

PEACE OPERATIONS SUPPLY AND DEMAND

Scholars of global conflict report that the incidence and magnitude of warfare, especially “societal” warfare—that which is primarily internal to states—have both declined steadily since reaching a peak in the early 1990s, coincident with the end of the Cold War. Measured conflict has continued downward into the new century, to apparent levels of relative peace not enjoyed by humankind for forty years.¹⁰ A rising proportion of these conflicts ended in stalemates that produced requests for help to implement peace, or they ended in outside military intervention followed by peace support operations.

WHO SENDS PEACEKEEPERS WHERE, ON WHOSE AUTHORITY?

The United Nations manages by far the largest number of PSOs globally (eighteen) and about half of the troops and police presently deployed in peace operations. Regional organizations are increasingly involved, however, and coalitions of the willing have become the first responders in situations that require the rapid deployment of international security forces. In a 2004 study for the UN DPKO Best Practices Unit, Bruce Jones and Feryal Cherif stressed the degree to which PSOs have become largely “hybrid” operations of various kinds. In only a few cases have all aspects of complex operations been run by a single entity from start to finish.¹¹ Responsibilities may be shared over time, or different organizations may function in parallel, coordinating their work in different substantive areas. **Table 1** shows how operations map onto a matrix that compares the standard categories of integrated, coordinated, parallel, and sequential operations with Jones’ helpful functional categories that unpack the coordinated and parallel operations into civilian-military divisions of labor, linked peacekeeping and observer missions, and short-term military support to ongoing operations. Understood as affiliated with essentially all operations in all categories are commercial sector support firms whose specialties vary from long-range air transport to VIP close protection.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping was a fairly steady-state enterprise to monitor and maintain cease-fires between long-term adversaries. As regional

Table 1: Categorizing Hybrid Peace Support Operations, with Select Examples

Jones' Categories:	Integrated Operations	Civilian-Military Division of Labor	Linked Peacekeeping-Observer Missions	Short-term Military Support	Hand-Over Operations
Standard Categories:					
Integrated Operations (all elements answering to a common structure of authority in the field)	Somalia (93-95) Haiti (95-96) Haiti (04-) <i>E. Timor (99-02)</i> <i>Liberia (03-)</i>				
Coordinated Operations (civil-military; UN-other; armed-unarmed military; or PSOs with common goals but own space)		Bosnia (95-) Kosovo (99-) Afghanistan (02-)	<i>Liberia (93-97)</i> <i>Sierra Leone (98-99)</i> Georgia (93-) Tajikistan (94-00)	S. Leone (00) UK >UN DRC (03, 06) EU >UN	
Parallel Operations (short-term military support; or securing separate space without coordination)		Afghanistan (02-) Iraq (03-)		Rwanda (94) France ~ UN	
Sequential Operations (trail-breaking operations or handoffs from one established mission to another)					Somalia (93) US >UN Haiti (95, 04) US >UN <i>Burundi (04)</i> <i>AU >UN</i>


Notes: **Bold** indicates operations with Chapter VII or equivalent peace enforcement authority. *Italics* indicates missions added by the authors of this study to those listed by Jones and Cherif.

Source: Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping, Policy Implications and Responses," paper prepared for UNDPKO Best Practices Unit (New York: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2004).

organizations in Africa and Europe engaged as well, in the 1990s, the UN Security Council remained the authorizing agent of choice for their operations. **Figure 1** parses peace operations according to such mission authority. It distinguishes two categories of UN-led operations ("Chapter six and half" peacekeeping and "Chapter seven" operations given broader license to use force or to exert powers of governance).¹² Operations in a third category have been authorized ("mandated") by the Security Council but led by other entities, like the NATO-led Kosovo Force. A fourth category includes operations recognized or endorsed by the Security Council but not formally mandated by it, which would include operations undertaken by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and the

Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (2003–), whose mandate derives from an agreement between the operation's sponsors and the host government. A fifth category includes all PSO's undertaken without reference to or recognition from the UN Security Council.

