

Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options

by

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In October 2001, the United States launched a war against al Qaeda, its infrastructure in Afghanistan, and its Afghan Taliban hosts. Twenty months later, al Qaeda and the Taliban have been pushed to the sidelines of Afghan political life, but they are neither gone nor forgotten. The political rebuilding process begun at the multi-party peace conference in Bonn, Germany, in early December 2001 is moving ahead. Kabul has an international peacekeeping force to help keep order. A grand assembly or Loya Jirga was held in June 2002 to appoint an Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) to rule while a new constitution is drafted and national elections are planned. Nearly two million Afghan refugees have streamed back into the country, mostly from Pakistan, mostly on their own initiative. Because their home towns and villages still lacked the fundamentals – water, shelter, food, jobs – nearly half of all returnees made a beeline for Kabul, where international relief and security efforts have been concentrated and where they compete for scarce jobs along with a million Kabulis.

Outside the capital, there is still scant evidence of central government presence and spotty international reconstruction efforts. Last autumn, the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia decided to emphasize reconstruction of the country's main road from Kabul to Kandahar and Herat. Local and regional warlords still control most of the country's security resources – the many militias that grow and shrink as circumstances and opportunity dictate – in part because they control the local spoils: tribute from checkpoints and border crossings, and a share of the proceeds from sales of opium gum.

The need to restore basic security outside Kabul to jumpstart reconstruction is clear, and consistent with prior experience from more than a dozen other internal conflicts and subsequent international efforts to help those countries make the transition from war to peace. This presentation relates the situation in Afghanistan to this larger universe of “tough cases” and the international community's experience in dealing with them. The analysis stresses that, without continued international help *in the right areas*, Afghanistan is likely to slide back into the internal strife that once before favored extremist rule and made it a haven for international terror.

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Presentation Road Map

- **U.S. Policy Over Time**
- **Afghanistan's Two Struggles**
- **How Critical Lessons from Other Conflicts Apply to Afghanistan**
- **Political and Security Timelines and Gaps**
- **Security Forces: Tasks and Options**
 - *Afghan National Army and Police Training Programs*
 - *International Peacekeeping Forces*
 - *Building on "Provincial Reconstruction Teams"*

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US Goals and Policy for Afghanistan

“President Bush and Chairman Karzai commit to build a lasting partnership for the 21st century, determined to fight terrorism, ensure security, stability and reconstruction for Afghanistan, and foster representative and accountable government for all Afghan men and women.”

(White House, 28 January 2002)

“Today, America affirms its full commitment to a future of progress and stability for the Afghan people.”

(President Bush, 11 October 2002)

Hamid Karzai took his place beside President Bush yesterday and thanked the United States for helping to rescue his country... and then he waited for reporters' questions. Five questions came, but all were directed at Bush, and none concerned Afghanistan.

(Washington Post, 28 February 2003)

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While rooting out al Qaeda and its Taliban hosts last winter, the Bush Administration stated that Afghanistan will not again be left to slide back into the chaos of the 1990s.

A year after the war against al Qaeda began, Secretary of State Powell and President Bush reaffirmed the US commitment to the recovery of Afghanistan. But US words and US deeds – money and resources – seem not to reflect the same set of priorities.

A year and a half after the war began, President Karzai held a joint press conference with President Bush, and no reporter present cared enough about his country's situation to ask a single question.

Managing Afghanistan's Two Struggles

- The fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda
 - *Is the responsibility of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).*
 - *Local informal forces supplement OEF, paid by the United States.*
 - *US choice of local partners affects course of the second struggle.*
- The struggle for control of post-Taliban Afghanistan
 - *Civil war of 1990s, suppressed by the Taliban, not fully resolved.*
 - *Bonn Process intended to shift this struggle from military to political channels. Its success depends on the political power balance*
 - *within Kabul, between "the Panshiris" and others; and*
 - *between Kabul and the provincial/regional governors/warlords.*
 - *Security outside Kabul is tenuous as Bonn requirements for voter registration, voter education, and elections loom.*
 - *Security problems hamper critical infrastructure repair and construction.*
 - *US efforts to adapt to growing security needs must be accelerated.*

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Afghanistan is unusual for its particular configuration of internal conflict and outside intervention in that conflict. In other cases, intervention may have focused on one of the warring parties (e.g., NATO air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia and, later, Kosovo) but all parties were subsequently part of the peace settlement. In Afghanistan, intervention has driven one of the parties off the field: the Taliban and their al Qaeda supporters are not part of the peace process initiated in Bonn, which is about allocating power among the parties remaining. Bonn is an effort to divert this unfinished "second war" into more peaceable political channels. Unless this political transition succeeds, the goals of *Operation Enduring Freedom* will not be met because Afghanistan will likely descend into cycles of violence once again.

A Year of Serious Security Incidents

1. Weapons Caches Discovered

	Kabul Area	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East	
Total Discoveries									
Jun 1-15, 02									
Jun 16-30									
July 1-15		1							1
July 15-31	1	1							2
Aug 1-15									
Aug 16-31	2			2					4
Sept 1-15	6								6
Sept 16-30			2						2
Oct 1-15			2	2			1		5
Oct 16-31			3	2					5
Nov 1-15								1	1
Nov 16-30	2	1							3
Dec 1-15	1		2						3
Dec 16-31	1								1
Jan 1-15, 03									
Jan 16-31									
Feb 1-15									
Feb 16-28		2							2
Mar 1-15				1					1
Mar 16-31		1		2					3
Apr 1-15			1						1
Apr 16-30			3						3
May 1-15									
May 16-31	1			1					2
Jun 1-15, 03		1	3						4
	14	7	16	10			1	1	49
									Kabul: 29%

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The chart above and the one on the following page are based on incidents reported on the major wire services and other international media. Their numbers therefore reflect only the most serious incidents and not the total number. US forces in Afghanistan maintain a much more detailed record. Weapon caches uncovered include anywhere from tens to thousands of weapons. In April, Romanian coalition troops found caves in Ghazni province in the southeast containing 3,000 107-mm rockets of the sort fired frequently (if inaccurately) at coalition forces, plus more than a million rounds of ammunition (AP, April 19, 2003).

