

INTRODUCTION

In an ideal world, peace would be self-validating, self-enforcing, just, and indivisible. While some countries have approached this ideal for some periods of time, in much of the world discord trumps tranquility, enforcement of peace has been neither reflexive nor necessarily just, and both peace and the responsibility to maintain it have been viewed as divisible nationally. But as populations grow and distances shrink, borders leak, and belief systems clash, the divisibility of peace becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, either conceptually or operationally; peace and stability with justice become growing imperatives; and peace, stability, and justice are validated in turn by the ability of political and economic systems to generate decent lives and livelihoods for those living within them. Implicit political recognition of these emergent facts can be found in international peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSOs) now scattered all through the world's least-well-governed, most-conflict-ridden regions.

Midway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, about 150,000 troops, police, and civilian mission personnel are deployed in these operations.¹ An average of 135,000 have been deployed annually since the turn of the century, at an estimated real cost of US \$11–12 billion per year.² They provide critical security, political, and other support that helps war-torn parts of the world regain a firmer peacetime footing. About half of these people serve in operations led by the United Nations and half serve under other arrangements. These numbers do not include coalition forces committed at this writing to combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Depending on how one defines it, peacekeeping has been around quite awhile.³ After World War Two, however, it became a tool by which the United Nations, in particular, could help keep conflict-prone parts of the international system from shaking the stability of the Cold War standoff. This process began with quiet, neutral, unarmed monitoring groups placed on disputed post-colonial frontiers, later adding armed contingents but also a self-preserving reflex against the use of force except in self defense. PSOs, more complex efforts managing decolonization or the settlement of intrastate conflicts, got their start in the early 1960s when Belgium suddenly relinquished its hold on the Congo. A series of difficult encounters there with internal politics and Cold War gamesmanship

soon put such operations largely on hold until the Cold War ended. In the new era, however, PSOs have once again been assigned intensely political tasks of internal security, peacebuilding, and state-building in some of the world's weakest, poorest, and most war-ravaged places. These may involve whole states but sometimes just parts of states, including parts that want to be states in their own right.

Such PSOs bring international military, policing, and other governmental resources to bear, under international mandate, to promote peace and, increasingly, political and economic transformation in the wake of war. As distinct from most outside interventions affecting state governance throughout history, the bodies that authorize such operations and the organizations and people who participate in them usually have less interest in who rules, *per se*, than in how they rule. But getting the how right is not easy, because acceptable rule is increasingly seen in terms of internationally-recognized principles of democracy and respect for human rights. These high standards make successful operational outcomes very gratifying but also very hard to achieve.

As demand for complex PSOs increased in the new century, the number of implementing institutions grew as well. Added to the United Nations were the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The Organization of American States (OAS) sponsored several military observer missions in Central America in prior decades, and one armed operation in the Dominican Republic in 1965, but has more recently favored civilian peacebuilding missions. NATO, the AU, and ECOWAS have focused primarily on security elements. The EU has been adding security and justice to its operational repertoire without losing its traditional focus on economic and humanitarian aid. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—the organization of successor states to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—authorizes operations in the former Soviet space that are nominally multilateral but also reflect the political and military preponderance of the Russian Federation. Other sub-regional organizations have also periodically sponsored missions on a relatively modest scale.

States set all of these organizations' policies and provide all of the troops and police that go into the field. Yet few states can sustain, without help, the forces and people they contribute to such operations and few organizations have the logistical and financial mechanisms in place to provide that help or to otherwise defray the continuing costs of a lengthy deployment. It is in this area—the ability to sustain troops, police, and civilian personnel at long distances for long periods in marginal and potentially dangerous circumstances—that most would-

be sponsors of peace operations currently fall short. The fundamental reason may be money, equipment (lift capacity, in particular), or politics (weak or waning domestic support), or it may be some combination of these. The one international organization capable of providing long-term and global logistical and financial support—the United Nations—does not have the ability to execute high-end or intensive military operations.

The operational environments and mandates for PSOs vary almost as much as the abilities of the organizations that would carry them out. Therefore no one operational model and no single security provider can address every circumstance and meet every operational need with equal aplomb. Over the past decade, various combinations of providers and divisions of labor have been tried: integrated operations that combined all mission components under one line of authority; sequenced operations where NATO, for example, replaced the UN or the UN replaced a regional organization; or simultaneous operations featuring NATO or coalition military forces and UN plus other civilian components.⁴ The prevalence of such “hybrid” operations points to the need for harmony in doctrine, training, procedure, and communications, if not basic equipment, across institutional providers.⁵

