THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping:

Experiences in Latin America and Africa

Virginia Page Fortna

Occasional Paper No. 11 June 1993

Pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives

The Henry L. Stimson Center
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Fifth Floor
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 223-5956 Fax (202) 785-9034

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Summary

As the United Nations struggles to find the resources to cope with a rising tide of regional conflict and a rapidly growing number of requests for its peacekeeping services, it has looked to regional organizations to relieve it of some of the responsibility for regional conflict containment and conflict resolution.[1] There is a longstanding principle, embodied in the UN Charter, that regional problems should have regional solutions and there is no inherent reason why the UN should bear full responsibility for keeping the peace all over the globe.

There are some advantages to regional organizations keeping the peace: regional actors may bring to the operation more intimate knowledge of the political complexities of a conflict and their staffs may be less likely to encounter language and cultural barriers in their work. Because they provide a regional forum for discussion and debate, regional organizations also can be vehicles for articulating norms of interstate behavior, and both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have played this role. Regional organizations can also exploit the solidarity that derives from their members' shared histories.[2] They can be successful peace-makers and peace-enhancers and can also contribute to joint efforts to mediate and keep peace.

The ability of regional organizations to assume large peacekeeping or peace enforcement burdens is limited, however, and not just by a lack of equipment or money. Even Western Europe, wealthy and well-organized politically, was reluctant to take on a peacekeeping role in its own backyard when civil and secessionist wars erupted in former Yugoslavia. Regional security organizations elsewhere have far fewer resources and are generally not in a position to take on large, expensive, logistically and politically difficult field operations.

Close proximity to the conflict and member governments' involvement in regional politics may also prevent regional organizations from being truly impartial. The reputation of the OAS was tarnished by its supporting role in the international intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, where it clearly functioned as an arm of US policy. Its reputation brightened in the late 1980s with its participation in the Central American peace process. The OAS joined with the UN to monitor elections in Nicaragua, to demobilize the Nicaraguan Resistance, and to monitor elections in Haiti, and worked to restore Haiti's elected government when it was overthrown by a coup d'etat.[3]

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1. Peacekeeping, traditionally, is "conflict containment, using third-party troops or observers with local consent to reduce the chances of fighting" after a truce has been reached. William J. Durch and Barry M. Blechman, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order* (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992), i. Recently, peacekeeping has grown to include efforts to rebuild national institutions and infrastructure destroyed by war.
2. Samuel G. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts: The Political and Institutional Dynamics of Regional Conflict Management*, Dissertation (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, 1989), 283–84.
3. Election monitoring is not traditionally part of peacekeeping but in many recent cases elections are part of the peace settlements that peacekeepers are mandated to facilitate or implement. Elections move the political contest from the battlefield to the voting booth, and they can be very volatile. Ensuring that elections are free and fair helps prevent political contests from erupting back into violence.

In Africa, the record of regional peacekeeping is equally mixed. The British Commonwealth successfully managed the 1980 transition of Zimbabwe to independent majority rule, with leadership from London and with the strong support of the states of Southern Africa, which included several members of the Commonwealth. The OAU, on the other hand, failed in its attempt to restore and to keep the peace in Chad in the early 1980s and a peacekeeping force sent to Liberia in 1990 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) became bogged down in the serious internal and now regional conflict there.

This paper examines these efforts of the OAS, OAU, ECOWAS, and the Commonwealth to undertake peacekeeping operations in Latin America and Africa. These cases suggest that the United Nations cannot expect to rely on such organizations—at least in the short term—to relieve it of a growing burden of regional peacekeeping. Regional security organizations such as the OAS and OAU first must improve their decision-making capabilities, strengthen their financial bases, and address key issues of command and control before they will be capable of shouldering more of that burden on their own.

The record also suggests, however, that such organizations can usefully operate in partnership with the UN in certain circumstances, including but not limited to monitoring elections or the human rights performance of governments. For such non-military activities, civilians can and have been used successfully. Where a military component is required, it might be added under UN auspices but with troops from the region, as was done in Nicaragua in connection with the UN/OAS demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.[4] UN participation would also permit that component to be drawn from outside the region, should political or other circumstances dictate. Such regional-international partnerships are relatively new, but appear to have more potential at the moment than the notion that regions can or should provide their own collective security with minimal outside support.

4. See Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 436–62.

About the Project

In the Spring of 1990, the Henry L. Stimson Center received a grant from the Ford Foundation to study UN peacekeeping and how it might be improved. The study culminated in the publication of *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* edited by William J. Durch (St. Martin's Press, 1993), which examines the political, financial, and organizational setting for peacekeeping operations and presents twenty case studies of UN operations from 1947 to 1991. This paper, also made possible by support from the Ford Foundation, examines the efforts of regional organizations in Latin America and Africa in peacekeeping activites. As the UN struggles to cope with inadequate resources and an increasing number of requests for its peacekeeping services, a partial solution may lie in the aid that regional organizations can provide for these activities.

The author would like to thank Abiodun Williams for his critical comments on this paper. However, responsibility for errors and ommissions rests solely with the author.

About the Author

Page Fortna is pursuing a doctorate degree in government at Harvard University. A former research assistant and program coordinator at the Stimson Center, 1990–1992, she holds an AB in international relations from Wesleyan University (1990).

Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping

Regional Peacekeeping in Latin America

The OAS, traditionally, has not been a strong or effective peacekeeper in Latin America. Member states have deliberately limited the organization's ability to intercede in conflicts, primarily because of their fear of US intervention. The OAS has been more successful at mediation and peacemaking, but, since its founding as a collective security system for the Western Hemisphere, the organization has had a few experiences with peacekeeping. These have generally been small ad hoc teams of military advisers or observers sent to disputed border regions. In 1948–1949, for example, a commission was sent to the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border; in 1957, a committee of military advisers supervised a ceasefire and troop withdrawal along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border; and a small OAS peace observer team patrolled the Honduran-El Salvador border after the 1969 "soccer war."[1]

The organization's largest and most important experience with peacekeeping during the cold war was its role in the Dominican Republic in 1965. The OAS established an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in response to the Dominican crisis and the United States' intervention in that conflict. The OAS peacekeeping mission was perceived by many as an attempt to legitimize the unilateral US action and this reinforced the perception of the OAS as a tool of US interests, rather than an impartial body. The Dominican experience and US proclivity for intervention have made Latin Americans very suspicious of OAS peacekeeping as a cover for US interests.[2]

After the Dominican Republic experience, the OAS avoided even the term peacekeeping, using "peace observation" or "verification" instead. The OAS has sent many small peace observation missions to various parts of Latin America and recently has sent several very small groups (a few individuals each) to observe elections in Honduras and Costa Rica. In 1989 and 1990, three missions of significant size were launched. The OAS helped monitor the election in Nicaragua in February 1990 and participated in a joint mission with the UN to assist the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance as part of the Central American peace process. In December 1990, the OAS sent observers, as did the UN, to monitor elections in Haiti. The details of each of these operations are examined in turn, followed by an assessment of regional peacekeeping in Latin America.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two thirds of the Island of Hispaniola in the Caribbean (the western third belongs to Haiti). The population in 1970 was slightly

1. Jack Child, "Inter-American System," *Military Review* 60, no. 10 (October 1980): 50–51.
2. Jessica Byron, *Regional Security in Latin America and Africa: The OAS and the OAU in the Light of Contemporary Security Issues* (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1984), 19–20.

over four million, in a country of over 48 thousand square kilometers, roughly the size of Mississippi.[3]

The Dominican Republic had a history of instability, often resulting in US intervention. The United States established a customs receivership in 1905 and occupied the country outright between 1916 and 1924. The commanding general of the army established under US occupation, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, was elected president in 1930 and promptly set himself up as a dictator. Trujillo ruled directly or indirectly, through his brother and through Joaquín Balaguer, until he was assassinated in 1961.

Juan Bosch Gaviño of the Partido Revolucionario Dominiciano (PRD) was elected president of the Republic in December 1962. A bloodless coup the following September installed a three-man civilian government headed by Donald Reid Cabral. This junta was unable to rule effectively and, on April 24, 1965, an uprising led by Bosch supporters attempting to restore constitutional government began the Dominican Crisis. Cabral's government fell one day after the insurrection began, but fierce fighting continued between the pro-Bosch "constitutional" rebels and the "loyalist" military.[4]

On April 27 and 28 the United States began evacuating its citizens and some other foreign nationals who had gathered at the US Embassy and at the Embajador Hotel in the capital, Santo Domingo. The anti-Bosch forces asked the US to send 1,200 Marines to restore law and order, and when the Dominican police informed the United States that they could not guarantee the safety of foreigners (US and others) awaiting evacuation, the US dispatched 400 Marines, who began landing on April 28 near Port Jaina, west of Santo Domingo. They established an international safety zone in the western part of the city and traded fire with the rebels. The justification for this initial deployment was humanitarian but as the crisis continued US officials, including President Johnson, began speaking of foreign (communist) influence over Bosch's rebels and of the need to prevent a communist take-over and "another Cuba." The 82nd Airborne Division landed at the San Isidro Airfield on April 29 and on May 3 established a corridor between the airfield and the international safety zone. This corridor ran more or less between the rebels and loyalist forces, preventing a pro-Bosch victory.[5]

The United States government acted unilaterally, in part because it felt there was no time to consult with the Latin American ambassadors beforehand or to use OAS procedures, which were seen as cumbersome despite the organization's rapid decision making process (under twelve hours) during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.[6] However, having sent in troops, the United States pushed the OAS to take action and proposed the creation of an inter-American force. Meetings of the Council of the OAS on

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3. By 1985 the estimated population was 6,224,500. *South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 1988*, 2d ed. (London: Europa Publishers Ltd., 1987), 318.
4. *South America, Central America, and the Caribbean 1988*, 315; David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 462–65. Most of the operational highlights related below are drawn from Wainhouse's excellent study of the Inter-American Peace Force.
5. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping*, 465–69; Byron, *Regional Security*, 19–20.
6. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping*, 466.

April 29 and 30 called for a ceasefire and the establishment of an international zone of refuge, encompassing foreign embassies. The decision was made to convene the Tenth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS (the "10th MFM") on May 1. The Secretary General of the organization went to Santo Domingo on April 30 to work with the Papal Nuncio and others to help arrange a ceasefire and to establish an OAS presence.[7]

The 10th MFM adopted a resolution establishing a Special Committee, consisting of ambassadors from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, and Panama, to offer its good offices to the parties in the Dominican Republic and to submit a report to the OAS. The OAS had more independent information available to it once the Special Committee was sent to Santo Domingo, but none of the countries that later opposed the creation of a peacekeeping force was represented on the committee.[8] It could therefore be argued that the early information available to the organization was biased in favor of US interests and those of the Dominican military.

On May 5, 1965, representatives of the military junta, the "Constitutional Government," and the OAS Special Committee signed the Act of Santo Domingo, which ratified a ceasefire agreement signed a week earlier. The opposing parties accepted and pledged to respect the US-established safety zone in Santo Domingo, agreed to cooperate with agencies such as the International Red Cross in their work, agreed to provide for the safety of those being evacuated, and accepted the Special Committee's competence to observe compliance with the Act.[9] Sporadic fighting continued, however, and the country did not return to normal conditions of law and order.

