

THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Peacekeeping and the US National Interest

Report of the Working Group on
Peacekeeping and the US National Interest

Co-Chairs

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Report No. 11 February 1994



Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives



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Peacekeeping and the US National Interest

Foreword

The dramatic world events of the past few years—the liberation of Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union—were thought to herald a new time of peace. But while the end of the Cold War removed the clear threat to US security posed by Soviet armed forces, it opened the door to new problems and new types of conflicts whose implications for US interests may be no less serious. Ethnic and religious strife within nations, disputes among new states emerging from old dictatorships, and humanitarian crises of horrifying proportions have become commonplace in several parts of the globe.

Each of these conflicts has the capacity to harm US interests:

- Most disrupt economic activities, including the business of American companies, traders, and investors.
- Some of these conflicts aggravate concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; a few raise nightmarish possibilities of nuclear or chemical weapons falling into irresponsible hands.
- In some cases, a conflict in one country can destabilize neighboring states by creating floods of refugees, as is happening in Africa and Central Asia. Under certain circumstances, such population movements can result in support for extremist parties in even distant nations, as is happening in Europe.
- Left unchecked, there is a strong possibility that burgeoning international and interstate violence will create broader instabilities in international politics, diverting governments from constructive actions and making international cooperation more difficult. Eventually, if fighting continues and spreads to wider regions, it will lead to a reversal in the global trend toward lower defense spending, diverting resources from economic development and social reconstruction. More states will place greater emphasis on arms, including weapons of mass destruction; the problems of proliferation will worsen and pose grave long-term dangers to American interests.
- All of these conflicts deny our fundamental political interest in a humane world in which there is universal respect for political rights and democratic values. They threaten our most basic human values as we witness the immense suffering inflicted on so many innocent people. They challenge our underlying belief in the possibility of progress for all peoples toward peace and prosperity.

Because of the United States' relative geographic isolation, however, these new types of problems lack immediacy for Americans. The Soviet Union's nuclear-armed missiles threatened the United States directly. The dangers of

these new types of conflicts are more subtle; the threats they pose, more remote. The persistence of these wars makes us uncomfortable. We hope that they will be resolved soon, that the suffering will end, that the world will become more settled. But the immediate significance of these conflicts for US security interests is not readily visible, and the long-term dangers are too distant to galvanize action. As a result, many Americans doubt that these new kinds of problems should be our concern.

The tragic US experiences in Beirut in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1993 made clear that involvements in these new kinds of wars can be costly to this country. Many Americans and their representatives in Congress questioned whether even a single American life should have been sacrificed for such purposes. As the debate in the media and the Congress which followed the Somali experience made clear, there is no consensus on how to handle these new types of conflicts or even if we, as a nation, should become involved in them at all. Before placing any more Americans in jeopardy, we should be able to see clearly the American interests that are served by their valor. And we should have confidence that steps have been taken to ensure that any future interventions are handled competently and efficiently, with the minimum possible risk to American lives, and the minimum possible cost to the American treasury.

This working group was convened in early 1993 to examine these questions. We include elected representatives, experienced diplomats and military officers, former officials of the United Nations, and private experts. Bringing our diverse expertise and special perspectives to bear on the new international situation confronting the United States, we sought particularly to understand the role which the United Nations could play in containing and resolving the new kinds of interstate and civil conflicts, and whether or not such a role would serve American security interests, as well as those of the international community. In principle, in what ways can UN peace operations help to protect American interests?

Having determined that such a contribution is at least theoretically possible, we then asked how the United Nations, and the United States, could become better prepared to carry out these activities in an effective manner. By taking a hard look at these issues, we hope to contribute to the ongoing debate concerning UN peace operations, advising the Congress and the Executive Branch on means of resolving the issues between them.

In examining the hypothetical role of UN peace operations in US security policy, a few principles were kept clearly in view.

- The UN Charter affirms the inherent rights of all nations to defend themselves, unilaterally and collectively; by implication, the Charter recognizes the right to maintain the national armed forces required for such self-defense. Any enhancement of UN military capabilities for peace operations must be accomplished without in any way casting doubt on these national rights.
- Whatever contributions the United States makes to UN military capabilities should be incremental, that is, they should be added to the unilateral capabilities required by the United States to protect its interests; fulfilling the needs of the UN can not be permitted to degrade the United States' own military preparedness.
- Currently, the United States' veto rights guarantee that the US Government can prevent any UN Security Council action that might harm US national interests. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States' negative vote is sufficient to stop any proposed UN enforcement operation, even if every other member of the world body—all 184 of them—are for it. This power must be protected.
- At no time should the United States' participation in a UN peace operation result from anything but the nation's own choice. The United States is now under no legal obligation to participate in any UN operation, even those it votes for or urges on the world body. In approving a Security Council motion to initiate a peace operation, the United States' one obligation is to pay its assessed share of the cost. The power to control US participation in UN actions also must be protected.

Assuming that these principles are maintained, and there is no reason to think that they will not be, we have come to the conclusion that it is in the US interest to work to strengthen the UN's capabilities to carry out peace operations. The United States can be as tough on approving new UN operations as it wants to be, and as selective in deciding whether or not US forces should participate as it wishes to be. But if the UN's capacity for peace operations is improved successfully, it would provide a new security option to the United States, to be used at the US Government's discretion, permitting us to avoid the necessity of choosing between unilateral action and standing by helplessly when international conflict and atrocities occur.

Each of us agrees with this overall conclusion and, except where indicated by footnotes, supports the individual recommendations concerning how the United Nations' capacity for peace operations could be strengthened, and the effectiveness of the United States' contribution improved. We should not, however, be held individually responsible for every specific phrase or nuance of wording.

In closing, we would like to thank the Henry L. Stimson Center for organizing this project, and the Ford Foundation, for providing financial support.

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Peacekeeping and the US National Interest

As the predominant military, political, and economic power in the world, the United States must retain the capability to protect its own vital interests and also to provide the leadership to ensure that the international community's common interests are well guarded.

