



## FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM *A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations*

### FROM TIMOR-LESTE TO DARFUR: NEW INITIATIVES FOR ENHANCING UN CIVILIAN POLICING CAPACITY

Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch

As peacekeepers have deployed at unprecedented levels worldwide, the demand for police to serve in such missions has swelled.<sup>1</sup> The United Nations (UN), for example, has increased the use of police from two percent of its peacekeeping forces in 1995 to more than twelve percent today. The mandates for UN missions have also expanded dramatically, with greater attention devoted to police and rule of law activities.<sup>2</sup> This trend reflects a recognition of the need to establish public security, combat lawlessness, and support the rule of law and governance in post-conflict societies. UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno has emphasized the significant role of UN police, arguing that “(e)xperienced civilian law-enforcement professionals are just as vital to the success of missions as military forces.”<sup>3</sup>

Over 40 percent of the police deployed in UN missions today are in Africa, with officers working to support and build more effective and accountable rule of law institutions in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia. African countries are also substantial contributors of police to UN missions. In June 2007, for example, more than one quarter of those deployed were from Africa.<sup>4</sup>

As part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Police Division is tasked with recruiting police officers with the skills needed for these operations. Recruiting quality personnel and deploying them quickly are chronic challenges, however, as the UN must build a police force from scratch, and convince member states to provide police at no charge, each time the Security Council approves a new or expanded peace operation.

How can the UN and member states improve the organization’s ability to recruit, deploy and support skilled police that are well-suited for post-conflict peace operations? The world body has new initiatives to improve its policing capacity within peace operations, but still faces major gaps in this area. This issue brief explores the current demand for UN police, looks at recent and ongoing reforms undertaken at the United Nations and in the field, and considers additional ways to address shortcomings in the use of police and rule of law teams in peace operations.

#### THE GROWING ROLE FOR POST-CONFLICT POLICING

Over the last decade, the scope and level of UN police activities have increased dramatically; the number of police in UN peace operations has increased nearly eight-fold. As of June 2007, there were 9,698 UN police deployed in 13 missions run by DPKO and three political/peacebuilding missions run by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The Police Division, within DPKO, has long relied on about 20 professional staff members to plan, manage, and recruit police personnel

for all UN missions. Changes in UN policing, however, go beyond their deployment in greater numbers. The core tasks of UN police and the means they employ to accomplish their tasks have also undergone sub-

stantive changes in recent years. Tasks have shifted from confidence-building measures, such as monitoring and reporting, to reforming and restructuring entire domestic police forces. In Kosovo and Timor-Leste, the UN took primary, if temporary, responsibility for investigating, punishing, and deterring crime.

Why the increasing prevalence of police in peace operations? Establishing public security and combating lawlessness are now recognized as greater priorities in post-

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## TALKING WITH AN EXPERT: A WORKSHOP WITH UN POLICE ADVISOR MARK KROEKER

On 10 August 2006, the Future of Peace Operations program hosted a workshop in Washington, DC to identify current gaps in the UN's policing capacity and to assess options for addressing them. UN Police Advisor Mark Kroeker of DPKO provided a briefing on the dramatic changes and trends in UN police (UNPOL) operations. He discussed recent initiatives to strengthen the United Nations' ability to mount timely and effective policing missions. He also described UN planning for new missions in Timor-Leste, where 1,600 police form the backbone of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and for Darfur, Sudan, where the Security Council authorized roughly 5,300 officers in August 2006 (the largest policing mission in UN history), although their deployment has been stalled due to objections by the government of Sudan. Workshop participants, many with expertise or experience in policing and rule of law issues, engaged in a lively and candid discussion about the continuing challenges facing UN police operations and the prospects for greater collaboration and effectiveness in the future.



*Mark Kroeker discusses recent reforms in UN policing*

This workshop was one of six held as part of Stimson's series, *A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations*, made possible by a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The series examined progress, challenges, and potential steps forward in expanding national, regional, and international capacity to lead and participate in peace operations in Africa. The six issue briefs produced in conjunction with this project provide background and analytical context for the insights gained through the Better Partnership workshops. Each brief also highlights workshop findings and identifies recommendations for the US, UN, regional organizations, and policymakers. For more information on this workshop, and others in the series, please contact the program or visit the Stimson website at: [www.stimson.org/fopo](http://www.stimson.org/fopo).

conflict settings. These are not easy tasks in environments where arms are plentiful, poverty and unemployment are rampant, societal structures are battered from years of violence, and domestic police are forces either non-existent, discredited in the eyes of the public, or tied to one of the warring parties. In short, post-conflict environments are ripe for enabling criminality just when the state is least likely to be able to contain it.

