

**INTERNATIONAL POLICE:
IMPROVING PROFESSIONALISM AND RESPONSIVENESS***Issue Brief September 2009*

By William J. Durch and Madeline L. England


The growing numbers of international police authorized by the Security Council to serve in UN peace operations attest to a recognition of the importance, and challenge, of fostering the rule of law in post-conflict environments. To date, however, the UN's capacity to recruit and deploy highly-skilled officers to the field in a timely manner has fallen far short of mission requirements.

On 5 May 2009, the Future of Peace Operations at the Henry L. Stimson Center hosted an expert workshop to address two questions key to meeting those requirements: First, how best to raise international policing cadres' professionalism so that each officer's contributions to multi-lateral peace operations are more efficient and effective? And second, how can US agencies best contribute to that professionalism and to supporting the police components of UN and other international peace operations? Participants compared recent increases in UNPOL demands and capacities to the recommendations in Stimson's report *Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law*, by Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch.

PANEL I – UNITED NATIONS POLICING: MEETING MISSION NEEDS**William Durch**, Senior Associate and Director, Future of Peace Operations Program, Stimson Center**Andrew Hughes**, United Nations Police Advisor and Director, Police Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations**PANEL II – US AGENCY POLICING INITIATIVES: INCREASING CAPACITY AND COHERENCE****Gregory Ducot**, Deputy Assistant Director, Europe/Eurasia Division, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice**Michele Greenstein**, Senior Police Advisor, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State**Robert Perito**, Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace**Angelic Young**, Deputy Director, Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law Programs, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), U.S. Department of State**United Nations Policing: Meeting Mission Needs**


The event began with a presentation of four current strategic challenges confronting UN police: increase in demand, increasingly complex tasks, lack of institutional knowledge and doctrine, and insufficient resources. Discussion ensued on how the UN is meeting those challenges, especially with respect of formed police units.

The demand for police has skyrocketed in recent years as the number of missions has grown and UN member states have become more cognizant of the rule of law in promoting security in areas with peace operations; currently 10,605 officers are deployed in 14 peacekeeping missions and 4 political missions, more than four times the deployment level of ten years ago (Figure 1¹).



However, the popularity of police and recognition of their importance in peace operations have not been met with police contributions, which has led to a continual inability to supply the authorized number of police in missions. Currently 100 UN member states contribute police but the median contribution is 26 officers; that is, 49 of these states contribute 25 or fewer officers to UN operations.² Meanwhile, the ratio of UN Headquarters police personnel to police in the field stands at 1:400, placing overwhelming administrative burdens on Headquarters personnel.

As numbers UN police have increased, so have concerns that those deployed lack the requisite expertise to perform increasingly complex and specialized tasks. It is hard to find effective mission leadership, and the development of police doctrine and strategic guidance to the field have both lagged, even as “policekeepers” must deal with increasingly robust mandates (Figure 2) in challenging environments, for which they receive inadequate training. Peacekeeping mandates may be traditional, transformational, or executive, with progressive degrees of complexity and responsibility, as the UN Security Council



¹ All figures are taken from Stimson’s report *Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law*, by Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch. (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007).

² The US contribution is 80 police officers to missions in Liberia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Southern Sudan.

pays increasing attention to the need to restore the rule of law in the post-conflict settings where UN operations and their police components deploy. Tasks include interim policing and law enforcement (patrolling, arrests, detentions, on-the-job mentoring, advising, training, and transition and support following a conflict), operational support (public order, crowd control, and riot control), and reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding the law enforcement institutions of the mission host state (developing professionalism, procedures, codes, management, vetting, training, and basic materials and logistics). UN policing is no longer passive; police help the host state transition from a security-first environment to a development environment while promoting local ownership through active engagement and training.

Stimson's international policing report presents these facts in detail (Box 2). Stimson senior associate William Durch discussed gaps that still exist regarding police availability, skills, and quality. The report's findings demonstrate the heavy burdens being placed on UN police.

