

## **Air Power and Escalation Control**

**Ramesh V. Phadke**

*Working Paper  
Version 1.1*

*August 2003*

*This working paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the Henry L. Stimson Center. This essay is posted to provide an insight into an Indian perspective relating to escalation control and the use of airpower.*

## **Introduction**

Following the December 13, 2001 terrorist strike on the Indian Parliament, India and Pakistan again came to the brink of war. Within days, India decided to mount a diplomatic offensive backed by the deployment of armed forces along its borders with Pakistan. The military standoff that brought the armies of the two South Asian neighbors into an eye-to-eye confrontation ended only after ten months, when India finally withdrew its army to peacetime locations.

War was averted due to India's restraint, as had been previously evident during the 1999 Kargil conflict, and due to intense political and diplomatic pressure by the United States and other countries. Some observers have also ascribed India's restraint to Pakistan's nuclear threat.

A number of factors influenced the decision, such as the international and national media, and the domestic situations in India and Pakistan. Preoccupation with a widespread drought in India and the continuing terrorist attacks on soft targets such as Godhra and the temples in Jammu and Ahmedabad, and on the Indian Army's families at Kaluchak in Jammu, may have distracted the Indian decision-makers from embarking on war. Some observers, however, continue to believe that India had never wanted to go to war in the first place, so long as politico-military coercion was working to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks. There does appear to have been a debate between those who argued that war would not solve any problems and those who felt strong action was necessary. Brajesh Mishra, national security advisor to Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, stated that India came very close to war with Pakistan in January and May 2002.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the U.S. travel advisory during May-June 2002 might have originated from genuine fears of an imminent conflict, although in New Delhi the warning was seen more as a pressure tactic to restrain India.

Another crisis between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out if acts of terror continue. In the future, the Indian leaders could again come under public pressure to take suitable retaliatory action if Pakistan-based terrorists are seen to be seriously destabilizing Indian society. At the same time, influential sections of the leadership would continue to demand that India exercise restraint, whatever the provocation.

Ever since the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, the world, and more specifically the five nuclear powers recognized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been extremely anxious about the possibility that a border skirmish between the two South Asian neighbors could escalate into a nuclear exchange. One of the major reasons for this anxiety was perhaps the much-publicized "limited war" theory that the Indian Defense Minister expressly endorsed following a well-attended seminar at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi in January 2000. The seminar concluded that it

---

<sup>1</sup> "India came close to war with Pak last year: Mishra," *Indian Express* (May 18, 2003).

would indeed be possible to launch a limited retaliatory war against Pakistan even after the two countries had become overt nuclear powers. The permanent members of the United National Security Council, all of which are nuclear powers, were in no mood to admit India and Pakistan to the exclusive nuclear club and continued to hope that they would ultimately be able to prevail upon India and Pakistan to at least return to recessed deterrence, if not cap and roll back their respective weapons programs.

U.S. officials continue to exhort both countries to take urgent steps in this direction. Bharat Karnad, an Indian strategic analyst, while assessing the prospects of U.S. intervention in Kashmir, notes that the Bush administration has reaffirmed that restricting nuclear weapons to the P-5 remains a U.S. policy goal. Karnad cites U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for non-proliferation John Wolf's comment to an audience at a U.S. nuclear weapons laboratory that, "[W]e are prepared to act unilaterally to defend our interests when they are directly threatened," and that India and Pakistan's ownership of nuclear weapons and delivery systems constitutes a "direct threat to U.S. forces deployed [in the contiguous region] as well as our friends and allies because they lead to 'the ratcheting up in regional instability.'"<sup>2</sup>

As Christina Rocca, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, said in congressional testimony:

We are working hard with both nations to get them to exercise restraint. We are asking them not to conduct nuclear tests, to minimize missile tests, to announce their missile tests in order to keep the tensions down, to announce them in advance, to bring an early end to the production of fissile material, which would be in line with their stated policies of having these weapons as a minimum credible deterrent.

We are also asking them not to build sea-launch or intercontinental ballistic missiles, not to deploy nuclear-capable warheads or ballistic missiles, and to keep missiles and warheads at separate locations...The high levels of tension and the lack of dialogue and the Cold War that exists increases [sic] the risk that the nuclear threshold might be crossed through misperception or inadvertence."<sup>3</sup>

It should be noted that while the 'lack of dialogue' is stressed, Pakistan's dangerous policy of sponsoring cross-border terrorism is not emphasized.

On April 18, 2003, the Indian Prime Minister once again offered "friendly relations" if Pakistan fulfilled its promises to stem infiltration. Although India has repeatedly reiterated its doctrine of "no-first-use" (NFU), it has not succeeded in convincing the world that there is no real danger of even a limited nuclear exchange in South Asia. India has affirmed that its nuclear weapons are for deterrence and not for fighting war. Fears of an unintended or accidental nuclear exchange, however, continue to haunt Washington and other foreign capitals.

It is perhaps natural that the majority of the world, brought up on the nuclear theology of the forty-year Cold War, does not believe that two nuclear powers could ever engage in a conventional war, however limited its objectives, without unwanted escalation. Pakistan's offensive doctrine of nuclear weapons-use and India's perceived conventional superiority over Pakistan add to these concerns.

This essay argues that the threat of inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange would be minimal, if not non-existent, in the event that India chooses to employ its air power to punish its implacable neighbor.

---

<sup>2</sup> Bharat Karnad, *Nuclear Weapons & India's Security* (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), 636.

<sup>3</sup> T.V. Parsuram, *Press Trust of India* (March 22, 2003), available on internet, <http://www.samachar.com>.

India cannot, after all, remain a mute witness while Pakistan-backed terrorists routinely kill innocent civilians, including women and children. Some in India have started questioning the very purpose of maintaining large armed forces when they cannot stop cross-border terrorism.<sup>4</sup> Pakistan has all along known that given India's size, population, economic strength, and military power, it can never really hope to achieve its objective of wresting control of the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) with military force. Because of this realization, Pakistan built its nuclear capabilities to indulge freely in terrorist and other subversive activities in India under the protection of a nuclear shield. Pakistan often advances the argument that nuclear weapons are essential for its very survival and has adopted a "use them rather than lose them" nuclear strategy. This strategy is seriously flawed because it forecloses Pakistan's military options except for proxy war, and because it offers no prospect for securing J&K from India.