ISAF and Afghan authorities in Kabul between mid-August and December 2002 intercepted nine bombs and suffered nine bombings. In mid-Sept, an aviation fuel tanker was intercepted carrying nine sticks of dynamite as it headed for a US air base near Kabul.

**A Year of
Serious
Security
Incidents**

2. Serious Armed Attacks Reported

Total Incidents	Kabul Area	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East		
Jun 1-15, 02										
Jun 16-30				1		1			2	
July 1-15	1			1					2	
July 15-31			1	3	1				5	
Aug 1-15		2	2	2		1			7	
Aug 16-31	3	1							4	
Sept 1-15	3	2	2	2	1			2	12	
Sept 16-30	2	1	2						5	
Oct 1-15		2	3	1					6	
Oct 16-31			2						2	
Nov 1-15	1	1	2						4	
Nov 16-30	6	2	2	2					12	
Dec 1-15	1		4	1	2				8	
Dec 16-31	2			1	1				4	
Jan 1-15, 03										
Jan 16-31		1		2		1			4	
Feb 1-15	1								1	
Feb 16-28			1					1	2	
Mar 1-15										
Mar 16-31	1		2	2					5	
Apr 1-15	1			1					2	
Apr 16-30	1	1		1					3	
May 1-15	2		1	1					4	
May 16-31	2	3	1	1					7	
Jun 1-15, 03	2	1	3						6	
	29	17	28	22	5	3		3	107	
									27%	
Total:	43	24	44	32	5	3	1	4	156	28%

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A fuel truck did explode in February, near a UN fuel depot and the Ministry of Interior in Kabul. In the spring, attackers also began to use remotely-detonated anti-tank mines against foreigners, including NGO personnel in marked vehicles. On 7 June, a car bomb exploded next to a bus carrying ISAF troops, killing 5 and wounding 28. (IRIN, 9 June 2003; Security Council 2003). ISAF resolved thereafter to move its personnel only by air or in armored vehicles. (AFP 21 June 2003)

Most rocket attacks have taken place in the southeast, near the lawless border with Pakistan. Incidents dropped off after mid-December, as the government of Pakistan asserted greater military control over the Northwest Frontier Province, resuming sporadically in March and June.

Incidents in the West and North more frequently involved inter-factional clashes. Fighting in the vicinity of Mazar-e Sharif between the predominantly Uzbek forces of Rashid Dostum and the predominantly Tajik forces of Atta Mohammed flared in late February, early April, and mid May.

3. Recent Incidents


- March 27 – ICRC worker murdered in Kandahar province.
- April 8-11 – Jamiat & Junbesh militias clash in the north; UNAMA brokers cease-fire; fighting resumes briefly in May.
- May 2 – Sec. Def. Donald Rumsfeld, in Kabul, declares bulk of country secure.
- May 3 – de-mining vehicle ambushed on Kabul-Kandahar road, Wardak province; driver killed.
- May 5 – convoy of UN-funded Afghan Technical Consultants ambushed in Zabul province, en route to Herat; three wounded.
- May 6 – Brahimi urges ISAF expansion before Security Council.
- May 8 – UN suspends staff travel in Zabul, Oruzgan, and parts of Helmand province; 6 pm-6 am UN road travel curfew country-wide.
- May 22, 28 – Remote-control mines explode under marked NGO vehicles, Nangarhar province.
- June 4 – Afghan National Army unit clashes with “al Qaeda remnants,” 6 soldiers, 40 insurgents killed.
- June 7 – Suicide bomber in Kabul attacks bus carrying German peacekeepers.

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Attacks against NGO personnel—national and international—increased in the spring. Grenades and other explosives were used against the office compounds of NGOs and UN agencies in Nangarhar, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, and Mazar-e Sherif.

Gunmen attacked individual vehicles or convoys belonging to national and international NGOs involved in development and demining along the Kabul-Jalalabad and Kabul-Kandahar corridors. After nearly four months of attacks on UN and NGO vehicles, the UN Security Coordinator imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew on road travel by UN personnel. In early May, the British Agencies Afghanistan Group concluded that “the entire aid community is regarded as a target by the radical elements.” (*BAAG Afghanistan Monthly Review May 2003*)

A Key Threat to Peace Implementation: Poppy Production



Afghanistan's post-war situation is precarious in part because its warlords have ready access to easily transportable black market commodities. Opium poppies are drought-tolerant and three crops per year can be harvested in Afghanistan. Farmers use revenues from opium gum to finance the rest of their crops and to pay off equipment loans. Warlords can exact "taxes" from opium distributors or get into the business themselves. Either way, the opium trade helps to finance several regional power centers at the expense of central authority.