Box 2**Resources available in*****Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict and the Rule of Law:***

- Compilation of all police and rule of law related mandates for UN peace operations since 1964
- Compilation of data on deployment rates of individual police and formed units since 1989
- Composite task lists for police and rule of law mission components from mandates since 1999
- Frequency and urgency analysis of tasks

The UN Police Division is looking to determine the future of robust policing to enable Headquarters to meet the needs of international police who, increasingly, work in unstable and potentially hostile environments. Performance of mandated tasks for those environments should be standardized, under guidance of an international policing doctrine and associated training regime. The Police Division is also considering "outside-the-box" options, such as an international police expeditionary force able to cope with highly unstable environments, and what additional responsibilities and resources such options would require.

Current effort at Headquarters is directed toward improving formed police units (FPUs), pre-existing units of 120 to 140 personnel that are trained and equipped to deal with public order maintenance. Following a tragic event in Kosovo in 2007, where a peaceful demonstration resulted in the death of two civilians from expired rubber bullets shot from FPU weapons, the Police Division began to evaluate the support, guidance, and training of FPUs. The Police Division sent seven Proficiency Testing and Training Teams (PT3s) into the field to assess the proficiency of all deployed FPUs. The PT3s found poorly trained FPUs incapable of performing basic tasks in crowd control or using their weapons and equipment, and operating without clear command structures or guidance. Since only about one-third of the 42 FPUs tested were deemed fully operationally ready, building FPU proficiency and doctrine have become top priorities within DPKO.³

The Police Division has tasked a Doctrine Development Group (DDG) of international police experts, many with experience in public order or commanding FPUs, to develop doctrine for

³ The actual number of authorized units deployed at the time of testing was 38; 42 were tested as several incoming units overlapped with units approaching the end of their tours.

FPU. While the DDG doctrine is being vetted, the Police Division is looking for international support for robust policing. Although recognizing that US contribution of FPUs is not likely due to the lack of a national gendarmerie in the United States, there is potential and need for the United States to contribute to UN objectives through the design of the doctrine, burden sharing (financially and with equipment), and cooperating with UN structures on missions to ensure interoperability.

Box 3**Case Example: Somalia**

Since Somalia might see UN police deployed in the relatively near future, participants thought it would be worth looking at previous police roles and lessons learned there.

Initially, the US took the lead in Somalia with a strong humanitarian intervention force in December 1992. That force recruited members of the well-respected Somali National Police to assist in maintaining basic order in Somali towns. That US-led coalition was supplanted in May 1993 by a UN-led mission (UNOSOM II) that rapidly ran afoul of the most powerful Somali armed faction, leading to open warfare in the capital city, Mogadishu, through the summer of 1993. US Special Forces deployed to capture the faction's leader but were themselves snared in an ambush on 3 October 1993 that killed 18 US troops. On 7 October, President Bill Clinton reinforced US troops temporarily but also announced that the US contingent would be withdrawn completely by 31 March 1994.

The UN mission remained, albeit with slowly dwindling troop contributions. One of its tasks involved the reconstitution of national police. The Security Council approved a budget of only \$45 million and a police contingent of 54 UN police officers to create a Somali police force of 10,000, constitute 5 police academies, and build 94 police stations. Not only were these resources too little, but the UN police contingent—part of the first UN mission attempting to “do development”—arrived with no plan or curriculum. From their arrival in March 1994 to the end of the UN mission in March 1995, “those 54 police showed tremendous courage,” according to one panelist, but spent most of their time enclosed in a high-security compound similar to the Green Zone in Iraq.

The experience emphasized the danger of issuing an unrealistic mandate with too small a deployment with too few resources, divorced from consideration of the larger political environment (although that did not stop the Security Council from creating the same sort of narrow training mandate for the UN in Haiti, at roughly the same time the Somali UN police mission was folding its tents).

Workshop participants considered the future role of the UN in Somalia, and UNPOL in particular. One participant remarked that peacekeeping in Somalia is a “potentially nightmarish mission.” The UN Security Council requested analysis and planning for a potential mission, forcing DPKO to consider its role and options. Should a police force be deployed to Somalia, there will have to be a sufficient military “crust” of security to protect the police and their work, as any UN presence would be a target, much as UNOSOM II was and AMISOM (the current African Union mission in Somalia) has been.

