

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

**Keeping the Peace:**  
*The United Nations in the  
Emerging World Order*

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*Report No. 2    March 1992*

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*Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives*



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**FINDINGS: OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

- Historically, UN operations have performed some tasks well, and others poorly. In general, the UN **has been good at**:
  - monitoring conventional military forces and force separation agreements;
  - verifying the withdrawal of forces from combat;
  - monitoring or supervising elections; and
  - mediating political transitions where all sides want the transition to take place.

On the other hand, the UN **has not done well at**:

- trying to restore government authority undermined by civil unrest, in the absence of an overall settlement; or
  - monitoring borders to detect the illicit infiltration of people or weaponry.
- Peacekeeping operations can't get off the ground without the support of the great powers, and can't do well *on* the ground without the support of all local parties. The average UN mission has about six weeks from initial deployment to demonstrate its competence and win local trust. If that trust is lost, or never fully realized, an operation can be crippled and its personnel put in jeopardy.
- Local mistrust can grow out of ignorance of peacekeeping and its mission, and is best dispelled by early consultations with the local parties by other countries with experience of hosting a peacekeeping force. In the absence of clear local understanding and support of the UN's role, peacekeepers can find their freedom of movement and use of certain surveillance technologies tightly constrained. Moreover, in formerly war-torn countries, not all armed elements will be under effective political control -- some may simply be bandits -- and the lack of civil order may require a more forceful UN presence than can be justified under the usual rubric of self-defense. It is important, however, that the UN face that prospect squarely, and in advance, and give its people in the field the authority that they may need in a crisis.

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## Executive Summary

The end of the Cold War has given the United Nations a greater opportunity than at any time in its history to play its intended role as the centerpiece of the international collective security system. But while it is fashionable again to speak of the UN as a "fighting" organization, larger opportunities lie in the direction of *cooperative* security, keeping the peace, fostering voluntary democratic change, and promoting respect for human rights.

Traditional peacekeeping is conflict containment, using third-party troops and observers with local consent to reduce the chances of fighting flaring anew between two countries who, for whatever reason, have reached a truce. Increasingly, however, peacekeeping has been joined to conflict resolution, producing more complex operations to rebuild the peace in nations torn by civil war, such as the recent missions in Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. The latter two missions in particular mark a further turning point for the Organization, as they give it substantial responsibility to oversee the realization of basic human rights for the peoples of both countries.

As the international community becomes more involved in what used to be considered the purely internal affairs of states, what once seemed a clear line between domestic and international has become increasingly blurred. Security Council Resolution 688 linked internal repression with refugee flows to define a threat to international peace and security that some countries, the United States among them, took as leave to intervene to protect and support the Kurdish people in Iraq. Dissolution of public authority in the wake of civil war (as in Somalia) is a second potential scenario for humanitarian intervention. Neither would be peacekeeping in the classic sense, but both could require peacekeepers in the wake of international action to restore civil order and establish civil rights.

Moreover, as the UN involves itself in rebuilding damaged polities, it may increasingly face situations in which the limited use of force may be necessary to maintain civil order and protect the populace (and the operation) from opportunistic armed elements. If it cannot use force in such situations or is unwilling to do it, or if it does not revisit its handiwork when political backsliding occurs, then the era of UN peace-building may turn out to be rather short. On the other hand, the Organization can afford neither the political nor the financial costs of sustained fighting. Thus it must continue to pick its engagements carefully, not so easy to do at a time when everyone's favorite solution to intractable conflicts is to "send in the UN."

- An ambiguous mandate that papers over political differences in the Security Council can make a straightforward mission difficult, and a difficult mission impossible. On the other hand, the clearest of mandates cannot make an impossible mission doable. It merely paints the impossible task in higher-contrast colors.
- The Secretariat's inability to contract for goods and services after a new mission has been authorized, but before its budget is fully approved, imposes undue constraints and delays on time-critical missions. Standardized sources of supply help to cut the lead-time in starting new missions, but on-hand stocks of long-lead items, and authority to obligate a fraction of the mission budget in advance of General Assembly action, would help even more.
- UN operations suffer from a lack of modern military technology that could make them more efficient and effective. Although satellite communications and such innovations as encrypted and wireless facsimile are used routinely, such potentially vital equipment as night vision devices, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ground surveillance radars are making their way more slowly into the field. The reasons have to do with cost, the military sensitivity of the technology, its complexity, and thus the skills required for its operation and maintenance.

#### FINDINGS: STRUCTURAL ISSUES

- Although an increasingly important and central function of the UN, peacekeeping is still administered and funded as though it were a rare emergency activity rather than a normal one that sometimes deals with emergencies. The UN's overworked apparatus for planning and implementing peacekeeping operations is small, scattered, and cannot long continue to meet the rising global demand for UN operations. A particular problem is raised by the organizational separation of peacekeepers and peacemakers -- those who plan and monitor peacekeeping operations versus those who negotiate the settlements that then result in such missions.
- Despite member states' complaints about the cost of new missions, the peacekeeping system is severely underfunded for what states call upon it to do. Moreover, significant numbers of member states do not pay a fair share of peacekeeping expenses, pay late, or do not pay at all. Part of the problem lies in the current atomized approach to budgeting and assessing member states for peacekeeping expenses, which is done on an *ad hoc* basis for each new mission. The international community may not yet fully appreciate that UN peacekeeping is its cheapest alternative for containing and resolving conflict in part because member states

receive the bills for peacekeeping as many times a year as there are missions and mandate renewals, creating an impression of never-ending costs and catching many countries' budgets out-of-cycle.

- Peacekeeping forces cannot substitute for national militaries, but one-third of one percent of what is now spent annually on national forces worldwide (or roughly \$3 billion a year) would constitute a generous estimate of annual demands for peacekeeping operations from now through the end of the century. The greater availability of trained and ready peacekeepers and their equipment that such funding levels could make possible could repay the investment of member states, rich and poor, many times over.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

The UN's ability to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs depends, first, upon the willingness of the nations of the world to rethink their attitudes toward the United Nations and to consider basic reforms in the Organization's internal structure and procedures. Although some changes, for example, the question of new permanent members for the Security Council, require amendment of the UN Charter, much could be done to strengthen the UN's role in peace and security far short of revising the Charter. The changes we propose come down to a matter of commitment and will: Commitment to looking more open-mindedly at the UN's potential contribution to this important part of human affairs; will to make the necessary changes in the UN's organizational structure and to provide the resources needed to make such potential a reality.

#### **The Permanent Five**

- The five permanent members of the Security Council should continue to play their crucial historical role in helping new peacekeeping missions get underway, with political and financial support, as well as transport and other logistical assistance. Military officers from the five should continue to participate in new observer missions, and where local political conditions permit, the five should contribute specialized military support units to UN operations (for example, communications, helicopter units, and equipment like surveillance drones that would be too expensive for the UN to purchase).
- Given the exemplary performance of military women in the recent Gulf War, and the UN's extensive commitments to women's equality, the UN should aim to increase the participation of women on the military side of peacekeeping operations, commensurate with those missions' staffing of civilian women professionals, now

running at 30 percent or better for new missions. Since military observers, as well as military units, are nominated by member states, the United States and other countries with higher percentages of women in their armed forces may need to set the example here.

#### **The "New Era" Powers**

- The constitutions of Germany and Japan make it difficult for these countries to deploy armed forces outside their borders. Both have compensated to a degree through voluntary contributions of money and services to peacekeeping operations. Both countries could play a greater role in this regard, for example, by supporting the acquisition, stockpiling, and maintenance of a UN equipment reserve. Such support would help to ease the material bottlenecks that afflict the start-up phase of large, time-urgent missions.

#### **The Authority of the Secretary General**

- To cover a new mission's start-up expenses, the Secretary General should be able to obligate an amount equivalent to one-third of its proposed budget as soon as the mission has been authorized by the Security Council. Since the Assembly is unlikely to cut a budget request by anything approaching two-thirds, this new authority would not impinge in any substantive way on the Assembly's right to approve expenditures.
- To be in a better position to use the UN's good offices to cope with unforeseen and extraordinary events, the Secretary General should be authorized to spend up to \$20 million a year, and \$50 million with preliminary legislative approval, as opposed to the current \$3 million and \$10 million, respectively.

#### **Budgeting and Paying for Peacekeeping**

- To make clear that it is a normal and routine part of UN activities, there should be a single biennial budget for peacekeeping, assessed annually along with the regular UN budget, even if the special *scale* of assessments for peacekeeping is retained. There should be a single Peacekeeping Fund that functions as the repository for assessed contributions. Although expenditures for individual missions still should be separately accounted for, and annual spending ceilings still should apply to each, the SG should be able to use the Fund to exercise the new obligational authority recommended above.
- Countries with above-average per-capita gross national products should pay a full share of peacekeeping expenses; fifteen countries

in that category now pay an assessment that is 80 percent lower than would be the case if peacekeeping used the same scale of assessments as the regular budget.

- Eventually, the special scale of assessments for peacekeeping should be phased out, reflecting peacekeeping's place as a central function of the United Nations. To ensure equity in assessments, and continued close attention to ability to pay, consideration should be given to revising the current ceiling and floor on assessments.
- Reimbursements of troop contributing countries should reflect their actual costs of operation, or \$1,000 per person-month, whichever is higher. Reimbursement agreements should be worked out in advance to ensure that costs are contained, and should be tied to countries' willingness to earmark units and equipment for fast deployment and to devote a fraction of any surplus reimbursement to UN-approved training and the purchase of UN-standard equipment for future use in peacekeeping missions. Such trained and equipped contingents should have priority for selection on future UN missions.

### **Restructuring the Secretariat**

- To complement the first phase restructuring recently initiated by the Secretary General, we suggest the appointment of three Deputy Secretaries-General, for Political Affairs, for Economic, Social and Environmental Affairs, and for Administration and Management, who would serve as the SG's alter egos in these areas. The political Deputy would supervise four Under-Secretaries General heading departments of Peacekeeping and International Security (PAIS); Information and Conflict Resolution; Arms Trade, Limitation, and Disarmament; and Emergency Relief. This organization would place the peacemakers, the peacekeepers, the people responsible for political information gathering and early warning, and the people responsible for UN relief efforts, refugee affairs and, potentially, human rights issues in the same administrative chain of command. The political Deputy would be in a position to track and coordinate all four elements as they affect current and future UN missions, and could provide comprehensive reports to the SG.
- Units dealing with peacekeeping that are now within the Department of Administration and Management should be moved to PAIS, under an Assistant Secretary General for Resources.
- The current post of Military Adviser should be changed to Assistant-Secretary General for Planning and Operations within



PAIS, and staffed by an officer with peacekeeping experience, on a five-year term appointment. Other military staff, sufficient to fulfill the UN's need to plan and implement a growing number of missions, should be seconded from governments on three- or five-year assignments.

- Whatever specific structure the UN adopts to manage peacekeeping in the future, it must make every effort to ensure the appointment of high quality people, without whom an organization cannot function effectively.

### **Training and Familiarization**

- The UN should promote regional, "UN-certified" training programs, especially in regions lacking such training heretofore, and make a greater effort to bring the leaders of new missions together for refresher training and mission familiarization prior to deployment. This is particularly important for complex, multi-component operations.

These proposals represent the most ambitious program of UN restructuring and reform since the Organization's founding. But given the momentous political change swirling all about it, and the rising demand for its services, the Organization can afford to do no less if it is to play a serious role in international affairs in the coming decade and the 21st century.



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## Preface

The twentieth century has been one of the most violent in human history. Since the end of World War II, our fractious community of nations has managed to avoid nuclear warfare, but conventional conflicts have flared with depressing regularity. There are precious few tools available to dampen ethnic, religious and international strife. Among the most important are the peacekeeping and peacemaking powers of the United Nations. During the depths of the Cold War, the UN made important, but limited, contributions in these areas. Now, as a consequence of radical change in the former Soviet Union, these tools for conflict containment and conflict resolution have begun to be applied in earnest, and with some clear success, to long-standing regional conflicts.

The United Nations was designed to work in a cooperative security environment. This report is written at a time when it is possible to correlate theory with practice. The underlying assumption behind this study is the need to take advantage of this precarious moment by increasing support and adopting measures to strengthen the UN's security-related activities.

Strengthening the UN would not obviate and need not foreclose unilateral steps by the United States to secure its national interests and protect its friends and allies, but could make unilateral actions less necessary while making multilateral approaches more effective, as was dramatically evident in the Gulf War against Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the UN can do things that even nations as powerful as the United States cannot do. Many countries see the UN as the intermediary of choice, which makes it supremely useful for conflict mediation and the oversight of peace settlements. The presence of UN peacekeeping missions can stimulate local confidence in the durability of cease-fires, lowering the probability of renewed warfare.

This study of UN peacekeeping, conducted by the Henry L. Stimson Center under a grant from the Ford Foundation, has examined the historical record of UN operations for the lessons it might contain for current and future missions. It has also investigated the contemporary political, financial, and organizational setting for peacekeeping, by means of background interviews with more than 80 United Nations and US government employees and officials of other governments and international organizations.

The Stimson Center's work strives to promote a better understanding of complex public policy problems, and to make policy-relevant recommendations that address those problems directly. We hope that readers find the recommendations in this study to be both timely and provocative.

We have been fortunate to have had the advice of a group of experienced individuals who were kind enough to constitute themselves as an advisory committee, including General George L. Butler, currently the commander of the US Strategic Command; Dr. David Cox, director of a study of UN peacekeeping at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa; the Hon. Jan Eliasson, Swedish Ambassador to the UN; Representative Lee Hamilton, Chair of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, United States Congress; Dr. Marianne Heiberg, director of a study of UN peacekeeping at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs; Dr. Patricia Lewis, director of the Verification Technology Information Centre in Great Britain; Ambassador Olara Otunnu, President of the International Peacekeeping Academy; the Hon. Thomas Pickering, US Ambassador to the United Nations; Dr. Enid Schoettle, director of a program on international organizations at the Council on Foreign Relations; Sir Brian Urquhart, formerly UN Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs; and the Hon. Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State and current UN Special Representative on the crisis in Yugoslavia. We would like to extend additional thanks to John MacKinlay and James Schear, whose comments on earlier drafts of this report were extremely valuable.

Needless to say, these individuals' responsibilities were restricted to reading and commenting on drafts and providing advice; responsibility for the content of this report rests solely with the authors. In particular, its recommendations should not be attributed to any of the individuals mentioned above, who may or may not agree with them.

The authors would also like to extend their thanks to all of the individuals who gave extensively of their time to be interviewed for this project, and to those who researched and drafted the peacekeeping case studies, which will be published under separate cover, as an edited volume. Those researchers include Karl Th. Birgisson, Virginia Page Fortna, Mona M. Ghali, and Brian D. Smith. In addition to her research and writing responsibilities, Page Fortna provided invaluable editorial and production assistance.

The Stimson Center would like to extend special thanks to the Ford Foundation, Enid C. B. Schoettle, its director of international programs at the time this study was initiated, and Shepard Forman, the current director. Without Ford's generous support, this study would not have been possible.

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President,  
The Henry L. Stimson Center

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## List of Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary General
CIAV	International Support and Verification Commission
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DSG	Deputy Secretary General
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation
FOD	Field Operations Division
INMARSAT	International Maritime Satellite Organization
INTELSAT	International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
IPA	International Peace Academy
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MNF	Multinational Force
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo
ONUSCA	UN Mission in Central America
ONUSAL	UN Mission in El Salvador
ONUVEH	UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Haiti
ONUVEN	UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua
ORCI	Office of Research and Collection of Information
PAIS	USG for Peacekeeping and International Security
PPBF	Office of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Finance
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SG	Secretary General
SPA	Office of Special Political Affairs
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAVEM	UN Angola Verification Mission
UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNFICYP	UN Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group
UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIPOM	UN India Pakistan Observer Mission
UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOGIL	UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNSCOB	UN Special Committee on the Balkans
UNTAC	UN Temporary Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	UN Transition Assistance Group
UNTEA	UN Temporary Executive Authority
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervisory Organization
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observer Mission
USG	Under Secretary General



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**KEEPING THE PEACE:**

**THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE EMERGING  
WORLD ORDER**



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## INTRODUCTION

The United Nations was created in the waning days of the Second World War to prevent a third war by organizing the nations of the world into a system of collective security. But the UN spent its formative years -- indeed, its first four decades -- buffeted by the two global struggles that World War II unleashed: The bitter competition between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, and the strivings of peoples in Africa and Asia for self-determination. The former evolved quickly into the nuclear-armed, bipolar, East-West stalemate known as the Cold War, and the latter soon became entangled in it. Where the European powers were unwilling to part amicably with their colonies, decolonization often became a violent and ideologically-tinged affair. As a result, a convergence of interests soon developed between nationalist leaders in colonial territories, looking both for alternatives to Western political and economic models and for sources of material support, and Soviet (and, for a time, Chinese) leaders seeking means and allies for challenging Western interests.

The United Nations inevitably fell victim to both global struggles. Virtually from its inception, it became clear that the veto power wielded by the five permanent members of the Security Council would deadlock that body on any issue perceived to be relevant to the East-West competition -- a very broad set of issues, indeed. The so-called "Uniting for Peace" resolution, passed by the General Assembly at the West's initiative in 1950 as a means of responding to the invasion of South Korea, became, for a time, an effective vehicle for by-passing the paralyzing effect of the Soviet veto. But as decolonization went forward, the General Assembly came to be dominated by newly-independent states disinclined to support the West's political agenda, and the UN's ability to act on security issues became more and more narrowly constrained. In short, throughout the period of the Cold War, the UN could neither deter nor fight major wars, nor enforce the principle of collective security on issues of central concern to either East or West.

The UN, however, did manage to carve out a more narrow security role. As a "neutral" organization, the UN could sometimes help to bring smaller conflicts to an end and work to keep them from flaring anew; at least, it could carry out this function when it was perceived by both the Soviet Union and the United States to be in their interest. Thus, rather than serving as a mechanism for global collective security, the UN came to be associated with more modest but, under the circumstances, more realistic objectives: The mediation of isolated and idiosyncratic conflicts, the monitoring of cease-fire arrangements, and the separation of hostile armed forces. Novel kinds of field operations were developed to support this work, grouped into two categories: Unarmed military observer missions (first utilized in the Balkans, in 1947) and armed peacekeeping missions (first utilized in the Sinai in 1956).

Over the years, the United Nations has undertaken more than two dozen such missions of varying scope, duration, and degree of success. Most of them have dealt with conflicts whose origins can be traced to the end of colonial empires. Decolonization has often meant the release of ethnic and nationalist forces in Asia and Africa that challenged state borders based on the old colonial boundaries. And even when national boundaries were not questioned, many new states had to struggle to keep their multi-ethnic populations in uneasy political balance. Indeed, sub-national groups' demands for empowerment, autonomy and, sometimes, complete independence, have constituted a second stage in the struggle for self-determination that, like the first, has often turned violent. The UN has contributed frequently to the resolution of such conflicts, or at least to the containment of the violence resulting from them.

The relative cooperation that now characterizes relations among the five permanent members of the Security Council has opened a range of additional kinds of opportunities for the UN to contribute to international security. Not only has the UN become increasingly creative in its security missions, it has added active "peacemaking" and "nation-building," particularly assistance in the transition of autocratic political systems to democracy, to its traditional observer and peacekeeping operations. The Organization is becoming a central player in resolving conflicts around the globe -- those between nations and even some within the boundaries of a single state. The changing international security environment has also opened up new opportunities for the UN to expand and improve upon its traditional, often behind-the-scenes, efforts on behalf of beleaguered peoples, especially refugees, displaced persons, and other victims of war.

In short, the end of the Cold War has not only left the United Nations more free than at any time in its history to play its intended role as the centerpiece of the international collective security system, as during the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis, but has also opened up new possibilities for UN-organized cooperative security measures to prevent, ameliorate, or resolve both international and intranational conflicts. Classical peacekeeping, the interposition of neutral forces between two hostile states or groups with their joint consent, is but one of the tools potentially available to the UN for keeping the peace, fostering voluntary democratic change, and promoting respect for human rights.

Just meeting its current obligations in international security affairs, however, will require serious structural, procedural, and financial reform at the UN. Except for a very small operational cadre, the UN Secretariat is geared more to study and debate than to run large-scale operational activities in disparate parts of the world. Some of the UN's specialized agencies, like the World Health Organization and the High Commissioner for Refugees, are already action-oriented. But the Secretariat is the body most directly responsible for political and security issues, and both its

resources and its permanent staff have already been stretched well beyond reasonable limits in supporting the expanded agenda of security-related field operations now underway.

Gaining greater resources for the UN will be a difficult task, as it is not an autonomous entity and sometimes barely more than the sum of its parts (175 nominally equal member states). Most member-states already complain about the cost of the organization and its allegedly "top-heavy" bureaucracy. In the past, many member-states took to withholding parts of their UN assessments to protest specific practices or policies. The Soviet Union and its then-allies were the first to do this. In the early- and mid-1980s, however, the United States became the most vociferous of the UN's critics, in the process accumulating back dues ("arrearages") of over half a billion dollars. Some of this financial delinquency was undertaken to encourage UN budgetary reform, a goal that has now been accomplished to a degree. Although both the US and the Russian Republic are now committed to long-term programs to eradicate their UN arrearages, the impact of all the delinquent nations' refusals to pay their assessments has significantly constrained the UN's ability to adapt to the changing international scene.

In the 1990-91 biennium, the UN system as a whole budgeted nearly eight billion dollars, most of which it received from member nations as voluntary contributions to its specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (see table one). Less than one billion of this total was spent on peacekeeping missions. Most of the funds for peacekeeping are raised through special mandatory assessments, each targeted on a specific operation.<sup>1</sup> How the UN's capacity to support conflict prevention and resolution through peacekeeping may be increased without draining resources that otherwise would be given to the specialized agencies that depend on voluntary funding (for example, the highly-regarded United Nations Children's Fund, [UNICEF], Development Fund, or High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]) is but one of the issues that need urgent attention.

Even if greater resources are obtained, however, the UN will continue to be hindered in its ability to contribute to international peace and security by a variety of factors. In official and legal terms, the UN remains tightly constrained and inhibited. Even its informal mandate for resolving world conflicts remains uncertain, and is created anew, on an *ad*

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<sup>1</sup> Of the \$950 million expended for peacekeeping overall in 1990/91, about \$60 million was included in the regular UN budget and paid for through the regular assessment, while another \$60 million was raised through voluntary payments for the Cyprus mission. All the rest was raised through special mandatory assessments.

Table 1 Budgets for the UN System, 1990-1991

	Amount (\$US millions)
United Nations regular budget	2,134
Peacekeeping operations funded off-budget (special assessments and voluntary contributions)	896
Specialized agencies and other autonomous bodies	4,785
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>7,815</b>

Sources: UN regular budget from: UN, Department of Public Information, "Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the First Part of its Forty-fifth Session," Press release GA/8165, 21 January 1991, 631-32; specialized agencies data drawn from UN Handbook (1991) and data provided by the UN Department of Public Information. For costs of peacekeeping operations, see table 7, below.

*hoc* basis, each time an international situation, for whatever reason, appears to be ripe for solution. To a degree, the UN's staff and constituent agencies continue to be bound by the political preconceptions of the past.


This disconnect between the greater opportunities for the United Nations resulting from the end of the Cold War and the practical constraints on the Organization's capabilities that persist from the Cold War period dogs virtually every aspect of its operations. It is evident that major reforms are desirable. These should include internal re-organization, to say nothing of sweeping revisions of UN practices and procedures. The most profound changes would require revision of the UN Charter. The five permanent members of the Security Council, for example, reflect faithfully the alliance which emerged victorious from World War II, 47 years ago, but do not represent accurately the distribution of political and economic power in the contemporary world. Hopefully, the governments of the world, as well as the international scholarly community, will soon put their collective minds to the desirable content, and means of implementing, such fundamental reforms of the United Nations.

Our study, however, had a more narrow focus, confined to the UN's roles in helping to resolve conflicts and to keep the peace. As we have noted, the tasks involved in such efforts are diverse. They involve fact-finding and reporting, mediation, negotiation, truce-monitoring, observation of cease-fire zones, disarming of military forces, election

fact-finding and reporting, mediation, negotiation, truce-monitoring, observation of cease-fire zones, disarming of military forces, election monitoring, and even national administration and reconstruction. Collectively known as peacemaking and peacekeeping, these missions have come to define, through action, a special role for the Organization in international security affairs.

They are, however, a subset of a larger spectrum of operations that the UN might undertake to sustain or restore peace and security under the terms of its Charter. Figure one shows how peacekeeping and related operations fit into this larger universe. The level of military force involved in a UN operation can range from zero (as in mediation or preventive diplomacy) to quite considerable (for a peace enforcement action like the 1991 Gulf War).

**Figure 1 Level of Consent and Use of Force in UN Field Operations**



Most UN operations are undertaken with full local consent. In a multi-party conflict, however, some parties' consent can be hard to maintain, so we depict it in figure one as a continuum. As a working definition, we take "consent" to mean the agreement of a host government to a UN mission's presence. Some factions within the host country, including armed elements, may object to that presence, and on occasion peacekeepers may need to use force as a last resort to defend themselves or restore order to a deteriorating field situation. We illustrate this possibility using the Congo operation (ONUC) as an example.

"Deterrent deployments" include actions that are sometimes dubbed "preventive peacekeeping," which is a misnomer. Such deployments would be intended to deter aggression by signaling the international community's willingness to counter it militarily. They would deploy with the consent of the threatened party, but with capabilities (and orders) to engage in combat as may be necessary. This mission distinguishes such preventive combat deployments from peacekeeping and places them outside the scope of this study.

Similarly outside its scope are still more coercive means of enforcing collective security, such as last year's intervention to liberate Kuwait, which employed economic sanctions, blockade, and ultimately air, ground, and naval warfare to oust Iraqi forces. The fact that there have been very few such actions to date (the 1950 Korean intervention, the 1965 blockade of Rhodesia, and Kuwait), does not make them any less important. But the Charter specifies that enforcement actions should be measures of last resort -- a recommendation founded partly on the Charter-writers' correct understanding of just how difficult it would be to gain international agreement for enforcement actions, and therefore just how rare such activities indeed could ever be.

We believe that UN security operations short of enforcement have the greater potential to build a more peaceful and stable international order. However, there is one area of growing UN activity -- humanitarian affairs and human rights -- where future actions may range all the way from consent-based and non-forceful relief efforts, including the negotiation of "corridors of peace" to allow food shipments to non-combatants (as has been done by UNICEF in Sudan), to non-consensual and predominantly military efforts to protect or restore basic human rights. Because several peacekeeping operations have substantial humanitarian components, we address humanitarian intervention at some length, below. At the same time, however, we recognize that its political, legal, and operational implications extend beyond the main focus of this work.

By studying the UN's past and current peacemaking/peacekeeping efforts, we hope to identify both the strengths and the weaknesses of contemporary practices. Our purpose is to suggest changes in UN



organization and procedures that can strengthen its ability to help maintain the peace in the years ahead, in the new circumstances made possible by the end of the Cold War. Some of our proposals may require the type of basic reform of the United Nations' system alluded to above. But most of them may be implemented more easily (and more quickly), requiring only internal organizational reforms or modifications of current practices.

Our findings are based on two types of information:

- Detailed, and highly structured, case studies of past and current UN peacekeeping operations, as well as studies of peacekeeping efforts by other multilateral or national organizations. These cases will be published separately from this volume, providing a source book for scholars and interested practitioners.
- Extensive interviews with current and former UN officials, and with individuals from national governments involved in UN affairs. More than 80 background interviews were carried out over a 15-month period (see annex B).

This report is organized into three sections. The first describes the origins and politics of UN peacekeeping, and discusses current international perceptions of its utility and its future. The second section summarizes the lessons learned from the research and particularly from the case studies. The third section contains our recommendations.



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## ORIGINS AND POLITICS OF PEACEKEEPING

The beginnings of the 40-year political struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, which became known as the Cold War, sealed the likelihood that the collective enforcement of international security as envisioned in the UN Charter could be implemented only in very rare circumstances. The fluke of UN-sponsored coercive military action in Korea was not repeated while the East-West rivalry continued, with the single exception of the blockade of Rhodesia, in which Britain's Royal Navy was empowered to act as the international organization's military arm. In place of enforcement, the UN developed a variety of types of operations known collectively as peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping began with small observer missions in the late 1940s in the Balkans, Indonesia, South Asia, and the Middle East, areas outside the initial, and then only, East-West confrontation in Central Europe. In these situations (the Balkans excepted), agreements had been reached to halt armed conflicts that had followed the withdrawal of colonial powers; and the UN sought to help stabilize the cease-fires, facilitate resolution of cease-fire violations, and generally contribute to a more peaceful atmosphere.

These types of activities were premised on Chapter VI of the UN Charter, pacific settlement of disputes. They differ from collective security functions in being undertaken only with the consent of all parties involved. They are means of reassuring parties to a conflict about opponents' intentions, as well as practical mechanisms for limiting the consequences of the inevitable disputes that arise in implementing a cease-fire or a settlement among groups that remain basically hostile to one another. Peacekeepers are not used to coerce parties to settle their conflicts. Although the occasional round has been fired in self-defense, or to maintain credibility in dangerous situations, peacekeepers depend on a common understanding that an attack on them is an attack on the international community, rather than on the threat of force, to deter attacks and accomplish their missions.