This recognition of the importance of effective policing in post-conflict operations has driven the effort to enhance UN capacity. In 2000, the UN Panel on Peace Operations issued a comprehensive report (known as the Brahimi Report) that called for a "doctrinal shift" in the way the UN conducts peacebuilding and rule of law activities.<sup>5</sup> Among its recommendations, the report urged the creation of on-call lists for police, judicial, and corrections personnel to be available for rapid deployment in UN missions.<sup>6</sup> While the on-call lists were not realized, the Civilian Police Unit doubled

in size, to become the Police Division, and a small Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit was established. Both police and other rule of law elements are now more integrated into DPKO strategies.

In 2005, the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change further urged improvements to the UN's police and rule of law capacity in peace operations. The Panel called for the creation of a "small corps of senior police officers and managers (50-100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations."<sup>7</sup> The subsequent endorsement of a 25-person Standing Police Capacity (discussed further below) marks a significant shift in member states' willingness to provide the UN with more capacity for police-related mandates and tasks. This expansion of UN police capacity is in part a response to the increasingly complex and ambitious tasks these officers are mandated to carry out in the field.

## FROM MONITORS TO MENTORS: CHANGING TRENDS IN UN POLICE OPERATIONS

In the early 1990s, UN police deployed to peacekeeping missions in El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, and Namibia with limited mandates to monitor and report on the activities of local police forces. These can be thought of as “traditional” police missions, meant to serve as confidence-building measures among the former combatants, and to reassure populations that had suffered abuse at the hands of domestic police. Frustrations mounted, however, over the UN’s inability to take concrete steps to prevent or punish continuing human rights abuses in countries such as Cambodia and Mozambique. There were calls for UN police to respond to human rights violations, and provide new training and guidance to local police that had operated under abusive authoritarian regimes.

More intrusive mandates for police in peacekeeping missions emerged during the mid- to late-1990s. The Security Council began to call on UN police to actively assist in the reform, restructuring, and rebuilding of local police forces. Today, such “transformational” missions focus on building institutional police capacity as their core work. The approach includes *reform* efforts, based on the principles of “democratic policing” and increased transparency, which focus on altering the behavior of domestic police forces through training in human rights and community relations. Often, the UN also works with the local government to *restructure* police forces in order to depoliticize them—which can involve purging human rights violators, recruiting new officers, and establishing democratic authority and oversight. The final component of transformational missions is *rebuilding* indigenous forces to ensure that they are properly equipped and capable of carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities. This is a particularly critical task in countries where local police forces (and their equipment) have been decimated by conflict. UN police conduct needs assessments, coordinate with the international donor community, and advise on the use of funds in facilitating the rebuilding of indigenous capacity.

In rare cases, when the Security Council has granted the mission executive authority, UN police have car-

ried out full law enforcement duties, as in Timor-Leste and Kosovo. UN police do, however, provide direct operational support to local police in several current operations, despite the lack of an executive mandate. In Haiti, UN police are assisting the Haitian National Police in combating criminal gangs in the capital city. In Liberia, UN police conduct joint patrols with local police and detain suspected criminals, although they have no authority to formally arrest suspects.

## MOVING FORWARD: UN POLICE STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

The United Nations and the DPKO Police Division have launched several strategic initiatives in response to the growing demand for UN police in peace operations and to improve UN police performance. These efforts include increasing the use of formed police units, establishing a standing cadre of police experts for rapid deployment, expanding the base of countries that contribute police, improving guidance for UN missions on police and the rule of law, and strengthening the ability to measure rule of law capacity and identify gaps in local institutional capacity.

### Increasing Use of Formed Police Units

The UN has traditionally recruited and deployed its police personnel for peacekeeping missions as individuals, a labor-intensive effort. More recently, the UN turned to *formed police units* (FPUs), groups of roughly 120-140 armed officers specially trained in unique skill-sets, such as crowd control. Known initially as Specialized Police Units, they were authorized for the UN operation in Kosovo (UNMIK) in 1999, and then became a more regular feature of operations with the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003. By early 2007, there were 35 FPUs (roughly 4,000 officers) deployed in UN peace operations in Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and Timor-Leste.

