



Occasional Paper 8

**Does the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Have a Future?**

Thoughts of the Agency's Former Directors

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THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

21 Dupont Circle, N.W. ■ Fifth Floor ■ Washington, DC 20036 ■ tel 202.223.5956 ■ fax 202.785.9034

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The Henry L. Stimson Center
21 Dupont Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 223-5956 Fax(202) 785-9034

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INTRODUCTION

Michael Krepon

In conjunction with the thirtieth anniversary of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Henry L. Stimson Center has received a grant from the Ford Foundation to assess ACDA's past record and to make recommendations for the future. Enid Schoettle of the Ford Foundation wisely suggested that we convene an advisory panel of ACDA's former directors to discuss these topics, the first time this has happened, if I am not mistaken. We meet at a very important time for arms control — shortly after President George Bush's sweeping initiatives with respect to tactical nuclear weapons — initiatives that may dramatically affect the way the United States government does arms control business in the future. Before looking to the past and thinking about the future, I would like to turn to Amy Smithson, a senior associate at the Stimson Center, to provide us with an update on how arms control is being handled within the U.S. government at present.

Amy Smithson

Administrations come and go, the names of individuals and interagency committees change, but much remains the same with regard to the structure for arms control policy-making.

The ACDA director participates in National Security Council (NSC) deliberations on arms control, and he or his deputy participate in the arms control discussions of the Deputies Committee. The "action" groups in the Bush administration are, first, the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), which is chaired by a staff member of the NSC. ACDA assistant directors usually attend these pcc meetings. On paper, this is supposed to be the real decision-making group, but apparently decisions are pretty hard to come by in this venue. The Arms Control PCC has several subcommittees that ACDA chairs or participates in.

Most of the action takes place in a second group, called the "un-group." This interagency committee was formed about a year ago to accompany and support Secretary of State James Baker during negotiations. The un-group has the authority to make decisions on the spot. When attending, the ACDA director outranks all of the other members who, are usually at the assistant secretary level. The NSC chairs some un-group meetings in Washington. Un-group deliberations related to ministerial meetings are chaired by the Under-Secretary of State. According to our reports, the ACDA director and his deputy are not influential members of the un-group.

Another telling trend with regard to bureaucratic standing is where the chief arms control negotiators and backstopping responsibilities reside within the executive branch. The U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

delegation is now led by officials who reside in the State Department — Richard Burt, followed by Linton Brooks. ACDA continues to chair the START backstopping committee and is doing the same with the interagency committee overseeing START implementation. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations were led by Ambassador James Woolsey, who worked through the State Department and the National Security Adviser rather than the ACDA director. The European office within the State Department rather than ACDA chaired the CFE backstopping committee and ran the CFE negotiations. Also housed in State are the Open Skies Ambassador John Hawes and the Defense and Space Ambassador Dave Smith. Presumably the new nuclear test limitations negotiator, like the last, will also be a State Department official if these talks resume.

The sole exception to this pattern is the U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, where the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is being negotiated. Ambassador Stephen Ledogar is on the ACDA organization chart, but his ties to the agency appear to be nominal. ACDA has the lead for backstopping the CWC negotiations. ACDA still funds the delegations and provides administrative support for them.

In the area of treaty implementation, many new bureaucratic institutions have been formed. Each agreement has spawned a new consultative commission, and most are housed in ACDA, beginning with the Standing Consultative Commission for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty has a Special Verification Commission, START a Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) a Bilateral Consultative Commission. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, which serves as the communications channel for all of these commissions, is located in the State Department. The State Department also controls the Joint Consultative Group established by the CFE Treaty.

Another major organization, the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) was created in January 1988. The initial staffing for OSIA was 125, plus another 125 personnel that could be pulled temporarily from the Department of Defense (DoD) and elsewhere for inspection missions. OSIA lists its 1988 expenditures at just under \$20 million, due to the fact that INF inspections began later in the year than expected. OSIA has now received responsibility for monitoring the TTBT, CFE, and START agreements. The agency may also become involved in CWC monitoring. Currently, OSIA's staff numbers 470, with growth to 1,000 expected. OSIA's Fiscal Year 1992 budget request is \$180 million. The growth curve for this agency is quite impressive.

Another organization that has significantly increased the number of professionals devoted to arms control monitoring is the U.S. intelligence community. The Arms Control Intelligence Staff (ACIS) began in 1981 with 6 professionals, housed in the Directorate of Intelligence. In 1989, this became part of the Office of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The arms control director wears two hats, the second being the Special Advisor for Arms Control to the Director of Central Intelligence. The ACIS staff now numbers 80 to 100 professionals and, at least before budget cutbacks extended to the CIA, was projected to double with the new treaties coming on line.

Another new staff of at least this size is being assembled specifically to focus the intelligence community's assets on nuclear, chemical, ballistic missile, and other military technology proliferation problems. The Nonproliferation Center is located at Langley, and is just now taking shape.

For an update on verification research and development (R&D) funding levels, I will start with two organizations that have long been involved in this type of research. The Department of Energy's (DOE) budget for what it calls Verification Control Technology (VCT) was \$27 million in 1979. In 1984, this budget was \$53 million, but had increased to \$78 million by 1987. The VCT budget reached a peak of \$138 million in 1988. For the last two years, DOE's verification funding has been around \$130 million. DOE has done a large part of the R&D for nuclear testing, INF, and START monitoring, and has also devoted some resources to CWC verification problems.

At the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the R&D has focused mostly on nuclear test monitoring, especially on regional and teleseismic arrays. The budget for the Nuclear Monitoring Research Office (NMRO) has been hovering around \$10 million for the last few years, but in FY92, NMRO is seeking a multi-million dollar supplemental for nonproliferation R&D.

A new player in the verification R&D game is the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). In 1988, DNA was chartered as the Defense Department's executive agent for verification R&D. The Pentagon found about \$2 million for start-up funds. In FY89, DNA's budget for this work was up to \$9 million. The next year, DNA's verification R&D budget had reached \$20 million. DNA received an additional \$15 million in supplemental funding for CWC-related research. This year, DNA was working with a verification budget of \$76 million.

By way of comparison, ACDA's annual external research budget has averaged about \$500,000 since the early 1980s. The agency's FY92 request would quadruple this amount to \$2 million, the amount DNA started with in 1988.

The ACDA budget is obviously tied to perceptions of the agency on Capitol Hill. The authorizing committees have been supportive of ACDA in the past, modestly increasing spare budget submissions approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Our interviews on Capitol Hill, however, indicate weakening support for ACDA, especially on the Senate side. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Dante Fascell continues to be a strong champion of ACDA. In contrast, liberal Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have become disaffected, championing recent amendments to provisionally place ACDA's appropriations on a one-year cycle and to require a report by the State Department's Inspector General (IG) on the agency's future roles and missions. The last IG report on ACDA was completed quite recently, in March 1989.

While our interviews across the political spectrum have uncovered some dissatisfaction with the way in which the executive branch carries out arms control policy-making, implementation, and verification research, the current system is far from dysfunctional. To the contrary, important arms control agreements have been reached, and historic initiatives have been

carried out. As a result, the future of ACDA is not a pressing issue on the congressional agenda.