If deployed quickly enough, with the consent of all disputing parties, the presence of multinational units in a troubled region could, theoretically, help to avoid an outbreak of violence.<sup>2</sup> If deployed following a lull in fighting, peacekeepers can prolong this lull and, perhaps, create an

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<sup>2</sup> What we have in mind here is not a deterrent deployment, to protect one state from another that threatens aggression, but a kind of proactive confidence-building measure intended to improve mutual communications, reduce tensions, and prevent minor incidents from sparking major conflagrations. Such an operation might grow out of a preventive diplomatic mission sent by the Secretary General or the Security Council.

atmosphere in which the negotiated settlement of disputes becomes more likely. The effectiveness of any peacekeeping mission, however, requires the continuing perception by all parties that the absence of violence is in each of their interests. Peacekeeping is the original confidence-building measure, providing a means for nations or factions who are tired of war, but wary of one another, to live in peace.

### **PEACEKEEPING DURING THE COLD WAR**

The first mission labelled "peacekeeping" explicitly was the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) dispatched to the Sinai following the Suez Crisis of 1956 to oversee the separation and withdrawal of forces, and to create a buffer zone between Egypt and Israel. The second peacekeeping force was sent to the Congo in 1960 to help preserve order. The Congo force, known as ONUC, later worked to control a major secessionist movement and thus to end an emerging civil war, establishing a potential precedent for coercive operations that was neither comfortable at the time, nor emulated in later years.

A UN force was placed on Cyprus in 1964. It still remains, separating Greek and Turkish factions on the so-called Green Line, an example to many now-impatient troop-contributing nations of how peacekeeping operations can sometimes have unintended adverse effects, suppressing conflict without resolving its causes. All told, between the UN's founding in 1945 and the coming-to-power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR in 1985 (the beginning of the end of the Cold War), the UN mounted fourteen operations that we would include under the generic heading of peacekeeping. These are listed in table two.

Many of these operations were possible because they helped to avoid situations in which U.S. and Soviet forces might otherwise directly confront one another. As was frequently the case in the Cold War, both sides' principal perceived interest in Third World situations was to keep the other power's influence to a minimum. The UN offered a nominally impartial, "third force" that fulfilled this objective, an important one, especially from the West's perspective.

Indeed, throughout the Cold War period, UN peacekeeping operations were generally thought to serve Western more often than Soviet interests, if only because peacekeeping missions sought to stabilize political/military situations. At the time, Moscow was more interested in achieving radical political change in the Third World through rapid decolonization and the establishment of friendly Marxist regimes. Thus, Soviet political support for UN peacekeeping was intermittent and its financial support extremely limited. Both factors, but especially the first,

**Table 2 UN Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War, 1945-1985**

Name	Dates	Description
UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)	1947-51	Investigate guerrilla border crossings into Greece
UN Good Offices Mission, UN Commission for Indonesia	1947-51	Observe decolonization
UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)	1948-present	Monitor cease-fires along Israeli borders
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949-present	Monitor cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir
UN Emergency Force (UNEF I)	1956-67	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	1958	Monitor infiltration of arms & troops into Lebanon from Syria
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	1960-64	Render military assistance, restore civil order
UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	1962-63	Keep order and administer W. New Guinea pending transfer to Indonesia
UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	1963	Monitor infiltration into Yemen across Saudi border
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964-present	Maintain order; from 1974 monitor buffer zone separating Greek and Turkish communities
UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	1965-66	Monitor cease-fire in 1965 India-Pakistan War
UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II)	1974-79	Separate Egyptian & Israeli forces in Sinai
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974-present	Monitor separation of Syrian & Israeli forces on Golan Heights
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978-present	Establish buffer zone between Israel & Lebanon

constrained the number of situations in which UN peacekeeping was a realistic alternative.

### THE UNITED NATIONS IN TRANSITION

The past few years have witnessed favorable changes in the attitudes of both the USSR and the United States toward the United Nations. Both became more willing to take the Organization seriously as a means of resolving international conflict. Soviet policy changed dramatically after 1985. As the USSR backed away from direct military involvement in Third World disputes and ended the confrontation in Europe, it came to see the UN as an alternative avenue of international influence. The United States also began to express more positive views, as the UN began to implement some of the financial and personnel reforms long demanded by the United States and, with the newly cooperative Soviet attitude, began to be able to act more decisively. The key role played by the United Nations in the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis reinforced these positive trends in the United States.

While some Americans remain deeply skeptical of the UN's potential, public opinion in this country has moved substantially in favor of the UN in recent years. Over three-quarters of the people polled in a 1991 survey approved of the job being done by the United Nations, up from 60 percent two years earlier. Eighty percent of the respondents wanted the UN to play the lead role in organizing the world to respond to aggression, and 88 percent supported a proposal to establish a standing UN peacekeeping force made up of units pledged by member nations. Sixty percent of the respondents thought "UN resolutions should have the force of law and should rule over the actions and laws of individual countries, including the United States, where necessary to fulfill essential United Nations functions;" this acceptance of UN infringement on national sovereignty is unprecedented.<sup>3</sup>

To publics in many European countries, in East Asia, and in parts of the Third World, the UN has long symbolized ordinary peoples' hopes for a more peaceful and more humane world. Whether or not these hopes can now be transformed into realities will depend largely on the policies pursued by the United States and other economically-advanced nations. They will also depend, however, at least in part, on the UN's ability to continue to reform its internal practices and procedures and to step back from past excesses, such as the 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. The General Assembly's withdrawal of that resolution in

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<sup>3</sup> *The Emerging World Order*, Americans Talk Issues, Survey No. 16, (Washington, DC: The Americans Talk Issues Foundation, August 1991), 9-10, 12-13.

December 1991 was an important political and symbolic step likely to further improve the UN's popular image in the United States.

### **PEACEKEEPING IN THE NEW ERA**

In the second half of the 1980s, the United Nations was inundated by requests for new peacekeeping missions in the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, South Asia, and Central America. Several of these new operations were precedent-shattering: In Namibia in 1989, the UN undertook its first nation-building operation, both overseeing the withdrawal of hostile armed forces and monitoring that nation's first free election. At the same time, the UN undertook its first mission in the Western Hemisphere, helping to disarm the Nicaraguan Contras.

A second, and even larger surge of demand for UN peacekeeping operations is underway at the current time. To long-anticipated missions in the Western Sahara, El Salvador, and Angola, have been added the monitoring operation on the Iraq-Kuwait border, the Special Commission implementing the disarmament provisions of the cease-fire with Iraq, and the policing and relief operation in northern Iraq.<sup>4</sup> At this writing, a huge mission to oversee the rebuilding of Cambodia, and another large mission to oversee the cease-fire in what remains of Yugoslavia, are getting underway simultaneously.

UN peacekeeping operations initiated since 1985 are listed in table three. All told, fourteen such missions have been started in the past seven years, equal to the number undertaken in the previous forty years of the UN's existence. If the typically more ambitious mandates of the new missions are also taken into account, it is clear that UN peacekeeping requirements have increased by orders of magnitude since 1985. More missions are sure to follow, as the Security Council acts to quell cross-border and other conflicts, and the Secretary General's mediators produce settlement packages. Peacekeepers are likely to be part of any cease-fire package, although they may be a proportionally smaller part of the total UN response, since the Council is now able to do more, politically, than it could heretofore.

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<sup>4</sup> For a summary of its activities, see Johan Molander, "The Lessons of Iraq: Unconventional Weapons, Inspection and Verification, and the United Nations and Disarmament," transcript of a briefing given November 13, 1991 (Washington, DC: The Committee on National Security, 1992). Mr. Molander served as special adviser to the Chairman of the Special Commission.

Table 3 UN Peacekeeping Operations in the New Era, 1985-1991

Name	Dates	Description
UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988-89	Monitor withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan
UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	1988-91	Monitor cease-fire in Iran-Iraq War
UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	1988-91	Monitor withdrawal of Cuban forces
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	1989-90	Supervise transition of Namibia from South African rule to independence
UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN)	1989-90	Observe Nicaraguan elections
UN Mission in Central America (ONUCA)	1989-91	Monitor for arms and troop infiltration; demobilize Nicaraguan contras
UN Mission for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH)	1990	Observe Haitian elections
UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991-present	Monitor general cease-fire and creation of new joint army
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	1991-present	Monitor buffer zone after Gulf War; armed components
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991-present	Conduct referendum on independence vs. joining Morocco
UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991-present	Monitor human rights violations, elections
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) UN Temporary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1991-present 1992-present	Supervise government functions and eventual elections while rebuilding the country and disarming the factions
UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia	1992-present	Advance mission late 1991; replace Yugoslav forces in Serbian areas of Croatia.



### **Dealing with Internal Conflicts**

It is likely that the UN will function increasingly as the midwife of political transitions. Indeed, nine of the missions undertaken since 1985 have facilitated resolution of "domestic" conflicts and the establishment of democratic regimes. As an organization that represents no one nation-state but the entire international community, as an entity with no armies of its own and no vested interest other than the success of the peace process, the UN may be ideally suited for this role. As an outsider that is guaranteed to leave when its work is finished, the UN can oversee the disarmament of armed factions, monitor the repatriation of dispossessed populations and property, and provide the public security and administrative coherence necessary to restore the basic amenities of life. Its presence can deter and, if necessary, expose unfair election practices, thus ensuring the credibility of new political processes and the regimes they create, and conferring a sense of legitimacy to which other election observer groups can contribute, but cannot readily match.

Although the 1991 Gulf War remains a recent memory, the cross-border security threats of the future are more likely to involve disaffected groups of nationals seeking to overturn the governments of their native lands than to involve open aggression by neighboring governments. Such domestic rebels may sometimes use staging areas outside the country (as did the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s, and as groups from Liberia, Chad, and Rwanda did in 1990-91), and thus implicate neighboring nations in the struggle, but these remain fundamentally internal conflicts.

Domestic conflicts may take a variety of forms. Long-simmering ethnic hostilities have erupted into separatist civil wars in many nations in recent years, including Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and the Sudan. The list of countries potentially the victims of such internal ethnic implosions is long. In other countries, there are internal conflicts with political rather than ethnic roots. El Salvador suffered through 12 years of politically- and economically-based warfare, for example. While ethnic resentments often have a hand in feeding such conflicts, they have as their focus a struggle for political rights and political control, rather than ethnic autonomy or independence.

Now that precedents have been set, it seems likely that the UN will be called upon increasingly not only to mediate or to supervise the settlement of such civil strife, but also to take a direct hand in the administration of the country during the process of rebuilding. In parts of the Third World that have been torn by these internal wars, domestic order has virtually disappeared; people residing in these regions are deprived of all government services, and not just law and order. The restoration of security requires not only such traditional tasks as disarming armed forces and monitoring cease-fires, but ensuring basic police and other civil

functions, so that a variety of UN and other humanitarian agencies can provide the fundamentals of life to ravaged civilian populations.

Any number of situations in Africa, Asia, Latin America and, indeed, Europe, suggest opportunities for such UN peacekeeping and nation-building operations. In some cases, it may be appropriate for regional organizations to play the necessary peacemaking role, but the interjection of regional forces into a situation often interjects regional politics as well, which may make one or more domestic factions unwilling to accept regional mediation (or regional peacekeepers). A West African peacekeeping force in Liberia since 1990, for example, was seen by many in the region as but thin camouflage for the imposition of Nigeria's will on the situation. This perception may have contributed to that force's inability to control the situation without considerable violence.

Indeed, involvement in national affairs, particularly in the more intrusive way that has been the trend recently, is a potential political minefield for the United Nations. Whatever the constellation of forces that permits a UN peacekeeping operation to be mounted, the resolution of internal conflicts involves the apportionment of power among hostile parties with sometimes long histories of bloodshed and violence. Referenda have losers, as well as winners. And regardless of the "fairness" of an election, to the degree that the UN is involved, it runs the risk of being perceived by losing leaders and populations as a hostile force. Indeed, even dominant factions may come to perceive UN peacekeepers as having lost their impartiality if they remain involved in conflicts for protracted periods. Once such a perception of one-sidedness is established, of course, the UN's effectiveness is greatly hampered, as was made clear by Israel's rejection of a role for the UN in Middle East peace negotiations.

At other times, moreover, negotiated outcomes of conflicts may simply be rejected by losing factions, regardless of the solemnity of prior commitments; or upheavals can occur that bring new, more belligerent individuals to head previously cooperative groups. The UN is then stuck with a choice between ignominious withdrawal and persistence, the latter perhaps requiring coercive enforcement of a settlement. Such a step changes the nature of peacekeeping completely, as the UN learned in the Congo in 1960. It requires a different sort of commitment on the part of the nations contributing peacekeeping forces, as well as different kinds of equipment, training, command arrangements, and so forth.

In contemplating involvement in internal conflicts, UN and national officials must weigh the risks (of casualties and, indeed, failure) very carefully. Awareness of the risks (and the substantial monetary costs) helped account for the UN's phased deployment into both Yugoslavia and Cambodia, and its cautious insistence on a firm cease-fire and a signed settlement agreement, respectively, before committing large forces to these

former killing fields. Once considered "domestic" and beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations, such conflicts may increasingly pre-occupy the Organization and its field missions in coming years.

Although risky, such missions are still subject to the traditional requirement of all-round local consent to their deployment. There may be other situations, however, in which the nations of the world might wish the United Nations to be prepared to intervene even without the consent of some disputants. As suggested in figure one, such operations may grow out of humanitarian relief efforts, some of which may require protection from bandits, or from factions that violate humanitarian cease-fires to prey on relief shipments. The dispatch of UN guards to northern Iraq to protect relief workers may serve as a model for future UN-sanctioned, humanitarian interventions within a single nation where many people's lives are at risk. Although the guards' function was largely symbolic, it was nonetheless important; the real sanction against grosser forms of Iraqi government interference with international relief lay in the forces of Operation Provide Comfort II, the residuum of Gulf War coalition forces based just outside Iraqi borders.

The UN mission in northern Iraq followed a Chapter VII enforcement action. There may be future situations where the process is reversed, and a Chapter VII action arises from initial humanitarian efforts or to redress fundamental violations of basic human rights.

### **Addressing Violations of Human Rights**

Some argue that the UN should be prepared to intervene against particularly oppressive governments. Such an action might be justified, it is argued, on the basis of humanitarian concerns; most nations have subscribed to certain basic human rights in a variety of documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that have the force of law. If a government is grossly violating such principles and thus its international commitments, the international community has a right, indeed a responsibility, it is said, to intervene. Such an intervention, for example, could have saved millions of innocent lives in the case of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. The foreseeable international consequences of civil strife, such as refugee flows and environmental damage, might be another argument in favor of such partially-coercive UN interventions.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Such arguments can be found in: Charles R. Beitz, "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics," *International Organization* (1979), 405-24; Thomas W. Franck, "United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order," *N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics* (1990), 601-40; and W. Michael Reisman, "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law," *American Journal of International Law* (1990), 866-73. For other recent discussions see Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer, eds., *Law and*

There are no positive precedents for the initiation of such coercive UN operations, and they are not peacekeeping as usually defined. The Congo case evolved into a quasi-enforcement operation only after the UN had initiated a peacekeeping mission in a consensual situation; in hindsight, moreover, it was seen as a near-disaster for the Organization by virtually everyone involved. In a sense, UN humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq in support of the Kurds might be understood as such a precedent, but they are more properly seen, in our view, as a corollary of the enforcement action previously undertaken against Baghdad, since they are backed by the explicit commitments (and force deployments) of the UN coalition that previously ejected Iraq from Kuwait with the UN's blessing. In prior years, the Baghdad government took equally horrendous military action against its Kurdish population without evoking a similar international response.<sup>6</sup>

It is not difficult to foresee many situations around the globe in which ethnic minorities, or indeed whole populations, might face severe repression, if not genocide, if not protected by outside powers. In some cases, governments might be the source of oppression; in others, genocide might be threatened in the course of civil conflict among groups competing for government power (as in Somalia in late 1991).

When a government is the oppressing force, intervention would require interpreting severe abuse of human rights as an *a priori* threat to international peace and security able to trigger Security Council sanctions. Such interpretation would require, in turn, a different understanding of the nature and locus of sovereignty in the modern nation-state than that which informed the writers of the Charter. The Charter-writers made no assumption about the political basis of governments, nor did they place limits on their internal behavior. Once they were recognized by other countries, the actions of governments with respect to their own peoples were taken to be inviolate; state sovereignty was unchallenged.

In democratic states, however, sovereignty resides neither in an abstraction called the State, nor among a self-appointed elite or governing coalition, but with the governed themselves. When a group seizes control of governing institutions it does not seize sovereignty along with power -- that continues to reside with the people. And even when authority to

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*Force in the New International Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); and David P. Forsythe, *The Internationalization of Human Rights* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1991).

<sup>6</sup> "Chronology," *Middle East Journal* 43:1 (Winter 1989), 80-82. In the face of an Iraqi military offensive following the August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, roughly 56,000 Kurds fled into Turkey, and about 5,000 fled into Iran. Press reports charged Iraqi chemical weapons use against the Kurds. Baghdad denied the charges but also rejected a UN bid to investigate, claiming this was an exclusively domestic issue.

government is granted to officials through democratic processes, it is not unlimited; basic human rights and democratic principles bind the actions of governments regardless of how they have been empowered.

These principles, of course, are the political legacy of the European Enlightenment and its first concrete embodiment, the Constitution of the United States. However, Europe itself fought the Napoleonic Wars, two World Wars, and one Cold War before the principles of the Enlightenment, including democracy and popular sovereignty, came to be the dominant political force in, apparently, all of its nation-states.

This process is not nearly so far along in other parts of the world, most of which shared the Enlightenment only as an ideology taught cynically by colonial masters while they practiced far different principles of authoritarian government. Still, democratic principles are given lip-service, at least, in most parts of the world. Their gains in concrete terms are undeniable in Latin America and parts of Asia, and they have begun to take hold in Africa. The end of the Cold War, moreover, will make Western democracies less tolerant of narrowly-based authoritarian regimes whose professed anti-Communism previously would have been sufficient to ensure Western support, or at least tolerance. More importantly, most nations, as noted, have now subscribed in solemn international documents to certain basic human rights and principles of political behavior.

Should the United Nations become the sole enforcer of such commitments? Can it? Obviously not, except in the rarest of circumstances. In few situations are the rights and wrongs sufficiently clear, the transgressions sufficiently transparent, and the excesses sufficiently brutal to shock the global conscience and permit the formation of the international consensus necessary for the United Nations to act. In fewer still will circumstances be sufficiently poignant for national leaders to willingly risk the lives of their citizens who would make up the UN forces. When circumstances are correct, moreover, enforcing the international community's will would require far more than peacekeeping forces and peacekeeping functions. These are matters of peace enforcement and of collective security, as specified in Chapter VII of the Charter, requiring the commitment of UN member states to coercive military action.

If and when the Council is prepared to act in human rights situations, its first decisions may parallel its response to the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis, namely, passage of resolutions authorizing member states to take action on its behalf. Such an approach would avoid both the cost and complication of a UN-directed intervention force, as well as the need for a General Assembly budget vote to finance it. If aimed at only the most egregious of human rights abuses, moreover, such Council actions may find sufficient support in the Assembly to permit the subsequent dispatch of UN peacekeepers, not to participate in the enforcement action but to help

reconstruct the country and its political institutions when enforcement has run its course.<sup>7</sup>

Governments are a major source of rights violations, but not the only source. As old authoritarian regimes in the former socialist world and in the developing world continue to fold, the potential for ethnic conflicts within states will grow, and along with them, the potential for anarchy and terrorism. Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia provide only the most prominent recent examples. Requests for help from beleaguered sub-national groups could result in a number of expensive humanitarian operations whose cost will eventually cause the international community, and the UN, to face difficult questions that pit moral against fiscal responsibility. In advance of such requests, the Organization and its members need to devise tools and techniques for defusing ethnic tensions, especially within states -- a potentially important task for preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping that has received little attention.

Obviously, no rigid metric could be established to gauge the suitability of such UN intervention, no threshold of casualties or checklist of barbarism. A decision to intervene would depend upon the specific circumstances, the views of the great powers, and the views of the regional neighbors of the troubled state, who might well request UN intervention if the troubles were to produce substantial flows of refugees *and* they knew there was an alternative to simply watching events unfold.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The consequences of leaving the offending regime intact may be seen in the dénouement to the Gulf War. Having suppressed Shiite and Kurdish rebellions, the regime turned its efforts to delaying and obstructing the Special Commission charged with implementing UN sanctions against Iraq. See, for example, *New York Times*, June 15, 1991, A1; July 3, 1991, A21; and October 14, 1991, A6. See also Rep. Les Aspin, "Winning the War But Forgetting the Peace," White Paper (mimeo), December 19, 1991, esp. 13-22.

The United States and the international community avoided the hard question of whether to brand as illegitimate a regime as systematically aggressive and contemptuous of human rights as that of Saddam Hussein. The consequences of trying to remove the regime from power were deemed by the US government to be more disruptive of regional stability than trying to "de-fang" it by means of the Special Commission. See, "The Day We Stopped the War," *Newsweek*, January 20, 1992, esp. 16-25.

<sup>8</sup> Security Council Resolution 688 will undoubtedly be cited as precedent for future humanitarian actions. The resolution cites "repression... which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region." It further "[i]nsists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq..." and "appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts." (S/Res/688, April 5, 1991)

The Council's actions cue future victims of despotic governments to head for the border as the quickest route to international intervention, with media coverage, if at all possible. Live television coverage of the Kurds' plight on the mountains between Iraq and Turkey certainly helped to stimulate reluctant Western governments to intervene forcefully

There are ample cautionary lessons from history, however. In 1971, India took unilateral action to end massacres in East Pakistan and a massive influx of Bengali refugees by intervening militarily, an action that resulted in establishment of the independent state of Bangladesh. In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda to end the bloody rule of Idi Amin. Later the same year, Vietnam invaded Cambodia to end the even bloodier rule of the Khmer Rouge. All three interventions accomplished their immediate objectives, but none left particularly happy countries in their wake.

Moreover, he who saves someone's life may be obliged to sustain it. If the UN were to authorize, or at some point to itself organize, intervention in such circumstances of civil abuse, it must also be prepared to field a follow-up mission to repair the damage done and to help the society get back on its feet, lest the old cycle repeat itself (as happened, initially, in Uganda). In addition to the issue of international willingness to sanction the initial intervention, there would be the daunting question of cost, which would vary with the size of the country and the duration of the operation. Every reconstruction operation could cost several billion dollars and last several years.

Hopefully, however, such operations would only be required in the most extreme circumstances. Regional organizations can be encouraged and expected to take initial steps to reverse rights abuses, as the Organization of American States has done in the case of the Haitian military's ouster of President Bertrand Aristide. Early, relatively modest steps to right growing wrongs in a country may avert the need for later, stronger actions. But to facilitate such steps, states must be willing to view global affairs as more than a set of relations, rights, and privileges among states. In the economic sphere, states follow international trade rules, and acquiesce to the "austerity" requirements attached to International Monetary Fund development programs. It is not too much to ask of states that they follow certain basic norms of decency toward their populations, or be held responsible.

## THE NEED FOR REFORM

The opportunity now presents itself for greater UN involvement in international affairs as a positive force for peace, democracy, and human rights. The Organization is grappling with a growing list of responsibilities just with respect to peacekeeping, and is hard-pressed to keep up, administratively, financially, and operationally. However, major reform can

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on their behalf, much as it has stimulated volunteer contributions for past victims of disaster or famine. Despots' awareness of the impact of television coverage will in turn make life more dangerous for media crews in future crises.

only occur when the majority of UN members, and all of the veto-wielding major powers, agree that the time is ripe for it. Through the end of 1991, their collective interest seemed more rhetorical than real.

The results of the Security Council "summit" held at the end of January 1992 suggest that the situation may be changing. The summit declaration stressed "the importance of strengthening and improving" the effectiveness of the UN, and asked Secretary General Boutros Ghali to submit a report within six months on ways to enhance "the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking, and for peacekeeping." As a first step, the Secretary General has moved to reorganize major elements of the UN Secretariat (they are discussed further in the following section).<sup>9</sup>

To substantially improve the UN's capacity in the realm of peace and security, member states will need to change the way they view the Organization. They will need to give it greater ability to watch for and react to impending conflict. While scrutinizing the direct costs of peacekeeping missions, they will need to keep in mind the greater costs (such as further strife) that UN action may avert, and the wider benefits (such as democratic reform) that it fosters. Both are hard to place on balance sheets. Past suggestions for reform have died because perceptions of the risk of change have exceeded the liabilities of the status quo. One can only hope that with revolutionary change sweeping Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and other parts of the world, the international community's premier organization will itself become more open to reform.

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<sup>9</sup> "Security Council Summit Declaration," *New York Times*, February 1, 1992, 4.



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## LESSONS LEARNED

What does peacekeeping do for conflicting parties that they can't do for themselves? Why does it work, when does it work, and what are the circumstances that make it work? Understanding the dynamics of successful peacekeeping will permit us to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the current system, and to make recommendations for its improvement.

Peacekeeping adds to the self-help system of international politics a formal element of disinterested outside assistance that can aid conflicting local parties to disengage. The specific tasks of peacekeeping missions may involve, in ascending order of complexity and intrusiveness, the uncovering of the facts of a conflict, monitoring border or buffer zones after armistice agreements have been signed, verification of agreed-upon force disengagements or withdrawals, supervision of the disarming and demobilization of local forces, maintenance of security conditions essential to the conduct of elections, and even the temporary, transitional administration of countries.<sup>1</sup>

By observing both sides' behavior, reporting on what they see, and resolving violations before they generate local military reactions, peacekeeping forces can assure conflicting parties, for example, that a cease-fire will remain a cease-fire. Among other things, peacekeeping forces can verify that one side's willingness to lay down arms is reciprocated by the other, that election processes are free from bias and voter intimidation, and that election outcomes are valid reflections of votes cast.

Peacekeeping operations derive their power from local perceptions of the impartiality and moral authority of their sponsoring organization, from their ability to dispel misinformation that could otherwise lead to renewed conflict and, a most important element historically, from the supportive role of the great powers. Particularly important for UN missions has been the support of the United States.

The political and military ambitions of peacekeeping operations have ranged from treating the symptoms of wars (by establishing and sustaining cease-fires and force disengagements) to implementing political settlements that treat the causes of conflict. The complexity of the political context in which these objectives have been pursued has varied

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<sup>1</sup> Holst's typology of missions is somewhat similar: observation, reporting, prevention of incursions, supervision of implementation of agreements, disarmament of contestants, and decompression of tensions. Johan Jørgen Holst, "Enhancing Peacekeeping Operations," *Survival* (May-June 1990), 265-266.

considerably, from two-nation border disputes to conflicts involving intertwined strands of territoriality, ethnicity, and religion -- three ingrained sources of collective human discord that produce deeply-felt and therefore tenacious disputes. Because the widely accepted doctrine of sovereign equality among states often delays international intercession until, in the words of the UN Charter, such quarrels become a widely recognized "threat to international peace and security," peacekeeping forces have tended not to be deployed until either the local parties have fought themselves to stalemate or exhaustion, or the interests of powerful outsiders have been placed at risk.

What follows is as systematic an assessment of past peacekeeping operations as its variegated practice permits. We look in this section at how the UN becomes involved in peacekeeping and why; at how local and international political support, the nature of the conflict, the quality of initial information, and the political marching orders, or mandate, given to the force affect the feasibility and effectiveness of operations; and at how issues relating to administration and planning, command and control, equipment and training affect the ability of peacekeepers to do their jobs.

## **SOURCES OF INVOLVEMENT**

The manner in which the UN becomes involved in a mission affects its structure, objectives, and likelihood of success. Of the 22 UN operations studied for this report, about one-fourth resulted from Security Council initiatives to staunch a conventional conflict. Another one-fourth originated with an independent request for UN assistance by the local parties to a conflict; all of these were made in the first half of the Cold War, and involved situations best characterized as disputes over local political control. Fully one-half of all UN peacekeeping operations, some old, but most of them new, grew out of agreements brokered by third parties that sought UN assistance in implementation. The United States participated in brokering seven of these eleven cases. (See table four for missions categorized by source of UN involvement.)

