

SECURING PEACE

The first requirement of peace support is security. Security and stability help make life livable, open doors for economic growth, and contribute to peoples' willingness to stay and make a go of it rather than risk their lives on the next smuggler's truck or boat outbound for Oz.²²⁷

In these and other ways, effective peace operations serve the interests of rich and poor alike. Indeed, as the international system and the powers within it wheel about to face the security challenges of the twenty-first century, PSOs find themselves elevated to a far more central role in "strategic affairs" than has been the case heretofore.²²⁸ This includes the blending of peace and stability support into US and other major power doctrine as a core military function. With this evolution comes a risk, however, as major powers naturally tend to emphasize their own needs and interests, at potential risk to the needs and interests of local parties, populations, and cultures, which may leave a legacy of diminished legitimacy and increased resentment, if not resistance, for follow-on institutions and operations to manage.

SPEED AND FIREPOWER VERSUS LEGITIMACY AND STAYING POWER

Security for peace operations comes in many institutional packages but at base derives from states, which loan their forces to the United Nations and to alliances, regional organizations, and coalitions. States redistribute security resources through aid and training programs. They and international organizations at all levels hire private security and support contractors, but many of these are led by, and virtually all of them hire, personnel who received extensive and expensive training in the militaries or police forces of their respective home states. The security packages for PSOs thus to a large degree simply represent reconfigured state assets. Yet these packages take on very different legal, political, and operational characteristics once reconfigured. Common origins notwithstanding, who manages what configuration of capabilities in the field makes a difference to the execution of PSO mandates.

Characteristics—from legitimacy through operational capacity to accountability—of six major security support providers are compared in **table 7**.

Table 7: Summarizing Capabilities of Major Security Providers

Capability	United Nations	European Union	African Union
Legitimacy	UN Charter, global writ.	Treaty of Maastricht+; UN Charter Ch. VIII; in/around Europe; else-where with local or regional invite, UN mandate.	AU Constitutive Act; UN Charter Ch. VIII; in Africa; potentially elsewhere.
Decision Structure	UN Security Council, 15 states, 5 vetoes	Council of EU, 25 states, active consensus, with opt-out	Peace and Security Council, 15 states, consensus preferred, can revert to 2/3 vote of voting members.
Military planning capacity	Limited; HQ Military Planning Service of ~ 20 staff, plus some operations planners in each mission.	Intrinsic capacity limited; small cell embedded with NATO; access to NATO capacity as needed.	Limited; to date, mostly seconded officers from other institutions.
Military force availability	Avg. 3–6 mos., brigade to division-size mission (3,000 troops/mo. max.).	Goal: 2–4 weeks, 1–4 “battlegroups” of 1,250 each. To date: 1 btlgrp equivalent, 3 wks (Ituri)	African Standby Force to be formed. To date: 6 mos., 3,000 troops, 900 milobs (Darfur)
Police availability	Avg. 4–9 months for 1,000 police to new mission; pilot rapidly-deployable field HQ team.	Goal: 1000 EU police, 30 days notice. To date: 6–12 mos. for 384 EU, 87 non-EU police (EUPM Bosnia).	10 mos., 815 police; 8 mos., for additional 400 police (Darfur, '04–'05).
Civilian availability (admin. and high-skills reconstruction)	Rapid Deployment Roster (14 days for 90-day deployment) on hiatus after initial trials; developing civilian peacekeeper career track.	Council: No centralized civilian roster; rapid secondment of personnel by member states. Commission: 2200-strong elections monitoring roster; 6000 national secondments for two-week technical	No AU-level civilian rapid deployment as yet. Southern Africa standby roster (SAFDEM) of 160 members, deployed just 18 since 2002 due lack of funds to pay for secondments.

Table 7: Continued

NATO	Coalition	Private Sector
<p>North Atlantic Treaty; in/around Europe; elsewhere with local or regional invite, UN mandate.</p>	<p>UN Charter Art. 51 (self-defense); other action with regional or UN mandate.</p>	<p>Derives from status of client, from specific contract, and applicable law.</p>
<p>North Atlantic Council, 26 states, acquiescence procedure with 26 vetoes.</p>	<p>Lead nation, plus bilaterally-negotiated terms of coalition membership.</p>	<p>Client and company directives to field team structure per contract.</p>
<p>Extensive. two Joint Force Commands with operations planning capacity. Plus member state capacities.</p>	<p>Lead nation; if U.S., thousands of planners; if others, hundreds.</p>	<p>Varies.</p>
<p>Goal: NRF brigade, 5 days; relief force, 30 days. Not yet deployed operationally.</p>	<p>Varies (lead nation specific); a few weeks on average for battalion-size force.</p>	<p>Varies with breadth, intensity of contracted tasks.</p>
<p>Has used para-military units to bolster peace-keeping forces but non-military police not part of NATO forces.</p>	<p>Varies by states participating.</p>	<p>Firms provide field security for many clients, from UN to NGOs. U.S. govt. sends contractors to UN operations.</p>
<p>NATO not geared to deploy civilian personnel in quantity.</p>	<p>Canada, Norway, UK, others: civilian rapid rosters. U.S. building a 100-person roster on 14-day notice, up to 6 mo. deployment and 3,000-person reserve roster, 30–90-day notice, up to 12 mo. deployment.</p>	<p>Varies by company.</p>

