In 2004, President Bush announced the launch of an ambitious new program, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to support training of 75,000 foreign peacekeepers worldwide by 2010, primarily in Africa.\(^1\)

Announced at the G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the program was described as an effort “to help bring stability and security to troubled regions, with an initial focus on the continent of Africa.”\(^2\) As early as 2002, the G8 nations had recognized an exponential growth in demand for peacekeepers, and crafted an *Africa Action Plan.*\(^3\) GPOI was aimed at increasing the supply of available and well-trained troops for deployment to UN-led and regional peace operations, especially in light of the surge in demand for such forces. Indeed, in sub-Saharan Africa alone, the demand grew from roughly 31,000 peacekeepers in 2002, to nearly 65,000 by 2006.\(^4\)

While the United States and Western countries in general provide relatively few personnel to UN-led peace operations, they fund and support the training of such forces. They also work to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of nations and multinational organizations to deploy to peacekeeping missions. President Bush called GPOI a way to move “forward on our common efforts to make the world not only safer, but better.”\(^5\)

Nearly three years after Sea Island, the US Departments of State and Defense are working to implement the President’s call. Planned to have a budget of roughly $100 million per year, GPOI is a sizeable increase over earlier US peacekeeping training efforts funded through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account. GPOI builds on existing US programs, but aims to increase their geographic scope and integration with regional and international efforts to improve capacity for peace operations. There are fundamental questions about how GPOI can meet its multiple goals of training foreign peacekeepers; addressing the capacity and availability of skilled peacekeepers, especially in Africa; and achieving the seemingly competitive objectives of training peacekeepers and building regional capacity. This issue brief describes the impetus for GPOI’s creation; examines how the program is structured, organized and integrated with similar international training initiatives; analyzes some of its central challenges; and finally, offers recommendations for enhancing GPOI’s effectiveness.

**Origins of the GPOI Program**

Over the last two decades, the number of UN, African Union (AU), and other peacekeepers deployed worldwide has skyrocketed from roughly 10,000 in the 1980s to nearly 100,000 by early 2007.\(^6\) With additional missions on the horizon—such as in Sudan (Darfur)—and no large draw-downs in existing missions anticipated (particularly in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), the number of peacekeepers around the world (excluding deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan) could soon surpass 150,000.\(^7\)

As peacekeeping missions have expanded in both size and scope, the UN and other organizations face a challenge in fielding sufficient numbers of qualified, trained, and well-equipped peacekeepers. The African Union, in particular, struggles to fulfill its mandates in Darfur and Somalia. Many nations are willing to contribute peacekeepers to UN missions, but they often lack appropriate training, placing the UN in the difficult position of accepting troops who may not be able to make an effective contribution to the mission. Well-trained and well-equipped troops from Western militaries are also overstretched, especially with the US-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union operations in Bosnia,
GPOI: MEETING THE DEMAND FOR PEACEKEEPERS?

In March 2006, the Future of Peace Operations program organized a workshop to discuss the GPOI program and its progress towards increasing capacity for peace operations, especially in Africa. The discussion was launched by a presentation by two of GPOI’s implementers, Michael L. Smith of the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Quentin E. Hodgson of the Defense Department’s Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Unit. Workshop participants represented the US and international policy community; US government offices, non-governmental organizations, House and Senate staff, research institutes, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and other partner nations in Africa.

The workshop focused on these key questions: What are GPOI’s priorities? Does the program focus on individual training programs or on building regional capacities in Africa? How will GPOI measure success? How is the program integrated with other US and international efforts to support capacity-building for peace operations?

This workshop was one of six held as part of Stimson’s series, A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations, made possible by a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The series examined progress, challenges, and potential steps forward in expanding national, regional, and international capacity to lead and participate in peace operations in Africa. The six issue briefs produced in conjunction with this project provide background and analytical context for the insights gained through the Better Partnership workshops. Each brief also highlights workshop findings and identifies recommendations for the US, UN, regional organizations, and policymakers. For more information on this workshop, and others in the series, please contact the program or visit the Stimson website at: www.stimson.org/fopo.

The US targets GPOI training for nations that have a track record of contributing to international peace-support operations should be implemented in close cooperation with the UN, in accordance with its technical standards, and take into account the recommendations of the Brahimi Report.”

GPOI’S GOALS AND STRUCTURE

GPOI is managed by the Department, in cooperation with the Department of Defense. Within the State Department, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs administers GPOI. It works with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OSD SO/LIC), as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of the J-5 (Political Military Affairs), Stability Operations and Security Assistance Division at the Pentagon. The program is implemented by the State Department, US diplomatic posts, OSD SO/LIC, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), regional offices of OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Regional Combatant Commands.