Figure 1: Peace Support Operations by Source of Deployment Authority, 1948–2005



Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (annual), London; Birger Heldt, "List of Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations 1948–2004 and Related United Nations Security Council Resolutions," Stockholm; Folke Bernadotte Academy, draft of January 31, 2006 (provided by the author); UN mission reporting documents; and UN Security Council resolutions and presidential statements. For a complete list of missions included in the chart, see annex.

Most Cold War operations were UN-led, deployed on international frontiers, and lacked Chapter VII peace enforcement authority. One large UN operation, sent to the former Belgian Congo (the present DRC) immediately after independence at the request of the state's fledgling leadership, became deeply enmeshed in its crisis of governance (1960–64) and found itself sandwiched between rival factions whose patrons came from different sides in the Cold War. Eventually authorized to use all necessary means to halt the country's slide into civil war, the operation shepherded a new national government into brief existence and halted the secession of the mineral-rich, mercenary-supported province of Katanga. The operation suffered substantial casualties over four years, however, and the country remained unsettled long after the peacekeepers left.

Other Cold War-era operations included the U.S.-led occupation of the Dominican Republic (1965–66), under the aegis of the OAS; the Syrian-led

Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon (1977–83), sponsored by the Arab League; and the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka (1987–1990), under a bilateral agreement with that government. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) that has patrolled the Sinai Peninsula since 1982 is a small, traditional-type peacekeeping force authorized by the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, managed by its own international organization based in Rome, and funded by the United States and the two treaty signatories. It replaced a UN peacekeeping force whose continuation had been vetoed by the Soviet Union, and a US-led, largely civilian-contractor-staffed Sinai Field Mission that filled the gap between the UN's departure and the MFO's arrival.¹³

Toward the end of the Cold War, UN operations grew modestly, by subsequent standards, with new, small missions in Central America, Angola, Afghanistan, and Namibia. After the Cold War, a second operational surge doubled UN peace operations to about 38,000 troops and police in 1992. UN forces doubled again the following year to 80,000, deployed mostly in the Balkans and Somalia. In this same two-year period, the size of non-UN operations exploded as well. The largest UN-authorized mission, led by the United States, put 35,000 troops in Somalia from December 1992 to May 1993. Another 37,000 troops were deployed at about the same time in UN-recognized operations, including the Nigerian-led ECOWAS operation in Liberia and the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operation in Tajikistan. Total numbers continued to climb in 1994, and about 150,000 troops and police were deployed by mid-year.

The 1994 peak was not exceeded for a decade. PSOs did not go away in the interim, however. On the contrary, they became a major, ongoing international enterprise occupying an average of 125,000 troops and police per year. The UN's share dropped substantially from 1994 to 1998, to just 8 percent of forces deployed. Meanwhile, NATO kept the peace in Bosnia, Russian operations continued in Tajikistan, and Nigeria, with help from other West African troops, wrestled with conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

UN missions rebounded unexpectedly in mid-1999, however, as the Security Council mandated major new operations in Kosovo and East Timor and followed up with three more operations over the next twelve months, in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and on the Ethiopian–Eritrean border. In Kosovo, the United Nations formed a temporary government and deployed police and civil administrators, while NATO provided 45,000 military peacekeepers. In East Timor, the UN took over from an Australian-led coalition and governed the territory until elections and independence in May 2002. The UN's operation in

the DRC started life as an observer force with fewer than 3,000 military personnel, most of them designated to protect the operation and its premises.

In December 2001, ISAF began deploying to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a coalition of the willing with a Security Council mandate, led by the UK and comprising roughly 5,000 troops. The U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom continued to fight Taliban and al Qaeda forces elsewhere in the country. ISAF was taken over by NATO in August 2003 and soon began to expand its operational reach beyond Kabul, as discussed later in some detail.


