks of call-up. For Group II, states were asked to fill positions in the roster, with names desirable but optional.

DPKO’s implementation of the on-call list resembles an earlier DPKO “Rapidly Deployable Mission headquarters” (RDMHQ) concept but with better-specified skill sets and a far more ambitious roster concept (in which an already much larger military list would be matched by comparable police/justice and civilian rosters; see sections 4.5 and 4.6, below). Like the RDMHQ, the on-call list supports rapid deployment of one mission at a time. In a pinch, it could support a new mission every three or four months, if other rapid deployment elements were in place. Although the Panel envisioned a more flexible deployment capacity with two or more teams maintained at the equivalent of Group I readiness, the implemented version is more operational in design.

In the spring of 2001, the S-G canvassed member states for support of the on-call list. By the end of 2001 he had 22 replies and just seven more by October 2002. Fewer than ten states nominated individuals. In March 2002, the Special Committee observed that, “Many delegations shared the Secretariat’s concern regarding the limited response to the United Nations stand-by arrangements system…. [Yet, t]hey underlined their preference for pledging expertise rather than names to the on-call lists.” By the end of 2002, DPKO had received “bids for positions” on the on-call list from 32 member states, covering each of the positions on the list with “at least two nominations.” Few states nominated individuals, however, posing “particular challenges, particularly in gaining coherence prior to deployment.” If DPKO can just find sufficient names to fill a couple sets of Group I rosters with coherent teams (all it needs is 18 names), it will have both a lean and an efficient design for rapid military operational planning.


43 Guéhenno (2003), annex, 5.
4.4.4 Pre-deployment assessments for troop contributors

The S-G’s first implementation report endorsed unreservedly the Brahimi Report’s recommendation that the UN evaluate troop offers before deployment, and proposed “to send a team from DPKO to each mission every 6 months to ensure that standards are continuing to be met.”\(^{44}\) The Special Committee endorsed it more warily, provided it was “administered impartially, without geographic bias.”\(^{45}\) In essence, the Committee wanted developed and developing countries to receive assessment teams with about equal frequency. The Security Council, meeting at heads of state level, pledged to “take steps to assist the UN to obtain trained and properly equipped peacekeeping personnel.”\(^{46}\)

At the end of 2001, DPKO’s Training and Evaluation Service (TES) was still hiring personnel to do the assessments and aimed to undertake pilot assessments that spring. In its year-end report to the Secretary-General, DPKO said that in 2002 it “established training assessment criteria to direct and assist member states with pre-deployment training,” but did not set a goal of conducting such assessments in 2003.\(^{47}\)

On the other hand, DPKO’s Force Generation Service, which maintains UNSAS, has undertaken about two dozen voluntary “pre-deployment visits” to troop contributing countries since 2001 as part of the process of negotiating an MOU regarding a country’s specific contributions to a peace operation, who will support it in the field (95 percent of MOUs now entail reimbursable self-support—a so-called “wet lease”), and agreement on reimbursement for wear and tear on contingent-owned equipment.\(^{48}\) UN auditors noted, however, that in 2001 and 2002, only three to four percent of mission MOUs were signed before troop contingents deployed and that the average MOU was signed three months after deployment. Some countries took advantage of that fact to chisel on what they had promised the UN, as determined by subsequent, mandatory in-mission arrival and inspection reports (“What was actually sent?”) and operational

\(^{44}\) A/55/502, para. 91.

\(^{45}\) A/C.4/55/6, para. 21.

\(^{46}\) S/RES/1318, para. III.b.3.


ready to become mandatory for troop contributors. 49

Sidebar 9:

HIV/AIDS and Peacekeeping

Security Council Resolution 1308 (17 July 2000) recognized “that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability, which increase the risk of exposure to the disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care.” With over 28 million individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa living with HIV/AIDS and estimates that infection rates within uniformed services are two-to-five times higher than in the general population, the General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (June 2001) urged UN member states, by 2003, to “have in place national strategies to address the spread of HIV among national uniformed services… and consider ways of using personnel from these services who are educated and trained in HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention to assist with HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention activities….”

DPKO promotes HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention among UN peacekeepers, in collaboration with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Former DPKO Assistant Secretary-General Michael Sheehan noted that, “DPKO is committed to working with our partners to support HIV/AIDS awareness among our peacekeeping forces. It is crucial that peacekeepers have the knowledge to protect themselves and the communities they serve.” By mid-2003, DPKO had in place an HIV/AIDS Policy Advisor in New York to “coordinate a comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS within peacekeeping operations,” in addition to Policy Advisors placed with UN peace operations in Sierra Leone, DR Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Timor Leste (with a fifth advisor planned for Liberia).

UNAIDS developed an HIV/AIDS Awareness Card for peacekeepers that contains basic facts on HIV/AIDS, a code of conduct, prevention instructions, and a condom. After field-testing in Sierra Leone, it is now standard issue in all peacekeeping operations, produced in 10 languages that cover 90 percent of all nationalities currently serving in UN operations.