Pakistan has adopted, not unlike North Korea, a policy of "deterrence through danger." The higher the perceived threat from India, the more dangerous Pakistan's posturing becomes. North Korea employs the concept of deterrence through danger to hold the United States and South Korea at bay. A weak and vulnerable power feels threatened with a large and powerful neighbor. It is then ready to appear more belligerent and aggressive than it actually is. It also shows its fangs at the earliest opportunity to preempt any danger from the more powerful adversary. In the case of North Korea, the rattling of the nuclear saber is aimed precisely at attracting international attention to the serious threat to North Korea's very existence, hence attempting to draw the United States into a direct bilateral dialogue. Nuclear weapons here have only nuisance or insurance value because if one were to apply widely accepted deterrence theories, North Korea surely could not hope to deter the United States.<sup>5</sup> Even if North Korea were indeed able to produce a few bombs, it would not be easy to design a nuclear weapon small enough to be carried by a No-Dong or Taipo-Dong missile, unless Pakistan has already provided the necessary technological assistance.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan's approach is nearly the same, except that India is not as powerful as the United States and Pakistan possesses more than a few nuclear weapons compared to North Korea. And yet Pakistan must know that it cannot run the risk of inviting nuclear retaliation from its more capable neighbor.

Indian officials are fully aware of the dangers inherent in nuclear brinkmanship. India's NFU pledge was designed to set at rest Pakistani fears of an Indian preemptive strike. New Delhi has not only accepted Pakistan's continued existence but is not interested, nor perhaps even capable, of destroying its smaller neighbor using conventional forces. This is because India does not possess the necessary military power, nor can an all-out attack guarantee the destruction of all Pakistani warheads. A fragmented Pakistan could well be a greater nuisance to India than a unified adversary. India has also made it clear through its words and actions that it will never allow a conflict situation to escalate into a nuclear exchange. Nonetheless, international opinion remains concerned about the nuclear threat on the

---

<sup>4</sup> Raja Menon, "We Can, But Don't," *Outlook* (New Delhi) (February 15, 2002), 12. Also see, "The frost before the thaw," *The Economist* (February 15, 2003), 28.

<sup>5</sup> For a more detailed analysis of this theory, see David Kang, "North Korea: Deterrence Through Danger," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed. *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 234–263.

<sup>6</sup> Bruce Cumings, "The next in line," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January–February 2003): 24–25.

subcontinent, pressuring India to exercise restraint rather than pressuring Pakistan to stop its provocations. Fears of a nuclear exchange are heightened every time tension mounts following a terrorist strike.

China has been a nuclear power since October 1964 and attacked India in 1962. India, despite having demonstrated its ability to produce nuclear weapons in 1974, refrained from weaponizing its nuclear program until 1998 when it became evident that the pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would finally close its nuclear options, and that the nuclear powers were not interested in total disarmament. This meant that India's security concerns would never be addressed. It may be recollected that the United States tried its utmost to force South Asia to cap and roll back its nuclear program during the first two years of the Clinton administration. As Samina Ahmed has noted, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel offered in 1993 to sell military hardware to Pakistan and deliver the twenty-eight F-16s that Pakistan had bought before U.S. cut off its military aid, as a one-time waiver of the Pressler Amendment and in return for capping on uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, the Clinton administration kept up immense pressure on India and even threatened sanctions and dual-use technology denials.<sup>7</sup> The May 1998 tests produced little change since both India and Pakistan have purportedly possessed nuclear weapons since at least the early nineties. The progress in putting in place a robust command and control mechanism has indeed been slow, though India has recently constituted a Strategic Forces Command. The management and control of India's small nuclear arsenal will become more transparent and definitive in due course.

Some U.S. officials and strategists are clearly concerned about a dramatic enhancement in China's nuclear and conventional arsenal, yet similar Indian concerns are usually downplayed. Ashutosh Varshney gives three reasons for India's nuclear program: the Sino-Indian border dispute; the growing Chinese economy that is bound to result in an enhanced Chinese naval presence off the coast of Burma and in the Indian Ocean; and China's continued assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Varshney predicts, "Challenges to China's current political elite are likely to increase...External adventures have often been used to prop up tottering authoritarian regimes."<sup>8</sup> India's larger security concerns thus cannot simply be wished away.

## **PRESENT SCENARIO**

The situation in South Asia has often been likened to a game of "snakes and ladders." The peace initiative by Prime Minister Vajpayee in May 2002 has raised hopes in the subcontinent. One never knows, however, if the next throw of the dice may result in the initiative slipping down 'the longest snake' to very near the starting point. The widespread support for Vajpayee's peace move is nevertheless encouraging. Only time will tell if the die-hard separatists in J&K and the Pakistani military establishment will allow the peace process to move towards its logical conclusion.

---

<sup>7</sup> Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 193.

<sup>8</sup> Ashutosh Varshney, "The folly of America's nuclear diplomacy," *The Washington Post* (May 17, 1998), available at <http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/usmedia/ftaug698.htm>.

Most Indian observers assume that Pakistan's support for militant terrorism in Kashmir will continue, notwithstanding President Pervez Musharraf's pledge to stop terrorism permanently. Continued acts of violence in J&K could have serious repercussions. Many in India assume that Washington's ability to leverage Musharraf is limited, given the latter's crucial help for Operation Enduring Freedom. The Bush administration perhaps rightly believes that Musharraf's successor could well be a worse outcome for Pakistan, for bilateral relations, and for the region. Under these circumstances, punitive retaliatory action by India in response to acts of terror from bases in Pakistan cannot be ruled out. Punitive retaliatory action could involve action across the Line of Control (LoC).