The Special Committee recommended that an OAS force be sent to restore order. This recommendation, as well as diplomatic pressure from the US, led to a resolution on May 6 requesting members to contribute forces for the creation of an Inter-American Peace Force under the authority of the 10th MFM.[10]

Political Support

International support for the IAPF was mixed at best. Even within the OAS, the resolution creating the force only barely received the two-thirds majority it needed. The United States and the Dominican Republic, not surprisingly, voted for the resolution, as did Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay voted against and Venezuela abstained.[11] Many in the OAS wanted to condemn the unilateral action of the United States, and there was also serious concern over compromising the Dominican Republic's sovereignty, a traditionally sensitive subject in inter-American relations. On the other hand, many felt that an OAS force was better than

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7. Ibid., 470–71.
8. Ibid., 470–72.
9. Ibid., 473.
10. It was originally referred to as the Inter-American Force, with the "Peace" added later. Ibid., 472–73 and 476.
11. Ibid., 472.

continued US unilateral action.[12] The US did not coerce other OAS members to add their forces to its own, but it did apply pressure to overcome their serious misgivings about doing so.

Support for the IAPF from outside the Western Hemisphere was minimal. The OAS force was seen within the United Nations Security Council, and particularly by the Soviet Union, as providing *ex post facto* legitimization of US intervention.

The United Nations itself played a small role in the conflict. The Security Council called for a ceasefire and sent the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, and the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, José Antonio Mayobre, to Santo Domingo. At first, relations between the UN officials and the IAPF were not good, but as it became clear that the UN role would remain limited, relations improved somewhat. Needless to say, the US would not have agreed to a UN force in place of the OAS force.[13]

The IAPF did not have the consent of both sides in the Dominican conflict. The "loyalists" supported the US action and the OAS force, but the "constitutionalists" (Bosch supporters) did not. The IAPF claimed to be impartial in the Dominican civil conflict, but this claim was in serious question: the US suspected the rebels of being Castroite communists; the force had been requested by the military government; and the interposition of US Marines had protected the military from a rebel takeover. Because of its vastly superior strength, the operation was not severely threatened by the lack of consent, but the IAPF did have to use force on occasion when it met resistance.

Mandate

According to the Foreign Ministers' resolution of May 6, 1965, calling for contributions to the inter-American force, and the Act Establishing Inter-American Force of May 23, the force would "have as its sole purpose, in a spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviolability of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning of democratic institutions."[14] The force was not to take offensive action, but could and did return fire in self defense.

The United States' intention for the force was more explicitly in favor of the Dominican government. A US draft resolution had called for the force to respond to requests from the Dominican authorities as well as to protect other nationals. At the height of the cold war, the US aim was to prevent a "loss" of the Dominican Republic.

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12. James Jose, *An Inter-American Peace Force in the Framework of the OAS: Advantages, Impediments, and Implications* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1970), 61–62.
13. Aida Luisa Levin, *The Organization of American States and the United Nations: Relations in the Peace and Security Field* (New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1974), 26 and 46–50.
14. Organization of American States, Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Resolution Adopted in the Third Plenary Session, May 6, 1965.

Funding

The operation in the Dominican Republic was funded almost entirely by the United States. In addition to paying for its own contingent, which was by far the largest part of the force, the US supported the other contingents, paid for most of the maintenance cost of headquarters (the US paid $575 thousand and Brazil contributed the remaining $35 thousand), and contributed some $270 million in emergency aid and economic recovery assistance for the Dominican Republic. US support for the Latin American contingents, including most of the transport of troops and equipment, amounted to $2.7 million. The cost of the US military forces was $35 million. Altogether, the United States spent over $308 million on the operation and the follow-up aid.[15]

Implementation

When the small Latin American contingents arrived to multinationalize the US military presence at the end of May, US forces had been in the Dominican Republic and in control of portions of Santo Domingo for almost a month.

The number of US troops, which peaked in mid-May at 22,500, was reduced by half as the situation settled somewhat and the Latin American contingents arrived. By June 30, 1965, there were about 12,000 US personnel in the Republic, and nearly 1,800 troops from Latin American countries. They included 1,152 from Brazil (an army battalion and a marine company), 250 from Honduras, 159 from Nicaragua, and 178 from Paraguay (each of these sent an army rifle company). Costa Rica, which has no armed forces, sent a platoon of 21 Guardia Civil as military police, and El Salvador sent three officers. All of the logistic needs of the IAPF were taken care of by the United States.[16]

The Latin American contingents operated together as a brigade. Command of the national contingents rested with national commanders, but operational control was exercised by the Force Commander, General Hugo Panasco Alvim, of Brazil. Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., of the United States, commanded the force until Alvim arrived on May 31, and then became Deputy Commander. Authority for the IAPF lay with the Meeting of Foreign Ministers and not with the OAS Secretary General.

The IAPF patrolled the International Security Zone in Santo Domingo and secured strategic sites, including roads and communication facilities. It investigated ceasefire violations, distributed food and medicine, and took over other administrative and public services that the government was unable to perform due to the civil war.[17]

The IAPF met resistance from the "constitutionalists" and a number of troops were killed. But it successfully interposed itself as a buffer between the loyalists and the constitutionalists and prevented a military victory by either side. Most importantly from the US government's perspective, it was perceived to prevent a communist takeover.

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15. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping*, 478–84.
16. Ibid., 477–80.
17. Jose, *An Inter-American Peace Force*, 64; Levin, *The Organization of American State and the United Nations*, 25.

This enabled an Ad Hoc Committee created by the Meeting of Foreign Ministers to negotiate with the two major contending parties and others in June, July, and August 1965. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of the ambassadors of the United States, Brazil, and El Salvador. The negotiations led to an Act of Dominican Reconciliation, signed August 31, 1965. The Act included acceptance by both sides of a Provisional Government under Héctor García-Godoy. The OAS invited a Group of Observers to monitor elections held on June 1, 1966. Joaquín Balaguer of the Reformist Party beat Juan Bosch by a landslide. The IAPF withdrew in stages, completing the withdrawal by the end of September. The IAPF was a success from the UNited States' point of view, but US dominance of this OAS operation reinforced the organization's image as a cover for US actions. Only recently has the OAS been able to show that it is capable of independent and impartial action.

Nicaraguan Election Monitoring

Much of Central America was torn by civil wars throughout the 1980s. The process of bringing peace to the region passed through several phases, frequently stymied by policies emanating from Washington. Nonetheless, by the mid-1980s, a joint UN-OAS effort in Central America came to be seen as a way to satisfy both the preference of Nicaragua's Sandinista government for UN involvement in the peace process (the OAS being too US-dominated for Nicaragua's taste) and the preference of the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras for OAS involvement (the UN being too "leftist" for these countries' tastes).[18]

Background

An agreement signed by the five Central American presidents on August 7, 1987 (known as "Esquipulas II"), established an International Commission for Verification and Follow-up (known by its Spanish initials CIVS). A representative of the OAS Secretary General, a representative of the UN Secretary General, the Central American foreign ministers, and the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group participated in this short-lived commission.[19] CIVS sent a joint UN/OAS technical mission to Central America to determine verification requirements for Esquipulas II but was dissolved after reporting frankly, and critically, on regional compliance with the agreement's human rights provisions in January 1988.[20]

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18. The OAS has participated in several joint or parallel missions with the UN, but the two organizations usually have not worked very well together—the UN has tended to look down on the OAS. But Secretaries General Baena Soares (OAS) and Pérez de Cuéllar (UN), both from Latin America, had a good working relationship and cooperation between the two organizations improved in the late 1980s. Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983–1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 31 and 39.

19. The Esquipulas II agreement was part of a continuing effort on the part of the Central American presidents to terminate conflict in the region. The Contadora Group consisted of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, while the Contadora Support Group included Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay.

20. Liisa North and CAPA, *Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990), 179–85.

The US presidential elections in November 1988 and a new, more pragmatic turn in US foreign policy helped move the peace process forward again. At meetings at Costa del Sol, El Salvador, and Tela, Honduras, in February and August 1989, respectively, the Central American presidents agreed, among other things, to the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance (the "Contras") by the end of the year and Nicaraguan elections in February 1990. A joint UN/OAS International Commission for Verification and Support (CIAV) was established one month later to verify and supervise the demobilization and resettling of the Contras, which the Tela accord sought, unrealistically, to complete by early December 1989. Actual demobilization did not begin until after the elections were held.

Mandate

On March 3, 1989, the Nicaraguan government invited the OAS to send a team of electoral observers to monitor the entire electoral process in Nicaragua. Previous election observations had lasted only a few days. In this case, OAS observers maintained a presence in Nicaragua from early August 1989 through April 1990, when the new government took power. The mission's purpose was to "verify the legitimacy of the electoral process at every stage" with the hope that this would "improve the outlook for peace and reconciliation in Nicaragua and other countries of the region."[21]

In April 1989, the OAS reviewed changes in Nicaragua's electoral law. After the OAS Secretary General signed agreements with the Nicaraguan government and the Supreme Electoral Council responsible for administering the elections, a group of eighteen OAS staff members from the General Secretariat arrived on August 4 to set up operations in Nicaragua's nine voting districts.[22]

Implementation

Election experts from OAS member states were added to the Secretariat staff for voter registration, which took place in October. The observer group continued to grow during the campaign period, reaching a peak of 433 for the vote itself. Over 2,500 observers were present for the vote, including the OAS group; the UN's observation mission, ONUVEN, of about 240 observers headed by Elliott Richardson; and representatives of many non-governmental organizations, for example, the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government chaired by former President Jimmy Carter. These groups coordinated their activities but theirs was not a joint operation.[23]

In the months leading up to the election, OAS observers met with election officials, monitored media access given to the political parties, attended rallies and campaign

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21. Organization of American States, *Fifth Report on the Observation of the Electoral Process, February 16 to March 20* (Washington, D.C.: General Secretariat of the OAS, 1990), 1 and 3.
22. Organization of American States, *Second Report on the Observation of the Nicaraguan Electoral Process, July 13 to November 3, 1989* (Washington, D.C.: General Secretariat of the OAS, December 1989), 1, and OAS, *Fifth Report on the Observation of the Electoral Process*, 1.
23. Officials of ONUVEN and the OAS mission met on a weekly basis, and Elliott Richardson and Jimmy Carter met with OAS Secretary General Baena Soares. OAS, *Fifth Report on the Observation of the Electoral Process*, 7, and Stimson Center peacekeeping project background interview 80, August 23, 1991.

events, and received and investigated alleged violations of electoral law. The OAS set up a computer system to track registration, campaign, and voting data.[24]

On February 25, 1990, the day of the election, observers visited about 70 percent of the polling stations to watch the proceedings. The OAS also carried out a "quick count" or parallel tabulation of the voting results, based on samples of the tallies provided by the Supreme Electoral Council. This allowed the official results to be verified. It also gave the OAS, the UN, and other organizations advance notice of the outcome, enabling them to hold meetings early the next day with both the losers and the winners to defuse tensions and maintain order during this potentially dangerous period.[25]

Violeta Barrios de Chamorro of the National Opposition Union (UNO) won the presidential election with 54.7 percent of the vote, while Daniel Ortega Saavedra of the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) received 40.8 percent. UNO won 51 seats in the National Assembly, the Sandinistas won 39, and the Social Christian Party (Yatama) and the Revolutionary Unity Movement won a single seat each.[26]

The Nicaraguan election was not without problems. There were many incidents of violence and allegations of electoral law violations during the campaign period. On the day of the election there were a few problems. For example, some of the "indelible" ink used to mark voters could be removed with chlorine. More serious was the presence of armed members of irregular forces at a few polling stations. Unarmed observers could not remove this threat, so several polling places were closed or relocated to prevent intimidation of voters. In general, however, the observers found polling to be normal and the official election results corresponded with the quick count.[27]

The week immediately after the election was quite tense, but things settled down thereafter. OAS observers remained in Nicaragua during the transition period until April 25, when Violeta de Chamorro was inaugurated.