DPKO has developed a standard sequence of options to remedy equipment and sustainability shortfalls. Pairing of troop contributors with third-country equipment donors, and the Brindisi Strategic Deployment Stocks, are jointly intended to meet emergency equipment needs for urgent operations.\footnote{A/57/397, paras. 28-29.}

If TES and the Force Generation and Military Personnel Service, which manages UNSAS, can combine pre-deployment visits with operational readiness reports and training evaluations, DPKO will eventually have a powerful tool for assuring quality in the military contributions made to UN peacekeeping. This is a politically sensitive task, but the risk of failing an assessment may deter some countries from offering substandard troops and equipment to DPKO, and the department is likely in any case to work with potential contributors in an iterative fashion to avoid such direct confrontations.

### 4.4.5 UN "Standard Generic Training Modules"

Potential troop contributors will have a better idea of the capabilities DPKO is looking for now that the department is distributing its initial Standard Generic Training Modules (SGTM). In 2002, TES collaborated with national and regional peacekeeping training centers and “delegates of more than 75 member states and regional organizations” at four regional seminars to evaluate the SGTM project. Having absorbed that regional input, the project is making available on CD-ROM a compilation of UN training standards and practices as part of the UN Peacekeeping Training Standardization Project, with 16 “level one” training modules distributed so far. In 2003, TES is developing SGTM to address the training needs of middle level military officers who serve as military observers, staff officers, or unit leaders. Modules for senior military leaders will be developed in 2004 and 2005.\footnote{UN DPKO, Military Division, Training and Evaluation Service, “Training and Standardization Project,” see: \texttt{www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm_home.htm}. TES’s presence on the web is, as of mid-2003, still quite scant with none of the completed modules uploaded and few of any page’s links activated.}

### 4.5 Recruiting and Deploying Capable Police and Other Criminal Justice Personnel

To facilitate rapid and effective deployment of well-qualified and trained CivPol in peace operations, the Panel urged member states:

- To establish national pools of civilian police officers, ready for deployment on short notice;
• To enter into regional partnerships for civilian police training and promote conformance with training standards promulgated by the United Nations;
• To designate a single point of contact within governments for the provision of civilian police to UN peace operations; and
• To establish national pools, regional training and focal points for judicial, penal and human rights specialists to support the creation of “collegial rule of law teams.”

The Panel recommended that the UN, in turn, create on-call lists comparable to those created for the military to support rapid deployment of civilian police and the other elements of these rule of law teams.52

Compared to the military side of the house, less significant progress has been made toward rapid deployment of CivPol. While some member states provide skilled civilian police and are committed to improving UN capacity for rule of law teams, too few states have created either national pools of candidates for international operations or, with the possible exception of the European Union, moved toward regional training partnerships. At a time when the CivPol Division is seeking more highly skilled individuals for deployment, many CivPol candidates offered to the UN are still fundamentally unqualified. For the UN deployment to Liberia in fall 2003, a majority of those interviewed for CivPol positions failed to meet basic UN standards, which include skills such as driving an automobile and speaking English (the mission language).53 Some member states may fail to appreciate the skills needed for CivPol, may not have capacity to provide highly skilled candidates, or many choose not to send them. Other impediments to providing better police may include the lack of a common set of standards and doctrine for training civilian police, or funding for national training programs.

The UN Secretariat had expressed the intention to draft standardized CivPol rules and procedures but has been hampered by a lack of member state feedback. Some regional training programs, such as those of the European Union, are being developed in close coordination with DPKO, however, and the department has helped to arrange some bilateral donor training assistance (e.g., from Norway and Sweden for Jordan). Primary DPKO CivPol training still falls under the purview of TES, raising concerns that CivPol training may not garner


53 Interview, UN DPKO, October 2003. English is the most common mission language in UN peace operations.
attention comparable to that devoted to military training or be structured appropriately.  

Meanwhile, the Panel’s proposal for a single point of contact for CivPol in member governments caused immediate bureaucratic reactions from some permanent missions to the UN, which stressed that they already served as focal points for police requests. The SG’s first implementation report reinterpreted this Panel recommendation as addressing contacts between member states, not member states and the UN; the Special Committee welcomed the clarification and discussion ended. The quality of contact, however, is uneven. A few member states’ missions at the United Nations include police advisors, but DPKO also maintains working contacts with key officials in capitals, or liaises with Civilian Police Advisors who sit in Departments of Interior. The Division additionally works with military officers in Departments of Foreign Affairs or Defense whose portfolios include responsibility for police as well as military matters. This inconsistent national attention to civilian policing roughly matches the inconsistent quality of CivPol contributed to UN operations and suggests there is still a long way to go before the United Nations can expect consistent and timely contributions of well-trained and well-qualified police for its operations.

By late 2001, the Civilian Police Division developed a model CivPol headquarters as well as generic job descriptions for 100 posts for initial field deployments. In February 2002, Finland hosted a CivPol Experts Conference where DPKO, 47 member states, and two regional organizations discussed rapid deployment and the development of rosters to support it. In August 2002, the Division distributed to member states a draft proposal for the CivPol On-Call roster. Two months later, however, DPKO had received no offers of expertise for the roster. Since then, many candidates have been offered, but the numbers of qualified candidates are not sufficient to quickly field CivPol without further, individual consultations with member states who require re-vetting their own nominees to the on-call rosters. Such a lengthy review process can delay rapid deployment.