The UN Drug Control Program estimated that Afghanistan's fresh opium production in 2000 (distributed as depicted above) was about 3,300 tons. The total plummeted to 185 tons after opium production was banned in Taliban-controlled areas of the country in 2001. (UNDCP 2001) Production in 2002 increased again to about 3,400 tons from 74,000 hectares of poppy. UNDCP estimates, however, that "no more than 6 percent of families" derived income from poppy. (Security Council 2003)

The United Kingdom has the lead among international donors for anti-narcotics programming in Afghanistan.

Lessons from Other War-to-Peace Transitions

- Local leaders' willingness to compromise and risk loss of power in the interest of peace is the best predictor of successful transition.
 - *Access to high-value commodities (diamonds, drugs—"spoils of war") reduces local leaders' incentives to compromise/cooperate.*
 - *Neighboring states that buy or transship spoils or otherwise support favored local factions also undercut local incentives to cooperate.*
 - *Demobilization of old fighting forces is a key component of "spoiler management" and the demilitarization of politics needed for effective transition.*
 - *Even among leaders who support peace, demobilization will not happen without replacement security, a level political playing field, and potential for regaining lost power eventually, by peaceful means.*
- Great power commitment to and support of peace is essential in tough cases, to deal with spoilers, spoils, and neighbors.

Sources: Blechman, Durch, et al. (1997), *Effective Transitions from Peace Operations to Sustainable Peace*; Stedman (2001), *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars*.

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Although Afghanistan's situation is unusual, it shares many elements with other transitions of the past 15 years, including the key roles of local faction leaders and neighboring states in supporting or spoiling the peace and the importance of black market "spoils" in financing that subversion. Peace in Sierra Leone was impossible, for example, as long as Revolutionary United Front leader Foday Sankoh was at large, the RUF had access to diamond fields, and neighboring Liberia was willing to forward these "conflict diamonds" to world markets in exchange for money, guns, and drugs.


In the Afghan context, al Qaeda and the Taliban are "total" spoilers who would wreck the peace process if they could. Many members of Afghanistan's political elite are potential "greedy" spoilers looking to maximize personal or communal gain from the Bonn process, with some incentive to wreck what they cannot control. (Stedman, 2001)

The tenuous state of governance in several of Afghanistan's neighbors and their respective histories of support for co-ethnics or co-religionists in Afghanistan also pose threats to peace and stability there.

As long as fighting forces from the old war remain intact, any breakdown in the political process risks a resumption of war. Their demobilization is a key element in "demilitarizing politics" and producing a stable peace. Demobilization usually entails a certain amount of factional disarmament but, in other contexts, secure cantonment of heavy weapons has contributed far more to a stable peace than have efforts to gather up light weapons -- prospects for which are, in Afghanistan, dim at best anyway.

Finally, transitions as difficult as Afghanistan's require continuing engagement and support from major external powers. Success is not assured with such support, but failure is basically guaranteed without it.

Effective Transitions Study: Initial Situational Difficulty vs. Effectiveness of Transition



This chart is based on a study done for the Department of Defense in 1997. It compares the difficulty of post-conflict situations with the quality of their transition from war to peace. (Both terms are defined in the Annex to this presentation.) Each post-conflict country depicted above had the help of international peace operations.

In general, the less difficult missions (Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique) enjoyed greater success, as might be expected. Current missions were placed on the chart based on difficulty scores alone and positioned left-to-right (X-axis) according to the level of success enjoyed in the past by comparably difficult missions. These are, in other words, predicted not measured success rates.

Of the current missions, East Timor shows the greatest potential for successful transition, followed by Sierra Leone. Congo, Bosnia, and Kosovo will all require a substantial and sustained international “push” to overcome the fundamental obstacles to peace that they embody (for example, internal disagreement about what constitutes the state, its boundaries, and/or its people).

Afghanistan under the Taliban had essentially no chance for a peaceful transition, and since the American intervention and the Bonn agreement, its conflict situation has changed from terrible to salvageable. Like the other tough cases, it will need continued international attention to complete its transition.

Effective Transitions: Applying Critical Indicators to Afghanistan

<p style="text-align: center;">Demilitarization</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Factions demobilized Reintegration of former combatants Heavy weapons cantonment</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Public Security</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Non-political/capable police force Police force respectful of citizen rights</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Governance</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Open elections and viable opposition Minimal level of corruption</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Economy</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Respect for property rights Economic reconstruction programs</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Basic Needs</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Freedom of movement Refugee repatriation Demining</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Civil Society</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Respect for human rights Access to independent mass media Freedom of speech</p>	<p><i>No</i></p> <p><i>No</i></p> <p><i>No</i></p> <p><i>Local factional policing outside Kabul; slow training.</i></p> <p><i>Elections one year away. Substantial corruption.</i></p> <p><i>(unknown)</i></p> <p><i>Some; security-limited.</i></p> <p><i>Self-repatriation, resource- & security-limited. Large demining program.</i></p> <p><i>Improving from Taliban era. Limited.</i></p> <p><i>(unknown)</i></p>
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Source: Adapted from Blechman, Durch, et al.
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This second chart drawn from the Effective Transitions study also looked at 42 variables mentioned in the literature as important to sustaining peace in post-civil war situations. We rated each of 13 cases on each of these variables at the end of a peace operation (or, for ongoing missions, used the latest estimate of the value of each), scoring them on a -5/+5 scale as we did with situational difficulty, where a +5 for, say, an education system might mean that the system had been restored to at least its pre-war functionality, and -5 would mean that it remained non-functioning.

Of the 42 variables, 15 correlated most highly with the independent measure of sustainable peace (the obvious inter-correlation amongst the 15 was addressed in the study methodology, which is available for those interested). The 15, grouped in six categories, are shown above, and Afghanistan's status on each is estimated at the right.