The protection of vital US interests requires that the nation maintain effective military capabilities, sufficiently large to deal with all possible direct challenges. Defending American territory, protecting US citizens at home and abroad, combating terrorism, and ensuring certain key economic interests, like access to oil supplies, are all interests for which the United States has demonstrated that it is prepared to act unilaterally. The ability of America to act alone when circumstances warrant must never be compromised.

But the United States must develop other means of protecting its interests, as well. To rely solely on unilateral action to protect US interests in all circumstances would be prohibitively costly and unwise.

In some regions, like Western Europe and East Asia, the United States has been able to forge powerful military alliances with like-minded states and has created effective multilateral security institutions and coalitions of military forces to defend common interests. These alliances—NATO, and bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea, and a few other states—are well prepared to act decisively against certain kinds of threats.

With the end of the Cold War, a third *potential* means of protecting American interests has emerged. With the Soviet Union no longer present to veto virtually any initiative that serves American interests, the collective security procedures outlined in the UN Charter, *in principle*, offer another way of defending American interests abroad, particularly in those regions in which the United States traditionally has not had much of a military presence.

The United Nations, of course, will never be a substitute for unilateral US military capabilities or for our traditional security alliances. Moreover, whether or not the United Nations can become capable of fulfilling its potential clearly remains to be seen. The experience over the past few years has been mixed, with a few clear successes, a few outright failures, and many uncertain results. One need only pick up a newspaper to understand that the United Nations has not yet developed reliable and effective means of carrying out peace operations.

This said, it nonetheless remains the case that *if* a higher level of proficiency in the UN's capabilities for peacekeeping and peace enforcement could be achieved, it would provide a third route for achieving the interest in a more peaceful world which the United States shares with other states—an additional avenue of choice between complete inaction and action taken unilaterally or in coalition with allies. Insofar as unilateral or alliance actions are feasible in only a few cases, and desirable in even fewer, the alternative to an effective United Nations is the continuing deterioration of the fabric of

What are Peace Operations?

The short-hand phrase “peace operations” is used in this report to connote a wide range of diplomatic and military actions.

- *Preventive diplomacy* attempts to ease tensions that could lead to conflict; UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s trip to North Korea in December 1993 is an example.
- *Preventive deployments* serve the same purpose, but in these cases the United Nations also dispatches troops in an effort to discourage open hostilities. The current UN operation in Macedonia is a noteworthy instance of preventive deployments.
- *Peace-keeping* involves the traditional activities associated with UN military operations, such as monitoring cease-fires or observing borders after a peace agreement has been reached.
- *Peace-building* is described by the Secretary General as “comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.” The UN operation in Namibia was a successful example of peace-building.
- If pacific methods do not suffice to end hostilities that threaten international peace, however, then the collective security mechanism of Chapter VII of the Charter can be used in what is termed *peace-enforcement*.

Regardless of which specific category they fall into, there has been a crucial change in UN peace operations in recent years. Increasingly, UN diplomats and military forces have been placed in situations in which fulfillment of their mandate has been opposed by one or more parties to a conflict. In the past, due to the Cold War, the United Nations was not able to become involved in situations except in rare circumstances when all parties agreed that the intervention was desirable. As a result of the change in UN peace operations, the United Nations and the military forces assigned to it face more difficult challenges now than they used to. In response, they have been compelled to develop a range of activities that fall somewhere between traditional, cooperative peacekeeping and coercive peace enforcement. The establishment of “safe zones,” assistance to civil authorities, and protection of humanitarian relief operations are all examples. Peace operations encompass these tasks and many others that involve a potential for violence.

international relations and, eventually, US involvement in more serious military conflicts.

US military intervention will be called for again and again as the conflicts let loose by the breakdown of the bi-polar international structure of the Cold War sort themselves out. UN peace operations potentially could help to relieve the US of this burden, politically and financially. Through the United Nations, the United States potentially

can harness the resources of many nations in support of common interests, utilizing cooperative multinational action in place of having the US serve as the world's policeman. Moreover, action by the United Nations, if handled properly, can legitimate intervention in the eyes of the world, thereby avoiding the emergence of armed opposition as sometimes follows unilateral or coalition actions.

But the United States must lead within the United Nations to bring about reforms that are long overdue if this potential is to be realized. The United States cannot do the job alone, but neither will the UN change without persistent US prodding and leadership.

This report outlines a series of steps which we believe are necessary to realize the UN's potential to contribute to international security and, thereby, to achieve American security interests. The report is divided into three parts: (1) How to strengthen the United Nations system; (2) The role which the United States should play within that system; and (3) The role which the Congress should play in decisions on UN peace operations.

Implementation of these measures, we believe, would create a more effective and less costly UN collective security system with the potential to make a major contribution to the United States' national interest.

Strengthening the UN System

Empowering the United Nations to carry out peace operations more effectively will not be easy. It is not a supranational organization, but a voluntary collection of sovereign states. Decisions require substantial majorities, and a consensus of the permanent members of the Security Council, and member states are always attentive to domestic constituencies which pull them in different directions. This means that mobilizing sufficient clout behind an effort to launch a peace operation is often a struggle. But when the UN can be mobilized, it puts the support and authority of the entire international community behind the effort to resolve a threat to international peace. It is worth the effort for the United States to try and use its position of leadership to shape the United Nations into a more effective instrument for realizing those US national goals that are shared by the international community.

Radical reforms are obviously necessary in the way the United Nations goes about preparing for, planning, and conducting peace operations. The system now in use is clearly ineffective. While the United Nations has had some striking successes, most recently in Cambodia, the organization has been given more challenging tasks in recent years than it has been able to carry out effectively. The current UN peacekeeping system is a jury-rigged, ad hoc set of procedures, a distant adaptation of the security system envisioned in the UN's Charter made necessary by the paralysis imposed on the United Nations by the Cold War. It is massively inefficient. Neither world peace nor US interests are protected under the current system.