Table 7: Continued

Capability	United Nations	European Union	African Union
Maximum demonstrated intensity of operations (example)	Division-strength peace enforcement against militia-type forces (Ituri, Kivus). Has managed up to 8 simultaneous complex operations each with brigade-level forces.	One battalion-level, stable police mission and one brigade-strength, stable PSO (both Bosnia) plus one short-term battlegroup strength peace enforcement mission (Ituri).	Brigade-strength observation mission (Darfur) with external support.
Lift assets	Contracted; use of member state assets in emergencies.	Members' medium air lift assets; limited UK heavy air lift; else contracted heavy air/sea lift.	Contracted; some assist from NATO for Darfur.
Initial Sustainability	Military/police good, civilian mixed (issue of timely replacement, RDR cadre).	Intended to be 90 days for battlegroups; 90 days demonstrated for UN support operations	Requires extra-regional funding and logistics; usually contractor-implemented.
Funding for Security Elements of Operations	Assessments from member states; supplemented by voluntary contrib.	Participant self-funding plus "Athena" system for common costs.	Donor countries and institutions outside Africa.
Accountability	Sending state disciplines military and seconded police; admin. penalties for UN civilians, functional immunity can be waived; gains criminal jurisdiction with a governance mandate.	EU through Coalition: Sending state discipline of military and seconded police personnel. Civilian legal status depends upon the laws of the sending or home state. Some egregious crimes subject to "universal" state jurisdiction and/or to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court.	

Table 7: Continued

NATO	Coalition	Private Sector
<p>Nationally-segmented air strikes (against Serbia); corps-strength stable PSO (Bosnia); division-strength PSO with some spoiler management (Kosovo, Afghanistan).</p>	<p>U.S.-led: up to army-level stability ops with counterinsurgency. French/UK-led: battalion- to brigade-level PSO with active spoiler management.</p>	<p>Small wars in small places against militia-quality foes. Logistics support under fire, with adequate compensation.</p>
<p>U.S. heavy air/sea lift; limited UK heavy air lift, others medium air lift; plus contracted heavy air/sea lift.</p>	<p>Lead state air/sea lift (U.S. strategic/heavy; others medium range and lift), some partner lift, and contract air.</p>	<p>Contracted or owned (heavy lift cargo firm).</p>
<p>Good; primarily national-level function.</p>	<p>Varies by states participating; heavily dependent on lead state.</p>	<p>Varies by company.</p>
<p>Participant self-funding for operational costs; NATO assessments for common costs.</p>	<p>Participants are self-funded, with possible subsidies for partners.</p>	<p>Client.</p>
<p>EU through Coalition: Sending state discipline of military and seconded police personnel. Civilian legal status depends upon the laws of the sending or home state. Some egregious crimes subject to "universal" state jurisdiction and/or to jurisdiction of International Criminal Court.</p>		<p>Varied, weak. U.S. has extended domestic law to cover DoD contractors only.</p>

Legitimacy is political body armor for PSOs, helping to generate and sustain local consent, without which PSOs can degenerate into counterinsurgency warfare. British doctrine still recognizes UN Security Council authorization as the “gold standard” for mission legitimacy and thus what it calls campaign authority. Washington and Paris seem much less certain of that value, yet failure to seek Security Council authority or endorsement can give pause even to regional action—such as more forceful EU or NATO action in Darfur—and deprive coalition operations not only of political cover but of states whose governments will not join without such cover. On the other hand, regional organizations may be able to act when the Security Council is politically deadlocked.

