FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM
A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN SECURITY CHALLENGES AND MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS

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Peacekeeping forces are deployed in record numbers in Africa today, working to support sustainable peace in regions from West Africa to the Horn of Africa and from the Western Sahara to the Great Lakes. While the United Nations (UN) leads many of these missions—more than 80 percent of its peacekeepers are deployed on the continent—African organizations are also organizing and leading missions through the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among other regional groups. African nations provide large numbers of personnel for UN-led missions, both on the continent and abroad, with nine African nations serving among the top 20 troop contributing countries to UN operations.[1] Across the continent, African countries and regional organizations are engaged in conflict prevention and numerous initiatives for peace and security, including building the African Standby Force, a brigade-sized force the AU is creating to respond to emergencies on the continent.

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At the same time, the United States is moving to support greater engagement on the African continent. Initiatives include developing a new US regional military command for Africa; posting its first US ambassador to the African Union; funding regional peace efforts led by the AU in Darfur and ECOWAS in West Africa; voting for expanded UN operations across Africa; and offering greater resources for counter-terrorism and peacekeeping training programs, including the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), among other initiatives. These programs come at a time when the G-8 nations have adopted an "African Action Plan" for enhanced peace and security in Africa; as the European Union has funded the AU mission to Darfur; and as additional bilateral initiatives have aimed to increase training and assistance for regional African operations.

How, then, are US programs working to support improved peace operations capacity in Africa and how are these programs viewed by leading African nations? Are US priorities matching African priorities? What are recommendations for improving the link between gaps in African capacity for peacekeeping and partner resources for increasing longer-term capacity building? The view of African leaders of their own peace and security priorities is important to understand, both in the context of broader challenges and within the specifics of peace operations. This issue brief explores current priorities for selected African leaders; considers the role of key countries in modern peace operations; reflects on the challenges of US programs to assist in these operations; and offers additional ways to further address improving the link between US goals and resources and those of African efforts.

AFRICAN SECURITY IN A BROADER CONTEXT

The fundamental security challenges identified for African nations are deeply rooted in the social, political, and economic situations of these countries. Specifically, states face concerns about human security and poverty. These issues take many forms, including levels of disease, governance, economic development and employment, and the need for stronger leadership and less corruption. This section provides an overview of these challenges and details their scope both in Africa as a whole and more specifically in Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda.

AFRICAN PRIORITIES, US INTERESTS:
A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

What are African leaders' priorities for peace and security? Many in Washington have less than a full understanding about the priorities and views of African nations. To better understand current priorities for peace and security on the African continent, the Henry L. Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program hosted a workshop with four distinguished defense attachés from embassies in Washington, DC, on 15 December 2006. Panelists included:

Angina, Opong-Kyekyeku, Bernath, Zannah, and Gacinya at the event.

♦ Colonel Kwame Opong-Kyekyeku, Defense and Military Attaché, Republic of Ghana;

♦ Group Captain Abbah-Ali Zannah, Defense and Air Adviser, Republic of Nigeria;

♦ Colonel Charles Angina, Defense Army, Navy and Air Force Attaché, Republic of Uganda; and

♦ Lieutenant Colonel John Gacinya, Defense, Military, Naval & Air Attaché, Republic of Rwanda.

The workshop, with about 25 participants, was chaired by Cliff Bernath of the US Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The goal of the meeting was to hear African leaders discuss key peace and security issues. Panelists were asked to identify key security challenges and their country's priorities for addressing them, including their view of peace operations, and how US support and assistance programs addressed those priorities. Participants included Congressional staffers, State Department and Defense Department officials, non-governmental organization representatives, think tank scholars and others.

This workshop was one of six held as part of Stimson's series, *A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations*, made possible by a generous grant from the United States Institute of Peace. The series examined progress, challenges, and potential steps forward in expanding national, regional, and international capacity to lead and participate in peace operations in Africa. The six issue briefs produced in conjunction with this project provide background and analytical context for the insights gained through the *Better Partnership* workshops. Each brief also highlights workshop findings and identifies recommendations for the US, UN, regional organizations, and policymakers. For more information on this workshop, and others in the series, please contact the program or visit the Stimson website at: www.stimson.org/fopo.