The parameters that once defined UN operations have changed. During the first forty years of UN peacekeeping, from 1947 through 1986, the world organization established only fourteen peacekeeping missions. During the past seven years (1987-93), twenty-one missions have been approved. In 1986, the United Nations had fewer than 10,000 peacekeepers in the field. The 1993 figure exceeded 80,000. The annual cost of

UN peacekeeping in the mid-1980s was less than \$400 million; it is more than \$3.6 billion today.

In the field, UN missions have been charged with more complex tasks than in the past. It was once unusual for UN peace forces to be given anything but straight-forward observation and force separation missions. Now, the United Nations, among other things, is being requested to disarm hostile factions, provide law and order, establish electoral systems and conduct elections, make possible humanitarian assistance in a secure environment, train police forces and administrators, arrange population exchanges, and monitor governments' respect for human rights.

Moreover, once undertaken in situations in which peacekeepers had to contend only with established governments, contemporary peace operations often now take place in hostile environments featuring multiple armed bands, limited central authority, and a possibility of a high level of violence. During the first forty years of UN peacekeeping approximately 1,100 UN peacekeepers were killed or wounded. Roughly the same number were killed or wounded in the past seven years.

The United Nations is badly overextended. It has been asked to cope with too many problems, too rapidly, with insufficient resources, and without sufficient pressure to reform its archaic procedures. The members of the UN, and especially the permanent members of the Security Council, need to make more hard-headed decisions on when, and when not, to start peace operations. They also need to provide more effective means of conducting them, not only forces in the field, but better early warning capabilities, command and control capabilities, and administrative capabilities. Finally, far more efficient use of the financial and other resources which are made available is required by UN headquarters in New York.

Reforming the United Nations

Inefficiency, mismanagement, poor personnel practices, lack of discipline, and a bureaucratic operational culture that prevents decisive action are serious problems which limit the UN's ability to carry out effective peace operations. The linkage between the UN's organizational and managerial problems and the willingness of nations to commit resources to the organization, particularly their willingness to risk the lives of their citizens, cannot be denied. Any initiative to strengthen the UN's capacity for peace operations must include a concerted effort to root out the organization's management problems and professionalize the UN system overall.

Many instances of mismanagement, poor organization, and abuse of power have been brought before the public. The UN bureaucracy is far too large. The organization has too many departments, many of which duplicate one another's duties. Some departments are overstaffed with unqualified people; others are understaffed and have over-worked personnel.

The personnel system causes particular problems. The need to distribute positions in a manner reflective of the organization's national membership means that governments have a strong voice in appointments and promotions at the senior level. Moreover, the UN bureaucracy has a highly developed "old-boy network." Appointments often are based on a system of patronage that rewards personal ties and ignores performance.

Some UN employees see their jobs as sinecures or, worse, as opportunities for self-aggrandizement.

There is absolutely no reason for member states to tolerate an inefficient UN bureaucracy. The keys to effective UN reform lie in a substantial reduction in the number of under-secretaries, in a consolidation of responsibilities and accountability under those which remain, in the nomination of the most highly qualified candidates for those posts, in the creation of a deputy-secretary-general to assist in administering the United Nations and coordinating its specialized agencies, and in the adoption of effective resource allocation procedures.¹

It is essential, moreover, to professionalize the UN's personnel system. Priority consideration in hiring and promotions should be given to those who work the hardest, possess the requisite skills, and perform with distinction. "Tenure" should not protect those employees who are incompetent. Standardized, objective criteria are needed to evaluate employees' performance. Managers should have the leeway to terminate employees who do not perform satisfactorily, and to reward those who perform well.

The increased cost of the United Nations, due especially to the rising cost of peace operations, has led to increasing concern about how national resources allocated to the organization are managed. Like other UN activities, peacekeeping missions require effective accounting procedures and outside auditors to ensure that they are utilizing resources efficiently and in strict accord with mandated purposes. When the United States and other member states commit money to the United Nations, they have the right to be confident that their citizens' tax dollars are being used efficiently.

The establishment of an independent inspector general and associated staff is an essential step toward a more professional UN bureaucracy. To be effective, such an office would need to be placed at the under-secretary-general level and should report directly, and solely, to the Secretary General. The inspector general should develop and implement a set of standards for administrative and budgetary procedures. Audits should be carried out quickly and professionally, dropping the ad hoc gathering of auditing teams that is the current practice. Any violations of established procedures, particularly if there is a suggestion of criminal behavior, should be dealt with decisively and firmly.

Another top priority should be the installation of an experienced management team to oversee a comprehensive reform effort. The recent lack of continuity in the Office of Administration and Management has hamstrung the Organization at a particularly unfortunate time. It is incumbent that a new Under-Secretary for Administration and Management be named soon, and that he or she be an experienced manager with the skills, authority, and determination to implement the reform agenda.

1. *Brian Urquhart* would permit the creation of up to four deputy-secretary-generals to assist in administering the organization.

When to Become Involved

With respect to peace operations themselves, as a first step, the Security Council needs to take more care in determining which conflicts warrant UN involvement. The Security Council cannot approve operations for every situation, anywhere in the world, in which conflict occurs. This is one reform the United States can ensure alone, by the simple expedient of vetoing missions that are not essential.

In the Fall of 1993, President Clinton stated that his administration would look more closely at proposed peace operations before voting to approve them. He said that the United States will assess more realistically the requirements for success: Does the situation under consideration pose a real threat to international peace? Are the objectives clear and the scope clearly defined? Are the financial and human resources available to meet the mission's objectives? Can a successful resolution to the situation be achieved realistically? Without satisfactory responses to such questions, the United States should make use of its veto to ensure that the mission is not begun.

Decisions on the UN's involvement have to be made on a case-by-case basis. It is not really feasible to define with any precision the specific types of situations in which the United Nations should, or should not, become involved. The US Government, and all other member governments, must look carefully at each new potential intervention, assess the specific political and military situation on the ground, determine if the situation actually poses a threat to world peace and security, and ascertain whether or not a UN intervention would be in their national interest *and* if the world community is willing to provide the financial, human, and other resources necessary to carry out the mission successfully.