### **Security Council Initiatives**

In six cases, the Council has taken the initiative to demand the conclusion of cease-fires in major regional conflicts and has followed up by dispatching UN peacekeeping operations. Those initiatives have all come in response to wars in the Middle East, including three of the four Arab-Israeli wars, the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the two recent Persian Gulf wars. The first Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948 led to the establishment of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO); the second, in 1956, led to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), the first armed

**Table 4 Sources of Peacekeeping Operations**

Council Initiatives	Brokered Requests	
<p>War for Palestine, 1948 (UN Truce Supervisory Organization)</p> <p>Suez Crisis, 1956 (UN Emergency Force I)</p> <p>October War, 1973 (UNEF II, Sinai, UN and US also mediated)</p> <p>Operation Litani, 1978 (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)</p> <p>Iran-Iraq War, 1980-88 (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group)</p> <p>Gulf War, 1990-91 (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission)</p>	<p>West New Guinea, 1962 (UN Transitional Executive Authority, US mediated)</p> <p>Yemen Civil War, 1963 (UN Yemen Observer Mission, US and UN mediated)</p> <p>October War, 1973 (UN Disengagement Observer Force, Golan, US mediated)</p> <p>Afghan Civil War, 1988 (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, UN mediated, Soviet withdrawal)</p> <p>Angola Civil War, 1988 (UN Angola Verification Mission I, US mediated, Cuban withdrawal)</p> <p>Namibian Independence, 1989-90 (UN Transition Assistance Group, Western Contact Group initiative, US mediated)</p>	<p>Conflict in Central America, 1989-91 (UN Operation in Cent. America, support Esquipulas II accord, demobilize Nicaraguan Resistance)</p> <p>El Salvador Civil War, 1990- (UN Operation in El Salvador, UN mediated)</p> <p>Angola Civil War, 1991- (UN Angola Verification Mission II, Portugal-US-Soviet mediated)</p> <p>W. Sahara referendum, 1991- (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, UN mediated)</p> <p>Cambodia Civil War, 1991 (UN Advance Mission and UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, Perm Five initiative)</p>
<p><b>Local Initiatives</b></p>		
<p>Greek Civil War, 1947 (UN Special Committee on the Balkans, Greece requests)</p> <p>Kashmir Dispute, 1948 (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, India requests)</p> <p>Lebanon Crisis, 1958 (UN Observer Group in Lebanon, Lebanon requests)</p> <p>Congo Crisis, 1960 (UN Operation in the Congo, Congo requests)</p> <p>Cyprus Dispute, 1964 (UN Force in Cyprus, Cyprus and UK request)</p>		

peacekeeping mission, deployed in the Sinai following the Suez Crisis. The Israeli Defense Force drove through the remnants of UNEF in June 1967 at the start of the third Arab-Israeli war, and from 1967 to 1973 the UN presence between Arabs and Israelis was limited to the still-deployed, unarmed UNTSO observers. The fourth Arab-Israeli war, in October 1973, led to deployment of UNEF II, which helped implement a Security Council cease-fire devised by the US and USSR, and later supervised a US-brokered separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces. Similar mediation by the United States led to a 1974 agreement to separate Syrian and Israeli forces and to a spin-off operation, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights.<sup>2</sup>

In March 1978, the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon sparked a US-sponsored Security Council resolution that called for a cease-fire, Israeli withdrawal, and a peacekeeping operation called the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to supervise both. Ten years later, a Council-mandated cease-fire created the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG), which supervised the separation of Iraqi and Iranian forces along their 1,400-kilometer frontier. UNIMOG's work wound down after Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait and formally ended as UN-sanctioned military operations to reverse that invasion began. Many of UNIMOG's assets were redeployed a few months later to the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), whose task it was to monitor the buffer zone established between Kuwait and Iraq by Security Council Resolution 687.

All of the operations initiated by the Security Council have involved "traditional" peacekeeping: Military units were sent to separate forces, monitor borders, and to investigate, mediate, and report on cease-fire violations. Usually dispatched in the immediate aftermath of major wars, they have rarely had the benefit of either long-range planning or a peace settlement, and have been primarily holding actions intended to prevent renewed outbreaks of fighting. The effectiveness of four of the six operations was ended by new conflicts. Only one of the operations (UNEF II) ended with a peace accord, the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, while a second (UNIKOM) is only ten months old at this writing, and its ultimate fate still undetermined. As an outgrowth of a Chapter VII collective security enforcement action, however, UNIKOM has unique parentage and unique military support by the great powers, and is thus likely to fulfill its limited border-monitoring mandate successfully.

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<sup>2</sup> UNDOF remains in place. UNEF II would still be in the Sinai, helping to implement the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, but for Soviet objections at the time. When its mandate expired in 1979, UNEF II's role was filled, *ad interim*, by the U.S. Sinai Support Mission, a group of civilian observers and technicians originally tasked to monitor the Midi and Gitla passes. In early 1982, the Sinai monitoring role passed to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), discussed below.

### **Unbrokered Local Requests**

Independent requests for UN peacekeepers from local parties were more prominent in earlier decades than they are today. In 1947, Greece asked for UN observers to investigate outside arms shipments to Greek Communist guerrilla forces. In 1948, India sought UN condemnation of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir. A small force, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was dispatched and remains there today, after more than 40 years. In 1958, Lebanon asked the UN to document infiltration of arms and insurgents from Syria. The UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) withdrew within six months when the immediate crisis passed. In July 1960, leaders of the newly-independent Congo issued several calls for UN assistance to repel "external aggression" when army mutinies threatened internal order and triggered Belgian military moves to safeguard European lives and property in the former Belgian colony. That operation lasted four years. Finally, communal strife in Cyprus in early 1964, and the country's refusal to accept a NATO peacekeeping force, led its Greek Cypriot-dominated government, along with Cyprus' guarantor power and former colonial master Great Britain, to request establishment of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which remains there today.

Two of these cases (Greece and the Congo) involved civil conflicts that were seen to have major Cold War implications. Aid to Greek insurgent forces was believed to be coming from Greece's Communist northern neighbors, and the strife-torn Congo was considered at the time to be a looming battleground between East and West in their contest for influence among the emerging new states of sub-Saharan Africa. Two other cases, Lebanon and Cyprus, involved civil conflicts with religious roots far deeper than the Cold War, but the US and its allies supported the dispatch of peacekeeping missions to maintain political stability and thus minimize Soviet influence. Troubles in Jammu and Kashmir also had religious as well as political origins in the struggles between Hindus and Muslims to sort out the boundaries of their respective states in a region that, from the late 18th century until 1947, had been British-ruled India.

With the exception of Kashmir, therefore, UN responses to independent requests for peacekeeping forces served primarily the West's interests in regional stability. This perceived bias was one reason for Soviet hostility to peacekeeping prior to 1986, and an important constraint on the potential of the UN system to contribute to world peace.

The new policies of the USSR made these issues moot, making possible, on the one hand, a far greater role for UN peacekeeping. On the other hand, with the anti-Soviet, anti-Communist motivation removed, Western willingness to become involved in such situations is much reduced.

The US showed great initial reluctance to support UN involvement in Croatia, for example. The UN itself did not move to end fratricidal violence in Somalia until the carnage reached epic proportions. Perhaps most telling of all, the political and economic situation in Zaire at the end of 1991 was roughly as chaotic as in mid-1960, and in many ways eerily parallel (mutinous soldiers, threats to foreigners, collapsing infrastructure, paralyzed government), but the upheavals have not yet produced "ONUC II."

### **Brokered Requests**

This category includes half of all the peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations; most began after 1987. The first one, the UN Transitional Executive Authority (UNTEA), stepped between the Netherlands and Indonesia to assist the transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control over a seven-month period in 1962-63. The bilateral agreement authorizing UNTEA was a product of talks brokered by then-retired US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, serving officially as the Special Representative of the Secretary General. Bunker was subsequently also involved, along with UN Under-Secretary General Ralph Bunche, in mediating a Saudi-Egyptian dispute involving the two countries' material support to opposite sides in the Yemeni civil war. An agreement to cease that assistance called for the UN Yemen Observer Force (UNYOM), which was duly dispatched in July 1963.

The US role in separating forces after the October 1973 Middle East War has already been noted. After that came a 14-year gap in brokered requests for UN peacekeeping operations. This gap resulted in large part from the continuing decay in US-Soviet relations that saw increased Soviet activism in regional conflicts, and increasingly assertive US responses. During this period, the United States tried peacekeeping missions outside UN channels, sometimes getting it right but other times straying into miscalculated efforts to enforce preferred solutions to local conflicts. The Multinational Force and Observers, for example, is a US-led organization jointly supported by US, Egyptian, and Israeli funds that successfully deployed in January 1982 to monitor the Sinai under a protocol to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. It remains a quiet success. Similarly, the first Multinational Force (MNF) for Lebanon, composed of US, French, and Italian troops, grew out of talks mediated by US presidential representative Philip Habib. MNF successfully monitored the withdrawal from Lebanon of Palestinian (and some Syrian) fighters pinned in Beirut by the rapid advance of Israeli forces in the summer of 1982. It then quickly departed, only to return just as quickly in the wake of massacres of Palestinian civilians by Christian Phalangist militiamen. French and American units of "MNF II" soon became too closely identified with Lebanon's Christian government, however, and in October 1983, both

French and US contingents became targets of suicide bombers, with heavy losses of lives, and several months later withdrew from the country, their mission incomplete.

By 1988, the end of the Cold War facilitated a series of agreements, some settling longstanding disputes, others permitting the graceful -- and verified -- withdrawal of foreign forces from regional conflicts. UN peacekeeping operations to observe such withdrawals included the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which monitored Soviet withdrawals from Afghanistan in 1988-89, and the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), which did the same for Cuba's withdrawal from Angola. The Soviet pull-out was based on regional multilateral agreements mediated by the UN in Geneva. The Cuban pull-out was based formally on a bilateral agreement between Cuba and Angola signed in late 1988, one result of a long US mediation effort that included Angola, Cuba, and South Africa (whose forces had withdrawn from Angola the previous year).

Other recent agreements calling for UN assistance include Esquipulas II, the Central American Presidents' vehicle for conflict resolution in that region. The UN's first operation in Central America (ONUCA) was deployed in late 1989 in support of that accord. UN mediation also produced the UN Operation in El Salvador (ONUSAL), a multi-part mission to monitor and investigate human rights issues. Starting in January 1992, ONUSAL's mandate was enlarged to monitor a cease-fire in that country's 12-year civil war, leading toward implementation of an accord that will demobilize guerrilla forces and reintegrate them into national life. Finally, a 1989 initiative by the five permanent members of the Security Council, brokered through the Paris Conference on Cambodia, led to authorization of a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), designed to rebuild the country and oversee its transition to democratic rule. Such settlements allow peacekeeping operations to be more than temporary palliatives.

In every instance in which there has been a political settlement, the conflicting parties' objectives have changed from winning *everything* to a more modest objective, winning *something*. Openness to settlement may stem from stalemate on the battlefield or from the mutual exhaustion of the local parties, which leads them to look more favorably at alternatives to fighting. Movement toward a deal may also be a function of pressures exerted by outside powers who see their own interests placed at risk by continued conflict.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the source of the shift, the parties reach

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<sup>3</sup> Brian Urquhart, "International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the Twentieth Anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's Death," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1981), 11.

Arrangements motivated solely by outside pressure, however, are unlikely to

the conclusion that pure victory is unattainable, and, equally important, that settling for less than total victory does not mean risking total defeat.

Non-coercive, third-party peace *making*, or mediation, can play a crucial role in this process. Intermediaries can bring in new ideas and facilitate communications between the parties without requiring politically difficult face-to-face talks. Of course, where one party does not recognize the legal existence of the other, any progress made in indirect talks may be illusory. The case of Western Sahara is illustrative. Through six years of UN mediation, and right through the initial deployments of the UN's referendum-conducting team, Morocco refused to recognize the Polisario independence movement as anything more than an internal phenomenon, even though Polisario's state-in-exile had been accorded diplomatic recognition by many African countries. Morocco's calculus of victory clearly had not yet been altered.

Mediation cannot produce peace overnight, particularly where the perceptions of the local parties are conditioned by years, and occasionally centuries of ethnic, religious, or national grievances, as in the Middle East. Yet, mediation has produced peace over time, especially when shifts in external support have paralleled battlefield exhaustion. The Namibia mediation effort, for example, was begun by the so-called Western Contact Group in the 1970s.<sup>4</sup> It stalled in the early 1980s, but finally bore fruit late in the decade, when a combination of rising costs (on South Africa's part), dwindling outside support (on Angola's part), and the opportunity to achieve through diplomacy what combat could not, led Angola, South Africa, and Cuba to agree to their mutual withdrawals from Angola, South African withdrawal from Namibia, and a UN-supervised transition to Namibian independence.<sup>5</sup>

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produce durable settlements, as the shifts in the local political calculus that they induce are likely to be expedient and temporary, rather than fundamental.

<sup>4</sup> Canada, France, (then-West) Germany, United Kingdom, and the United States.

<sup>5</sup> South Africa's original stake in control of Namibia changed as its *apartheid* policies relaxed under domestic and international pressure, and as the financial and human costs of maintaining forces in Angola increased. The decline of Soviet activism and influence in the Third World also reduced South Africa's perceived need to buffer itself against encroaching Communist influence. Cuba agreed to leave Angola after South Africa pulled back and promised to leave Namibia as well. In a real sense, the settlement allowed all sides to declare victory and go home, except for SWAPO, which went home and then declared victory, although its percentage in the constitutional elections monitored by the UN fell short of a controlling two-thirds.



## **POLITICAL SUPPORT**

Peacekeeping operations require complementary political support from the great powers, and from the local parties. If either is missing, or deficient, an operation may never get underway, or may fail to achieve its potential once deployed.

### **Great Power Support**

The changing face of UN peacekeeping is a function of the changing nature of international relations at the great power level. A few past peacekeeping operations benefitted from the tactical confluence of US and Soviet regional interests, as in the case of the October 1973 War and the establishment of UNEF II, when both sides wanted the fighting to end, or in the case of West New Guinea, where both sides backed Indonesian claims, although for different reasons. In the last few years, however, Moscow and Washington have consistently followed complementary foreign policies, and the positive results have been apparent in southern Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and most visibly, in the Persian Gulf.

US support has been an absolute prerequisite for peacekeeping in the past. In 45 years of UN operations, all that have gone forward have had US support; while some of those that have been stillborn suffered from a lack of such support. Nicaraguan requests for observers to monitor the activities of Contra guerrillas, for example, or France's proposal to have UN troops secure the PLO's withdrawal from Beirut in 1982, were both blocked by the United States. As it demonstrated in the run-up to the Gulf War, Washington can marshal an awesome array of political, military, and financial resources when its governmental machinery is bent to the task.

In the new era, US leadership may sometimes be most effective when exercised quietly, behind the scenes, in concert with other powers. Such efforts can and have spelled the difference between success or failure of peacekeeping missions at critical junctures.

For example, when deployment of the military component of UNTAG was delayed in late March 1989, fighters of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) poured into Namibia from their bases in Angola, threatening the settlement agreement. UNTAG's leaders felt compelled to let South African military forces leave their Namibian bases to contain the incursion, which resulted in several hundred casualties. Only intercession by the Joint Commission of Angolan, Cuban, and South African officials established by their tripartite agreement of December 1988, on which US and Soviet officials sat as interested observers, brought the fighting to a halt, induced SWAPO to withdraw with promises of safe

passage back into Angola, and allowed the peacekeeping mission to proceed. Quiet US leadership was exerted in this action. Even if UN forces had been fully deployed in Namibia at the time, it is not clear that they would have been willing or able to accost SWAPO, let alone throw themselves between SWAPO's fighters and South African guns. The political leverage of the Joint Commission proved decisive, and a similar Commission is now watching over the implementation of Angola's more recent settlement of its internal conflict.

### **Local Support**

Such support by the great powers, and especially the Security Council's five permanent members, although necessary for successful peacekeeping, is far from sufficient. "Consent of the local parties," although recited often enough to appear a cliché, is also crucial if an operation is to be both politically effective and financially supportable. Peacekeeping is cheap compared to war because it does not require such expensive military accoutrements as armored brigades, advanced air forces, or 30-day supplies of smart munitions. Peacekeepers don't require such things because they don't have to force their way into disputed territory; they are invited to deploy there with the consent of local parties. Consent also makes peacekeeping operations more effective politically, because they can build trust faster with parties who want them than with parties who don't, or parties who are ambivalent.

Impartiality is important to maintain local consent. When it falters, the consequences can be fatal, as happened to MNF II in Beirut. But impartiality itself, in the views of some partisan observers, may be evidence of bias (as in, "he who is not with me, is against me").

Iran, for example, treated UNIIMOG with marked suspicion. Part of UNIIMOG's difficulties could be attributed to Teheran's initial lack of familiarity with UN peacekeeping, and to a general wariness of foreigners "spying" near its most sensitive military dispositions. Iraq had the benefit of Egyptian briefings about what to expect before UN personnel arrived, and Iran had no such coaching. But continuing Iranian suspiciousness suggests a more fundamental disconnect than unclear initial expectations.

Iran was suspicious of all outside UN communications, and especially suspicious of communication links between UNIIMOG elements in Iran and those in Iraq, concerned perhaps that military secrets derived from UN inspections were being funnelled to Iraqi authorities. As a result, Iranian officials impounded the operation's main INTELSTAT transmission dish, used to talk to New York, and shut down the smaller INMARSAT terminal used to communicate with UNIIMOG-Baghdad. Ground observers assigned to the Iranian side of the international border were not permitted

to cross into Iraq, nor observers on the far side to cross into Iran. Indeed, ground observers were restricted to a very narrow strip of border zone, and generally not allowed to venture inland. Even when permission came down from Tehran to allow such visits, local commanders often failed to act on it. And observers were usually accompanied by members of a specially-raised, politically correct group of escort-interpreters.

Restrictions applied to air patrols as well. The UN was forbidden to bring any of its own observation helicopters into Iran, and suitable Iranian helicopters were not always available when needed. Having had only their removable doors painted "UN white," they could be reassigned to military tasks on short notice.

Unhappiness with peacekeeping operations may be even more pronounced when a local party feels that its arm was twisted to accept the operation. When that party is particularly well-armed, the peacekeepers' mission can become impossible, as happened to UNIFIL. Never fully accepted by Israel, UNIFIL was not able to extend its area of operations to the Lebanese-Israeli border (nor, to be strictly fair, into Palestinian strongholds around Tyre). In 1982, UNIFIL was brushed aside by Israel's re-invasion of Lebanon, and today has a limited role and limited freedom of movement, even within its nominal area of operations. Israel might have supported the operation had UNIFIL been willing and able to seal its area to all "armed elements" hostile to Israel, meaning Palestinians and extremist Lebanese factions, at the risk of firefights and continuing casualties. Dissatisfied with UNIFIL, Israel retained the Lebanese proxy force it had created to enforce "security," as it saw it, in southern Lebanon. After its troops withdrew from Lebanon they left behind a "security zone," patrolled by their proxies, that overlapped UNIFIL's area to a significant degree, especially near the Syrian border. Both developments have made life difficult for the UN peacekeepers.<sup>6</sup>

In some cases, certain armed groups may be less than happy to see peacekeepers appear. Like El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), they may perceive the UN force to be deployed against their interests. The five Central American presidents' Esquipulas II accord called for an end to cross-border arms aid to insurgent movements in the region, and a UN force deployed there (ONUCA) had the job of monitoring regional compliance. Particularly after the Nicaraguan Contras demobilized, the FMLN felt (rightly, in fact) that ONUCA's principal

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<sup>6</sup> Most recently, exchanges of fire between Iranian-supported Hezbollah fighters and the Israeli Defense Force escalated into a 24-hour Israeli ground incursion that pushed through UNIFIL checkpoints to engage Hezbollah within the UN's area of operations. Several peacekeepers were wounded. *New York Times*, February 16, 1992, 3; February 17, 1992, A1; February 18, 1992, A8; February 22, 1992, A1. *Washington Post*, February 21, 1992, A1.

remaining mission was to abet the shutdown of FMLN arms supplies. ONUCA's leadership was told that the FMLN did not want to see any of ONUCA's white Toyotas or UN helicopters on or over its areas of influence -- and they didn't. When the Salvadoran conflict reached the stage, in the summer of 1991, where a settlement seemed possible, an entirely separate UN operation was established to help implement it. And when eleventh-hour negotiations in New York at the end of 1991 produced a peace accord, ONUCA was immediately terminated and most of its personnel and equipment were transferred to the new operation, ONUSAL.

In Afghanistan, government forces and the *mujahedeen* fought on while the UN monitored the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces. As the guerrillas were neither party to the withdrawal agreement nor much interested in making UNGOMAP's job easy, the UN's observers did not venture much into the field. In Angola, a similar withdrawal agreement covering Cuban forces was somewhat easier to verify because guerrilla forces there recognized that interfering with UN personnel would not benefit their cause.

In sum, peacekeeping missions don't get off the ground without great power support, and they don't do well *on* the ground without local consent. The more complex the local situation, the more opportunities to lose the consent, or the trust, of one or more parties. When that happens, the operation is in jeopardy. A peacekeeping mission that loses a substantial element of local support can no longer do its original job.

## GROUND TRUTH, MANDATE, AND FEASIBILITY

The characteristics of the field situation, what peacekeepers call the "ground truth," carry their own implications for the success or failure of a mission. A border war presents UN forces with one set of circumstances, an internal struggle a different one. In this section, we look at the impact of "ground truth" and how an operation is instructed to deal with it, that is, its mandate.

### Quality of Initial Information

It is frequently said by people with field experience in peacekeeping that the first six weeks of an operation are the most critical. In that period, the force must organize itself and present a credible face to local parties, whose leaders will be looking for reasons not to trust the outsiders, and whose lower-level cadres may be prone to challenge them face-to-face.

We divided peacekeeping missions roughly according to the initial level of information available to the peacekeepers about the situation into

which they were about to deploy. For some missions, there are specific indications of the quality of information available. In some cases there were fact-finding missions sent out prior to the deployment and there is independent information on the relevance of those missions' information to the actual situation faced by the deploying force. For other missions, our assessment of the quality of the information is deduced from the amount of time available between official awareness that a mission was in the offing and the actual field deployment.

In discussing the level of information, we are concerned primarily with tangibles. Political information at New York headquarters might be excellent, for example, but logistical or other field information vital to deployment of a force may still be poor to non-existent. Such information would include, for example, the strengths and dispositions of the local parties' forces, the locations of minefields, the state of the local transportation network -- roads, bridges, airfields -- and availability of basic mission support (housing, water, food). Table five lists missions that deployed with "poor" initial information; table six lists missions with "good" information.

The UN has been able to succeed in operations with poor initial information when key parties really wanted the operation to succeed. In Afghanistan and Angola, for example, the withdrawing forces really wanted to gain international credit for their withdrawals, and UN oversight was seen as the key to their receiving that credit. Thus, although UN observers arrived in both countries with no detailed advance information as to Soviet or Cuban force dispositions, they were able to monitor withdrawals through major points of departure from the countries and, at least in Angola, to undertake spot inspections of former base areas to verify that Cuban troops had indeed departed.<sup>7</sup> In both cases, the withdrawing countries ensured that there was no suspicion of unobserved activity by providing all necessary information on the ground.

Some peacekeeping operations succeed despite poor initial information because troop contributing countries want them to succeed. Their military reputations (and in some cases the lives of their troops) are

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<sup>7</sup> In Afghanistan, continuing artillery and rocket attacks in the countryside and more than 600 minefields left by the departing Soviets in the care of the Afghan Army kept UN observers from venturing into the field to verify a majority of Soviet departures from their 18 field garrisons, although count was kept of departures by air from Shindand air base, and via road at the border towns of Hayratan and Torghundi.

Moreover, due to the fighting and its small size (50 observers), UNGOMAP could not effectively investigate more than a handful of the 8,862 complaints lodged by Afghanistan and Pakistan with respect to border incursions or interference in one another's affairs. UNGOMAP was notable for its lack of impact on the regional security equation beyond monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Table 5 Impact of "Poor" Initial Information on Mission Performance

OPERATION	PLANNING TIME	MISSION MILITARY OUTCOME
UNEF I (Sinai, 1956-67)	Days. Units sent to Suez ahead of ground transport.	Success for 10 years, withdrawn at Egyptian request before June War.
UNOGIL (Lebanon, 1958)	Days. Borrowed staff from other nearby field missions.	Unable to verify arms infiltration; permitted early withdrawal of US Marines.
ONUC (Congo, 1960-64)	Hours to days. Units arrived before command structure, logistics or long-distance communications were set up.	Eventual partial success. Katanga secession ended, but not Congo's political instability.
UNTEA (W. New Guinea, 1962-63)	Months. Seconded observer group followed by Pakistani infantry.	Success after slow start. Political transition.
UNEF II (Sinai, 1973-79)	Days.	Success. Egypt-Israel separation of forces.
UNIFIL (Lebanon, 1978-)	Days to weeks. Initial deployments haphazard.	Marginal impact on military situation, useful in humanitarian terms.
MNF II (Lebanon, Sept. 1982-Spring 1984)	Days. Poor understanding of local political dynamics.	Failure. Elements came to be seen as partisan.
UNGOMAP (Afghanistan, 1988-89)	Days. Arrived without maps or knowledge of Soviet dispositions.	Success, but only as a withdrawal monitor, not as investigator of Afghan or Pakistani complaints.
UNIIMOG (Iran-Iraq, 1988-91)	Weeks. Two survey missions just prior to deployment.	Success, but due in part to pressure from Iraq's next war in Kuwait.
UNAVEM I (Angola, 1989-91)	Months. Mission lacked disposition data on Cuban forces until it deployed.	Success. Good cooperation from Cuba and Angolan government.

staked to the outcome of the mission. Instances where troop contributors themselves have helped to salvage a mission initiated with incomplete information include ONUCA, where prior operational plans had to be discarded once headquarters personnel deployed to Honduras, trucks had to be scrounged from the UN's air unit and the civilian economy because the operation's infantry battalion arrived without its promised ground transport, and extra helicopters had to be cajoled from the UN supply system to support 20,000 unanticipated Nicaraguan Contras.<sup>8</sup> Similar horror stories may be elicited about other missions.

On the other hand, badly conceived operations may fail despite good information (see table six). The field information necessary to deploy the UN's mission to Yemen in 1963, for example, was obtained by its commander some weeks before deployment. But the operation's mandate, the meager amount of money and equipment allotted to it relative to the commander's requests, and the low level of Saudi and Egyptian commitment to the agreement that created it doomed the operation even before it deployed.

In some cases, confidence-building with the host nation may be prerequisite to confidence-building across a hostile border. In cases where a local party is not convinced that the UN's presence is a good thing, good field information and advance information *for the local parties* about what the UN does, why it needs freedom of movement in its area of operation, and how it will handle the information that it gathers, can be crucially important to successful start-ups and to a mission's longer-term effectiveness.

High quality initial information may be most important in the case of a multi-component operation that deploys on a time-limited mission. It has basically one chance to do its job. If its information is faulty, the result can be fatal to mission members, due to uncharted minefields or unappreciated local sensitivities, or even fatal to the mission itself.

Because it lacks intelligence-gathering facilities of its own, the UN relies on informal information sharing by member states, along with its own tactical survey teams, to generate mission planning data. Reforms begun in

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<sup>8</sup> The UN initially assumed that the Contras would demobilize at their foreign bases, where their families lived, and then former fighters and families would be returned to Nicaragua. Instead, after the opposition's unexpected electoral victory in February 1990, the Contra leadership insisted upon return to Nicaragua first, with demobilization to follow. This necessitated the creation of "security zones" inside Nicaragua to ensure the separation of Contra and Sandinista forces. Venezuela's infantry battalion patrolled the perimeters of the security zones and destroyed the guns turned in by Contra fighters (each of whom turned in one personal weapon). The voluntary demobilization was conducted by the Central American Presidents' International Verification Committee (CIAV).

Table 6 Impact of "Good" Initial Information on Mission Performance

OPERATION	PLANNING TIME	MISSION MILITARY OUTCOME
UNSCOB (Greece, 1947-51)	Months	Largely irrelevant.
UNTSO (Palestine, 1949-)	Weeks to months	Marginal impact after initial period; ignored by Israel.
UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan, 1949-)	Weeks to months	Marginal impact after initial period; ignored by India since 1971.
UNYOM (Yemen, 1963-64)	Weeks	Failure. Underfunded, undermined, circumvented.
UNFICYP (Cyprus, 1964-)	Days to weeks	Success for 10 years, overrun/reconstituted.
UNDOF (Golan, 1974-)	Weeks to months	Success.
MFO (Sinai, 1982-)	Months	Success.
MNF I (Lebanon, August 1982)	Days. Probably good intelligence from US and/or Israeli sources.	Success. Oversaw evacuation of Palestinian fighters.
UNTAG (Namibia, 1989-90)	Months to years	Success after rocky start.
ONUSCA (Central America, 1989-91)	Days to weeks. Made new plans after deployment. Plans for securing and demobilizing Contras made on the fly.	Partial success.
UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait, 1991-)	Weeks to months. Not clear that lead time was well-utilized.	Likely success.
MINURSO (W. Sahara, 1991-)	Years	(New mission.)
ONUSAL (El Salvador, 1991-)	Months to years	(New mission.)
UNTAC (Cambodia, 1991-)	Months to years	(New mission.)



1988 to improve the SG's access to information included establishment of an information unit, the Office of Research and Collection of Information (ORCI), headed by an Assistant Secretary General, which was intended to gather and correlate data from open sources and from other UN agencies. But ORCI had few staffers and even less money, a handful of desktop computers, and no common data protocol permitting it to access the reporting of UN field organizations like UNICEF, or the UN Development Program, which has offices and Resident Representatives in more than 100 developing countries.<sup>9</sup>

In the last two years, the Secretariat has attempted to leave permanent, quasi-diplomatic missions behind when peacekeeping operations fold their tents. The first such offices were created in Kabul, Islamabad, Tehran, and Baghdad after UNGOMAP and UNIIMOG were terminated.<sup>10</sup> The great powers complain of the expense and the duplication, claiming that what the UN needs to know about regional situations it can learn second-hand from them. This stance is obviously self-serving: Since information is power, a better-informed Secretariat could be a more powerful and independent international player, and that might be viewed by some states as a threatening development.

### **Clarity and Ambition of the Mandate**

Although studies of peacekeeping often note the importance of a clear, feasible set of marching orders, or mandate, for a successful peacekeeping operation, the attitudes of the local parties and support of the great powers, as suggested above, seem to be more important determinants of a mission's likely success. An ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make a straightforward mission difficult, or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world cannot make an impossible mission more doable. It merely paints the impossible task in higher-contrast colors.

Mandates tend to reflect the political play in the Security Council. Ambiguous mandates are often a sign that the great powers' perceived interests in the situation diverge, but each of the potential veto-wielders is willing to go along with the operation for the time being, so long as its duties are fudged.<sup>11</sup> It is this fragile political consensus behind the

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<sup>9</sup> ORCI was disestablished as a free standing Office by the SG's reform of February 7, 1992, its functions shifted to a segment of the new Department of Political Affairs.

<sup>10</sup> The Offices of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) and the United Nations Offices of the Secretary General in Iran and Iraq (UNOSGII).

