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NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND STRATEGIES: A Note on Current Practice[1]

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FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A national security policy (NSP) is a government-wide analysis and description of the strategic-level concerns a country faces; it addresses how the government plans to deals with these concerns. A national security strategy (NSS) is a government's overarching plan for ensuring the country's security in the form of guidance for implementing a country's national security policy. The NSS is considered essential for the integration and coordination of activities by various national security actors. It defines the role of each national actor in dealing with national security needs, determines processes (and chain of command) for making decisions when response to threats or crisis is required, and delineates conditions for using security forces. Additionally, an NSS may detail cooperation mechanisms between various security actors, rationales for involvement in regional or international peace operations, and justification for intervention in other countries' security affairs. Generally, an NSS is based upon threat assessments (provided by the various intelligence collection and analysis actors) and reviews of the existing state of the country's security sector.[2]

In many countries, national security policies are determined by a National Security Council (NSC) structure. The NSC can be either advisory or executive in nature (Bearne et al., RAND 2005, 2). Generally, the main actors devising the NSS will include the Chief Executive, the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, the National Security Advisor, senior military officials, and senior intelligence officials. The NSC, as both a developer of security policy and an oversight body, can also help to maintain the integrity of security sector policy-making and manage policy implementation (Kinzelback and Cole, 2006, 66).

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[2] For more on threat assessments and reviews, see the relevant practice note.

The parliament generally provides oversight for national security policy and for financial matters related to the use of security institutions in application of national security policy. In post-conflict countries, international agencies including the UN and donor governments may support both the development of an NSS and the implementation of national security policies. In some countries, civil society groups are acquiring a greater voice and role in determining national security policy despite the resistance of some governments who consider national security issues to be the domain of security officials and not the general public.

National security policies vary by country but much of the writing on the subject has tended to be focused on powerful western states. The national security policies of countries such as the UK, US, France, Canada, and others assume that states are large, wealthy, and have an expansive array of security concerns (Chuter, 1). In smaller and weaker countries that are also emerging from conflict, however, viewing security concerns as global and expecting resource-strapped countries to play more than a small role in regional security can lead to unrealistic expectations about security and its implications. In these countries, national security strategies could more productively focus on the tasks that security institutions can perform to contribute to the country's security needs (Chuter, 5). Additionally, a national security strategy can usefully be embedded into a national development strategy which includes plans for government-wide institutional capacity building and sustained economic development efforts. Framing national security strategy within wider efforts also allows for more realistic financial planning, not just for development of the security sector (which often uses threats outlined in national security strategies to justify military expenditure) but also for broader infrastructure, institutional, and economic development. In other countries where the UN supports security sector reform, national security policy determination and implementation mechanisms may either not exist at all or may not be functional and thus may require external support to build up both their effectiveness and legitimacy. In other cases, the existing NSC structures may not be guided by strategic vision, which the development of a national security strategy can help generate. In such contexts, an initial national security strategy may also play an important role in determining a comprehensive strategy for security sector reform. Indeed, a competent, transparent, and effective security sector is a requirement for successful implementation of a national security strategy, which can be effectively used to assess and redefine the role of the security sector based on a current threat assessment and the expectations of the country's population. In short, the NSS can be a tool for building legitimacy of security actors in the eyes of a population.

This practice note discusses the challenges to reforming national security structures, as they relate to drafting appropriate national security strategies, and provides examples of ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

CORE PROGRAM DESIGN ISSUES

In cases where a national security structure needs to be established or substantially reformed, core issues affecting program design include the constitutional or legislative framework for national security policy an strategy, the security structure's "as found" effectiveness and legitimacy, how those attributes can best be improved, and how the security sector should be (re)organized so that peacekeepers leave behind a capable, legitimate, and sustainable national security structure.

Basis for National Security Policy and Strategy: Framework, Legitimacy, Transparency, and Accountability

Developing a national security policy and national security strategy requires an adequate policy *framework*. The framework should detail the main sectoral priorities and fundamental values, legal basis, and role of key actors in national security policy making and implementation. Based upon democratic principles and delineating the relationship and hierarchy between security organizations and civil authorities, the framework should include a policy process for the security sector and base the policy on accountability, participation, and a culture of inclusivity, with an accessible process that guarantees transparency, efficiency, and ownership.