Building human security is a first priority for many African nations, including those represented at the workshop. In addition to strengthening governance and the rule of law, the panelists shared fundamental challenges include unemployment, disease and food insecurity. Many nations face high unemployment with large populations that live on less than a few dollars per day. The International Labor Organization (ILO) reports that, as of 2005, in Sub-Saharan Africa roughly 55 percent of the population lived on less than one dollar a day and nearly 87 percent lived on less than two dollars a day.[2]

Combating the spread of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, is another fundamental challenge, as can be seen in Table 1 below. HIV/AIDS is a huge public health crisis that impacts food security. Indeed, the disease weakens the agricultural labor force, for example, when it affects farmers and shoulders families with rising healthcare costs. Because women traditionally buy and prepare foods, families are especially vulnerable if they fall ill. Estimates from UNICEF, the ILO, and the CIA World Fact Book, for example, highlight data on the scale of the issues for Sub-Saharan Africa, including in Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Table 1:
SNAPSHOT OF HUMAN SECURITY IN GHANA, NIGERIA, RWANDA, AND UGANDA

Country	Percentage of adults with HIV[3]	Percentage of population undernourished (2001-2003)[4]	Life expectancy (in years) [5]
Ghana	2.3	12	59
Nigeria	3.9	9	47
Rwanda	3.1	36	34
Uganda	6.7	19	52

These issues of human security are deeply linked. Weak leadership in young democracies, along with high levels of corruption, diminishes the state's ability to provide citizens with the health, food, and employment opportunities they need. Since gaining independence, many African countries have sought to build democratic, accountable, and stable institutions. In Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer and one of the largest contributors to the AU peace operation in Darfur, political uncertainty has followed the 2007 elections, which were marred by systematic fraud.[6] Such elections have local, national, regional, and international implications.[7] Similarly, high levels of corruption prevent governments from delivering on promised services (such as health and education) to the

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population and may affect a country's political stability. According to Transparency International's global perception corruption index, out of 161 rated countries, Ghana ranks 30th, Uganda 105th, Rwanda 121st, and Nigeria 142nd in the worldwide ranking of corruption (higher numbers imply more corruption).[8] Widespread corruption in these countries affects not only the leadership's legitimacy, but also the military's

ability to contribute effectively to peace operations. Improving African security will require addressing these challenges and problems.

THE ROLE OF AFRICAN MILITARIES IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Since the early 1960s, African nations have provided military personnel to deploy in peace operations. Over the last five years, the need for peacekeepers in Africa has grown exponentially. By 2002, there were 31,000 UN and AU peacekeepers in Africa; by 2007 that number had grown to over 60,000.[9] In April 2007, nearly 55,000 uniformed personnel were deployed with UN-led peace operations in Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Liberia, Sudan, and the Western Sahara. Today, African countries contribute nearly 26 percent of all UN military personnel worldwide and 33 percent of UN military personnel in Africa.

Table 2:
KEY NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL

Country	Numbers of Peacekeepers Deployed to UN and AU Peace Operations (by year)[10]		
	2004	2005	2006
Ghana	3,159	3,218	2,462
Nigeria	3,338	2,808	4,146
Rwanda	0	6	1,806
Uganda	0	8	14

The African Union has also led peacekeeping operations, including its initial mission in Burundi from 2003-2004 and the current, high-profile mission in Darfur, Sudan since 2004. The AU and UN are further planning to transition the Darfur mission from AU leadership to a larger "hybrid" operation with the United Nations. Finally, the AU began a new mission in Somalia in March 2007. In 2006, the AU had 5,381 troops deployed in its missions.

Table 3:
TROOPS TRAINED THROUGH GPOI IN GHANA, NIGERIA, AND RWANDA[12]
According to the US Department of State, as reported to the Congressional Research Service

Country	Number of Troops GPOI Trained per Year					
	FY05	**FY06**	**FY07 Planned (estimates)**	**Totals FY05-FY07 (estimates)**	**Total Trainers (estimates)**	**Total Trainees (estimates)**
Ghana	1,947	571	825	3,343	130	3,213
Nigeria	202	920	670	1,792	242	1,550
Rwanda	2,939	3,215	1,450	7,604	151	7,453
Africa TOTAL	**10,724**	**11,137**	**5,649**	**27,510**	**1,390**	**26,120**
GPOI TOTAL (All Countries)	**11,008**	**11,576**	**6,072**	**28,65**	**1,709**	**26,947**

Ghana and Nigeria are among the top ten UN troop contributors for 2006. Additionally, Uganda's contribution to peace operations increased substantially since it agreed to offer troops to the new AU operation in Somalia. As of May 2007, Uganda has deployed 1,500 troops to the country.[11]

During the Stimson workshop, panelists highlighted the major challenges African countries face in contributing to (UN, AU or other) peacekeeping operations. Specifically, African militaries face a lack of resources, training, and equipment. The panelists emphasized that the international community, while it has begun to address these challenges, could do so in a more effective fashion. The workshop discussion therefore focused on the degree to which US military assistance addresses these challenges.