<sup>11</sup> Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace," *Political Science Quarterly* 103:3 (1988), 497.

operation, and not the ambiguity of its instructions per se, that may endanger a field force should its operational circumstances deteriorate. In such cases, the energetic interpretation and implementation of a mandate by field personnel can create even more turmoil in New York and a backlash in the field, as happened to UN officials in the Congo whenever they took forceful actions.

With a peak strength of 20,000 troops, ONUC was the largest peacekeeping force so far deployed by the United Nations. Its initial mandate of July 1960 authorized Secretary General Hammarskjöld to,

provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until... the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to fully meet their tasks.<sup>12</sup>

ONUC had the strong support of the United States and, initially, the support of the USSR as well, until it became clear that UN troops were not going to suppress the foreign-supported secession of the country's richest province, Katanga, as Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba wished. In Hammarskjöld's view, ONUC did not then have the authority to use force. Lumumba sent his own troops toward Katanga in Soviet-provided transport aircraft. When they killed large numbers of civilians en route, Lumumba was sacked by the Congo's pro-Western president and attempted to fly his troops back to the capital to seize control. UN officials closed the capital's airport and seized its radio station. In the ensuing political turmoil, the government dissolved, Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev demanded Hammarskjöld's resignation, and ONUC occupied itself trying to minimize death and destruction in the country while nudging its fragments back together. When ONUC failed to prevent Lumumba's assassination in early 1961, one-third of its troop contingents were pulled out by their governments, but within a month its mandate was expanded to include the deportation of foreign mercenaries and the use of force to prevent civil war.

This ambitious order was not exercised for six months while a new central government was built under UN protection. When ONUC officials in Katanga did act to seize and deport European mercenaries, they did so haltingly, since whatever they did displeased some UN member governments. Partly as a result, three separate skirmishes over a period of sixteen months, and a further mandate amendment in November 1961 that explicitly ordered an end to Katanga's revolt, were needed to enable ONUC to complete the task.

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<sup>12</sup> Security Council Resolution S/4387, July 14, 1960. China (Taiwan), France and the UK abstained.

The Security Council is unlikely ever again to dispatch such a sizable force under UN command with such a wispy initial mandate. ONUC did permit the expeditious withdrawal of Belgian troops from most of the country, thus removing one source of tension. But ONUC was a force otherwise deployed more to prevent things than to accomplish them. It was intended to prevent the country from deteriorating into wholesale civil war and political breakup, and it did so.<sup>13</sup> At one time or another in its first nine months, however, ONUC was the focus of harsh words and physical violence from every faction in the country. The experience was traumatic for the UN, and cost Secretary General Hammarskjöld his life in a plane crash en route to Katanga. Thirty years would elapse before the Organization would undertake a peacekeeping operation remotely as large or as broad in scope.

And yet, an ambiguous mandate is not without advantages and can serve as a vehicle for broadening political support for a controversial operation. Under such circumstances, vagueness may allow states to lend their support without appearing to endorse (indeed, leaving them free to denounce) specific actions taken under color of the mandate. Members had such freedom in the case of ONUC, and used it.

A second way to gain such sometimes necessary political cover is to have a major nation run an operation with UN blessing, much as Desert Shield and Desert Storm were run. But thought should be given to making future delegated mandates a good deal more specific than Resolution 678, which authorized the use of "all necessary means" to reverse Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The United States chose to stop the war once that objective had been achieved, but it is not difficult to envision a different situation in which a different political calculus on the part of a coalition leader would have sent its forces "on to Baghdad." If that leader (or an ally) wielded a veto in the Security Council, then the Organization would find itself in the uncomfortable position of sponsoring an operation that it could neither control effectively nor terminate. Delegated mandates should therefore be used with extreme caution.

Mandates have qualities other than clarity, of course, and what an operation is asked to do has as much to do with its success or failure as how clearly it is asked to do it. Over time, the UN has demonstrated that it is good at fulfilling certain mandates, among them border monitoring and overseeing force separations, verifying the withdrawal of forces from combat, monitoring or supervising elections, and mediating political transitions where all sides are happy enough to have the transition take place. Mandates for which the historical record is less consistently

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<sup>13</sup> It was also intended by the US to prevent a direct US-Soviet military clash in the Congo, although this objective was never a formal part of its mandate.

successful include attempts to restore governmental authority that has been seriously eroded by civil unrest.

Mandates for which the record is decidedly negative involve border monitoring to detect illicit infiltration of people or weaponry. Not since the UN Special Commission on the Balkans helped to verify outside support for Greek Communist guerrillas in 1947 has the UN managed to deploy a force that has been effective in monitoring arms trafficking. The observers dispatched to Lebanon in 1958, to Yemen in 1963, and to Central America in 1989 generated little or no evidence of contraband. All experienced problems of access, and none was equipped nor, for that matter, particularly willing to watch for illicit activity after dark. Indeed, the very premise of the mission violates the requirement for impartiality that is one of the basic principles of successful peacekeeping, unless the gun-runners in question are merely smugglers whose activities are devoid of political content.

The UN's first peacekeeping mission in Central America, ONUCA, was supposed to monitor border regions to verify states' compliance with obligations to cease all assistance to regional insurgent forces. The UN realized after ONUCA had been deployed for less than a year, however, that neither arms traffickers, nor the local populace who might see their comings and goings, were about to impart potentially life-threatening information to UN officers cruising the back roads in bright-white, four-wheel-drive vehicles. Thus, in late 1990, the operation was reduced in size and its mandate altered to monitor how well local authorities themselves were implementing Esquipulas II. That was a change for the better, as the overwatch prompted those governments to improve their own border monitoring.

### **Options for Problematic Missions**

Mandate revision is one of the UN's three principal options when a force is not contributing to the solution of a conflict, or cannot otherwise fulfill its original tasking. The others include soldiering on with an unrevised and unsuccessful mandate (as on Cyprus), and withdrawal (as did the first Sinai force). A revised mandate might be weakened (as in the case of ONUCA) or, under appropriate conditions, strengthened.

Most assessments of UNFICYP agree that this operation, intended as a temporary palliative, has become a political fixture. Inserted to separate conflicting parties, the Cyprus force has treated the symptoms of Greek-Turkish strife so well that the local parties have lost incentive to treat the causes. The human cost of this political recalcitrance has been reduced without creating or requiring any changes in basic local attitudes. UNFICYP's presence removes the need for compromise.

Although unhappy with this situation, the UN has chosen to stay in Cyprus, rather than to leave and force the local parties to resolve their dispute or face further bloodshed. Soldiering on is the path of least resistance and regret (except on the part of the middle powers who contribute most of the troops and pay most of the bills). The UN does not want to appear, by withdrawing its force, to be declaring a dispute insoluble, nor does it want to risk blame for outbreaks of violence that might follow such withdrawal. Such charges of dereliction were levelled at the Organization by critics of UNEF's pullout from the Sinai in 1967, just before the outbreak of the June War, even though the UN had no legal recourse but to leave Egyptian territory when Cairo requested it. Since Israel refused to accommodate a UN presence on its soil, UNEF had nowhere to go but home.

The UN would also prefer not to face a "snap back" operation, in which peacekeeping forces are rapidly returned to a situation worse than the one they left, as were the contingents of MNF II. Perhaps overly sensitive to what they perceive as the Organization's limited reserves of credibility in international affairs, UN officials prefer to hang tight, even when staying may be damaging to the image of peacekeeping, as well as to real resolution of an underlying conflict.

In principle, the Secretary General can approach the Security Council to seek an alternative mandate, one stronger or weaker than the original. But to make effective use of a strengthened mandate, one with quasi-enforcement powers, for example, several political-military conditions should be met. The UN force must operate throughout a country's territory and not just in a border region and have substantial military power relative to local combatants, or be able to invoke such power reliably. Thus, it must have the active cooperation of the relevant great powers and not just their acquiescence. Finally it must have the cooperation of regional powers (to deny the uncooperative party sanctuary and support). These conditions are difficult to meet.

ONUC was the first, and so far the only, peacekeeping operation to have had its mandate successively strengthened to cope with deteriorating field conditions.<sup>14</sup> However, the military balance in the Congo was no more than adequate from ONUC's perspective, and in 1960-62 the country was nearly surrounded by European colonies, including Portuguese Angola and British Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), through which Katanga's rebels could be supplied with arms. France and the Soviet Union were largely hostile to the operation (refusing to support it financially), and British official opinion was divided, as was Belgian. US support was

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<sup>14</sup> ONUCA's mandate was also expanded temporarily, but to adapt to new opportunities, such as disarming the Nicaraguan Contras, and not to salvage the mission.

consistent, but its attention was not, as it weathered both the Berlin Wall Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis while ONUC wrestled with Katanga. All of these factors contributed to the uneven and hesitant manner in which ONUC went about its tasks, and made the Congo experience nearly as searing for the UN as Vietnam was for the United States.

Member states' objections to entanglement in comparable situations of civil unrest helped prevent the operation in Cyprus (begun three months before ONUC ended) from being funded as an obligatory "expense of the Organization." Moreover, conditions surrounding UNFICYP were not conducive to strengthening its mandate when local conditions deteriorated. Regional powers Greece and Turkey, two of three guarantors of Cypriot independence, failed to inhibit armed elements within their respective Cypriot communities, but rather, encouraged them. The third guarantor (Great Britain) both operates sovereign base areas important to NATO and contributes peacekeeping troops. Prospects for Soviet support of a stronger mandate for UNFICYP when unrest increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s were thus nil, and Cyprus' stipulation that no people "of color" serve in the UN peacekeeping force doubtless left much of the non-aligned world indifferent to its troubles.

UNIFIL, in 1978, deployed into a situation as unsettled as the Congo or Cyprus that met none of the conditions for mandate strengthening. UNIFIL's operating area was limited (and Israel opposed extending it to Beirut). Israel and Syria were far stronger than UNIFIL militarily, and great power support did not extend to military intervention on the UN's behalf.<sup>15</sup> However, UNIFIL illustrates the other alternative for mandate revision, namely, reduction in scope.

Prevented from carrying out its original, arguably impossible, instructions to restore the authority of a then-crumbling government in the southern part of the country, UNIFIL became an essential provider of basic services and political protection to the populace within its area of operations. When UNIFIL first deployed in 1978, the population in its area of operations was about 50,000. As fighting in and around Beirut escalated during the 1980s, the UN area's population peaked at 300,000, serving as a sanctuary from Beirut's violence. This is a population that the UN is loathe to abandon. Since the Lebanese government, gradually rebuilding its power since the Saudi-brokered Taif accords of 1989, also prefers a weak buffer force in the south to none at all, UNIFIL is likely to remain in place with a narrow, largely humanitarian, agenda.

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<sup>15</sup> The US was busy brokering the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord and, in any case, was still flush with Vietnam Syndrome, prompting reluctance about ground involvement in Lebanon that seemed quite appropriate when viewed from the perspective of the MNF II disaster, five years later.

Of the newer UN operations, those in Iraq (taking together the relief operations, the weapons-hunting of the Special Commission, and UNIKOM) meet most of the conditions for mandate expansion. The operation in Cambodia (UNTAC), where the risk of field resistance to UN plans is also not negligible, may meet some of the conditions. UNTAC's ability to adapt to problems will depend on whether its modest military capability can be reinforced, on the willingness and ability of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam to seal their borders to weapon infiltration, and on the continued support of the permanent members of the Security Council, and China, in particular, as chief external patron of the Khmer Rouge, the faction most likely to challenge the agreement.

### **Risks in Settlement**

Signing a settlement plan does not guarantee risk-free implementation. Some local factions may remain disgruntled, or hope to use the settlement for their own ends. In Namibia, for example, right-wing elements of the old Southwest Africa security police harassed potential voters well after UNTAG deployed, South African security forces worked covertly to manipulate the election, and busloads of new-found "Namibians" were trucked across the border from South Africa to help dilute the electoral majorities of the Southwest African Peoples Organization.

There are particular risks in agreements that only appear to lead to political settlement; in the partial demobilization of armed elements; and in political backsliding after UN forces depart.

### **Expedient Agreements**

Expedient agreements can masquerade as settlement plans, providing the appearance of settlement without its substance. Many peacekeeping forces, even some growing out of brokered requests for UN help (table four, above), deploy as expedients and not as solutions to conflict. They are not billed, or seen, as permanent solutions when they first deploy.

In other instances, however, expedient arrangements masquerade as political settlements. The operation that effectuated transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control in 1962-63 kept these two powers from outright warfare over this territory, and in those terms was quite successful. But it settled little from the perspective of the local, Papuan, population. Having ousted the Dutch, Indonesia remained determined to control the territory. Not until six years after the UN force withdrew did a series of local conclaves, tightly-controlled by Indonesian

authorities, endorse union with Indonesia.<sup>16</sup>

In Western Sahara, control passed from the European colonial power (Spain) to Morocco in the mid-1970s. Armed resistance to the new regime was far better-organized than in West New Guinea, but stalemate ensued by the mid-1980s, opening a window for UN mediation. After six years of UN mediation, Morocco and Polisario agreed to have the UN conduct a referendum on the political fate of the territory. It is difficult to craft a settlement when both sides want all of the land. UN mediators drafted an agreement that would give all of it to one party or the other. If a majority of voters cast their lot with Morocco, the well-organized Polisario movement was to gracefully go out of business after nineteen years, with the UN supervising its disarmament. If a majority voted for Polisario, on the other hand, Morocco was to withdraw its forces, relinquish claims that are overwhelmingly popular with Moroccan politicians and public alike, and leave behind several hundred thousand recent Moroccan settlers to a political future about which the agreement says nothing. It says only that Morocco will leave, then the UN will leave. At that point, the strongest armed factions in the territory would be free to do as they like. The basic terms of the accord are thus a recipe for continuing turbulence, whatever the outcome of the referendum. As of this writing, differences over who is eligible to vote in the referendum have put UN plans on hold for several months.

The peoples of West New Guinea and Western Sahara had the misfortune to live in places coveted first by colonial powers and then by imperious neighbors. In both cases, political agreements appeared to offer a choice to the local peoples, but the realities of regional power made that choice much more apparent than real. If the UN wishes to continue or expand its role in fostering democratic transitions, it must come equipped to assure a level political playing field and to truly guarantee the outcome of free and fair votes, lest its role in such transitions be seen as cosmetic.

### **Demobilizing Armed Elements**

Where a settlement calls for the UN to disarm and demobilize "armed elements," like the Contras (or the Khmer Rouge, or the Polisario), it is difficult to verify that it actually happens. In Nicaragua, the UN understood that significant quantities of arms would remain in the bush, and that it had neither the authority nor the manpower to search for or

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<sup>16</sup> Arend Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), esp. 285-291; Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy* (London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), ch. 5; and Christopher J. McMullen, *Mediation of the West New Guinea Dispute, 1962, A Case Study* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1981), 71.



seize those arms. In Cambodia, it will have the former, but not the latter. In Yugoslavia, which does not yet involve a full settlement, the UN will rely on the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav federal army to disarm Serbian militias in the areas to be monitored by UN forces. In such cases, the Organization can only hope that the hedging party finds the new political situation sufficiently congenial that it does not create secret arms caches or, more realistically, feels no need to use them.

Even if all local parties formally support an accord, there may be splinter groups who do not, or remnants of armed elements who have turned to banditry in the countryside. Countries on the rebound from lengthy civil wars may also have largely demolished or deteriorated physical infrastructures that make the re-establishment of civil order all the more difficult. UN peacekeepers sent into such circumstances must be prepared, therefore, to face hostilities that neither emanate from, nor are amenable to, political solution. Activities such as mine clearing may require active protection, as may the local populace.

In short, despite every effort politically to avoid placing its forces in harm's way, a UN force deployed into a situation of recent civil war may find it necessary to undertake, at least locally and on a small scale, operations not unlike those required in counter-insurgency. The alternative may be to suffer continuing casualties, among populace and peacekeepers alike, that threaten the success of the mission. As Mackinlay observes, for such operations to succeed, the peacekeepers must be seen to be acting with the support of the people, and any use of force must be "precise" in its effects. But such responses will be viable only against splinter groups and outlaws. Should a major local party renege on the settlement agreement, the force may have little choice but to withdraw.<sup>17</sup>

### **Dealing with Backsliding**

In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Front was unexpectedly voted out of office in a closely-monitored election in February 1990. But tensions remain between the new government and the Sandinistas, who are still a powerful political force with effective control of the army.

In December 1990, the United Nations helped to monitor Haiti's first free and fair presidential elections. Nine months later, long after UN and other election monitors had gone home, a military coup ousted President Aristide. The Organization of American States voted economic sanctions, and after long negotiations to return Aristide to power, devised a plan to oversee implementation of the new political settlement.

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<sup>17</sup> John Mackinlay, "Powerful Peacekeepers," *Survival* (May-June 1990), 246-248.

Similar problems may occur on a much larger scale in other places in the future. The UN needs to devote more thought to how best to follow-up its peace-building operations with efforts to shore up the new polities they leave behind. The shoring-up process might involve continued monitoring by a small, free-roving observer group, technical advice, integrated development assistance, or some combination of all three. Having intervened once to halt conflict or help a people establish democracy, the international community has an interest in preserving what it has wrought, if not an obligation.

In sum, the practical feasibility of a peacekeeping operation is influenced by many factors. For simpler missions, strong local support can make up for initially poor tactical information, but more complex operations must be tactically competent before they deploy, lest the mission be put in jeopardy. Ambiguous marching orders can make a difficult mission even harder, but the clearest of orders can't make an impossible mission feasible. Rapid deployments to contain conflicts or reinforce cease-fires do immediate good, but may leave the UN bogged down indefinitely in costly operations. Mediation offers the UN a chance to resolve, rather than simply contain local conflicts, but containment may be all that is feasible in many situations. The Organization should decide where to put most of its peacekeeping money in the future, and how many new, long-term commitments it can realistically afford. In addition, the UN needs to think harder about the implications of its growing involvement in implementing political settlements and rebuilding countries, the ways in which such operations can go wrong, its options if they do, and the sorts of reserve capabilities that it will need in such cases. Countries are more likely to be reluctant to send troops on more dangerous missions, or to leave them in missions that turn rough. But the most difficult reserve capacity of all to maintain will be financial.

## **FUNDING**

Although UN assessments are treaty obligations that member states are bound to pay under international law, the Organization has little leverage over member states in this critical area. The only sanction in the UN Charter against non-payment of dues (Article 19) is loss of one's vote in the General Assembly after accumulating the equivalent of two years' arrearages, but that sanction is not automatic. Indeed, it is essentially unused. Thus, historically, it has proven far easier to excite the Security Council into supporting new missions than to get member states to pay their share of the cost on time, or at all.

In this section, we discuss past and current funding crises, the present and likely future cost of peacekeeping, the UN system for covering those costs, and how it reimburses participants.

### **The Funding Crises**

Since 1985, the UN has been in a funding crisis precipitated in part by the United States Congress, in the form of the Kassebaum amendment, which threatened to choke off successively larger fractions of the US contribution unless the Organization undertook significant administrative reforms.<sup>18</sup> As a result, the United States accumulated several hundred million dollars in arrearages, which the Congress only recently agreed to repay over five years, starting with fiscal year 1991. Since 1981, moreover, the United States has budgeted its regular UN dues a year later than when they are due. Thus, the fiscal 1992 US budget, passed in October 1991, contained money for the United States' calendar year 1991 UN obligations. These funds were paid to the UN by the end of 1991.<sup>19</sup>

Although the United States has accumulated the largest debt, it has company. By the fall of 1991, a combination of old arrearages and late payments of current dues made it difficult for the Organization to meet its regular payroll. As of December 31, 1991, nearly 40 percent of the assessments for the regular 1991 UN budget had yet to be paid.<sup>20</sup>

The situation with respect to peacekeeping assessments was comparable. The United States owed \$141 million (\$84 million for 1991

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<sup>18</sup> For text of the Kassebaum Amendment, see US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The US Role in the United Nations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations*, 98th Cong., 1st sess. October 3, 1983, 85. As modified in 1988, the amendment stipulates withholding 20 percent of US contributions to organizations that do not create their budgets by consensus. Also, by Administration policy, the US seeks to avoid real (inflation- and exchange rate-adjusted) growth in international organizations' budgets; the US will withdraw from consensus on budgets that exhibit such growth, which would trigger the Kassebaum withholding mechanism.

<sup>19</sup> The US paid in two parts, \$223 million in October and \$79 million on December 31st, retaining enough to cover the requirements of the Kassebaum Amendment until assured that the General Assembly would pass the 1992 UN budget by consensus.

<sup>20</sup> Because the UN credits payments first against arrearages and then against current assessments, how it views a member state's debits, and how the state views them may be rather different. Thus, at year's end, the UN showed the United States without arrearages on its regular budget assessment, but still owing \$266 million for 1991 (71 percent of the total owed by all member states). The United States considers its 1991 assessment fully paid, while its back dues continue to be paid off in stages. Of the remaining \$109 million in outstanding assessments, Russia accounted for \$46 million. UN Document ST/ADM/SER.B/364, January 8, 1992, 7.

and \$57 million for prior years), and Russia (which inherited the debts of the USSR) owed \$127 million. Both owe back dues primarily for UNIFIL, and both are committed to repaying their arrears over time. The number two financial contributor to peacekeeping, Japan, paid its full assessment by the end of 1991, but 85 percent of that payment was made in December. Japan will be able to exert greater influence on the shape of peacekeeping operations since it assumed a two-year seat on the Security Council, starting in January 1992.

In its last great funding crisis in 1961, over peacekeeping in the Congo and the Sinai, the UN faced a situation in which two permanent members of the Security Council, France and the USSR, refused to pay their share of peacekeeping costs, which at the time equalled 150 percent of the regular budget. The UN sought and won an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice that peacekeeping costs are legitimate "expenses of the Organization." Still, neither country paid up, but neither lost its vote. Instead, the Assembly agreed to proceed for two sessions without taking any votes.<sup>21</sup> Since the Assembly has recently taken to deciding major issues by consensus, Article 19 sanctions, if enacted today, might actually mean something, since consensus procedures theoretically give each member state a veto over Assembly action.

The UN weathered the Congo crisis partly by issuing \$200 million in 25-year bonds, of which \$169 million were actually purchased, half by the United States (in accordance with limits imposed by the Congress). The bond issue kept the Organization and its two major peacekeeping missions going for a year. The Secretary General has periodically sought and been denied borrowing authority in recent years, as well as the authority to charge interest on overdue assessments. So common in business and government alike as to be unremarkable, and used by other agencies in the UN system, the calculation of interest on UN assessments was not approved by member states.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary, Vol. III: Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1980), 282-85, 294-300.

<sup>22</sup> To encourage prompt payment by their member states, the International Telecommunications Union and the Universal Postal Union -- both UN specialized agencies -- charge interest on "contributions not received by 1 January" of the year after assessments are made. The International Civil Aviation Organization uses an incentive approach whereby the organization's interest income is "distributed to member states on a weighted scale which takes into account the dates of payment and amounts of current year contributions actually made." The incentive payment is proportionately greater for states paying in the first half of the year.

The 36th and 40th UN General Assemblies rejected Secretariat proposals for comparable incentive or penalty plans. *Financial Emergency of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary General*, United Nations document A/C.5/42/31, November 5, 1987, esp. 7-9.

Over the years, various voluntary funds have also been proposed or established to ease the Organization's financial problems. For example, the UN has always maintained a Working Capital Fund as its basic cash reserve. Last increased in 1982, to \$100 million, the Fund has been regularly depleted of late to cover arrearages.

In 1965 and again in 1972, the General Assembly established a Special Account intended to allow states that had withheld their assessed contributions to peacekeeping operations to make voluntary contributions to those operations. Although nominally worth well over \$100 million by 1989, counting contributions and accumulated interest, the Special Account has been drained along with the Working Capital Fund to pay the daily expenses of the Organization.<sup>23</sup>

More recently, a Trust Fund in Support of United Nations Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Activities was established with initial financial support from Japan, Australia, Sweden, and others. As of the end of 1991, it contained six million dollars.<sup>24</sup> A separate trust fund exists for advance voluntary contributions to peacemaking and peacekeeping in Cambodia. Finally, in late 1991, the Secretary General urged the establishment of a one billion dollar Peace Endowment Fund, with roughly one-third of the money to be provided by governments, and the remainder to be raised from the private sector.<sup>25</sup>

It is not clear, however, that states will contribute voluntarily what they fail to contribute under legal obligation. Unless the UN becomes more widely viewed as a source of indispensable services, like the International Monetary Fund, late-paying member states will continue to pay late, and also refuse to give the Organization a bigger stick to use against those in arrears. Peacekeeping can and should be viewed as such an indispensable service, not the only one that the UN provides, but an important one that serves member states' national interests in a stable and peaceful international political environment.

In the wake of the 1960s financial crisis, the only new peacekeeping missions undertaken for ten years were those paid for by the disputants themselves (missions to West New Guinea and Yemen) or by voluntary

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<sup>23</sup> Susan R. Mills, *The Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Occasional Paper No. 3 (New York: International Peace Academy, 1989), 13-14.

<sup>24</sup> Information provided by the Unit for Peacekeeping Matters, Office of Program Planning, Budget and Finance, United Nations. Telephone interview, January 22, 1992.

<sup>25</sup> Paul Lewis, "UN Asks Billion for Peacekeeper Fund," *New York Times*, November 25, 1991, A3.

contributions (for Cyprus, the one and only time that approach has been used). In the current crisis, the Organization may not be loathe to initiate new missions but those missions may be cut back in size and face delayed starts. Moreover, the UN will have to rely upon the continuing good will and patience of troop contributing governments, who may not be reimbursed for years. Because of the way the UN structures its missions and pays its forces (discussed below), operations organized around military units may be the only readily affordable ones.

### **Current Costs**

Through 1988, the United Nations typically spent less than \$300 million annually for peacekeeping. In more recent years, as the demand for peacekeeping missions has increased, total annual peacekeeping costs have risen sharply, although they still remain small by the standards of contemporary military operations. All told, the UN probably spent close to \$640 million on peacekeeping in 1989, the first year of really big demands since the early 1960s. Costs declined considerably in 1990, but rose again in 1991, exceeding \$550 million. As noted earlier, and detailed in table seven, late payments and arrearages are as much a problem for peacekeeping as they are for the regular budget.

Peacekeeping costs in 1992 are likely to at least double the 1991 figure, and may reach \$2 billion. The most expensive current missions -- in Lebanon, Western Sahara, and Kuwait -- will be continuing into the new year, and the operations in El Salvador, Yugoslavia, and Cambodia are all gearing up.

Since 1988, a few small missions have been paid for out of the regular UN budget, including UNGOMAP (to monitor Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan), ONUVEN (to monitor the 1990 election in Nicaragua), and ONUVEH (to monitor the election later that year in Haiti). Good offices and technical survey missions, as well as peacemaking and the office staffs who support the activities of Special Representatives of the Secretary General, are also funded from the regular budget, for about \$2 million annually. At present, only two observer missions, both of long standing, are financed from the regular budget: UNTSO, with about 260 military observers in the Middle East, and UNMOGIP, with 36 observers deployed in Kashmir. Together, they cost between \$25 and \$30 million each year. Finally, the regular budget includes about \$4 million annually for the small staff in the Office of Special Political Affairs (now the Office of Peacekeeping Operations).

All other UN peacekeeping missions are financed through special arrangements. The mission on Cyprus, UNFICYP, which cost about \$29 million last year, is paid for by strictly voluntary contributions from a

Table 7 Cost of UN Peacekeeping, 1989-1991

Mission and Starting Date	Cost (\$US mil)			Outstanding (\$US mil)	
	1989	1990	1991	To 1990	1991
UNTSO (1948, Israel's borders)	21	22	24	(a)	--
UNMOGIP (1949, Kashmir)	4	4	5	(a)	--
UNFICYP (1964, Cyprus)	26	28	29	(b)	(b)
UNDOF (1974, Golan Heights)	36	37	38	6	10
UNIFIL (1978, Lebanon)	141	142	152	167	98
UNGOMAP (1988, Afghanistan)	7	7	--	(a)	--
UNIIMOG (1988, Iran-Iraq)	95	44	8	1	--
UNAVEM I/II (1988, Angola)	9	5	52	1	14
UNTAG (1989, Namibia)	294	71	--	(c)	--
ONUSCA (1989, Cent. America)	--	49	23	3	4
ONUVEN (1990, Nicaragua)	2	--	--	(a)	--
ONUVEH (1990, Haiti)	--	5	--	(a)	--
UNIKOM (1991, Iraq-Kuwait)	--	--	60	--	9
ONUSAL (1991, El Salvador)	--	--	13	--	6
MINURSO (1991, W. Sahara)	--	--	141	--	55
UNAMIC (1991, Cambodia, advance mission)	--	--	10	--	--
Secretariat Support Costs	3	3	4	(a)	--
<b>TOTALS:</b>	<b>638</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>559</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>196</b>

NOTE: Table includes payments outstanding as of 12/31/91. Table notes: (a) Regular budget; (b) Voluntary contributions, as of May 31, 1991, UNFICYP had a \$188 million deficit; (c) Surplus, being distributed to other accounts as the creditor states direct.

SOURCE: Authors' estimates based on information from, Fred Schottler, DPI/CPMD/PSPS (Fax, October 4 & 14, 1991), *Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 1992-93, Vol. 1* (A/46/16/Rev.1), part II, *Report of the Secretary General on Cambodia* (S/23097/Add.1, September 30, 1991), and *Status of Contributions as at December 31, 1991* (Document ST/ADM/SER.B/364, January 8, 1992).

handful of states. The rest of the peacekeeping missions now underway are budgeted and paid for out of special accounts and financed by special assessments on all member states.