54 Interviews, UN DPKO, March, May, and October 2003.
55 A/55/502, para. 100; and A/C.4/55/6, para. 23.
56 Interviews, UN DPKO, March and May 2003.
57 A/56/732, para. 28.
59 Interviews, UN DPKO, May and October 2003.
The lack of progress is mirrored on the Police Division’s web page. While useful web data is available from other DPKO offices, the CivPol pages merely describe what the division is supposed to do, with less evidence of policy or product development or history of recent activities. This is disturbing and perhaps reflective of the difficulty that the Civilian Police Division has had in gaining and maintaining effective leadership since its creation as a separate entity in 2001. Although DPKO received over 10,000 applications for the 91 new posts approved by the General Assembly in January 2002, the position of Civilian Police Advisor (and division director) had to be re-advertised in the fall, presumably due to a lack of suitable initial candidates. A new advisor was finally announced in January 2003.60

The division has since been able to move forward with planning and staffing, with 18 of 20 professional posts filled as of May 2003. The new Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (referred to in section 2.5.3) became operational with a Judicial Officer and a Corrections Officer to formulate and implement rule of law strategies in peace operations. The Unit conducted a fact-finding mission to Kosovo in April 2003, the basis for working with the DPKO’s Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit to produce a lessons learned report on the rule of law and peace operations. After further consultations within the UN and with member states, the aim is to create an operations-focused framework for rule of law, training guidelines, and on-call lists.61 Unit staff also traveled to the DR Congo and Liberia to help with mission planning later in 2003.

With only two officers, however, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit is clearly understaffed to both handle the development of specific mission plans (the UN mandate in Liberia alone requires development of police, police training, a national legal framework, and judicial and correctional institutions) and the development of a broader UN capacity to manage, recruit, coordinate, and integrate rule of law components for all UN operations.62 DPKO has a three-year-old MOU with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the selection of human rights officers for peace operations that anticipated the creation of a stand-by roster of human rights specialists for such operations but there, too, OHCHR lacks the staff to develop this capacity.63

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60 UN News Center, “Kiran Bedi Appointed Civilian Police Adviser in Department of Peacekeeping Operations,” UN Press Release, SGA/827, PKO/100, 10 January 2003.
61 Interviews, DPKO, March, May, and October 2003.
63 Interview, UN DPKO, March 2003.
New efforts, however, may help push the development of rapidly deployable rule of law teams. In September 2003, Great Britain chaired Security Council sessions on the need for rule of law components, welcoming remarks by member states and the S-G that urged a “comprehensive approach” to “quickly deployable personnel,” including police, lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and prison officers. The Council welcomed development of an SG report on how to build such a capacity; a report is expected early in 2004, building on the Rule of Law Task Force findings.

4.6 Recruiting and Deploying Capable Civilian Field Staff

Historically, DPKO has had a difficult time recruiting and deploying well-qualified civilians with special skills to field missions in a timely manner, partly because of the lack of a stand-by system for civilian staff and partly because recruitment was channeled through a few headquarters recruiting officers. Lacking a standard recruitment system or stand-by roster, DPKO has been overwhelmed repeatedly by job applications in recent years: first for field positions in 1999-2000 and then during its own period of 50 percent growth (2001-2002), when as many as 500 persons applied for every new job in the department. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the ACABQ criticized DPKO for long average lead times in filling advertised posts in 2001 (362 days for regular vacancies within DPKO and 264 days for the “emergency” posts authorized in round one of Brahimi implementation).

The process of growing the department mirrored the ills highlighted by the Brahimi Report, since it was still the old, overstretched organization that had to handle the thousands of applications for “Brahimi” posts in the first round of recruiting. In 2002 it did somewhat better, cutting the average hiring lag to 180 days, filling twice as many positions at headquarters and in the field (about 600) as the rest of the Secretariat combined, and reassigning three times as many people (about 400) as the rest of the Secretariat. DPKO’s goal in 2003 was to reduce the average hiring lag time to 95 days, emphasizing automated rosters accessible by field missions as well as headquarters.

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64 UN General Assembly, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit of the policies and procedures for recruiting staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Note by the Secretary-General, A/57/224, 19 July 2002, paras. 1-5.

65 Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003; and UN General Assembly, Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/723, 6 February 2003, para. 21.
Delegating some hiring authority to the field in 2002 improved both the speed and competitiveness of the process, but general delegation of hiring authority required field access to the latest policies and procedures. On 15 January 2003, the DPKO human resources handbook went online and all operations now have instant access to the same rulebook. DPKO can now begin to delegate more hiring and management authority to the field and may as a result be able to reduce the number of “processing people” at headquarters.66

4.6.1 The Galaxy Project

The Brahimi Report recommended that the Secretariat establish a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-qualified civilian candidates available to deploy to peace operations on short notice; and that field missions should have access to the roster and the authority to recruit from it in accordance with Secretariat guidelines.67 DPKO has taken major steps toward implementing this recommendation in partnership with the UN Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM), which is modifying OHRM’s “Galaxy Project” for online job announcements and applications to meet peace operations requirements.68

The Galaxy Project aspires to be a Web-based system for Secretariat-wide recruitment, appointment, post management and roster management. Eventually it will give program managers tools for evaluating candidates in accordance with pre-approved evaluation criteria, although the December 2002 release permitted sorting only by gender and national origin.69

The Special Committee and ACABQ like Galaxy and hope that it will help reduce hiring lag times, Secretariat-wide.70 The prototype system was released at the end of 2001, with the first operational release in May 2002. Vacancy