Decision making in the Security Council is subject to the vetoes of its five permanent members and several other organizations’ decision structures are also vulnerable to vetoes although most have emergency work-arounds. The European Union works on the basis of active consensus but for “issues that involve only selected governments” members can form “committees of contributors” that need only “general approval from a principal EU governing body.” The AU Peace and Security Council can opt to make decisions on the basis of two-thirds majority present and voting if it is unable to reach a consensus. The UN Security Council or the General Assembly can vote to shift a deadlocked security issue to the General Assembly for an advisory resolution under the 1950 “Uniting for Peace” resolution. Only NATO decisions appear always to be vulnerable to veto, but the silence procedure does allow the North Atlantic Council to act unless some member simply cannot bring itself to abstain.²²⁹

Once decisions are made, lead nations and NATO have much more extensive operational planning capacity and can operate at higher intensity than other PSO providers. The EU can deploy small forces relatively quickly and in theory NATO can deploy somewhat larger forces even faster, although its Response Force is as yet untested operationally. The United States can deploy a battalion-sized Marine force up to a few hundred miles from the ocean shore in the time it takes to sail an Amphibious Ready Group to the operational area. The United Nations can ship up to 3,000 troops to new missions per month, if necessary, starting about 90 days after planning begins and request letters issue. Every entity is short on police and has its own approach to police recruitment, as is the case with civilian personnel. Only the United States owns substantial amounts of long-range, outsized airlift and, for solutions to the airlift problem, all presently turn to the private sector. The United Nations and NATO both contract with international firms for Ukraine/Russia-built heavy airlifters, many operated by Russian or Ukrainian companies through contracts with international

partners. Rented strategic lift is just one dimension of contemporary PSOs' present and foreseeable reliance on the private sector for logistical support.

Although the United Nations cannot run large combat operations or marshal intervention forces quickly, it can sustain the operations that it undertakes because of its structure of financial assessments, equipment stores, systems contracts, and reimbursements to contributors. NATO's and the EU's provisions for funding "common costs" of operations do not extend to troop or police contributors' direct operational costs. In these and other non-UN operations, only the wealthiest of states can afford to participate in the absence of separate, bilateral subsidies. Because United Nations operations have global financial support, they can tap the large armies of South Asia or the forces of African states that could not otherwise afford to participate in extended field operations.

Accountability, the last item in table 7, is critical for all elements of PSOs but can be very difficult to ensure, even where nominally strong institutional and legal systems are in place to deal with malfeasance, as in the case of the US Uniform Code of Military Justice and its application to field forces. When forces are loaned to international operations of any stripe, disciplinary jurisdiction remains with the sending states and their respective systems of military justice. As noted earlier, rapidly-growing UN operations have suffered serious accountability problems and the organization has moved to deal with them, but has limited recourse beyond administrative measures even with its own civilian personnel. Every international operation suffers from similar accountability issues to some degree, however.

PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL CROSS-SUPPORT

The institutions in table 7 engage in a range of military operations relevant to PSOs, consistent with their respective political and operational characteristics. At higher levels of intensity—war and/or involuntary regime change—states and coalitions take the lead, perhaps followed by a PSO in the aftermath of full-scale fighting. At mid-level intensity—repression of genocide or mass killings, or reversing the overthrow of democratic governments—either coalitions or regional organizations may come into play politically or operationally and the United Nations may play politically. Regional institutions have also undertaken peace operations in places that are too difficult for the United Nations to manage, as has NATO in Afghanistan. The United Nations tends to dominate the lower-intensity range of operations, implementing cease-fires and peace agreements in situations that nonetheless can and have flared into temporary or localized fighting.

Even where the United Nations is not putting boots on the ground, the Security Council frequently puts political gas in the tank of new peace operations, and a UN-led operation often follows either a coalition intervention or a regional mission. **Table 8** compares how various first-in forces have timed their handovers to follow-on forces. It suggests that handovers have tended to be quicker when the follow-on force was to be led by the United Nations, and this tendency seems to have grown more pronounced over time: Seven of nine transitions to UN operational control have occurred since 2000. Five of these happened within one year, from October 2003 to June 2004. In most of these transitions, the first-in force withdrew within six months of deployment and sometimes within three months. Especially when more than one operation is experiencing such a transition, the pressures on UN DPKO to find, transport, and sustain the requisite numbers of troops, police, and civilian professionals can be tremendous.

Table 8: The Timing of Mission Handovers

Time to prepare for handover: Handover sequences:	Three Months or Less	Four to Six Months	Six to Twelve Months	More Than Twelve Months
Coalition to UN	Haiti, MIFH-UN ('04)	Somalia, UNITAF-UN ('93) Haiti, MNF-UN ('95) E. Timor, INTERFET-UN ('00)		
Regional Organization to UN	Congo, EU-UN ('03) Liberia, ECOWAS-UN ('03)	Sierra Leone, ECOWAS-UN ('00) Côte d'Ivoire, ECOWAS-UN ('04)	Burundi, AU-UN ('04)	
Coalition to Regional Organization			Burundi, South Africa-AU ('03)	Afghanistan, ISAF-NATO ('03)
Regional Organization to Regional Organization				Macedonia, NATO-EU ('03) Bosnia, NATO-EU ('04)
UN to Regional Organization		Bosnia, UN-NATO ('95)		Bosnia, UN-EU ('02)

Note: In underlined missions, the top troop contributors from the initial mission also contributed a substantial fraction of the follow-on force, or most of the original mission was "rehabbed" as part of the follow-on force.