The US targets GPOI training for nations that have a track record of contributing to international peace-
keeping. While not focused exclusively on Africa, the initiative’s largest training component is the existing African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.\textsuperscript{15}

While initially described as an effort to train 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010, GPOI has grown to include the following objectives:

- Increase the ability of troop contributing countries to participate in UN and regional peace operations by training troops and officers for these operations.
- Support the G8’s Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations by creating an information exchange clearinghouse and coordinating G8 efforts toward the training goal.
- Work with the G8 to create a system for supporting and sustaining the transportation and logistics of these peacekeepers to the required theaters of operation.
- Create a program to ensure that troops have the equipment they need for their deployments with peace operations.
- Help the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) in Vicenza, Italy increase the ability and interoperability of civilian police, particularly formed police units, to participate in peace operations.
- Support recipient countries in their efforts to maintain the skills gained through GPOI.\textsuperscript{16}

The approach to training used in GPOI is to “train the trainer.” Trainees in the program are thus expected to transfer the skills learned to colleagues at home. To count towards the 75,000 goal, individuals must receive at least 24 hours of training on approved tasks. Units trained collectively must use similar standards and each member must be present for at least 80 percent of the training and show 80 percent mastery of the skills they have learned.\textsuperscript{17} Troops indirectly trained by those who have been through GPOI programs are tracked but not counted towards the 75,000 target.\textsuperscript{18}

To increase sustainability, GPOI includes steps for establishing self-sufficiency in peacekeeping training; creating a permanent peacekeeping training cadre; building a peacekeeping training facility (with, for example, training areas for exercises, classrooms, barracks for the soldiers to live in during training, and the necessary administrative and logistical support); and publishing and distributing training materials in the appropriate language.\textsuperscript{19} Today, of the troops trained, roughly five percent of troops are trained as “trainers.” In Africa for example, roughly 27,500 troops have been trained; almost 1,400 are trainers. While this might seem to be a small number, the ratio to those trained is high in comparison with the US ratio of trainers to troops. The number of trainers trained by GPOI is five per 100 troops; US Special Forces training teams only use one and a half trainers per 100 troops.\textsuperscript{20}

The State Department works with other countries, particularly those who administer similar programs, such as Canada’s GPOP,\textsuperscript{21} France’s RECAMP,\textsuperscript{22} and Italy’s CoESPU,\textsuperscript{23} to ensure efforts are coordinated. The State Department meets frequently with their French and British counterparts, as well as with the administrators of the Canadian and Italian programs.\textsuperscript{24}

### The US targets GPOI training at nations with a track record of contributing to international peacekeeping.

GPOI supports transportation and logistics for recipient countries through its Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA)—an international arrangement that makes Western transport planes, helicopters, and other equipment available to African (and other recipient) militaries—for supporting deployments. GPOI also supports rapid intervention with the maintenance of two pre-positioned equipment depots in Africa.\textsuperscript{25}

Part of GPOI focuses on building capacity by addressing gaps in headquarters capacity within the African Union and ECOWAS. As can be seen in the budget table below, GPOI supports the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters with about $6 million a year in US funding. These regional organizations have increased their use of peace operations, but they lag in having sufficient capacity for planning and executing
## Annual US Funding for GPOI
### Appropriations, 2004-2008

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<tr>
<td>Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(funding begins in FY 2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations Account</td>
<td>96.67</td>
<td>100.38</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td>95.2</td>
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<td>Total Amount</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>173.2</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>221.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPOI</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>As a percentage of the PKO account</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>43%</td>
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### Program Components of GPOI

*Data from the Congressional Research Service*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA (program begun in 2002, incorporated into GPOI)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40.39</td>
<td>40.26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa Regional HQ Support to the AU and ECOWAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia Pacific</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europe and Eurasia</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>South &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>12.83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deployment Equipment</td>
<td>20.69</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Program Management</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing International Peacekeeping Capacities</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(formerly in Foreign Military Financing)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPOI Total</td>
<td>96.67</td>
<td>100.38</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>95.2</td>
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</table>
deployments. GPOI tries to address this gap by sharing relevant existing plans and by increasing cooperation between countries in this area.