There is no typical peacekeeping operation. The cost of any single mission varies with the number of people involved, the mix of military personnel and civilian specialists, and the type of equipment required by the mission. Member nations contributing units for peacekeeping missions are compensated at the flat rate of \$30-\$40 per day per soldier regardless of rank (the higher rate is for technical specialists), while civilian specialists and military observers (usually officers) serving individually in missions receive a *per diem* ("mission subsistence allowance") that may exceed \$100 per day. Thus, the costs of UNIFIL, the mission in Lebanon, and UNDOF, on the Golan Heights, which each consist almost exclusively of troops in units, are between \$20,000 and \$30,000 per person on the ground per year. Missions featuring individual observers, like UNIMOG (Iran/Iraq) and ONUCA (Central America), cost around \$90,000 per person on the ground per year.

These financial estimates, moreover, greatly understate the true cost of peacekeeping, as they neglect the contributions in-kind often made to peacekeeping missions, including some air and sea lift, intelligence, and planning and logistical support. Most importantly, some of the countries contributing troops to peacekeeping missions provide an implicit subsidy to the UN, both by bearing the expense of the specialized training necessary to prepare their forces for peacekeeping, and because the rates at which they pay their soldiers exceed the troop reimbursement rates used by the United Nations. In the extreme case, on Cyprus, the bulk of actual operating costs are borne by the troop contributors themselves.<sup>26</sup>

### Future Costs

Looking to the future, how much is peacekeeping likely to cost each year? In contemplating this question, it is essential to place the estimate in appropriate context. Because peacekeeping is an alternative to unilateral action to maintain international stability and national security, peacekeeping costs should be compared to the cost of military forces and activities.

In such a context, even the record-breaking amount spent by the UN for peacekeeping in 1989 (\$638 million) is minimal. It is less, for example, than the annual cost of a single US Army division when the latter is calculated to include pay and allowances, operations and support, and

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<sup>26</sup> For costs and reimbursements for UNFICYP, see UN Security Council Documents S/18431, November 1986, and S/22665, June 1991.



annualized equipment costs. UN peacekeeping expenses can also be compared to the cost of procuring modern armaments. The full amount spent by the United Nations in 1991 would not have covered the cost of a single modern bomber, for example, a single nuclear-powered submarine, or a single missile-armed destroyer. The United States has the largest share of UN peacekeeping costs (about \$168 million in 1991), but it would have to save its share for 25 years to have enough money to pay for a single aircraft carrier, and then wait another nine years to buy the aircraft that operate from the carrier.

Peacekeeping costs should also be evaluated in terms of the costs avoided by keeping the peace. The United States' expenditures in the 1991 war against Iraq, for example, totalled approximately \$63 billion -- more than 100 times the amount spent for UN peacekeeping worldwide in that same year. If the opportunity had presented itself prior to the Iraqi invasion, the few hundred million dollars that might have been required to deploy a large UN monitoring force on the Iraq/Kuwait border, in conjunction with intense preventive diplomacy, would have been a bargain for this country and the financial backers of Operation Desert Storm, and an even sounder investment for both Iraq and Kuwait.<sup>27</sup>

When evaluated in such a context, annual peacekeeping budgets of \$2 billion, as now seems possible for 1992, or even \$3 billion, if the true costs of the operations are calculated, should give no nation pause. A budget of this size would permit the UN, each year, to conduct one large operation with high administrative content, like the one planned for Cambodia, two good-sized operations consisting primarily of troops in units, like the one in Lebanon, and the dozen or so smaller missions, like those in Central America, which seem likely to be on the UN's agenda in the years ahead. If the budget were raised to \$3 billion, moreover, it would permit the United Nations to reimburse countries for more services contributed to peacekeeping in-kind, an innovation that would make calculations of assessments more fair to major contributors of military units and support services.

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<sup>27</sup> The force described above is not conceived of as a deterrent force or a tripwire, but as on-scene, expert eyes and ears for the Secretary General, and as a symbol of focused global attention on the budding crisis. Should diplomacy manage to defuse the immediate crisis, the force could either be withdrawn, or reconfigured as needed into a more permanent border monitoring operation.

Such a force would need substantial reconnaissance capability; in such a potentially dangerous situation, that capability might best be provided by drone aircraft, discussed further, below.

## **Paying the Tab**

Article 17 of the UN Charter empowers the General Assembly to approve the budget of the Organization and states that "expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." The apportionment is called the "scale of assessment." There is one for the regular budget, and a separate one for peacekeeping.

### **The Regular Scale of Assessment**

The "regular" scale is worked out in the UN's expert Committee on Contributions every three years and approved by the General Assembly, traditionally at the end of the session, along with the budget for the succeeding year.<sup>28</sup> The steeply sliding scale is based on adjusted national income. For the richer 50 percent of UN members, assessments are almost exactly proportional to Gross National Product (GNP). However, for the poorer 50 percent (and the microstates), there are complex offsets for low per capita GNP and external indebtedness. There is also a ceiling rate (25 percent of the regular budget, paid by the US), and a floor rate (0.01 percent, paid by the 78 smallest and poorest members). In addition, there are two mechanisms that keep rates from shifting very much from year to year. The first is the "base period" and the second is the "scheme of limits."

National income for purposes of UN assessments is calculated as a moving average of several years of real national income, to smooth out possible spikes in income due to exchange rate fluctuations and abrupt changes in resource prices, including, since the 1970s, the price of crude petroleum. From 1954 until 1977, the base period was three years. It changed to seven years in 1978, and to ten years in 1983, where it remains.

The so-called scheme of limits was introduced in 1981 as a further brake on changes in assessment rates. The rates of top contributors (those paying for at least five percent of the UN budget), may change no more than 0.75 percent per year. The rates of the 78 states contributing the least may not change at all, unless the General Assembly revises current policy. Their contribution to the regular budget in 1991 was about \$92,000 apiece. At the end of 1991, the GA agreed in principle to phase out the scheme of limits but at the same time to keep the lowest contribution level fixed at 0.01 percent.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Fifth Committee, "Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of the Expenses of the United Nations," UN Doc. A/C.5/46/L.20, December 19, 1991.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

### The Special Scale for Peacekeeping

Since 1973, the scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations funded in special accounts has been separate from, but based upon, the regular scale. Until 1973, voluntary contributions from wealthier countries (primarily the United States) had been used to defray the assessments of the poorest member states. The concept of cost shifting was formalized with the deployment of UNEF II, when most of the developing states' share of peacekeeping expenses was shifted to the five permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>30</sup>

For purposes of peacekeeping assessments, member states are divided into four groups. The five permanent members of the Security Council (Group A) pay roughly 22 percent more for peacekeeping costs than they would if peacekeeping were assessed using the regular scale.<sup>31</sup> Other developed industrial states (Group B) are assessed for peacekeeping at the same rate as for the regular budget. The peacekeeping rate for wealthier developing countries (Group C), however, is one-fifth of the regular budget assessment rate, while the rate for the poorest countries (Group D) is just one-tenth their regular assessment (or 0.001 percent). For 1991, the 78 countries in Group D were assessed about \$5,000 apiece for peacekeeping (see annex A for a listing of states and their assessments).

There are some curious anomalies in the assignment of states to Group C, particularly the fifteen states with per capita GNPs of \$5,000 or more (see table eight). These states, it would seem, could readily afford to make a full contribution to the UN's peacekeeping accounts. This would be desirable, as a matter of equity. Were they to move to Group B, its share of peacekeeping costs would rise two percent, to roughly 43 percent; the Perm Five's share would drop two percent, to about 55 percent; and Group C's share would drop one-half percent, to less than two percent. To its credit, one country (Spain) voluntarily made the switch from Group C to B when one of its countrymen took command of ONUCA in 1989; it will pay a full regular share of peacekeeping expenses starting in 1992.

The rationale for the special scale rests on the argument that the Permanent Five, with privileged positions as veto-wielders on the Security Council, have greater than average influence over Council decisions. With

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<sup>30</sup> David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 575.

<sup>31</sup> The five states pay the following shares of the regular and peacekeeping budgets, respectively, for 1992: China, 0.77 and 0.94 percent; France, 6.0 and 7.29 percent; the former USSR, 9.41 and 11.44 percent; the UK, 5.02 and 6.10 percent; and the US, 25 and 30.39 percent.

greater influence and voting privileges, it is argued, comes heavier than usual political and financial responsibility for Council actions.

However, in the regular scale of assessments, the majority of the General Assembly already have a steeply progressive system of dues, although for some of the poorest and smallest, even 0.01 percent may represent a burdensome assessment. If so, the desirability of a floor needs to be revisited. But, at present, 125 countries together provide just six percent of the UN's regular budget (and just two percent of the contributions to peacekeeping accounts). Moreover, while officials of developing countries argue that their countries are too strapped for cash to be dunned for any larger share of global peacekeeping costs, the same countries spend, on average, several thousand times more per year on domestic military expenditures than they do on peacekeeping. A fractional reduction in these countries' military spending would fully fund a greater commitment to peacekeeping even if annual costs reach the \$3 billion projected above, and the regular scale were to become the basis of assessment.<sup>32</sup>

### Mission Start-Up

A peacekeeping mission is created in a series of steps whose sequence depends in part on the source of request for the mission. Security Council initiatives tend to be taken in response to a crisis, so the processes of mission structuring, contributor recruitment, and mission budgeting occur more or less simultaneously. With more time, the sequence is usually the following:

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<sup>32</sup> Again, it is important to place the numbers in proper context. Toward a budget of \$3 billion, a country in Group D would pay \$30,000 under the current special peacekeeping scale, and \$300,000 under the regular scale of assessments, if the floor on contributions in the regular scale remains at 0.01 percent. For a state like Tanzania, with per capita military spending of just \$7 annually, the larger amount represents about two-tenths percent of its military budget. For a country in Group C with higher per capita military spending, like Syria (\$242/year), whose regular assessment is 0.04 percent, the full contribution would be \$1.2 million, equal to about 0.04 percent of its military budget.

On average, in the late 1980s the Perm Five spent about \$2,400 on armaments for every dollar they spent on peacekeeping. Countries in Group B averaged \$750 in arms for each dollar devoted to peacekeeping. But countries in Group C averaged \$20,000, and countries in Group D averaged \$40,000 in military spending for every dollar spent on peacekeeping. Were they to contribute to peacekeeping on the basis of the regular scale of assessments, the ratios of military to peacekeeping expenditures in the latter two groups of countries would drop to 4,000:1, still well above the average of the developed industrial states.

Data on military spending were drawn from Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military & Social Expenditures*, 14th ed. (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991) 54-59; Data on the 1991 scales of assessment for the regular UN budget and peacekeeping were drawn from UN Secretariat Document ST/ADM/Ser.B/364, January 8, 1992.

**Table 8 Fifteen Wealthiest States Paying Reduced Assessment for Peacekeeping**

Country	Per Capita GNP (\$US)	Est'd Share World GNP (Pct.)	Regular Assessment (Pct.)	Peacekeeping Assessment (Pct.)
United Arab Emirates	18,400	.14	.19	.038
Kuwait	16,400	.15	.29	.058
Brunei	14,100	.02	.04	.008
Bahamas	11,400	.02	.02	.004
Singapore	10,500	.14	.11	.022
Qatar	9,900	.02	.05	.010
Israel	9,800	.22	.21	.042
Cyprus	7,100	.02	.02	.004
Barbados	6,400	.01	.01	.002
Bahrain	6,300	.02	.02	.004
Saudi Arabia	6,200	.50	1.02	.204
Malta	5,800	.01	.01	.002
Libya	5,400	.13	.28	.056
Greece	5,300	.28	.40	.080
Oman	5,200	.04	.02	.004

NOTE: GNP = Gross National Product. GNP per capita from latest available year.

SOURCES: *World Bank Atlas*, 1989 and 1990 Editions, (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1990, 1991). Scale of assessment data are from the United Nations, *Status of Contributions as at 31 December 1991*, ST/ADM/SER.B/364, January 8, 1992.

- Mediation, with one or more field survey missions conducted as political settlement nears, or soon after it is reached.
- Presentation of the mission concept to the Security Council for its preliminary approval.
- A directive from the Council to the SG to report back with a plan for the peacekeeping mission that indicates its overall size, structure, duties, and timing.
- Creation of that plan by the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) with assistance from the Field Operations Division (FOD) in the Office of General Services.
- Council approval of the plan.
- Creation of the mission budget by FOD.
- Review of cost justifications by the Special Peacekeeping Unit in the Office of Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Finance (PPBF).
- Submission of the mission budget by PPBF to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (or ACABQ, the standing budget review unit of the General Assembly's Fifth, or Financial, Committee).
- ACABQ recommendations to the Fifth Committee (which includes all member states).
- Fifth Committee consensus and referral to the General Assembly for final, consensus approval.

Once the budget has been approved by the GA, the UN sends out assessment letters to member states. Until then, the Secretariat can make no contracts for equipment, transport services, or the like, that exceed the current \$10 million cumulative annual limit on the Secretary General's independent spending authority for "unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances."<sup>33</sup>

This constraint can prove dangerous. In the case of UNTAG, a lag of six weeks between authorization and budget approval -- caused by haggling over the size, structure, and cost of the operation -- left the UN with just four weeks to order all of the materials, the new field equipment, and the transport that the operation would need to meet a mission start-up date that had been fixed by agreement among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. Troop contributor Finland was prepared to send its battalion to Namibia some three weeks before it was eventually dispatched in an emergency US airlift, the source of urgency being the sudden incursion of SWAPO forces into Namibia, discussed in an earlier section.

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<sup>33</sup> Any expenditures exceeding \$3 million in one year must be approved by the ACABQ, under current General Assembly rules set at the start of each biennium. See UN document A/RES/44/203, December 21, 1989.

In the case of Cambodia, the relatively long delay between signature of the Paris Agreement in late October 1991 and the planned deployment of the main body of UNTAC left the country in unstable political equilibrium, its civil order and infrastructure continuing to deteriorate, and a monsoon season approaching in April that promised to make most rural areas inaccessible by road for many months.<sup>34</sup>

As one way to cope with the problem of start-up squeeze, the Secretariat has developed the flexible mission timeline, which does not begin until the budget is approved. This approach was used for MINURSO, the mission to Western Sahara, and shows promise for future operations where time is not at a premium.<sup>35</sup> Where time *is* at a premium, however, and particularly for large missions whose start-up costs exceed the SG's current autonomous spending authority, a mechanism needs to be developed whereby the Secretariat can enter into contractual commitments after a mission is authorized, but before its budget is approved. This may entail larger discretionary spending authority for the SG, and/or submission of preliminary budget estimates to the Security Council along with the mission plan. The latter approach tends to raise hackles in the legislative bodies if it appears to usurp their prerogatives in financial matters.

A second time lag affects the UN's ability to field and sustain a full-size operation quickly. It is not coincidental that the UN operations in Cambodia have been getting underway in piecemeal fashion, first with a 260-person advance mission, then with 1,000 additional mine-clearing personnel. In late 1991, the Secretary General appealed to member states to advance up to \$200 million to a fund for UNTAC, saying that the Organization needed assurance of such funding before it made the great leap into a full-fledged effort to rebuild the country. The scope and sensitivity of the operation are such that the UN cannot afford to have its activities grind to a halt in three months' time because it has run short of funds. The General Assembly, in mid-February 1992, authorized the Secretary General to enter into contractual obligations for UNTAC worth up to \$200 million. At that point, the recruitment of the operation's large civilian components got underway in earnest.

UNTAC's situation is the most acute because the operation is so ambitious, but it is not unique. The often-long lags between budget approval and receipt of money from member states result in part from the way the UN assesses and accounts for its peacekeeping funds.

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<sup>34</sup> *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 27, 1992, 22-28.

<sup>35</sup> See *The Situation Concerning Western Sahara, Report by the Secretary General*, Security Council document S/22464, April 19, 1991, and *Financing of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara*, GA document A/45/241/Add.1, May 8, 1991.

Because each peacekeeping operation is now separately funded, under its own Special Account, states receive separate assessment letters for each mission; since ongoing missions are frequently mandated for six-month periods, they receive two letters per mission per year. Because operations' "fiscal years" follow their mandate periods, which started on the date they were authorized by the Security Council, letters arrive at member states' treasuries year-round. It is sheer luck if they coincide with states' budget cycles. Unless there is a national fund set aside for anticipated UN requests for money, states must work these requests into their budgets as best they can, or seek special appropriations.<sup>36</sup>

### Reimbursing Troop Contributors

As noted earlier, troop units deployed on UN peacekeeping duty are reimbursed at a flat per-person rate, regardless of their actual operating costs. The middle industrial powers, who are the most frequent contributors to UN peacekeeping and whose troops are the most expensive to support, do not expect ever to recoup the full cost of their participation. Thus they approach new missions with a certain fatalism about finances. Poorer troop contributing countries, who send the lowest-paid forces with the least technical skills, are reimbursed much more than their actual costs. A 1990 survey of troop contributors revealed that their monthly per-person cost averaged \$2,300, so the average contributor absorbed about 59 percent of the actual costs of keeping its troops in the field. But actual costs varied by \$2,000 in either direction, from as little as \$280 per month to as much as \$4,400. The lowest-cost contributor is thus "reimbursed" roughly 3.5 times as much as it spends, and the highest-cost contributor a bit less

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<sup>36</sup> For example, the United States budgeted \$90.6 million for peacekeeping for its fiscal year 1991, which runs from October 1990 through September 30, 1991. Although the money for the United States' regular UN payment is budgeted a year behind UN assessments, an effort is made in the State Department to budget ahead for peacekeeping. But the 1991 budget, submitted to the Congress in February 1990, was based on planning begun in the spring of 1989. The US initially owed \$92.3 million for calendar year 1991, very close to the amount requested from Congress, but new missions begun in mid-year added \$67 million to the tab. Of that added amount, the United States' \$19 million share of costs for UNIKOM, the operation on the Iraq-Kuwait border that began in late April, was appended to an emergency appropriation for war refugees, sailed through the Congress, and was sent to the UN by July. But there is very little money available for the other new missions. State had budgeted just \$69 million for peacekeeping in fiscal year 1992, evidently not foreseeing diplomatic breakthroughs in Angola or El Salvador and discounting prospects for operations in Western Sahara, Cambodia, and the Gulf. Although the full \$69 million fiscal 1992 request was approved by the Congress, after State is through paying 1991 assessments it will have just \$20 million in hand for peacekeeping payments in 1992, a year that may well see the US share for peacekeeping soar to \$300-400 million if operations in both Cambodia and Yugoslavia gather a full head of steam. Thus, State went back to the Congress with a supplemental request for another \$350 million for 1992, and budgeted an equivalent amount for fiscal 1993. US Department of State, *The Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 1993*, February 1992, 63.



than one-fourth of its costs. The fixed reimbursement system functions, in effect, to redistribute resources to developing countries' militaries, but without requiring that surpluses be invested in, say, equipment or training that could be useful to the UN at a future date.<sup>37</sup>

Troop contributing governments may be able and willing to wait for reimbursement, but observer missions and multi-component operations require cash up front. The individual *per diems* paid to civilians who are seconded to peacekeeping missions by governments, and to military observers, are "fast" money, the sort that must be paid continuously and on time, theoretically because it buys subsistence for field personnel (although, for a frugal individual in a remote area, \$65-100 a day beyond regular salary can mount up to a tidy sum over the course of a year). Commercial vendors must also be paid in good time, lest they refuse in future to sell items or lease services to the UN. Reimbursements for infantry battalions and other specialized military units are paid to the contributing governments, and governments have more patience than the market. Contributing governments, and especially those of wealthier countries, thus tend to be the last to receive reimbursement.

Despite their commitment to the concept of peacekeeping, some middle powers are growing disenchanted with the idea of doing it essentially for free. Most of that disenchantment appears to be directed not at countries that profit financially from peacekeeping, but at the wealthiest countries that withhold or otherwise delay payment. US repayment of its old debts in particular will do much to reduce the middle powers' sense of having been exploited (particularly in Lebanon and Cyprus) because of their commitment to peacekeeping.

In sum, the financial situation in peacekeeping currently depends crucially on the timely and regular contributions of a relatively small handful of countries, the Permanent Five, and by the contributions in cash and in kind of roughly twenty other states, the members of Group B. The peacekeeping scale of assessments reflects General Assembly decisions of nearly twenty years ago to relieve developing states of most of their obligations to support peacekeeping operations. However, the extremely high ratios of military spending to spending on peacekeeping in many of those countries suggests that a re-examination of national priorities, as is now occurring throughout the industrialized world, may also be in order there. Such an examination might suggest the net benefits of trading some military spending, far less than one percent, for higher contributions to UN peacekeeping. Those countries making that tradeoff should be accorded

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<sup>37</sup> For the history of troop reimbursement levels and policy, see General Assembly document A/44/6-5/Add.1, October 12, 1989. See also General Assembly document A/45/582, October 10, 1990, 5.

greater opportunities for training and participation in UN operations, which could in turn bring more into national coffers than higher monetary contributions to peacekeeping would take away.

Finally, the UN's ability to dispatch peacekeepers promptly is hampered by internal financial constraints and by its year-round billings to member states. Both need to be redressed if peacekeeping is to evolve from its old status of emergency activity to one that is fully integrated into the functions of the United Nations.


### **ADMINISTRATION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL**

The UN's system for planning and implementing peacekeeping operations, largely unchanged in size and structure since the Cold War, is increasingly hard-pressed to accommodate the new demands for its services. Even if all funding arrearages were resolved tomorrow, serious structural shortcomings in the UN's current approach to peacekeeping would hamper the Organization's ability to shoulder the responsibilities that the post-Cold War world is thrusting upon it. Although our analysis focuses on structural elements specifically relevant to peacekeeping, creation of an efficient structure to plan and implement a growing number of peacekeeping operations should be done in the context of a more comprehensive restructuring of the UN Secretariat, including efforts to ensure the appointment of high quality people, without whom an organization cannot function effectively, whatever its structure.

At present, the Secretary General is both the UN's chief administrative officer and its chief decision-maker and diplomat. As UN functions have grown over the years, in the political as well as economic and social fields, high-level UN offices reporting directly to the SG have multiplied. By late 1991, 27 Under-Secretaries General (USGs) and an equivalent number of Assistant-Secretaries General (ASGs) nominally reported directly to the SG. Figure two depicts that arrangement and includes all of the New York-based Under-Secretaries plus two major humanitarian units, based in Geneva, that have liaison offices in New York. For readability, figure two groups legal and administrative functions in the first column, political and humanitarian in the second, and economic in the third.

No individual can maintain oversight of this many direct subordinates, even if his or her principal interest is administration. As a result, the Secretariat has been but loosely administered, and the need for

Figure 2 Secretariat Structure through February 1992



restructuring has become increasingly clear.<sup>38</sup> A geographically-, politically-, and economically-diverse group of 30 member states suggested, in the fall of 1991, that the fortuitous combination of wholesale change in the international political scene and the election of a new Secretary General offered the United Nations the best opportunity in decades to reinvent itself. (For lack of a formal title, let us call this the "30-Nation Initiative.") The group's informal recommendations for change built consistently on the inherently plausible notion that the number of officials routinely reporting directly to the SG must be reduced to a more manageable number, perhaps four or five. This notion was shared by other proposals for restructuring the Secretariat that were floated within the UN community in 1991.<sup>39</sup>

The new Secretary General lost no time in beginning the process of structural reform. In February 1992, he announced the "first phase in the process of restructuring and streamlining the Organization."<sup>40</sup> Figure three depicts the revised organization. There are the makings of three "super departments" in Administration and Management, Political Affairs, and Economic Development. Four other entities also report directly to the SG (Legal Affairs, which has absorbed Ocean Affairs; Public Information; Peacekeeping Operations, which is the renamed Special Political Affairs; and the Emergency Relief Coordinator, whose responsibilities, as of this

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
<sup>38</sup> Organization theory calls this the "span of control" problem. As the number of subordinates grows, a supervisor has less time to devote to each, authority is increasingly decentralized, and coordination among the disparate power centers may become increasingly difficult. To reduce span of control to manageable proportions, an organization must either add new layers of supervision, eliminate or consolidate functions, or do both at once. Adding layers makes the organization "taller," that is, raises the level to which a conflict must rise for resolution. Cutting functions wounds one or more constituencies that like or rely on those functions. In the case of the UN, policy flow is already quite vertical, but there has been no layer of management able either to halt or resolve policy conflicts before they reach the executive office of the Secretary General, or to enforce better horizontal coordination efforts amongst the Organization's various departments and offices.

Two classic treatments of public administration and organizational structure are Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 3rd Ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1976), and Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967), esp. 49 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Missions to the United Nations participating in this initiative to reform the Secretariat include Algeria, Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, USSR(Russia), United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. *Secretariat Reform: Background Memorandum*, Mission of Australia to the United Nations, November 29, 1991. Our own thinking on these issues was also stimulated in no small part by papers authored by former Under Secretary General Sir Brian Urquhart, resident scholar at the Ford Foundation, with co-author Erskine Childers, beginning in February 1991.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations, "Secretary General announces changes in the Secretariat," press release SG/A/479, February 7, 1992.

Figure 3 Revised Secretariat Structure from March 1992 (est.)



writing, were still being defined).

The February 1992 restructuring goes a long way toward correcting the span of control problem, but leaves a certain number of issues unsettled with respect to peacekeeping. These include issues of coordination between operators and negotiators, and between political planners and logisticians, as well as issues of recruitment and operational management. All of these issues are addressed further, below, and approaches to their resolution are presented in our recommendations in the final section of this report.

### **Evolution of Special Political Affairs**

From the earliest days of peacekeeping, perhaps in reaction to the militarized politics of the Cold War, or perhaps in reaction to the politicized role of the military in many countries, the Secretariat evolved a culture that tends to separate the concepts "peace" and "military." Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was himself dedicated to non-violent conflict resolution, and refused to use force in the Congo even when authorized to do so, as a last resort, to prevent civil war. When UN troops tried, in September 1961, to forcefully round up and deport Western mercenaries in the Congo's secessionist province of Katanga, they were acting without Hammarskjöld's explicit authorization.<sup>41</sup>

The Congo crisis led to creation of the post of Military Advisor to the Secretary General in late 1960. The first advisor was then-BGen. Indar Rikhye, who served until 1969. Rikhye doubled as Force Commander of the first UN Emergency Force in the Sinai, from February 1966 until it was withdrawn at Egyptian request, on the eve of the June 1967 War. From 1969 into the 1980s, more junior military officers were posted to the Secretariat, growing in rank without leaving their post. Rikhye's replacement rose from Lieutenant Colonel to Major General over an eight year assignment; that individual's successor, the current Military Advisor, was appointed as a Major in 1977 and also has risen to Major General. Nominally, the Military Advisor is still the Secretary General's principal source of military advice, but he and his small staff function, for all practical purposes, as assistants to the Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs.

The long-standing title of that office reflects the Secretariat's historical military allergy. Originally, Hammarskjöld established two

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<sup>41</sup> Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (New York: Knopf, 1972), 566-68. Urquhart notes that Hammarskjöld did authorize an earlier effort to round up mercenaries that proceeded without violence on August 28, 1961. His representatives in-country viewed their subsequent operation, two weeks later, as an extension of the original one.

"Under-Secretaries Without Portfolio," who were renamed Under-Secretaries General for Special Political Affairs in 1961. One post was held by Ralph Bunche until his death in 1971, the other by José Rolz-Bennet until his death the same year.

Bunche was replaced by his long-time aide Brian Urquhart, who retired in 1985 and was succeeded by fellow Briton Marrack Goulding, the present officeholder. By UN tradition, the successive appointments made the position a "British slot." For many years, this side of the Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA) oversaw the UN's operations in the Middle East, then constituting virtually all of the ongoing peacekeeping missions.

The other USG position in SPA became a Latin American slot by the same tradition of successive appointment, and the officeholder served as a mediator and troubleshooter for the Secretary General. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar held this post when selected to be SG in late 1981. His work as UN mediator for the crisis in Afghanistan passed to his successor, Diego Cordovez of Ecuador. After the agreements on Afghanistan were signed in 1988, friction over Cordovez' independent management style evidently led to his departure from UN service. His post was abolished.

### **Peacemaking and Peacekeeping**

At about the same time that SPA was reduced to a single Under-Secretary, all peacemaking functions (that is, all conflict resolution and mediation activities) were drawn into the SG's Executive Office as part of a larger reshuffling of the political side of the Secretariat. The SG continued the traditional practice of delegating day-to-day responsibility for mediation efforts to individuals appointed Personal or Special Representatives of the Secretary General (hereafter, SRSG).

The role of the SRSG varies considerably by mission. Although sometimes involved in both the creation of a settlement and its subsequent implementation, the SRSG is more often only the mediator, with no operational responsibilities. For example, the Special Representative to Iran and Iraq had no operational connection to the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, deployed along those countries' common border.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> The military officers involved in traditional operations like Iran-Iraq, or Cyprus, where the local parties are barely civil to one another, tend to prefer that the political efforts be managed separately from peacekeeping, as that helps the peacekeepers maintain an apolitical local image. That role may be blurred in a more politically complex operation like Central America. There, the Chief Military Observer, from Spain, managed the operation's day-to-day relationships with the five national governments who were parties to Esquipulas II, the agreement that called for a UN presence in the region. His Chief of Staff handled operational questions for the mission.

In other instances, the SRSO heads the operation and assumes responsibility for any negotiations needed after the field mission deploys, but may not have been involved in prior negotiations. This is the case with the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), where the SRSO is head of mission but had little role in negotiation of the agreement that he now must try to implement. The same is true *de facto* for UNTAC, the operation in Cambodia, since a new SRSO was appointed as the mission began to deploy.