The members of the United Nations should take an especially careful look at civil conflicts in which one or more parties do not accept the UN role. If the members of the organization wish to ignore this constraint, they *must* be prepared to devote sufficient resources, and to empower military commanders sufficiently, to carry out the necessary military tasks. It is fundamentally irresponsible to place peacekeepers of any nationality in hostile situations without the means and authority to disarm hostile factions and protect their own lives.²

Mandates

When the Security Council approves a peace operation with an ambiguous or impossible mandate simply as a political "gesture," as has happened often in recent years, it damages the United Nations as an institution and reduces its ability to act effectively in other situations. It also puts soldiers and civilian UN employees in terrible danger for

2. *Harold Rogers* believes that the US should not become involved in peace operations for purely civil conflicts which bear no threat to US national security or international security interests. The UN was established to maintain peace among nations, not to become involved in civil wars, except in those very rare instances when a civil conflict directly threatens international security, and when all parties to the conflict agree to accept the UN's role. Had these principles been adhered to, the UN would not have become involved in Somalia or Haiti.

no good reason. Such “gestures” result in a reduced willingness of all member states to support the United Nations, and reinforce longstanding perceptions of the organization as a toothless debating society. When the members of the Security Council are not willing to write realistic mandates, the UN’s involvement should be limited to mediation, good offices, or other diplomatic initiatives. The United Nations was established to do more than diplomacy, and it can do more, but only if its members adopt a more realistic outlook.

When the Security Council does decide to become involved in a conflict situation, it should send in forces with a tough-minded mandate that includes clearly defined and attainable goals, an effective military doctrine, and appropriate rules of engagement. Ambiguous mandates lead to confusion in the field about the objectives to be pursued and how to pursue them, and create unacceptable risks for soldiers on the ground. Mandates that do not take into account the “true” ground situation need to be reviewed and updated.

The United Nations also needs to be tougher in carrying out its mandates. The concept of operation and rules of engagement should be those necessary to make possible successful completion of the mandate. The Security Council and the Secretariat need to focus on the required rules of engagement, before deciding to initiate an operation, to get a sense of the types of military activities that might be necessary to complete the mission successfully. The UN’s guiding principle of firing only in self-defense was valid for the types of situations in which peacekeeping operations traditionally were carried out. A new, more aggressive doctrine and rules of engagement must be defined for those situations in which UN peacekeepers are either prevented from carrying out their duties by hostile armed factions or actually become the targets of aggressive acts.

If hostile parties are permitted to dictate what the United Nations is able to accomplish once the organization is involved in a situation, future UN efforts will be jeopardized. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, UN peacekeepers were tasked in 1992–93 to secure the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. In many instances, the parties to the conflict blocked the UN’s efforts to carry out this mission. Confrontations, portrayed in the media, showed the United Nations to be weak in furthering its objectives. Subsequent UN missions in Somalia and Haiti clearly were made more difficult by opponents’ appraisals that the organization could be pushed around.

Mandates also should include realistic deadlines and criteria for termination; the need for these elements reinforces the need for a strong mandate that promotes the achievement of goals within the allotted time frame. The current typical practice of writing six-month mandates maintains a tight lease on an operation, but also fosters a tendency for short-term thinking and encourages the view that deadlines are unimportant, as mandates are renewed virtually automatically.

Deadlines should be long enough to accomplish the goals of the mandate, but not so long that the UN mission becomes a permanent fixture in the situation. In writing a mandate, UN planners and, eventually, the members of the Security Council, should identify the specific goals to be accomplished, make realistic estimates of the time and resources required to achieve them and the sequencing with which they might be attacked, and derive from that the deadline for the mission. As the deadline nears, the UN staff and member states must make realistic assessments of what has been

accomplished and what has not, and determine if the mission should end on schedule or if the mandate should be revised and, perhaps, the deadline extended. Circumstances sometimes change and extensions are necessary, but there should be clear prejudice toward sticking with the plan.

Not least in importance, it must be clear that sufficient financial and military resources to accomplish the tasks assigned in the mandate will be made available. Even the most well-defined mandate and rigorous pre-planning for a mission are futile without the necessary funds, people, and equipment necessary to carry out the mission. If the resources are not likely to be made available to support a new peace operation adequately, then the members of the Security Council should not vote to establish the mission.

Financing Peace Operations

The methods used to budget and pay for UN peace operations are anachronistic and in desperate need of reform. They compound the difficulties of financing the UN, delay the start of new operations, and make it impossible for the UN to develop the infrastructure necessary to support military operations.

An integrated budget and financial assessment that encompasses all peace operations should be prepared each year, replacing the individual budgets and assessments that are now prepared for each mission separately. In fact, the budgets for most peacekeeping operations are reconsidered every six months, as the operation's mandate expires. Member states can thus receive as many as two bills yearly for each peacekeeping operation, to say nothing of their assessments for the regular UN budget and for specialized agencies. This frequent billing process lies outside of states' regular budgeting cycles, and makes it difficult for governments to set aside the proper amount of resources for the United Nations. It contributes to the persistent problem of arrears in payments of peacekeeping dues that has placed the United Nations in a difficult financial situation. It also encourages an image of never-ending payments to the international organization and aggravates the problem of building and sustaining political support for national participation in UN peace operations and other UN activities.

With an integrated budget, members would receive one annual bill for all peace operations. An integrated budget would necessitate a more rigorous process for budget estimates, including better means of gaining early warning of new missions. A contingency fund for possible new-starts would have to be included, but the Secretary General would be precluded from releasing all but a very small portion of the funds prior to authorization of the mission by the Security Council. Contingency funds are generally disliked by the member states but, with the management reforms proposed elsewhere in this report, might become acceptable.

Although the possibility of supplemental requests at times of extreme emergency could not be excluded, an integrated peacekeeping budget would reinforce the many other reasons for the United Nations to be discriminating in reviewing possible new missions. As we have mentioned, the members of the Security Council should only accept those new missions that are such clear threats to international peace that they are willing to make available sufficient resources to carry them out successfully, and should turn down participation in those situations that are either ill-defined, unaccomplishable, or simply unaffordable.