By and large, Afghanistan is not doing so well on any of these variables.

Stanford/IPA Peace Implementation Study: Comparable Measures of Difficulty

Situations are more difficult if they involve:

- » Secession
- » Collapsed State
- » No Agreement, Coerced Agreement
- ➔ Likely Spoilers
- ➔ Hostile Neighbors
- ➔ **Disposable Resources (Spoils)**
 - » **More than 2 parties**
 - » **>50,000 soldiers**

Blue = key factors common to both studies.

Applied to Afghanistan:

- *Regional fiefdoms instead.*
- *Collapsed, rebuilding center.*
- *Bonn → Loya Jirga → Transitional Authority.*
- *al Qaeda/Taliban, war/drug lords, ethnic suspicions, local rivalries.*
- *Hostile elements in Iran, Pakistan, northern tier states.*
- *Poppy crop (3 harvests/year).*
- *Many "parties".*
- *More than 50K militia?*

Source: Stedman (2001). Adapted with permission of the author.

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
A study by Stanford and IPA also measured situational difficulty, and the blue/underlined variables in the table above are shared with the Effective Transitions study. In addition, the Stanford/IPA study evaluated the impact of disposable/lootable resources (e.g., diamonds, drugs, gold), the number of factions in the fight, and the overall size of the fighting forces.

Only in the area of the peace agreement is Afghanistan doing reasonable well, and what was begun at Bonn, Germany, in December 2001 was more a process for reaching a peace agreement and new government than it was a settlement in and of itself. Bonn set up an interim government, authorized deployment of international peacekeepers, scheduled an emergency Loya Jirga (or collective meeting) to establish a transitional government, a constitutional convention, national elections, and a permanent government by 2004.

Otherwise, Afghanistan's regional power brokers are not looking to secede, but neither are they eager to cede power to the center; state services have been collapsed since the Taliban takeover in 1996; al Qaeda and the Taliban are weakened but potential spoilers, as are the country's various warlords and drug lords. The country's neighbors play a mixed-to-negative role as sources of instability, sources of aid to favored factions, and transit zones for drugs and other contraband. Opium gum is a highly disposable black market resource of great value to farmers and dealers. There are many "parties" contending for power, and very likely more than 50,000 militia nationwide.

All in all, by these measures, Afghanistan is a tough case in need of a lot of help.

Stanford/IPA: Situational Difficulty, Great Power Interest, and Case Outcomes




Source: Stedman (2001). Adapted with permission of the author.

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The Stanford/IPA chart from which the above graphic is adapted stresses that relatively straightforward cases with concerted great power engagement tend to succeed. Such engagement does not guarantee success in the difficult cases, but difficult cases with lower levels of engagement tend to fail. So great power engagement in support of peace implementation is necessary, but not sufficient, to produce success.

Should great power engagement in Afghanistan fade, then this chart would predict a failed transition, based on experience elsewhere. The same would be true for Iraq.




The chart above relates most of the principal forces working for and against security in Afghanistan over the next two years to the political timeline that runs along the horizontal axis.

At the April 2002 Geneva pledging conference for Afghan national forces, the Interim Administration proposed a 12,000-strong border security force, 70,000 police, a 60,000-strong army and 8,000-strong air force. (USDOS, 2002) The United States has the lead for training the armed services, including the border police, Germany for training other police, Italy for the justice system, and the UN for demobilization. *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF) also has roughly 10,000 troops inside Afghanistan plus air support and logistics elements posted outside of it. (Schmitt & Shanker) ISAF patrols Kabul and its environs. The chart rates each OEF and ISAF soldier as equivalent in fighting capacity to several local fighters because of their weapons, training, mobility, communications capacity and access to air power backup.

National forces loyal to the central administration may be the best way to secure the two-year transition to a new constitution and government but at planned rates of training the Afghan Transitional Administration, by mid-2004, would have less than a third of planned forces. (US Senate, 2002)

There may be 70,000 (USDOS, 2002) to 200,000 (ICG, 2002c) fighters loosely organized in such local and regional militias. Although demobilization of present informal forces is recognized as essential: Failure to demobilize existing fighting forces as new national forces are built has threatened or destroyed other countries' transitions from war to peace (Stedman, 2001; Collier, 2001). Japan has provided funds toward demobilization, but implementation awaits "reform" of the Ministry of Defense, i.e., confidence that all armed factions will demobilize more or less together.




Basic training takes 10 weeks, at which point unit training begins and continues for another 20 weeks. Thus each battalion takes about seven months to become operational. Some new trainees (e.g., from the 7th battalion) will be used to backfill the initial battalions to full strength.

France has trained three battalions and has also begun officer training. The UK is training non-commissioned officers. About 39 Afghan trainers are now qualified to provide basic training to new Afghan recruits.

The ethnic makeup of the ANA continues to be heavily Tajik, but as more units deploy into predominately Pashtun areas such as Gardez and make a good impression, Pashtun recruitment rates have increased. Critical to the perception and reality of ethnic balance is what is called “Ministry of Defense reform,” or the professionalizing and political rebalancing of the ministry to reduce the dominance of the Panshiri Tajik faction led by Marshall Fahim. His forces remain deployed in Kabul with access to their heavy weapons.

Afghan National Army and Border Security Police, Training Totals




Actual training rates for the ANA have been running at just over half the planned rate. Dropout rates for the first two battalions exceeded 50 percent; subsequent battalions have graduated up to 70 percent of their initial trainees. US government managers of the program note that these latter dropout rates are comparable to those of the US Army and other modern militaries..