66 Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003.
announcements for DPKO have been posted since December 2002 on two Galaxy-linked websites: one for UN job profiles in 16 occupational groups at all professional levels, and the other for all current field mission vacancies. Positions are posted for two weeks each. In its first three months of use, posted DPKO jobs attracted 63,000 applications.71

Electronic job applications have replaced dozens of boxes of resumes that used to litter the floor of the DPKO Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS). Until Galaxy permits more sophisticated sorting of applications, however, PMSS staff still must review each application received in some detail but can triage and bundle applications electronically for forwarding to managers. UN staff pointed to CANADEM, which the Canadian government uses to maintain a roster of potential candidates for field employment, as a model online recruiting system that allows five or six staff members to maintain a roster of 10,000 names, which indicates the kind of staff productivity that appropriately designed information technology can generate. 72

4.6.2 Civilian Rapid Deployment Teams

Galaxy’s own roster module is under development. When complete, it will support DPKO’s civilian Rapid Deployment Team (RDT) concept, which is based on the “range of jobs required to undertake a technical survey and initiate and support a field operation for the first 90 days.”73 There are to be three RDTs of about 120 persons each, drawn from volunteers in DPKO and field missions who have been pre-cleared by their supervisors for quick, temporary release from their full-time post (thereby removing a traditional obstacle to rapid staff deployment, especially of high-performing staff members). Each volunteer will remain on the roster and subject to call-up for 12 months. Each technical area of the department reviews candidates and assesses who should participate in which team. The first command post exercise to test the RDT concept was held in

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71 Stimson Center interview, DPKO, 6 March 2003. Overall, in Galaxy’s first nine months of operation (May 2002-January 2003) 608 posted job vacancies attracted 155,000 applications from 198 countries, more than double the number of applications received by the UN in 2000 and 2001 combined. UN General Assembly, Implications of all provisions of General Assembly resolution 55/258 on human resources management, Note by the Secretary-General, A/57/726, 10 February 2003, para. 20.

72 CANADEM allows applicants to indicate type, level, and locale of job experience, offering 30 experience categories each with several subcategories to choose from, including indications of field experience, plus language skills, level of education, and availability (how soon, and how long), see: www.canadem.ca.

73 UN General Assembly, Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General, A/57/711, 16 January 2003, para. 46.
January 2003, using staff from the logistics, personnel, and finance services. Starting in February, staff could apply for the RDT online.\footnote{74}

4.6.3 Civilian Training and Support Programs

For many years, finding expertise for peace operations was a matter of hope more than planning or programming: The UN hoped that states would send them well-trained troops and, later, police. When it needed a chief administrative officer to keep the books in a new operation, it hoped it could find an experienced staff member to take the job. As missions became more complex, it recruited a wider variety of job specialties from outside the system, but training to fit them into the system and acculturate them to its rules and procedures, or to the dangers and objectives of the mission, was not as high a priority as getting the mission assembled. Staff recruited for field operations were given little orientation ("induction") training and may not have been told the precise job they were to fill before reaching the field, while field managers may or may not have been told they were coming or what jobs they were to fill. In general, the urgent need to do the mission stole time from teaching the mission: imparting critical information about the operating environment to international hires, and essential information about UN policies and procedures to international and local hires alike.

Although the Brahimi Report placed great stress on alleviating the roadblocks to recruiting and deploying capable civilian staff to peace operations, the issue of training for civilians seemed to fall between the cracks. The issue was picked up, however, by the consultants who undertook the 2001 comprehensive review. They were "dismayed" at the poor treatment of field staff in particular, whether in terms of salaries, training, life support, or evacuation and security plans.\footnote{75} Between 1996 and 1999, the annual training budget in the peacekeeping support account was about $400,000, all of which was directed toward seminars and courses for member states’ military and civilian police trainers. None was directed internally. Money for training within field operations, meanwhile, amounted to just $1.4 million as late as 2000-2001,
or about *six hundredths of one percent* of the $2.4 billion those operations cost that year.\(^76\)

This situation has changed a great deal in three years. DPKO’s military training support for member states increased to $1.75 million in 2003-2004. Training programs for civilian staff in missions grew to $3.8 million, or three times per capita what it was in 2000. Nearly one quarter of that effort will support training in management skills, which has previously lagged badly behind technical training. Staff training money now also appears within the peacekeeping support account: $1.2 million in 2002 and $2.3 million in 2003, so about 2.5 percent of the support account’s civilian staff costs now relate to training.\(^77\) Responsible for planning and managing these expenditures is the new Civilian Training Section in PMSS, set up after the second round of Brahimi implementation. This section will, for the first time, institutionalize civilian training within DPKO and coordinate peacekeeping-related training for civilians at headquarters and in the field.

Taking a step beyond job training, DPKO is for the first time instituting a career development program, run by the new Human Resources Management and Development Section in PMSS, and is taking steps to retain a growing pool of mostly young, field-experienced civilian personnel. Staff exchange programs will also bring field staff to headquarters for 90-day assignments and send headquarters staff into the field to experience firsthand the operations for which they are providing support or drafting guidance.\(^78\) Such exchanges will help to bridge perceptual and cultural divides between headquarters and the field, changing a sometimes “us-them” relationship into something more like teamwork, with greater appreciation in both directions of the needs and constraints imposed by their respective operating environments.