The existing constitutional framework and accompanying national security legislation should be examined to ensure that they define the basic responsibilities of each security actor. The law should also mandate civilian control over security forces and the chain of command for policy implementation and force employment decisions, mandate separation of civil policing and internal defence, and define the principles on which security actors base their actions, (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6, 12, 24, 40; Ball et al., 71–79).

The legal or constitutional framework should also include clauses for the role of the legislature in national security policy formulation and oversight. Legislatures, and in particular the relevant policy and financial oversight committees, should have a legal basis for access to information on security sector issues. Similarly, legislators should have a say in declaring war and have the capacity to oversee budget decisions and expenditure for the security sector. The legislature may also be given authority to approve of the nomination of senior security sector officials, whether in the civilian executive branch or senior echelons of the security forces. The legislature should also be able to advise on and approve of decisions on executive emergency powers. Finally, the law should prohibit military interference in politics.

The policy process should be managed and administered in a credible fashion where the process ensures *legitimacy* by being continuously reviewed to ensure it adheres to specified standards, guarantees appropriate participation (ownership) and where debate helps to address conflicting aims and views.

The legitimacy of a national security document rests on the manner in which it is developed and the degree to which consultations with stakeholders, as well as the concerns of the population concerning security, are integrated into the final document. Its legitimacy can also be affected by the legitimacy of national security decision-making and implementation institutions. Legitimacy can be bolstered by reducing the number of potential blockage points in security decision making. Such blockage points can exists at different levels and with different actors involved in either making national security decisions or in the oversight of national security mechanisms. Avoiding blockage points requires consulting different actors, securing the commitment of targeted groups to policy objectives and in some cases conducting information campaigns to ensure transparency.

For both policy determination and policy implementation, civilian control can assist with transparency and accountability, as does parliamentary oversight and possible involvement in the decision-making of non-governmental specialists. Similarly, the UN (and donors in general) can

support transparency and accountability by requiring that security actors understand the structures and the processes they use to make decisions (Bearne et al., 22–23).

Transparency and accountability represent a challenge for national security policy, strategy, and corresponding structures, in terms of drafting and decision-making as well as implementation, particularly in countries where the public legitimacy of security institutions has not previously been established or where, because of a history of conflict, transparency itself can be perceived by leadership as threatening. Without some transparency and clear accountability, however, national security institutions may fail to develop the necessary public legitimacy or rapidly lose whatever temporary legitimacy they acquired by signing a peace agreement. For decision-making, the creation of a centralized NSC can itself be a barrier to transparency because members can make decisions without seeing much need to consult with outsiders, even if the outsiders are part of agreed mechanisms for oversight such as the relevant committees of the legislature, let alone the media and civil society.

National Security Implementing Structure: Presidency, Ministries, NSC, Armed Services, and Intelligence Services

The institutions involved in national security policy-making, implementation, and oversight require support to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of their efforts. This section discusses challenges to developing institutions for these purposes, particularly in war-torn states. Institutions include the presidency, ministries, the NSC, armed services leadership, and intelligence services. Each plays an important role in the four phases of national security policy and strategy formulation and implementation: development, decision-making, implementation, and assessment and lessons learned (Fluri et al., 28–29).[3]

In most cases, the *presidency* will supervise the development of national security policy and strategy and make final national security decisions, particularly concerning national security policy and implementation of national security strategy. When competing or dissenting analyses are presented and members of the NSC or equivalent body are unable to agree, the president is often the arbiter. On matters such as foreign deployment of the armed forces, however, the president should be mandated to request parliamentary approval.

This executive role is increasingly facilitated by a national security advisor who "may play a key role in centralizing decision-making, the development of threat assessments, giving advice on national security issues, implementation of policy decisions and oversight" (Bearne et al., 25). When the advisor plays an important role, that office should be subject to effective oversight. The national security advisor also requires access to as wide a range of information, intelligence, and analysis sources as possible.

In post-conflict countries, or in countries where the UN is supporting an ongoing transition to peace, the UN may find itself in the difficult position of supporting government efforts that it cannot directly control. The UN may also need to express concern over the government's lack of commitment to national security strategy implementation. In some cases, the host state's

[3] Although the four phases are applied by Fluri et al. to the legislature, they are equally apt for other security actors.

president may even deny the existence or validity of security concerns the UN views as crucial peacebuilding. The presidency may, for example, not want to include dealing with the remnants of an insurgency as part of an official national security strategy for fear that it would impede the government's ability to operate freely (and perhaps outside of acceptable human rights law). It is important that all such national security challenges be discussed with host state leadership and addressed accordingly.