Eight infantry battalions have completed basic training as of mid-2003, as have an armored battalion, with a mechanized battalion still in basic. Combat support battalions are to be trained next.

The border security force was transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior, creating problems for the US training program. US Foreign Assistance legislation places strict limits on DOD training of foreign police, and Afghanistan's border forces are now considered police. As a result, the transitional government has no forces with which to control its main commercial border crossings and none on the immediate horizon. Provincial governors control the border crossings and collect the revenues from export and import traffic. A meeting of Karzai and the governors in late May produced a revenue sharing agreement, but the central government has little leverage it can exert over governors who have both cash in hand and their own militias—some, as in the case of Ismail Khan in Herat, with armored forces.

Security Options While National Forces Reach Full Operational Capacity



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What are the options for closing Afghanistan's security gap in the near- to mid-term?

- US forces now in the country appear to be doing more now in support of what the Pentagon calls “stability operations,” could, as conditions of the “first war” permit. Post-Loya Jirga, ISAF and OEF forces based at Bagram airfield hold the balance of power in Kabul vis-à-vis the Northern Alliance.
- US forces could, in principle, quickly strike more deals with local parties to provide local security and advisors, promote stability in exchange for reconstruction cash, and monitor local forces' behavior. Where those forces belong to governors recognized by the Transitional Administration, US efforts could reinforce the relationship, in support of the political process begun in Bonn last December that aims to move Afghanistan beyond warlord suzerainty toward stable governance.
- An expanded ISAF would be the next interim security option for Afghanistan. With political go-ahead and logistical support from the United States, it would take a few months to deploy. **Direct, even if token, US participation on the ground, perhaps drawing upon forces already deployed, might be needed to induce other countries to contribute troops.**
- NATO members with forces committed in the Balkans have been reluctant to volunteer additional forces for Afghanistan, both because of commitments in the Balkans and very likely because of the looming conflict in Iraq. However, the North Atlantic Council voted to cut forces in the Balkans by 11,800 troops in 2002. (Lawsky, 2002) That reduction is just shy of the number of additional troops (13,500) that this briefing recommends be added to the international security assistance effort in Afghanistan (for a total of about 18,000). The added troops could fill a key security gap and serve as models, mentors, and monitors for the new national forces *outside* Kabul. It could perform tasks that help knit the country together and build its financial base (deterrence of highway banditry and private taxation, and generation of customs revenue for the central government).

Tasks for Security Forces - 1

- Address active internal security threats:
 - *Self-defense against al Qaeda/Taliban/other harassment.*
 - *Deter/prevent and disrupt lower-level fights for local political control; ethnic violence; and disruptive efforts by external powers.*
 - *Deter/suppress checkpoints, shakedowns, road crime, smuggling on major routes.*
 - *Provide security for reconstruction projects, refugee/IDP transit.*
 - *Oversee voluntary demobilization, heavy weapon cantonment, as agreed to in transitional political process.*
- Address border security to deter smuggling at major crossing points and generate customs revenues for national administration.

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Any international security force must be able to defend itself against potential local enemies. How well it does that depends in part on the quality of its intelligence about the movements of local fighters, its threshold of concern regarding concentrations of hostile forces, and how fast it could react to such concentrations. Spoilers -- indigenous or external -- could be expected to pose threats in outlying cities similar to those uncovered by ISAF in Kabul.

Because political violence is a major threat to the peace process, international forces should have a role in deterring it, in separating local forces, and in overseeing the voluntary demobilization of those forces. It may be necessary to implement and monitor voluntary heavy weapon cantonments and “no brandishing” rules.

Because weak states generate much of their revenues from export/import fees, the transitional administration must generate such revenue and at an early date. Early international military presence on the border at major crossings would help persuade local warlords to share such revenues with the center and both support and monitor the functioning of the new border security force.


Tasks for Security Forces - 2

- Address passive security threats.
 - *Clear mines from roads, bridges; manage ex-fighters clearing mines.*
 - *Undertake other civil engineering tasks (repair of roads, bridges, wells, and irrigation systems).*
 - *Should be capable of supporting disaster response (earthquake).*
- Work ad interim with forces of local rulers recognized/appointed by ITGA.
- International advisers remain with deployed units of ANA.
- International peacekeeping units operate jointly with deployed units of ANA.
- Phase security responsibilities to ANA and border security police as they gain end-strength, operational experience, and public confidence.

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The legitimacy of foreign military presence and of the Transitional Administration itself will likely hinge on visible improvements being made in the average Afghan's quality of life during the transition. Depending on the evolution of local politics, a principal initial task of a larger international security assistance force may be to support repair and reconstruction activities. Reconstruction projects managed by the force's engineering elements could employ demobilized fighters and thus provide an incentive to demobilize.

An expanded international force would have to work initially with those local forces who respond to regional governors appointed or accepted by the central authorities. But as new Afghan national forces emerge from basic training, they could continue to receive field training from the international force. Deployment of some national forces outside Kabul, assigned to road and border security tasks, the restoration of commerce, and the suppression of illegal "taxation" at multiple highway checkpoints, could enhance the credibility of the new forces and acclimate local populations to their presence without directly threatening the suzerainty of regional leaders (whose cooperation with or co-optation into the transition process could be encouraged by other, political and economic, means). International forces would draw down toward an advisory role as national forces gain capacity and experience.