DPKO is simultaneously making a greater effort to retain and reassign staff whose missions are downsized or closed. Currently it is emphasizing the finance and budget, procurement, and human resources occupational groups. Comparable efforts presumably are made to retain and reassign information and communications technology specialists who are responsible for creating and maintaining the electronic links that support everything from decentralized management to video teleconferencing.\(^79\) These are the mission-critical support


\(^{77}\) A/57/723, tables 12 and 13.

\(^{78}\) A/57/723, para. 26.

\(^{79}\) A/57/723, para. 22.
specialties that DPKO’s Office of Mission Support needs to make the wheels of an operation turn.

Seemingly less emphasized, however, are recruitment, training, and retention of mission-oriented staff. These are the people whom the finance, budget, personnel, and ICT people exist to support, whose primary job it is to implement the substance of the mandate. DPKO’s support elements must be ready, willing, and able to perform their duties but getting there is only half the fun. Good mission support enables mission success but cannot create it.

This emphasis on support elements may reflect in part the respective cultures of DPKO’s Office of Mission Support—can-do, nuts and bolts, operator-oriented—and its Office of Operations—analytical, conceptual, conservative, and oriented toward meeting the needs of UN higher-ups, the demands of the Security Council, and the queries of member states’ diplomatic missions. The Office of Operations includes all of the country desk officers who are the nominal first points of contact for operations that have political queries for headquarters. It also includes the Situation Center, the 24/7 switchboard for emergency messages from the field that also hosts DPKO’s video teleconferencing facility. Historically, Operations has tended not to involve itself either early or deeply enough in the details of mission planning, which is precisely when military, police, logistics and transport planners need political context for the plans they are asked to make. Because Operations pays less attention to the nuts and bolts of the field (or the department) the nuts and bolts are designed and assembled by others.

Building up a roster of substantive capabilities for possible new missions would also put the Secretariat out ahead of the Security Council, where it would run the risk of displeasing states that oppose a pro-active role for the UN in either short-term conflict prevention or in managing conflict transitions—especially authoritative management on the order of East Timor or Kosovo. Not to prepare for such contingencies, however, runs the risk of falling flat when given the job or of being ready to move but having nothing to say on arrival. Politics aside, this is a problem for DPKO because, while support requirements are fairly generic and adaptable to the needs of a new operation, substantive requirements are not generic—they may be unique—so banking the right kinds of expertise in advance would not be easy. But DPKO could build on its relationship with the UN Volunteers program, from which about half of the civilian staff for Kosovo and East Timor were initially drawn.\(^80\) It could also reach out to universities and think tanks to build up a network of advisers and

potential mission recruits. There are many ways in which the information technologies now being tapped, and the outreach programs now being planned by the Best Practices Unit, could make the UN more ready to shoulder the substantive burdens of complex operations without exorbitant stand-by expense or undue political risk.

4.6.4 Reforming the UN Field Service

The UN Field Service was created in 1949 to support peacekeeping missions by providing "land transport; radio communications maintenance; security of premises, mission personnel, supplies and records; and maintenance of order during meetings, hearings, and investigations." At the end of 2000, the composition of the Field Service reflected the need for reform: The average age of Field Service Officers was 47 with none under 30, partly due to a hiring freeze since 1993. It is overwhelmingly (85 percent) male in composition, reflecting its original recruitment among developed state militaries. Given a lack of major training or career development opportunities, the Field Service skill base has fallen behind the times. In 1997, the Office of Internal Oversight Services proposed to phase it out entirely. By 2000, its 460 personnel constituted just 13 percent of the international civilian staff employed in UN peacekeeping.81

Yet the Field Service, the only UN staff category "exclusively oriented to the field and to peace operations,"82 has remained the UN’s only corps of first responders for new operations who do that job full-time. The Brahimi Report thus encouraged “the urgent revision of the Field Service’s composition and raison d’etre, to better match the present and future demands of field operations, with particular emphasis on mid- to senior-level managers in key administrative and logistics areas.”83 Although not recommended by the Report, a revamped Field Service structure could be home to other key field-oriented capacity, such as rapidly deployable planning and management staffs for the military and rule of law components of peace operations.

Integration of the Field Service into the global civilian staffing strategy recommended by the Panel appears to have lagged, however. In a May 2002 report, DPKO said that it was:

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82 Ibid., para. 12.
83 A/55/305, para. 140.
In consultation with the Field Service Staff Union and the Office of Human Resources Management, on the concept and structure of a revised Field Service category. In order to define the core operational requirements, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has started collecting and analyzing the necessary demographic and other data of personnel serving in the field as well as occupational groups currently used in field operations. Once the profile…is completed, …a managed mobility system, selection criteria and procedures, as well as issues related to the conditions of service, need to be discussed and agreed upon. [emphasis added]

The Field Service is thus being handled as an element of the larger problem of field staff conditions of service and career development opportunities. Addressing the Field Service in this larger context makes sense, but in moving to homogenize its field personnel policies, DPKO risks losing the opportunity to rebuild the Field Service as a flexible, updated, full-time first response team for critical elements of future peace operations.

4.7 LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT

The Panel spelled out substantial logistical roadblocks to rapid mission deployment, with delays caused by depleted UN equipment reserves, internal procurement bottlenecks, long delivery lead-times, and difficulty getting cash for procurement into the field. To help meet the 30-90/day deployment timelines, the Panel supported a global logistics support strategy that included additional “mission start up kits” at UN Logistics Base, Brindisi. The Panel also recommended updating the unwieldy UN procurement system; shifting procurement authority for peacekeeping on a trial basis from the Department of Management to DPKO; and delegating more purchasing authority from headquarters to the field. Finally, the Panel urged giving the Secretary-General authority to use up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund in advance of Security Council action authorizing a new mission, with ACABQ approval, as discussed earlier (see section 4.2).