A fourth surge of demand for UN PSOs occurred between July 2003 and April 2005. Over that period, the Security Council doubled the size of the UN Mission in the DRC to 10,800 troops then increased it by a further 5,900 troops in the fall of 2004. The Council established a new, 15,000-troop UN operation in Liberia in September 2003; directed the UN to take over peacekeeping in Côte d'Ivoire from ECOWAS and to triple the size of the operation to 6,000 troops (April 2004); took over peacekeeping in Burundi from a financially-strapped African Union mission of 5,000 (June); established an 8,000-person force to replace a 90-day coalition operation in rapidly-decaying Haiti (also June); and, in spring 2005, authorized deployment of 10,000 troops and 700 police for the UN Mission in Sudan, to implement a peace accord ending two decades of war in the country's south. By the end of 2005, UN operations involved 70,000 troops, military observers, and police, with 4,500 international civilian personnel, 8,300 local staff, and more than 1,800 UN Volunteers (the UN's Peace Corps-equivalent).¹⁴

This latest sharp growth in demand for UN forces occurred shortly after the United States mounted Operation Iraqi Freedom. During this period the United States was also canvassing the globe for coalition partners to contribute forces to the stability operations phase in Iraq that it believed would follow the end of major combat operations. The allied portion eventually comprised 24,000 to 25,000 troops, of which about one-third were British (the UK had roughly 41,000 troops in Iraq for the initial attack but drew down rapidly to 9,000). The most significant other national contributions came from Poland, Ukraine, Spain, and the Netherlands, followed later by South Korea, Italy, Romania, and the Netherlands.¹⁵ Because forces in Iraq were mired in counterinsurgency warfare by mid-2004, Iraq is not counted here as a PSO after 2003.

We have noted in passing where operations have deployed, but before turning to the supplier survey it is useful to look at geographic distribution more specifically. **Figure 2** charts deployment levels over time by region. The Middle East is traditionally associated with peacekeeping but, except for a few

significant spikes, historically it has not seen the sort of large operations deployed in Europe and Africa. Nor, with the exception of operations focused on Iraq, has there been much in the way of Chapter VII enforcement authority.

Figure 2: Peace Support Operations by Region, 1948–2005



Sources: See figure 3.

Post-Cold War, PSOs expanded in striking fashion in Europe (to cope with the breakup of Yugoslavia) and in Africa (to cope with anarchy in Somalia and, later, civil wars in western and central Africa). Central Asian PSOs reflected the adaptation of Russia and the newly-independent, former Soviet republics of that region to post-Soviet realities and the use of the regional PSO model by Russia as a way to reassert political-military influence. As operations in southeastern Europe have phased down, operations in Central Asia and Africa have grown. Apart from Cambodia and East Timor/Timor-Leste, few UN peacekeepers have been deployed in Southeast Asia. Neither have regionally-mandated forces, reflecting both Southeast Asia's lack of a formal regional organization and rigorous support of national sovereignty among Southeast Asian states. The situation in Oceania has been a little different, as Australia has provided operational leadership for missions arranged bilaterally and with the endorsement of the Pacific Islands Forum. Apart from a few troops to monitor the disarmament of Nicaragua's "contras" in 1990 and the two deployments in Haiti, armed UN peacekeepers have not been deployed in Latin America, a region whose sovereign

immune response has been periodically reinforced over the last century or so by US military interventions.


Over the past decade, the various organizations able to conduct PSOs have worked out, or perhaps defaulted to, a rough geographic and task-oriented division of labor. The United States and its close allies specialize in forced entry. NATO is presently focused on peacekeeping in southeastern Europe and Afghanistan. The European Union is slowly testing its abilities to do PSOs in Europe and short-term reinforcement operations in Africa. The African Union has the greatest regional need for PSOs but the least regional capacity to provide for them. The United Nations has become, by default of other options, the principal manager of complex PSOs in sub-Saharan Africa.