While not technically a “strategic initiative,” the increasing use of FPUs represents a commendable effort by the Police Division to identify challenges and adapt accordingly. Two main factors contributed to the dramatic growth in UN reliance on formed units. First, FPUs demonstrated their ability to fill the critical “public security gap” that often exists in the after-

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math of conflict. They are specifically trained to respond to volatile situations (such as riots or gang activity) with more muscle than local police or individual UN police officers can provide, yet with more finesse than most military units. The threat of public disorder has been demonstrated in numerous post-conflict settings, from the burning of the Sarajevo suburbs in 1996 to the mass looting in Baghdad that followed the US invasion. Specialized police trained in de-escalation of conflict allow the UN missions to respond to such threats quickly and with enough authority to quell disturbances with a minimum use of force.

Second, deploying FPUs is more cost effective for the UN than deploying individual police, and only slightly more expensive than deploying military troops in units. This cost distinction stems from how countries are reimbursed for contributing police to UN missions. For individual officers seconded to UN missions, the contributing nation is expected to pay the officer's salary, which is not reimbursed by the United Nations. The individual police officer, however, receives a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) of anywhere from \$80 to \$150 per day (\$2,400 to \$4,500 per month). The officers in FPUs, on the other hand, do not receive MSA; instead, the UN provides a standard reimbursement to the contributing government (roughly \$1,400 per officer per month). The result is that officers in FPUs cost the UN roughly half as much as their individually deployed counterparts.<sup>8</sup> It is thus easier for the UN to recruit FPUs in a timely manner not only because they are a pre-existing operational entity, but because member states receive reimbursements for their deployment.

Trends suggest that the use of FPUs will continue to grow in the coming months and years. In July 2007, the Security Council called for a record 19 FPUs (or roughly 2,500 officers) for the UN-African Union hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Also significant is the Security Council's decision to mandate the deployment of an additional FPU to Liberia in July 2006, while downsizing the military component there by 125 troops, nearly a one-for-one replacement. While military units and FPUs are clearly distinct in their skills and potential uses, this approach could mark the beginning of a new trend ("less green, more blue") in UN missions.

## Rapid Deployment and Police Contributing Countries

In 2006, UN members approved the creation of a *Standing Police Capacity* (SPC) to assist in the start-up of new missions and to provide guidance to existing operations. The SPC is made up of 27 personnel (25 professional and two administrative posts) hired on one or two year contracts and capable of rapidly deploying to the field, in two separate teams if necessary. When fully operational, the SPC is intended to include "world-class" policing experts and advisers in areas such as public order, police reform, community policing, transnational crime, and investigations. While initially stationed in New York, the SPC is likely to eventually reside in Bonn, Germany, or Brindisi, Italy. The Police Division has stressed that the SPC will be nationally and gender representative.

The SPC is intended to address the UN's difficulty in deploying quality police personnel to new missions in a timely fashion. In the past, it has often taken weeks (and even months) to get the senior police leadership

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team selected and deployed into new operations. Missions in the 1990s were characterized by extremely slow deployment times for police and uneven quality of the police that did deploy. In Cambodia, for instance, less than 50 percent of the authorized 3,600 UN police personnel were deployed four months into the mission. The Secretary-General did not report passing the 90 percent threshold until eight months after authorization.<sup>9</sup> Similar lag times in police deployments hampered UN missions in Bosnia, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo. In recent peacekeeping missions, the UN has reduced the time required to deploy FPUs but continues on average to require nine months to deploy the authorized number of individual officers to a mission. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), for instance, was launched in March 2005 and had only 101 of its 715 authorized police, six months into the operation. Police remained nearly 20 percent below authorized strength as UNMIS entered its second year and did not reach 90 percent capacity until June 2006.<sup>10</sup>

Another effort aimed at improving the UN's ability to recruit reliable police personnel is known as *Operation 100*, to increase the number of police contributing countries (PCCs) to at least 100. As of June 2007, 88 countries had police personnel deployed with the UN, an increase of nearly 25 percent since early 2000. By increasing the number of countries contributing police personnel to peacekeeping missions, the UN hopes to expand the pool of applicants and the political investment of countries in their success.

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### **Improving UN Police Policy and Guidance**

Another UN police initiative is the *International Police Advisory Council* (IPAC), launched in 2006. The Council draws on international police, law enforcement, and rule of law experts from inside and outside the UN system to advise the UN Police Division. It meets semi-annually to identify trends in international policing and to offer recommendations and insights on improving performance.<sup>11</sup> IPAC's primary goal is to support the UN by serving as a specialized forum for discussions and offering policy-level input on strategic international policing matters. Key challenges to be addressed by IPAC include how to improve recruitment of high-quality officers, to develop clear guidelines for military-police coordination, and to improve the gender balance in UN police contingents.