4.7.1 Building Strategic Deployment Stocks

During the mid 1990s, DPKO created and successfully used small start-up kits of basic mission equipment at the UNLB. That equipment was often not replaced and, as new operations outpaced mission closures, UNLB was left without many long-lead items needed for full mission deployment. While

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84 A/57/78/add.1, 29 May 2002, para. 5.
standing contracts gave the UN high production priority, filling and shipping
UN orders for major equipment can take months. A fairly straightforward item
like a four-wheel-drive light truck in UN colors might take three months to slot
into the production line, build, and ship. Specialty vehicles like airport fire
trucks (critical safety items for air-dependent operations) might take nine
months. Armored vehicles require three to four months and digital microwave
links (towers, antennas, and supporting equipment that connect the elements of
widely-dispersed operations) two to four months.\footnote{For an extensive list of equipment and lead times, see A/56/902, annex.}

Resolving these delays required more than what the Panel recommended.
Following the 2001 comprehensive review of DPKO, the S-G proposed that the
UN create Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) pre-positioned at UNLB. The
second implementation report presented three options involving tradeoffs
between the cost of UN acquisition and maintenance of equipment and the cost
of having manufacturers maintain inventories of certain equipment on the UN’s
behalf, for an annual fee.

The “light” option relied heavily on such “retainer contracts.” DPKO
concluded that, while the up-front costs of the light option would be relatively
low (about $30 million), the retainer fees could amount to 30 percent of the
value of the inventory maintained, drive recurring costs to $100 million per year,
and make it a very costly option over time.\footnote{A/55/977, para. 123.}

The “heavy” option put the onus on the UN itself to stockpile essentially all
of the equipment and service capacity that a complex operation would need to
deploy rapidly. DPKO concluded that this option would not only be costly ($350
million up front) but would probably deploy equipment faster and in greater
volume than troops, police, and other mission personnel could be assembled and
trained to make effective use of it.\footnote{A/55/977, para. 122.}

The “medium” option turned out to be just right. Sized initially by DPKO to
support one complex and one traditional operation simultaneously, it was
reduced by the ACABQ to support just one complex operation, the traditional
operation being viewed as a lesser-included subset.\footnote{A/56/902, para. 15.}
As long as DPKO is not
called upon to launch a complex mission within six months or so of initiating a
traditional one, this concept is largely valid but it gives DPKO reduced surge
capacity by comparison to the original plan, which aimed to promote rapid response to average demand. 90

Under the medium option:

The Secretariat will procure key items, such as vehicles, communications and engineering equipment, accommodations and ablution units, and store them at UNLB as strategic deployment stocks. Other critical items and services, such as strategic lift, fuel, rations and water, will be procured through contractual arrangements before the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing a new mission. 91

Such contractual arrangements include “letters of assist” (LOAs) with governments for key services. Strategic airlift, for example, is critical for rapid delivery of equipment and personnel to the mission area. In addition to LOAs for provision of medium-size (IL-76) cargo aircraft, DPKO has investigated long-term LOAs for large cargo aircraft (AN-124). 92

To launch the SDS, the GA approved $142 million for 2002-2003 for the initial investment, financed through funds remaining from closed peacekeeping missions ($81 million), the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund ($14 million) and new assessments ($47 million). This is a one-time expenditure to finance the stocks. Replacement equipment will be paid for out of the budgets of peacekeeping missions that draw upon the stocks. Additional SDS resources include equipment transferred from DPKO’s mission reserve and surplus stocks (worth $21 million) and Italy’s donated construction of three warehouses, beginning in January 2003. The upgraded base itself will cost about $22 million a year to operate. 93

90 Periods of peak demand, historically, have involved the simultaneous launch of up to four major operations within a few months of one another: in 1991-92 and again in 1999-2000. DPKO’s original plan was geared, essentially, to launch 1.5 major operations at once.
92 A/56/732, para. 32. The UN Procurement Division also has looked into stand-by contracts with commercial AN-124 operators. Roughly 29 percent of the UN Procurement Division’s contracts in 2002, by value, were for air transport. See the Procurement Division website at: www.un.org/Depts/ptd/02pie.htm.
DPKO met a major milestone in December 2002: Brindisi stocks could support deployment of a headquarters for a traditional peacekeeping mission. (The next milestones are creating capacity for deploying one traditional mission and, finally, the capacity to support one complex mission.) By March 2003, however, the UN had disbursed just seven percent of the SDS budget for 2002-2003 (that is, goods or services had been bought and paid for). Another 22 percent had been obligated (that is, contracts had been let) and requisitions were in train to obligate a further 52 percent. A major pacing factor was the construction of the necessary climate-controlled storage facilities, including the donated warehouses, which fell behind schedule causing DPKO to seek and receive an extension on its spending authority for the SDS until the end of June 2004. A pilot exercise in rapid deployment using Brindisi and the SDS, with personnel from the missions and headquarters participating, was held in January 2003 to validate the SDS concept and integrate it into DPKO mission planning.