To meet this increasing demand and complexity, Dr. Durch argued UNPOL needs a cadre of experienced professionals that can address rule of law in the early stages of a mission and build the foundation for further engagement. While the *principle* of a UN standing police capacity (SPC) is accepted, the current staff of 27 is far short of what is needed. Requests to increase staff by another 49 posts have been denied by the UN General Assembly pending further clarification of the need for such an increase, despite the conclusions of a December 2008 panel of experts

report on the present SPC.⁴ Recently, however, the General Assembly approved the SPC's relocation to the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, which will facilitate deployments to UN operations in Africa and Asia, in particular.⁵

These steps, although welcome, are not sufficient. A much bigger standing capacity is needed to start and sustain policing and other ROL elements of new missions, and a more reliable and productive system also is needed for finding and deploying UNPOL and filling senior mission posts. Stimson's proposals in this respect includes a larger standing police capacity of about 400 personnel, a new UNPOL reserve force, and a UN senior reserve roster (see Box 4).

Box 4**Stimson's Proposed UN Rule of Law Capacities*****Standing Rule of Law Capacity (ROLCAP):***

- ROLCAP proposed to include 400 persons (two thirds police; one third other rule of law specialties).
 - Structure: 8 teams of about 50 persons each to fully staff mission headquarters components of new missions and to train mission components and reservists.
 - Deployment tempo: 50 percent (actual days on duty). Over 24 months, ROLCAP members could expect one 12-month field assignment and 3 months other 'away' duty.
- Lead elements should deploy shortly after mandate and reach full capacity within 3 weeks.
- Startup costs (personnel, basing, infrastructure): ~ \$45 million
- Recurring annual non-deployment-related costs, apportioned across missions: ~ \$33 million
- Annual deployment-related costs (50 percent deployment tempo): ~ \$33 million

New UN Police Reserve:

- Reserve should be sized to replace current system of individual UNPOL recruitment:
 - UN should pay retainer equal to 10 percent of a reservist's actual salary: 5 percent for 2 weeks annual UN-related training, and a 5 percent incentive fee to ensure rapid deployment when needed.
 - UN should reimburse UNPOL providers as it reimburses contributors of formed units, at a fixed per capita rate.
 - Recurring annual non-deployment costs, apportioned across missions: \$28–52 million. (Increased OECD-DAC member participation would increase retainer costs, as would a higher proportion of specialist police/SSR experts.)
 - Annual deployment-related costs for 7,000 UNPOL: ~\$109 million

UN Senior Reserve Roster:

- Should include personnel retired from appropriate national careers and suited to senior positions in mission management and security sector reform programs.
 - May be an appropriate repository of names of potential police commissioners and deputy commissioners.
 - Management overhead and a retainer to guarantee rapid (30-day) availability of a portion of the reserve would be this facility's only marginal costs (~ \$500,000).
 - Once called up, marginal costs would be nil, as senior reservists would fill positions billeted for international civil servants and thus fully costed in a mission budget.

Total Estimated Annual Impact on UN Peacekeeping Budget, Current Deployment Levels: +3 to 4%

⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, Financial performance report for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008 and proposed budget for the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010*. A/63/746/Add.17, 3 June 2009, para. 51.

⁵ United Nations, *General Assembly Resolution, Financing of the UN Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy*. A/RES/63/286, 13 August 2009, para. 6.

US Agency Policing Initiatives: Increasing Capacity and Coherence

Workshop participants included a range of experts from various US agencies with a role in supporting international rule of law and police efforts. Discussion began with the capacities and roles of various US agencies with a role in or capacity to provide international police support.

Bureau of International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Affairs

The Bureau of International Law Enforcement and Narcotics Affairs (INL) makes few direct personnel contributions for overseas missions but often works bilaterally. Key challenges to INL's participation in international policing are a lack of professional leadership, training, and doctrine that suits the needs of international police. Efforts have been made to overcome these, however, by improving pre-deployment training, increasing outreach and recruitment, and improving retention rates.

One of the primary challenges to US participation at any level is the lack of a national police force. Often INL ends up "stealing" from police agencies that are obviously reluctant to see their good personnel leave for international missions. Recent outreach efforts have included cooperating more with those agencies and explaining international policing through organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives (NAWLEE).