The election observers could bring problems to the attention of the Supreme Electoral Council, could investigate incidents, and could try to mediate when crises arose, but they did not have any real power to set things right if they went wrong during the electoral process. Nevertheless, their presence helped maintain order and stability in a potentially explosive situation. Impartial observers helped to convince the populace that they were safe to exercise their right to vote without intimidation and that the election would not be fraudulent. Along with the UN and non-governmental organizations, the OAS legitimized the election and even without a military component helped keep the peace during the unprecedented transfer of power from a revolutionary government to its opposition.[28] The presence of OAS observers, along with others, helped ensure free

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24. OAS, *Second Report on the Observation of the Nicaraguan Electoral Process*, 1–2.
25. OAS, *Fifth Report on the Observation of the Electoral Process*, 14–21, and Jennifer McCoy, Larry Garber, and Robert Pastor, "Pollwatching and Peacemaking," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 103.
26. OAS, *Fifth Report on the Observation of the Electoral Process*, 14.
27. Ibid., 11–12
28. McCoy et al., "Pollwatching and Peacemaking," 102 and 107.

and fair elections, which were an important part of the peace process in Nicaragua and in Central America as a whole.

International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV)

CIAV was a joint UN-OAS operation with a mandate to assist and verify the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance.[29] Along with the UN observer group in Central America (ONUCA) and the missions sent to verify Nicaraguan elections, CIAV was an important verification mechanism for the Central American peace process.

Background

CIAV was established in September 1989, shortly after the Tela Summit in Honduras. One of the agreements reached by the Central American presidents at Tela on August 7, 1989 (exactly two years after the signing of the Esquipulas II accords), was a joint plan for "the voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of members of the Nicaraguan Resistance and their families" to take place between September 6 and December 6, 1989. A ceasefire and negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the Resistance broke down in October and November, however, delaying progress for several months. Demobilization did not begin, nor did CIAV become operational, until after the March 23, 1990 signing of the Tocontín agreement between Nicaraguan Resistance negotiators and president-elect Chamorro on details of the ceasefire and demobilization process.[30]

Mandate

As originally planned, CIAV was to be entirely responsible for the demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance, but it was soon decided that armed UN peacekeepers would be better equipped to secure demobilization areas and to dispose of weapons. In December 1989, the five Central American presidents requested that these jobs be given to ONUCA. In March 1990, the UN Security Council expanded ONUCA's mandate to cover military aspects of the demobilization and gave it an infantry battalion to implement them.[31] CIAV was therefore left with responsibility for the civilian aspects of demobilization.

Within CIAV, the UN and the OAS divided tasks geographically. CIAV-UN handled repatriation of forces in Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, while CIAV-OAS operated in Nicaragua itself. There were only a few Contras in Costa Rica, none in El Salvador, and the Salvadoran FMLN was not demobilizing, so the UN's role in CIAV was almost

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29. CIAV was also to assist any other forces in the region who wished to demobilize, particularly the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), but at the time the FMLN was not interested in laying down its arms.
30. Organization of American States, *Additional Information from the Secretary General on the Demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance*, OAS Document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2565/90 add.1, June 8, 1990, 1.
31. *UN Chronicle*, March 1990, 64–65; and June 1990, 16. For details on the UN operation, see Brian D. Smith and William J. Durch, "UN Observer Group in Central America," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 445–46, 453–55.

entirely in Honduras. CIAV-UN was most active early in the process of repatriation, as Contras based in Honduras began demobilizing first. When they moved into Nicaragua, they became the responsibility of CIAV-OAS. In 1991, CIAV-UN dissolved, giving its remaining tasks to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and CIAV became entirely an OAS operation, continuing to moderate tensions within Nicaragua.[32]

Implementation

The demobilization process got off to a slow start. On April 16, 1990 some 260 members of the Atlantic Front (Yatama) handed their weapons over to ONUCA, beginning the demobilization process of Contras based in Honduras.[33] Within Nicaragua, however, the process took longer to gel. The Nicaraguan Government signed ceasefire agreements with the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Yatama movement on April 18. These agreements called for demobilization of forces in Nicaragua between April 25 and June 10 and for the creation of security zones, monitored by the UN, into which soldiers and their families would move. CIAV set itself up in the first security zone on April 23, 1990, but demobilization within Nicaragua did not actually begin until May 8, and then at a much slower pace than necessary to meet the initial demobilization deadline of June 10. The deadline was extended to June 29, by which time 21,863 members of the Nicaraguan Resistance had been demobilized in Honduras and Nicaragua. (Another 550 were demobilized by the end of the year.) CIAV was also responsible for 13,819 other repatriates and 58,721 immediate family members of ex-Resistance fighters. Thus, for a time, it was providing assistance to almost 95,000 people.[34]

After handing over their weapons and being officially demobilized by ONUCA, ex-Contra fighters went to reception or transition centers where CIAV officials gave them and their families new sets of clothes, identification cards, medical exams, farming and construction materials, as well as transportation back home. The CIAV-OAS staff numbered about eighty during the demobilization.[35]

This process took place in a very tense atmosphere. The Nicaraguan Resistance was very concerned for its own safety and wary of laying down its arms. The fact that the opposition had won the recent elections alleviated Contra fears, but the Sandinistas still controlled the security apparatus in Nicaragua. Ongoing negotiations between the government and the Resistance were interrupted by charges (later found to be false) of a massacre of demobilized troops and by Nicaraguan security forces surrounding

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32. Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 85–86; Shirley Christian, "OAS Goes in Peace," *The New York Times*, July 16, 1992, A4.
33. *UN Chronicle*, September 1990, 4.
34. OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2565/90 add.1, June 8, 1990, 1–4; *Report of the Secretary General on the Procedure for Establishing Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America*, OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2681/91, April 29, 1991, 8; and *UN Chronicle*, September 1990, 1–2 and 6.
35. The Pan American Health Organization supervised health care. Interview 80, August 23, 1991; OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2565/90 add.1, June 8, 1990, 2; and *Report of the Secretary General in the Work and Programs of the CIAV/OAE in Nicaragua*, OAS document OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2112/90, October 30, 1990, 3.

Resistance negotiators (who were under CIAV protection) in their hotels. CIAV met with the government and the Resistance leadership and was able to resolve this crisis.[36]

After demobilization was completed, CIAV continued to operate in Nicaragua to help ex-fighters and their families in the security zones, providing food and materials for five months after demobilization. Ex-Contras were also given fifty dollars worth of gold córdobas as "immediate financial assistance." As part of the Declaration of Managua signed in May 1990 that had helped restart the stalled demobilization process, the Nicaraguan government created "development areas" for ex-combatants. CIAV helped build infrastructure and set up development projects, such as fishing, honey and wool production. Whenever possible, CIAV employed former Contras to carry out its work.[37]

CIAV also set up a "program for the monitoring and verification of rights and guarantees" to ensure compliance with the security guarantees given to demobilized members of the Resistance. Complaints could be filed at monitoring office, from which CIAV protection officers investigated incidents. The political situation in Nicaragua remained very tense; and incidents of violence, confrontations with police, and human rights abuses occurred. Protection officers often found themselves mediating conflicts as well as investigating them.[38]

CIAV's most significant problem stemmed from the Sandinistas' perception that the mission was biased in favor of the Nicaraguan Resistance. As CIAV's job was to assist the Contras during and after demobilization, the mission found itself in the unfortunate position of being criticized by the Contras and the United States if it did its job of poorly or by the Sandinistas if it did its job well. Eventually, CIAV provided humanitarian aid to demobilized Sandinistas as well, alleviating criticism on this issue somewhat.[39]

However, two other factors furthered the Sandinista's perception of CIAV bias in favor of the Resistance. One was the prevalence of Argentineans on the CIAV staff: the Argentine military had played a key role in training the Contras in the early 1980s before Argentina returned to civilian rule. The other was the fact that CIAV was funded almost entirely by the United States, which gave $46 million to the OAS side of the operation. This money was originally intended as humanitarian assistance to be given directly to the Contras, but, at the San Isidro meeting in December 1989, the five Central American presidents requested that the money be given to CIAV.[40]

CIAV's political involvement became more contentious when some Contras began to rearm with weapons they had not turned over to ONUCA. These "re-contras," dissatisfied

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36. OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2565/90 add.1, 3.
37. OAS document OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2112/90, October 30, 1990, 5–6, appendices 2–4.
38. OAS document OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2112/90, 4 and 11–16; OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2681/91, 8; and *UN Chronicle*, September 1990, 15–35.
39. Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 86, 108, 117-18. Christian, "OAS Goes in Peace."
40. With the exception of staff wages, none of CIAV's expenses were covered by the OAS's regular or voluntary funds. OAS document OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2112/90, October 30, 1990, 7. Interview 80, August 23, 1991; Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 86; and OAS, International Commission of Support and Verification, "Statement of Activity and Changes in Fund Balance from Inception (February 22, 1990) to December 31, 1992," Washington, D.C: OAS, Office of Financial Services, May 1993.

with their situation after demobilization, posed a serious threat to peace. CIAV helped mediate between the re-contras, the government, and the Sandinista military, but was often accused of being partial to the Contras.[41] Overall, however, CIAV played an important adjunct role in helping many Contras readjust to civilian life in Nicaragua and in helping highly-politicized Nicaragua to adjust to their presence.

Election Monitoring in Haiti

In the years since 1986, when dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier fell from power, Haiti has tried without lasting success to develop a democracy. Elections planned for November 1987 were postponed because of violence. They were eventually held in January 1988, despite violence and boycotts. The elected government of Leslie Manigat was soon overthrown, however, in a coup led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy. Namphy was overthrown, in turn, by Brigadier General Prosper Avril. Avril resigned in March 1990 in the face of strong opposition and violence. Ms. Ertha Pascal-Trouillot was appointed president of a provisional government that would rule until elections could be held on December 16, 1990. Following the Nicaraguan model, Pascal-Trouillot invited the OAS, the UN, and several non-governmental organizations to observe the elections.[42]

Upon receiving confirmation of Haitian interest in an OAS electoral role, the organization sent several preparatory missions to Port-au-Prince to meet with authorities and gather information. In April 1990, the OAS Secretary General appointed Pierre Coté of Canada as his personal representative and head of the observer mission.[43]

The Haitian election was run by a nine-member provisional electoral board (known by its initials in Creole, CEP), which included representatives of various groups and interests in Haiti, rather than by the government.[44] Security was provided by the Haitian police and military. Military support for free and fair elections, in contrast with the military's role in upsetting elections and democratic processes in past years, was a major factor in ensuring the positive outcome of the 1990 elections.