Although other institutions plan to deploy military forces rapidly, including to PSOs, only the United Nations is routinely required to meet short deadlines for operations undertaken at *other* institutions' initiative. Although Operation Artemis responded to a support request from the UN secretary-general and arrived in Ituri within weeks of that request, it functioned more as a French-led coalition than as a regional force and operated under a self-imposed and self-enforced deployment timeline of 90 days, which it refused to extend as UN

forces filled in behind it. The African Union had about six months to prepare for its mission in Burundi but a South African force already there was “rehabbed” as the core of the AU presence. The South Africans also provided most of the managerial expertise.²³⁰ Finally, while the 1996 UN-NATO handover in Bosnia was accomplished on just a few months notice, it involved an easier mission than NATO had originally anticipated (namely, extracting international personnel under Bosnian Serb fire).

Rapid deployment of UN follow-on forces would be easier if the troops of richer coalition forces did not decline to participate in the follow-on operation. Notable exceptions to that trend were Haiti in 1994 (with US forces) and East Timor in 2000 (with Australian and other forces). More often, rehabbed units have needed substantial equipment upgrades to meet UN deployment standards, as in Liberia and other operations in Africa, generating costly logistics burdens.²³¹

If the world wants the United Nations to be an effective purveyor of sustained security support to peace operations, then the Security Council needs to review the deployment time pressures that it routinely imposes upon DPKO and its current troop contributors. Moreover, the organization’s wealthier members should resolve either to build the organization bigger deployment stocks and give it a massive training budget or to contribute forces of their own to UN operations that are now earmarked, if at all, exclusively for regional-level or coalition deployments. It is unfortunate and ironic that, in a period when the United Nations is more capable of managing PSOs and is carrying an historically high burden of operations, its richest and most capable members would offer little more than dollar diplomacy on its behalf.

PEACE AS A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

Although the historical utility of private sector support for PSOs is undeniable, the growing reliance on private firms by major militaries, minor governments, and international organizations alike is symptomatic, we would argue, of a failure of public authorities to adapt military structures and strategies to current security requirements, and of a perhaps deeper failure to educate their publics as to how international military engagements meet their national security interests. The mere availability of private alternatives to governmental functions is not sufficient reason to adopt them: The private sector will always offer such alternatives because its firms compete to live and a good living can be had from outsourcing, which can be a practical solution to a short-term problem (a lack of recruitable police for PSOs, for example). Over the longer term, however, government’s capacity to perform or even to manage the outsourced function

may atrophy unless government competes vigorously with the market to retain at least the managerial talent, and over time *experienced* talent will only be recruitable from the private security providers themselves, producing, in effect, a closed loop.

The main job of government in a democratic society is to protect the country, its people, their Constitution, and their interests abroad, using policy tools that best serve the public interest. It is a continuing struggle to ensure, even in developed states, that what elected officials represent in their decisions is indeed the public interest and not well-funded private interests. This struggle is even more intense in places where civil war is a recent memory. For that reason, peace operations work to restore not just the physical infrastructure but the rule of law—which must incorporate some notion of public interest and public service if it is to last—against efforts by dissatisfied or greedy local leaders to re-privatize governance or elements of it. The need to prevent this and to promote accountable, legitimate government is a major reason why key public security functions in PSOs should remain in public sector hands, lest capabilities and decisions for which public leaders ought to be held accountable end up parceled out to corporate persons whose accountability is at best indirect, at worst nonexistent, and whose operations abroad can elude the effective reach of criminal law.²³²

Although the rapidly-growing literature on peacebuilding (or “state-building”) has not quite reached consensus on what is needed or achievable for self-sustaining peace in war-torn states, most authors agree that reconstruction and transformation take time and need protection.²³³ These twin requirements demand that political decision makers exercise caution in selecting which cases to add to the international PSO inventory—especially if they do not represent the institution that will be finishing the job—because operations are likely to remain on the books in some form for five to ten years. Fifteen years ago, completion of national elections was the signal for a complex PSO to up stakes and leave after just one or two years in the field. Elections seemed to offer both a peaceful mechanism for allocating power and a step by step recipe for mission termination. They soon came to be viewed as inadequate for either purpose.