US Programs for African Peacekeeping: ACOTA and GPOI

The US State Department uses two primary accounts to support peacekeeping operations and capacity-building efforts in Africa. First, the US funds contributions to UN-led missions through its *Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities* (CIPA) account. Second, the US uses its *Peacekeeping Operations* (PKO) account to provide bilateral funding to support regional and bilateral training programs, regional organizations (such as ECOWAS and the AU), and to assist with peacekeeping missions. This section focuses on one component of the PKO account: US training for peacekeeping through the GPOI and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programs. Table 3 above details how many troops were trained through GPOI between 2005 and early 2007, in the countries represented at the workshop, in three of the countries Africa, and in total.

The US began training African militaries for peace operations in 1997, with the development of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The Bush Administration expanded that effort into the larger ACOTA program in 2002. Between 2002 and 2004, ACOTA trained over 17,000 African soldiers. In 2004, ACOTA was incorporated into the new Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). That program was established in June 2004 at the G8 Sea Island Summit to help train 75,000 peacekeepers, primarily in Africa, by 2010. Today, ACOTA is

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the largest component of GPOI, which also aims to develop support mechanisms for transportation and logistics to help recipient countries deploy in peace operations; to support the Italian center for training civilian police for peace operations; to coordinate G8 capacity-building efforts; to create weapons and equipment caches; to support African efforts to build capacity at AU and ECOWAS headquarters; and to help recipient countries develop means of sustaining deployments in a self-sufficient fashion.[13] In fiscal year 2006, the US funded GPOI at $100 million through the PKO account. In 2007, the US allocated $80 million for GPOI; the Administration requested $95 million in its fiscal year 2008 budget request.[14] GPOI reportedly has trained over 22,500 soldiers (mostly from Africa) as of May 2007.[15] Up to now, troops trained by GPOI have deployed to UN peace

> **Troops trained by GPOI have deployed to UN peace operations in the DRC, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sudan.**

operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sudan. Soldiers from the following countries are known to have deployed to peace operations, following GPOI training: Benin, Ghana, India, Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Tonga.[16]

AFRICAN VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING & SUPPORT EFFORTS

Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, and Uganda have deployed personnel to UN-led peace operations, as well as to regional missions led by ECOWAS and the African Union. All but Uganda has received training through GPOI as well. Panelists pointed out, however, that most military personnel participating in GPOI/ACOTA programs are relatively high-ranking officers and often trained in the United States one at a time. As a result, few enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers receive such direct training. Senior officers are less likely to pass on their knowledge when they return home. The "trickle down" effect on training to regular soldiers could therefore be limited. Panelists worried that some training recipients, who are selected by their governments, are not always the most promising officers. Participants suggested that US resources

could be more efficiently used by deploying a full company of US trainers to the recipient country. They recommended an increased focus on "train the trainer" activities, where more people could benefit from direct training, with access to more promising leaders.

Participants emphasized that US efforts should consider other capability gaps for African countries that deploy in peace operations, such as management of peace operations, command and control, and interoperability among troop contributors. The Defense attachés pointed out that these areas were recurring challenges for their militaries, especially given the frequency of their deployments. Finding enough officers fluent in the main mission languages and personnel experienced in using equipment required for effective interoperability are further challenges. Workshop participants suggested that the UN, AU, and ECOWAS discuss with donors ways to address this gap through training and provision of equipment.[17]

Finally, while US programs such as ACOTA have helped African militaries develop their capacities for peace operations, one panelist argued that in some cases African militaries needed more fundamental military soldiering skills, rather than those developed specifically for peacekeeping missions. Indeed, some African soldiers lack even basic war-fighting training, and thus, US assistance could help address this problem.

Lack of adequate resources for sustained deployments

Participants argued for the need to recognize that resources are a fundamental challenge to African leadership and participation in peacekeeping operations. As seen with the current African Union Mission to Darfur (AMIS), the lack of resources is a continuing issue for African contingents serving there and elsewhere. One panelist said his nation did not deploy to Sudan, for example, not because of lack of training, but due to a lack of resources and an uncertainty that sufficient assistance would be provided to sustain that deployment.

Some panelists also highlighted that their countries need resources for capital development in the military. Ghana, for instance, still has equipment it used in deployments to Liberia with ECOWAS in the 1990s.