Mandate

The OAS sent both observers and advisors to Haiti. An agreement was drawn up between the Secretary-General and the Haitian government on privileges and immunities, based on a similar agreement for the Nicaraguan elections. According to this agreement, the functions of the observers were "to follow the progress of each of the operations connected with the electoral process, to receive and forward to the competent

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41. Child, *The Central American Peace Process*, 120–27.
42. The UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) played a major role not only in election observation but also in advising and observing Haitian security personnel. ONUVEH helped Haiti create and implement a security plan for the election, while UN military advisors showed the Haitian military how to conduct itself in a free and fair election. Unarmed security observers monitored the security situation and deterred intimidation. UN Department of Public Information, *United Nations Electoral Assistance to Haiti*, DPI/1120-91-40244, March 1991; and interview 34, January 23, 1991.
43. Organization of American States, *Report of the Secretary General on the Organization's Support for the Electoral Process in Haiti*, OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2671/91, April 29, 1991, 1–2.
44. Interview 34, January 23, 1991.

authorities complaints concerning any irregularity brought to their attention, to ascertain the facts following receipt of complaints and to report their findings to the appropriate quarters." Advisors were "to provide the provisional electoral board and each of its subordinate bodies with all the expertise and legal, professional, logistic and technical assistance required in the context of the preparation and implementation of the electoral process."[45]

Implementation

The OAS observer mission monitored voter registration and the campaigning leading up to the election, its numbers growing steadily to about 200 on election day. Observers were contributed by twenty-six member countries and by CARICOM (the Caribbean community). Funding and equipment were provided primarily by the United States, Canada, France, Venezuela, and Peru, while the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture and the Pan American Health Organization provided logistical and transportation help.[46] During the campaign period, observers attended political meetings and rallies, maintained contact with Haitian authorities and the other observer missions, verified preparations at polling stations, planned the voting observation and the "quick count" (again, based on the Nicaraguan model), and set up a communications base.[47]

Tensions ran high during this period. The CEP rejected fifteen out of twenty-six presidential candidates, in some cases because of their association with the Duvalier regime. One of these candidates was the infamous former leader of the *Tontons Macoutes* Duvalier militia, Roger Lafontant. The Haitian constitution prevents Duvalierists from running for office, but it was feared that the rejection of extreme right-wing candidates would lead to violent reprisals. Indeed, a grenade attack on a rally that left eight dead and many wounded seemed to confirm fears that this election would lead to violence or a coup, as usual.[48]

On election day, December 16, 1990, almost 1,000 observers from the OAS (including the Secretary General himself), the UN Observer Group (ONUVEH), and non-governmental and church groups were in Haiti to try to deter fraud and violence. OAS observers worked in pairs to visit as many polling stations as possible and to report any problems. The irregularities noted included shortages of materials (including in some cases ballots and ballot boxes), stations opening late, and similar problems. The voting procedure was relatively complicated because voters were being asked to cast ballots for officials at five levels of government, from "commune administrators" and magistrates to the president.[49]

On the presidential level, the results were overwhelmingly clear. Reverend Jean-Bertrand Aristide won 67 percent of the vote. The closest candidate, Marc Bazin, won

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45. OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2671/91, 3–4.
46. Ibid, 7.
47. Ibid, 9–10.
48. Ibid, 7; and *New York Times*, December 9, 1990, 19.
49. OAS document OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2671/91; and *New York Times*, December 16, 1990, 3.

only 14 percent. Because Aristide won a majority, there was no need for a presidential run-off. However, a second round of voting was held for the other levels on January 20. The total CEP vote count was not as high as expected, partly because many ballots were disallowed due to technical problems, but also because turnout was kept down by fears of violence.[50]

In general, the OAS and the UN coordinated their activities only informally, but, for the quick count of election results, the two organizations worked together closely, unlike in Nicaragua, where the two organizations had carried out quick tallies separately. Based on results at 150 polling stations, the quick count was particularly important in Haiti because logistical and technical problems delayed the reporting of the official results until January 14, a month after the election.[51]

On January 6, 1991, Roger Lafontant attempted a coup, taking the presidential palace and capturing interim President Pascal-Trouillot. Thousands of Aristide supporters took to the streets in protest. The military upheld the constitutional government and by morning Lafontant had been arrested.[52] The OAS mission stayed in Haiti, where things remained tense, until after Aristide's inauguration on February 7.

Aftermath

As in the Nicaraguan elections, the OAS was able to play an important role in monitoring free and fair elections in Haiti, a country without a democratic tradition. But in Haiti, the efforts of the observers were in vain. Despite the military's support for the constitution and democracy during the election and Lafontant's coup attempt, military support for Aristide quickly waned. On September 30, 1991, General Raoul Cedras deposed Aristide, citing breaches of the constitution on the President's part. While some of the accusations against the outspoken Aristide were valid, the violence of the new regime, and its intransigence in negotiations since the coup, belied its stated concern for the Haitian constitution.[53]

Two days after the coup, the OAS "recommended" that its members suspend aid and trade with Haiti. The sanctions and the behavior of the military regime were sufficient to send thousands of Haitians to sea in search of asylum in the United States. Haitian refugees attempting to reach US shores in small boats created a large political and humanitarian problem. The United States began turning back Haitian emigrants, claiming that they were economic, not political refugees, and relaxed its support for the trade embargo, arguing that it hurt ordinary Haitians more than the rogue regime. By early 1993, the US government had intercepted more than 40,000 would-be refugees; most were returned to Haiti.[54]

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50. OAS, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2671/91, 13–14.
51. The CEP had declared Aristide elected based on partial results on December 23, however. OAS, OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.2671/91, 16.
52. *New York Times*, January 8, 1991, A1.
53. *Washington Post*, October 6, 1991, A29. *New York Times*, February 7, 1992, A5.
54. The Bush Administration was severely criticized for this policy, but the Clinton Administration adopted it more or less intact, albeit with greater emphasis on resolving Haiti's political crisis in a

Soon after the coup, the OAS proposed to dispatch a contingent of human rights monitors to Haiti. The organization also brokered a deal between coup leaders and Aristide in February 1992 that pledged all sides to form a government of national unity headed by Aristide and to admit a team of OAS rights monitors. However, Aristide refused to guarantee coup participants immunity from criminal prosecution, and the country's national assembly failed to ratify the agreement for lack of a quorum (opponents walked out of the chamber). A small group of human rights monitors was finally allowed into the country in September 1992, one year after the coup, but its activities were confined by the regime to Port-au-Prince.[55]

In early January 1993, the US government sent Major General John Sheehan of the Marine Corps on a three-day mission to meet with the Haitian High Command, the first such high-level military-to-military contact since the September 1991 coup. Sheehan reportedly offered a resumption of US nonlethal military aid and training to professionalize the Haitian military in return for their cooperation in the peace process, warning that the US would not help them if the crisis got worse.[56]

Soon after the Sheehan mission ended, President Aristide requested that the United Nations send a human rights observer team to his country as part of a political settlement involving the UN, the United States, and the OAS. UN envoy Dante Caputo headed the effort to gain the agreement of the regime in Port-au-Prince in a frustrating, months-long effort in which one or both parties would sign and repudiate agreements and then re-accept them under outside pressure. Following a pattern established in El Salvador, human rights monitors were sent into the country while talks on the overall political settlement continued. One hundred fifty OAS monitors deployed in early March 1993.[57]

Negotiations stumbled again over the issue of amnesty for coup participants. President Aristide accepted an invitation to the White House in mid-March 1993, the first in his 18 months of exile. His meeting with President Clinton both increased the visibility of US support and appeared to lessen Aristide's opposition to amnesty as a condition for his return to power. In mid-April, he pledged publicly neither to prosecute coup participants nor to oppose parliamentary efforts to grant amnesty. As of this writing, negotiations continued, borrowing additional features from the Salvadoran accords, including an independent "Truth Commission" with the power to investigate atrocities and assign responsibility, but without power to prosecute.[58]

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manner that would give Haitians an incentive to stay at home. *The Washington Post*, February 11, 1992, A18; and May 20, 1992, A27. *The New York Times*, October 9, 1991, A3; January 28, 1992, A3; February 10, 1992, A1; May 19, 1992, A7; and January 14, 1993, A3.

55. *New York Times*, October 9, 1991, A3; February 26, 1992, A3; and January 29, 1993, A7. *Washington Post*, March 22, 1992, A29.

56. Howard W. French, "Visiting US General Warns Haiti's Military Chiefs," *New York Times*, January 9, 1993, A5.

57. *New York Times*, April 7, 1993, A3.

58. *New York Times*, April 14, 1993, A1.

Assessing the OAS and Peacekeeping

The OAS operation in the Dominican Republic really involved peace enforcement, not peacekeeping, despite its name and nominal mandate. The IAPF did not enjoy full local consent and it was not indifferent to the outcome of the conflict. The larger political context of the cold war determined the US reaction to Bosch's uprising, and the United States' influence as the superpower member of the OAS enabled it to use the organization to put a multilateral face on what otherwise bore all the earmarks of a traditional US military intervention into Latin American politics. Indeed, the Inter-American Peace Force confirmed many Latin Americans' fear of the US using the regional organization and "peacekeeping" as a new guise for old policies to advance its own interests. Partly as a result, a quarter-century would go by before the OAS was once again willing to play an active role in peacemaking and peacekeeping in the hemisphere.

With the three operations after the end of the cold war, the OAS improved its reputation somewhat as it began to be seen as an organization that could help maintain peace in Latin America. Its role in fostering peace in Nicaragua was significant: OAS election monitors helped that country hold free elections and eased the politically volatile transition from the Sandinista to the Chamorro government. CIAV helped ensure a relatively peaceful demobilization of the Contras, ending Nicaragua's long war. Its continuing presence in that country for two more years helped to keep conflict from flaring anew in very difficult economic circumstances.

The OAS role in Haiti was more mixed. Together with a similar UN mission, OAS observers helped to prevent fraud and intimidation during Haiti's election, but as yet the organization has been unable to play an effective role the Haitian crisis brought on by the ouster of President Aristide. Haiti's long crisis demonstrates the difficulty of arms-length international efforts to restore democracy in situations where so many factors are arrayed against it. On the other hand, the combination of public and private diplomacy by the United Nations and the United States, and the availability of OAS personnel to staff the human rights monitoring mission in Haiti, suggest a potentially fruitful combination that exploits the strengths of each entity.