In response to inquiries from Capitol Hill and to the March 1989 IG report, ACDA has been undergoing a modest reorganization since February of 1990. Two particular items of interest to note on the new organization chart are the creation of an Office of the Chief Science Adviser and the movement of the Operations Analysis group into that office. ACDA's Verification and Intelligence Bureau, where the Operations Analysis shop was previously located, has been renamed the Verification and Implementation Bureau.

ACDA still has skilled staffers, but many good people have been lost to other agencies. The staff ceiling set by the OMB allots ACDA 204 full-time employees. As of July 1991, ACDA had a full-time staff of 180. Supplementing this in-house staff were 64 detailees or professionals from other agencies. The agency's cap for detailees was 67. There were 24 slots vacant at the agency at this time, 15 for professional positions and 9 for clerical, administrative, and public affairs positions. Across the bureaus, about three-quarters of the staff are professional, with the remaining quarter providing support and clerical services. ACDA's administrative staff now numbers 29, the Public Affairs shop has 13, and the Office of Counselor and Congressional Affairs has 5 full-time employees.

Some of the bureaus appear to be significantly understaffed. For example, the European Security Negotiations Division has seven professionals, two of whom are usually in Vienna. Those based in Washington must cover confidence- and security-building measures, CFE, backstopping assignments, preparations for CFE 1A negotiations, and for good measure, arms control developments in Central and South America and Korea. Four of the professionals in this office are career military, one is a foreign service officer, and two are civil servants. ACDA currently has two staffers assigned to United Nations issues.

The actual number of full-time ACDA professionals can be determined by simple mathematics. These calculations do not include the 24 slots at the agency for part-time and temporary employees. From the ceiling of 204 slots, we can subtract the 47 administrative, congressional liaison, and public affairs employees, and approximately 25 clerical workers. The resulting figure is 132. If we also subtract for the number of vacancies, the number of full-time ACDA arms control professionals onboard last July was just under 110. Adding the detailees back to this in-house staff would bring the agency's corps of arms control specialists up to 172. With that, I conclude my update.

DISCUSSION OF FORMER ACDA DIRECTORS

Michael Krepon

Thank you, Amy, for that descriptive summary of ACDA's current position within the executive branch. Other parts of the national security bureaucracy appear to have gained ground at ACDA's expense. The office of the Joint Chiefs, ACIS, and the Office for the Secretary of Defense all have highly professional staffs that are working on arms control questions, and progress is being made on many fronts. Is there still a need for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? In a letter to me, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith noted, "... I do not think that there would be much difference if the function was turned back to the State Department." This is a fairly provocative statement from a former director of ACDA and an arms control proponent of long standing. How would you respond to Ambassador Smith's comment?

Paul Warnke

I think ACDA originated from the lack of high-level attention being given to arms control. Hubert Humphrey, among others, felt that an agency with a chief arms control adviser to the president of the United States would give more priority to arms control than the subject had been previously accorded.

Eugene Rostow

As I have in the past, I still support the maintenance of a separate agency for arms control. The McCloy Commission's basic reason for a separate agency was to have an ongoing and permanent staff focusing on the problem of arms control and disarmament, capable of operating independently in a manner that would not have been possible had this staff been located in the State Department or scattered throughout the government. Having an independent agency can mean, should mean, and from time to time has meant that there is a coordinated policy push for arms control. This ability depends entirely on the president, of course, and the relationship between the secretary of state and the ACDA director.

For example, during the Johnson administration, when William Foster, the first director of ACDA, and Adrian Fisher, the deputy director throughout the 1960s, were in charge, the relationship was extremely good. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had meetings every Saturday morning. Principals only met in his office — no substitutes allowed — and discussed all forward-looking projects, many of which were arms control projects. The 1961 ACDA Act does not ensure this type of relationship, however, and you cannot make sure that the president and secretary of state are deeply interested arms control, or, that they will not try to steal the clothes of the ACDA director while he is

swimming. You can, however, emphasize the nature of the problem by tracing variations in the relationship between the three principal players, the president, the secretary of state, and the ACDA director.

What can and has been institutionalized is that ACDA's staff does a great deal of the spade-work in arms control. The preparation of treaties and the backstopping work are extremely important for the cables that are then cleared by interagency committees before going to the delegations. To have one agency under fairly focused leadership driving to exploit the potentialities of this backstopping process has usually been productive. These reasons for maintaining a separate agency remain valid, despite the ups and downs of ACDA.

William Burns

I basically agree with Gene, but I would like to look to the future rather than the past. We are at a major watershed right now — the impetus to negotiate agreements is going to weaken considerably, while the requirement to monitor past agreements will increase. In this regard, I initially opposed the establishment of the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) under DoD auspices for a number of reasons that were valid at the time. Over the last two or three years, however, I have come to see the benefits of having the OSIA involved with the DoD. A number of DoD assets have gone to support OSIA. This is not a drain on DoD now, but all too soon OSIA's requirements may increase and DoD will find it harder to meet such requirements out of a constrained budget. For this reason, DoD may lose interest in the OSIA mission. ACDA may be called upon to meet the task. This is an example of the kind of involvement ACDA could have in the future.

While the argument can be made that ACDA in the past has not lived up to its charter, primarily for political reasons, and the agency's present structure and the statutes that frame it are not quite as helpful as they could be, this situation can be remedied. We need an independent agency that can do the very things Gene was talking about — to be the catalyst, the watchdog, the monitor, the supervisor, and the agency of choice to initiate ways of dealing with future, unforeseen arms control problems. Given that argument, ACDA should remain an independent agency as originally envisioned, without ties of subordination to either the State or Defense Departments. As the executive agent for arms control matters, the director's responsibilities would include the entire range of arms control activities, particularly as the bilateral arms control issues between the United States and the Soviet Union become less time-consuming.

Issues ACDA should be involved with in the future, such as proliferation, will be broader than they are today. Even so, the secretary of state and the secretary of defense must remain supreme in their own spheres and the ACDA director of necessity will play a supporting role. But arms control issues are rather complex ones that fall between the cracks and touch a little bit on the functions of CIA, DoD, and the State Department. There is an opportunity here for an independent, effective working agency — but a sub-cabinet agency.

In this regard, I would keep ACDA separate from the State Department. The current law makes it very clear that the ACDA director works through the secretary of state for certain matters, and that is as it should be. But the State Department bureaucracy — as opposed to the secretary of state himself — over the years has considered ACDA part and parcel of the State Department.

Having worked at the State Department as well as DoD, and knowing the perceptions of ACDA in those departments, I forbade my subordinates in ACDA to subordinate themselves to State Department officials. If those we dealt with had any problems with this arrangement, I told them to take it up with the secretary of state and have him talk to me. The working relationships were generally good, but the subordination in some areas was tough to sever.

The secretary of state must be preeminent in foreign affairs and the secretary of defense in defense matters, and the ACDA director must remember his place in this hierarchy. In many ways, ACDA's reports to the White House on arms control matters should be similar to the General Accounting Office's (GAO) reports to Congress — they should be based on professional analysis and judgment. People can and certainly should take issue with the reports, but they should not influence the report before publication to satisfy a particular agency's viewpoint. If the president does not like the reports ACDA publishes, he can always fire the ACDA director.

Other alternatives exist. You could do away with ACDA, I suppose, since various agencies have developed arms control expertise. Without an ACDA, however, the option to subordinate OSIA to a specialized arms control agency will not exist. In other ways, the clear focus on arms control as a discrete element of national security policy will be lost.