Whether or not peacekeeping budgets are integrated into a single annual assessment, procedures should be developed to make small amounts of funds available to the Secretary General at the very onset of any new peace operation, once it has been approved by the Security Council. Experience has shown that the first few weeks of a mission are crucial. When the arrival of units is delayed due to funding or manpower shortfalls, potential opponents are given greater time to organize and muster resources. The Secretary General needs a certain amount of funding to proceed with mission start-up while the budget cycles through the usual process. Delay in mission start-up could negate the objectives of the mandate and can also be read as a sign that the United Nations is not really committed to the operation.

Finally, the twenty-year old special formula used to assess peacekeeping costs is obsolete and should be revised. The scale divides member states into four categories. The permanent five members of the Security Council constitute Group A; these members pay about 20 percent more for peacekeeping operations than they do for normal assessments. Group B consists of developed nations; they pay the same rate for peace operations as for the regular UN budget. The less economically advanced nations of Group C pay 20 percent of their regular assessment rates for peacekeeping, while the least developed countries in Group D pay only 10 percent of their regular rates.

This method treats some countries in an overly generous manner, while penalizing others. Since the scale was devised in 1973, many nations, such as Japan and other countries in East Asia, Germany, and some OPEC countries, have experienced considerable relative growth in their per capita incomes and, in fact, are in a better position to pay for peacekeeping than some of the permanent members of the Security Council. The United States, on the other hand, pays 25 percent of the regular UN budget but more than 31 percent of UN assessments for peace operations. Most Americans believe that the United States pays too much for peace operations and that other wealthy nations pay too little. We agree.

In fact, the old rationale for having a special peacekeeping formula—that peacekeeping primarily served the interests of the great powers—is clearly no longer the case. Today, now that the East-West conflict has ended, peace operations are increasingly taking place in smaller and impoverished countries, helping to stabilize developing regions and providing humanitarian services to populations devastated by civil conflicts. Peace operations serve the interests of the great powers primarily indirectly, through their long-term impact on world stability. There is no longer a good reason for the assessment formula for peace operations to differ from the formula used for other UN expenses.³

3. *Enid Schoettle* and *Donald McHenry* agree that the United States should not pay as large a share of peacekeeping costs as it does now, but do not believe that the US peacekeeping share should necessarily be the same as its share of regular UN assessments. They note that the permanent members of the Security Council have special powers with respect to peacekeeping due to their veto rights; as such, a higher than normal assessment rate is fair. They also point out that the peacekeeping formula, like other UN assessment formulas, was devised to reduce the burden on the poorest countries. If the advanced countries were permitted to pay less, it would shift a greater burden on those least able to pay.

While not disagreeing with this position, *Chester Crocker* and *Ronald Spiers* also stress the rights

Providing Trained Peacekeepers and Support Staff

The members of the United Nations need to move forward on better means of providing the organization with trained military and civilian personnel on a timely basis. States should designate military units for potential service in peace operations and provide them with the specialized training necessary to operate efficiently in multinational UN operations. Currently, the practice of rounding up units for each new peace operation parallels the practice of "holding out the tin cup" to finance the operation; each is done on a rushed, ad hoc basis.

If countries were to designate units for potential service, the Secretary General would know where to look for particular capabilities. Designated forces should include infantry forces, military police, medical detachments, and support forces such as communications, transport, and logistical units. Designating units on this basis would not imply in any way a commitment to make those forces available for any particular mission. The actual commitment of designated forces for a specific mission would remain strictly a national decision.⁴

To prepare for those situations in which they would be willing to commit forces, member states should provide designated units with specialized training and equipment, preparing them to work more effectively in multinational peace operations. Until the past year, the major military powers had given very little thought to peace operations, and had not developed the specialized doctrines, standardized operating procedures, and advanced equipment that could enable military units of different countries to operate more effectively together in a UN context.

Past and ongoing peace operations have demonstrated that peacekeeping troops need to be well versed in riot and crowd control, in knowing how to protect themselves in static positions, in operating checkpoints and carrying out searches, in the use of

conveyed by the veto power and the connection between those rights and financial responsibilities. They note this relationship should be considered when countries, such as Germany and Japan, are requested to pay a larger share of peacekeeping costs.

Brian Urquhart reminds us that a substantial portion of the United States', and all other nations', contributions to the UN makes its way back into the US economy. New York City alone gains about \$1 billion per year from the UN's presence there, he states.

4. *Harold Rogers* disagrees with the recommendation that each nation "designate" military units and specially train them for potential service in UN peace operations. Mr. Rogers believes that such designations would effectively be a de facto commitment of US troops in unanticipated, future peace operations. Mr. Rogers believes that all such decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the political and military situation on the ground and the US national security interests served by such operations. He believes further that all US troop commitment decisions must be made with appropriate congressional consultation and action.

Brian Urquhart and *Donald McHenry* disagree with this recommendation, as well, but for very different reasons. They believe that the designation of units for peacekeeping service without automatic commitment constitutes a weak proposal. In the absence of a priori commitment, they note, the start-up of new missions would face the same delays that they do now. Elsewhere, Mr. Urquhart has advocated the creation of a standing UN military force composed of individual volunteers. This standing force, he suggests, could be used for rapid deployments prior to the dispatch of a regular force made up of national contingents.

firepower when civilians and opposing military units are close to one another, in carrying out counter-mine operations, and in various diplomatic and administrative functions. Although the Nordic nations and a few others have developed specialized peacekeeping training courses, few of these tasks receive the necessary emphasis in routine military training. Moreover, developing nations, which potentially could provide a larger share of UN peacekeepers, do not have the resources to establish such training curricula or to provide them to their forces.

The UN's integrated peace operations budget should include funds for training and other support services. The cost would be too high for the United Nations to pay for the training of designated national units, but the United Nations could provide teaching materials for training courses, coordinate multinational training exercises, send out training teams to help nations develop peacekeeping curricula, organize conferences and other events that would facilitate the exchange of information among trainers, and even inspect and certify training establishments.

The training of police, election monitors, and other civilians who take part in UN peace operations is as important as the training of military units, and is generally neglected. Because civilians typically are recruited from large numbers of nations, the need for a coordination center, and even for UN-provided training, is even greater for civilians than for military units.