## **ROLE OF AIR POWER**

Air power is the most suitable instrument should India consider limited retaliatory action. The decisive role of air power in conventional warfare is now widely accepted the world over. Its attributes, such as inherent flexibility, reach, speed, shock effect and ubiquity, are eminently suited to fine-tuning and calibrated action. The continued success of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), along with the advent of unmanned aerial vehicles, makes air power increasingly more lethal and accurate. Air power can surgically neutralize targets with a minimum loss of civilian life and property or collateral damage, provided that accurate and timely intelligence is available for correct targeting. The value and lethality of PGMs are such that conventional strikes are now a part of the U.S. Strategic Command's war planning.

During the 2003 Iraq war, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) seems to have changed its strategy to what it calls "effects-based operations." The aim is to carefully match the importance and vulnerability of targets to the capabilities of the weapons and platforms at hand so that the destruction of the smallest component of the system would ensure the total collapse of the whole system.<sup>9</sup> Because of the considerations of post-war administration needs, the United States did not target bridges, power grids, and water supply and communication nodes during the war but concentrated on "regime" targets. This no doubt reduced the effects of "shock and awe" since the average Baghdad citizen was seen moving freely around while the regime targets in the capital burned.

To achieve such dramatic effects, air forces need truly modern and sophisticated equipment including means to exploit satellite imagery, real-time secure communications, PGMs, and the ability to keep a minute-to-minute control of the battlefield. Today, such a capability exists only within the USAF. The 1991 Gulf War,<sup>10</sup> the 1999 Kosovo conflict,<sup>11</sup> and the 2001 Afghan War have all proved that even NATO countries find it difficult to work in concert with the USAF because of interoperability problems. As a developing country largely dependent on foreign arms, India is obviously not in the same league as the USAF.

Lack of sophisticated equipment and hardware, however, is not the only impediment with which the Indian Air Force (IAF) has to cope. The "defensive defense" military strategy that India has followed since its independence makes it difficult if not impossible for its armed forces to take the initiative in

---

<sup>9</sup> Nick Cook, "Shock & Awe?" *Jane's Defence Weekly* (April 2, 2003): 20.

<sup>10</sup> Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and Future of Warfare," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 5-44.

<sup>11</sup> Rebecca Grant, "Nine Myths about Kosovo," *Air Force Magazine* (June 2000): 50-55.

war.<sup>12</sup> The Indian mindset is essentially territorial. In the past and perhaps even today, its political leadership expects the armed forces to defend every inch of its territory. The civilian and military decision-makers are content to do nothing so long as there is no immediate threat to India's territory. The idea of defending its strategic frontiers is still alien to the Indian mind.<sup>13</sup>

Another deficiency is that while the IAF is often seen as a mere adjunct to the ground forces, its employment is oddly considered to be highly escalatory. This has been the thinking since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, when the threat of Chinese air attack was minimal if not nonexistent. Many military analysts in India think that the IAF is best used in a tactical support role for airlift and for other support missions. There is widespread skepticism about the efficacy of modern combat air power. Reports about the supposedly exaggerated role of U.S. air power in the Kosovo War and the Gulf War in 1999 reinforce this belief.<sup>14</sup>

At present, no Indian fighter aircraft or even attack helicopters can effectively fire rockets and missiles at altitudes in the range of 20,000 to 25,000 feet. Hence, the IAF's focus has naturally been on strategic or independent counter air operations against targets in Pakistan, although the Indian Army expects the Air Force to support its operations in the mountains. The IAF has not been able to convince the political masters of its independent strategic role. It hopes that the government would allow it to mount offensive counter air missions against the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). There is thus an apparent disconnect between the army and the air force on the one hand and with the political leadership on the other. To be fair, given the nuclearization of South Asia, it is also not realistic to expect the Indian government to give the IAF total freedom to engage depth targets.

India's overall conventional superiority is normally overstated by international commentators. At the height of the military tension during May-June 2002, the Indian media reported that the three Services Chiefs had advised the Indian government that their lack of adequate military superiority over Pakistan made it difficult to launch an offensive. The report claimed that India's superiority over Pakistan was barely 1.12:1 and that it had slid from 1.7:1 during the 1971 War.<sup>15</sup> There is no doubt but that the conventional superiority that India enjoys over Pakistan is indeed slim. Without a 3:1 superiority, the Indian Army cannot go on the offensive.

The air power balance between the PAF and IAF is in India's favor though no longer decisively so. Not only has Pakistan received approximately 60 F-7P fighters from China, but in the event of a war with India, it could receive additional fighters from China and from some of its allies in the Gulf, as the problems of interoperability have been resolved with a largely American and Chinese origin combat fleet.

The IAF does not need overwhelming superiority over its adversary if only limited air operations are envisaged. The IAF has some 40 Mirage-2000, 25 Su-30 multi-role fighters, and over 80 long-range Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike Aircrafts (DPSA) that together give the IAF considerable offensive capability. In addition, the 140-odd MiG-27 short-range ground-attack fighters can also prove very useful

---

<sup>12</sup> V. R. Raghavan, "Limited War and Strategic Liability," *The Hindu* (May 17, 2001).

<sup>13</sup> Raja Menon, "Raw Incompetence," *Indian Express* (February 13, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Daryl G. Press, see note 9.

<sup>15</sup> Aloke Banerjee, "Slim edge over Pakistan," *The Times of India* (June 14, 2002).

against targets close to the LoC.<sup>16</sup> Both the Jaguar and the MiG-27 would certainly need some air defense protection because in any future war the PAF would very likely aim to inflict high attrition on the IAF. The PAF is fully aware of the actual air power balance in the region but Pakistani leadership naturally likes to play up the Indian conventional military threat to justify its dangerous nuclear doctrine.<sup>17</sup>

## UGLY STABILITY

The threat of nuclear escalation, if any, comes only from Pakistan and not from India. As a status quo power, India has no need to use its nuclear weapons against anyone, least so Pakistan. India's conventional forces are quite capable of defending its territorial integrity, and thus its NFU pledge is sincere. India has repeatedly said that its nuclear weapons are not for fighting war but are simply to deter nuclear weapons of the adversary and to thwart a possible nuclear blackmail. Its nuclear arsenal is still very small and not on hair-trigger alert. Its nuclear weapons are safely in civilian hands with a clear chain of succession.