INL is also engaging through training for other countries' police forces and would like to expand to Darfur. It has recently engaged with the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU), an organization dedicated to training formed police units. INL is also offering training bilaterally; officers providing training in Nepal, for example, were asked to return and INL hopes to expand the program.

Police officers operate very differently from military personnel. Very few officers expect deployment abroad for extended periods of time; they accept positions abroad for additional income prior to retirement and one year is often the maximum many will accept. INL must start leading by example and therefore is providing in-service training and attempting to do more without contractors.

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in the Department of Justice is a law enforcement development organization established in 1986 whose mission is to work with foreign governments to develop effective, professional, and transparent law enforcement capacity that protects human rights, combats corruption, and reduces the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.

ICITAP has funded programs in 39 countries and maintains 16 field offices attached to U.S. embassies with a total of 390 ICITAP personnel (HQ and field). As of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, ICITAP had trained 82,911 foreign participants, performed 1,117 distinct training activities, and initiated 145 USG partnership activities. ICITAP's funding comes from the Department of State, Department of Defense, USAID, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).

ICITAP is non-operational and can provide assistance only by working in conjunction with embassies. ICITAP's priority is increasing host government capacity through a broad range of support: organizational development, transnational crime, criminal investigations, public integrity and anticorruption, specialized and tactical skills, forensics, basic police skills, academy and instructor development, community policing, corrections, marine and border security, information systems, and criminal justice coordination. Because one of the Justice Department's priorities is supporting US national security strategy in combating international terrorism and transnational crime, the US must have effective partners abroad. By strengthening rule of law capacity in foreign countries, ICITAP helps strengthen the security of the United States.

Some programs, such as forensics, due to its uncontroversial scientific nature, have less trouble gaining access to countries than others. Investigations assistance is also requested frequently. In one of its more high profile cases and in support of the UN Truth Commission, ICITAP assisted with the investigation of the 1989 massacre of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador.

Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction

The Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) has been working for the past several years to improve the professionalism and timeliness of the US Government response to reconstruction and stabilization crises that call for international policing. Participants discussed two current S/CRS priority initiatives: the Civilian Response Corps and an inter-agency working group tasked with analyzing US options for policing in high-risk environments.

The Civilian Response Corps (CRC) is a reconstruction and stabilization initiative that operates under a whole-of-government approach, which recognizes that no single government agency has the monopoly on the expertise needed for reconstruction and stabilization activities. It draws on the expertise of eight US government agencies. CRC consists of three complementary components—Active (CRC-A), Standby (CRC-S), and Reserve (CRC-R)—which are planned to have 250, 2,000, and 2,000 members, respectively. The CRC will include experts from rule of law, governance, public administration, economics, infrastructure, and health sectors. One hundred of the first 250 members of the CRC-A and 350 of the first 500 members of the CRC-R will be in the rule of law sector, including judges, prosecutors, war crimes and human rights experts, police, and corrections professionals.

CRC members will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis, that are pre-conflict and unstable, or that are emerging from conflict, serving overseas as advisors to senior US and host-nation officials and as mentors to host nation counterparts. The CRC-A is thus far the most functional; members have participated in planning and operations in Lebanon, Haiti, Sudan, Chad, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

What the CRC is not designed to do, and what the US government does not have any civilian ability to do, is to perform actual policing functions in high-risk environments. When identifying the first 250 positions of the CRC, S/CRS recognized that deployable, "operational or executive" police that could function as a team or in formed units were not part of the plan.

S/CRS established a technical-level interagency working group to examine two issues: 1) how the US can support FPUs deployed and developed by partner nations to perform robust policing tasks

and 2) what option(s) exist for a US capability to fill the gap between what individual police do and what military forces do. The group's work does not reflect US policy, although it does look at the issue from a government-wide perspective. The group has not made any recommendations as to whether this is a type of capability that the US Government needs. It has been asked only to examine what such capacities would look like and what resources the government would need if US formed police units were determined to be needed and desirable.

The working group has determined that a robust policing mechanism would have three priorities: filling a public security gap, deploying early for assessment and planning purposes, and dealing with spoiler elements (e.g., gangs, terrorists, and organized crime). The units would need to be able to work from a police perspective and uphold democratic policing standards using appropriate operational law enforcement methods and capabilities. They would need to be capable of performing at a level of risk higher than that of typical patrol officers but less than that of military combat operations. Their tasks would include mitigating the criminal damage and intimidation common in unstable environments and speeding the restoration of freedom of movement and local populations' sense of "normalization."