The *ministries* of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, and Finance play particularly important roles in the development and implementation of national security policies and ensuing strategies. Their ministers participate in NSC meetings and ministry officials work closely with relevant counterparts to share information and implement policy. Ministries should also be required to participate in assessment and lessons learned from decision-making and implementation processes. Lessons learned may not always be flattering or politically palatable but they may be ignored at the institutions' peril; those who would raise such lessons may need protection, via some form of ombuds-mechanism or whistleblower law.

National Security Councils play an important part in all four phases of national security policy and strategy formulation and implementation. During the development phase, national security decision-making structures, whether formalized into a standing NSC and support structure or implemented by the relevant agencies involved, can be used to review joint security assessments, resource allocations, or oversight reports, and can determine security priorities and provide emergency coordination between crisis responders (Bearne et al., iv, 28).

National security decision making structures may have just an advisory role or an additional executive (implementation) role. While not all countries require a specific NSC structure, countries that need the capacity to respond to emergencies or that face acute, ongoing security threats may find such a central decision structure helpful (Bearne et al., 28). Security sector reform could be one such area where an NSC could help determine policy; coordinate, monitor and evaluate its implementation; and be the principal forum for policy adjustments.

An NSC can also function as an information integrator. For most national security related issues, information typically gets integrated at lower levels and moves up only as necessary, for example, when ministries disagree on policy or its implementation. (Bearne et al., 24–25). During the implementation phase, most NSCs coordinate the various line ministries with roles in national security, helping to ensure that policy is carried out with a focus on national-level (versus ministerial) objectives. The working levels of the NSC also provide important coordination (both informal and formal) with working levels of the implementing actors. An effective NSC would need the support of the country's senior leadership and adequate resource allocations of its own (Bearne et al., 24, 29).

NSCs require balance between civilian and military influence. In countries that are reforming their security sectors, balancing the civilian and military functions is crucial, particularly in countries transitioning from conflict. An appropriately balanced NSC can help to deter the intervention of military forces in domestic issues (Bearne et al., 26).

The *leadership of the armed forces* can most legitimately influence national security policy and strategy development by offering accurate assessments of force capabilities and analysis of the force generation, infrastructure, and other implications of proposed policy and strategy. They can also influence the decision-making phase by expressing reservation concerning the likely impact of a proposed policy or strategy on the above variables.

In post-conflict states where UN peacekeepers are supporting reform of the armed forces, implementation of the national security strategy may require extensive lustration, new recruitment, vetting, and training of the country's forces. Using these tools to build the legitimacy of the new forces will be a key task for peacebuilders.

In countries that use gendarmerie type forces for public safety, the national security policy should clearly delineate the role and chain of command for use of these forces, as it should do for the regular armed forces supported, as necessary, by legislation (Chuter, 17).

In cases where national strategy proposes to use the armed forces in regional or international peacekeeping missions, it is important to keep in mind that newly-rebuilt security forces may require some years of training and operations before they are prepared to meet the more challenging environment of international assignments (Chuter, 13).

During the development phase, *intelligence services* provide some of the information and analysis on which threat assessments are based. National security policy should provide guidance on types of intelligence these services *should* collect, rather than what is easy or intended to cement certain political leaders hold on power (Chuter, 15; United States, 6.16). The purpose of intelligence collection, however gathered, should be clearly defined and the means of collection should be delineated within the law to protect human rights.[4]

For the purpose of forming national security policy documents, "intelligence information should be distributed as widely as possibly, so that it can be evaluated and commented upon by experts" other than the collectors themselves (Chuter, 16). When competing or dissenting analyses are produced, an effort should be made to produce consensus; failing that, analysis should be assigned to a single producer who is trusted to reflect the full spectrum of views to decision-makers (Chuter, 16).

During the decision-making, implementation, and lessons learned phases, intelligence services should provide information and analysis on the risks associated with certain decisions, policy choices, and the effects of those decisions on national security policy and strategy.