In general, African nations urge the international community to help with equipment, logistics support and transportation to missions. The US has begun to assist by providing both training and equipment as part of GPOI. According to the State Department, some recipient countries for GPOI have received "tents, generators, water purification units, trucks, cranes, trailers, ambulances" and other equipment.[18] One participant pointed out donating military equipment to African militaries could impact the population as a whole in potentially beneficial ways, such as for natural disaster relief.

Mandates

Many African militaries have extensive experience in peace operations led by the UN, AU, and ECOWAS and under their varied mandates. As a result of repeated deployments, their military leadership have found similar challenges in such missions including limited mandates. Forces deployed to Liberia with ECOWAS in the 1990s, for example, had a mandate to observe and monitor the ceasefire. Participating troops were not authorized to apprehend or arrest individuals who committed crimes, despite local expectations that ECOWAS was there to support the peace. When they failed to act, those same troops were accused of not doing enough to keep the peace, and were even suggested to be incompetent. In other words, the attachés pointed to the familiar peacekeeping problem of a disconnect between mission mandates and the public's expectations of what the peace operation can do. One attaché argued that troops from his country could have done a much better job with a more comprehensive mandate.

Participants pointed out, however, that even with a more robust, Chapter VII mandate, the ability of troop contributors to build sustainable peace is not assured.[19] In Liberia, for example, UN permission to arrest criminals might have been helpful, but the more fundamental absence of rule of law institutions—police, judges, and adequate corrections facilities—could render any such efforts useless. An important component of all peace operations mandates should therefore be the development—and if necessary in the interim, the deployment—of rule of law personnel.[20]

The African Standby Force

The African Union announced the creation of an African Standby Force (ASF) in May 2003, with plans to create a brigade-sized (2,000 to 3,000 soldiers) contingent from each of five African subregions to deploy to peace operations within Africa.[21] As a starting point, the AU suggested that 500 trained military and civilian observers be identified to jumpstart the standby capacity, with

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the brigades ready to be deployed within 30 to 90 days, depending on the complexity of the mission. In the event of genocide, the AU force would ideally be deployable within 14 days.[22]

The ASF is to be authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council, with mandates ranging from observation and monitoring missions, peace support missions, military interventions, preventive deployment, peace-building missions, to humanitarian assistance missions. Preparation for the ASF has two phases. The ASF has completed its first phase goals to develop the necessary supporting mechanisms for the force, such as doctrine and operating procedures. The second phase, to be completed in 2010, is to develop the capacity to lead increasingly complex peacekeeping missions. The UN is expected to provide strategic planning and practical support to AU headquarters. The second phase is expected to conclude with a military exercise to assess the ASF's operational capabilities.

While acknowledging that the ASF would be helpful, panelists were cautious about its prospects. They emphasized that, based on the current difficulties the AU faces in Darfur—if the AU considers that deployment as a "test" for the ASF concept (panelists implied it did)—they would prefer that the ASF be a small but capable, well-financed and sufficiently equipped force, rather than a larger one. Some panelists added

that if AMIS is an example for the ASF, then its apparent failure suggests there should be no ASF at all. Panelists argued that a five brigade-sized ASF would be very difficult to create, manage, and maintain. Indeed, they agreed that creating a fully trained, equipped, logistically self-sufficient brigade, capable of fulfilling an internationally-approved mandate, would be a significant challenge.

US Africa Command

Participants welcomed the news that the US Department of Defense was planning to create a Unified Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM), formally announced on 6 February 2007.[23] The new command is planned to take responsibility for US military (and non-military, to some extent) security and development operations in Africa. This effort will combine areas now managed by European Command (North and Sub-Saharan Africa), Central Command (northeastern Africa, Horn of Africa), and Pacific Command (Madagascar). After beginning its operations from Stuttgart, Germany, AFRICOM is scheduled to be fully operational by the fall of 2008.

The decision to create AFRICOM reflects Africa's growing importance to the United States for multiple reasons, but primarily for its role in combating terrorism and other, more enduring, US strategic interests.[24] In April 2007, US officials discussed the command with Kenyan defense and foreign affairs ministries in Nairobi.[25] Panelists expressed the hope that the creation of AFRICOM, while reflecting increased US interest in Africa, will translate into additional US aid and involvement. Other participants suggested it could help harmonize an otherwise disjointed approach to peace and security on the continent.

LOOKING FORWARD:
RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION

Panelists emphasized that to reduce the need for costly peace operations, the international community should focus on dealing with the causes of crisis rather than its symptoms. Specifically, the international community should focus more on improving human security and promoting economic development. Panelists agreed that more effective state and regional security will require nations to strengthen their democracies, improve economic livelihoods, and increase the health of their populations. In other words, the more traditional concerns with military threats, as well as broad concerns about human security both engage African leaders. In addressing capacity for peace operations and broader economic

development objectives, donor assistance programs need to be better coordinated and more mutually reinforcing. Partner nations to the various "blocs" in Africa, the Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries, should work to agree on approaches for addressing both the economic and security challenges that African countries face. Donors should coordinate their efforts by keeping each other informed of their programs.