Kenneth Adelman

With regard to whether ACDA's ties to the State Department should be perpetuated, I established all of those ties with the State Department that Bill talked about subsequently severing. I felt the agency should be heavily involved with the State Department, and for that matter, anybody else who called on us. People worked on the staff level together with the State Department, DoD, CIA, or Joint Chiefs, which was fine. In fact, I very much encouraged this type of interaction.

Although I do believe, like Gene and Bill, that ACDA served a very good function, I no longer believe that is true. We have turned a corner and should acknowledge it. If we were in the traditional, twenty-year old mold of holding formal negotiations in Geneva, like the mega-proposals of SALT and START, or even semi-mega proposals, such as INF, then ACDA would serve a very good function for all the reasons that were given. Should this be the case, I think having a director who also serves as chief negotiator, like Paul did, was the best model in ACDA's thirty-year history.

I do not, however, see that model happening ever again. We went through that period, and the wave of the future is just what George Bush did a few days ago — unilateral, reciprocal actions. Because of the changes in the Soviet Union, we will stop a lot of programs and do a lot of things differently.

I have absolutely no doubt, even from my conservative viewpoint, that the Soviets are going to do likewise.

At one time I believed that the kind of verification that Bill talked about, which is very different from intelligence gathering, was terribly needed. I no longer believe that, nor do I believe verification is central for several reasons.

First, it was always questionable how important verification was if you never found a violation and took steps, concrete action, on this basis. The age-old question is: "Why have a lot of policemen if you do not have any jails?" Second, verification had a political side to it and functioned partly to show that the Russians could not be trusted much — at least not with critical matters of our security. Third, and most serious, verification was important when dealing with a totalitarian, centrally controlled country. The more open a country is to its press, interest groups, and legislative oversight, the less you need verification. The Soviets, for example, never needed verification in the United States because any possible violation would certainly be known to the press and to members of Congress and would thereby become a matter of public record. The whole verification issue dries up in democracies.

Another serious point is the issue raised by Bill concerning GAO-like reports. Personally, I was never impressed with the competence of GAO reports and thought some were politically motivated. What will all the GAO-like reports done by ACDA cover? Nonproliferation, the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and the proliferation of nuclear events are serious problems, and there is no question that a lot more can be done to better our security and world security. I do not, however, think you need a separate agency to study these things. We know the problem now. The solution depends on traditional diplomacy, with diplomats and experts in security handling these matters. I just do not see the mold of Geneva-type negotiations continuing.

Finally, I am sure that all of Amy's facts and figures about personnel and everything are absolutely correct, however, these numbers should not leave the impression that people in the other parts of the executive branch are doing things that only ACDA can do, or that these figures are in some way comparable. For example, those in the intelligence community working on arms control verification are not doing so all day long. If arms control were not there, they would have other things to do. These numbers probably just reflect a shift in personnel — probably not even in any kind of organized way — into an area that will sell better for their budgets than in the past. Other parts of the executive branch are doing the same thing they did ten years ago, albeit with a new label. Though Amy made an effort to compare various budgets with ACDA's, I do not think any of those figures are comparable.

William Burns

Can I clarify one point? When I broke contact with the State Department, it was not with communications but with the subordination felt in some lines in State of their opposite numbers. I saw it coming out of the State Department and did not appreciate it. As far as the communications, I think what you set up was exactly what we needed and I tried to continue that.

Barry Blechman

General Burns — concerning your model of an independent agency, what is ACDA's role in whatever negotiations do go on? Is it to provide support for the negotiations?

William Burns

I think an independent agency will continue what ACDA is supposed to do now, provide support. The Warnke model, as Ken said, is the way to go. If there is a substantive, substantial negotiation, then the ACDA director, or his deputy, should be the negotiator.

Kenneth Adelman

In the president's speech, the only negotiation he alluded to was the de-MIRVing (reducing the number of warheads on multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles) of land-based systems. This negotiation would not take an enormous amount of effort nor an enormous staff. You could even send a telegram or a postcard saying "Here's the idea, what do you think of it? We may have to work out..." Or, perhaps you could amend the START treaty on page 732, or whatever, where there are related references. The concept is not complicated though, nor is its execution.

Barry Blechman

Beyond our next election, there will be a rich negotiating agenda — many other issues concerning strategic forces, such as lower ceilings on offensive forces. There will probably be negotiations connected with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), certainly the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, START, and test ban negotiations of some type.

Eugene Rostow

I agree, and I doubt that the world as it looks today will be the same a year hence. This is really 1917, and the process of change has not come to an end by a long-shot. Where it will end nobody knows, but in 1917, the name Lenin was known only in a few esoteric circles.

The Soviet Union now is in a very precarious position. Who exactly is going to run it and what further transitions will take place, one cannot tell. Furthermore, despite the most optimistic assumptions, remember that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has been in office for six years and has not cut defense expenditures. He has cut the projected rate of growth in the plans for defense expenditures, but not expenditures. More double-talk is going on.

Serious problems will remain even if we assume the best — that Russia and the other parts of the former Soviet Union are governed by people with the outlook we hope prevails. Nonproliferation, for example, is clearly a problem that has taken on all sorts of new dimensions with the Gulf War. The

United Nations Security Council has taken the amazing step of saying that Iraq, although a member in good standing, is not entitled to have nonconventional and other weapons of mass destruction. This most astounding step validates what we did in Cuba and what the Israelis did with Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor, but it does so with the full weight of the unanimous Security Council. I can foresee a lot of very difficult political problems coming along, and I would think the U.S. government would find it useful to have one central organization that supposedly keeps an eye on these implications.

I also agree with what Bill said, with one exception. I would not have a total break between the agency and the State Department. I think that the dotted line they publish in the State Department telephone book is just about right — it says everything. There is no way of separating the two.

Kenneth Adelman

I agree with the dotted line regarding separation. ACDA has grown further apart from the State Department, which is not in the best interests of either party. The dotted line is exactly the way it should be — the secretary of state must remain preeminent in foreign affairs, and arms control is basically a foreign affairs issue. But the ACDA director is the individual who responds to the secretary of state, not some unnamed official in the "X" office of the "Y" bureau.

Paul Warnke

A case can be made for the continuation of a separate agency. Trying to coordinate between the State and Defense Departments is complicated, but a separate entity would have a better shot at coordination and working out compromises since State and Defense are usually at loggerheads. The Special Coordinating Committee, which really called the tune as far as arms control negotiations were concerned, was an opportunity to work on that kind of problem and compromise.

I would have to admit I was in a singularly happy situation, because I had worked for Cyrus Vance before in the Defense Department. Les Gelb [head of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs], who had Reggie Bartholemew's job in the Carter administration, worked for me in the Defense Department as did Bartholemew at one point. All of us had worked there with [Secretary of Defense] Harold Brown during the Johnson administration, so the personal communication was really quite easy.

Eugene Rostow

I am very much against [former National Security Adviser Henry] Kissinger's system of having the coordination done by the NSC staff. President Lyndon Johnson had those coordinating committees ad hoc, as needed, and the chair of the committee was always from the same group of under-secretaries. If it was a foreign policy problem, I was the chairman, and if it related more to defense, it was the defense under-secretary. To have a White House staff

person, or even a deputy, participating in the process of hammering out a position is all wrong because they have to judge that position later.