Key Oversight Actors: the Legislature, Media and Civil Society

Legislatures, and national security parliamentary oversight committees in particular, can play an important part in all phases of national security policy and strategy. Their involvement can help to ensure the legitimacy of national security structures and decisions (Fluri et al., 26–44). The main

[4] For more on the reforms required of intelligence services, see the defence sector reform practice note.

role of parliamentarians throughout the process is to share public concerns over security policy with the executive.

During the development phase, which is primarily an executive responsibility, parliamentarians can still try to ensure that the policy or strategy meets the needs of their constituents. Executive branch drafters should consult early with the relevant parliamentary committees to make sure that various political visions for security are taken into account. During this phase, drafters should meet with legislators and prepare for the parliament's debate of the policy. Doing so will also help with obtaining approval for the policy or strategy, since parliamentarians will already be familiar with the rationale behind the policy (Fluri et al., 28–29).

During the decision-making phase, if the national security policy document is submitted to parliament for approval, legislators must have sufficient time to study the document. The relevant committee should consider holding separate debates for the security policy document as a whole and for its component security-related appropriations. Parliamentarians also should be apprised at this time of the budgetary implications of the national security policy document, and public hearings should be held to increase public awareness and support and to build legitimacy for national security policy. In short, framework legislation alone is not enough to establish an effective national security process. "[P]arliament's most important influence is usually exerted through budgetary appropriation" (Fluri et al., 29).

During the implementation phase, legislatures play an important role in ongoing oversight both at the political and budgetary levels (Bearne et al., 22).[5] Legislators should therefore examine the activities of security actors, work with other monitoring and oversight mechanisms, and determine whether appropriations are properly used. This can also involve reviewing the results of outside audits of security actors. Finally, parliament may also play a role in approving decisions to deploy troops abroad, declaring a state of emergency, or beginning an inquiry in case legislators believe that key principles of the adopted national security policy have been violated (Fluri et al., 30). The relevant committees should hold hearings with executive officials and security forces leaders to ask questions and validate implementation of the adopted policy.

During the assessment and lessons learned phase, parliament plays a role in auditing how its appropriations have been spent. Such audits can help confirm, modify based on recent developments, or suggest the need for a new national security policy (Fluri et al., 30–31). Parliament should develop legislation that delineates its role in all four phases of national security policy-making.

When national security policy determines that the country should be party to important international agreements, parliaments have an important role to play in debating the appropriateness of such a commitment and then of ensuring that existing policy or policy that is under development complies with the terms of the agreements (Fluri et al., 32–36). In particular, since most post-conflict countries are UN members, their national security policies and strategies should comply with the UN Charter. Parliaments should also examine which agreements the

[5] For more on governance, oversight, and management of the security sector, see the relevant practice notes.

executive proposes to adhere to and work with the executive to determine whether continued adherence is appropriate. Similarly, discussions should consider which agreements the country would do well to join, whether on the international, regional, or bilateral level. To ensure transparency and legitimacy, the executive should not "conclude secret treaties or bilateral agreements without the knowledge and consent of the parliaments." In particular, agreements that "affect the sovereignty, the territory, and the international status of the country should most certainly be subject to parliamentary debate and approval" (Fluri et al., 34). Some agreements may also be subject to popular referendum. Concerning treaties as a whole, parliamentarians, and particularly the relevant committees, should take part in negotiations, obtain constituent views on the agreement, and share views and concerns with the executive officials leading the negotiations. Parliaments should take the time they require to ratify treaties and to add reservations or interpretative clauses to the agreements.

Effective oversight of national security policy-making also requires legislation to ensure that the *media and civil society* can monitor the making and implementation of such policy. Legislation should ensure public access to basic national security documents (Fluri et al., 36–44).

PROGRAM PLANNING

The national security strategies of stable states assume a relatively homogeneous view of security concerns and that "citizens have common interests to be protected, and common interests to be pursued" (Chuter, 10). In post-conflict countries, however, such assumptions may not only be erroneous but damaging to peacebuilding and reconciliation. Developing a national security strategy in the politically fractured circumstances in which many UN operations function requires the involvement and consultation of as broad a group of stakeholders as possible. The Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) should verify the scope of the work to be done in this area and the role of all the players involved. Mission planning should assign responsibility for managing the security strategy process, including a framework for the interaction of identified players.