The United Nations also should continue to improve its capabilities to support peace operations. Much has been accomplished over the past year, but the organization has a ways to go to match the standards of contemporary military command and logistical capabilities. The United Nations has finally established a 24-hour command center, but continued investments are necessary to equip the organization with modern communications systems so that New York can stay in constant touch with all field headquarters and interact confidentially with field commanders through a variety of means. The organization also needs better early warning, logistical, administrative, and support capabilities.

Thought should be given, also, to the potential of specialized equipment, such as rapidly-deployable remote sensors coupled with modern information processing systems, to enhance the UN's capabilities for peacekeeping and, particularly, to reduce the risks which peacekeepers confront. Standardized equipment, especially communications equipment, would enable troops from different nations to work together more efficiently. Troops from developing nations, especially, do not always have the proper equipment for their tasks. Stocks of standardized equipment could reduce this problem.

Finally, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Secretariat should be given the staff necessary to develop situational assessments of potential peace operations, to plan and manage an operation once it has been approved, and to coordinate national efforts to improve the training and standardize the equipment of peacekeepers.⁵

5. Some members of the group, including *Barry Blechman, Chester Crocker, John Deardourff, Donald McHenry, Harold Rogers, and Ronald Spiers* believe it important to give the Security Council a source of professional military advice by activating the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the chiefs of staff of

The US Role in UN Peace Operations

Until 1993, the US military establishment spent very little time thinking about, or preparing for, UN peace operations. As part of a general understanding with the other permanent members of the Security Council, the United States deliberately stayed out of UN missions, except for providing a small number of individual military observers and certain support services. Now that the US has begun to play a more active role in these missions, the US armed forces have begun to think through the requirements of multilateral peace operations and to develop appropriate doctrines, operating procedures, training curricula, and specialized equipment. In effect, the United States now faces the same contentious issues debated in the United Nations: How to fund peace operations and how to prepare for the possibility of participation.

Funding

Appropriations for peace operations are currently a part of the Department of State's budget. US activities in the United Nations are rightly viewed as part of American foreign policy, and therefore the responsibility of the State Department. But the US-UN relationship also has a military component. The 1945 UN Participation Act formalized the president's authority to detail military personnel and materiel to the United Nations in non-combatant situations. The Department of Defense has supplied military observers and airlift and sea lift to the UN for years. US forces served in Somalia in 1992-93, of course, and there is also a US combatant unit in Macedonia as part of the UN's preventive deployment there.

The DOD budget, however, contains no line item for these expenses, and payment for them is typically extracted from the military services' operating accounts. When the United Nations reimburses the United States for its participation, it typically covers only a small portion of the Defense Department's costs. Facing a declining budget, the Department of Defense is rightfully becoming more concerned about such unplanned uses of funds.

It seems clear that the Defense Department's participation in UN peace operations should be fully reimbursed; the cost of UN activities cannot be permitted to bite into the readiness of US forces for other types of contingencies. Defense funding could be accomplished either by including specific line items for such purposes in the Defense Department's budget and appropriation, or by having the State Department request the

the armed forces of the permanent members of the Security Council (or their designees), as called for by the UN Charter. At a minimum, the Committee could help the Security Council to estimate the resources and specific types of activities required to translate political objectives into actual accomplishments through the use of military forces, and to estimate the feasibility that the tasks could be accomplished given the situation on the ground. The availability of professional military advice would strengthen the Security Council's ability to write clear mandates with necessary rules of engagement or, for that matter, to decide not to participate in conflict situations when the task is too difficult. *Mr. Spiers* would go further and utilize the Military Staff Committee for many of the operational tasks now carried out by the Secretariat. In *Mr. Spiers'* view, the Secretariat's proper functions are principally administrative.

funds in its budget and reimburse the Pentagon. In the greater scheme of things, this bureaucratic squabble between executive departments (and also between congressional committees) is not really important. What is vital is ensuring that both branches of the government recognize that funds are required both for US participation in specific peace operations, and for preparing the armed forces to take part in them. If legislators and executive branch officials are not willing to authorize such expenditures, the US should not plan to participate.

How Should the US Participate?

We believe that the United States, like other nations, should designate certain military units for potential service in UN peace operations and provide those units with the specialized training necessary for them to operate effectively in multinational UN operations.⁶

In most cases, the United States' most important contributions to UN peace operations would consist of those unique military capabilities, such as airlift, specialized logistical units, and advanced technical means of intelligence that are available to us and to very few other countries. The US could also make an important contribution by helping, on a reimbursable basis, to train and equip forces designated by other nations for peace operations, especially those of poorer developing nations.

As the leading country within the United Nations, however, the United States must at times be willing to accept some of the risk that comes with the participation of combat units in peace operations. At times, the United States seems inconsistent in its attitudes toward UN operations. On the one hand, it insists on a leadership role; on the other hand, it is reluctant to participate in the "hard" tasks, notably the provision of combat forces. To other nations, especially those who have contributed troops and suffered casualties for many years, the US seems to be supporting a double standard. If the United States wants to lead, it must sometimes be willing to get out in front.

In short, the United States must tailor its participation to the situation, and particularly to the importance of the UN mission to American interests. US forces need not play a role in many UN peace operations, perhaps even most. For others, the US can contribute logistical and support capabilities that would not otherwise be available to the UN. In a few cases, however, when US interests are clearly at stake, the United States should be prepared to contribute combat units along with other countries. In these latter cases, moreover, it is particularly important that the Congress take part in the decision to become involved, along with the Executive Branch (see below).

The Command and Control of UN Peace Operations

The most sensitive and difficult issue is the question of command and control. Like other nations, the United States is hesitant to place its troops under foreign command

6. *John Sewall* and *Harold Rogers* believe that such a step would not be desirable. Instead, they believe, general training for peacekeeping should be included as part of the standard training curricula for all relevant forces, and supplemented by focused training for the specific mission before an actual deployment.

in potentially hostile environments. Americans will always place responsibility for any casualties on the US command chain, leading ultimately to the president. Thus, simply as a matter of political reality, any arrangement for a UN operation involving a real threat of hostilities, in which US combat forces will participate, needs to allow US military officials to carry out their responsibilities. At the same time, the command arrangements also need to allow the US forces to operate effectively in a multinational context.