GPOI is funded through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations account, which is the primary source of bilateral US support to non-UN-led peace operations worldwide. In the past, funds from the PKO account have been used to support the AU and ECOWAS, for example, such as for support to their headquarters capacity and for assistance in the deployment of their operations. With GPOI, however, some of the funding in the PKO account for these purposes has increasingly been shifted into the GPOI program.

As can be seen from the table above, since 2005 the size of GPOI funding relative to PKO as a whole has increased. Today, the PKO account seems to have fewer programs and potentially less flexibility as GPOI takes on more responsibilities.

To assess GPOI’s effectiveness, the State Department employs three full-time contractors. Their first goal is to measure efficiency by looking at how much money goes into the program and its cost per soldier trained. Second, the contractors examine outcomes following training. In other words, they determine how many people were trained and equipped and how many of them deployed. They also examine how well the soldiers do once they deploy—based not on public statements from their commanders but on the degree to which they conduct operations according to what they were taught. For instance, troop contributing countries that have received training might be asked how often they performed the tasks the training taught them each time a unit goes on patrol. Training is considered most effective when countries report that trained units frequently and successfully perform the tasks they have been taught. US government officials acknowledge, however, that this type of assessment is difficult to conduct in a systematic and comprehensive fashion during UN and other peace operations.

Looking Forward: Challenges and Priorities for GPOI

As of May 2007, GPOI reported training 22,500 troops around the world. Most training was through ACOTA’s 18 partner nations, but also through the South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) and the Conference of Central American Forces (CFAC). As of May 2007, GPOI-trained troops have been deployed to UN peace operations in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. For example, six Senegalese battalions trained through GPOI have been deployed to these missions. In addition soldiers from Benin, Ghana, India, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, and Tonga are known to have deployed to peace operations, following GPOI training. While these numbers are impressive, the State Department faces numerous challenges in balancing GPOI’s multiple goals and objectives beyond direct training of personnel. This section considers GPOI’s effectiveness and highlights challenging areas for its efforts in the future.

First, the program faces issues that can be hard for any program to address, such as how to measure the effectiveness of its training. In terms of structure—beyond the “train the trainer” approach—GPOI currently requires a minimum of 24 hours of training for any soldier to count as “trained.” This is the equivalent of a skill-building seminar for US soldiers who have received basic peacekeeping training. As such, it might be a good measure. But is it as useful for an average African soldier? What if the soldiers lack basic skills and experience? What kind of instruction should be provided if troops need more training?

A related challenge is establishing unit cohesion as part of the training program. Certainly units are more effective when individuals who deploy together have prepared together in advance. This goal is difficult for GPOI to meet, however. While GPOI does train entire units, up to battalions of 600 soldiers each, many units are assembled ad hoc for the training. Once complete, they may be broken up when they return home, potentially limiting the institutionalization of lessons learned and after-action assessments that require continuity in the units’ composition. To increase effectiveness, the US maintains lists of individuals who participate in GPOI training and conducts follow-up training.
Another issue in measuring GPOI’s effectiveness is determining how much a recipient country’s capacity has increased as a result of GPOI. In other words, how much easier, if at all, is it for countries to deploy troops to peace operations after they have received GPOI assistance? To answer this question, the program would need to assess capacity and training for peace operations both before and after participation in GPOI. Overall, assessing the quality of training and the efficiency of the program is difficult. The State Department has created evaluation forms for the program, however, and these are in use. Those involved with the program are now working on making these evaluations as effective as possible.

GPOI must also ensure that recipient countries meet US requirements for adhering to human rights. US policy is to abstain from training forces from countries known to use their militaries to repress their citizens’ human rights. Reportedly, the State Department has decided not to provide assistance to countries whose human rights records are uncertain.

**If GPOI is to meet its broad goals, the idea of ending the program in 2010 seems short-sighted.**

Second, given the dramatic growth in peace operations, there is a clear need to help build capacity for such missions, and to support nations’ abilities to contribute to these efforts. GPOI is central to US efforts in this area, and the largest program of its kind. Yet, describing GPOI as exclusively a training initiative is misleading. GPOI’s goals have grown with the program to encompass much more than training, including support to ECOWAS and the AU, for example, as well as to their missions. Despite the increase in the scope of its activities, however, GPOI has not benefited from either the funding or the larger political recognition needed to sustain these ambitions. In other words, there is a mismatch between GPOI’s objectives and the resources it receives.