Some American scholars fear a preventive war by India and many think that the risk of an accidental or inadvertent escalation is very high.<sup>18</sup> Most of the western writings on the nuclear dangers on the subcontinent begin by explicitly stating that this situation is vastly different from the Cold War confrontation between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Yet these analysts cite deterrence theories of the Cold War period to reinforce their case. The short time of flight of opposing missiles and poor or inadequate command and control in India are normally seen to be the most destabilizing factors. The three major factors that they cite in support of their argument are Pakistan's first-use policy to deter a conventional attack by India, a conventionally superior India, and the vulnerability of the small Pakistani nuclear arsenal to India's conventional air strikes.

The western critique is based on the false assumption that India and Pakistan do not really appreciate the risks involved in their nuclear standoff. The stability-instability paradox also does not apply to the South Asian situation. This theory holds that, "To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence."<sup>19</sup> While the Soviet Union and the U.S. no doubt engaged in many proxy wars, they took care not to allow them to escalate out of control. The South Asian situation, on the other hand, has never been stable, with Pakistan first trying the thinly-veiled Mujahideen attack into J&K in 1947 and 1965, and again in 1999 when in fact it was a conventional attack. In that sense, nuclear weapons have not affected stability at the conventional level. According to Tellis, "the current reigning condition of 'ugly stability' in South Asia may be occasionally punctuated by episodes of 'uglier stability' from time to time."<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> These figures are based on the IISS Military Balance 2002–03.

<sup>17</sup> Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, "India and Pakistan at the Edge," *IISS Survival* 4 (Autumn 2002): 69–86. The authors suggest that it is the military imbalance that drives Pakistan to hold out the nuclear threat and therefore recommend that it be given suitable military hardware to redress this imbalance.

<sup>18</sup> Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia" (presentation to the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, July 26, 2001). Sagan does not categorically fear a preventive war by India but alludes to it (p. 9).

<sup>19</sup> Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 31.

<sup>20</sup> Ashley J. Tellis et al, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 83.

“Deterrence pessimists” in the West routinely try to put the fear of nuclear escalation into the minds of decision-makers in India and to a lesser extent in Pakistan by simply invoking deterrence theorists like Brodie, Kahn, Schelling, Waltz, and Jervis. Even if well-meaning, their advice tends to sound hollow, since there are few constructive recommendations except the implicit suggestion of a move towards gradual but definite denuclearization of the subcontinent. Some western theorists point to their over fifty years of experience with handling nuclear weapons during the Cold War, and claim to know better about nuclear issues—a sophisticated version of Kipling’s “burden.” The debate is usually hijacked by nuclear theorists, who are masters of what John Chipman calls “nuclear accountancy”<sup>21</sup> but ignore the nature of South Asian ground realities. Unlike in the Cold War when the two superpowers were locked into a contest for global influence, the India-Pakistan dispute involves a challenger (Pakistan) trying to undo the reality of a status quo power (India). The Kashmir issue has also been tangled with the geopolitical interests of other major powers. It is basically clear that once Pakistan realizes it cannot hope to get the support of some major powers, it is bound to come to terms with India. Repeatedly citing the Cuban Missile Crisis and the risk of inadvertent, accidental, unauthorized, or misperceived use of nuclear weapons in an unstable climate does not help illuminate the debate nor resolve the issue which is essentially political. The example of the Cuban Missile Crisis in fact showed that the so-called “evil empire” finally chose survival over mutual destruction. In any case, the debate is based on inductive logic, with neither side able to conclusively prove that escalation would indeed occur in a given situation or that it would be avoided.

On the other hand, Pakistan regularly brings up the threat of nuclear war. It achieves two major strategic objectives by highlighting this threat. First, the world tends to believe that Kashmir is indeed a “nuclear flashpoint”; second, it serves as a warning to India not to take any military action to stop cross-border terrorism. Pakistan uses the nuclear scare to focus world attention on Kashmir, but it cannot ever think of launching a conventional military offensive to wrest J&K.<sup>22</sup> Another dimension of the debate is Pakistan’s game plan of involving the U.S. in underwriting its security. Sagan, Christopher Gagné, and Colonel Rafi Khan, a Pakistani analyst, conclude that the U.S. must play a role given that, “Bilateral initiatives in the absence of conflict resolution are no longer workable in South Asia.”<sup>23</sup> They suggest intrusive inspections and verification regimes for arms control and weapons reductions for the subcontinent knowing full well that while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are India-specific, India’s weapons program has to cater to a wider security threat. Repeated Pakistani proposals for denuclearization of South Asia also cannot be accepted by India since Pakistan is not the only threat India faces. Pakistan cleverly links its nuclear program to that of India thereby helping the non-proliferation agenda of the P-5. The Indian Prime Minister has clearly ruled out the prospect of India rolling back its weapons program.

Within weeks of the historic summit meeting at Lahore between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan in February 1999, the Pakistani army and trained Mujahideen intruded into India across the LoC in the Kargil sector of J&K. The Indian Army and the IAF successfully threw out the intruders at a high

---

<sup>21</sup> John Chipman, “The future of strategic studies: beyond even grand strategy,” *IJSS Survival* (Spring 1992): 109.

<sup>22</sup> Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Dilemma,” *The Hindu* (August 11, 2000).

<sup>23</sup> Rafi Uz Zaman Khan, “Pakistan and India, Can NRRCs Help Strengthen Peace?” Occasional Paper no. 49 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2002), p. 6.

cost in casualties. Although India used its air power in combat role for the first time since 1971, the Indian government did not allow it to cross the LoC. In retrospect, it appears certain that Kargil was staged for two primary reasons. First, Pakistan wanted to put its army back in a position of power and authority, which General Musharraf achieved in October 1999 by ousting the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Second, Pakistan wished to test the limits of India's patience, resolve, and the efficacy of its nuclear deterrent. India's decision to restrict its operations to its own side of the LoC appears to have convinced the Pakistani establishment that India was in fact deterred. Even so, the Pakistani army called the limited retaliatory response by India an "over-reaction" and held out nuclear threats, although these were largely ignored by India.