During the Johnson years, when I had the Middle Eastern assignment during the Six-Day War, we had the perfect means of coordination. My brother [Walt W. Rostow] was the National Security Adviser. Later, Henry [Kissinger] wanted to be in charge of everything, and the practice of strong NSC participation developed. The White House is institutionally in favor of it. These modes of achieving departmental coordination should be studied.

Kenneth Adelman

Except for very exceptional circumstances, I am not sure that ACDA can fulfill the role of reconciling positions. This task is very hard to do. When somebody says that ACDA never lived up to its charter, the same can be said about the Housing Department, the Treasury Department, and probably about Congress. But, ACDA's charter was always rather unrealistic. Anybody reading the ACDA charter in 1961 had to be aghast, because it placed Moses — the ACDA director — in the middle of the president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. The charter said the ACDA director will take care of things and everyone should look to him. This was always unrealistic.

ACDA did fulfill a useful function on the level of centralizing the expertise and backstopping of negotiations, and that is all anybody could have expected from ACDA regardless of the charter's wording. Giving shape to negotiations, coming up with ideas, and having somebody in government who spends full time on arms control rather than one who does it along with 38 other things was quite useful. I always found this playing to ACDA's advantage in the interminable number of interagency meetings. Everybody else would run around like crazy and spend minutes on some issue that we would spend hours on. So I agree that there is a value to this specialization, as well as to the backstopping function.

I still have difficulty, however, with our presumptions that all of this will be continuing indefinitely. What negotiations? What backstopping? We will not have the familiar model of SALT/START negotiations. Therefore, the institutions should change. Nonproliferation is going to be a big topic, but it will be a topic for the intelligence community, as it had been before ACDA started. The whole thrust of our function as past directors of ACDA will be changed. The "beast" will not be there anymore, and we should not be like the March of Dimes, looking for another disease once a cure had been found for polio.

Michael Krepon

One could argue that ACDA's greatest achievement was the NPT. People involved with the treaty have told us that had there been no ACDA, there would not have been an NPT in 1968. The State Department had its own interest in protecting relations with other states, Germany in particular, and the Pentagon was not terribly interested in nonproliferation at the time. If, as you say Ken, nonproliferation is the issue for the 1990s, is there not a need for an ACDA to

do the agenda-setting, provide institutional memory, prod the issue along, and help enforce treaties?

Kenneth Adelman

As far as enforcement goes, we have had an ACDA but have not done a great job of enforcement with Iraq.

Eugene Rostow

We have had two episodes of nonproliferation enforcement, one the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the other, the Gulf War. Neither of these episodes had any relation to ACDA, unless the agency had wanted to blow a bugle to try to arouse the government. This was not necessary.

Paul Warnke

Concerning the agenda for negotiations, it remains a substantial one. Granted, negotiating to eliminate MIRVed ballistic missiles is not very complicated — you either do so or not. The START framework could be followed, or, even with other approaches, the negotiating scenario is not complicated.

There are other negotiations, however. We will have the NPT extension conference in 1995. We will also have some modification of the CFE treaty, because the CFE treaty assumes a now non-existent Warsaw Pact balanced against NATO. The single country limits may no longer be applicable. We will have to negotiate something with the Ukraine. What part of the total of what is now allotted to the former Soviet Union will go to the Ukraine? What part goes to the Baltics, to Kazakhstan? Will we have a series of negotiations to try to conform the CFE treaty to the post-Soviet Union world?

There is also the issue of a test ban. We will have to be responsive to the world-wide demand for one. Whether you are for a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) or not, there will be negotiations and some tinkering with the TTBT. Certainly the Russians are going to continue to push for a CTB, because they are no longer testing. They certainly will not be able to blow things up in Kazakhstan, and Yeltsin has said their testing site up north at Novaya Zemlya is ecologically fragile. An official from the Soviet Embassy recently told me that nobody is going to go up there to test, given the new situation. He said it is the most unpleasant place in the world; it will not support life. The Soviets therefore will have a de facto cessation of testing. They are going to make this a constant agenda item, as they have already done in response to President Bush's announcement the other day. Even if it is only a stalling operation, there will be test ban negotiations. Consequently, there will be sufficient justification for having an arms control agency that can backstop these negotiations and perhaps even negotiate issues themselves. In addition, it does not cost much to keep ACDA up and running. ACDA is not a very large part of the federal budget.

Barry Blechman

One subject I think we have neglected is strategic defenses, space and defenses. The ABM treaty will be re-opened in the not-too-distant future, and that will be a very complicated, protracted negotiation. There will be plenty to do.

I am intrigued with General Burns' model, although I have argued against the current status of the agency for three reasons. First, symbolically, arms control should not be set apart as something so special. Arms control is a part of diplomacy and defense policy and would be better if it were not symbolized by its own agency. Second, as a practical matter, being part of the State Department but outside of it reporting to the secretary as well as the president introduced, at times, a multiplicity of voices. These additional voices in the policy process were sometimes confusing and led to conflicts within the government, as well as causing various practical problems. Third, being a part of the executive branch but reporting on the executive branch, on Arms Control Impact Statements (ACIS) or arms transfers, places the agency in a rather difficult position. It is easier for GAO to report on the executive branch than it is for an agency that reports to the president to do likewise.

ACDA should be integrated into the State Department and serve as the technical arm of the secretary in support of negotiations and other issues dealing with military subjects. An alternative is breaking the ties with the State Department, placing it as a separate agency, and clearly orienting it towards the technical aspects of arms control. ACDA is concerned with technical questions and in providing support to the State Department and to negotiations on these technical matters, whether it is proliferation, test ban, or what will be a very complicated negotiation on defenses. Given all the changes in the world, perhaps there is reason and opportunity to make changes with regard to ACDA.

Kenneth Adelman

I would not argue that there will be a total absence of negotiations in the security realm. There are, however, all kinds of negotiations in the security realm that have been going on for years that do not involve ACDA. We have a big security interest concerning our bases in the Philippines, for example, and numerous other subjects that in the past were handled routinely. Only when issues received an "arms control" label did they suddenly become special and unique, primarily because of their political impact during the 1970s and 1980s and because of the technicalities and large ambitions for them.

When we talk about such things as the NPT review committee, I do not think such work involved more than five or six people in ACDA. With the CFE treaty's country limits and its conforming to the post-cold war era, is more conforming needed? This wonderful treaty substantially reduces Soviet superiority in Europe, but there will be no Soviet superiority in Europe, nor even any Soviet troops in Europe. So what if Hungary has 80,000 men under arms or 120,000? Once Soviet troops are out of Europe, that is the ball-game.

There will be pressure for a test ban, but I am not sure it will be any greater than it has been in the past. In fact, with reducing the alert status of some nuclear forces, such as the bomber forces, and other recent modifications, there may be a lot less pressure for a test ban.

Barry is absolutely right about space and defense issues and possible modifications of the ABM treaty. Actual negotiations are not certain, we do not know how complicated they could be, and we do not know what the results would be. Even though there will be some kind of negotiations, I do not see the type of mandate that existed previously. Generally speaking, we should not have an agency tailored for a job, ninety percent of which no longer needs to be done — handling the formal SALT/START-like negotiations in Geneva.

Michael Krepon

Let's discuss some other aspects of Bill's model. If the agency is heavily involved with the implementation of agreements, backstopping, and technical issues, does that take it out of the policy realm? Do you lose a great deal in recasting the agency in this way?