FUTURE DEMAND FOR PSOS

Are current levels of demand for PSOs likely to be sustained into the foreseeable future? Charts of recent conflict trends produced by a consortium of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and the Conflict Data Program at Sweden's Uppsala University suggest that while war may be down, it is far from out. Virtually all of the 30 ongoing conflicts that they track are internal/societal wars (**figure 3**). Of those, seven count as major wars with over 1,000 battle-related deaths per year; ten are intermediate conflicts with more than 25 but fewer than 1,000 such fatalities annually; and thirteen are minor conflicts that cause up to 25 fatalities per year but, over time, have racked up at least 1,000 battle-related deaths (**figure 4**).¹⁶ If most of the intermediate-to-major conflicts follow recent trends and end in stalemate (or intervention) over the next few years, then we could expect at least half of them—say, ten out of twenty—to generate demand for new peace operations, based on trends of the past decade.


A separate effort by Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr at the University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) has, since 2001, generated roughly biannual reports on the magnitude, causes, and consequences of war, together with an assessment of countries' capacities to build and sustain internal peace. These reports build on Gurr's longstanding "minorities at risk" work and Marshall's efforts to measure the societal impact of war.¹⁷ In their estimation, "major societal wars" escalated steadily in total magnitude—or total impact on the affected society—from the late 1950s through the early 1990s, also showing significant decline in magnitude after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.¹⁸ Long-running and newer wars alike came to an end in unprecedented numbers during the 1990s.

Figure 3: Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict, 1989-2004



Source: Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5) 2005: 623-635, tables I and II, www.prio.no/csw/armedconflict.

Figure 4: Armed Conflicts of Minor, Intermediate, and Major Intensity, 1989-2004



Source: Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005.

Roughly half of the sixty societal wars that ended in the 1990s benefited from the presence of some sort of PSO in starting their transition back to peace.

As of spring 2005, Marshall and Gurr counted sixteen ongoing wars, which they catalogued both as to magnitude and intensity of fighting (sporadic to high intensity). **Table 2** maps these sixteen wars according to these two parameters. None of the conflicts exceeds magnitude five on their ten-point scale of peace-to-apocalypse but magnitude five is bad enough, involving up to a half-million deaths.¹⁹ The countries listed in *italics* in table 2 already host peace support or stability operations: In Darfur’s high-intensity conflict, African Union peacekeepers are largely observers. The conflict in the DRC is rated as medium intensity, while Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire are considered low intensity. Three conflicts (Afghanistan, Algeria, and Somalia) were rated as “sporadic” fighting as of late 2004–early 2005. That the authors’ consider four states to have ongoing conflicts despite the presence of PSOs underlines the fact that war has not always ended completely before a PSO deploys; or may re-erupt for any number of reasons.

Table 2: Ongoing Major Armed Conflicts in Early 2005

		Intensity			
		Sporadic	Low	Medium	High
Magnitude	5	Somalia		<i>DR Congo</i>	
	4	Algeria	<i>Burundi</i>	Colombia Myanmar Russia	<i>Sudan [Darfur]</i>
	3	<i>Afghanistan</i>	Philippines [Moros] Nigeria [Communal]	India [Kashmir]	
	2		<i>Cote d'Ivoire</i>	Nepal	
	1		Indonesia [Aceh]		

Source: Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, (eds.), *Peace and Conflict 2005* (College Park, Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, July 2005). Based on appendix table 11.1.

Note: *Italics* indicate countries that Marshall and Gurr count as ongoing conflicts, which also host peace support operations.

Looking ahead, Marshall and Gurr viewed sixteen states *not* already at war as dangerously deficient in domestic peacebuilding capacity, a deficit that places these countries “at the greatest risk of neglecting or mismanaging emerging societal crises such that these conflicts escalate to serious violence and/or instability.” Most of these states at risk are either in Africa or in the southern tier of Asia, regions where most PSOs are already concentrated.²⁰ Fifteen other low-capacity states were already engulfed in some level of armed conflict, by their accounting, when Marshall and Gurr published (see **table 3**).