Securing Afghanistan's main roads for legitimate traffic would boost commerce and cut the deployment costs of all international entities operating in the country, civilian and military, official and NGO. The numbers used above employ norms for deployments of "NATO-standard" forces that were validated for NATO by the Peace Operations Policy Program at George Mason University.** These norms suggest that at least eighteen armored reconnaissance companies with wheeled vehicles would be needed to patrol Afghanistan's principal all-weather roads. They would need the support of at least two air reconnaissance squadrons using light helicopters (roughly 30 per squadron) and/or unmanned air vehicles, primarily to surveil the long loop of road running from Kabul through Kandahar to Herat. Three air assault battalions with about 40 transport helicopters apiece, based at Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif, would give the ground forces additional quick-response eyes and ears and could also be used to move reinforcements to an AOR that experienced an upsurge in violence.

To help the transitional central authority generate legitimate income, an international force should also take control of major border crossings, working jointly as soon as possible with members of the new national border security force and phasing the mission to them over a year or two. An air mobile infantry battalion and perhaps a special operations company would be needed to secure main border crossings.

To summarize, the light option would require about 4,500 mechanized infantry, 2,500 combat engineers, and 6,500 cavalry, which, added to the 4,600 troops presently deployed with ISAF, would result in a force of about 18,100 troops – about 13,500 more than currently deployed with ISAF.

This force can be less than half the size of the Kosovo force in part because it would be implementing a political solution that all Afghan factions have endorsed, and in part because it would not be responsible for enforcing peace everywhere, as KFOR is. *Operation Enduring Freedom* has pursued its objectives without a heavy troop presence, but it can call on air reinforcements based in and near the region. A light, but properly-configured and -supported international security presence could function similarly, if it could call, in turn, on OEF for backup.

** Although the chart above draws upon these norms, their application here is solely the responsibility of this presentation's author.

Force Sizing: Light Option

UN Region:	Capital	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East	
UNAMA regional offices:	Kabul	Jalalabad	Gardez	Kandahar	Herat	Mazar-e Sharif	Bamiyan	Kunduz	
Current ISAF Force:	4,600								Total Increments:
Force Sizing Criteria:									
Infantry, sized by relative threat and relative population; one-battalion minimum in high-threat areas		900	900	0	915	952	256	532	4,455
Combat engineers (1-2 companies/region)		250	250	500	500	500	250	250	2,500
Road and border crossing forces (cavalry), light option		398	427	1,210	1,849	1,210	456	949	6,500
									Total Force:
Infantry, engineers, cavalry, light option:	4,600	1,548	1,577	1,710	3,264	2,663	962	1,731	18,055
Est'd OEF troops by region (NYT, 6 May 02)	5,000			4,000					

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This table shows three types of forces: mechanized infantry, combat engineers, and cavalry/reconnaissance troops. Calculations for the infantry *assume that ISAF, with 4,600 troops in and around Kabul [at the time this chart was drawn], is appropriately-sized for its area of responsibility and the size of the population within that area, and that the tasks of forces in the other AORs would be similar to tasks in Kabul.* The AORs are designed so that regional airports could be used as force headquarters, resupply points, redoubts, and extraction points, if necessary.

The first line in the table multiplies ISAF-Kabul's size by the indices of population and political threat for each region, but sets a floor of one battalion (900, including support troops) to assure self-defense capacity in areas with threats of political violence close to or exceeding Kabul-minus-ISAF. In Gardez, for example, near where coalition forces pursued al Qaeda throughout the winter of 2002, a force that simply matched ISAF's ratio of troops to local population would number fewer than 40. *ISAF patrols an AOR with a population at least as large as Kosovo's, although much smaller in area; it does so with one-tenth the peak manpower of NATO's Kosovo force.* It can do so in part because it has de facto backup from roughly 5,000 troops of OEF based at Bagram air base and perhaps 4,000 based outside Kandahar. (Schmitt and Shanker) This backup and its impact are also taken into account in apportioning infantry outside Kabul. The stabilizing effect of OEF forces in Kandahar is credited against what would otherwise be a requirement for ISAF infantry. Taking that credit, the total "light option" increment for infantry would be about 4,500. If OEF forces in Kandahar were restricted to a quick reaction role vis a vis ISAF, then an international battalion probably would be needed for Kandahar as well.

I would also deploy companies of combat engineers in each region outside Kabul, to work on basic infrastructure repairs and, in close collaboration with UNAMA, to manage demobilized fighters put to work repairing and de-mining the country's main roads and other critical infrastructure such as irrigation systems.

Finally, cavalry units would patrol main roads (as discussed further in the following slide), and air mobile units would be tasked, together with the country's new border security forces, to establish control over the dozen or so border crossings with all-weather roads.

Force Sizing: Medium Option

UN Region:	Capital	East	South East	South	West	North	Central Highland	North East	
UNAMA regional offices:	Kabul	Jalalabad	Gardez	Kandahar	Herat	Mazar-e Sharif	Bamiyan	Kunduz	
Current ISAF Force:	4,600								Total Increments:
Force Sizing Criteria:									
Infantry, sized by relative threat and relative size of AOR		2,727	2,551	3,378	2,457	3,472	1,955	1,955	18,496
Combat engineers (1-2 companies/region)		250	250	500	500	500	250	250	2,500
Road and border crossing forces, medium option (three extra battalions: ground, air recon, and air assault)	492	583	339	1736	1960	1909	284	1101	8405
									Total Force:
Infantry, engineers, cavalry, medium option:	5,092	3,561	3,141	5,615	4,917	5,881	2,489	3,306	34,000
Est'd OEF troops by region (NYT, 6 May 02)	5,000			4,000					

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Although I argue for the light option – for reasons of politics, culture, cost, and availability – it may be that a different metric would be more appropriate for sizing forces. The table above uses a threat-adjusted *force-to-space ratio*, sizing forces according to the size of their AOR and again using the Kabul AOR as the baseline. Line one above calculates infantry numbers without regard to OEF presence because these larger forces would be better able to self-reinforce in times of stress – although OEF is still assumed to function as an ultimate backup force.