As part of its effort to develop clear guidance for UN police in the field and to PCCs, the Police Division has begun to rely on *Doctrine Development Groups* (DDGs) to craft policy and doctrine around key issues related to UN police operations. These ad hoc groups, with UN and non-UN experts, are created in response to specifically identified challenges. In 2006, the Police Division convened a DDG to help develop doctrine relating to the use of FPUs. New DDGs examining how to improve pre-deployment training and other issues are anticipated during 2007.

### **Measuring the Rule of Law**

The UN has often launched missions without benefit of a systematic analysis of the levels of criminality and capacity for rule of law in the mission area. In the past, peace operations have relied on anecdotes to gauge the level of functionality, efficiency, and popular support for the police, courts, and prison system in its area of deployment. DPKO has not had a system to collect data for police and other elements of the criminal justice systems in post-conflict settings. Without such data, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of domestic police and justice institutions is difficult and reduces the UN's ability to formulate effective strategies to support the rule of law, delaying improvements in accountability and performance.

The UN is therefore developing a new *Rule of Law Index* (ROLIX). ROLIX is designed to use empirical indicators to assess a cross-section of rule of law institutions in the host country, including the police, the legal and judicial sectors, and the prison system. This tool should help the UN identify problems and assist a new mission to develop its plan, approach, and priorities for capacity-building and support for the rule of law. Numerous UN offices are collaborating on ROLIX, including DPKO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Development Program, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The index is slated to be piloted in two mission areas in 2007, likely Liberia and Timor-Leste.

### **CONTINUING CHALLENGES IN UN POLICE OPERATIONS**

These initiatives are significant steps toward addressing some shortfalls in UN police operations. Such reforms need time and long-term support—and potentially more resources—to bear fruit. Additional challenges in UN headquarters management and in recruiting police also remain. They deserve attention in order to create more effective and responsive UN police missions, to combat lawlessness and insecurity, and to help establish the domestic institutions that will maintain stability and peace after international peacekeepers depart.

### **Managing UN Police: UN Headquarters and Permanent Missions**

While the UN has doubled its deployment of police to the field since mid-2003, UN headquarters staff has not seen such growth. The professional staff in the

Police Division has grown by only 15 percent during the same time period. The Division began 2007 with about two dozen professional staff posts (excluding the SPC). In mid-2007, the General Assembly approved about a dozen more police positions at UN Headquarters, including experts to serve in Integrated Mission Teams. While the full staffing of the SPC will essentially double the size of the Police Division, the SPC has a unique mission, and it will not help with recruitment and management duties. Maintaining quality support to officers in the field with such limited headquarters capacity, therefore, will remain a critical challenge for the Police Division.

Member states also need to recognize that policing is a substantive component of UN peace operations. While more nations are providing police, approximately 100 countries do not contribute officers to UN missions. Among those that do contribute police, few countries have dedicated police advisors on their staff at their Permanent Missions to the UN in New York, which leaves DPKO to work with military advisers, who may not recognize the unique requirements of policing. Increasing the level and quality of police contributions from member states (and increasing the number of PCCs through Operation 100) is likely to be a priority for the Police Division for some time.

### **UN Police in the Field: Skills and Leadership**

The quality of UN police personnel has long been a challenge and cause for concern. In extreme cases, missions have had to deal with incompetence, and even allegations of criminal misconduct (in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere) by UN police officers.<sup>12</sup> In Sierra Leone, an after-action report noted that “(m)ost [UN police officers] had little knowledge of international norms and standards for democratic policing and some had less professional experience and competence than the local police they were supposed to be advising.”<sup>13</sup>

In an attempt to improve the quality of UN police deployed, DPKO created Selection Assistance Teams (SATs) in the 1990s that were sent to screen prospective UN officers prior to their deployment. While the SATs have proven very useful for weeding out those ill-equipped to serve in UN missions, there is still a need for more qualified officers. The bar remains relatively low for inclusion, requiring only basic policing skills, language aptitude, and driving ability. Nonetheless, 50

to 70 percent of the police offered by countries fail to pass the screening process. The overall quality of personnel deployed to the field has remained lower than what is necessary, and in many cases, UN police continue to lack essential skills or experience needed to be effective.