In short, the OAS has shown in recent years that it can make significant contributions to Latin American peace even if it is not in a position to mount or support multinational military operations. Its civilian operations in Nicaragua were successful and the electoral mission in Haiti ran smoothly. The OAS enjoyed adequate funding for these operations and, as important, strong political support. However, in none of these cases did the OAS act alone. The UN played a large role in the peace process in Nicaragua and in the elections in Haiti. The UN traditionally has been wary of working with other international organizations but the recent successes with parallel or combined missions and the ever-larger peacekeeping burdens borne by the international organization have altered its views. Sharing responsibilities for peacekeeping and conflict resolution may lighten the burden on the UN without requiring that limited regional organizations do the whole job themselves.

Regional Peacekeeping in Africa

There have been three peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa by organizations other than the United Nations. In 1980, the United Kingdom led a British Commonwealth-sanctioned operation to oversee the transition of Zimbabwe to majority rule. In 1981–82, the OAU sent a peacekeeping force into Chad during a lull in that country's ongoing civil war. And in 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a multinational force to intervene in the civil war in Liberia.[59]

While the operation in Zimbabwe was successful, the OAU was unable to keep the peace in Chad and ECOWAS remains, at this writing, mired in a costly and frustrating effort to reunify a country against the wishes of a powerful local faction. The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates the potential utility of third-party peacekeepers where there is a political settlement and the financial, organizational, and operational resources available to the operation are commensurate with its mandate. The cases of Chad and Liberia point to the impossibility of operating effectively without such political and material precursors in place. The OAU and ECOWAS do not presently have the capability to launch logistically complicated operations in places where civil wars are as far from political settlement as Chad in the early 1980s, or Liberia in the early 1990s.

Zimbabwe's Transition to Independence

In 1965, Rhodesia was the last British colony in Africa; the others had become independent states. It was also the most heavily colonized by European settlers. Since 1923, the white-ruled colony had been "self-governing." Although London retained a right to veto certain local legislation through an appointed governor, that veto was difficult to enforce without military intervention, which Britain was loathe to undertake.[60]

As other British colonies became independent and subject to rule by their black majorities, Rhodesia's white minority became increasingly alarmed. Most of the adult white population of 145,000 had immigrated since World War II (nearly 50,000 from South Africa, 52,000 from Britain, and 10,000 from other British colonies as they became independent).[61] In 1965, shortly after neighboring Zambia (the former Northern Rhodesia) gained its independence, the right-wing Rhodesian Front gained control of the colonial government. In November, the new Prime Minister, Ian Smith, made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain. In December 1966, the United

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59. In June 1978, six African nations sent an inter-African force to the Shaba/Katanga region of Zaire in response to an invasion by a Katangan rebel group operating out of Zambia and Angola. The force was largely successful, but is better characterized as collective self-defense than as peacekeeping. For more on this force see Zartman, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 154, 161–62.

60. Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 36–37.

61. The total white population was roughly one-quarter-million, while blacks numbered about three million. Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War*, 41.

Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for only the second time in its history, slapped economic sanctions on the rogue state, but their effectiveness was undermined by continued South African economic cooperation with the Smith regime and by the purchase of Rhodesian chromium by the United States from 1971 to 1977.[62]

Background to Lancaster House

While Britain and the Smith regime conducted intermittent negotiations on majority rule through the early 1970s, militant black opposition to white rule grew stronger. The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, operated out of Botswana and Zambia, largely with Soviet support. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led from the mid-1970s by Robert Mugabe, operated out of Mozambique, largely with Chinese support. In 1975, after Portugal abandoned its African colonies, newly-independent Mozambique gave active support to ZANU, in particular, and by 1976 its harassing operations within Rhodesia had increased considerably.[63]

In September 1976, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to the region in an effort to mediate a settlement. The deal that he offered Ian Smith involved 50–50 black-white interim government, white retention of the ministries of Defense and Law and Order, and majority rule within two years. Smith, facing economic pressure from South Africa to take Kissinger's offer, as well as a deteriorating security situation, accepted the principle of majority rule.[64] The deal fell apart, however, when the Republicans lost the 1976 US presidential election and Kissinger lost whatever bargaining leverage he had enjoyed.

The Carter administration's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, teamed up with British Foreign Secretary David Owen to restart negotiations among the parties on the basis of a new proposal calling for universal suffrage, a period of protected white representation in Parliament, and a six-month, British-ruled transition period during which a new Zimbabwean National Army would be formed.[65]

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62. United Nations Security Council, S/RES/232 and Corr. 1, December 16, 1966. The first use of Chapter VII, the Charter's enforcement chapter, was against North Korea in 1950. In 1971, the Congress passed the Byrd amendment, allowing imports of Rhodesian chrome, over the objections of the State Department. The amendment was repealed in 1977. Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Zimbabwe, A Country Study*, 2d. ed., (Washington, D.C.: HQ, Department of the Army, 1983), 229 and Robert C. Good, *UDI: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (Princeton, N.J.: PUP, 1973), 324n.
63. Michael Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa, Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1990), 40 (interview with Kenneth Kaunda). Stedman, 94.
64. Charlton, 2–4 (Ian Smith interview). Stedman, 98–103, 106–113. Once Smith accepted the Kissinger package, South Africa reopened Rhodesia's supply lines and backed Smith diplomatically as well. Although Kissinger dealt with Front Line presidents Kaunda (Zambia) and Nyerere (Tanzania) in addition to Smith and Vorster, he did not have their advance approval of the package that he offered to Smith.
65. Stedman, 132–39. President Carter, discussing the proposal with Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere in August 1977, apparently agreed that black nationalist forces would constitute the national army during the transitional period, implying demobilization of Rhodesian forces, that is, white surrender. This made the proposal difficult to sell in Salisbury and the mediation effort stalled for several months.

In early 1978, as Rhodesia's military situation continued to deteriorate, Smith and black political leaders inside the country, including Methodist bishop Abel Muzorewa, reached an "internal settlement" that supposedly set the country on a course toward majority rule. In October, Smith agreed to all-party talks but the Patriotic Front (the coalition of ZAPU and ZANU) was not interested.[66]

In April 1979, the internal settlement group made another stab at international recognition when Bishop Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister of "Zimbabwe-Rhodesia," nominally replacing Ian Smith. In June, the Conservative Party won control of the British government. However, instead of endorsing the internal settlement, Prime Minister Thatcher pursued all-party talks under British sponsorship and the endorsement of the heads of state of the British Commonwealth, who were scheduled to meet in Lusaka, Zambia, that August. The communiqué on Rhodesia issued by the Lusaka conference endorsed "genuine" majority rule with protections for minorities, free and fair elections conducted under British authority with Commonwealth observation, and a constitutional conference.[67]

The Lancaster House Talks

The constitutional conference convened at Lancaster House, in London, in September 1979. To ensure that all the parties understood that this would be their last, best chance to settle, the British made it clear that if Smith and Muzorewa walked out of the conference, the internal settlement would never be recognized as legitimate and sanctions would continue, as would the fighting. On the other hand, the British made it equally clear that if the Patriotic Front walked out of the talks, London would recognize the Muzorewa government. Chief mediator Lord Carrington relied on the Front Line States to pressure the Patriotic Front. Mozambique and Zambia threatened to eliminate guerrilla bases in their countries if the Front left the conference.[68]

Carrington used the text of the Lusaka communiqué as the basis for negotiations, first over a new constitution, then over the process of transition, and finally over the terms of a cease-fire. He convinced Muzorewa to relinquish power to a British governor during a period of transition. He also convinced the Patriotic Front, which wanted a United Nations peacekeeping force to oversee the transition, that a Commonwealth force would have to do, because the internal parties objected to the UN.[69] Fighting continued all the while, but the military leaders of the two principal combatant parties (General Peter Walls of the Rhodesian forces and General Josiah Tongogara of ZANU) helped to convince their respective political leaders that victory on the battlefield was unattainable and that political compromise was therefore urgently necessary.[70]

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66. Ibid., 141, 143, 150–56.
67. Ibid., 168–72. The communiqué was drafted with the help of key Commonwealth leaders (Presidents Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania, Prime Ministers Michael Manley of Jamaica and Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Foreign Minister Major General Henry Adefope of Nigeria, and Commonwealth secretary general Sridath Ramphal).
68. Charlton, 79 and 124.
69. Keeping the operation under the aegis of the Commonwealth also assured Britain of continued control of the transition process. Ibid., 107.
70. Ibid., 134; Stedman, 200 and 212. Although the Patriotic Front was gaining on the Rhodesian

The actions of third parties put pressure on the most reluctant of Patriotic Front leaders, Robert Mugabe, to agree to a settlement. The United States warned that it was about to lift sanctions. Mozambique's President Samora Machel informed Mugabe that, as far as he was concerned, "the war was over."[71] An agreement was signed on December 21, 1979, and a formal ceasefire went into effect on December 28.

The Commonwealth Monitoring Force[72]

The Lancaster House Agreement called for transitional British administration of Zimbabwe, for an international electoral observer group to assess the openness and fairness of the elections, and for a Commonwealth Monitoring Force "to assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire" between the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Security Forces. The Monitoring Force (the British shied away from the term peacekeeping) consisted of 1,250 British, 150 Australian, 74 New Zealand, 50 Kenyan, and 24 Fijian troops. The Force Commander, Major General John Acland, had previously commanded the British contingent with the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

An advance portion of the Monitoring Force arrived in Zimbabwe on December 20, 1979, the day before the ceasefire was formally signed, and the rest of the force arrived by airlift (most of which was provided by the United States) over the course of the next 10 days. The monitors met Patriotic Front guerrillas at 24 designated "rendezvous" points on the border and escorted them to 16 assembly points within Zimbabwe. The Monitoring Force ran into the same problem that UN peacekeepers would face a decade later in Nicaragua and Angola, namely, the need to feed and supply large numbers of people in remote assembly areas, a need largely unforeseen by transition planners. Many of the initial supplies were airdropped into the assembly points.

Rhodesian police and military forces were assigned responsibility for internal security during the transition, thus they were not confined to barracks. These forces operated under the authority of the British governor, Lord Soames. Although the Patriotic Front retained its arms, it was understandably worried about the security of its people in the assembly points, and about the impartiality of these forces that had been its enemies. An estimated 6,000 troops of Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) remained outside the assembly points as a hedge against the agreement falling through. Those at-large troops were a source of much of the pre-electoral violence and voter intimidation that plagued the country and caused Lord Soames to extend the country's State of Emergency and to deploy Rhodesian security forces to maintain order.[73] Muzorewa's United African National Congress was also considered a source of intimidation and violence.

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military, a final, all-out offensive to end the conflict was all but certain to generate substantial South African military intervention, as South Africa had intervened in Angola's civil war, just four years earlier.

71. Stedman, 201.

72. Unless otherwise noted, this section is drawn from Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, The Politics of Transition* (New York and Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981).

73. In a similar situation nine years later, UN officials agreed to a release of South African forces from their barracks to contain an unauthorized influx of guerrilla forces into Namibia as that country began

Election Commissioner John Boynton and his staff of about 90 were responsible not only for setting up elections, but also for persuading the populace, through a large publicity campaign, that the vote would be secret and the result valid. Elections took place over three days in late February 1980. Unarmed British "Bobbies" were brought in for the elections to create a visible presence of "British fairness and authority," and the elections were observed by 223 observers from the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, the UN, and the European Community.