These varying arrangements may appear to reflect a carefully crafted, optimized approach to each situation. But it is more correct to say that they reflect the constellation of personalities trusted by, and available to, the SG as needs arise. The SRSOs in turn select their principal assistants, dual-hatting a further tier of upper-middle managers or requiring their secondment from other UN departments. Over a period of years, this approach to delegating responsibility dual-hatted a growing number of UN officials whose nominal responsibilities within the Secretariat take second place to their mediation duties when a conflict begins to appear ripe for resolution. As the number of mediation and peacekeeping efforts continues to grow, so does the size of this informal apparatus of small decision-making and administrative offices. Their common characteristic is that all reported directly to the Secretary General.<sup>43</sup>

A number of such conflict mediation efforts came to fruition as the 1980s drew to a close; indeed, since 1988, most new UN peacekeeping operations have grown out of mediation efforts and the settlement agreements they have generated. With peacemaking drawn into the Executive Office, SPA, although charged with the planning and implementation of peacekeeping operations, sometimes has been left without a direct role in the crucial political run-up to new operations. Moreover, there is no organizational requirement that the peacemakers check with the operational offices before they make or accept proposals in their negotiations.

Efforts to improve coordination between negotiators and operators have included establishment of a standing committee called the Senior Planning and Monitoring Group. But such committees do not provide a sufficiently strong and consistent link between politics and operations; that

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<sup>43</sup> A related problem concerns the recruitment of UN Secretariat staff to fill professional civilian slots in the new multi-component peacekeeping missions. Staffers may be asked to join a field operation for a few weeks (as in the case of election observers), or for a year or more. There is a need to create a mechanism whereby returning "veterans" are assured of positions within the UN system comparable to those they left behind when they volunteered for overseas assignment. Otherwise, field duty will be shunned by precisely those UN staffers, with the brightest career prospects, who may have the most to contribute to a mission.



is, between an understanding of the needs and priorities of the contending parties, on the one hand, and decisions on such questions as mission size, structure, cost, and timing, on the other, yet these are all crucial determinants of operational feasibility and early effectiveness.

Peacemakers' reluctance to share information with operators before talks have concluded is defended on grounds of political sensitivity, but once an agreement has been reached, the local parties are typically impatient to implement it rapidly. If there has not been continuing consultation between mediators and operators, there will necessarily be a greater lag in fielding a mission, the mission may be only partially functional during the critical start-up period, and parts of the agreement may prove much more difficult than anticipated to implement, potentially placing at risk both the agreement and those who are tasked to implement it.

### **Operational Planning Issues**

New peacekeeping missions are planned at several levels in the Secretariat. A Task Force may be formed at the political (USG) level, with participants from every bureau having an interest in the new mission. Their deputies serve on the Task Forces' subordinate logistics working groups.

Working-level responsibility for mission planning falls in part to civilian officers in SPA, who are responsible for political planning, and in part to the military officers assigned to SPA who work in the Military Adviser's office, and are responsible for drawing up the initial mission operating plan. SPA, a very small office, also recruits the military elements of each mission, whether troop contingents or military observers, and is responsible for political and military backstopping, although it has no operations center.

The Field Operations Division (FOD), a unit of the Office of General Services, which in turn is part of the Department of Administration and Management (DAM), is responsible for administrative and logistical aspects of peacekeeping missions. Being in a separate chain of command, FOD coordinates with SPA but does not take orders from it. The division's 90 or so staffers in New York generate requirements for transport, logistical support, and communications, draw up mission budgets, and tend to these aspects of each operation once it deploys into the field. Fifty-five of FOD's people are permanent UN staff, a varying number (currently six) are seconded military officers, and the remainder are temporary "overload" staff paid out of peacekeeping mission budgets. As logistics and transport specialists, the military officers are most important when missions are just getting underway. They tend to come from member states whose armed forces have strong logistics and transport components, and who have strong interests in particular missions. Contributors have

included Australia, Austria, Canada, France, and the UK, as well as the United States.

Staffers in the Office of Human Resources Management, also a part of DAM, recruit all the civilian members of new peacekeeping operations. Still others in the Peacekeeping Unit of DAM's Office of Program Planning, Budget, and Finance review budget justifications and present budgets to the UN's legislative bodies for review and approval, as noted previously.

Four years ago, this system managed *five* continuing missions (in Kashmir, Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon, plus the UN Truce Supervisory Organization, headquartered in Jerusalem). Two years ago, it managed *ten* missions (the original five plus Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, Iran-Iraq, and Namibia, all begun in 1988-89). Today, it manages or will soon manage *thirteen* operations (eight of the previous ten or their successors, plus new missions in Cambodia, El Salvador, Iraq-Kuwait, Western Sahara, and Yugoslavia). Of the new missions, only Iraq-Kuwait has a "traditional" mandate, monitoring an international border, and even it has unusual parentage in the UN enforcement action against Iraq. Each of the other new missions is novel, complex, and dangerous. In the Western Sahara, the UN is tasked to conduct a referendum intended to resolve what fifteen years of fighting could not, namely, the territory's independence from, or merger with, Morocco. Cambodia and El Salvador both involve the reconstruction of nations following long civil wars, with Cambodia being the biggest UN operation in thirty years (16,000 military and 6,000 civilians). The Yugoslavia operation will place up to 14,000 UN troops in an uncertain political situation. Whatever margin the planning and implementation system may once have had has been eaten up by the continuing crush of new missions.

Operational planning for MINURSO illustrates the difficulties. Mission planning was done in parallel with ongoing, last-minute mediation efforts, and because the operational people were among the last to hear the latest results of those efforts, planning and budgeting for the mission were revised frequently and on short notice. The first draft referendum plan was agreed to by contending parties Morocco and Polisario in August 1988, and was endorsed in principle by the Security Council the following month. A revised implementation plan was approved by the Security Council in June 1990. MINURSO's interdepartmental planning task force, the only one not headed by SPA, subsequently grappled with the mission budget for six months. When its chairperson retired and his successor proved less than satisfactory, SPA was given charge of the task force and mission planning. Almost immediately, however, the Gulf War, the planning for its aftermath, and the planning for three other anticipated operations (Salvador, Angola, and Cambodia), diverted SPA's attention and MINURSO planning faded for several months. It was revitalized after the

formal cease-fire in Iraq in early April. A marathon budget-cutting session in mid-April pared mission costs, partly by declaring that a key element of the operation, the repatriation of roughly 100,000 refugee voters and their families, would be paid for through voluntary contributions. The operation received final political approval from the Security Council in late April, and budgetary approval from the General Assembly in mid-May, after further wrangling in committee over costs.

### **Selection of Field Personnel**

As noted, SPA recruits military contingents and military observers from member states for peacekeeping operations, and the Office of Human Resources recruits civilians. Some 840 full-time FOD Field Service personnel provide world-wide mission communications and other mission support, and roughly 160 professional-level staffers manage mission finances and procurement in the field. Other civilians are hired locally for each mission or recruited from member state governments.

In staffing a peacekeeping operation, all offices pay attention to "geographic distribution," to ensure recruitment opportunities for each of the UN's regional caucuses, but there is no master list of countries, contingents, or expertise. Indeed, a questionnaire distributed to member states in 1990 asking what military capabilities, equipment, and forces they might make available to the UN, if requested, produced a rather disappointing return and there has been no similar questionnaire for civilians. Still, more than 80 countries have at one time or another contributed at least individual observers, support personnel, or equipment to UN peacekeeping missions. A shorter list of countries has contributed military units (specialized companies, infantry battalions or, on occasion, entire brigades). Specialized units have included air and ground transport, logistics, communications, engineering, and medical. As few developing states can provide more than basic infantry contingents, specialized units tend to be drawn from the middle industrial powers. Until recently, the Security Council's five permanent members have contributed primarily financial and logistical support to peacekeeping. However, several new operations, including MINURSO, UNIKOM, and UNTAC, include military observers from all five permanent members.

Generally, when the need arises for contributors to a new operation, the Secretariat informally approaches diplomatic missions to the UN, asking for the capabilities that it needs and sounding out countries' willingness to provide them. The missions in turn ask their capitals, passing replies to the Secretariat and noting, when the reply is favorable, any national conditions on the size or type of unit, duration of deployment, and so on. If the conditions fit the UN's plans (or the plans can be adapted to the conditions), the Secretariat then makes a written request for the unit

on the stated terms. This procedure allows both sides of the transaction to avoid saying "no," and mirrors decision-making elsewhere in an organization that routinely goes to great lengths to avoid loss of face for itself or its members.

When the troop contributors for a traditional (all-military) operation have been selected, their unit leaders (the battalion commanders and their deputies) may be brought to New York for a familiarization meeting with UN officials and with the Force Commander, who in most cases has had nothing to do with the actual planning of the operation he is to head or the choice of troop contributors. The military leaders may have as much as a week to interact before heading for the field. They may or may not interact with logisticians from FOD during their time in New York, and may or may not meet the UN civilians who will administer the operation in the field on behalf of FOD. Nor is there a formal procedure for familiarizing military officers who will serve on the operation's headquarters staff with UN financial or procurement procedures.

For multi-component missions, which include civilian components as well as military units, pre-deployment coordination and familiarization is even murkier. All professional personnel, civilian and military, other than those deploying in self-contained military units, are recruited and supported by the UN as individuals (although governments may nominate their nationals in groups). Only the heads of the police or electoral components of such missions are likely to be pre-briefed in New York about the mission. They, like the military, receive a mission plan drafted by someone whom they do not know, and they will not meet the people whom they are to lead until they reach the mission area. The latter individuals may or may not have prior experience working with a UN field mission. The requirement that mission leaders, who do not know one another well, undertake wholesale on-the-job training of field personnel, with whom they have not worked before, can delay mission implementation and reduce local confidence in the UN's ability to do its job. Yet experienced hands argue that the first six weeks of a new mission are critical in establishing its credibility with the local parties. The tenser the local situation, the more critical it is that the mission be seen as competent and effective from the outset. Yet the tenser the situation, the more likely that the mission has to be deployed in some haste, and thus the less likely it is to hit the ground running.

The UN's recruitment of countries and people for peacekeeping operations may always have an *ad hoc* air to it, as an unavoidable consequence of dealing with sovereign states and their prerogatives. But the impact of such recruitment on the start of new missions could be reduced by a program of pre-training and familiarization with UN mission goals and procedures that could be required at least of all military and civilian leadership cadres, before they participate in UN field operations,

and eventually of most mission participants. We deal with this question further in our recommendations.

### **Command and Control in the Field**

UN officials in New York are well aware of the basically tenuous nature of their control over military contingents in the field. Historically, they have striven to reinforce it by sending career UN civilians on every peacekeeping mission, to mind the money, dispense supplies, and communicate with New York. Whereas the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer reports to SPA, the Chief Administrative Officer for the mission reports back to FOD. The argument for the dual system, the so-called "Middle East Model," rests in part on the need to have people in the mission who understand UN procurement and financial regulations, but the existence of a second chain of command also reflects the Organization's perceived need to maintain control and continuity in operations that they view as staffed largely by "temps," that is, non-UN personnel engaged temporarily for UN duty who are typically on the scene for six months to a year, but no more than that.

Astute Force Commanders recognize the stability and expertise that the UN civilian presence imparts to such traditional peacekeeping operations. But their lack of control over spending can place an administrative straitjacket on operations that face a difficult or changing field situation. Logistics and finance are critical functions -- an operation can fail for lack of food, water, transport, or spare parts -- but they remain support functions tangential to the main mission, which is to contain conflict. Moreover, they are functions that modern military staff officers are fully capable of performing, given the time and advance opportunity to learn the basics of the UN procurement system.

The relatively short duration of the newer multi-component missions, like the one in Namibia, where a good fraction of the military, police, and other personnel are new to UN work, tends to strengthen the Secretariat's argument for close UN staff control. On the other hand, as more of those missions are undertaken, the cadre of national personnel, both civilian and military, who are familiar with the UN *modus operandi* will broaden and deepen.

But the nature of multi-component missions reinforces the Secretariat argument for UN civilian control in another way. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, where the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer is the top operational officer and the mission is primarily military, the more complex missions have more specifically political objectives and have much larger civilian operational components (civilian police and police supervisors, electoral supervisors and observers, and perhaps civil

administrators). For that reason, they are headed by a civilian Special Representative, to whom all subordinate heads of mission components, civilian and military, report. The first of the new multi-component missions, UNTAG, experienced some friction in that regard, and as a result of that experience, the Secretariat has taken pains in its planning for subsequent missions to ensure that civilian control is effective.

In May 1991, for example, when the ACABQ cut the admittedly top-heavy plan for MINURSO from two proposed Under-Secretary-level positions to one (which the ACABQ assigned to the Special Representative), and from three Assistant-Secretary-level positions to one (which it assigned to MINURSO's Force Commander), its action set off political alarms within the Secretariat. In short order, the Fifth Committee received an in-person appeal from the Under-Secretary General for Administration, Martti Ahtisaari, whose people had assembled the MINURSO budget and who had headed UNTAG. As a result of this intervention, MINURSO's civilian deputy SRSG was given a rank comparable to that of the military commander. Although this may seem a small matter, it reflects not just "military allergy" in the Secretariat, but a judgment that the future of peacekeeping lies in facilitating political transitions, and that such operations must consistently demonstrate military subordination to civilian control. Given the prevalence of military regimes and the continuing fragility of democratic civilian control in many countries, this concern is legitimate and important for both operational and symbolic reasons.

The UN correctly views such operations as primarily political: Politics is about power and settlement agreements reallocate power or provide methods (usually elections) to bring about its reallocation. But peaceful reallocation requires that all parties to the settlement agree to abide by its results. They may not agree, or they may not get the word. SWAPO's April 1989 incursion into Namibia threatened to derail UNTAG, although it may not have *aimed at* doing so. Future forceful dissents may have more deliberate aim (as, perhaps, did the sniper who fired on a UN reconnaissance helicopter in Cambodia in late February 1992).

In such instances, the UN chain of command -- Headquarters in New York, the civilian head of mission, and the military component commander -- must have the necessary mutual respect for one another, and the mission must have sufficient flexibility, to cope with the situation quickly and effectively. Civilian leaders (and the member states who fund the operation and contribute the troops) must face the likelihood that some degree of force may have to be used to restore local stability and that

the operation may need substantial reserve capability to do it.<sup>44</sup> Military commanders (and troop contributing governments, who are often consulted by their contingents and may influence them directly) need to have sufficient confidence in UN leadership that they are willing to follow UN orders that may place their forces at risk, either in taking action or in avoiding it, as the larger interests of the mission dictate.<sup>45</sup> Generating such confidence is one function of the structural and procedural changes suggested in the final section of this report, including the appointment of a general officer with UN field experience to work within a Department of Peacekeeping and International Security. For unless UN civilian-military relations are sorted out, there remains the potential for friction, even tragedy, as the UN embarks upon missions where civil conflict may not be fully extinguished or civil order has yet to be restored.

## EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING

Obtaining equipment for a new peacekeeping operation is a costly endeavor that may also delay the start of time-critical missions. Deployment of government-provided personnel without experience in peacekeeping can further delay the effective start of operations as these individuals are familiarized with the field situation and learn what is expected of them as members of a UN team. This combination of equipment delays and unacquainted, inexperienced personnel can create start-up problems that reduce the confidence of local parties in the UN's ability to sustain a peace or rebuild a society.

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<sup>44</sup> Keeping forces in reserve can be expensive. To reduce costs, they have routinely been kept on their home territory until called upon. Several battalions, initially recruited but not deployed, were nominally available for UNTAG, and that operation's police component was increased several times during the course of the mission. But a fast-breaking situation in the field may not await the arrival of reinforcements based outside the immediate region. Realistic planning would build a reserve increment into the deployed force, and justify the costs as a necessary hedge against the unknown. (Such a "Force Mobile Reserve," less than battalion-sized, has evolved in UNIFIL; larger operations would require proportionately larger and more mobile reserves.) The purpose of the reserve would not be to "win" battles for the UN against willful armed elements, but to contain the damage until political pressure can be brought to bear on their major patron(s). If they have no outside patrons, presumably the problem would be easier for the UN to contain, in cooperation with the local parties.

<sup>45</sup> Traditional military thinking and traditional UN philosophy differ sharply on how best to respond to military provocation. Militaries train their people in the escalating use of force to achieve field objectives, while peacekeeping emphasizes non-violent responses to provocation, and de-escalation of conflictual situations. If de-escalatory responses tend to make local armed elements less rather than more respectful of UN operations, as seems, for example, to have been the case with some groups and some contingents in Lebanon, then UN leaders will face some unpalatable choices.

Such problems are most acute, of course, when the UN is asked to deploy a traditional military peacekeeping mission on short notice, in the aftermath of conflict. The last time it did so was in 1978, in Lebanon. Battalions arrived and deployed over a period of months. Several faced active resistance from local militias. Some reached their positions just as Israeli forces were pulling out, but in the "confused and dangerous circumstances" of southern Lebanon, that was as much a matter of good fortune as good planning.<sup>46</sup>

More recently, assembling UNIKOM, the relatively small observer mission that followed the Gulf War, took four weeks from mandate to first effective deployments, although much of the people and equipment it was to use initially were shipped from relatively nearby UN operations (Iran-Iraq border, Lebanon, Cyprus) and contingency plans were said to be in hand as much as two months earlier. Yet observers arrived in-country ahead of the UN's support and communications people. As of this writing, the UN is preparing to deploy thousands of peacekeeping troops and police observers to Yugoslavia in the space of a few weeks.

### Equipping the Force

When the United Nations recruits a military unit for a peacekeeping mission, it requests that the unit bring certain equipment with it that is needed for the mission (trucks, armored personnel carriers, communications gear).<sup>47</sup> Units from wealthier countries generally arrive well-equipped, whereas units from poorer countries may arrive with rifles in hand and not much more. Transport and other support for them is provided either through donations from wealthier countries or through the UN procurement system. In the latter case, there may be a delay of weeks to months while the equipment is acquired and delivered.

For observer missions, and for complex missions with large civilian components, the Field Operations Division has some standardized equipment and sources that it uses under standing contracts. Nissan and Toyota are the standard suppliers of four-wheel-drive (4WD) vehicles, and will interrupt their production lines to fill orders from the UN. Motorola has been the standard UN supplier of communications gear for several decades, from walkie-talkies to new manpack units that combine radios with facsimile machines; it will also give the UN its highest production priority (for "emergency equipment"). Odelph, in the Netherlands, supplies night vision devices, and the Crypto-Zug Company of Switzerland supplies

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<sup>46</sup> John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers* (London, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 48-54.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations, *Requirements for United Nations Peacekeeping*, UN Document A/45/217, May 8, 1990, 4.



facsimile machines with encryption capabilities. In the case of communications and other electronics gear, such arrangements are considered, by UN logistics planners, to be superior to maintaining a stockpile of equipment that rapidly becomes obsolete. However, in the case of large items, such as trucks and other vehicles, even arrangements for priority production entail six to nine weeks delay from the time orders are placed to the time equipment reaches the area of operations. For time-urgent missions, such delays may be unacceptable.

Since 1988 there has been, therefore, interest in the Secretariat in enlarging the role of the UN's storage depot at Pisa, Italy. Established in the 1950s as a way station for equipment bound for active missions, it remains essentially that. Non-perishable items such as uniforms and other personal accoutrements are stored there, along with items used by the UN's Disaster Relief Office (tents, blankets, plastic sheeting, buckets, and the like). A 1990 request that \$15 million be authorized to create, under FOD management, a revolving stock of vehicles, maintenance equipment, communications equipment, field accommodations, and the like, was denied by the ACABQ, which recommended that equipment be recycled from ongoing missions.<sup>48</sup> It is only with the advent of time-limited missions like UNTAG, UNIMOG, or MINURSO that this alternative has emerged, as long-term missions will wear out equipment and have none to recycle.

The mandates of UNIMOG and UNAVEM I specified that surplus equipment be sent to Pisa, following their completion. But these missions were followed up immediately by new operations (UNIKOM and UNAVEM II) that absorbed their surplus. The same was true for ONUCA, whose personnel and equipment were shifted immediately to ONUSAL; surplus equipment is being stored in El Salvador pending transfer to other missions.

The press of new missions in fact gives the UN little choice but to purchase new goods and to lease equipment, where necessary and feasible, to fill the gap between orders and deliveries. But costs sunk into leasing might better be directed toward smoothing out the acquisition of such items over the course of each year, in anticipation of mission needs, even if that entails hiring mechanics for an enlarged facility at Pisa.

Although SPA and FOD can readily anticipate such needs, the authorizing and financial arrangements that support peacekeeping still treat it as an emergency function, and thus tend to treat each mission in fiscal and political isolation. The system does not respond to projections, only to

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<sup>48</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, "The feasibility and cost-effectiveness of a reserve stock of equipment...", UN Document A/45/493/Add.1, October 30, 1990.

specific mission budget requests, as the legislative arms of the UN focus on minimizing costs in each instance. *Overall* costs might be minimized with an approach that permitted total peacekeeping budgets, and their equipment line items, to be estimated much as the line items of the regular biennial budget are estimated. With a great deal more planning experience under their belts now than even four or five years ago, UN resource planners should be able to do that quite handily, given appropriate input from the UN's political offices about the size and timing of anticipated missions. In our recommendations, below, we suggest ways in which such changes in budgeting and procurement might be made.

### **Technology in the Field**

Peacekeeping missions can make use of more than just vehicles, binoculars, and radios in their operations. Other technologies include aircraft, ground surveillance devices, and satellite communications.

#### **Aircraft**

Increasingly, air transport and air surveillance are seen as key "multipliers" of operational capabilities, especially where UN areas of operation encompass entire countries. Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, too expensive to purchase and maintain, are provided by governments or leased from private firms. In Central America, for example, an American firm provided helicopter support to ONUCA. However, when that operation was given the additional task of securing the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (the Contras), ONUCA found that it needed much heavier lift capability than the contractor was providing. Although civilian contractors tend to field "leaner" (and thus cheaper) units with fewer support personnel per aircraft, military units are more capable of responding to unforeseen circumstances. Trucks used to support the Canadian air unit in ONUCA, for example, were pressed into service as cargo-haulers to help supply the security zones established throughout Nicaragua for Contra repatriation and demobilization. Moreover, should a peacekeeping situation deteriorate into conflict or otherwise become more dangerous than anticipated, military units are trained for it.

The militaries of relatively few countries outside the industrialized West are equipped to provide air support to UN operations, particularly long-range transport of equipment. The US Air Force has traditionally provided most of the airlift for the initial deployment of UN peacekeepers. From the first Sinai mission in 1956 through the deployment of UNIFIL in 1978, the United States waived reimbursement for initial airlift. Altogether, the US flew more than 2,000 sorties in support of the Congo operation, for example, and waived reimbursement for almost one-third of

them.<sup>49</sup> When peacekeeping revived in 1988, the US government's deficit problems (and undoubtedly a certain lapse in institutional memory over the ten year gap between new missions) contributed to a decision to seek reimbursement from the UN for the cost of non-emergency lift services provided. Emergency transport, as in the case of nine C-5 *Galaxy* missions to fly Finnish peacekeepers to Namibia in April 1989, has still been provided to the UN at no cost to the Organization. Such capabilities, which involve more than just aircraft -- air traffic control personnel, as well as communications gear, spare parts, and repair capabilities must be distributed along the flight path -- remain unique to the United States.

For regional air transport, however, the UN has benefitted from the loan of aircraft from several countries, and of late from the interests of the new market economies of Eastern Europe in earning hard currency. The aircraft provided may not have the latest in instrument navigation equipment, but they cost less to lease, and to the cash-starved UN, cost is becoming a paramount concern.

Air support is not new to UN operations, and neither is aerial surveillance, although its role has been quite low-key to date. Both of the Sinai peacekeeping missions benefitted from aerial surveillance capabilities, as have their non-UN successors. Moreover, US reconnaissance flights continue to be made over Sinai and the Golan Heights, on a highly structured, predictable basis, in a nearly 20-year-old operation known as "Olive Harvest."<sup>50</sup> Helicopters played a role in UNIMOG, although not as key a role as they might have, largely due to Iranian objections. The importance of local support for UN inspection flights has also been highlighted by the Organization's experience in Western Sahara. MINURSO's mandate provided for unfettered UN use of the territory's airspace, but in practice its ability to deploy and conduct operations has been highly dependent on Moroccan acquiescence. In another case, that of the Special Commission in Iraq, Baghdad allowed the UN to use its own helicopters for weapons inspections only after sabre-rattling by the US.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> US Air Force, Military Airlift Command, Office of the Historian, "MATS Participation in United Nations Peace-Keeping Missions," *MATS/MAC Chronologies, 1960, 1989*. Wainhouse, 547.

<sup>50</sup> For details on the Middle East operations, see Amy Smithson, "Multilateral Aerial Inspections," in Michael Krepon and Amy Smithson, eds., *Open Skies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, forthcoming), and Smithson, "Overhead Inspections," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (January/February 1992).

<sup>51</sup> Hon. Les Aspin, "Winning the War and Losing the Peace in Saddam Hussein's Iraq." Mimeo. Text of a speech given in New York City, December 12, 1991, 7. David Fulghum, "Protecting UN Inspectors in Iraq Would Require Many US Aircraft," *Aviation Week*, September 30, 1991, 71.

The Special Commission also marked the first time that a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft (an American U-2) was placed under the control of the United Nations. The aircraft's sensors, along with satellite intelligence data made available to the UN by the United States, have aided the Commission's ground inspections.<sup>52</sup> Other airborne technologies of potential utility would include synthetic aperture radars (SARs), potentially able to peer through jungle canopies to detect the stronger radar returns of weapons caches. Searching for such caches, for example, will be a task of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.<sup>53</sup>

In other situations, for example, where unsettled border zones must be monitored, UN forces could put simpler overhead surveillance capabilities to good use. A former Commander of UNIFIL, Gen. Gustav Hägglund of Finland, has written of the potential utility of low-altitude reconnaissance drones for peacekeeping operations.<sup>54</sup> A drone poses no risk to a pilot, and can be very hard to see or track on radar. *Pioneer* drones, for example, operated successfully with US forces during the Gulf War, providing real-time television pictures to ground controllers at ranges up to 185 kilometers. A *Pioneer* unit could maintain surveillance of a border zone up to 400 km long with overflights every two hours. To maintain contact with the local populace, while limiting risks at night, a peacekeeping force could routinely use human patrols during the daytime, with drones providing additional information quickly on reported hot spots. At night, a combination of passive ground sensors to detect movement and infrared-equipped drones to check it out would permit the proportion of human and drone patrolling to be reversed.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> R. Jeffrey Smith and John M. Goshko, "US Lends Spy Plane to UN to View Iraq," *Washington Post*, August 13, 1991, 12.

<sup>53</sup> See the *Final Act of the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, Annex I: UNTAC Mandate*, section C.1.d. Contained in UN General Assembly document A/46/608, October 30, 1991, 24. On the capabilities and operations of synthetic aperture radar, see Eli Brookner, "Radar Imaging for Arms Control," in Kosta Tsipis, David Hafemeister, and Penny Janeway, eds., *Arms Control Verification* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), 135-165, esp. 136. Radar frequencies of 1.25 GHz or less are needed to reduce signal attenuation by foliage, and even then, only caches located above-ground would have any probability of detection.

<sup>54</sup> Lt. Gen. Gustav Hägglund, "Peacekeeping in a Modern War Zone," *Survival*, May/June 1990, 235.

<sup>55</sup> The example assumes a control unit positioned in the middle of the border area to be patrolled. Built under Israeli license by a Maryland-based company, the *Pioneer* has five hours endurance and carries either a daylight TV camera or an imaging infrared camera for use at night. AAI Corporation, "*Pioneer* RPV," company factsheet (Hunt Valley, MD: AAI Corp., 1987). In Operation Desert Storm, *Pioneer* sorties averaged three hours apiece. *Aerospace Daily*, February 13, 1991, 264.

Forward-looking infrared sensors, as deployed on *Pioneer* and other drones, have a

### Ground Surveillance Technology

For many years, the UN has had to operate in dangerous situations with fewer arms than the parties it is keeping apart. In many cases, it has also operated with lower-capability surveillance technologies than have been available to the parties. This has been true particularly in the case of the two missions on Israel's northern borders, UNIFIL and UNDOF, but was also the case in UNIIMOG, where observers were limited not only in the technologies they could use, but the places they could look. Thus politics plays a key limiting role and is sometimes a decisive barrier to higher-technology UN operations. However, in situations where local political support for an operation is strong enough, and the peacekeepers are perceived as even-handed, political barriers can be lowered. The region of Israel's southern border with Egypt, for example, is monitored by the independent Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), deployed in the Sinai in support of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. That force uses a wide variety of electronic devices to assist it in monitoring a wide expanse of territory. Surveillance results are summarized and reported to the parties.<sup>56</sup> That a large part of the force is American helps, not only with political acceptability, but with the availability and operation of the technology.

Among the potentially useful technologies are seismic ground sensors to detect movement of vehicles and (at relatively close range) people; passive night vision devices (image intensifiers and thermal imagers); and ground radars. Seismic sensors were used with success by the US Sinai Field Mission, starting in the mid-1970s.<sup>57</sup> Image intensifiers, which magnify ambient visible light to useful levels, enable observers to see in the dark when the air is clear. However, field experience has demonstrated their limited utility where ground haze is prevalent, as along the Iraq-Kuwait border. The UN has purchased image intensifiers for use in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Western Sahara. Not cheap, a pair of basic night vision binoculars may cost \$3,000, and a telescope with nine or ten power

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relatively narrow field of view (generally 20 degrees or less), so they are not as useful for wide-area surveillance at night as for quick follow-up investigation of events with known locations. A unit with four to six drones would cost about \$10 million to acquire, and probably another million dollars a year to operate.