William Burns

There would be a reduction to some degree in the impact of the agency in broad arms control policy. But if Ken is right, there no longer is such a thing as broad arms control policy because there is not much to negotiate in arms control. In that environment, the kinds of policy issues would be more technical policy issues — how to and how much and how far, interpreting results of inspections, and issues along those lines.

A new law would maintain the ACDA director as the principal adviser in arms control matters, but this would not mean anymore in the future than now, except that it would be legitimized to some degree because arms control will no longer be as important. In other words, you really are not changing anything, so leaving it out of the law would not be detrimental. Making the separation more specific between ACDA and the State Department would certainly not sever the ties between the secretary of state and the director of ACDA. But ACDA's revised mission will be much less a State Department mission, and therefore the State Department will not get as involved with ACDA as it does now. The natural course of events will reduce the policy input of ACDA in broad foreign policy, but it will be a natural outcome and not something that will have to be legislated, examined, or explained in detail.

Eugene Rostow

I disagree with this kind of thought. If arms control positions, especially regarding nuclear weapons, are not a vital part of the broader process of trying to find an accommodation with the Soviet Union, I certainly would not have been interested in accepting the position as director of ACDA, nor, I suspect, would all of you.

Perhaps we should look at the future in terms of a reasonable period for which we are legislating, say fifty years. My brother, an economic historian, likes to point out that fifty years hence there will be two countries in the world. Both will be highly industrialized, modern countries with a large well-educated middle class and a population of a billion and a half each. India and China will not be forever peripheral to world politics. We may have all sorts of security problems as the structure and dynamics of state systems change. For us to say that it is all over — there will be no more trouble except a few brushfire wars off in some far-flung corners of the world — is premature, to put it mildly. Any instrument for maintaining a rational, realistic foreign policy should be preserved.

Kenneth Adelman

I agree with everything you said. My position should not be equated with saying there will be absolutely no problems — that no one is going to have tooth decay ever again, that we are going to have no more conflicts — I do not believe any of that.

Paul Warnke

Some relationship between ACDA and the State Department is useful. I always found it useful to have representatives of other countries think that I was speaking for and to the secretary of state. If the right relationship exists between the ACDA director and the secretary of state, there is a sense of aura, even in dealing with the French, which I say somewhat in jest.

Also, is there not at least one other negotiation where ACDA could be useful? Conventional arms transfers will be a red-hot topic for the next several years, and it is going to be particularly complicated because of the emergence of new countries from the former Soviet bloc. Many of these countries will want the most modern arms. The five permanent members of the Security Council have convened on a limited basis on restraining arms supplies, but it will be important to try to see to it that the level of inevitable conflicts is somewhat lower than it would be if these new nations all had the most sophisticated equipment. Arms transfers, therefore, should be focused on. Granted, we do not have the same kind of an immediate security interest that we had when the Soviet Union was overtly hostile, but we still have an interest in a relatively stable world order. We have economic interests, if nothing else. We should be in a position to help build up customers for consumer goods rather than have them kill one another and spend all of their money on buying weapons.

William Burns

That is absolutely right, because in the broader realm of world disarmament, we must begin to think seriously of nonproliferation. This presents an argument for maintaining ACDA because the State Department's interests are a little different, seeking to maintain balances in regional arms.

DoD's interests, legitimately but unfortunately, are cluttered by the need to sell overseas to help support our own defense industry. In this case, a separate arms control agency has a certain value because it can look at these issues rather dispassionately.

Eugene Rostow

I would like to raise a personal gripe about filing those darned Arms Control Impact Statements. This requirement came from Congress, and is an example of micro-management. Filing ACIS reports and others for Congress was just an endless chore. The problem should be highlighted. I would encourage the abolition of a great many statutory exercises of this kind which are probably unconstitutional, or nearly so, and certainly serve no other useful purpose.

Kenneth Adelman

Let me follow up on the Impact Statements. ACDA is not a watchdog agency on the other parts of the executive branch. ACIS are cleared with the State and Defense Departments, and in no way does ACDA have a watchdog, GAO-like function.

William Burns

My example of GAO and ACDA was, perhaps, wrong; I agree with you on Impact Statements. My feeling is that while such reports might be ultimately unhelpful as well as illegal, Congress will continue to demand them no matter what, and no matter who controls the Congress. These kinds of reporting requirements will continue, so we may as well have an agency technically qualified to render them in the most effective way possible.

Michael Krepon

Let me summarize where we stand. We started with the basic question of whether there is a need for ACDA in this strange and wondrous new world. We have some division of agreement on that.

In one view, there is no need for ACDA and we ought to proceed through a variety of unilateral initiatives, not travelling the formal negotiations route. The business of arms control will continue, but it can be done through other, qualified parts of the U.S. government.

Another view is that the agency will have an important role, although arms control might be different than in the past. Arms control might focus more on proliferation questions and arms transfers, as well as some of the old, outstanding negotiating issues such as nuclear testing or modifications in the START framework.

We have also had a division of opinion as to what ACDA should look like, assuming that we want it to continue to exist, and how it would fit within the executive branch. One view holds that ACDA ought to be closely tied to the

Department of State, particularly with the relationship between the ACDA director and the secretary of state. Another view holds that there should be more distance between ACDA and the State Department than currently exists. In both models, ACDA should be more involved in the nuts and bolts of arms control, implementation, backstopping, and providing institutional memory.

Let us assume for the moment that ACDA will continue. As Amy noted, the ACDA director now relates to others within the executive branch at the assistant secretary level. Institutional memory within the agency is being drawn down. Recruitment is difficult; there are approximately 25 vacancies for positions. For those who espouse the point of view that ACDA should continue to exist, would you continue to hold this view if current trends continue?

Eugene Rostow

Articulating what the current trends are as distinguished from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is very difficult for me. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire gave rise to 200 wars all over the Middle East and elsewhere. By no means is it clear that this moment of post-Cold War euphoria is going to last indefinitely. Crises will again develop, spread, and persist. The future orientation of Islam will be one of the most important questions in the next fifty years, with the Islamic countries anxious about being taken over by fundamentalists. Another instance would be the elections in Algeria, which could have very serious and large-scale implications.

If present trends do continue, we should dismantle ACDA. ACDA is a small agency and its functions can be divided up within the government. We are, after all, the only government in the world that organizes our arms control activities in this way. Yet, the other governments seem to go to meetings as well prepared as we do.

Nonetheless, arms control represents something very powerful in American culture. The first arms control treaty was proposed with the British in 1782, to demilitarize the Canadian frontier. Constantly trying to reduce the threat to peace by something institutionalized is not so terrible.

Barry Blechman

One way to think about Michael's question is to look back to the late 1970s. We went through a period where arms control was a highly politicized, very important issue in terms of political agendas and fortunes. There were enormous debates as to whether we should even have arms control. Later, it became integrated on a bipartisan basis where everyone thought arms control was fine and we should continue negotiations to reduce weapons. As arms control integrated itself into the main work of government, ACDA moved away from a central role in major negotiations to focusing more on technical subjects. This shift is now being reflected in the glaring questions of staffing, hiring, and vacancies which we have discussed. The question now becomes: is there something we can do in terms of the agency's staff, status, focus, and

executive relations that will allow it to play a special role and at the same time rejuvenate it?