Mugabe's ZANU-PF party won 57 of 100 seats in the national assembly, while 20 went to Nkomo's ZAPU party, and three to Muzorewa. Twenty seats were reserved for whites; the white community had held its election earlier in the month. The Monitoring Force remained in Zimbabwe until the formal independence ceremony and the swearing in of Mugabe as Prime Minister on April 18, 1980. The role of the Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe's transition set a precedent that the United Nations followed, successfully, nine years later in Namibia.

Assessment

Given the hostility among the various parties contending for control of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, it is unlikely that a political settlement could have been reached without the intervention of the Thatcher government and the firm hand of Lord Carrington at the Lancaster House conference. It is unlikely, in turn, that Lancaster House could have succeeded or, indeed, that it could have taken place at all, without the legitimacy provided by the Lusaka communiqué, the firm support of the Front Line leaders, and the background support of the United States. In the absence of the Lancaster House accord and its internationally-supervised transition to majority rule, the conflict in Zimbabwe could easily have become a major conflagration engulfing much of southern Africa. Fearing such a turn of events, political leaders inside and outside the region and military leaders of the principal contesting factions determined to avoid it.

Given the continuing levels of mistrust among the parties after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement, it seems clear that implementation would have been difficult, even impossible, without the neutral presence of the Monitoring Force to allay suspicions, investigate complaints of ceasefire violations, and generally act as a buffer between the contending factions. The Commonwealth Observer Group, in turn, verified the validity of the electoral process and its results. Thus, when Robert Mugabe won an unexpected 63 percent of the popular vote, there were few grounds to claim that he had done so by fraudulent means. In combination, the transitional Governor, the Monitoring Force, and the Observer Group rendered valuable service to Zimbabwe and its people.

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its transition to independence under UN supervision. See Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia," in Durch, *Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, 369–370.

The OAU in Chad

The Organization of African Unity does not have a strong reputation as an effective keeper of the peace, and has serious organizational limitations. It does not possess the structure, the logistical ability, or most importantly, the financial resources necessary to mount an effective peacekeeping operation.

Historically, the OAU was not concerned with resolving conflicts so much as ensuring that they remained African conflicts, that is, isolated from the East-West rivalry or other non-African influences.[74] The organ of the OAU that was set up to handle conflict resolution—the Arbitration, Mediation, and Conciliation Commission—has never existed except on paper.[75] With the appropriate formal arm of the organization inoperative, conflicts and crises have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis. Commissions, usually made up of respected elder statesmen, have been assigned to mediate conflicts. This approach has had the advantages of being highly flexible and rooted in traditional African culture. It has also had some drawbacks. The selection of committee members often injects regional politics into the mediation process. The chairmanship of these committees rotates, disrupting continuity, and there is no institutional memory or link between one conflict and the next.

By comparison to its counterpart in Latin America, the Organization of American States, the OAU enjoys relatively balanced power relations among its members. But as it operates on a basis of consensus, the organization is easily deadlocked.[76] Despite a declared principle of solidarity, unanimity on serious intra-African issues is rare in an organization whose members are extremely diverse regionally, culturally, and ideologically. Attempts to take effective action in the face of serious conflicts can be sufficiently divisive to threaten the organization's very existence. The Western Sahara conflict (addressed by the OAU from 1976 to 1983) is a case in point; the organization has opted to transfer responsibility for resolving the dispute to the UN, rather than risk self-destruction by doing the job itself.[77]

Lack of funds as well as technical and logistical capability have been major obstacles to OAU peace efforts. The organization's only major attempt at peacekeeping, in Chad, involved a conflict far too intense and complex for the OAU's limited resources and capabilities.

Chad had been an issue on the OAU agenda since 1977 but there was "a gaping abyss between the OAU resolutions on Chad and the organization's actions in the

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74. B. Akinyemi, "Africa: Challenges and Responses, A Foreign Policy Perspective," *Daedalus* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 251, quoted in Jessica Byron, *Regional Security in Latin America and Africa* PSIS Occasional Paper No. 1/84. (Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 1984), 10.
75. Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, eds., *The OAU After Twenty Years* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 37.
76. Byron, *Regional Security in Latin America and Africa,* 15.
77. See John Damis, "The OAU and Western Sahara," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 273–95.

country."[78] Several peacekeeping forces were sent to intervene in the Chadian civil war. The most important of these lasted a little over six months, from the middle of December 1981 to June 1982. It consisted of over 3,000 troops from Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire and a small group of military observers from Kenya, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, and Zambia. Its efforts were not successful.

Background

Chad is a landlocked country of almost 500,000 square miles. Like most nations with colonially imposed borders, it encompasses many different peoples—in this case societies whose pre-colonial relations were decidedly unfriendly. The historical animosity between the Arab, Muslim societies in the North and the Black African, Christian *cum* animist societies of the Southern region of present day Chad has its roots in 1,000 years of slave trading.[79] Colonialism under France did nothing to improve the situation; its effects were felt mostly in the South where French culture and Christianity were adopted. France never was able to exercise much control in the North and never established ties between the periphery and the central government.

At independence, when power was handed over to the peoples of the South, there were no political or cultural ties to hold the poverty stricken country together. The new government ruled brutally in the north. A tax revolt in 1965 and other incidents developed into a civil war with a loose coalition of factions known as *Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad* (FROLINAT) fighting against the government of François Tombalbaye. After secretly ceding the uranium-rich Aouzou strip in the far north of the country to Libya in 1972, in return for Qadaffi's agreement to stop aiding the FROLINAT rebels, Tombalbaye began a campaign to instill "traditional" Chadian values in the populace.[80] This "Chadianization" campaign alienated his own supporters and he was deposed in a military coup led by General Felix Malloum (also from the South) in 1975.

Four years later, the central government fell apart when one of the rebel factions in the continuing civil war took the capital. The conflict was characterized by factional splintering, shifting alliances, and by the personal ambitions of the rebel leaders. Several of the groups that originally started the revolt together as part of FROLINAT ended up fighting against each other.[81] In 1979 there were eleven splinter groups vying for control of the country.[82]

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78. Dean Pittman, "The OAU and Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU After Twenty Years*, 297.
79. Samuel G. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts: The Political and Institutional Dynamics of Regional Conflict Management* Dissertation (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University, 1989), 145–46.
80. Libya's claim to the 45,000 square mile Aouzou strip along the Libyan border was based on a treaty signed by the Vichy regime with Benito Mussolini in 1943. Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 300. See also Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Proliferation Today* (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), 152.
81. For more details on the conflict, see Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts*; Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*; and I. William Zartman, "Conflict in Chad," in Arthur R. Day and Michael W. Doyle, eds., *Escalation and Intervention: Multilateral Security and Its Alternatives* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 13–30.
82. Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 302.

Libya's involvement in the conflict attracted the OAU's attention in 1977 but the organization did nothing concrete beyond forming an ad hoc committee. Nigeria, as a concerned regional power, took upon itself responsibility for mediating the conflict (for good-neighborly as well as self-interested reasons). Nigerian actions were supported and legitimized by the OAU, and in some respects Nigeria was acting for the organization.[83] Nigeria hosted a series of conferences, not all of which included all the relevant parties to the conflict. The first conference led to the dispatch of a Nigerian peacekeeping force of 800 troops in March 1979. The force was to back up a ceasefire agreement and help demilitarize the capital, Ndjamena. But the small force never had any hope of accomplishing its mission; the ceasefire never came into effect. The Nigerians were neither willing nor able to neutralize the much larger rebel forces; they were not even able to restore law and order in the capital, and were soon asked to leave.[84]

The next two conferences were failures, the first because all the parties attended and could reach no agreement, the second because the two most important leaders, Hissene Habré and Goukouni Oueddei, did not attend. At the time, Habré and Oueddei were jointly running the government, such as it was. Nigeria and the OAU imposed economic sanctions to force them back to the negotiating table. A falling-out between the two leaders, along with the pressure of sanctions, weakened their positions enough to bring them back to the negotiation table. The plan agreed to at the ensuing conference in August 1979 was similar to that which had led to the Nigerian peacekeeping mission, except that the new peacekeeping force was to come from non-neighboring states: Guinea, Benin, and the Congo. Only the troops from the Congo ever arrived; they never intervened in the fighting and soon left. The OAU raised only one percent of the $60 million it had targeted for the operation.[85]

The OAU was shaken into action once again by a Libyan invasion into Chad in late December 1980, and a declaration the next month that Libya and Chad would merge to become one nation.[86] The African condemnation was swift and strong. Libya, surprised by the intense reaction, backed away from the merger but did not withdraw its troops.[87] At the OAU Summit meeting in June 1981, in Nairobi, the heads of state decided to send another pan-African peacekeeping force to "ensure the defence and security of the country whilst awaiting the integration of government forces" that it would help create.[88]

The situation on the ground in Chad as the peacekeeping operation began did not bode well for success. When Oueddei, who had taken control of the transitional government with Libyan backing during the invasion, asked Libya to withdraw its troops by the end of 1981 to make way for the peacekeeping force, Qadaffi pulled out of Chad immediately, except for the Aouzou strip. Whether or not it was intended to undermine the peace process, this move left a destabilizing power vacuum in most of Chad until the

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83. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts*, 163; and Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 306.
84. Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 304–305.
85. Ibid., 307–309.
86. Libya had been occupying the Aouzou strip since 1973, but now moved south into the rest of Chad.
87. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts*, 178.
88. OAU Document AHG/Res.102 (XVIII) Rev.1, in AHG/109 (XIX) Part I, June 6–11, 1983, 1.

peacekeeping force could be assembled. Moreover, Qadaffi, irritated by Oueddei's asking him to leave, had switched his support to Habré. Habré took advantage of the power vacuum and with Libyan support occupied Eastern Chad.[89]

Political Support

The OAU force enjoyed only meager political support from those involved. The OAU itself was ambivalent. The question of an African defense force had long been an issue of debate within the organization. Originally it had been supported by radical states as a means for combatting colonialism. Later, support for the idea came from moderate states, while radicals denounced it as a way of defending the status quo. In the Chad case, the fact that the United States and France were pressing for an OAU force to replace Libyan influence did not increase the idea's merits in the eyes of many states.[90]

Within Chad, political support, the crucial ingredient for successful peacekeeping, was scarce. The idea of a peacekeeping force had been part of several of the political agreements reached at the various Nigerian-sponsored peace conferences, but these political settlements were neither strong nor lasting. The force was not perceived as neutral, and may not have been intended to be neutral originally (see discussion of mandate below). The transitional government run by Oueddei was the only faction to support the force, but his support lasted only as long as he believed the force was there to protect his government against Habré's forces.