4.7.2 Other Procurement-Related Recommendations and Actions

The Brahimi Panel recommended that the Department of Management transfer authority and responsibility for peacekeeping procurement to DPKO on a two-year trial basis. The subsequent comprehensive review concluded, however, that “a centralized headquarters procurement process can yield synergies, and furthermore that the Procurement Division in the Department of Management has made considerable improvements to its systems and procedures, as has been recognized by member states.” The S-G concurred and decided not to implement the Brahimi Report’s recommendation.

UN Secretariat procurement of goods and services is big business and in 2001, peacekeeping operations represented 80 percent of it. Just before the end-decade surge in UN operations in 1998, peacekeeping procurement totaled $174 million, just 20 percent higher than purchases for UN headquarters and other UN offices. By 2001, however, the value of procurement for peacekeeping operations had risen to more than four times that of headquarters. It subsided a bit in 2002, to $640 million.

94 A/57/751, table 3 and para. 12; A/57/772/Add.9, para. 33; and A/57/751, para. 7.
96 A/55/977, para. 205.
97 UN purchases of humanitarian and emergency relief supplies are in addition to these amounts and are funded by voluntary contributions.
Table 6 lists the top 15 national recipients of UN headquarters and peacekeeping-related procurement contracts. For every dollar that the U.S. government contributes in assessments to the UN regular budget, U.S. companies receive back nearly 50 cents in headquarters purchase orders. American firms received 77 percent of those orders, by value, in 2002, reflecting the New York City location of UN Headquarters.

Peacekeeping purchases are more widely distributed, as are peacekeeping operations. U.S. firms are still the number two national recipients of UN orders, however, at nearly 10 percent of the total, but Russian firms lead all others by a fairly wide margin owing largely to heavy lift air transport contracts, which are peacekeeping operations’ single most costly support item. (Russia, Ukraine, and the United States are the only countries that fly cargo aircraft as large as the AN-124 or the C-5. All C-5s are operated by the U.S. military, however, and hence are very expensive to borrow.)

Other countries of interest in table 6 include the DR Congo and Sierra Leone, which appear prominently in the 2002 listings, indicating local purchases by the large peacekeeping operations begun in those states in 1999. The two countries that seem to have the best balance of UN payments and procurement income are South Africa and India, which receive in headquarters purchase orders a substantial fraction of what they pay into the UN regular budget, and receive in peacekeeping purchase orders roughly ten times what they pay in peacekeeping assessments. Both, however, are also substantial troop contributors.89

89 As of October 2003, India was the fourth largest contributor of troops to UN operations and South Africa was number ten. UN DPKO, “Monthly Summary of Contributors,” see:
In 2001, the last year for which the UN has published data breaking out the share of procurement decisions made in the field, peacekeeping missions themselves allocated 43 percent of the money. DPKO and the UN Procurement Division allocated the rest. The average headquarters purchase order, based largely on standing systems contracts, was ten times larger than the average order placed from the field, which cannot exceed $200,000 for any contractor or purchase order in a given year without approval of the headquarters Committee on Contracts. Because mission purchase orders do not draw on standing contracts (which are, almost by definition, managed from headquarters), large orders must pass through the eight-step process for new requisitions that was outlined in the Brahimi Report.99

The Report argued in favor of raising this ceiling to as much as $1 million “depending on mission size and need,” where accompanied by appropriate training of field staff, provision up to date procurement manuals, and appropriate procedures for accountability.100 The ceiling has not changed but DPKO has been working to increase the ability of field missions to implement and manage large contracts, with technical assistance, training, quality assurance programs to monitor vendor compliance with contract terms, annual meetings of chief procurement officers and an Extranet site for the sharing of best practices, online procurement manuals, and electronic requisition tracking tools that allow headquarters monitoring of field procurement decisions. Wet-lease arrangements with troop contributors and greater emphasis on pre-deployment equipment inspections should also reduce the amount of UN bulk logistics support needed for military contingents in UN operations.101

Over the years, the UN’s majority of developing states have been keen to receive a greater share of UN procurement. Table 6 indicates that the share of peacekeeping-related contracts going to developing and “transitional” (former communist) economies has risen from 47 to 59 percent since 1998. Deducting the two main transitional recipients (Russia and Ukraine), developing economies’ share of peacekeeping procurement has dropped slightly since 1998, from 41 to 38 percent, but the value of that share has grown by $172 million.

100 Ibid., para. 168.
101 A/57/187, paras. 16-22. As of April 2002, operations in the DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo, and East Timor had been delegated authority for purchases up to $200,000. A/56/887, paras. 56-60.
## Table 6: UN Procurement, 1998 and 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1998 Procurement</th>
<th></th>
<th>2002 Procurement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Headquarters Offices</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Headquarters Offices</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Total (Rank ordered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>143,766,117</td>
<td>174,240,342</td>
<td>172,623,657</td>
<td>639,998,083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developing &amp; Transitional Economies</strong></td>
<td>25,554,790</td>
<td>82,072,028</td>
<td>12,932,251</td>
<td>375,394,074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
<td>17.87%</td>
<td>47.07%</td>
<td>7.49%</td>
<td>58.31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source:
Rapid and Effective Employment

When a large peacekeeping operation deploys into a war-torn country, an important early task is to explain its presence to the local parties and the local population, who may or may not have heard that another army was due in town and may not recognize it as friendly. Later, the operation may have to sell its “products” (such as free and fair elections) over the heads of local factions’ propaganda machines. Such oppositional activity has been an ongoing problem.