Fred Iklé

The advocacy/missionary function was important in the 1960s to introduce arms control to the U.S. government and consequently into the world through the U.S. example. The latter was established with the SALT and ABM treaties, which then led to a question of advocacy within the U.S. government. I separate the advocacy function from the missionary, because although the mission was accomplished, the advocacy still needed work. This depends, of course, on the personalities of the secretary of state, the president, national security adviser, and the director, and it changes with the constellation of these people. That advocacy role usually resides with those who occupy these positions. In the future, there will be even less of a need for arms control advocacy, because the bipolar East-West philosophies are less relevant to the future role, or lack thereof, for arms control. You could argue that there is no need for an ACDA. On the other hand, ACDA could either be tucked under the State Department or more separate from State.

ACDA has, on an intermittent basis, handled extremely well the very complicated arena of policy planning, the combination of agreements and unilateral moves. This agency could also deal with breaking up the adversary/friend horizon into new constellations. Looking ahead, some of these issues have an awfully long lifetime, particularly nuclear weapons. I would be concerned that the arms control policy planning role would further shrink without an ACDA. The State Department and DoD might pick up policy planning a bit, but it is something that is particularly important for the future.

William Burns

There was mention that the ACDA director now operates at the assistant secretary level. Could that simply result from the styles of leadership in the administration? No matter what legislation intends, the president or the secretary of state, in this case, will arrange things as he likes. One particular administration's usage does not necessarily make the statute deficient. Secretary Baker, for example, has an interesting management style based upon a very small group of personal advisers. Given recent foreign policy successes, this approach appears to work for him. In the long run with regard to ACDA, I believe that the interests of the nation are best served by giving the ACDA director access and responsibility as envisioned by the statute — and that is not at the assistant secretary level.

Fred Iklé

We could consider continuing to do policy planning inside the administration, not in some place over at the Brookings Institution or the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The incumbent tends to view policy planning as very much drawn into current affairs and negotiations.

Some staffers in the executive branch do long-term arms control planning and have technical expertise, so to keep policy planning from getting lost in a think tank on the side, we must have a director who can insist that he be engaged in negotiations and other arenas where things are being discussed. That, of course, is up to the personalities involved. If this is done, what is most needed is preserved. Then it is possible to move on to the management of on-site inspections, negotiation planning, negotiation involvement, clawing with the other agencies about negotiating positions, and so on.

Kenneth Adelman

Although I generally agree with Fred, I have to take exception on one issue. Over twelve years in the government has given me the impression that policy planning does not work very well and is not very relevant. We can all say again and again that this is a shame, but it is hard to think of an administration that has used policy planning well. Officials and staffers are just too busy to think five years out. If we are relegating that to ACDA, what is the difference between the agency and Brookings?

Eugene Rostow

Under Lyndon Johnson, we often discussed options and considered where we would be twenty years from now if we took one or the other. We did that over and again, coming back later to discuss it.

Fred Iklé

There are two more exceptions about policy planning — Gerald Ford and George Bush. During the Ford years, we did a great deal of work on nonproliferation and its technical aspects, such as plutonium accumulation. We redrafted the Ford legislation to scale down plutonium purification and enrichment. This was a direct channel from the scientific, technical, and analytical work to policy. This case was not enormous, but it was useful for reversing the policies of the U.S. government.

Concerning George Bush, his recent arms control initiative was born from policy planning. Once the president gives a signal that he wants something, people can then act on it. Some have argued that this all took place in ten days' time, but actually the policy planning work took place over half a year, ensuring that people were properly prepared on these issues. Perhaps they sorted things out and put the final proposal together in ten days' time, but policy planning made sure that it was ready at the president's request.

Michael Krepon

Aside from policy planning, are there ways to rejuvenate the agency other than waiting for this fortuitous chemistry to develop between the secretary of state and the director of ACDA?

Eugene Rostow

I decided to direct the organization, sending others to the negotiations. However, people involved in planning love to get involved in the action and hate to be outside of the loop when there is something exciting going on. Sometimes good things happen when you sit back and wait. Some things happen almost automatically. The European Community takes a step forward toward unification, and we propose the Kennedy Round of tariff reductions.

I believe in long-range planning, and planning can be integrated into policy. I think the president's conclusions last Friday are very interesting examples of integration. We must stress that we are moving into a very uncertain new world, and one dimension of it is certainly going to be the development of armaments and their proliferation. Never has there been a time when more careful thought needs to be given to such matters.

Fred Iklé

Negotiations have a strong technology dimension, unlike diplomatic planning. Technology has a long-term dimension, such as what happens with tritium and plutonium. The State Department is not well-equipped to deal with such technical issues. DoD can do it, but they come at it from a very different point of view. The essence of the test ban issue, for example, is very much a question of the long-term technical capabilities of the U.S. laboratories, as well as the viability of U.S. nuclear weapons. The people who do that work for DoD have an axe to grind, whereas the people in the State Department do not have the technical wherewithal to sort it out.

Kenneth Adelman

For the sake of clarity, I feel long-range planning and similar problems are best addressed outside the government, either through the private, intellectual think tank community, or just by government studies that are done by the action office, rather than the long-term planning office.

Fred Iklé

But someone on the inside needs to listen to the studies, to be a bridge into the government decision process. The director, his deputy, or his associate directors can be that bridge. This may be the most efficient way to insert a proposal or suggestion into the ongoing process. Without that bridge, all your information may get wasted. Such information should not be just mailed in.

Kenneth Adelman

Some studies are done which have a lot of significance. This happens in all kinds of government fields — housing, economics, defense. I think

normal channels, however, are capable of getting information into and out of government decision-making circles.

I would not send information through the mail, but the secretaries of defense and state have staffs that do this and read articles. There is no more of a unique element in arms control to have its own agency than there would be to warrant an agency for Southeast Asian security studies.

Fred Iklé

One possible reason for an agency is the strong technological dimensions that are involved and interwoven in policy and diplomacy. Besides, DoD and the State Department are far too busy to pay much attention to arms control.

Michael Krepon

Right now of course, ACDA has no money to even contract out studies. What is the budget now, Amy?

Amy Smithson

The external research budget since the early 1980s has been around \$500,000, with the FY 1992 request quadrupling that to \$2 million. Congressionally directed studies noted that some of ACDA's external R&D budget was apparently being withheld for the funding of the delegations and that contracts were being awarded very late in the fiscal year.

William Burns

When I was heading the agency, there was more than half a million, perhaps as much as \$700,000. Those reports also said that some ACDA studies were not particularly relevant to U.S. policy at the time.

Barry Blechman

To put it in perspective, a professional man-year of labor at a place like RAND or the Institute for Defense Analyses costs upwards of \$200,000. ACDA's budget was sufficient for about two and a half man-years worth of research. Peanuts.

William Burns

As a small agency, ACDA suffers greatly when the budget cycle is off-kilter. Delegations must be funded at the beginning of a fiscal year even though no budget exists. During the fiscal year, negotiating requirements change and these changes must be funded. Not having a budget at the beginning of the fiscal year also limits flexibility in handling research funds.

I agree that some sort of arms control planning function is needed, and I think that ACDA is the logical place to have an arms control planning function. This process should, I believe, be a mix of inside and outside thinking. Researchers under contract often have good input on forecasts for the future that are not easily obtainable from the agency staff.