Mandate

One of the operation's major flaws was the ambiguity of its mandate. Originally, the OAU expressed its support for the transitional government and the peacekeeping force was sent to help it maintain security while an integrated national force was created from the rival factions. However, Habré's army was advancing unchecked by the government, and the OAU realized it would be unable to intervene to stop it. In February 1982, the OAU Standing Committee on Chad expressed the changed nature of the mandate when it recognized Habré as a negotiating partner equal to Oueddei's government. The force could not fight Habré for the government, but its transformation from protector of the government to neutral presence infuriated Oueddei and seriously strained relations between the Chadian government and the OAU force. It is unclear whether the OAU always intended neutrality and was misunderstood by Oueddei, or whether it intended to protect the government until it realized this would be impossible. It is most likely that the OAU itself was not sure.

Both sides in the conflict were now flinging accusations at the OAU, Oueddei accusing it of getting in the way of the war effort and Habré accusing it of protecting government forces.[91] Viewed objectively, the force's mandate was impossibly

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89. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts*, 180.
90. Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 314–15.
91. G.E. Dawit "OAU Peace-keeping Mission in Chad: A Critical Analysis." Unpublished.

broad; maintaining law and order alone would have been an ambitious undertaking, and even colonial France had failed at that.[92]

Funding

Even more debilitating than the ambiguous mandate was the serious lack of funds. The operation's original budget was pegged at $163 million. It was subsequently raised to $192 million on the advice of a United Nations technical team.[93] As the OAU itself admitted, this amount was "beyond the ability of Member States to bear alone."[94]

In the end, the money was never raised. The OAU appealed to the United Nations for help, but the UN was unwilling to fund an operation over which it had no control. The UN Secretary General made an appeal for voluntary contributions but none were forthcoming.[95]

Unable to fund the operation by itself, the OAU allowed troop contributing countries to secure outside funds on their own.[96] For example, Zaire received aid from the United States, Senegal from France, and Nigeria from the United Kingdom. However, this approach to funding severely undermined the OAU's control of the operation; indeed, the OAU "forfeited its right at exercising... authority." The uncoordinated national forces sent to Chad acted to protect their own countries' interests and those of their outside funders (for example, by protecting embassies), rather than to further the OAU's objectives. Troops would often ask their own governments for approval before acting on the Force Commander's orders. On occasion, troop contributing countries instructed their troops to disregard those orders and changed the size of their contingents without informing him.[97]

Planning and Implementation

The decision to send a force was taken in June 1981. Consultations with possible troop contributing countries had just begun when the OAU was caught off guard by Libya's rapid withdrawal. The organization tried to speed up deployment to fill the void left by Libya's departure. The troop contributing countries met in November 1981 to discuss deployment, force composition, command, finance and other issues. The target date set for deployment was December 17. This seems to be the only major planning that took place before the force was sent to Chad.[98]

The Special Representative of the OAU Secretary General, G.E. Dawit, and the Head of the Defence and Security Section of the OAU secretariat along with two staff members made up the civilian component. The Force Commander was Major General G.O. Ejiga from Nigeria. The force of 3,182 included 1,587 troops from Nigeria, 694 from

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92. Amoo, *The OAU and African Conflicts*, 181 and 184.
93. Ibid., 181.
94. OAU Document AHG/109(XIX), Part I, 6.
95. Interview 71, June 19, 1991.
96. OAU member contributions amounted to only $260,000. OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX), Part II, 9.
97. Dawit, "OAU Peace-keeping Mission in Chad," 4; and Interview 71.
98. OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX), Part I, 1–3.

Senegal, and 845 from Zaire, as well as military observers from Kenya (29), Algeria (19), Guinea-Bissau and Zambia (4 each). The territory was divided into six zones of operation. The Zairian and Nigerian contingents were each assigned two zones, the Senegalese one, and one zone was allotted to the "National Integrated Army" (which was never formed).[99]

Chad's civil infrastructure, never well developed, was close to non-existent after years of civil conflict, and contingents that had been promised from Benin, Guinea, and Togo, and which included essential logistics, engineering and medical units, never arrived.[100] Transportation and logistics were thus a problem for the OAU force from the beginning, delaying deployment of some contingents to their zones of operation and hobbling the entire operation. Despite requests to member states, the force never had its own air detachment. When the Secretary-General of the OAU visited Chad he was unable to visit two battalions for lack of transportation. The basic necessities of the operation, such as office space, housing, and communication facilities, were all missing.[101] Dawit summed up the situation: "The Special Representative of the Secretary-General was made to function with the absolute minimum and the list of his grievances are [sic] endless."[102]

In February 1982, two months after the force deployed, the OAU Standing Committee on Chad met to discuss the deteriorating situation. A new peace plan was drawn up, calling for a ceasefire by February 28, negotiations to begin on March 15, a provisional constitution to be drafted in April, and elections to be held in May and June. The OAU force would then withdraw by June 30.[103] The plan was completely unrealistic. None of the parties to the conflict had agreed to it (the only party that had been cooperating with the OAU—Oueddei's regime—was now questioning the OAU's authority because of the neutrality issue). Moreover, the plan sought to achieve in four months what had proved impossible to achieve for years. Its impossibility suggests that the OAU simply wanted out of the conflict.[104]

Relations with the Oueddei's regime worsened, and the government refused to cooperate with the plan unless the OAU provided security against Habré. Meanwhile, Habré's forces served an ultimatum to the OAU forces stationed in the East to withdraw or face armed confrontation. The force withdrew, completing the split with Oueddei, who continued to refuse to negotiate or to establish a ceasefire until the evening of June 6th, when he agreed to the OAU plan formulated in February. That agreement came too late, however, as the following morning Habré's forces entered Ndjamena and ousted the transitional government. [105]

Despite a request from Habré that the OAU force remain in Chad to help him defend the country, the force withdrew by June 30 as envisioned in the February peace plan—the

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99. Ibid., Part II, 2–4.
100. Ibid., Part II, 7.
101. Ibid., Part I, 5, 10–11.
102. Dawit, "OAU Peace-keeping Mission in Chad," 6.
103. OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX), Part I, 13.
104. Pittman, "The OAU in Chad," in El-Ayouty and Zartman, eds., in *The OAU after Twenty Years*, 317.
105. Dawit, "OAU Peace-keeping in Chad," 3–4; OAU Document AHG/109 (XIX) Part I, 21.

only part of the plan to be implemented. Later that year, a split within the remaining faction in the South allowed Habré to consolidate his power.

Aftermath

Between 1982 and 1986, Libya backed various rebel groups, most importantly Oueddei's, in their fight against Habré's government. Habré in turn was supported militarily by a French force aimed at deterring another Libyan invasion. In 1986, however, Oueddei turned against Qadaffi and, with Habré, presented a virtually united Chadian front against Libyan troops still in control of the Aouzou strip. A peace treaty halted the fighting in 1989, and in 1990, Habré and Qadaffi agreed to submit the dispute over the strip to international arbitration.[106]

Meanwhile, an April 1989 coup plot by Habré's army chief of staff, Idriss Deby, was exposed. Deby fled to the Sudan from which he launched an offensive against Habré in November 1990 (with Libyan support). French forces declined to intervene, and on December 1, Habré and troops loyal to him fled into Cameroon; three days later Deby declared himself president, promising a multi-party democracy.[107] Since then, Deby's regime has come under attack by insurgencies, including attacks by forces loyal to Habré. Deby has been making moves toward holding a national conference and creation of a transitional government that would include members of recently legalized opposition parties. However, a May 1992 deadline for holding the conference passed without action.[108]

Assessment

The OAU's attempt to bring peace to Chad was a disaster; no ceasefire was imposed, no negotiations were ever held, order was never restored, and the transitional government was not successfully defended, if that was indeed the intention of the OAU. Yet none of this is surprising. There was no political settlement before the force was deployed and there was no willingness on the part of the various factions to reach one. This alone is reason enough for the failure of a peacekeeping mission, but the OAU was hampered in its very presence there by Chad's lack of infrastructure and the organization's inability to compensate for it; by a vague and shifting mandate; and by lack of money or other resources. Moreover, the experience in Chad has made it less likely that African nations would contribute either money or troops to future peacekeeping missions that the OAU might wish to organize.

ECOWAS in Liberia

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established by the Treaty of Lagos in 1975 to promote trade, cooperation, and self-reliance in West Africa. The sixteen ECOWAS states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde (joined in

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106. *Facts on File 1990,* 918–19; *New York Times,* December 2, 1990, A3.
107. Ibid. Also *New York Times,* November 12, 1990, A8; December 1, 1990, A5; December 3, 1990, A9; *Washington Post,* December 2, 1990, A29.
108. Telephone interview, May 21, 1992; *New York Times* January 3, 1992, A3.

1977), Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The organization has not been very successful in many of its endeavors because of the members' lack of commitment, and especially, their unwillingness to pay dues; arrearages were reported to be $58 million in 1990.[109] In that year, ECOWAS undertook to keep the peace in Liberia. As peacekeeping, its effort has been a failure. As peace enforcement, it has been sufficient to stalemate the conflict but not to bring it to resolution.

Background

Liberia is a country about the size of Ohio. Its population was approximately 2.5 million in the late 1980s but an estimated half of these people have fled the dreadful atrocities committed by all sides in the civil war. Monrovia (the capital city) was founded in 1822 by former African-American slaves. The country declared itself an independent republic in 1847. Descendants of the original American-born Liberians (5 percent of the total population) dominated the country from then until 1980, when the corrupt and authoritarian government of President William Tolbert was overthrown in a coup led by Army Sergeant Samuel Doe. Doe was originally greeted as a liberator by most Liberians but over the next nine years his regime became increasingly oppressive. He filled most government posts with members of his own Krahn tribe, and human rights violations increased, especially along tribal or ethnic lines.[110]

On Christmas Eve 1989, a small force of forty rebels led by Charles Taylor entered Liberia from the Côte d'Ivoire. The government's harsh reprisals against the Gio and Mano tribes in Nimba county, where most of Taylor's supporters came from, rapidly increased support for Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). After eight months of fighting, the rebels numbered 10,000. Taylor's rebels took revenge on the Krahn for the government atrocities and by August 1990, the civil conflict was irrevocably a tribal war. It became a three-sided conflict when a splinter of the NPFL led by Prince Yormie Johnson broke away as rebel forces advanced successfully towards Monrovia.[111]

ECOWAS Involvement

In the absence of action by the UN, the OAU, or the United States, and after an unsuccessful mediation attempt by the Liberian Council of Churches, ECOWAS intervened in the Liberia conflict. Although it is primarily an economic organization, ECOWAS had created a collective security system in 1981 and a standing mediation committee in May 1990. ECOWAS justified its intervention on the grounds that the large number of refugees generated by the war constituted an international threat, but humanitarian concern for the Liberian people was also a factor in its decision.[112]

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109. *Africa South of the Sahara, 1991,* 20th ed. (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1990), 205.
110. Abiodun Williams, "Regional Peacemaking: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War" in David Newsom, ed., *The Diplomatic Record 1990–1991* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), 213–18.
111. *Washington Post,* "Flight from Madness," June 16, 1991, F7; *New York Times,* February 24, 1990, A5; Williams, "Regional Peacemaking," 219–21.
112. Ibid., 220–22.