Sidebar 11: Rapid Response for Other Humanitarian Action

In addition to housing DPKO’s strategic deployment stocks, since March 2001 the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, has been home to the UN Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD). UNHRD contains stocks of emergency food aid and mobile cooking facilities, medicine, shelter materials, electric generators, water treatment systems and personal safety provisions, plus rapid response equipment including trucks, shipping containers, emergency telecommunications equipment, and mobile offices. The World Food Program (WFP), the UN’s primary transport arm for humanitarian aid, manages UNHRD on behalf of partners that include the Italian government, non-governmental organizations, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Health Organization.

At any one time, WFP’s Ocean Transportation Service has 40 ships at sea, transporting two million tons of food annually, plus 20 cargo aircraft ranging in size from de Havilland Twin Otters to Ilyushin-76 heavy airlifters. In 2001, WFP operating expenses totaled $1.74 billion.

Other agencies and programs of the United Nations with emergency response programs include OCHA (Emergency Services Branch, Geneva), UNHCR, UNICEF (Office of Emergency Operations and Operations Center, New York), WHO (Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action), UNDP (Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery), and the International Labor Organization (Infocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction).


4.8 Promoting Fast and Effective Public Information in the Field

When a large peacekeeping operation deploys into a war-torn country, an important early task is to explain its presence to the local parties and the local population, who may or may not have heard that another army was due in town and may not recognize it as friendly. Later, the operation may have to sell its “products” (such as free and fair elections) over the heads of local factions’ propaganda machines. Such oppositional activity has been an ongoing problem.
for many UN operations as well as for NATO and other organizations operating in the Balkans. It is a hazard of opening up political processes in very recently violent, grievance-steeped societies that have not yet worked out the boundaries of acceptable political behavior, including what is acceptable on the airwaves.

The Panel recommended that public information strategies and personnel be included in pre-mission planning; that experienced spokespeople be integrated into the leadership team; that start-up kits of equipment be created for rapid deployment of PI teams; that DPKO or DPI set up a roster of pre-screened experts with field experience who could be deployed on short notice; and that information technology be used to keep field operations staff informed of key events in the mission area. The Report originally proposed a distinct unit, housed within DPI or DPKO, for operational planning and support of public information in peace operations. It would contribute to Integrated Mission Task Forces, ensuring that peacekeeping and political missions were fully staffed for public information and that such capabilities were rapidly deployable, were able to meet mission information needs, and that PI field staff received full support and guidance from headquarters.102

The first implementation report proposed a distinct unit in DPKO, with seven regular budget posts to be shifted from DPI.103 The ACABQ deferred this move until after the comprehensive review and, following that review, the S-G proposed to add four posts to DPKO’s newly revamped Best Practices Unit, funded by the peacekeeping support account.104 Failing to win the support of the ACABQ for these four posts, the S-G came back in 2002 with a request for two positions within the Peace and Security Section of DPI, the first support account posts for that department. He made the case that the eight person section could not otherwise do what was being asked of it: surveying and planning for new missions; designing strategy and structure for PI field components; developing deployment timetables, equipment and budget requirements for new missions; maintaining and screening a roster of PI mission candidates; producing all promotional information and publications for peace operations; and maintaining mission and headquarters websites for DPKO. In a relatively rare move, the GA overruled the ACABQ in July 2002, approving the posts.105

104 A/C.5/55/46/Add.1, para. 5.12.
So the effort to improve planning, rapid deployment, and support for public information in UN peace operations shrank from seven people, to four, to two, and the ACABQ still seems to object to them. On the other hand, as part of a program of departmental changes begun in 2002, DPI decided to close nine UN Information Centers in Europe, consolidating operations in Brussels, Geneva, and Vienna. With a growing proportion of the UN’s official documents available on the Web and CD-ROM, walk-in centers in developed countries seem less needed and the regular budget posts thus freed up could be redeployed to more pressing matters—like planning and support for public information in peace operations.

One solution to bureaucratic (and member state) reluctance to build such rapid-response capacity into the UN itself has been the creation of non-profit institutions outside the UN system that help to implement radio networks in collaboration with UN operations like MONUC, whose “Radio Okapi” reaches a substantial percentage of Congo’s population with a combination of news, music, and public affairs programming. MONUC’s collaboration with Fondation Hirondelle in Switzerland has been quite productive, permitting rapid acquisition of radio broadcast equipment, for example. Over time, MONUC has built up a substantial public information office, now planned to total some 192 persons, of whom 70 percent are national staff (Congolese). MONUC broadcasts in shortwave and FM from Kinshasa and 14 cities around the country, in French and four national languages. It provides training to Congolese journalists and broadcasters, its reporters and on-air presenters are Congolese, and it will leave behind a working infrastructure and a skilled work force.

106 In the spring 2003 budget cycle, in a seeming fit of pique, the ACABQ zeroed out a request for computers and office supplies for the two new PI positions and cut by two-thirds DPI’s request to fund field visits by these officials to peacekeeping operations. A/57/776, paras. 77-78.


108 Fondation Hirondelle’s website is www.hirondelle.org. Click on Radio Okapi. See also UN, Budget for [MONUC] for the period 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, A/58/381, 19 September 2003, p. 27.