In most cases, a national security policy and ensuing national security strategy will draw upon a comprehensive (and multi-agency) assessment of the internal and external security threats the country faces. The NSC (or equivalent) should collect threat-related information from all relevant actors, as such "all-source assessments" can be derailed by lack of information sharing and unwillingness by various players to consider information sources other than their own (Bearne et al., 27).[6]

A comprehensive list of security issues should inform initial steps toward policy and strategy development.[7] The development process should involve both military and civilian officials but be civilian-led, both to reinforce the concept of civilian control, to promote greater process transparency and accountability for results. The process should involve public stakeholders through public information campaigns and perhaps through formal consultations at different levels of society, including, as appropriate to the society, traditional community leaders. Where

[6] For discussion of the elements and process of threat assessments, please refer to that practice note.

the state lacks capacity to organize formal community consultations, informal individual consultation may be a vehicle for building relationships and improving transparency.

Developing and implementing a national security strategy requires adequate administrative and financial support. Donor assistance—financial and technical—may be required initially, but donors should not do the work for the country's authorities (Hendrickson 64–65). Each actor should develop a clear statement of how their institution can be structured to develop and deliver the required capabilities to implement the national security policy. Such a statement should include plans for capital acquisition, facilities, and personnel, and their implementation plans for short to medium term operational tasks. Some administrative capacity (e.g., within the NSC structure) will be required to manage and monitor national security policy implementation, including development and execution of budgets. Monitoring should also ensure that national security actors continue to operate within the confines of the law.

Other program planning issues relate to the need to balance openness of policy and debates with legitimate needs for secrecy; the tension between freedom of action and limits on the actions of leaders; the cost of conducting regular security reviews and evaluations in both human and material terms; and the need to balance public debate and ownership with the input of experts (DCAF, 2005, 3).

Liberia's National Security Strategy Implementation Matrix, discussed below, provides an example of how the UN can support monitoring and evaluation of the national security policy-making and implementation process. Similarly, the UN may wish to consider setting up advisory mechanisms for this process as has often been done with defence sector reform.[8] Advisers can be useful in helping host-state officials develop their capacity to implement policy within the standards envisioned by the leadership.

FIELD EXPERIENCES

This section describes the processes undertaken in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan to reform national security structures and draft national security strategies and policies.

Liberia

In 1999, former President Charles Taylor requested and received approval from the legislature to establish an NSC, but it was not used during his tenure. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf reactivated it upon taking office but had no staff to support it. Cabinet members who are part of the NSC nonetheless meet. As part of MoD training, the US provided assistance in developing guidelines on how the NSC is supposed to work, including guidelines for the military. In 2006, the USG commissioned RAND to conduct a study on Liberia's national security needs (Gompert et al., RAND 2007; Crisis Group, 2009, 5).

The study assessed the country's security environment and requirements for meeting internal and external security challenges. It offered a concept for meeting these challenges and described core

[8] For more on advising and mentoring, see the defence sector reform practice note.

functions for the various national security institutions, balancing costs against the country's need for effective and legitimate national security structures.

The study recommended, first, that the NSC be used for "policymaking, resource allocation, and crisis management," be chaired by the president, and include ministers of justice, defence, finance, and foreign affairs. The head of national intelligence, senior police and armed force officers and the Liberian National Security Advisor (LNSA) should provide advice. The NSC system, under the coordination of the LNSA, should be "extended downward from the cabinet level to working levels to ensure interministerial cooperation." The report suggested that a national security law was also required to codify missions and roles, ensure political buy-in, and promote public acceptance and understanding. (Gompert et al., 76–80)
Since the report recommended that Liberia continue to seek assistance for SSR within its overall reform plan, this is one country where a more capable NSC could perhaps be of assistance in monitoring and coordinating reform (Gompert et al., 77–78).

In January 2008, President Johnson Sirleaf approved the National Security Strategy of Liberia. The document defines the vision of national security in the country and the issues that threaten this vision (Liberia 2008a, 2). The strategy defines the roles of the various security actors, the mechanisms for coordinating their actions, and the means for their oversight and management. To increase the legitimacy of the security sector, the strategy was developed in part by asking Liberians about their security needs, as the new NSS is intended to ensure that "security agencies…will protect the people rather than only those in power in the context of a country-wide fragile security situation" (Liberia 2009, 1).