Michael Krepon

ACDA is such a small place it has trouble protecting its research budget, which are nickels and dimes compared to the DOE and the DoD verification research programs. If all of those arms control related activities that were once considered to be given to ACDA were added up, there would have been a very large agency, quite different from the one today that is struggling to keep its head above water. At one time, I believe a proposal was considered to place some DARPA verifications programs into ACDA.

Kenneth Adelman

DARPA was always cooperative and helpful with regard to conducting studies. However, I must add that the statistics that Amy used earlier need a footnote to them. Statistics like the number of vacancies must be accompanied by an explanation of where those vacancies are. They could all be in the Office of Administration.

When I took over ACDA from Gene Rostow, one gigantic issue that did not have paramount significance to the history of the 1980s, if not the century, was the relocation of the ACDA library. We have to be very careful about all these numbers. We cannot all gasp because there are 15 vacancies in ACDA. Out of context, that does not mean very much at all.

I think the thrust of your questions is very good: what is the mission for arms control, what is the mission of the agency, and what kinds of things should the agency continue to do.

Paul Warnke

Let's return to the suggestion that there will not be a massive agenda for negotiations. If in fact the task of the future is going to be a determination of what cuts to make on a unilateral and hopefully reciprocal basis, does the agency not have a definite role to play there?

Kenneth Adelman

No. Nobody will play in that act with the secretary of defense, the policy planning office, systems analysis, and the three services. These decisions are the lifeblood of three roomfuls of people over in the Pentagon.

Paul Warnke

They should take certain steps, though. There must be a large restructuring of the armed forces since their roles are changing. We have had these many decades of arming to fight a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, an event that is now on a level of probability somewhat below a Martian invasion. The relatively modest proposals announced by the president were definitely not just the product of the last ten days, but surely came from a whole variety of sources, including articles that you, I, and Paul Nitze have written. Should we not have an agency whose job it is to try and determine what reciprocal steps ought to be attempted?

Barry Blechman

The more I think about it, the more I think there is going to be a huge agenda of international negotiations and related activities. Gene is right — it is 1917, an empire has fallen, and the world is going to reorganize itself. As part of that, there will be negotiations related to weapons of mass destruction, the NPT, CTB, and negotiations probably involving all nuclear powers concerning the size of nuclear arsenals, not to mention the chemical and biological weapon agreements. The question of the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons and what that means for the ABM treaty will also be raised. A new field of serious negotiations will address conventional arms transfers, such as the permanent five meeting in Paris to study consultative mechanisms. The difference between now and 1917 is the world hopefully has learned something over the interim 70 years and will make an effort to contain weapons before a new conflict system forms. As a result, there will be a very big agenda not only for negotiations, but consultations and verification, and various arrangements that come out of these discussions.

Fred Iklé

Some of these issues are indeed complex and important. Yet, they might get short shrift for a lack of staff or priorities in a place like DoD. The chemical weapons negotiations and arrangements, for example, have been put on the backburner in DoD because of other pressing business. If ACDA does not attend to these matters, the U.S. government could end up with a messy negotiation coming back to haunt them. Another example is further limitations on nuclear testing, which involves issues where the diversity of educated, prepared, scientifically grounded opinions from within the U.S. government is utterly important.

Perhaps policy planning was a bad choice of words, but it refers to someone who can get into the cabinet room, see the secretary of state or the president, and call up the national security adviser to point out that an idea is flawed and make the argument backed up with evidence from a study. The ACDA director and his deputies derive their influence from a policy planning basis, which is built on a good senior staff combined with outside contracts. ACDA's higher officials can make phone calls and get into the rooms where

things are being decided, whereas the people from Brookings and RAND can only give their fifty page reports to the decision-maker's secretary.

Kenneth Adelman

Would you have established ACDA today if it had not existed?

Fred Iklé

No. I would have established an agency within the State Department that can fulfill the purpose.

William Burns

If ACDA had not been created, the elements to deal with arms control problems would have developed in the State Department, and also probably in DoD. How that would have evolved is now difficult to say, but I do not believe that events right now would trigger the creation of ACDA. But, there is an ACDA and we have to deal with it and its present and past impact. We have the opportunity to make better use of the agency; if we believe the system we are using is flawed, one fix might be to abolish the agency. I do not believe that the system is flawed by the agency and thus I do not think that ACDA should be eliminated.

Fred Iklé

Incidentally, we have to acknowledge that there are two things that are impossible to do in Washington. One is to square the circle, and the other is to eliminate an agency.

Kenneth Adelman

I think the post-war system has been so successful that we do not need an ACDA. ACDA's elimination would be a measure of its success. When people speak of ACDA's functions, it seems to mean two things. One is that people are searching for something to fill an agency with after most of its original functions have gone. Number two is that these important functions can be done just as well on the outside, so we should not try to fabricate ideas just to keep an organization on the charts.

William Burns

ACDA has a relatively inexpensive budget of \$30 million. If one option is to eliminate ACDA, is there a savings, and is it worth it?

Kenneth Adelman

If there is an agency, the Warnke model of dual-hatting, with the director also handling the negotiations, is the way to go.

Fred Iklé

What if there are three very important negotiations converging simultaneously? How will the director handle that? We now have Dick Kennedy [Ambassador at Large for Nuclear Non-Proliferation] from the State Department doing a lot of the non-proliferation negotiations, which pushes away ACDA as well as DoD. This is not a good arrangement. If the ACDA director had those negotiations, he would not be able to handle future negotiations, such as START II.

Paul Warnke

Both could be done. We need only to remind ourselves that the director of ACDA is the chief negotiator, but he has a number of deputies. He does not have to do all the negotiations himself.

Fred Iklé

Why do you think the director and/or his deputies ought to be the negotiators? Why is that an ACDA function rather than a State Department function or an ambassador's function?

Kenneth Adelman

Because of ACDA's technical expertise.

Fred Iklé

Is it not more of a U.S. policy position? After the negotiator takes off to Geneva, the position is cabled to him.

Kenneth Adelman

Yes, but he has to help write those instructions.

Fred Iklé

We have seen negotiators who get these telegrams but are in no way exposed to the policy discussions in the under-secretary's committees, where positions are shaped and where the situation is malleable. Once at the table, positions move very little.

Paul Warnke

There is no reason why the director of ACDA, or a very competent deputy, could not participate in the sessions from whence his instructions evolve. Besides, in all candor, the fun is in both crafting your instructions and carrying them out.

One other thing is that we are talking about the U.S. Arms Control and *Disarmament* Agency. The arms control function has been largely a negotiating function, but we are now heading for a point in which there will be much more in the way of disarmament, although not total and complete disarmament. Therefore, it is logical to have an agency that is responsible for trying to set disarmament policy.

On that particular subject, one could argue that the Pentagon's heavy wheels might threaten to grind ACDA into dust. We certainly would not win all the battles, perhaps not even very many of them, but ACDA would at least have some input.

William Burns

If I could carry your point just a little further, there is no advocate for the arms control solution to security problems without ACDA. DoD cannot be expected to advocate disarmament. Nothing is wrong with having an advocate for arms control someplace in the U.S. government.

Michael Krepon

I appreciate all of you taking the time to share your thoughts about these important issues.