This “medium option” generates a much larger increment of infantry, about 18,500 troop, sufficient for one brigade or battle group per AOR outside Kabul. These larger formations would be better able to function selectively outside their AORs, responding to trouble spots within their regions, and to reinforce one another.

On the other hand, their military and political footprint would be sufficiently heavy as to risk looking like an occupation force without enough power to be one: No fewer than 100,000 troops would be needed to deploy troops throughout Afghanistan (based on the present ISAF ratio of forces to population in Kabul) and perhaps as many as 600,000 (to achieve a Kosovo-like ratio of forces to population). The logistics of such forces would be daunting and the dim prospect of finding sufficient troops would foreclose it in any case, much as force availability and cost might foreclose the “medium option.”

Cavalry forces in the medium option would be augmented as well, with one more battalion of ground forces, an extra air reconnaissance squadron, and an extra air assault battalion based in Kabul, raising the cavalry total to 8,400.

The total force under the medium option would be about 34,000 troops.

“How much is enough?”
Rough Annual Cost Estimates of Larger
International Forces in Afghanistan

	Number of Troops, with Route Security	US Forces @ \$215,000 per troop year	Other Developed States @ \$120,000 per troop year	UN Force @ \$103,000 per troop year maximum
Light Option, Year One	18,100	\$3.9-4.3 billion*	\$2.2-2.4 billion*	n/a
Light Option, Year Two (less engineers)	15,600	\$3.4-3.7 billion*	\$1.8-2.0 billion*	\$1.6 billion** (US share: \$440 million)
Medium Option, Year One	34,000	\$7.3-8.0 billion*	\$4.1-4.5 billion*	n/a
Medium Option, Year Two (less engineers)	31,500	\$6.8-7.5 billion*	\$3.8-4.2 billion	(too large)

* The higher number reflects 10 percent added for air support element. See Annex II.

** Heavily air-dependent, inclusive of air support costs. See Annex II.

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The above table estimates are based on numbers drawn from the US Congressional Research Service (Ek 2000) and US General Accounting Office, the *Military Balance* published by London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 1999-2001), and official United Nations financial reporting for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (UN, 2001a). They are rough estimates, nonetheless: Different configurations of forces and variations in overall troop quality would affect numbers needed to accomplish particular tasks. US costs for the air support elements of NATO forces in Bosnia and Kosovo equaled roughly ten percent of ground force costs. (GAO)

The above numbers do not include the cost of rapid response forces that might belong to OEF, but such cost could be estimated from US troop-year costs once the response force was sized.

These numbers do *not* include estimates of police, rule of law, or other security-sector personnel often associated with a large, complex peace-building operation. UNAMA does not, at present, have such a mandate. Training of police, and related capacity-building, is assumed to be ongoing “under separate cover,” as pledged by Germany and perhaps other states.

In short, the numbers above are the *minimum* security buy-in that may be needed for a given-sized force for at least the next year to make the rest of the peace-building package in Afghanistan viable. How long these forces would be needed would depend on progress in rebuilding Afghan politics and government, including its military and police forces. The greater the up-front effort devoted to those institutions and their revenue streams, the sooner international security forces could depart.

Doing the job with American forces is the most costly option, per capita. Forces from other developed countries are cheaper, on average, but there is considerable variation in costs across countries (see Annex II). A UN force would be still cheaper per capita (even with extensive air support costs built-in) but the main financial advantage of a UN force, with the UN’s funding, reimbursement, and related support mechanisms, would be to extend the possibility of participation to a larger number of states.

Using the PRT As a Security Trellis

- Small composite Provincial Reconstruction Teams (~ 60-80 members each) deployed now in Gardez, Bamian, and Kunduz; by year's end to be in Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat.
 - *Mix of US military and civilian (State Dept., AID, seeking Agriculture and other participation).*
 - *Some PRTs planned to be non-US teams.*
- Will provide direct US involvement in local security and reconstruction; anchor point for ANA small unit deployments; maintain direct link to OEF backup; encourage co-location of relief/development agencies.
- **BUT:** not enough air transport attached; not enough people to provide continuing security presence except for force protection; not enough people to manage or protect major reconstruction projects, especially road work; concept flexibility makes it harder to explain.
- Present build rate of Afghan forces will allow no more than company-sized deployments with PRTs for about another year, whereas battalion-strength would be more appropriate as an ISAF substitute.

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Rebuilding the non-Military Security Sector

- Germany is lead nation for police, and doing more than training:
 - *Infrastructure (police headquarters, academy, hospital)*
 - *Training (17 staff, and mobile training teams)*
 - *Focus on Kabul; seeks partners for the regions*
 - *No established build rate for national police*
- UN Law & Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan provides salary support.
 - Contributions slow: \$65 million budgeted, \$7 million received.
- Governors/other leaders meanwhile building own forces.
- Italy responsible for judicial sector; slow progress.
- US to train border police, but no training has started.
- US Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, contracting to train several thousand Afghan police.