To assist with implementation of the strategy, an integrated National Security Strategy Implementation Matrix was also developed that details steps for building capacity within each relevant institution and describes gaps in expected funding for each of the steps. The matrix can be considered as a road-map for reforming the security sector and also as a means for monitoring and evaluating progress towards an effective, legitimate, and competent security sector. The matrix was developed by Liberians with the support of international partners and is a "synthesis of the strategic and budgeted plans for each security agencies, taking account of the main challenges and threats that the security agencies must confront individually and jointly to deliver the peace and stability required for Liberia's continued resurgence" (Liberia 2008b, 6). The Implementation Matrix also details steps required from the various security agencies to allow UNMIL's planned withdrawal and the Liberian authorities' assumption of full responsibility for security functions, and lists critical security sector priorities for government and donor support. (Beneath "critical," in decreasing order of urgency, are "highly important," "highly desirable," "important medium term," and "important long term.") (Liberia 2008b, 7) The matrix details priorities for the ministries of Justice (covering police, immigration, corrections, and fire service), National Defence (armed forces and coast guard), Finance (including customs), and the Office of Presidential Affairs (including the Office of the National Security Adviser, National Security Agency, and Special Security Service).

The NSS calls for the development of county and district based mechanisms to "provide effective and accountable security coordination, implementation of the rule of law, and joint working with

local government as well as civil society, and traditional leaders in the interest of the wellbeing of all the people of Liberia" (Liberia 2008a, 15). County Security Councils and District Security Councils, respectively chaired by Superintendents and District Commissioners, are to gather representatives of the security agencies, local government authorities, civil society groups, and community members for periodic briefings on Liberia's national security activities (Liberia 2008a, 4).

The NSS divides security concerns for Liberia into three main areas: domestic, regional, and global. Domestic concerns include the effects of civil war, the struggles of a nascent democracy, a dependent economy, youth vulnerability and exclusion, porous national borders, and rebuilding the police and armed forces. Regional concerns include regional conflict and insecurity, the role of Liberia in regional security and standby forces arrangements, and regional economics. Global concerns include the war on terror, international serious and organized crime, and debt relief and the international trade regime. Within this context, the NSS prioritizes domestic threats as the most important (including, under "effects of civil war," a lack of respect for rule of law, poor natural resources management, deactivated and unemployed ex-servicemen and ex-combatants, crimes such as corruption, robbery, drug abuse and trafficking, illegally held arms, land property disputes, ethnic hatred and tensions, prison overcrowding, a poor justice system, and HIV/AIDS). External threats are mostly regional in nature and derive from the situation first in the Mano River Union, and second within ECOWAS. Importantly, the National Security Strategy also serves as Pillar One of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Liberia 2008a, 2; IMF, 2008, *Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*, 51–60).[9]

The NSS defines the Liberian NSC as "the supreme security policy coordination body operating within the domestic, regional and global contexts which affects Liberia's national security agenda" (Liberia 2008a, 4). It discusses the role of the National Security Agency and the need to establish an intelligence unit within the Liberia National Police. The NSS also calls for a "thorough Defence Review and Defence Policy and Strategy that will, among others, clarify and determine the mission, doctrine, character, appropriate size, functions, and duties of the [Armed Forces of Liberia]; and provide direction for the development of the military" (Liberia 2008a, 8–12).

Sierra Leone[10]

Since 1999, the UK's International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) has supported efforts to increase capacity of national security institutions in Sierra Leone. The 2002 National Security Act established a National Security Council (NSC) and an Office of National Security (ONS), which serves as the NSC's secretariat. One of IMATT's initiatives was to support the development of a Defence White Paper, under the coordination of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As part of the process, the MoD consulted with stakeholders both inside and outside the

[9] Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, including the IMF and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over several years to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as external financing needs and the associated sources of financing. International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm.

[10] This section is largely drawn from Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, *Security Sector Transformation in Sierra Leone, 1997-2007*.

defence sector, including the relevant ministries and parliamentary committees (Albrecht and Jackson, 102–103). A Sierra Leonean NGO, Campaign for Good Governance, received support from the US-based National Democratic Institute to organize meetings in several towns.