One way which has been suggested to resolve this dilemma is to limit the authority of the UN force commander to the highest level of direction. The UN commander's responsibility would be to devise the overall military strategy intended to fulfill the objectives of the mandate, to arrange the basic deployment of forces assigned to the mission, and to map the overall campaign. Based on this evolving plan, the UN commander would provide strategic directives to individual national unit commanders. However, the latter, US officers in the case of US units, would have responsibility for operational planning and tactical command and control.

The UN force commander, for example, would give the US unit commander broad orders to achieve a certain objective or to complete a specific task in a specific location during a certain period of time. The US unit's own commander then would determine all the operational details, the procedures and actions needed to accomplish the mission, and then direct the American forces in an appropriate manner. The same arrangements, obviously, would have to be made for any other troop contributing country that wished to have them.

This type of command arrangement presupposes the deployment of units that are battalion-size or larger. Units of this size are independent entities with an autonomous command structure. They have the capability to operate alone. Those nations deploying smaller units, such as companies, which is often the case, would have to accept a more closely integrated command arrangement.

The range of the force commander's authority would be shaped by the Security Council during the operation's planning stage. Potential difficulties would be reduced if, as we have suggested previously, future mandates are written with clear objectives and realistic rules of engagement. Prior to authorizing a new mission, each of the Council's members, including the United States, should have a clear idea of what will be required to accomplish the political objectives, and of how the UN's force commander and the commanders of national contingents will divide their responsibilities.

Such a scheme, admittedly, is far from ideal. It places enormous emphasis on coordination among units and between units and the force commander. Planned actions by national unit commanders would have to be coordinated with the force commander and with national contingents in adjacent zones; arrangements for supporting and back-up forces would have to be made in a timely manner and secure communications established. The assignment of national contingents to different sectors and different types of tasks, as is typically the case, would help to avoid excessive difficulties. The training of units in the special doctrine and procedures of UN peace operations also would help to ease potential problems related to the

command arrangement. Even so, implementing such a command arrangement will always be difficult and risky.⁷

Our working group is divided on the issue of command and control. The largest number of members reluctantly support the general idea of divided command responsibilities, as just described, as a less than ideal, but practical necessity. Others oppose the proposal, but are themselves divided on the alternative.

A few members believe that the proposed compromise is unworkable and unwise because it could not guarantee US command and control of American troops. They state that in all circumstances in which US troops are in combat situations, those troops should always be under US command and control. They believe that this rule should be followed no matter how small the US combat presence might be. If the United States is not permitted to command the operation, they state, its participation, if any, should be limited to logistical and support functions.

Other members believe that the proposed compromise is unworkable and unwise because it could not result in effective UN peace operations. They state that any such arrangement would violate the military principle of unity of command and note further that since all other nations will demand the same arrangements for their forces, it would, in fact, be the end of multinational operations. They state that the degree of integration of the force is an indicator of the seriousness of the international community in carrying out peace operations, and that the US should not participate at all, if it is not willing, at times, to permit its troops to be commanded by competent and experienced foreign nationals.

These different perspectives notwithstanding, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States will always have a clear say in the writing of any mandate, as well as the ultimate ability to veto any mission in which it disagrees with any aspect, including the assignment of command responsibilities. For any major enforcement action, in which the probability of combat is high and the United States is providing most of the required combat forces, it can rightfully insist on retaining command of the overall operation, as in Operation Desert Storm. In other cases, decisions on US participation should be made in conjunction with decisions on the specifics of the command arrangements, prior to the vote in the Security Council authorizing the mission, based on an evaluation of the US interests at stake and how they would be affected by the alternatives.

Finally, at all times, the president and US military authorities should keep close tabs on any US forces assigned to UN peace operations, combatants and non-combatants, through the United States' own unified command structure. Units assigned to peace operations should maintain communications with the appropriate US geographical command. That command should prepare contingency plans to reinforce or extract the

7. *James Thomson* points out that this concept of divided responsibilities is similar to the way that US forces would operate under allied commanders in NATO operations, with the principal exception being the level of command—divisions under national command, normally, in NATO; battalions under national command, normally, in the UN case.

US units if they were ever threatened by overwhelming force, and retain the capabilities to act decisively if such an eventuality ever developed.

The Congressional Role in Decisions on Peace Operations

As the members of the United Nations have extended the scope of the world organization's peace operations, and the cost of American participation has risen, the role of UN peace operations in US policy has become a serious issue between the executive and legislative branches. If the two branches don't heal this division and develop a constructive relationship on these questions, efforts to improve the UN's effectiveness in peace operations will be derailed by US domestic discord.

The president clearly has the constitutional authority to conduct foreign policy and to command the armed forces. However, executive decisions to approve costly UN peace operations and, particularly, to commit US personnel to participate in them without seeking the Congress' advice and consent have led to intense criticism by many legislators. In particular, there is concern that recent decisions have led to policies which follow the United Nations' direction, serving the interests of other countries and not those of the United States.

Legislators showed their discomfort during 1993 by introducing legislation which would curtail the president's freedom of action as pertains to peace operations. For example, a deadline of March 31, 1994 was imposed on US participation in the Somalia mission by legislation. A more inclusive piece of legislation proposed to withhold funding for any peace operation in which US combat forces had been placed under foreign command without prior congressional approval, but it was defeated. The Congress also again refused to appropriate the full amount requested by the administration to pay for UN peace operations, and turned down the request to create a Defense Department Peacekeeping Fund.

The Congress' concerns about UN peace operations have been building for a while. It is symptomatic of larger problems—differing opinions between the executive and legislative branches on the relative importance of foreign and domestic needs and the direction of foreign policy in general, as well as specific doubts about the United Nations and its implications for US security.