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Annexes

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Annex I

DFI Effective Transitions Study: Assessing Difficulty Prior to Mission Deployment

	Character of the Conflict			Character of the Peace			Quality of External Support	
	Objective of War	Combatants' Motives	State of Governance	Scope of the Accord	Objective of Peace Process	Willingness of the Faction Leaders	Neighboring States	Major Powers
Less Difficult, More Favorable to Peace (+5)	Control of central government	Parties divided along political lines	Fully functional	Detailed plan for peace, reconstruction	New consensus political arrangement	All accept possibility of losing power	Fully supportive	Long-term, consistent and even handed political attention with resource support
(0)	Autonomy within existing state		Partially functional		Power sharing by original factions	Minor player unreconciled	One or more indifferent	One or more indifferent
(-5)	Loose confederation under weak states		Dysfunctional		Winner-take-all electoral results	Major player unreconciled	One or more undercut accord with illicit trade	One or more undercut accord with subrosa support to clients
More Difficult, Less Favorable to Peace	Secession	Parties divided along ethnic, tribal, religious lines	Collapsed	No peace accord in place	No resolution of differences	All unreconciled to possible loss of political power	Neighbors oppose pact	Major powers oppose pact

Chart © DFI International, 1997

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Situational difficulty for each conflict transition case was established by rating the case on each of the eight variables in the table above, and then simply averaging those scores. However, regression analysis indicated that willingness of faction leaders to compromise in the interest of peace, and the role of neighboring states in supporting or hindering peace had the most on sustainable peace (defined in the next chart). (Blechman, Durch, et al., 1997)

Effective Transitions: Defining Sustainable Peace

Scale Value	Conflict Status	Status of Civil Security	Political System Survival
(+5)	No re-ignition of armed conflict	No politically motivated, violent disruptions of civil society	Free and fair national-level election, indigenously and internationally recognized after peace operation withdraws
(0)	Minor skirmishes	Intermittent politically motivated violent disruptions of civil society	Questionable election
(-5)	Widespread conflict has resumed	High degree of politically motivated, violent disruptions of civil society	Collapse/overthrow of political system

Chart © DFI International, 1997

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The Effective Transitions project measured the degree to which a post-conflict situation achieved sustainable peace by averaging scores on conflict status (did the old war renew itself), on civil security, and on the ability of the country to stage a follow-on election after international peace forces left the country.

Effective Transitions Framework: Situational Difficulty, Operations Begun Since 1999

	War Objective	Combatant Motives	State of Govt.	Peace Accord Scope	Peace Process Objective	Local Leaders Willingness to Compromise	Role of Neighboring States	Major Power Engagement	Average Score
EAST TIMOR	-3	5	-5	0	5	4	3	4	1.6
SIERRA LEONE	4	3	1	3	2	-5	-5	2	0.6
DR CONGO	-2	-2	-4	2	-4	-2	-4	0	-2.0
KOSOVO	-5	-5	-2	-5	-5	-2	-2	5	-2.6
AFGHANISTAN/TALIBAN	5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-5	-3	-2	-3.1
AFGHANISTAN/BONN '01	5	-2	-4	0	0	0	-2	3	0.0
AFGHANISTAN/BONN '02	3	-3	-1	0	2	-2	-2	3	0.0
Iraq/Post-OperIraqiFreed	5	-5	-5	-5	5	-2	0	5	-0.3

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The above table evaluates the situational difficulty of peace operations begun after the Effective Transitions project was finished. Each reflects a “going in” evaluation, conditions in the country as the peace operation deployed. Afghanistan under the Taliban measures country conditions when Operation Enduring Freedom began; Afghanistan/Bonn measures the post-Taliban period.

Annex II

**Estimated costs of 1999 troop contributions to *Joint Guardian*
(KFOR, Kosovo), with US comparisons from *Joint Forge*
(SFOR II, Bosnia)**

(annualized, ground forces only)

Troop Contributing State	Estimated Military Expenditure (USD millions)	Troops Deployed (1999 and 2000-01)	Cost per Troop, annualized (USD)
Czech Republic	\$15.5	160	\$166,071
Denmark	\$46.2	900	\$88,000
France	\$96.0	4100	\$40,139
Germany	\$530.8	4400	\$206,818
Greece	\$20.0	550	\$62,338
Hungary	\$18.7	325	\$98,637
Norway	\$94.9	800	\$203,357
Poland	\$9.6	750	\$21,943
Portugal	\$44.9	300	\$256,571
Spain	\$57.3	900	\$109,143
Turkey	\$17.5	500	\$60,000
United States '99	\$1,044.5	8400	\$213,163
United States '00	\$1,803.1	6550	\$275,279
United States '01	\$931.4	6425	\$144,965
US SFOR II '99	\$1,431.2	9150	\$156,411
US SFOR II '00	\$1,381.0	5390	\$256,215
US SFOR II '01	\$981.4	3980	\$246,583

Costs per troop year	Average	Low	High
Kosovo, non-US =	\$119,365	\$21,943	\$256,571
Kosovo, US =	\$215,436	\$144,965	\$275,279
Bosnia, US =	\$219,737	\$156,411	\$256,215

United Nations Comparators		
	Ethiopia-Eritrea	Dem. Rep. of Congo
Total cost per troop year:	\$46,500	\$103,000
US share: 27.35%	\$12,718	\$28,171

(All UN costs inclusive of air support.)

Sources: Ek, 2000; IISS, 1999-2001; UN, 2001a, 2002a; US GAO.

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Note: Data included for non-US countries whose expenditures for *Joint Guardian* were broken out from other Kosovo-related military actions such as *Allied Force* or *Allied Harbor*. US troop totals include associated support troops.

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(notes page)

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