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In addition to seeking better trained and more experienced police personnel, there are language, gender, and leadership issues. The Police Division is often short of French-speaking police officers, for example. Operations in Haiti, the DRC, and Côte d’Ivoire together are authorized over 4,000 officers as of mid-2007, and the lack of well-qualified, Francophone police has hindered the work of each and caused significant delays in deployments. France, an obvious candidate to provide such personnel, currently contributes 150 officers. Canada provides around 70 officers, with the vast majority serving in Haiti. Belgium, another potential Francophone PCC, contributes no police to UN missions. Current French-speaking police in UN missions primarily hail from Francophone Africa.

The UN is trying to help develop inclusive and representative local police forces in post-conflict countries, but has serious gender imbalance in its police deployments. As of August 2006, for example, only five percent of UNPOL officers were female, whereas most national police forces are made up of 15 to 20 percent female officers. Former UN police advisor Mark Kroeker has stressed that improving the ratio of women in UNPOL operations is a priority and that consultations with PCCs on this issue are widespread and frequent. This effort has begun to produce results, including the deployment in January 2007 of a nearly all-female Indian FPU for Liberia (UNMIL). Ensuring that the women who are deployed are given roles and responsibilities equal to those of their male counterparts is another ongoing challenge for the United Nations.

Finally, the Police Division continues to face obstacles in recruiting highly experienced, high quality leaders for its missions. Talented police officials, including Police

Commissioners, must first be nominated by countries. In the past, the appointment process has at times been politicized, limiting DPKO's ability to select the most qualified candidates. Given the importance of effective leadership in the field, improving the Police Division's ability to recruit and appoint top police personnel should be a priority.

#### **CONCLUSION: MEETING THE CHALLENGES**

The initiatives outlined above demonstrate progress, but further reforms are required to address remaining gaps in capacity. The UN and member states should build on the initiatives launched by the Police Division under the leadership of former police advisor Kroeker. Support for these initiatives should be sustained during the tenure of the new UN Police Advisor, Andrew Hughes. Attention should be focused in three key areas: 1) knowledge and analysis; 2) planning and management capacity; and 3) rapid and effective deployment.

#### **1. Knowledge and Analysis**

Greater support for the development of the Rule of Law Index and formalized guidance to UN police is needed. After years of relying on anecdotal evidence and the initiative of resourceful leaders in the field to develop field strategies for UN police, the time has come to fully develop the tools required for operational success. The Police Division has begun this effort with the launch of ROLIX, which will require full support and resources from member states and the UN Secretariat in order to succeed.

The creation of formal guidance for the use of Formed Police Units is a significant step in developing "doctrine" for UN police. The Police Division is expected to follow up with comprehensive guidance on other aspects of UN policing, including their role in reforming local police, community policing, and executive policing. The UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of DPKO should be encouraged to undertake a lessons learned study focusing specifically on roles and experiences of UN police in peace operations, capturing key operational successes and failures that can be used to inform planning and guidance for future missions.

#### **2. Planning and Management Capacity**

To increase the effectiveness of UN headquarters, member states should increase the profile of policing

and rule of law in their relations with DPKO, preferably designating an official within their UN missions in New York to serve as a policing focal point between the home government and DPKO.

With a ratio of only one permanent headquarters staff member for every 300-400 police deployed in the field, the Police Division's ability to provide strategic guidance and management to current missions, while simultaneously recruiting and deploying new and rotating officers from nearly 100 countries, is severely stretched. Member states should also support additional staff posts within the Police Division to adequately recruit and manage police operations as numbers continue to expand.

#### **3. Rapid and Effective Deployment**

Several reforms are required to enhance the UN's ability to deploy quality police quickly. More support to the nascent Standing Police Capacity is needed, for example, given the average deployment by the UN of roughly 800 new individual police per year since 1992, and more in peak years (1992, 1999, and 2007) when new deployments have reached 5,000.<sup>14</sup> While the SPC is designed to serve as mission leadership during the start-up phase of one mission, it is only a start, and not

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**One option is creating a UN Police Reserve to have needed personnel ready to deploy.**

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adequate to meet the growing number and complexity of police missions. In mid-2007, DPKO requested 25 more posts for the SPC but failed to win member states' approval.<sup>15</sup> Getting quality police personnel into the field in the early stages of a peace operation is critical, and the SPC concept offers the potential to significantly improve UNPOL effectiveness if it is supported and enlarged.