OBSERVATIONS OF GEORGE SEIGNIOUS

Basically, there are two choices left for the agency. The first option is to become much more closely affiliated with the State Department. The type of closeness I am advocating stems from the fact that arms control is so closely linked to the foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, I believe that the ACDA director must literally be "in the pocket" of the secretary of state. By that I mean that the director must consult very closely with the secretary of state and influence national arms control policy through him. To achieve this, I would suggest that the ACDA director wear a second hat, that of under-secretary of state for arms control policy. This title and position in the State Department would give the director authority and access that has historically been lacking. Plus, it would help foster a closer working relationship with the staff of the State Department.

Under his first hat, the director would continue to run ACDA's arms control research and technical analysis programs. Preferably, the agency would be given additional funding and other resources to enable it to become more of a resource for the secretary of state and the rest of the executive branch. ACDA's supervision in the monitoring of treaties and participation in compliance decisions would also increase under this scenario. If resources were made available, the On-Site Inspection Agency should become part of ACDA.

This first option would probably require a change in ACDA's legislation, which would mean bringing key members of Congress aboard early on in this process. The cooperation of Congress would also be essential in bringing about the second alternative.

The second option is to make ACDA a truly autonomous entity, complete with the clout and the resources that would enable it to hold its own in interagency circles. A healthy budget and additional staffing would enable ACDA to compete, when necessary, with the State and Defense Departments and to become the principal adviser on arms control matters within the executive branch.

Of the two, I prefer the first option. Arms control is really inseparable from foreign policy. Therefore, a closer association with the Department of State, one that increases ACDA's role in arms control policy-making while preserving its other functions, is desirable.

Editor's Note: Former ACDA Director George Seignious was unable to attend the former directors meeting, but volunteered these comments.

OBSERVATIONS OF RALPH EARLE

Although I have given a great deal of thought to the future of ACDA over the years, I unfortunately have never come to a completely satisfactory conclusion. I do, however, have some thoughts on the subject which I would like to share.

There are suggestions by some that there is not much of an arms control agenda left. In my view, that is simply wrong. I think the arms control agenda, looking into the future, will be larger than it ever has been. Admittedly, the bilateral problems between the Soviet Union and ourselves will have vanished, because the Soviet Union will have vanished as a nation. However, problems will remain where bilateral issues become multilateral issues concerning the various republics, although these may only be largely legal issues. Over the years, however, there may be negotiations to determine exactly how the existing signed or ratified treaties will apply to the republics.

Beyond that, we are now in a multilateral world in terms of arms control where numerous negotiations will remain necessary — the continuation of negotiations on limiting chemical and biological weapons, talks on anti-satellite and ballistic missile technology, and of course the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, to name a few. I therefore reject any suggestion that the arms control agenda has vanished or has been so truncated that addressing it is not worth the time. The agenda is longer and more complex than before.

As I mentioned earlier, I have never come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding the future of ACDA. I am sorry that former ACDA Director George Seignious was not at the meeting, because he has been a strong advocate for ACDA's absorption into the State Department with the head of ACDA becoming a second deputy secretary of state. Although that makes some sense, I do not support the view.

The problem for ACDA is that everyone is into the act on arms control, from the president on down. Therefore, just as it was impossible for Richard Nixon to set up an economic czar or Ronald Reagan to set up a drug czar with any success, I do not think it is possible to have an arms control czar. The suggestion has been made that the arms control agency be made into a cabinet level department, but the problem would not disappear since everyone would remain in the act. One of the problems I think all ACDA directors have faced over the years is that a lot of arms control gets done at high level meetings, even when arms control is not on the agenda. The Tuesday lunch at the Johnson administration, for example, or any other meeting where the president has discussions with his closest

Editor's Note: Former ACDA Director Ralph Earle was unable to attend the former directors meeting, but volunteered these comments.

advisers might originally focus on an invasion of Panama, but during dessert might turn to accepting or rejecting a Soviet proposal on inter-continental ballistic missiles. It would not be realistic to think that the director of ACDA should be invited to all these meetings. At the same time, given the fact that there is and will continue to be an arms control agenda, it seems the best we can do is continue the present system.

The system today has the benefit of having an agency that specializes in matters concerning arms control and disarmament, or at the least will collect the number of experts necessary to pursue a matter. It really comes down to people. Restructuring the government to somehow deal with arms control in a better way will not improve the situation. If the ACDA director has the confidence of the secretary of state or the president, an effective agency will exist. If, as apparently is the present case, the secretary of state looks elsewhere for his principal advice on arms control, you are going to have low morale in the agency and less impact on policy. No number of wiring diagrams or changes in the name or nature of the agency — or abolition of the agency for that matter — will change that.

One must hope that future ACDA directors will be people in whom the president has great confidence and respect for, and people he feels close to. I am sure a number of presidents have had respect and confidence in their ACDA directors, but I am aware of no case where the president has really looked to the director for his principal advice on arms control. That would be an ideal situation, but it has not happened and I do not know if it will ever happen. On the other hand, there have been situations where the secretary of state had immense confidence in the ACDA director and looked to him as his principal arms control adviser. This was evident with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and ACDA Director Paul Warnke, and to a slightly lesser extent it was true when I was the ACDA director under Vance. On a number of occasions, memoranda on arms control would reach Vance's desk without having been cleared through ACDA, and Vance would simply scribble on the margin, "Has Ralph Earle seen this?" We had a very good working relationship, and there was no question that Warnke, and again to a slightly lesser extent myself, had the confidence of the secretary of state.

The situation is also complicated by the words of the statute which created the agency. That legislation states that the ACDA director should be the principal adviser to the secretary of state and the president, as well as the NSC, on matters involving arms control and disarmament. When Edmund Muskie became secretary of state, I explained to him my awkward position: though I was supposed to be his principal adviser on arms control, if my advice was ignored, I could and should go to the White House and argue my positions there. I do not think that it is a very serious difficulty, although it is perhaps a legal anomaly.

ACDA currently has many dedicated people and experts in the various areas which are under examination in the arms control arena. The agency is an arms control spokesman that is sometimes listened to, though frequently not. At this time, I just do not see a better replacement for ACDA. It would be a loss to the government should the agency be abolished; certainly ACDA is not

expensive to maintain. Thirty million dollars a year is less than one hour of the Defense Department's budget operating on a 365 day, 24-hour period.

The principal issue is the personalities of those involved, and whether the president and secretary of state are wise and interested enough to have an effective director. An impressive director will produce an effective agency that might not dominate the arms control arena, but will nonetheless make a significant contribution for advancing arms control. Without such a happy result in terms of personal relations, the agency might have a lesser voice and lower morale but will continue voicing its opinions and will remain a reservoir of expertise and talent.

Finally, I might add that I hope the various views expressed here and in your report will be submitted to Congress. For years the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and particularly its current chairman, have had concerns about the status of the agency and have tried to broaden its influence and say-so. I am sure all the senators and the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee appreciate the problems with ACDA, but I think they should be made aware that the present agency is under-used and could be playing a much larger role. Just yesterday, ACDA Director Ron Lehman spoke at the luncheon of the Arms Control Association, setting forth a long list of issues that the agency was working on and putting a brave face on its influence within the government. It was obviously somewhat exaggerated, but I think if senators were to be made aware of ACDA's problems, if the Senate paid more attention to the agency and its director, and if the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees paid more attention to the agency, that alone would give the agency a little more clout in the government.

Although the system is imperfect, it remains better than anything I have heard suggested. Nonetheless, so much depends on the individual and his or her primary relationship with the secretary of state, and conceivably, the president as well.