Legislated restrictions on the president's authority as concerns foreign and military policies are usually best avoided, if possible, as they encourage recalcitrance by opponents and weaken the credibility of US initiatives. Still, it is evident that if the executive branch does not accede to the establishment of a more interactive decision process on these matters, such restrictions indeed may be forthcoming. The Executive Branch clearly should consult with congressional leaders prior to decisions to authorize new UN peace operations, and certainly prior to decisions to commit US forces to any such operation. The Congress cannot be expected to appropriate funds for peace operations unless it is given a role in such decisions. Moreover, legislators, as the elected representatives of the American people, cannot be expected to accept the loss of American lives in UN operations without a prior understanding of the US national security interests involved. Presenting the Congress with *fait accomplis* has not aided the president in improving the effectiveness of UN peace operations.

The two branches do not have to remain divided on this issue. In its role as advisor to the president, the Congress can contribute to positive reforms in US policies toward the United Nations. The president cannot ignore the domestic constituencies required to gain support for his policies. He should want to consult with the congressional leadership and key committee members prior to undertaking either financial or military commitments by authorizing new UN missions. In these consultations, the executive branch should explain the purpose of the peace operation, how US interests will be advanced by it, and seek congressional advice on the level and type of US participation. Decisions on policy implementation will ultimately be the President's responsibility, but the president and the Congress should work together in the formulation of policy.

New legislation is not required to provide the Congress with such a consultative role. A standing, bipartisan consultative group could be established to monitor peacekeeping activities. This standing body would consist of about twenty members selected from the congressional leadership and appropriate committees—appropriations, armed services, foreign affairs, intelligence.

When the president is contemplating the commitment of US combat forces in a UN peace operation with a significant risk of hostilities, the need for congressional consultations is particularly acute. Indeed, most members of the group believe that, under such circumstances, the president should go beyond consultations and seek an affirmative action by the Congress prior to committing American troops. In their view, such a step would ease any doubts about the US commitment to the mission in question, dispel any illusions that divisions in the United States might cause the US forces to be withdrawn, and greatly aid the sustainability of American policy.

The group was divided on this issue, however, and particularly on whether or not a requirement for affirmative congressional action prior to the commitment of US combat forces to a UN peace operation with significant risk of conflict should be written into law, as has been suggested during the past few months by several key legislators. Some members of the group stated that such legislation would dangerously compromise the president's authority as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. They believe that the decision about whether or not to seek affirmative congressional action should be left up to the president, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Congressional involvement in decisions on peace operations is consistent with the ideas of the architects of the UN and the United States' participation in it. In the 1940s, the procedures governing participation of US combat forces in UN peace enforcement operations were left to be decided following conclusion of an agreement with the Secretary General, as specified in Article 43 of the UN Charter. Both the United Nations and member states stressed the importance of following national constitutional practices in implementing such arrangements, meaning that the US Article 43 agreement would have been subject to the approval of Congress, providing an opportunity to work out arrangements for consultations between the branches.

For a variety of reasons, however, no Article 43 agreement has been concluded by the United States, leaving us with the ad hoc practices now followed. Clearly, in the absence of a congressional-approved Article 43 agreement, the president should recognize the right and desirability of the Congress to have a say on commitments of US

combat forces to peace operations. The Congress, for its part, should not waver in taking on this responsibility. When the situation requires, the Congress should accept its responsibility to share with the president decisions to commit American lives to foreign dangers.

Congress can be a positive resource in aiding the president to improve the effectiveness of UN peace operations. A consultative group that understands the president's objectives can gather support among other legislators and help the president convey to the public the national interests served by the policy. Not bringing Congress on board beforehand can only lead to remonstrations and bad blood between the branches. Such confrontations between the president and Congress can erode policy and weaken the effectiveness of troops already deployed in the field, placing them in greater danger. Agreement on the Congress' role is a key measure for improving the potential for UN peace operations to serve American national interests.

The Need for US Leadership

Presidential leadership is essential to bring about reforms in the way the United Nations carries out peace operations. However, the president must also lead on the home front. Time must be spent so that the Congress comes to understand the president's concept of the role of UN peace operations in US security policy. The public must be educated on how peace operations and US participation in them can serve the United States' national interests, as well as the broader interests of the international community.

Polls show that Americans want the United Nations to succeed. They prefer multilateral means of keeping world peace to having the United States play the role of the world's policeman. Without the all-encompassing Soviet threat, the United States can now work to advance a wider agenda in order to help further national interests. The Cold War period, although tense at times, offered a measure of stability. A stable international environment offers the best environment for the United States to secure its political and economic interests. Although the smaller conflicts that are disrupting the international environment may seem to fall outside US interests, they can be harmful in the long-term. The United Nations, established to foster peace in the international arena, can be an effective instrument through which the United States works to alleviate instability.

The UN's role will remain a theoretical one, however, unless the world body makes far-reaching reforms in the way it goes about its business. The administration and the Congress should work out a comprehensive package of initiatives that the US Government can present as a unified program to the Secretary General and to UN member states. In summary, these initiatives include:

- Key reforms in UN procedures to eliminate waste and inefficiency, to create an independent inspector-general, to professionalize overall management and procedures, and to strengthen the UN's specific capabilities to carry out peace operations;
- Reforms in the financing of UN peace operations, including the creation of an integrated peacekeeping budget and revision of the special peacekeeping assessment formula so that the US share is reduced;

- Creation of appropriate procedures and organizations to ensure an effective congressional role in US decisions about UN peace operations;
- In the context of the successful implementation of such procedures, a congressional commitment to full payment of all assessments for UN peace operations. Efforts to withhold funding only increase the constraints on the UN's capabilities by forcing it to act with limited resources.

Reforms along these lines will increase the public's confidence in the United Nations and ease concerns about US participation.

As the world's predominant power, the United States cannot disconnect itself from the international environment. It also cannot choose to act only when vital interests are immediately in danger. But when such urgent threats are not involved, the United States does not have to act alone, but can work in collaboration with other countries. Effective United Nations peace operations offer an alternative for the United States to share the burden of world peace with like-minded nations.