In addition to enlarging the standing cadre of police experts, substantial reforms for police recruitment are needed. The current system relies on nations to contribute police to UN missions out of good will, without financial incentives or reimbursement. This system of donations has proven inadequate for generating the necessary quality and quantity of officers. Reforms should include reimbursement to governments, in

exchange for commitments of pre-screened officers and substantial pre-deployment training, to meet current and future demand. This approach would allow for more rapid deployment of police and give the UN greater leverage in recruiting specific skill-sets, including language.

Such a UN Police Reserve could significantly improve the organization's ability to support law and order during the critical early months of a new mission and jump-start the reform and training process of local police. Such a system would produce major financial savings over the course of a mission, both shortening the length of the overall mission (by accelerating local police reform) and by preventing breakdowns of order that have major costs locally and hurt the international community's credibility and effectiveness in building peace.<sup>16</sup>

The UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and member states appear to have recognized the importance of “getting it right” when it comes to police and the rule of law. New DPKO initiatives hold the potential to improve the UN's efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out post-conflict policing. These efforts are wanting of support and should be the starting point for more concerted efforts to further develop the tools and capacities necessary to enable UN police in peace operations to meet their mandates and support the rule of law.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> UN peace operations traditionally comprise troops, military observers, police, and civilian staff.

<sup>2</sup> Eleven of the twelve UN peacekeeping missions authorized since 1999 have mandates that specifically refer to monitoring, reforming, and/or rebuilding local police forces, and these missions include police components tasked to carry out the mandate. For more on police and rule of law references in UN mandates, see Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming, 2007).

<sup>3</sup> David Sands, “The Thin Blue Line,” *The Washington Times*, 24 July 2006.

<sup>4</sup> Top African police contributors include Senegal (with 504 police deployed in UN missions), Nigeria (445), Niger (165), Ghana (133), Zimbabwe (114), Burkina Faso (104), and Benin (114). United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributors,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, June 2007.

<sup>5</sup> UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, paras. 39–40, 119, 122–125.

<sup>6</sup> The Brahimi Report also called for: a) member states to establish national pools of civilian police ready for deployment to UN operations on short notice, b) the creation of regional training partnerships for civilian police to promote common training and performance standards, c) designation of a single point of contact within Member State governments to coordinate police contributions to the UN, and d) similar systems for other non-police “rule of law” personnel. A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 126.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, para. 223.

<sup>8</sup> These figures do not account for operational costs incurred in the field. For a detailed cost analysis associated with UN police configurations, see Smith, Holt, and Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity*.

<sup>9</sup> United Nations, *Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia*, S/24286, 14 July 1992; United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 783*, S/24800, 15 November 1992.

<sup>10</sup> United Nations, “Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel,” Department of Peacekeeping Operations, June 2006. For detailed analysis of UN police deployment times, see Annex II of Smith, Holt, and Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity*.

<sup>11</sup> The first IPAC meeting was held in London in August 2006; the second in Abuja in January 2007. Participants included former UN Police Commissioners, leading academics and researchers, international rule of law experts, and the heads of national police forces.

<sup>12</sup> For smuggling allegations, among others, against UN police in Cambodia, see Robert Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When You Need Him? America's search for a post-conflict stability force* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2004). For allegations against UNPOL officers in Bosnia, see Colum Lynch, “Misconduct, Corruption by U.S. Police in Bosnia,” *The Washington Post*, 29 May 2001. For allegations related to UN police in Kosovo, see Frederick Rawski, “To Waive or Not to Waive,” *Connecticut Journal of International Law* 18, 2002, 119. For Timor-Leste rape accusations, see “UN Policemen Charged with Rape in East Timor,” *Agence France-Presse*, 24 August 2004.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations, *Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone*, Best Practices Unit, DPKO, September 2003, 53.

<sup>14</sup> For a detailed analysis of UN police authorization numbers and trends, see Smith, Holt, and Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity*.

<sup>15</sup> United Nations, *Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations; Budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008; Report of the Secretary-General*, A/61/858/Add.1, 17 April 2007. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended against enlarging the SPC, suggesting that it would “be premature” to double its size without a promised performance assessment of the initial capacity. United Nations, *Proposed budget for the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, A/61/937, 1 June 2007.

<sup>16</sup> For a detailed description of how such a system might function, see Smith, Holt, and Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity*.

The **Future of Peace Operations** program evaluates and helps advance US policy and international capacity for peace operations, and is co-directed by Stimson senior associates Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch. The program team includes research analyst Alix Boucher, research associate Madeline England, and research assistant Max Kelly. Founded in 1989, the **Henry L. Stimson Center** is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous analysis and outreach. For more information, call 202.223.5956.