Presently, institutional decisions to co-operate and the forms of co-operation that emerge rest on largely ad hoc processes and temporary convergences of interests. Promoting convergence is one task of the secretariats who staff each institution but most need better guidance from their member states and better tools to work with. Most of all, they need better understanding of what different potential partners and their members can bring to the table for contemplated PSOs. They need to know what others can or cannot, will or will not, do in the field; what available capabilities complement one another; and what new capabilities should be developed and maintained to remedy present operational deficiencies.⁶

What constitutes a deficiency depends, of course, on what one intends to do under what circumstances, and how much of it. Keeping a small place stable is relatively easy if everyone wants peace and the basic problem is mistrust; but keeping even a small place stable is hard if the outsiders face one or more groups that have not renounced violence, or splinter factions that have taken it up. An organization capable of doing the first job may be utterly incapable of doing the second. An organization capable of effectively containing violence, on the other hand, may be incapable of shepherding the political and institutional changes needed to keep itself from being locked into its job of containment forever.

For both analytical and operational purposes, therefore, it is key to distinguish between PSOs imposed by international initiative and those invited to deploy by the local parties themselves, usually to implement a peace agreement. Politically imposed peace includes instances where international actors demand a halt to hostilities and, together with diplomatic or other pressure, bring an end to fighting. Examples include the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1973 Middle East war. PSOs deployed in the wake of such pressures to induce a cease-fire can last for a long time while the local parties decide whether and how to end their dispute.

PSOs can also be considered politically imposed if outsiders assume control after pressuring the ruling group to relinquish control (Indonesia and East Timor, 1999); threaten but do not actually use violence to achieve a political goal (the United States and Haiti, 1994); or implement an accord signed by some but not all local belligerents. The latter type operation runs the risk of decaying into militarily imposed peace: the use of coercive military power to overcome armed resistance by at least one local belligerent. In 1987, for example, an Indian Peacekeeping Force deployed to Sri Lanka under an agreement with the government that left out its principal adversary, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Within a few months, the Indian force found itself at war with the LTTE and ultimately failed in its mission.⁷

Internationally-sanctioned military intervention may also aim to end genocide or other grave crimes against humanity (the goal of the NATO air campaign against Serbia in 1999); to remove from power a regime that supports or shelters a group responsible for terrorist violence (as, the US-led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, from late 2001); or to rescue a peace process under threat from violent spoilers (British forces in Sierra Leone, 2000).

PSOs that either follow or function in parallel with such military interventions tend to require more resources and time than other operations. Change will be harder to create and sustain on the ground because the demand for change either did not arise locally or arose from groups out of power who must learn how to govern. Some or all local parties may be as hostile to the follow-on PSO as they were to the initial intervention. Much greater military capacity per head of local population may therefore be needed to maintain political stability and public security. (NATO's Kosovo Force, KFOR, for example, initially deployed one soldier for every ten Kosovar males of fighting age). The larger the area of operation, the more resources spoilers have available to them, and the thinner the international presence, the more elusive stability may prove to be. Where those associated with the old regime have been excluded from the new one, as in Afghanistan, constant vigilance and periodic resort to force by the outsiders

may be needed for several years, to protect the new regime's basis for governing until it can protect itself.

Invited PSOs generally derive from peace agreements, the negotiation of which may have entailed international mediation or other support. They are easier to implement, point-for-point, than imposed settlements for a given-sized territory and population, but the places where they deploy are still settings of unfinished political struggles, the military elements of which have ended in stalemate. Therefore even invitational PSOs deploy into situations of frustrated ambition or, perhaps, frustrated criminal enterprise, where one or more belligerent factions may function primarily as extortion and extraction rackets. Countries with relatively abundant and readily accessible sources of mineral wealth, such as Sierra Leone, have fallen prey to such gangs.⁸ Therefore, while invitational PSOs may not require the concerted fighting power of forces that seek to implement an imposed peace, they still must be able to maintain peace against potential spoilers who may look for opportunities to renege on promises made in peace accords and may just shift gears from overt, military-style operations to those of organized crime.⁹

This volume examines the operational capabilities of present providers of security for PSOs in all of the above sorts of situations. We start with an historical review of security support to peace operations—what kind, how much, by whom—and then turn to likely future demand for that support based on current trends in conflict, conflict resolution, and estimates of state vulnerability to violent internal conflict. We then examine how major security providers' doctrine for and thinking about PSOs have evolved over a decade of experience with increasingly complex and dangerous operations. That discussion prefaces a detailed discussion of the strengths, weaknesses, and accomplishments of the United Nations, NATO and other alliances, regional and sub-regional organizations, states and coalitions, and private firms as security providers for PSOs. The final section compares providers on multiple dimensions, traces patterns of institutional cross-support in the field, and stresses peace as a public enterprise that is outsourced at great peril, as well as the critical importance to PSOs of civilian peacebuilding efforts and the risks that arise when the military takes on, by design or default, substantial peacebuilding tasks.