Alternative benchmarks for effective peacebuilding need not mean solving everyone’s problems for all time but do require that underlying grievances be resolved or successfully shifted into non-violent channels for resolution. When that is accomplished, complex operations can end gracefully, even when many other local problems remain. In Sierra Leone, the violent opposition to peace was dealt serious military setbacks and then collapsed after its founder’s death. In East Timor, the opposition fled. Manageable peacebuilding objectives in both

places focused on standing up democratic forms and institutions of governance and international advisory missions succeeded the respective peacekeeping operations to ease the shock of international drawdown. Liberia may have reached a similarly positive tipping point with the election of a new government, with the close advice to be available to that government through the novel “Governance and Economic Assistance Program,” and with the arrest and arraignment of former president Charles Taylor, who had fomented so much of the country’s internal strife.²³⁴ International drawdown in Liberia will require stability in the rest of the sub-region as well, however, where it has been a scarce commodity for much of the past two decades.

PEACEBUILDING AND THE ADVISABLE LIMITS OF MILITARY ACTION

Even an invited peace operation faces the limits of outside influence when it tries to implement a flawed peace accord whose signatories still seek personal gain over public good. An example would be MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but there are others. At some point, local politics must change or the mission will simply stall, but creating that change is not and cannot be the responsibility of military peacekeepers. It is, rather, the job of change-minded local leaders supported by diplomatic pressure that ties aid to compliance with peace accords, with the risk prosecution for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity—for which too many faction leaders in too many places bear enormous but untried responsibility—hovering in the background.

Implementing an imposed peace, of which Bosnia and Kosovo are present examples, entails even deeper problems. The cost of maintaining artificial stability in order to encourage or enforce political and economic change balances against the risk that strife might once again erupt should external props be removed and the flow of dollars and euros cease. Yet Bosnia and Kosovo are at least arguably part of Europe. Attempts to Westernize governments in places well outside the ambit of Western culture and politics, that have strong alternative governance models on which to draw, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, pose even stickier problems.

Astute military leaders recognize the trap that awaits forces consigned to political, economic, and/or social reconstruction tasks. Major militaries—the US military in particular—should continue to be wary of picking up the reconstruction sack just because they are widely viewed to have the strongest grip. The system of unit rotation alone, designed to give soldiers respite from the battle front, regularly weakens that grip at the crucial local level, lending a Sisyphian quality to military-led or -coordinated development work in the

constant re-learning of basic facts and re-building of personal relationships that are key to understanding, let alone influencing, local-level behavior. And while the energetic efforts of bright, competent leaders of tactical units like Provincial Reconstruction Teams can seem a model of good governance delivered on time, they also send the inadvertent message that local people should turn to the military if they want to improve their lives. This is not what a democratic transition would hope to achieve.

The reconstruction trap is harder for the military to avoid when there are not enough civilian counterparts to take on civil-side operational tasks. The US government has moved to remedy that deficit with a new, small State Department Office for the Coordination of Reconstruction and Stabilization, but the department has had a hard time convincing Congress to fund it. Indeed, there may never be a true civilian counterpart in the US government to the well-funded Pentagon, but that may not be a bad thing. No American should want the functional equivalent of a Colonial Office. Americans should, instead, support US capacity to contribute to a competent, effective, and civilian multilateral entity dedicated to coordinating UN, regional, and national peacebuilding capabilities, policies, and operations. Fortunately, there is enough civilian governing experience out in the rest of the world—at the national, provincial, and local levels—that such an entity, with an on-call cadre of peacebuilding specialists, is not beyond the realm of possibility. The need for it is well-recognized and the first, halting steps in its direction have been taken.²³⁵

Such peacebuilding capacity, even when fully deployed, is likely to be dwarfed in size and cost by the security forces deployed to protect it. The military components of even relatively calm peacekeeping operations are internationally-labor-intensive by comparison to such operations' civilian components or to the development efforts that may operate in parallel with them. Support for imposed peace must be even more robust and therefore costly. The preferred solution for reducing that cost and phasing out international military presence is of course to recruit, train, and equip local military and police forces. But local forces do not automatically function professionally with two or three rounds of training, nor are they automatically prepared to risk their lives to fight for the international community's (or, worse, the occupying power's) vision of what their government and society ought to be. Without compatible local and international visions of a country's political future, it is very difficult for the outsiders to let go of an imposed peace, yet very costly to hang on. This argues for the international community taking great care about where it places its bets—and its forces—in the future, lest past commitments soak up present forces and leave the future without champions.