When the Defence White Paper was issued in July 2003, its aim was "to share with the people of Sierra Leone the way in which their government's plans for defence are developing and to stimulate debate on this vital issue" (Sierra Leone Government, Defence White Paper, para. 1002). The White Paper would also serve as the basis for a defence review (which later became a Security Sector Review). The White paper defined Sierra Leone's security environment, identified internal threats and challenges, suggested security priorities, and looked to the future for the country's defence mechanisms. The White Paper also discussed the role of IMATT in SSR and defined the parameters for reforming the Ministry of Defence. It called for the establishment of an MoD staffed with civilians that coordinates its activities with the ONS. The White Paper also set out initial provisions for military aid to civil authorities, determined mechanisms for defence procurement and defence support (including health and welfare support for the armed services) and listed tasks for the various components of the security sector. In 2004, after the white paper was completed, the MoD, with the support of the IMATT Commander, also developed an implementation plan, called "Plan 2010." (Albrecht and Jackson, 102–105). This process was followed by a security sector review which was specifically designed to be part of the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy (Jackson and Albrecht, 2008, 3; Albrecht and Jackson, 2009, 102–105).[11]

Afghanistan

The United States, United Nations, and other donors have supported the development of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as well as of some of its components, including the Afghan National Security Strategy and the Afghan Security Sector Reform Strategy. The ANDS details portions of the Afghan National Security Strategy and describes major contemporary threats to Afghanistan, including terrorism and illegal armed groups, narcotics, and mines and other explosive remnants of war. The National Security Policy looks ahead five years and is reviewed annually. Within it, the SSR Strategy "establishes a mechanism to regulate relations between ministries and departments to ensure effective coordination" and is based on the OECD DAC implementation framework for SSR. The SSR Strategy aims to reform the Afghan National Army and Police, and to build a security sector that is effectively coordinated, operationally capable, and fiscally sustainable, where corruption is reduced, the public trusts the government to deliver security and justice, and the narcotics industry is less prevalent (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 54–73).

The ANDS explains that the Afghan National Security Council "is the highest institution for indentifying and addressing national security issues." The president leads the council, which develops strategies, determines priorities, coordinates and oversees the various security actors. The National Security Advisor "identifies the needs and requirements of the [security] sector and leads the Policy Action Group," an emergency response mechanism for coordinating activities in the southern part of the country. The ANDS also describes the structure and roles of the various

[11] This security sector review is discussed in more detail in the Threat Assessments and reviews practice note.

security institutions including the national army, national police, the National Directorate of Security, and the ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Counter-Narcotics (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 57–60).

Concerning security sector reform, a three-phase strategy was developed to ensure that SSR efforts would be fiscally sustainable. The first phase consists of "an accelerated development in the number of Afghan security forces that are adequately manned, equipped and trained to defeat all internal and external threats." The second phase aims to transition from a coalition-led to an Afghan-led and NATO-supported effort. In the third phase, army capacity will have increased to the point that "the partnership with allies will become one of normalized defence relations" (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 59–60).

ITERATIVE LESSONS LEARNED

National security policies and strategies should be developed by host state leaders in consultation with the population. International advisory teams can contribute to the policy-making process but the UK experience in Sierra Leone suggests that advisors should be flexible. They should recognize domestic capacity constraints even as they engage in a process of building capacity to reduce those constraints. Widespread popular consultation elicits the views of key population segments not only regarding what they consider the most pressing security issues but also their expectations of the country's security actors.

National security policies and strategies should outline the roles and boundaries of the country's various security actors, appropriate mechanisms for coordinating their activities and rules for cross-agency support (as, armed forces for police). They should specify whether national security policy/advisory institutions have a coordinating or an executive role. In countries recovering from conflict, national security strategies should be embedded within wider development strategies. National security strategies should include a realistic assessment of the costs and sustainability of security institutions and plan for their development accordingly. Host state governments should not exclude certain threats from national security policy and strategy for the sake of political or military expediency. That is, host state leaders must have the will to develop an honest national security policy in order to develop a realistic implementing strategy.

Concerning support to the development of national security strategies and policies, the UN and other donors should make sure that they provide the assistance required to create sustainable (and repeatable) processes. National security strategies and policies are not static and require periodic updating. Additionally, donors should ensure that processes are not overly dictated by the host-state's immediate military priorities but rather by a combination of short and long term considerations for maintaining security for the country's population.

Overall, the public literature on support to national security strategy and policy development is limited and devoted largely to transitional, post-communist countries or middle-income to fully-developed countries. The literature that to any significant degree, addresses, the development of security strategies in post-conflict countries—those most frequently of concern to complex UN peace operations—is sparse.

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