In July 1990, ECOWAS developed a "peace formula" and met with the Doe government and the NPFL to discuss it. The ECOWAS proposal included a ceasefire, the deployment of a regional peacekeeping force, Doe's resignation, and an interim government to run Liberia until elections could be held. After expressing objections, Taylor seemed to accept the plan, as did Doe. Taylor's support was very short lived, however, as his forces continued to be successful. Despite the lack of a settlement or a ceasefire, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was sent to Liberia in August. The force of 2,500 troops from Nigeria (800), Ghana (800), Guinea (500), Sierra Leone (300) and Gambia (100), under Ghanaian command, was mandated to impose a ceasefire if necessary and to establish a broad-based interim government that would organize elections.[113]

Doe and Johnson, contesting for control of the capital, both lent their support to the West African force, but Taylor, in control of the rest of the country, was violently opposed to the intervention. Taylor's major stated objection to the force was the dominant role played by the prosperous and populous Nigeria and the participation of Guinea, since both of these countries had been partial to Doe. Ongoing peace talks after the force landed in Monrovia failed to yield any lasting political accord. As soon as the peacekeeping force moved out from the capital, it clashed with Taylor's forces.[114]

Johnson's forces captured Doe at ECOMOG headquarters under dubious circumstances and subsequently killed him, calling the peacekeepers' effectiveness into serious question.[115] Despite their leader's death, remnants of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia continued to fight under General Hezekiah Bowen.[116]

In mid-September, the NPFL heavily shelled the area in which ECOMOG was based, prompting the peacekeepers (after some disagreement among them) to abandon their policy of passive resistance which had left them vulnerable to attack. After the shelling, ECOMOG's strategy shifted to one of "limited offensive" operations and retaliation when attacked.[117]

In late September 1990, after being bombarded by Ghanaian planes, and fighting three armies, Taylor announced a unilateral ceasefire. Unfortunately, at the same time, Nigeria announced that the Ghanaian commander of ECOMOG would be replaced by a Nigerian, Major General Ishaya Bakut. This was seen as a declaration of war against Taylor, particularly given his objection to Nigeria's dominant role in the force.[118] Meanwhile, the West African force continued to grow, reaching 6,000 by the end of September and 12,000 by the end of October, when ECOWAS set up an interim government in Liberia with Amos Sawyer as president. Taylor refused to recognize

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113. Williams, "Regional Peacemaking," 222–24; *New York Times*, August 9, 1990, A7; August 13, 1990, A5. A contingent from Guinea-Bissau was added to the force in October 1991. *Keesing's Record of World Events* 37, no. 10, October 1991, 38518.
114. *Washington Post*, August 26, 1990, A19.
115. *Washington Post*, September 12, 1990, A12.
116. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, vol. 38, Reference Supplement 1991, R14.
117. Williams, "Regional Peacemaking," 225; *New York Times*, September 29, 1990, A3.
118. *New York Times*, September 22, 1990, A3; November 17, 1991, A3.

Sawyer's government in Monrovia and set up his own government, the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly, in Gbarnga, from which he controlled almost 95 percent of Liberia.[119]

In the spring of 1991, the Liberian conflict began to spill across international borders, as Taylor's forces, along with indigenous rebels, fought government troops in neighboring Sierra Leone. The Armed Forces of Liberia joined with Sierra Leone to form the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) to fight Taylor.[120] Guinea and Nigeria also sent forces to aid Sierra Leone's 3,000-strong army. A meeting held in Yammoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, at the end of October 1991, yielded an agreement calling for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Sierra Leone, the creation of a buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, and the handover of territory held by the NPFL to ECOMOG. Despite agreeing to this plan the rebel group did not comply with it and ULIMO rejected the plan a month later.[121]

In early April 1992, a new accord reaffirmed the Yammoussoukro agreement. It was agreed that Taylor would be able to send unarmed observers into the buffer zone. In the course of a month Taylor reversed his position several times, first refusing to allow ECOMOG into areas under his control and then agreeing to pull back from the Sierra Leone border.[122] At the end of April, President Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone was overthrown in a coup. His support for ECOMOG and the spillover of the Liberian conflict into Sierra Leone were thought to have contributed to his downfall.

In October 1992, intense fighting broke out once again as Taylor's forces attempted to overrun Monrovia. ECOMOG blunted that effort, operating as the sole effective protection for the capital city's more than one million occupants, over half of whom were refugees from the fighting.[123] However, the force was not strong enough to defeat NPFL, and the standoff continued into the new year. The United Nations Security Council added the new element of a belated arms embargo on Liberia (exempting supplies to ECOMOG), but Taylor's Libyan suppliers, themselves under UN interdict, seemed unlikely to heed that call.[124]

States contributing to ECOMOG were helped financially by $27 million in nonlethal and refugee aid from the United States.[125] This along with Nigeria's wealth and military

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119. *New York Times*, September 30, 1990, A3; October 28, 1990, A17; and April 14, 1992, A3.
120. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, R14.
121. IISS, *The Military Balance 1991–1992* (London: Brassey's, 1991), 142; *Keesing's Record of World Events*, 38518; vol. 37, no. 11, November 1991, 38562; and vol. 38, no. 1, January 1992, 38709.
122. *Keesing's Record of World Events* 38, no. 4, April 1992, 38852.
123. Keith B. Richburg, "Liberia's Civil War: The Sequel," *Washington Post*, November 15, 1992, A1, and Kenneth B. Noble, "Intensified Liberia War Threatens to Engulf Other African Nations," *New York Times*, November 15, 1992, A1.
124. *New York Times*, November 20, 1992, A6; *Washington Post*, November 20, 1992, A44; and Janet Fleischman, "An Uncivil War," *Africa Report*, May-June 1993, 56-59.
125. *West Africa*, February 4-10, 1991, 149; James L. Woods, Charles R. Snyder, and Robert W. Hess, "Military Factors in Sustaining the Peace," a paper prepared for a Consultation of the International Negotiation Network, "Resolving Intra-National Conflicts: A Strengthened Role for Non-Governmental Actors," Carter Center, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, January 1992, 4; and US Department of State, West Africa Section, telephone interview, March 19, 1993.

strength prevented some of the problems that hampered the OAU in Chad, but the ECOWAS force had many others. While Nigeria provided needed resources, Francophone countries objected to its strong influence in ECOMOG. Other policy disagreements between Francophone and Anglophone countries also hampered the mission and were made worse by the spillover of the conflict into Sierra Leone.[126] Although this attempt at peacekeeping by ECOWAS was hailed as an African solution to African problems, its reputation was severely undermined by accusations that it had allowed Doe's murder, by allegations of human rights abuses, and by reports of ECOMOG soldiers looting in Monrovia and stealing food aid.[127]

Worst of all from the standpoint of traditional peacekeeping principles, ECOMOG was not perceived as neutral. Its parent organization could not separate the peacekeeping force from regional politics, and it lost any residual claim to neutrality by actively fighting Taylor's forces. But even a force roundly viewed as neutral would have had difficulty dealing with a situation in which the local parties were unwilling to lay down their guns. This is the sort of situation that frustrated the United Nations in Bosnia and the OAU in Chad. It is questionable whether any organization, no matter how neutral, how well-equipped, -funded, or -organized, could have dealt successfully with such civil conflicts short of massive military intervention to smother the fighting and force a peace.

Assessing Peacekeeping in Africa

The cases discussed in this section are a subset of a larger number of multilateral efforts to keep or to bring peace in Africa. A majority of those operations have been conducted under United Nations auspices and the UN's track record is equally mixed. Called upon to deal with anarchy and prevent a clash of superpowers in a newly-independent Congo (now Zaire), the UN muddled in, beset by the conflicting political objectives of its major member states. Eventually, the UN force brought a secessionist province to heel and withdrew, but conflict continued to flare, ultimately producing the three-decade dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko. The organization had much better luck in Namibia in 1990, where the political groundwork for a UN-assisted transition to independence had been laboriously laid over twelve years. That luck ran out in Western Sahara, where a similarly-mandated force has been stuck fast in local politics for nearly two years, and in Angola, where a weak UN presence proved insufficient to prevent a return to war when election results proved unacceptable to one faction.[128]

The British and Commonwealth oversight of the transition of Zimbabwe to independence foreshadowed and was available as a model for the later UN mission in Namibia. Like that UN operation, the Zimbabwe transition met the requirements of peacekeeping (even if those in charge avoided the term). It was accepted by the local parties and had the strong support of Zimbabwe's neighbors. The Commonwealth Force

126. *Keesing's Record of World Events*, R14.
127. Ruby Ofori, "What Price Peace: Nigeria's Role in Liberia," *West Africa*, 140.
128. For details on these and other UN operations, see Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*.

served as a valuable buffer between the former adversaries and assisted Zimbabwe's transition to majority rule.

Chad and Liberia, on the other hand, are cases where the basic prerequisites for peacekeeping were missing and the basic rules were broken. In neither case was there adequate or comprehensive political support for the operation, either international or local. Indeed, in both instances one or more local factions opposed the international force. In neither case did the force have a feasible mandate and both had to decide whether to use violence or lose ground. In Chad the decision was to retreat, indeed to withdraw completely. In Liberia, the force became part of the conflict that it was sent to resolve.

Both cases illustrate not only the need for sustained and substantial political, financial, and logistic support for a peacekeeping force, but also for a careful and forthright evaluation of the field situation into which it may be deployed. Calling something a peacekeeping force does not endow it with magical powers, because peacekeeping works only in specific circumstances. If one or more of the belligerents in a conflict oppose the deployment of outside forces, then peacekeeping will not be feasible. Outside intervention may still be desirable to halt the fighting or to help the victims of war, but such peace enforcement operations and the forceful and partisan activities they entail should not be confused with or mislabeled as peacekeeping. They require different levels of political and financial commitment from troop contributors, heavier weapons, different training and rules of engagement, and greater willingness on the part of contributors to take casualties in the interest of conflict suppression. It may be that regional powers, viewing the carnage of a civil war and the refugee flows that it generates, decide to intervene in their own interests, either to take sides or to impose a settlement on all parties. In so doing, however, they should be prepared to become the enemy.

Conclusion

The experience to date of regional organizations attempting to keep the peace in Latin America and Africa suggests that these organizations are not equipped at present to undertake large field operations in difficult political circumstances. They tend to lack the political consensus or the financial wherewithal needed to support such operations. The track record of the OAS, in particular, is better where it has teamed with the United Nations, suggesting that future arrangements that play to respective strengths might be mutually fruitful. Being more attuned to regional relations, the regional organization can also play a crucial role in preventive diplomacy and mediation of disputes. Although it may seem more logical that the UN take the lead in mediation, and receive tangible assistance in peacekeeping from regional organizations and their members, that relationship has yet to become commonplace, even in regions where there are strong organizations and substantial military forces, as in Europe. Moreover, as noted in the introduction to this paper, there are functions less costly than peacekeeping, such as electoral or human rights monitoring, that regional organizations could more readily undertake, sometimes in conjunction with the UN, and sometimes on their own, in response to members' requests for assistance. In general, however, blending the resources of the UN and the resources of the region can play to the comparative advantages of both.