<sup>56</sup> Smithson, "Multilateral Aerial Inspections." Also, Brian S. Mandell, *The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multinational Arms Control Verification and Risk Management*, Arms Control Verification Studies No. 3, prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, September 1987.

<sup>57</sup> Mandell, 9-12.

magnification may cost \$10,000.<sup>58</sup> But the capabilities they provide are irreplaceable. Without such night vision equipment, UN forces are vulnerable to local armed elements every time the sun sets.

Thermal imagers, which detect infrared emissions and translate them into images visible to the human eye, can see through haze, dust, and smoke, in daylight or at night. Advanced models were the key to coalition tank gunners' success against Iraqi armor in the Gulf War. As a result, thermal imaging technology tends to be militarily more sensitive, and more liable to export restriction. It is also harder to maintain, requiring some means of keeping the imager cool (where "cool" can mean the temperature of liquid air). But for observers who need to be able to spot movement at night, such technology can be indispensable.

Finally, the UN has been experimenting with ground surveillance radars in Lebanon. Radars, which send out their own signal and interpret its reflection, can cover a wide swath of territory automatically. To date, potential exporters have been as reluctant to part with radar technology as they have thermal imagers.

The main problem with sophisticated technology, aside from local politics, military sensitivity, and cost, is the level of skill needed to operate and maintain it, a level found in relatively few troop contributing countries. As military technologies diffuse around the globe, general familiarity with them can be expected to rise as well. But the UN, for the time being, will need to rely on member states who own such equipment to contribute the military units that will operate it in the field.

In the case of some technologies, such as night vision equipment, the issue is not so much user skills as it is maintenance. In such cases, the UN could develop its own cadre of maintenance technicians based, perhaps, at an improved Pisa facility, to perform depot and field maintenance.

### **Training and Competence**

Because the Secretariat must consider "geographic distribution" as well as military competence in requesting a government's participation in a mission or in weighing its offer of assistance, the quality and technical competence of its troop contingents and groups of observers tend to vary widely. Such disparities could be ameliorated by a greater emphasis on standardized training for officers and units to be deployed in UN

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<sup>58</sup> Representative cost numbers provided by Ron Clayton, Electro-Optical Systems Division, IMO Industries, Inc., Garland, Texas. Telephone interview, January 2, 1992.

operations, and by opportunities for military officers, police officials, and senior election officials to work together in simulated operational settings. The International Peace Academy has run small seminars annually, in New York and Geneva, for senior national personnel, using inter-personal simulation and role-playing to give participants a feel for the problems they are likely to encounter in the field.

Some states have already established UN-oriented training centers. The Nordic countries take pride in the system that they have established for training participants in peacekeeping missions: Denmark trains military police; Finland trains observers; Norway provides logistics and transport training; and Sweden trains staff officers. In addition, each country trains its own infantry battalions in peacekeeping and observation techniques. The Nordics encourage other countries to visit their facilities and participate in their programs (which are conducted in English, peacekeeping's "trade language"). Partly in consequence, training programs for peacekeepers have been established in Austria, Canada, Malaysia, Poland, Switzerland (for observers), and (ironically, perhaps) Yugoslavia. The Austrian center also trains Hungarian officers. In the spring of 1991, the UN issued its first training manual, as well as its first compendium of standard operating procedures for peacekeeping. Heretofore, only the UN civilians in an operation have had a book of standard procedures.

The cost of specialized training for UN operations is beyond most of the individual developing states who contribute troops and observers.<sup>59</sup> With respect to the majority of contributing states, therefore, the UN incurs a certain amount of risk in accepting an offer of troops. "War stories" to this effect abound. What the Organization needs, as it embarks on an era of larger, more complex, and more risky missions, is a system whereby it can assure itself in advance of the ability of a given country's troops or personnel to shoulder successfully the mandated tasks of a new mission, without narrowing the pool of countries from which it selects its people. The existing pool of troop contributors (and especially contributors of specialized units) is already, if anything, too small, too white, and too Western. If the UN is to maintain its image as a truly impartial, international organization, then the traditional emphasis on representative geographic distribution in its forces must also be maintained, not by lowering the Organization's standards, for that is a recipe for disaster in critical situations, but by raising standards among member states.

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<sup>59</sup> Perhaps it is more correct to say that *sustaining* a trained capability over time is the problem. Soldiers rotate into and out of units, and not every country that trains troops for UN duty is called to send them into the field before their tours of duty expire. A country could spend years "marching in place," waiting for a call from the Organization, and consider its investment in New York soldiering a waste of resources. One way to recoup that investment would be to recruit peacekeeping units as Sweden does, from the pool of citizens with military experience. The individual battalions disband upon rotation home.

For suggestions on how this might be accomplished, please turn to the recommendations in section three.



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## RECOMMENDATIONS

The UN's ability to play a wider and more effective role in world security affairs depends first upon the willingness of the nations of the world to rethink their attitudes toward the United Nations and to consider basic reforms in the Organization's internal structure and procedures. The permanent members of the Security Council, for example, are still the world's only declared nuclear powers, but international economic clout has been accumulating in other capitals for many years. Germany, Italy and Japan remain, in the UN Charter's now-anachronistic terms, "enemy" powers. They would much like to have that language rescinded, but to do so would require amendment of the Charter, as would changes in the composition of the Security Council to reflect the new centers of power and to better represent the world's regions. Such changes are no less important for being extremely difficult to implement. Charter revision requires the favorable votes of two-thirds of the UN's member states and two-thirds of member states' legislatures, including those of the permanent members. There have been no such changes in three decades. Proposals for revision have been accumulating, then, like stress in a geologic fault-line. The fear is that when enough sentiment for change has built up, the resulting "quake" will fracture the Organization. Thus, fundamental changes in the UN are approached with great caution by all responsible parties, particularly those with the greatest stake in the current structure.

If the world's capital-surplus countries continue to be pressured to contribute more to the workings of the UN, particularly in the peace and security field, we can expect to hear the old cry from the American Revolution, "no taxation without representation," echoing (softly and diplomatically) in the corridors of the world body. If and when a change in representation comes to the Security Council, it could have significant impact on what the Council is able to accomplish in the security field.

But much could be done to strengthen the United Nations' role in peace and security short of revising the Charter. The changes we propose in this area come down to a matter of commitment and will: commitment to looking more open-mindedly at the UN's potential contribution to this important part of human affairs; and will to make the necessary changes in the UN's organizational structure and to provide the resources needed to make such potential a reality.

## NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING

The different nations of the world have different roles to play in UN peacekeeping, with the five permanent members of the Security Council having special responsibilities.

### **The Permanent Five**

As a practical matter, in security affairs more than any other, the United Nations will have great difficulty growing beyond whatever limits may be imposed by the powers who wield the veto in the Security Council, singly or in concert. In one sense, their veto power is only a formality; historically, the permanent members have had a decisive say on most types of UN security operations by dint of their military and political status alone. Thus, the initiation of UN missions without the approval or at least tacit consent of all five remains unwise, even if it is possible. Security questions, in theory, can still be taken to the General Assembly for veto-free consideration under the US-invented "Uniting for Peace" resolution. But the permanent five currently pay 57 percent of the cost of each operation, and the withholding of their financial and logistical support, particularly the support of the United States, could cripple an operation. Lost in many member states' eagerness to bill a disproportionate share of the costs of peacekeeping missions to the permanent five is an appreciation of the degree of control this gives the five powers, irrespective of the veto. It is the same economic clout that allowed the United States, by withholding portions of its regular contribution to the Organization, to alter the process by which the General Assembly makes financial decisions. We do not denigrate consensus-based budgeting, but its emergence reflects the fact that, with states as well as with individuals, you get what you pay for. For at least the past six or seven years, the United States has been making sure of that, and in doing so has effectively ended the era in which UN policy was controlled by the voting majority of developing states in the General Assembly.

The permanent members, except for China, also possess most of the world's military lift capacity, which is vitally important in the early phases of new missions. Their expertise in military planning and logistics has been, and should continue to be, made available to the Secretariat. Military officers from the permanent five should continue to participate, quietly but routinely, in UN observer missions, as their presence can lend greater credence to an operation, yet not suggest great power dominance.

Military participation by the permanent five in peacekeeping missions should remain low-key, however, so that peacekeeping does not come to be seen as a tool of great power domination. US military officers should not serve as commanders of UN operations, for example, as it would be widely assumed that Washington was really directing the mission in its own interest, whatever the reality in the field, and despite all efforts by the Force Commander to demonstrate otherwise. By the same token, infantry battalions from the permanent five should not be used in peacekeeping unless the credibility of the mission demands it; for example, to bolster an operation that carries greater than average risk of combat.

Such units should never be included in an operation if that would threaten the UN's reputation for disinterested even-handedness or its ability to mediate disputes.

Where local political conditions permit, however, permanent members might contribute specialized units to peacekeeping operations, such as helicopter units, ground transport companies, and communications companies. The US already provides much of the airlift for UN peacekeeping; this should be continued and other types of logistical functions added, as well. The permanent members might also provide advanced equipment, such as drone surveillance vehicles and the personnel to operate them, which they keep in military inventories routinely, but which the UN has not the financial resources to purchase on its own. The permanent five, in fact, might purchase for UN missions relatively simple-to-operate advanced devices, such as night vision equipment, and come prepared to train other nations' personnel in their use. Such contributions of units and equipment, relatively small by US standards, could tremendously magnify the UN's peacekeeping potential.

Contributions of military support units by the United States, in particular, also would raise the visibility of women in UN peacekeeping operations. UNTAG was something of a breakthrough operation for UN civilian women, as several seconded from the UN professional staff helped to manage the operation, even running electoral districts.<sup>1</sup> Women have thus far been less visible in military contingents. That can and should change, as suggested by two examples. The Canadian Forces air unit deployed to Central America in support of ONUCA included female personnel, including truck drivers who found themselves unexpectedly navigating back-country mountain roads when called upon to resupply the camps set up to repatriate the Contras. They served with distinction. So did thousands of American military women who participated in the recent Gulf War, as fixed- and rotary-wing transport pilots, logisticians, truck drivers, military police, and mechanics. They lived and worked in the field and, indeed, took some casualties. It is past time for UN operations, long since integrated by nationality, to pay more attention to integrating women in military functions.

### **The "New Era" Powers**

A glance at the list of contributions to UN peacekeeping will show that the permanent five are not the top five contributors, even at their augmented rates of assessment. Japan, with a 1992 assessment of 12.5

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<sup>1</sup> See *UNTAG in Namibia* UN Publication E.90.1.10 (New York: United Nations, March 1990). Since Namibia, upwards of 30 percent of the civilian professionals recruited for new operations have been women.

percent, is number two. The USSR was assigned responsibility for 11.4 percent of peacekeeping costs in the new scale, but Russia's eventual share will be smaller, as the former Soviet assessment is being reallocated among all the successor republics that join the UN. Thus Germany, now at 8.9 percent, will likely soon assume the number three spot. France and the UK are fifth and sixth. Italy is seventh. China is sixteenth.

Germany and Japan have constitutions that limit the use of their armed forces outside national territory. The limits were imposed after World War II, as part of a concerted effort to demilitarize German and Japanese society. That effort has succeeded, perhaps beyond anyone's expectations at the time and, indeed, to such an extent that both countries' governments have a difficult time convincing legislators and publics that their military participation in even so clearly a multilateral, peace-oriented, and constructive an endeavor as UN peacekeeping is a good idea. Evidently there are fears in those countries that sending military units to far away lands might reawaken some atavistic imperial urge or re-stimulate German or Japanese forces to dominate their societies.

These concerns may seem remote to us, but they are powerful in Japan and Germany. If contributions of military units remain unfeasible, perhaps military observers, who operate unarmed and as individuals, would be more acceptable. In the recent past, Germany has sent civilian police, as well as mechanics, to UN operations, and has donated aircraft. In the future, Japan could do so as well. Cambodia, for example, offers an opportunity for Japan to contribute engineering equipment and the people to go with it, to help rebuild the country's airfields, roads, bridges, railways, and other civilian facilities. Given Southeast Asian history, those units might make the most favorable impression if they were civilian.

The Japanese government might also take it upon itself to purchase, store, and maintain against UN needs, the ubiquitous white four-wheel-drive vehicles that the UN buys in quantity from Nissan and Toyota for peacekeeping missions. Even if the stocks have to be shipped from Japan, saving the several-weeks lag for production that UN orders now entail could be vitally important to some future operation. Japan might even maintain two vehicle stocks, one of them at the UN's Pisa facility, for more timely distribution to operations in different parts of the world.

Germany's contribution to this aspect of peacekeeping might be to finance and supervise, in cooperation with the government of Italy, the upgrading of the Pisa facility to include humidity-controlled storage and maintenance facilities for vehicles and other equipment. The UN's legislative committees have in recent years rebuffed Secretariat requests for as little as \$15 million to upgrade Pisa and its inventory, a trivial sum for a power with Germany's economic clout that, if invested, could pay

substantial dividends in terms of more timely start-ups for UN missions and good will for Germany.

#### **AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL**

Today, the SG has the authority to send out mediation, fact-finding, and similar "good offices" missions not previously budgeted, under General Assembly resolutions governing "unforeseen and extraordinary expenses." However, he can spend no more than \$3 million annually on his own authority, and only \$10 million with the approval of the ACABQ. These ceilings should be raised to perhaps \$20 million and \$50 million, respectively, to reflect the pro-active orientation of the Organization recommended by this study. This is not a new idea, but one that would give the SG more freedom to undertake good offices missions as needed.

The new Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, is being encouraged by the great powers to take a more active role in peace and security affairs. This is all to the good, but a SG who walks out on a diplomatic limb risks having those same great powers saw the limb off unless he has at least their tacit agreement to proceed. Thus, the SG should make far greater use of Article 99 of the Charter than has heretofore been the case. Having apprised the Council that a situation poses a potential threat to international peace and security, and having received its informal support for UN intercession, the SG and his mediation teams could have more immediate impact on the situation, while spending less time watching their political backs.

When the Security Council has approved a new peacekeeping mission, the SG should be able to obligate funds on behalf of that mission before the General Assembly finalizes the budget, using his "unforeseen and extraordinary" spending authority and drawing on the single peacekeeping fund whose creation we suggest, below. This approach would permit the immediate ordering of necessary support equipment and transportation for a new mission without usurping the General Assembly's control of funding. The Secretariat might be limited in its contracting authority for the start-up period to one-third of the mission budget (even the most diligent of committees is unlikely to reduce a peacekeeping budget request by two-thirds, so the Secretariat would be most unlikely to commit itself, during the start-up period, to more than the Assembly eventually approves).

Such early spending authority would help to reduce the deployment bottlenecks faced by recent missions, but would also require that basic budgetary information be provided to the Security Council as it weighs an operation's mandate. The SG did that in seeking Council authorization of

MINURSO, although he received a tart reprimand from the ACABQ for doing so, and subsequent reports seeking Council authorizations have also sketched funding requirements.<sup>2</sup> The permanent members of the Council pay a majority of peacekeeping costs and have an interest in knowing the cost of what they authorize. Since they and other major funders are also represented on the ACABQ, as a practical matter the Council's awareness of a mission's financial requirements should help rather than hinder its progress through the UN's funding hoops.

## FINANCE

Peacekeeping is clearly a legitimate function of the United Nations, and the costs of missions approved following normal UN procedures are clearly legitimate expenses of the Organization. Most countries, including all of the great powers, ascribe to this position. While it began as an emergency function, peacekeeping has become a normal activity of the Organization, and one of its most important, although it still sometimes deals with emergencies. Both its structure (discussed below) and its financing should reflect its ongoing routine nature.

Peacekeeping suffers from tight constraints on available resources, as do most functions of the United Nations. We suggest that states be prepared to make up to \$3 billion available for UN peacekeeping each year, roughly four times the amount that has been spent in recent years. But the financial problems of UN peacekeeping go well beyond the total amount of funds available. Reforms are desirable in the way the Organization budgets and raises money for peacekeeping missions, in the timeliness with which funds are made available to new operations, and in the system for reimbursing nations that participate in missions. Whether one looks at cash flows or balance sheets, UN peacekeeping efforts could be greatly strengthened through financial reforms.

### **A Single Budget for Peacekeeping**

Whatever the aggregate amounts estimated for future peacekeeping costs (and more careful and detailed estimates should be made than are possible in this report), it seems clear that peacekeeping should be treated like any other integral UN expense. That is, peacekeeping costs should be estimated for the upcoming biennium, incorporated into the UN's two-year budget, considered by the General Assembly in the normal budgetary process, and paid for as part of a single annual assessment of UN dues, with no more than one supplementary assessment each year to support

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the proposal for the Advance Mission in Cambodia, UNAMIC. S/23097/Add.1, September 30, 1991.

unanticipated missions. This procedure would avoid the current situation of multiple, off-cycle assessments to member states for particular missions. Moreover, it would make clear that peacekeeping was no longer a special function for special circumstances, but a method through which the UN routinely contributes to international peace and security.

Although each peacekeeping mission should have its own expenditure ceiling and balance sheet, monies should be consolidated into a single Peacekeeping Fund. That is, as countries remit their consolidated assessments, the portion allocated in the overall UN budget for peacekeeping should be credited to the Peacekeeping Fund. Contributions should not be made to individual missions and, likewise, could not be earmarked for withholding from individual missions. Although nothing could stop a state from withholding payment of a sum equivalent to its share of a mission it disapproved of, with a fungible pool of peacekeeping money the UN could spread the shortfall over all missions (including those the withholding state liked most), which might shift disputes over particular mission mandates and performance to their proper venue, namely, the Security Council.

The common pool of cash for peacekeeping could be used to finance the start-up of urgent new missions, as well as the costs of ongoing missions, and is one of several steps suggested in these recommendations to cushion the shock of start-up, the others being the creation of equipment stocks and an increase in the SG's "unforeseen and extraordinary" spending authority.

Although it is more difficult to estimate budgetary needs for episodic functions like peacekeeping, it is not impossible, as national military establishments and disaster relief agencies all over the world have known for years. If estimates of peacekeeping costs turn out to have been wildly exaggerated, the funds remaining at the end of a year could be placed in contingency accounts for future years or could be used to offset the next year's assessments. Alternatively, surpluses could be used to finance the purchase of equipment stocks for peacekeeping, as discussed elsewhere, or used to expand and improve the training given to the troops that have been earmarked to take part in peacekeeping missions. If peacekeeping financial requirements turn out to have been underestimated, on the other hand, and contingency funds are not available, the option of drawing up a special budget and making an additional assessment for an unforeseen mission will always be available. The Secretariat should limit itself to one correction per annum.

The budgets and mandates of new missions should be standardized on the calendar year (and thus the UN's fiscal year), with the initial mandate period devised to bring the mission into conformity with the fiscal year from the second period onward. The UN has long maintained the

fiction that every operation is just for the short term, and so mandates for missions without specified timelines (virtually all traditional missions), as well as their budgets, are doled out in six-month packets. After the initial mandate period, such operations should be reauthorized on an annual basis. This innovation alone would allow field administrators to better rationalize their acquisition planning, and could reduce the cost of operations.

Finally, the amount budgeted for peacekeeping should represent the true cost of the peacekeeping missions contemplated during the coming biennium, including the value of goods and services that will be contributed in-kind and the cost of the implicit subsidies now paid by troop contributing countries.

### **Paying the Bills**

As a matter of equity, even in the absence of the overall reform just described, member states with above-average per capita GNP should be moved to Group B in the peacekeeping scale of assessments; that is, they should pay a share of peacekeeping costs equivalent to their share of the regular budget. The reduced burden imposed on many oil-producing, revenue-surplus nations is a particularly unfair aspect of the current peacekeeping assessment formula. Indeed, in view of the fact that peacekeeping contributes importantly to international stability, and thus to a favorable environment for the financial markets upon which these countries depend heavily, one could argue that they should be willing to pay even more for peacekeeping than other states do. The higher shares paid by the permanent five could then be reduced proportionately.

More fundamentally, however, over a period of time, the special scale of assessment for peacekeeping should be phased out as part of the process of making peacekeeping a routine UN function. Eventually, peacekeeping should be paid for like any other UN activity. To prevent this process of normalization from presenting undue hardships for poorer member states, the Organization should consider eliminating the ceiling and floor for assessments (currently set at 25 percent and 0.01 percent) and using a common metric to assess all member states' shares of the budget.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The United States' contribution is the only one affected by the 25 percent ceiling. Although its share of global gross national product is estimated at 28 percent (and given fluctuations in exchange rates and problems in establishing accountable production in current and former centrally planned economies, it can only be an estimate), global economic realities in the 1990s ensure that the US share is unlikely to rise, so the ceiling on assessment rates could comfortably be done away with as a tradeoff for doing away with the floor. The computations of the Committee on Contributions are both torturous and largely opaque to member states. At the end of the 46th General Assembly, the Fifth Committee issued a plea for simplification and transparency (but not for a change in floor or ceiling rates).



### Improving the timeliness of contributions

It is essential that assessments for peacekeeping, like all UN assessments, be paid on a timely basis. In recent years, the UN has faced recurrent cash flow problems. As recently as December 1991, for example, the Organization came close to missing its payroll. Deliberate national decisions not to pay certain UN assessments have been one major cause of this problem, but simple delays in payments have also contributed. A particular problem dates from the early 1980s, when the United States decided to pay its annual assessment with funds appropriated for the following, rather than previous, fiscal year. This means that the US payment for any year typically arrives at least nine months after the start of the UN budget year. US appropriations for peacekeeping *are* made a year ahead, but US budgeters have not done as good a job as they might have in predicting costs up to a year in advance, and the Congress often discounts such projections, in any case. If the UN itself projected peacekeeping costs in its biennial budgets, then member states, including the US, would have an easier time estimating their assessment and justifying it to legislatures.

To help further alleviate problems of timeliness in contributions to new operations, all nations, and particularly the United States and other major contributors, should be encouraged to establish escrow accounts in their national treasuries, adjusted annually to keep them equal to one and one-half times the previous year's peacekeeping assessments.<sup>4</sup> Funds from these accounts should be made available to the Secretary General in two

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A/C.5/46/L.20, December 19, 1991, 8-9.

<sup>4</sup> In the case of the US, the account could be part of the State Department's "Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities" budget.

If our proposal to integrate peacekeeping costs into the regular UN budget were accepted, the amount in escrow would equal 1.5 times the peacekeeping portion of the regular budget. With respect to the regular budget, the United States should revert to the policy that it followed through 1980, budgeting a year ahead, so that money is on hand in January when assessments are received. To limit the fiscal impact of this shift, it might be phased in over four years, beginning with the fiscal 1994 request.

As part of these reforms, the Department of Defense should be assured reimbursement for the actual costs of supporting UN peacekeeping operations. The State Department usually deducts such costs from the US assessment, thus assuring national reimbursement, but most recently the reimbursement has not reached those who expended the funds, for example, the Military Airlift Command. In the latter 1980s, when US payment of its assessments was often partial, reimbursable costs were deducted from the amount owed the UN as an accounting transaction, but State had no real funds to pay DoD. Were there an escrow account such as we have proposed, DoD could be reimbursed immediately. (As a supplement to the escrow account managed by State, DoD might be given its own account and a modest amount of open-ended money for purposes of peacekeeping support. "Modest" in this case might be \$15-25 million.)

annual payments that reflect a country's share of the budget for peacekeeping. Together with the other financial reforms we propose, new missions would then be able to get underway and be sustained more easily and effectively than they are at present.

### **Reimbursing Troop Contributors**

Reimbursements to troop contributors, in line with the realistic budgeting proposed above, should be altered to one of two approaches. The system could revert to the pre-1973 approach of reimbursing states for their incremental costs. This is the difference between the normal costs of the forces contributed when deployed domestically, and the costs to deploy them with the UN. The increment should be established by agreement with each troop contributor prior to its selection for use in an operation. This method would be similar to the way in which the UN treats individuals, civilian or military, contributed to field missions by governments; the governments continue to pay the individuals' salaries, as they would at home, and the UN pays for travel and subsistence. For previously formed troop units, the equivalent of "subsistence" would differ by country and would be paid to the government and not to the individuals in the field. This approach was used in the 1960s, but differences in how states defined incremental costs led to a certain amount of acrimony. Thus to use this approach, the UN would need to establish common costing criteria and categories to use in negotiating reimbursement agreements.

Alternatively, the UN could reimburse each contributor's actual costs, with cost guidelines established by prior agreement as in option one. Under this method, the UN's willingness to reimburse full costs would be tied to the member states' willingness to earmark certain personnel or units in advance for quick response to a UN call for assistance. By "quick," we mean initial deployment within 48 hours of the UN's request for assistance.

Under the second option, no troop contributor would receive less than the current average of about \$1,000 per person per month, meaning that lower-cost countries would continue to receive surplus reimbursements, to which strings could be attached. For example, most of the lower-cost contributors do not have peacekeeping training programs. A negotiated fraction of surplus reimbursements should be devoted to setting up and running UN-certified training programs, and to acquiring UN-standard equipment for units to be used in peacekeeping operations. States that have established such programs would then receive priority for selection in future operations.

Either of these options would drive up the budgetary cost of traditional peacekeeping operations. But in the UN as elsewhere, there is no such thing as a "free" lunch. It is in the Organization's interest to

spread the costs and responsibilities for peacekeeping across as broad a segment of the international community as possible. Peacekeeping potentially benefits all members of that community, and the burden of its support should not fall disproportionately on those relatively few countries most willing to invest their own resources in it. The funding reforms suggested here would at least ensure that those countries, whose devotion to the cause of international peace and stability has been great enough for their armed forces to participate consistently in peacekeeping missions, are not penalized financially for this generosity.

### **Controlling the Purse Strings**

Traditional peacekeeping operations are headed by a military officer who has no control over the monies disbursed by his operation. The Secretariat should have sufficient faith in its chosen Force Commanders to give them such control, reducing duplicative field staffing and reporting. Such unified command would be made more feasible after a New York Headquarters reorganization of the sort suggested below. A program to train would-be UN field headquarters staff officers, also suggested, would familiarize them with UN financial and procurement procedures. Although UN civilians should still be sent along to assist in the administration of an operation, operational budgetary decisions in traditional-type operations ought to rest with the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer.


In more complex, civilian-controlled multi-component missions, fiscal control should be centralized in the office of the civilian chief of mission, and he or she should have the authority to reprogram available funds *among* the various functions of the mission as operational requirements dictate, reporting such reprogramming to New York, but not seeking its prior dispensation.

### **RESTRUCTURING THE SECRETARIAT**

The Secretary General can embody the United Nations without having a direct hand in the details of all that it does. If the UN is to meet the challenges of the 1990s, there must be greater willingness to delegate responsibility for political affairs than there has been in the past.

The first phase reorganization effective March 1, 1992, moved in that direction, reducing the Secretary General's over-extended span of control. The reorganization plan can also be viewed as a step toward the creation of three super-departments for administration, political affairs, and economic development. We believe that the process should be taken a step further, creating a new position of Deputy Secretary General (DSG) to

Figure 4 Proposed Secretariat Structure



head each of these three functional areas. The offices would clearly need to be held by individuals whom the SG trusts as alter egos, and their terms of office should match the SG's. Our suggested structure for the political side of the Secretariat is depicted in figure four.

Because we focus on those elements of the Secretariat with greatest relevance to peacekeeping and peacemaking, we present no detailed proposals for the economic or administrative bureaucracies, but do suggest that some administrative functions relating largely to peacekeeping be relocated. The economic/social and administrative/service bureaucracies are large and complex, they absorb the bulk of the regular UN budget, and their reform is the proper subject of a separate study.

There are several reasons for creating this new "layer" of bureaucracy. First, the new posts would carry broader authority and responsibility than any single USG in the current structure, and the new title reflects that greater responsibility. Second, eliminating units formerly headed at the USG level and consolidating their functions under four or five Under-Secretaries has the effect of pushing the span of control problem down one level rather than eliminating it.<sup>5</sup>

To make room for the new deputy SG positions, we suggested in an earlier publication the elimination of several current offices and departments. Since then, the SG's first phase restructuring has deleted each of these units from the UN organization chart, along with nine others. It is not yet clear which functions will be retained by their new departments.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The current reform increases the number of Office directors (Assistant-Secretaries General) reporting to each USG. The span-of-control issue could continue to be pushed further down into the bureaucracy by consolidating Offices and giving each ASG greater responsibility, while expanding the authority of the UN's highest career rank (the D2's). This process would leave more of the nuts and bolts of administration to career officials. To open up career opportunities and prevent the accretion of an immovable and potentially inflexible mass of senior officials at the top of the pyramid, the UN should adopt an "up or out" policy for professional staff, to assure that senior positions are staffed by the highest quality career officials. For more in-depth discussion of personnel issues, which we do not treat further here, see Peter Fromuth and Ruth Raymond, "UN Personnel Policy Issues," in *A Successor Vision: The United Nations of Tomorrow* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America for the United Nations Association of the United States, 1988), 213-254.

<sup>6</sup> William J. Durch, *Peacekeeping in the New Era: Restructuring the Secretariat*, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 10, 1992). We proposed eliminating the Office for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services and the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, which were traditional American and Soviet posts, respectively. We also suggested eliminating the Department for Special Political Questions, Regional Co-operation, Decolonization and Trusteeship, since the decolonization and apartheid-related issues that it has addressed are either resolved or sufficiently well in hand that they need no longer be addressed by a separate bureau.