Table 3: Comparing Conflict Risk in *Peace and Conflict 2005* and *The Security Demographic*

Country	Marshall & Gurr: "Low Peace-building Capacity"	Cincotta, et al: "Very High Demo-Risk"	Marshall & Gurr: "States in Armed Conflict"	Uppsala-PRIO Dataset, 2004: Ongoing Wars	Low PB Capacity with Ongoing War	Hi Demo- Risk States at War	High Risk Factors But No Wars	Wars without Highest Risk Factors
Afghanistan	X		1	2	x			
Algeria	X		3	2	x			
Angola	X			1	x			
Armenia	X						x	
Azerbaijan	X						x	
Bangladesh		X					x	
Bhutan		X					x	
Burkina Faso	X	X					x	
Burundi	X	X	3	2	x	x		
Cambodia	X						x	
Cent. Afr. Rep.	X		1		x			
Colombia			3	3				x
Comoros		X					x	
Congo-Braz.	X		1		x			
Congo-Kinshasa	X	X	3		x	x		
Cote d'Ivoire	X		1	1	x			
East Timor		X				2006		
Eritrea		X					x	
Ethiopia	X	X	1	1	x	x		
Gambia		X					x	
Georgia				1				x
Guinea	X						x	
Guinea-Bissau	X						x	
Haiti	X		2	1	x			
India			3	3				x
Indonesia			3	2				x
Iran	X						x	
Iraq	X		3	3	x			
Israel-Palestine		X	3	2		x		

Note: Shading indicates both sources consider the state to be at high risk of future violent conflict. 1 = minor conflict with 25 or fewer battle deaths/year; 2 = intermediate conflict with more than 25 but fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths/year; 3 = major conflict with more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

Table 3: Continued

Country	Marshall & Gurr: "Low Peace-building Capacity"	Cincotta, et al: "Very High Demo-Risk"	Marshall & Gurr: "States in Armed Conflict"	Uppsala-PRIO Dataset, 2004: Ongoing Wars	Low PB Capacity with Ongoing War	Hi Demo- Risk States at War	High Risk Factors But No War	War Without Highest Risk Factors
Kenya		X					x	
Laos		X					x	
Lebanon	X				2006			
Liberia	X	X	1				2005	
Madagascar		X					x	
Malawi		X					x	
Maldives		X					x	
Mauritania		X					x	
Myanmar	X		1		x			
Nepal	X	X		3	x	x		
Nigeria	X			1	x			
Pakistan	X		2		x			
Philippines			1	2				x
Russia			3	3				x
Rwanda	X	X	1		x	x		
Saudi Arabia			2					x
Sierra Leone	X	X	1				2006	
Solomon Is.	X	X	1		x	x		
Somalia	X	X	1		x	x		
Sri Lanka			1					x
Sudan	X			3	x			
Tajikistan	X						x	
Tanzania		X					x	
Thailand			2					x
Turkey			2	2				x
Uganda	X			3	x			x
USA (GWOT)			3	2				x
Uzbekistan				1				x
Yemen		X	2			x		
Totals:	31	25	29	22	21	10	22	13

Sources: Marshall and Gurr, 2005, 8-10. Richard Cincotta, et al, *The Security Demographic* (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003). 74. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946-2004," *Journal of Peace Research* 42(5): 623-635, tables I and II.

Richard Cincotta and his colleagues at Population Action International took a different cut at predicting war, emphasizing demographic “stress factors” that have historically been associated with higher risks of civil conflict. These include a large “youth bulge” (males aged 15–29), rapid urban growth, and low availability of cropland or fresh water. The authors consider countries with all three risk factors to be at “very high” risk of future violent conflict; countries at “high risk” of conflict have two risk factors: a youth bulge and either high urbanization rates or land or water shortages.²¹ Among the 25 countries at very high risk during the 1990s, the likelihood of civil conflict breaking out during the decade was 40 percent; among the 40 countries at high risk, the likelihood was 33 percent. Among other countries the likelihood of conflict was 12–24 percent.²²