Arguments such as that "Kargil was disputed territory" and that such "nibbling operations" were routinely resorted to by "both" sides to "adjust" the LoC in J&K and Siachin, did not hold ground with the international community. Soon, countries like Japan, a major donor and friend of Pakistan, also accepted Pakistan's culpability in Kargil. Some analysts believe that India did not cross the LoC because it was deterred by Pakistani nuclear weapons. They believe that Pakistan may stage another such intrusion in the future, but at the same time, they question India's ability to fight and win a limited war without crossing the Pakistani nuclear threshold.<sup>24</sup>

Paradoxically, however, some analysts foresee the possibility of India launching a preemptive strike to neutralize Pakistan's weapons.<sup>25</sup> What would India gain from such a strike? Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha's comments in March 2003 did not express support for a nuclear preemptive attack on Pakistan; rather, they suggested that since Pakistan is a fit case for regime change, the U.S. should have targeted it rather than Iraq.<sup>26</sup> Does it then mean that this debate is unwittingly assisting Pakistan in achieving its objective of forcing India to relinquish control over its province of Jammu & Kashmir?

It is widely believed that there are three classic components of stable deterrence. First, both sides must possess technically reliable nuclear weapons with a high degree of assurance that they will indeed work when needed. Second, both sides must possess the capacity to survive the first strike and launch a devastatingly powerful second strike. Third, neither side must be tempted to mount a preemptive attack to destroy or seriously degrade the other side's nuclear capability. There is no doubt that stable deterrence also requires crisis stability. Analysts express fears that small strategic assets such as those of India and Pakistan may in fact tempt either side to preempt the other, hence stable deterrence does not exist. Stable deterrence requires that opponents be deterred by the other's nuclear capability which, according to them is not the case in South Asia. But this is not the reality on ground. When told that the results of a war game conducted by the Pentagon repeatedly showed that Pakistan lost every time, the Pakistani analysts sheepishly asked: What then should Pakistan do?<sup>27</sup> As Tellis says, "Until Pakistan...acts upon the realization that Kashmir, no matter how valuable, is still not as valuable as Pakistan, the resentment, grievances, and dissatisfaction that currently drive Islamabad's Kashmir and India policies will only

---

<sup>24</sup> Tellis, pp. 31–32.

<sup>25</sup> Sagan, see note 19, p. 9.

<sup>26</sup> "US dismisses Iraq Pakistan Comparison," *BBC News* (April 11, 2003).

<sup>27</sup> Conversations with an Indian defense analyst who personally knew this.

compel Pakistan to contemplate future Kargil-like operations, despite the fact that the full range of costs of such operations may grossly outweigh any putative benefits.”<sup>28</sup>

India is a reluctant nuclear weapon power. Nevertheless, this does not mean it would not be willing to protect its core national values and interests in the face of a threat. India’s NFU doctrine and vast strategic depth ensure deterrence against Pakistan. India does not intend to use its nuclear weapons for war-fighting. The history of the past five years clearly shows that India’s quest for a minimum credible deterrent has not led to a nuclear arms race even if its ultimate aim was to deter China. Although India knew that Pakistan had possessed or was quickly building its nuclear weapons capability from the 1980’s onwards, there is no credible proof to suggest that it entertained a serious desire to destroy Kahuta or any other nuclear facility in Pakistan. The fact that both India and Pakistan signed the agreement on “Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities” and have been dutifully exchanging the relevant information every year on January 1<sup>st</sup> shows that India is unlikely to launch a conventional attack to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.<sup>29</sup> Pakistan cannot hope to do this either, simply because it does not have the capability to do so. The scenarios of Pakistan launching multiple nuclear missile strikes on India on strategic warning do not appear credible because even at this early stage of its nuclear development, India would have the capacity to prevail. There is also little chance of India’s conventional forces encountering the opponent’s strategic or nuclear assets in a future conventional war since India is unlikely to carry out such deep strikes into Pakistan. Why indeed would Pakistan hide or store its nuclear assets near a terrorist hideout?

South Asian nuclear weapons are neither stored in assembled condition nor are they on alert. India’s weapons are firmly under civilian control and even after the formation of the Strategic Forces Command, their control is unlikely to be delegated to field levels. Adequate safety and security measures are reportedly in place and accidents during maintenance and routine handling quite unlikely. Given the small size of the arsenal and India’s vast geographic expanse, their vulnerability to surprise attacks is also quite low. Since India adheres to the NFU, its launch procedures are not time-critical and hence the chance of an unauthorized launch is almost nonexistent. Indian weapons are not tightly coupled, which allows enough room for errors to be corrected well in time. Even if the custody of the small number of weapons was transferred to the armed forces, the weapons would, in all probability, continue to remain in a de-mated state. Still, no one can completely rule out the chance of a freak accident. The existing channels of communication between the two governments and the Directors General Military Operations have worked reasonably well so far. In addition, other successful measures include avoidance of combat flights in close proximity of the borders, and prior intimation of major exercises, missiles tests, and launches. It can be hoped that the two countries will engage in a serious nuclear dialogue soon. Pakistan’s military establishment will, however, have to abandon its current strategy of keeping the LoC hot and raising nuclear fears at every conceivable opportunity.

As far as overall stability, it must be noted that the enmity between the two neighbors goes back to 1947 and the situation has never truly been stable since. The consequences of turning a blind eye on

---

<sup>28</sup> Tellis, p. 83.

<sup>29</sup> Some analysts feel that the lists of nuclear installations are incomplete. This may indeed be so, but the routine exchange of the lists every year shows that both parties wish to avoid misperceptions.

Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program are of little cost to India but of great concern to the world. This, however, does not mean that both countries should not institute measures to reduce the risk of unintended escalation. As the larger of the two, India perhaps has the greater responsibility to ensure a stable security nuclear environment in the subcontinent. But the two nuclear doctrines are gradually evolving and at this stage it is difficult to expect any country to show greater transparency. At the same time, Pakistan cannot escape the responsibility of creating conditions for building trust. It is in this spirit that the Lahore Declaration was signed in February 1999. The Pakistani army's top brass and the entrenched bureaucracy panicked at the prospect of a rapid improvement in Indo-Pak relations and staged the Kargil conflict. India justifiably saw this as a gross breach of trust but believed that in the post-9/11 scenario Pakistan might mend its ways since it was now purportedly fighting global terrorism. However, these hopes were dashed by renewed violence against soft targets in India. As a result, measures to reduce the risk of nuclear exchange have become hostage to what Pakistan calls the resolution of the "core issue." It is hoped that the new peace initiative will address the issues of nuclear stability and risk reduction with the urgency deserved. It is a good starting point to begin a nuclear dialogue provided that Pakistan allows the discussion to move away from Kashmir.

From the above, it should be obvious that the Indo-Pak nuclear challenge is exceedingly complex and irrevocably tangled with Pakistan's larger objective of preventing India's economic progress and overall development. Tellis explains, "Pakistan's nuclear capabilities have become the key to successful execution of its political strategies at multiple levels. Nuclear weapons not only enable Islamabad to pursue 'strategic diversion' and immunize the country from a violent Indian counter-response, they also serve to catalyze the attention and, Pakistan hopes, the interest of the international community. Consequently, they have acquired centrality in Pakistan's national strategy."<sup>30</sup>

## CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE

The nature of warfare has changed in recent times. According to Eliot Cohen, modern conflict resembles medieval warfare waged by and against non-state actors with no clear starts or endpoints to the actual fighting.<sup>31</sup> The U.S.-UK invasion for regime change in Iraq, however, seems to follow the classical colonial war trajectory. American operations in Afghanistan, after the end of the air strikes phase, have now reached a new dimension. The U.S. military is now apparently consolidating the gains of the air war and securing the war-torn country against the threat of "warlords" and internecine warfare, but the establishment of peace and stability will take time. The Afghan situation is likely to remain fluid with forces linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban becoming active again.

History shows that in the Indian subcontinent a limited conventional war has never begun with a "cold start." Every conflict has been preceded by heightened tensions, political posturing, bellicose statements, visible mobilization of troops, border skirmishing, and airspace violations.

---

<sup>30</sup> Tellis, p. 30.

<sup>31</sup> Elliot A. Cohen, "A Tale of Two Secretaries," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (May-June 2002).

Pakistan-sponsored proxy war against India, however, has changed all of this. It is now a no-war-no-peace situation. Today, a sudden but limited action is a distinct possibility. If India is to seize fleeting opportunities to counter terrorism, it cannot take months to launch retaliatory attacks. The world is unlikely to countenance an Indian offensive except *perhaps* if it is in direct response to extreme Pakistani provocation. India has lost many such opportunities in the past. Timely and accurate intelligence would be the prerequisite since the key to success is instantaneous response. Such action would require, however, a different mindset, a rapid retaliatory capability, and well-trained joint-arms teams with a preponderance of air power.

These air strikes by fighter bombers and/or heli-borne commandos would have to be well-planned, coordinated, and equally well-orchestrated. Their limited objectives would have to be chosen well and deliberated upon in advance, and the strikes themselves swiftly carried out with surgical precision and efficiency. Post-strike damage assessment could provide the necessary information for further strikes, which could then be launched after a review of the enemy's reaction. India possesses the hardware to mount such precision strikes. In sum, such an operation would be of the start-stop-review-recommence variety and not a set piece, copybook conventional war that starts with the ground forces advancing on a broad front, with armored forces in the vanguard.

India does not covet territory nor is it intent on breaking up Pakistan. There is thus little sense in launching major ground operations against Pakistan. Instead, it would be easier and more beneficial for India to rely on its air power. One necessary caveat is that Indian decision-makers know that air power is useless against small groups of terrorists operating in mountainous terrain. The IAF cannot always hope to effectively neutralize terrorist hideouts on or near the LoC. It can, however, make it exceedingly difficult for the terrorists and their Pakistani army sponsors to operate at will. Air power and small teams of heli-borne commandos are best suited to such operations.

The Mongols and later the Maratha armies successfully used their cavalry to strike and harass their enemy and disappear into thin air before the enemy realized the seriousness of the situation. In limited actions, air power should be used in a similar manner to punish the enemy in the place where it is most vulnerable. The main objective of such retaliatory air strikes would be threefold. First, prompt action can indeed stop an infiltration bid on the other side of the LoC. Second, it can also neutralize known buildups of terrorists and Pakistani army prior to the actual infiltration if the convoys of military transport are targeted. Finally, air strikes can effectively degrade if not destroy the Pakistani army's infrastructure that is routinely used for terrorist activities across the border. It would thus be evident that the combined commando action and air action had been designed to achieve a very limited aim.

## **ESCALATION CONTROL**

It is the importance and value of the target system that would no doubt decide the enemy's reaction. Pakistan is unlikely to resort to nuclear weapons if India were to restrict its retaliation to the objectives mentioned above. To prevent such limited attacks from spinning out of control, it would, however, be essential to take some preparatory steps. These would include: (a) a clear and unambiguous declaration of India's limited intent, (b) a clear communication to other major powers that India had little

option but to resort to force in the face of continued Pakistani complicity in exporting terrorism across the border, (c) a demonstrated resolve that any future misadventure would be met with instantaneous retaliatory action, and (d) a well-publicized move to create joint army-air teams and dedicated strike squadrons for the task. Such actions may well deter Pakistan from continuing its support to terrorism but should deterrence fail, India must be ready to take the necessary retaliatory action.

Without such explicit warnings, Pakistan may misread India's intentions, but the chances of this actually happening are low. Pakistan would undoubtedly call such a scenario a blatant Indian aggression, but at least it cannot complain of overreaction as it did during the Kargil conflict. Such warnings would no doubt take away the element of surprise but are nevertheless necessary for more effective escalation control. There is, however, an inherent danger of Pakistan further lowering the bar of its nuclear threshold to frighten India and indeed the world, when such air strikes became imminent. India would have to persevere without losing its resolve.