With these priorities and tasks in mind, the working group determined a few essential resources for such units: standing headquarters; unity of command and unit cohesion; appropriate legal authority and authorization; integration with all USG foreign affairs police and rule of law assets so as to be part of a whole-of-government response; a common approach with and support from the Department of Defense; ability to operate with international police; flexibility to adapt to varied criminal justice systems, mission mandates, and host nation law enforcement capabilities; and logistical and organizational support. The units would need to include perspectives from law enforcement, foreign affairs, and development; receive training targeted to international operations, including field exercises and cross-training for multiple functions; have the ability to deploy rapidly; and be held accountable for the conduct of their work. The working group also determined that training host state counterparts should not be a primary task of such formed police units.

Due to the hypothetical nature of the subject matter, the working group has had the freedom to explore many questions and possibilities, including the proper size of a unit of this type, the operational environment in which it might work, whether it could deploy in UN, coalition or regional organization missions, who should command it, and what level of force it should be allowed to use. If deploying unilaterally, the group has considered whose laws should it enforce, whether it would require an invitation from the host nation or operate under UN authorization, and whether it could or should operate in conjunction with military occupation.

Discussion on International Police and US Contributions

Discussions among workshop participants focused on the particular skills needed for international policing, responsibility for recruiting, and composition of international police; doctrine development and international training standards; and US cooperation and contributions in international peace operations.

Skills and composition of international police

Workshop participants discussed a number of issues relating to necessary skills of international police officers, including specialist capacities on intelligence, and mechanisms for identifying and recruiting officers with particular skills. Participants discussed whether diaspora communities could be a resource pool for international police and for increasing the participation level of female police officers.

The UN generally relies upon member states and partners to identify expertise among the officers they contribute, although it will approach a member state or partner in search of a particular specialty. In Haiti, for example, there had been a major problem with kidnapping, leading UNPOL to receive advice bilaterally from Colombia and Mexico, countries that do not contribute police but have capable anti-kidnapping experience and intelligence to curb the level of kidnappings.

Participants noted that police in UN missions have limited capacity for intelligence collection and criminal investigation and acknowledged that only within the last year have UN officials begun to realize the absolute need to improve intelligence gathering capabilities, and the Security Council has since “commended” it. Intelligence is still a new paradigm for the UN but unequivocally “an important part of the equation.” To increase investigative capacities within DPKO and especially amongst police, they have begun looking to models from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Interpol that have been implemented in Asia and the Caribbean.

Several panelists highlighted their experiences and knowledge of recruiting from diaspora groups. The US has done this in the past, depending on the availability and accessibility of populations and the context of particular missions. Diaspora groups speak the language and understand the culture but also present challenges. Albanian speakers deployed to Kosovo, for example, lost their impartiality, as perceived by the population and by any objective measure, while Haitian-American police officers hired by State Department to serve with the UN contingent in Haiti soon re-established “family” ties of varying degrees of propriety when deployed in the 1990s. And, inhibiting the use of diasporas, any officer that the United States contributes must be a US citizen.

Participants recognized the need for and the value of an increased role for women in international policing. The current participation rate of women in UN missions is 7.75%, which participants acknowledged to be an improvement over previous years but is mostly due to a single all-female formed police unit from India that has been deployed to the UN mission in Liberia. One participant suggested that perhaps “the pendulum has swung too far” with such a configuration and that mixed-gender units may be preferable, as having both genders represented is beneficial. Nigeria, for example, has begun to include female officers in its FPUs.

Doctrine development and international training standards

Doctrine and training are a primary means of standardizing professionalism and skills; participants therefore exchanged information on recent developments in doctrine development, specifically how to deal with spoilers, and on international training standards.