Third, funding for GPOI has been unsteady. While announced as a $660 million program over six years, the annual budget for GPOI has shifted between nearly $80 and $100 million per year. Additionally, GPOI program funding has been transferred to other State Department accounts to provide resources to separate programs, such as US bilateral support to the AU mission in Darfur. In 2006, GPOI funds were shifted, then restored by the equivalent amount in supplemental appropriations—but only after nine months. Such “raiding” of program funds is problematic if it occurs year to year. It is also symptomatic of a wider problem in US support for peace operations, which is generally underfunded against US goals.

It is unrealistic to expect GPOI to succeed fully if funding for the program is regularly short, delayed or reallocated. This approach to budgeting led some in Congress to question the Administration’s commitment to GPOI. Indeed, though State Department officials are frequently asked to brief both senior Administration officials and Congress on GPOI, there is little public evidence of senior Administration officials working to increase support and understanding for the program. The Administration could make its support better known. Unstable funding is particularly problematic for a six year program because it cannot be expected to accomplish its objectives under these circumstances.

Finally, if GPOI is to meet its broad and worthy goals, the proposed conclusion of the program in 2010 seems premature. Even if the US trains 75,000 peacekeepers by then, GPOI’s other efforts to support peacekeeping capacity-building and more effective missions may just be beginning to bear fruit. To build on GPOI’s initial efforts and potential successes, the program’s impact over time needs to be considered. Earlier US training efforts, including the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and the ACOTA program, helped lay the basis for GPOI today. While it is difficult to measure success, GPOI has the potential to harmonize even further with similar efforts with the UN and G8. Current requirements and anticipated future requirements for peace operations suggest the need for the GPOI program, or a comparable one, to continue to beyond 2010.

**CONCLUSION**

The Global Peace Operations Initiative’s overall goals are to address vital challenges for peace operations and longer-term efforts at increasing security, especially across Africa. No other US program focuses so intently on the region’s efforts to support stable peace by
such peacekeeping missions. With the large US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing UN missions in the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan, and the possible deployments to Darfur and Chad, the need for available, skilled peacekeepers for these operations is likely to continue, and on the continent, to increase. The program’s future is tied, however, to its perceived level of success in its initial efforts to train and build capacity among African peacekeepers. If the program is considered successful, the US should strengthen GPOI and consider ways to build on its identifiable areas of progress past 2010.

Endnotes

2 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
12 GPOI is managed by a three-person staff within the Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis. Author interview with State Department official, 29 May 2007.
14 Ibid.
17 Author interview with State Department official, 9 July 2007.
20 Author correspondence with State Department official, 5 July 2007.
21 The Global Peace Operations Program (GPOP) is funded through the Canada Fund for Africa. It aims to strengthen the capacity of West African countries to train and deploy civilian police for peace operations.
22 RECAMP, or Renforcement de la Capacité au Maintien de la Paix (Reinforcing Peacekeeping Capacity), is a French peacekeeping training program created in 1997 to increase African capacity for peace operations. The program functions under UN auspices, with AU cooperation and includes individual training, field training, and the provision of equipment for peace operations.
23 CoESPU, the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, was created in March 2005 and is also the fruit of the 2004 G8 Summit. CoESPU will contribute to the goal of training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010 by contributing to the training of 7,500 stability police troops.
24 Author interview with State Department official, 29 May 2007.
25 US Department of State, “Deployment Equipment,” Chatham House, The Implementation of the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of current G8 and African activities and potential areas for further collaboration, April 2005. Equipment from these depots has been used to assist AU and ECOVAS (because their member states contribute troops to AMIS) efforts in Sudan.
26 Serafino, The Global Peace Operations Initiative, Congressional Research Service, updated 11 June 2007. Foreign Military Funds have been absorbed into GPOI. Only ACOTA and Foreign Military Funds existed prior to GPOI’s creation. Program components with no 2004 numbers were created with GPOI. The authors of this Stimson issue brief calculated percentage of PKO numbers.
27 Author interview with State Department official, 30 May 2007.
29 Serafino, The Global Peace Operations Initiative.19. Tracking exactly how many troops trained by GPOI that have since deployed to peace operations is difficult.
30 The authors found no evidence that President Bush has made any public speeches on GPOI since its official launch in June 2004, nor is there much public evidence of Secretary of State Rice or senior Department of Defense officials regularly speaking on GPOI. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2006, 90.
The Future of Peace Operations program evaluates and helps advance US policy and international capacity for peace operations, and is co-directed by Stimson senior associates Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch. The program team includes research analyst Alix Boucher, research associate Madeline England, and research assistant Max Kelly. Founded in 1989, the Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous analysis and outreach. For more information, call 202.223.5956.