Both India and Pakistan have been exchanging information on their nuclear assets under the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities signed in 1988. This has continued even when tensions have been very high, which should give some solace to those who believe that the situation in South Asia is in fact very dangerous. India's record of adhering to treaties and agreements is exemplary. As has been averred earlier, the onus for escalation rests entirely on Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear strategy no doubt is based on deterring an Indian conventional attack, but as Menon suggests:

The difference in foreign and Indian perceptions arises from the fact that no Indian believes that India has any wish to attack Pakistan, grab territory, split the country or undo partition. The Pakistanis do believe much of this and foreigners accept Islamabad's perceptions, for what they are worth. Indians believe that they are the status quo power, and will continue to be so indefinitely. They aver that trouble is fomented by Pakistan. Pakistan on the other hand feels that once they get Kashmir it would become the status quo power and India the reactionary power to destabilize Pakistan.<sup>32</sup>

Menon continues,

Pakistani nuclear strategy attempts to convert an unfavorable land war situation into a favorable status quo, or a victory, using nuclear weapons. In theory this sounds simple, focused and uncomplicated. Hence the remarks by Western visitors on Islamabad's clarity of perception. In practice the conversion of territorial defeat into a nuclear victory, or nuclear stalemate, is a perfectly daft idea and has nothing to do with deterrence, which is the stated political aim of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Any semblance to Central Europe is superficial. NATO's idea of balancing Soviet conventional might with nuclear weapons has some logic, because according to NATO, it was the USSR that was the reactionary power. Whether or not this is true, there was no doubt that NATO was the status quo power, happy to go on with Europe the way it was. It was the USSR that was expected to initiate the big ground push and walk into a nuclear response which could be immediate or delayed.<sup>33</sup>

According to Menon, "The Kargil crisis demonstrated that the sub-continental nuclear threshold *probably* lies territorially in the heartland of both the countries, and not on the Kashmir cease-fire line."<sup>34</sup> Even if Menon's assessments are overly optimistic, surely no one can believe that Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons the moment an Indian soldier sets foot across the border. It is also safe to assume that Pakistan does not fear a preventive or preemptive attack on its nuclear arsenal and other strategically

---

<sup>32</sup> Raja Menon, *A Nuclear Strategy for India* (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), 193.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

important targets. India's NFU commitment was reiterated in January 2003 when the Indian government announced the formation of its Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Although the Pakistani nuclear weapons are India-specific and make up for the so-called conventional asymmetry, Pakistan is likely to use them only if its very survival was threatened. It is, therefore, incorrect to think that India's military options were forever closed.

Should Pakistan desist from sponsoring terrorism across the border, chances of even a limited conflict are remote. This may at first glance sound somewhat contradictory, but seen in the light of the twenty year-long proxy war and India's continued restraint, it is appreciated that the prospects of Indian retaliation depend on the limits of its people's patience rather than those of the Indian government. Even so, India would most probably resort to the use of force only if it became absolutely unavoidable. The IAF could then mount attacks on the numerous bridges that serve as crossing points for infiltration by the terrorists. It could also destroy camps, logistics, and ammunition dumps, and interdict lines of terrorist supply in close proximity to the LoC. Although both Islamabad and Kahuta lie relatively close to the LoC, it should be possible for India to restrict its operations to some 30-40 kilometers from the LoC. This author believes that India and Pakistan would give due importance to the Kargil lessons when planning their moves. Air strikes can be called off at short notice and can be ordered again as the situation demands. The key advantage of such hit and run raids is that the opponent does not know how to react to them except by raising the alert status of its air defense elements.

Pakistan's response to even limited air strikes could be ferocious when it sees that India is quickly destroying or seriously degrading its army infrastructure which it has so painstakingly developed over the last two decades. It could do any or all of the following:

- (a) At the very outset, issue a nuclear threat to attract international attention.
- (b) Launch limited counter attacks on ground across the LoC and carry out major terrorists strikes at widely dispersed points in India.
- (c) Increase pressure at selective points along the International Border.
- (d) Simultaneously highlight civilian casualties.
- (e) Take effective air defense measures to inflict high attrition on the Indian strike aircraft.
- (f) Threaten and then launch Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) attacks using conventional warheads against the forward airfields of the IAF.
- (g) Take major retaliatory action on ground to grab a big chunk of Indian real estate and launch air strikes against high value economic targets such as the Bombay High and oil refineries in the Indian states of Gujarat and Maharashtra.

The most likely courses of action that Pakistan may follow are as indicated at (a), (b), and (e). It would be difficult for it launch a major offensive as at (g) because it would not like to be seen as the initiator of escalation. Indian nuclear signaling and crisis management would have to be clear and unequivocal. India would also stop its air strikes the moment it achieves its military and political objectives of demonstrating its firm resolve to counter terrorism and punishing the Pakistani Army.

As brought out earlier, some analysts fear that unbeknownst to India, Pakistan could have stored its strategic assets near the intended targets of Indian attack, and their damage or destruction might lead Pakistan to misperceive it as India's attempt to defang Pakistan's nuclear capability. This is absurd for two reasons: first, given the small size of the Pakistani arsenal it would be foolish for it to store its assets in close proximity of the LoC and/or known operating areas of terrorists; second, given its limited strategic depth, Pakistan's nuclear assets are vulnerable even when stored at Sargodha. Why then would India choose to strike at these assets kept close to the LoC? Pakistan is thus unlikely to misread Indian strikes.

Some analysts fear that Pakistan might launch multiple missile strikes in its first nuclear response. It should be recalled that the U.S. did not use nuclear weapons against North Vietnam even after suffering the loss of 57,000 American lives. The former Soviet Union also refrained from using them in Afghanistan after suffering heavy casualties of 6,300 killed and 9,880 wounded. Nadeem Iqbal goes further, "What is clear is that, definitely at the lower threshold of aggression, no power is willing to raise the stakes by punishing the aggressor, even a non-nuclear aggressor, with a nuclear strike."<sup>35</sup>

Pakistan is also unlikely to launch conventional missile strikes because of the fear that these may be misread by India. This, however, does not mean that Pakistan would remain a passive onlooker to India's offensive action.