Marshall and Gurr list thirty-one countries as having critically low peacebuilding capacity. Cincotta, et al, list twenty-five countries at “very high risk” of conflict in the decade 2000 to 2010. Ten states are rated as high risk by both studies, that is, face high demographic pressures with low peacebuilding capacity. Of these ten, nine were already judged to be involved in violent conflict in 2004 (six minor conflicts, three major). Of Marshall and Gurr’s states at risk, twenty of thirty-one were engaged in some level of violent conflict in 2004 as judged by them and by PRIO/Uppsala. Lebanon joined them in the summer of 2006 as battlefield if not as belligerent. Of Cincotta, et al’s twenty-five states at highest demographic risk, ten were in conflict in 2006. Twenty-two states had one or the other class of risk factors but were not at war, while thirteen states presently at war fit none of the highest risk categories in either study.

The reader is invited to study table 3 at leisure but it is immediately clear that those who study conflict risk closely can disagree not only about what risk is but about where risk is most acute. Both studies may be right, at different times and places, and there may be a chance to head war off at the pass if some major player is willing to mount a peace posse and the risk factors assumed to be at play really are the crucial ones.

The thirteen wars whose host states meet neither study’s set of risk factors give particular pause. There are, by definition, conflict-promoting variables in parts of Colombia, Georgia, India, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, among other places, that neither study seems to be picking up—perhaps the lure of drug money, perhaps ethnic or religious fanaticism. Other studies have attempted to divine those factors, with equally mixed results.²³

The range of current and potential conflict, and the minor likelihood of outright victory in modern civil wars,²⁴ together suggest that international peace operations have a busy if not bright future ahead of them. The record to date suggests the difficulty of leaving behind a fully-formed democracy in the amount of time that the international community has generally been willing to devote to post-conflict peacebuilding, but the same record also suggests that half-formed democracies are politically unstable. Because the focus in this volume is the security that is prerequisite to successful peacebuilding, and not peacebuilding itself, we do not pursue this issue of ultimate objectives in any depth here. Nonetheless, poorly-governed countries with unresponsive and non-transparent governments are the ones that tend to generate civil wars, mass population displacements, and genocidal outbursts with regrettable regularity.²⁵ If the well-governed parts of the world are not to face an increasingly unpleasant choice of either of paying for rehabilitation or dealing with the migrating human detritus of failed or failing states, it will behoove them to attempt to avoid that choice either by preventing the failure, or by building high walls to seal out the problem. The former will be difficult but the latter is morally bankrupt as well as impossible.

The case for prevention is buttressed by calling attention to the fact that peace operations have enjoyed relative success in relatively small places and then only after considerable investment of time and resources. Larger zones of potentially violent conflict pose daunting obstacles to effective peacekeeping. Nigeria, for example, has 132 million people—five times the population of Iraq.²⁶ Colombia is twice the size of Iraq and is not only mountainous and forested but home to thriving drug cultivation and distribution networks and to the gangs that operate them to feed the developed world's cocaine habits—like Afghanistan but with shade. Myanmar has equally difficult terrain, multiple ethnic conflicts, and a history of involvement in the heroin trade. Any of these places would pose severe operational challenges to a peace operation. Indeed, the international community would be hard pressed to field peacekeepers in anything like the density achieved by NATO in the Balkans. The United States has found it difficult to maintain even one-third that troop density in Iraq, yet to achieve even Iraq-type troop densities in countries the size of Nigeria or Pakistan would require on the order of one million troops in each. The UN operation in the DRC has been able to gain leverage against rogue militias and other foes only because it has been able to focus on a small fraction of the DRC's vast territory. Were it necessary for the United Nations to keep the peace on its own in all parts of the DRC simultaneously, at a tempo equivalent to that now maintained in the eastern 15 percent of the country, it would find the task impossible, as would NATO or, for that matter, the United States. This matter of scale and

perspective is vital to keep in mind as we contemplate the world's capacity to meet the demand for peace support that is likely to arise in the decade to come.