Dealing with spoilers is difficult for police as the average officer’s task is to police communities, so individual officers are not trained to manage criminal spoiler threats. Yet the military often

says that such crime is not their responsibility. In Chad, for example, the UN's mandate is to assist the national police in providing security for displaced persons and refugees. Armed banditry is a problem but the military component of the mission says that such banditry is a police matter and that the military deal only with "organized" threats. This is where FPU with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) training can be useful. The Police Division's Doctrine Development Group will help to define the level of threats that FPUs should be capable of handling as a matter of routine, versus those threats that require a higher-intensity, SWAT-type response.

One participant stated it is generally the responsibility of countries to provide training for their police, although many countries have demonstrated a "strong desire" for international training. International training is still a new concept, and UNPD is first using its new Mobile Assistance Teams to develop FPUs because their needs are the greatest, with initial emphasis on those already deployed. There is, however, also a general need for more police proficiency and pre-deployment training in general, and mechanisms to ensure that it is provided. In the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), only 10% of UNPOL officers received pre-deployment training in the early months of the mission. That has increased to 70 percent with a new training initiative. UNPOL is developing a core international police curriculum, which will be a great step toward an international training standard for basic and pre-deployment international police training.

Cooperation within and contributions to international peace operations

Participants discussed the past experiences of US civilian police officers in UN peacekeeping and the potential for further contributions. The discussion coalesced around how international deployment could be made career-enhancing for police in the United States and whether the CRC could be tapped to augment the UN Standing Police Capacity.

One participant commented that national police force rank at one time carried undue importance in the hierarchy of UN missions; that the United States had contributed a large but relatively low-ranking police contingent in Haiti in 1995—lieutenants rather than "generals" (some national police forces use military ranking schemes), and the issue proved to be "endlessly frustrating." Another participant countered that UN missions have moved on from that point and that it is now more common for ability to weigh more heavily than home rank in mission assignments.

On promoting international deployment as a good police career move, a panelist remarked that few INL relationships with police agencies are strong enough to make it happen. Chicago's police department allows for and rewards the taking of a leave of absence for international duty, which led INL to recognize its contributions to international policing with a public award. There is, however, no official US outreach program to police associations to promote international policing (no budget for it), and relatively few police departments can afford to part with officers for extended periods, especially top-quality officers.

One participant suggested that INL's resources and annual budget of \$1.9 billion (FY 2009)⁶ or ICITAP's budget of \$94 million could support UN and international rule of law needs more than they currently do. Another participant noted that many of those resources are attached to specific country programs or initiatives and only recently have "general purpose" funds been available for

⁶ Joseph C. Whitehill, *Analysis of the FY 2010 International Affairs Budget Request*. Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009, p. 10

discretionary initiatives, for example, the recent support for FPUs and collaboration with COESPU. Moreover, the CRC contains exactly the kind of resources that could usefully supplement the UN SPC and absolutely should be used to do so.

Conclusion

The demands placed on UNPOL have limited its ability to respond to the need for police in critical areas. One participant noted, for example, that the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) with only eight police officers has limited police capacity and questioned the reasoning for this in such a strategically and politically important operation. Another participant countered that the SRSG for UNAMA would like to raise the profile of police work in Afghanistan and try to focus UN energies on coordination between the several international presences in the country that have programs to train Afghan police, but the UN simply has not been called upon or been able to take on a major role.

Participants agreed there were broad areas of potential US support for international policing. INL should be able to provide more police expertise, especially senior police leadership that understands management challenges. INL, however, has had relatively few police professionals on staff, even though it, along with ICITAP, is involved in substantial police training efforts abroad. The US could also support doctrine and basic curriculum development that reflects the overall UN mission. The US has the capacity to do strategic planning and make that available to the UN, as it is a significant gap for the Organization, and to provide greater funding and resources to international policing. The bottom line is that the engaged US agencies understand the issues and have the capacity, expertise, and interest to help work on many of the problems that UN police face on a daily basis, in a collaborative fashion.

The Future of Peace Operations program evaluates and helps advance US policy and international capacity for peace operations, and is directed by Stimson senior associate William J. Durch. The program team includes research fellow Alison Giffen, research analyst Alix Boucher, research associate Madeline England, research assistants Guy Hammond and Max Kelly, and Scoville fellow Jessica Anderson. Founded in 1989, the Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous analysis and outreach. For more information, call 202.223.5956 or visit www.stimson.org/fopo.