It is clear from the above that resorting to air strikes is not easy but if handled well, the risks of nuclear escalation are intrinsically minimal if not altogether nonexistent. Some important caveats are, however, necessary:

- (a) Air power has certainly proved decisive in recent wars but it works best when employed in complete synergy with the army and navy.
- (b) The successful destruction of targets through means of air power does not necessarily imply a successful strategy. Continuous evaluation of the importance and relevance of the target system to the overall political aim needs no emphasis.
- (c) There are few clear examples of successful coercion or complete destruction of a dispersed target set. Air power efficacy must not be judged only by the number of tanks or guns that it destroys but by the overall effect it has on the adversary's options.
- (d) The mere success of a military or air operation may not necessarily translate into the achievement of the country's political aims.<sup>36</sup>
- (e) Pakistan has always believed in a strong air defense. Even when the overall aim, scope, and theater of operations are limited, air power employment must achieve local air superiority to ensure that enemy air forces are not allowed to effectively interfere with operations, or else attrition would soon reach unacceptable levels.

Air power, however strong and effective, cannot work unless it is intimately linked to political objectives. The mere decision to employ air power in a particular situation will emphatically demonstrate

---

<sup>35</sup> Nadeem Iqbal, "Hiding behind a nuclear cloud," *Asia Times* (January 11, 2002).

<sup>36</sup> Richard K. Betts, "Memorandum to the President," in Philip D. Zelikow, ed. *American Military Strategy: Memos to a President* (New York: WW Norton, 2001), 19–32.

the country's resolve for positive action. The success of each offensive air power mission and the enemy's reaction will have to be carefully analyzed to control escalation without throwing away the benefits of bold action. While this paper has repeatedly emphasized limited offensive action, mere pinpricks will not bend the enemy's will. In order to be effective, air power is best used as instant thunder rather than rolling thunder. Offensive action must therefore be sustained until it actually starts showing visible results.

## **CONCLUSION**

The South Asian security scenario has worsened in the last twenty-four years since Pakistan embarked on its proxy war strategy against India. Since the May 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the latter has cleverly used the slogan that Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint to its advantage. It has apparently convinced the international community that any retaliatory military action by India would entail the risk of escalation to nuclear level, while at the same time openly sponsoring violent terrorist activities in India under the nuclear shield. The world has no doubt girded itself to fight global terrorism in the post-9/11 era and many countries have repeatedly demanded that Pakistan stop aiding and abetting terrorism against India. Nevertheless, such exhortations have had little effect on General Musharraf. The Pakistani army continues to believe that full support to terrorists operating in India is the best way to focus international attention on the Kashmir issue. The United States sees General Musharraf as its most reliable partner for Operation Enduring Freedom, even when it is evident that in fact Pakistan is the fountainhead of jihadi terrorism.

Despite the decision to mobilize its army in the aftermath of the terrorist outrage on its parliament in December 2001, the Indian government has shown remarkable restraint in the face of extreme provocation. By issuing the travel advisory that warned its citizens to leave India and Pakistan fearing a nuclear exchange, the U.S. and its allies unwittingly helped Pakistan thwart the threat of Indian military retaliation and weakened India's attempt to coerce Pakistan into seeing reason. This essay has argued that the risk of nuclear escalation, if any, came solely from Pakistan because of its first and early use nuclear doctrine. India, in contrast, has repeatedly declared its commitment to NFU and has stated that its nuclear weapons are designed to deter nuclear blackmail rather than to fight war. India is a status quo power and has not resorted to military aggression, but it is also determined to safeguard its core national values and interests through diplomatic means where possible and through the use of force where necessary. While India is unlikely to resort to nuclear brinkmanship, it also cannot appear to be powerless in its fight against terrorism. As a democracy, India's leadership is accountable to its people and cannot hope to rule unless it effectively safeguards their security and well-being. India is also acutely aware of the adverse effects of continued cross-border terrorism and subversion by Pakistan on its economy and on society.

In these circumstances, limited retaliatory action cannot be ruled out in the future. This paper has argued that air power is the most suitable instrument of coercion and punishment. Air operations which are innovatively planned and vigorously executed can achieve the desired results without coming anywhere near Pakistan's nuclear threshold.

Finally, air power is merely a military instrument and hence it is not a panacea in every situation. It is only as effective as its political masters allow it to be. To avoid nuclear scares in the future, it is imperative that India clearly articulate its intention to retaliate to any further adventurism by Pakistan. It is time that Pakistan learned to live and let live. In the post-9/11 world, it cannot continue to follow the dangerous policy of aiding terrorism. The U.S., UK, and many other powers have failed to get Pakistan to mend its ways.<sup>37</sup> The latest peace initiative of Prime Minister Vajpayee, it is hoped, will lower the temperatures for the summer of 2003, but in the meantime, India cannot permit Pakistan to indulge in anti-Indian activities that take a huge daily toll on the lives of innocent civilians.<sup>38</sup> It is unrealistic to expect India to institute CBMs until Pakistan has regained India's trust by effectively dismantling the terrorist infrastructure on its soil. The construction of a nuclear risk reduction regime is not an easy task in the present circumstances. The democracies of the world must realize that by raising the bogey of a nuclear exchange, they are in fact helping Pakistan to promote its dangerous agenda. In the words of Robert Blackwill, "the fight against international terrorism will not be won until terrorism against India ends permanently. There can be no other legitimate stance by the U.S., no American compromise whatever on this elemental geopolitical and moral truth."<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> See, for instance, Manoj Joshi, "The Indo-Pakistan Military Balance and Limited War," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* (Autumn 2002), reprinted in *IDSA Strategic Digest* (New Delhi) 33 (January 2003): 16-27 and Rob Young, "The UK and International Security," *USI Journal* (New Delhi), (October–December 2002): 532–545.

<sup>38</sup> Muzamil Jaleel, "Midnight Massacre Pushes Valley to the Brink," *Indian Express* (March 25, 2003). The massacre of 24 Kashmiri Hindu Pandit community came a day after the killing of a moderate Hizbul leader Majid Dar.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Blackwill, *Indian Express* (April 22, 2003).