### **Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs**

The proposed DSG for Political Affairs (or "Political Deputy") would supervise four Under-Secretaries General, heading departments of Peacekeeping and International Security; Information and Conflict Resolution; Arms Trade, Limitation and Disarmament Affairs; and Emergency Relief. This organization would place the peacemakers, the peacekeepers, the people responsible for political information gathering and early warning, and the people responsible for UN relief efforts, refugee affairs, and human rights issues in the same administrative chain of command. The Political Deputy would be in a position to track and coordinate all four elements as they affect current and future UN missions, and could provide comprehensive reports to the SG. A small liaison group would provide substantive advice as required to the Security Council and to the various committees of the General Assembly, with support from the relevant political departments. However, responsibility for general secretariat services to the legislative bodies would be shifted to the Deputy for Administration and Management.

#### **USG for Peacekeeping and International Security (PAIS)**

This department would absorb the old Office of Special Political Affairs (now Peacekeeping Operations). The USG would be responsible for planning and implementing all peacekeeping, peace observation, and multi-component peace-building operations. We add "international security" to the title to suggest that this department would also be the proper nexus of planning and implementation for operations with larger elements of enforcement, such as the Special Commission now operating in Iraq, as well as future preventive peacekeeping, deterrent deployments, or humanitarian interventions.

Two ASGs (or equivalent) would report to the Under-Secretary.

The Office of Plans and Operations would be headed by a general officer (brigadier or major general) with prior UN experience, who would be seconded to the UN for a fixed term of service to supervise civilian and military mission planners, operations backstoppers, and field communications. The office would incorporate the functions of the current Military Adviser and his staff, as well as the civilian political officers of SPA. It would also manage an operations center able to keep in touch with the field 24-hours a day. The commanders of traditional peacekeeping operations would report routinely to this ASG, who for non-routine situations would consult with the Under-Secretary before issuing replies.

Special Representatives leading multi-component missions would report directly to the Under-Secretary, with copies to Plans and Operations. Their military commanders could communicate directly with the ASG on routine matters with minimal friction, since the chain of command in the field would be a mirror of New York.

A second ASG, for Resources, would supervise the personnel recruiters and transport planners, logisticians, financial planners, and training and familiarization programs necessary for preparing and implementing peacekeeping operations. A mission's chief administrative officer, whether military or civilian, would deal with this office; its people would coordinate closely with Plans and Operations; and policy conflicts would be sorted out by their common boss, the Under-Secretary General.

The Office for Resources would encompass the duties of three offices now under the jurisdiction of the Department of Administration and Management: the Field Operations Division, the Peacekeeping Unit of the Office of Program Planning, Budget and Finance, and those elements of the Recruitment and Placement Division of the Office of Human Resources Management that recruit civilian staff (except election observers) for peacekeeping and related missions. Bringing these units into PAIS would give peacekeeping units in the field a single organizational entity to report to in New York, and give PAIS control over all aspects of mission planning and implementation.

Military units, military observers, civil police, electoral observers, civil administrators, and civilian support staff for peacekeeping missions would be recruited by this office, budgets would be drawn up there, and contracts would be let for mission support. The staff may still need to coordinate the paperwork on people and money with the administrative bureaucracy *en route* to legislative approval, but all of the mission recruiting and peacekeeping-related operational functions now scattered about that bureaucracy would be consolidated in this office.

### **USG for Information and Conflict Resolution**

The two basic functions of diplomacy, information gathering and negotiation, make the amalgamation of information and conflict resolution services in one department a natural one. These functions are not subordinated to the peacekeeping department, because they have utility for much more than peacekeeping. We envision two Offices within this department, for Research and Analysis, and for Peacemaking and Mediation.

An ASG for Research and Analysis would head an expanded version of the former Office for Research and the Collection of Information. The unit's job would be advance warning and analysis of emerging political and military situations that the Secretary General might wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council, or address directly through his good offices.

The information function is an important one, and independent political analysis can complement the kinds of information that is gathered by member states' intelligence organizations and from time to time passed along to the UN. Some member states have always been nervous about the UN having its own sources of information, but states do not always focus their resources on events of import to the UN, so its own analytic capabilities should be greatly expanded. There is a large amount of open-source data in the daily media and in the reports and computer files of other agencies in the UN system that have field operations (for example, the UN Development Program and UNICEF). The expansion of this function might be funded in part by redirecting some of the resources now devoted to public relations to analysis in the service of policy-making.

An Office of Peacemaking and Mediation would be headed by a second ASG. Reporting to this Office would be all of the SG's Special Representatives who mediate conflicts and negotiate settlements. The SRSGs are the kernel of what may evolve into a United Nations diplomatic corps. Although administratively supported by this Office, they could report directly to the SG as needed or requested at critical points in their negotiations.

### **USG for Arms Trade, Limitation, and Disarmament Affairs**

This Department would incorporate some functions of the old Department of Disarmament Affairs, including the UN Arms Trade Registry, and would be the focus within the Secretariat for support of multilateral arms control negotiations, non-proliferation policy, multilateral verification efforts, and arms reduction (disarmament) efforts.

### **USG for Emergency Relief**

This Under-Secretary would be the Secretary General's chief coordinator of relief services. The offices of the current High Commissioner for Refugees and the Disaster Relief Coordinator, both of which are now headed at the Under-Secretary level, should be combined within this new department, under the purview of the Political Deputy. These programs, especially disaster relief, should be strengthened, but high-level contacts with governments and with the UN Secretariat should be the



job of the USG's office in New York, representing the consolidated humanitarian relief capabilities of the UN.<sup>7</sup>

Operational offices should be headed by Assistant Secretaries in Geneva, where a preponderance of international relief organizations also have their headquarters. The USG's office should be in New York, however, to improve the visibility of humanitarian affairs at Headquarters, and to have a high-level representative immediately available for impromptu decision making and coordination with other elements of the Secretariat. A liaison office within this department would be the Secretariat's formal working link to other UN agencies that deal with natural and man-made crises (eg, the UN Development Program, UNICEF, and the World Food Program, some of which are headquartered in New York). The UN Center for Human Rights in Geneva should also be located administratively within this department.

Other recent proposals have recommended that the humanitarian affairs function have its own deputy SG.<sup>8</sup> Yet humanitarian affairs are also deeply political in nature, and to treat them as *sui generis* would be a mistake that would tend to keep them at the periphery of the international community's vision, rather than bring them front and center as a co-equal concern. UN peace-building operations invariably involve the repatriation of refugees, and wars invariably create human tides fleeing the conflict. The most acute human rights abuses have their roots in political oppression and political corruption. Internally-displaced and vulnerable populations are often the subjects of relief efforts, and in the future such efforts may need security support. UNHCR, moreover, has been asked repeatedly in recent years to undertake large repatriations of refugee populations with no more support than the heartfelt thanks of the Organization. That is, it has been tasked to help, and then made to raise its own funding, as it usually does, from voluntary contributions. Such demands are unfair, and having representation in New York at the highest level, UNHCR would be less likely to suffer them in future.

Those who labor courageously on behalf of humanitarian concerns may feel that the added visibility given their mission and its explicit location within the political arms of the Secretariat might undermine rather than further their work, which can sometimes be done more effectively if done quietly. This is particularly true for UNHCR's follow-up protection efforts

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<sup>7</sup> This proposal would be consistent with the agreement reached in December 1991 to create a single humanitarian aid coordination office within the Secretariat. See Paul Lewis, "UN to Centralize Its Relief Efforts," *New York Times*, December 18, 1991, A19.

<sup>8</sup> Brian Urquhart and Erskine Childers propose creation of the post of Deputy Secretary General for Humanitarian and Human Rights Affairs. See their "Strengthening International Response to Humanitarian Emergencies," Mimeo, October 1991.

on behalf of returnees. That concern is legitimate and must be respected, but the new organization need not disrupt such quiet field work.

### **Improving Military Advice and Operations**

A restructured Secretariat should be accompanied by changes in how the UN provides for military advice, staff planning, and training.

#### **Secretariat Military Staff**

The current functions of the Military Adviser should be assigned to a new Assistant Secretary General for Plans and Operations, as noted above. The occupant should be a general officer with UN experience, preferably as a Force Commander. There should be a single, fixed, five-year term of office, coterminous with the tenure of the SG, as are most such high-level appointments. Such an arrangement would ensure that the slot was filled by a field-experienced officer familiar with UN operations, and the fixed term would mean no loss of face to the contributing country upon his replacement after five years. The supporting staff of military officers should be enlarged. The mission planners and backstoppers for field operations should have three- to five-year assignments. Transport, logistics, or communications specialists should be seconded on one-year rotations. Seconded officers now provide valuable support to the Field Operations Division, but their numbers and terms are not regularized. The number of officers should be tied to the requirements of ongoing and projected peacekeeping missions, and their appointment should be factored into initial mission planning.

#### **Field Staff**

The confidence of field staff in directives from New York should improve if an experienced military officer is known to be participating in their crafting, as head of Plans and Operations. Headquarters' confidence in its military commanders would be enhanced, in turn, if their selection were made strictly a matter of UN request and not a matter of member state offers, which the Secretariat has a hard time refusing. Quality control (and mission competence) would be enhanced if the field of candidates eligible to be Force Commanders were limited to officers with prior experience as national peacekeeping contingent commanders, and if prospective contingent commanders were required to undergo a UN-sponsored or UN-approved course of training. The extent, and the cost, of such "certification" training remain to be determined, but the value of such programs could be considerable, giving the UN a filter through which to strain national offers of assistance. Such training should also be extended to commanders of specialized support units, and to police supervisors.

Common training experience could also make the first weeks of a new mission run more smoothly, due to shared expectations. Giving the mission staff an opportunity to work together, either in planning the mission or in previous simulations and command post exercises, would also make mission start-up easier. Experience and certification should also be requirements for appointment to a regular military slot in the Secretariat.

For military observers, efforts should be made to give those who have completed a training program an opportunity to experience an ongoing mission for a short period of time (a few weeks temporary duty), to give them a personal sense of what a field mission is like, before they are committed to one for a year. UNTSO has traditionally served as the "training" ground for new observers, but with any luck it will not be in business forever, and alternatives should be available.

Training programs should be regionally-sited, on the territories of states with histories of contributing troops, equipment, or support services to UN peacekeeping. A program run out of New York Headquarters might give regional programs an initial boost by "training the trainers" or by funding their attendance at existing, high-quality training programs run by member states. Most costs of training would be borne primarily by the respective states and regions.<sup>9</sup> The UN itself would keep track of and "certify" the programs, and perhaps contribute training materials that would be cheaper to order in bulk. It would also sponsor command post exercises in which officers and civilian officials in line to participate in a future operation could become familiar with one another and the problems likely to be encountered in the new mission. Gathered in advance of deployment, they might also contribute to basic mission planning, which would help to keep down the size and cost of planning staffs on full-time UN salary.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> If the UN cannot afford to make such monies available, then states with military aid programs, like the United States, should think seriously about earmarking within those aid packages the one to two hundred thousand dollars a year that it may cost to train an infantry battalion or two for peacekeeping duties.

<sup>10</sup> BGen. Ian Douglas, Canadian Forces, takes a different tack toward Headquarters mission planning. He has recommended, based on his experience as Chief of Staff of ONUCA and commander of Canada's Standby Brigade, that the New York planning staff be able, and expected, to constitute a field headquarters for a brigade-level UN force on short notice. Having headquarters personnel deploy *en masse* would seem, however, to leave headquarters itself bereft of backstoppers, and to limit the Organization to one mission start-up at a time. This concept would be well-suited, however, to deterrent deployments or "tripwire" forces under the UN's flag, where the need for field command structures would be immediate. Ian Douglas, "Improved Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Mobile Force (UNMF) -- An Option," Service paper. Mimeo. (Ottawa, Ontario, January 28, 1991.)

## **FORCES AND EQUIPMENT**

The UN's ability to undertake field missions (not just traditional peacekeeping, but also multi-component operations) would be greatly enhanced if forces and equipment were maintained in readiness to deploy.

### **Earmarking Forces**

This is not a new proposal but has never been adequately implemented. Member states should make serious efforts to earmark infantry battalions and specialized support units for quick call-up for UN missions. Concern about where and how such forces could be used might be alleviated by agreements between member states and the UN that provide the option to decline participation in a given mission, and reassurance to states regarding how those forces could be used if called up. The proposals we make in the discussion of Finance, above, provide incentives for making earmarked forces available.

### **Maintaining Equipment Reserves**

Standing agreements with manufacturers for production of vehicles and other standard equipment make mission start-up more responsive to political requirements, but are still not sufficient to meet many missions' needs. The suggested contributions of equipment and storage facilities by Japan and Germany would be a large step toward sufficiency. With such support, the UN could make much greater use of an expanded depot at Pisa, Italy, both for storage of new equipment and for overhaul of equipment returned from the field. Detailed cost analyses should be undertaken to compare the cost of an augmented facility with the current system of "explosive" equipment orders and associated delays in delivery to new missions. The US Army found that basic transport vehicles can be successfully stored for up to four years in 50-percent-humidity-controlled conditions (air conditioning to control temperatures at Pisa's latitude should not be necessary). The vehicles need to have periodic preventive maintenance, to be driven ten to fifteen miles over the four-year period, and to have the benefit of preservative lubricants. Vehicles maintained to these standards were found to exceed operational vehicles in general readiness, when brought to active status. A UN vehicle storage site would tend to rotate vehicles into the field more rapidly than a US storage site awaiting a big war, which would make storage more cost-effective because there would be less vehicle dead-time.

A true maintenance depot would require one-time initial investments in shop equipment, vehicle hoists, basic tools, and "bench stock" (spare parts). The "float," or inventory, of vehicles may need to be fairly large to meet the needs of unknown new missions, although trucks

and four-wheel-drive vehicles are fairly standard and the depot need not be expected to meet a mission's entire requirement. For high-tech gear, such as communications equipment, Pisa may continue to function as more of a way station. Modern, integrated-circuit-based electronics seem to store well (older vacuum-tube-based electronics do not), but technology is changing rapidly, arguing against pre-acquisition of large stocks. The best argument for having such equipment on hand, however, may be that few UN field missions operate with sufficient reserves, and should a crucial piece of equipment fail it could be expeditiously replaced from Pisa.

The depot could also be used train mechanics who would later be available for service in the field. Depending on individual countries' rules about temporary duty assignments for their troops, maintenance platoons from various countries could rotate through Pisa for a few months at a time, long enough to learn the ropes from the permanent training and maintenance cadre, and then to contribute usefully to depot routines. After a few years, there would be maintenance units in many countries with experience of UN needs, potentially capable of serving in a mission on short notice. Such availability could improve the geographic distribution of skilled support units available for and familiar with UN procedure. The capabilities would be a wasting asset to the UN, as trained individuals left their units for other employ, but they would take their skills with them into their national economies. And to the extent that future missions could recruit "Pisa accredited" mechanics as individual civilians or into civilian "maintenance support units," their skills could be recaptured for UN use.

### **High Technology**

Finally, there may be a greater role for technology to play in peacekeeping operations, to permit monitoring of borders with fewer personnel, or the efficient monitoring of troop cantonments or weapon storage areas. Among the candidate technologies would be ground acoustic sensors, used for years by the US Sinai Field Mission; ground surveillance radars, used by some contingents of UNIFIL; night vision devices, used in Lebanon and planned for other operations; and surveillance drones. US experience in the Gulf War with the Pioneer drone proved valuable. A similar day/night observation capability could be quite valuable to a monitoring operation, permitting night "patrols" to be undertaken without risk to observers, and without denigrating the human interaction and bridge-building that is usually a key component of successful peacekeeping, but normally done in daylight hours.

High technology for peacekeeping runs into two problems other than cost: the need to rely on developed states to operate and maintain it, and local political sensitivity to equipment that increases the "espionage" potential of a UN force. The use of high tech instruments in a tense

situation would require skillful preparation of the political terrain, education of the parties as to their uses and limitations, and perhaps agreements on data sharing with the local parties, which would vary from mission to mission.

## CONCLUSIONS

Peacekeeping is no longer an emergency activity of the UN. It is, rather, a routine activity that often deals with emergencies. As the Organization's responsibilities in this area grow, its structure and procedures must be modified to adapt. The major powers can contribute more to peacekeeping in terms of personnel and technology; those not contributing personnel should contribute more in equipment and financial aid. Funding should be regularized, and all peacekeeping missions, while retaining their individual budgets, should draw upon a common Peacekeeping Fund. Member states, moreover, should pay for peacekeeping as part of their annual assessment to the UN. Eventually, the rates that the UN uses to assess dues for its regular budget should be used for peacekeeping as well, with appropriate adjustments made in the overall shares of low-income countries. States contributing troop units should be reimbursed a flat minimum rate or their actual costs, whichever is higher, with an agreed portion of any excess over costs going toward UN-certified peacekeeping training programs and acquisition of UN-standard field equipment.

Creating the office of Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs and giving it purview over the political side of the Secretariat would improve coordination among peacekeepers, peacemakers, information analysts, and providers of emergency humanitarian aid and refugee assistance. Creating a Department of Political and International Security Affairs, and bringing under its wing all of the functions relating to planning and sustaining a peacekeeping mission, would give the Secretariat a more efficient and effective structure for dealing with field operations. Improving the quality and size of the UN's capacity to plan for and sustain peacekeeping operations is long overdue.

These proposals represent the most ambitious program of UN restructuring and reform since the Organization's founding. But given the momentous political change swirling all about it, and the rising demand for its services, the Organization can afford to do no less if it is to play a serious role in international affairs in the coming decade and the 21st century.

## United Nations Member States, and Assessments, 1991

	Regular Assessment (pct.)	Peacekeeping Assessment (pct.) (grp)		Regular Assessment (pct.)	Peacekeeping Assessment (pct.) (grp)
Afghanistan	0.01	0.001 D	Ghana	0.01	0.002 C
Albania	0.01	0.002 C	Greece	0.40	0.080 C
Algeria	0.15	0.030 C	Grenada	0.01	0.001 D
Angola	0.01	0.001 D	Guatemala	0.02	0.004 C
Antigua	0.01	0.001 D	Guinea	0.01	0.001 D
Argentina	0.66	0.132 C	Guinea Bissau	0.01	0.001 D
Australia	1.57	1.570 B	Guyana	0.01	0.002 C
Austria	0.74	0.740 B	Haiti	0.01	0.001 D
Bahamas	0.02	0.004 C	Honduras	0.01	0.002 C
Bahrain	0.02	0.004 C	Hungary	0.21	0.042 C
Bangladesh	0.01	0.001 D	Iceland	0.03	0.030 B
Barbados	0.01	0.002 C	India	0.37	0.074 C
Belgium	1.17	1.170 B	Indonesia	0.15	0.030 C
Belize	0.01	0.001 D	Iran	0.69	0.138 C
Benin	0.01	0.001 D	Iraq	0.12	0.024 C
Bhutan	0.01	0.001 D	Ireland	0.18	0.180 B
Bolivia	0.01	0.002 C	Israel	0.21	0.042 C
Botswana	0.01	0.001 D	Italy	3.99	3.990 B
Brazil	1.45	0.290 C	Jamaica	0.01	0.002 C
Brunei	0.04	0.008 C	Japan	11.38	11.380 B
Bulgaria	0.15	0.030 C	Jordan	0.01	0.002 C
Burkina Faso	0.01	0.001 D	Kenya	0.01	0.002 C
Burundi	0.01	0.001 D	Kuwait	0.29	0.058 C
Belarus	0.33	0.330 B	Laos	0.01	0.001 D
Cambodia	0.01	0.002 C	Lebanon	0.01	0.001 D
Cameroon	0.01	0.002 C	Lesotho	0.01	0.001 D
Canada	3.09	3.090 B	Liberia	0.01	0.002 C
Cape Verde	0.01	0.001 D	Libya	0.28	0.056 C
Central African	0.01	0.001 D	Liechtenstein	0.01	0.001 D
Chad	0.01	0.001 D	Luxembourg	0.06	0.060 B
Chile	0.08	0.016 C	Madagascar	0.01	0.002 C
China	0.79	0.970 A	Malawi	0.01	0.001 D
Colombia	0.14	0.028 C	Malaysia	0.11	0.022 C
Comoros Islands	0.01	0.001 D	Maldives Islands	0.01	0.001 D
Congo	0.01	0.002 C	Mali	0.01	0.001 D
Costa Rica	0.02	0.004 C	Malta	0.01	0.002 C
Cote d'Ivoire	0.02	0.004 C	Mauritania	0.01	0.001 D
Cuba	0.09	0.018 C	Mauritius	0.01	0.002 C
Cyprus	0.02	0.004 C	Mexico	0.94	0.188 C
Czech & Slovak	0.66	0.660 B	Mongolia	0.01	0.002 C
Denmark	0.69	0.690 B	Morocco	0.04	0.008 C
Djibouti	0.01	0.001 D	Mozambique	0.01	0.001 D
Dominica	0.01	0.001 D	Myanmar	0.01	0.001 D
Dominican	0.03	0.006 C	Namibia	0.01	0.001 D
Ecuador	0.03	0.006 C	Nepal	0.01	0.001 D
Egypt	0.07	0.014 C	Netherlands	1.65	1.650 B
El Salvador	0.01	0.002 C	New Zealand	0.24	0.240 B
Equatorial	0.01	0.001 D	Nicaragua	0.01	0.002 C
Ethiopia	0.01	0.001 D	Niger	0.01	0.001 D
Fiji	0.01	0.002 C	Nigeria	0.20	0.040 C
Finland	0.51	0.510 B	Norway	0.55	0.550 B
France	6.25	7.680 A	Oman	0.02	0.004 C
Gabon	0.03	0.006 C	Pakistan	0.06	0.012 C
Gambia	0.01	0.001 D	Panama	0.02	0.004 C
Germany	9.36	9.360 B	Pap. New Guinea	0.01	0.001 D

*Annex A-2*

	Regular Assessment (pct.)	Peacekeeping Assessment (pct.) (grp)	
Paraguay	0.03	0.006	C
Peru	0.06	0.012	C
Philippines	0.09	0.018	C
Poland	0.56	0.112	C
Portugal	0.18	0.036	C
Qatar	0.05	0.010	C
Romania	0.19	0.038	C
Rwanda	0.01	0.001	D
Samoa	0.01	0.001	D
Sao Tomé/Princ.	0.01	0.001	D
Saudia Arabia	1.02	0.204	C
Senegal	0.01	0.001	D
Seychelle Is.	0.01	0.001	D
Siera Leone	0.01	0.001	D
Singapore	0.11	0.022	C
Solomon Is.	0.01	0.001	D
Somalia	0.01	0.001	D
South Africa	0.45	0.450	B
Spain	1.95	1.560	B
Sri Lanka	0.01	0.002	C
St. Kitts & Nevis	0.01	0.001	D
St. Lucia	0.01	0.001	D
St. Vincent	0.01	0.001	D
Sudan	0.01	0.001	D
Surinam	0.01	0.001	D
Swaziland	0.01	0.002	C
Sweden	1.21	1.210	B
Syria	0.04	0.008	C
Tanzania	0.01	0.001	D
Thailand	0.10	0.020	C
Togo	0.01	0.001	D
Trinidad	0.05	0.010	C
Tunisia	0.03	0.006	C
Turkey	0.32	0.064	C
Uganda	0.01	0.001	D
Ukraine	1.25	1.250	B
USSR (Russia)	9.99	12.290	A
Uruguay	0.04	0.008	C
UAE	0.19	0.038	C
United Kingdom	4.86	5.970	A
United States	25.00	30.400	A
Vanuatu	0.01	0.001	D
Venezuela	0.57	0.114	C
Vietnam	0.01	0.002	C
Yemen	0.01	0.001	D
Yugoslavia	0.46	0.092	C
Zaire	0.01	0.002	C
Zambia	0.01	0.002	C
Zimbabwe	0.02	0.004	C

**SOURCES:** Derived from United Nations, *Status of Contributions as at 31 December 1991*, ST/ADM/SER.B/364, January 8, 1992, Annex II.



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## List of Individuals Interviewed

Under-Sec'y Genl Martti Ahtisaari  
UN Secretariat

Col. Nils Alstermark  
Swedish to the UN

Col. Robert Anderson  
US Mission to the UN

Mr. Hedi Annabi  
UN Secretariat

Col. Zacharias Backer  
Norway

Mr. Howard Bamsey  
Australian Mission to the UN

Maj. Joseph C. Bebel  
US Air Force

Mr. Denis Beissel  
UN Secretariat

Mr. Philippe Boullé  
Office of the UN Disaster Relief  
Coordinator

Ms. Marjorie Ann Browne  
US Congressional Research Service

Ms. Margaret Carey  
UN Development Program

Mr. Christian Castro  
US Mission to the UN

Ms. Lois A. Cccsarini  
US Department of State

Prof. Chester Crocker  
Georgetown University

Mr. Dawit Gebre-Egziabher  
Organization of African Unity

Deputy Sec'y Genl Hugo de Cela  
Organization of American States

Maj. Gen. Göran de Geer  
Swedish Ministry of Defense

Mr. Juergen Dedring  
UN Secretariat

Mr. Steven Dimoff  
UN Association of the USA

Mr. Timour Dmitrichev  
UN Secretariat

Mr. John Donovan  
US Department of State

Brig. Gen. Ian C. Douglas  
Canadian Dept. of National Defence

Ms. Susan Driano  
US Department of State

Lt. Col. Dermot Earley  
UN Secretariat

Ambassador Jan Eliasson  
Swedish Mission to the UN

Ambassador Lars-Göran Engfeldt  
Swedish Mission to the UN

Mr. John Fox  
US Department of State

Col. Douglas Fraser  
Canadian Mission to the UN

*Annex B-2*

**List of Individuals Interviewed, continued**

Col. Sigurd Friis Norwegian Mission to the UN	Under-Sec'y Genl James Jonah UN Secretariat
Mr. Peter Fromuth US Mission to the UN	Col. William Jordan US Department of Defense
Under-Sec'y Genl Marrack Goulding UN Secretariat	Ambassador Philippe Kirsch Canadian Mission to the UN
Mr. Lawrence Grossman US Mission to the UN	Ms. Angela U. Knippenberg UN Secretariat
Hon. John H. M. Hagard Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Ms. Sheila Kolodny UN Secretariat
Gen. Gustav Hägglund Finnish Ministry of Defense	Mr. David Leis US Department of State
Representative Lee H. Hamilton US House of Representatives	Dr. Ingrid Lehmann UN Secretariat
Lt. Col. Christian Härleman International Peace Academy	Dr. John W. Leland US Military Airlift Command
Dr. Marianne Heiberg Norwegian Inst. for International Affairs	Mr. F. T. Liu International Peace Academy
Maj. Mikael Heinrichs Finnish Ministry of Defense	Mr. Edward C. Luck UN Association of the USA
Lt. Col. Bo Henricson Swedish Ministry of Defense	Mr. Joseph Manso US Mission to the UN
Mr. Leon Hosang UN Secretariat	Mr. Shawn McCormick Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mr. Robert Hughes US Department of State	Mr. Colin McGregor UN Secretariat
Dr. Charles J. Jefferson US Department of State	Mr. Craig McKee US Department of State
Col. Bertil Johansson Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Lt. Col. Gerry McMahon UN Secretariat

**List of Individuals Interviewed, continued**

Mr. Michael Michalski US Mission to the UN	Mr. Robert Rosenstock US Mission to the UN
Cdr. Markku Moisala Finnish Mission to the UN	Mr. Behrooz Sadry UN Secretariat
Ms. Donna Nelson Evergreen Aviation	Ms. Kathryn G. Sessions UN Association of the USA
Lt. Col. Martin H. Ness Norwegian Department of Defense	Ms. Laurie Lerner Shestak US Mission to the UN
Mr. Johan Nordenfelt UN Secretariat	Lt. Col. Charles R. Snyder US Department of State
Dr. Jennifer Noyon US Department of State	Under-Sec'y Genl Ronald Spiers UN Secretariat
Ambassador Olara A. Otunnu International Peace Academy	Lt. Col. David Tanks US Army (Ret'd.)
Ms. Lisette Lindahl Owens Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Mr. Shashi Tharoor UN Secretariat
Dr. Marc S. Palevitz US Department of Defense	Mr. Franklin N. Thevanaz UN Secretariat
Mr. William Petersen US General Accounting Office	Mr. Cedric Thornberry UN Secretariat
Asst Sec'y Genl Giandomenico Picco UN Secretariat	Ambassador Klaus Törnudd Finnish Mission to the UN
Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering US Mission to the UN	Lt. Col. David Underwood US Department of Defense
Mr. Frank Record House Foreign Affs Committee Staff	Mr. Frank Urbancic US Mission to the UN
Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Ret'd.) US Institute of Peace	Sir Brian Urquhart The Ford Foundation
Mr. German Santiago Romero-Perez Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees	Hon. Cyrus Vance Simpson, Thacher, & Bartlett

*Annex B-4*

**List of Individuals Interviewed, continued**

Col. Ahti Vartiainen  
Finnish Ministry of Defense

Col. Finn-Goran Wennström  
Finnish Ministry of Defense

Mr. Martin Wilkens  
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Ms. Molly Williamson  
US Department of State

## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**William J. Durch** is a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He is former assistant director of the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and holds a doctorate in political science from MIT. He has taught at Georgetown University and held research appointments at Harvard University and the Center for Naval Analyses, in addition to a stint in government at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is author of *National Interests and the Military Use of Space*, and *The ABM Treaty and National Security*, and is coauthor of studies on arms reductions in central Europe, and naval arms control.

**Barry M. Blechman** is chairman of the Henry L. Stimson Center and president of Defense Forecasts, Incorporated. He holds a doctorate in international relations from Georgetown University and has taught at The Johns Hopkins University, Georgetown University, and the University of Michigan. He served as Assistant Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 to 1980, and headed the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution, where he also co-authored the annual *Setting National Priorities*. Widely published on defense issues, his works include *Force Without War*, and most recently, *The Politics of National Defense*.