> ## The international community should focus on dealing with the causes of crisis rather than its symptoms.

Peacekeeping capacity-building programs such as GPOI should be expanded to include more troops and promote careful choice of trainers to continue training in the recipient countries. Programs should further focus on improving interoperability, resolving command and control issues, and building logistics and communications capacities. For peace operations, African nations may benefit from improved or more comprehensive and detailed mandates, with adequate executive authority and sustained resource support, to better perform their missions and achieve success. Finally, international assistance should include resources for the establishment of an African Standby Force, but the effort to build this capacity should be recognized as ambitious and challenging.

There is much room for cooperation in assistance and training support programs for African nations and organizations. The US and the international community should keep in mind local priorities for building security, even as they design more targeted programs for peace operations. Efforts could focus on providing logistical support to ongoing operations and on building African capacity for sustained deployments. Specifically, programs such as GPOI could be accompanied by complementary and coordinated efforts to build more sustained human security, such as access to food, shelter, health services, and ultimately, long- term employment. Human security should be a higher priority of assistance programs. Donors could work with recipient countries to design peacekeeping assistance programs that reflect the country's existing level of training, doc-

trine, ability to purchase equipment, and capacity for sustained deployment. With better coordination, expanded training, and improved awareness of African priorities for African security, efforts will be more sustainable and, in the long term, help to build peace and security throughout the continent.

Endnotes

[1] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations," April 2007, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2007/apr07_2.pdf.

[2] International Labor Organization Statistics, Laborsta Internet, "Household Income and Expenditure Statistics," http://laborsta.ilo.org, figures as of 2005.

[3] UNICEF, "Country Statistics," www.unicef.org/infobycountry/centralafrica.html, figures from 2001-2003.

[4] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *FAO Statistics*, www.codexalimentarius.net, figures from 2001-2003.

[5] Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook for Uganda, Rwanda, Ghana, and Nigeria, 2007.

[6] Nico Colombant, "Observers Blast Nigeria Elections; Call for Urgent Action," *VOA News*, 23 April 2007; "Big Men, Big Fraud and Big Trouble," *The Economist*, 26 April 2007.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Transparency International, *2006 Perception Corruption Index*, www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2006.

[9] UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Background Note," June 2007.

[10] Data includes peacekeeping levels reported in the annual edition of *The Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, data from the volumes for 2004-2005, 2005-2006, June 2006.

[11] "Uganda Reports Somalia Progress Despite Peacekeeper Deaths," *Agence France Presse*, 23 May 2007.

[12] Nina M. Serafino, *Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, updated 4 June 2007. Uganda is not included because it will begin to receive training later in 2007.

[13] US Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006," September 2006, www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74680.htm. Also, see Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, *US Training, African Peacekeeping: The Global Peace Operations Initiative*, Issue Brief (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center; May 2007). GPOI will also train troops from Latin America and Asia. African troops represent the largest share of troops trained, however.

[14] US Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications, 2006, 2007, 2008.

[15] US Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, "Accomplishments," www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam/gpoi/c20204.htm, May 2007.

[16] Serafino, *The Global Peace Operations Initiative*, Congressional Research Service, updated 11 June 2007, 19.

[17] Participant comments, Stimson workshop on *African Priorities, US Interests*, 15 December 2006.

[18] US Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, GPOI "Train and Equip," www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam/gpoi/c20204.htm, May 2007.

[19] Chapter VII is invoked for operations with more robust mandates and when peacekeepers may use force beyond self defense.

[20] For more on this issue, see Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming).

[21] African Union, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee*, Part I, Document Adopted by the Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staffs, 15-16 May 2003, Addis Ababa, 3.

[22] Ibid., 39-40.

[23] A Defense Department official at the workshop announced that the internal US decision to create the new Command had been made, leading to a discussion of its aims and objectives. For more, see also, "Defense Department Unified Combatant Command in Africa," White House Press Release, 6 February 2007, www.state.gov/p/af/rls/80166.htm.

[24] Richard Whittle, "Pentagon to train a sharper eye on Africa," *Christian Science Monitor*, 5 January 2007.

[25] "Kenya, US, Discuss Role of new Military Command for Africa," *Xinhua News*, 18 April 2007.