Action Plan from the
Global Policy Dialogue on
Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions

Venue:
The Stimson Center
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About the partner organizations

The Stimson Center: The Stimson Center is a nonpartisan policy research center working to protect people, preserve the planet, and promote security & prosperity. Stimson’s award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through concerted action. Our formula is simple: we gather the brightest people to think beyond soundbites, create solutions, and make those solutions reality. We follow the credo of one of history’s leading statesmen, Henry L. Stimson, in taking “pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives.” We are practical in our approach and independent in our analysis. The Just Security 2020 Program supports efforts to build more capable global governance institutions to better cope with existing and new global challenges, in the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks. Effective problem solving requires both global collaboration and attention to serious deficits of justice as well as security, to create what we call “just security.” The program gives particular attention to initiating and influencing preparations for a Leaders Summit, in September 2020 in New York, on United Nations renewal and innovation. Visit our new knowledge Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform: http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/

Global Challenges Foundation: The Global Challenges Foundation (GCF) facilitates global governance reform aimed at ensuring the fair and effective mitigation of global catastrophic risks. In collaboration with others, the GCF fosters a demand for change and generates plausible alternatives to the current global governance system, its tools and approaches. Founded by Swedish-Hungarian financier Laszlo Szombatfalvy in 2012, the GCF is a politically independent not for profit entity.

One Earth Future Foundation: For more than a decade, One Earth Future has worked to solve complex problems at the root of armed conflict. Through its unique culture of iterative learning and improvement, One Earth Future designs, tests, and partners to scale programs that help communities see problems in new ways and solve them collectively. OEF Currently has 7 main programs: Shuraako, PASO Columbia, Stable Seas, Shared Resources, Our Secure Future, and OEF Research. Learn more about One Earth Future and its programs at oneearthfuture.org

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office: The values of freedom, justice and solidarity inspire the educational and policy related work of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). As a progressive political foundation, the work of FES is oriented towards enhancing global solidarities and providing progressive solutions for pertinent global challenges - transforming our world as stipulated by the 2030 Agenda. FES believes in inclusion, participation and dialogue among all stakeholders to foster democracy, social justice and peace. The FES New York office serves as the liaison for FES offices worldwide with the United Nations (UN) in New York and the international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) in Washington, D.C. The office addresses peace, justice and economic issues, working closely with academia, civil society, multilateral institutions and their Member State governments to convene multi-stakeholder debates. The formats of our work include international conferences, expert workshops and high-level meetings involving government representatives, as well as published policy briefs and analytical studies. Our overarching mission is to bring a special focus to the perspectives of trade unions, women, and developing and emerging-market countries in an effort to forge consensus toward multilateral solutions to international and global challenges.
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Context and Objectives

This Action Plan synthesizes the discussions and recommendations of the Global Policy Dialogue on Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions, which was convened from 5-6 June 2019 in Washington, D.C., by the Stimson Center, Global Challenges Foundation, One Earth Future Foundation, and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office. The dialogue’s fifty participants—representing diverse global and regional policy-making, scholarly, activist, and practitioner perspectives—gathered to respond collectively to major global policy challenges associated with security, justice and economic institutions; to better understand current global and regional responses (including those championed by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres); and to consider and refine major global and regional governance innovation initiatives and the strategies to bring them to fruition. Attention was given to several global institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) Security Council and General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN Human Rights Council (HRC), the Group of 20 (G20) countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The dialogue concluded with discussions about new global efforts, such as the UN 2020 Initiative and Together First campaign and the knowledge-based Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform, to advance a global governance innovation agenda between now and 2020, the 75th anniversary of the United Nations.

Context

Security Institutions: In conflict-affected states and regions worldwide, large gaps in security, justice, and governance are readily identified but hard to fill. Multiple, concurrent, and recurring intrastate conflicts, exploited by international state and non-state actors, have reversed the declining global trends in political violence witnessed since the end of the Cold War, fueling refugee movements and human suffering, particularly in the fragile and less developed countries. At the same time, the growing roles of women, civil society organizations, and businesses, whose voices are amplified through modern communications technologies, offer new opportunities for effective peacebuilding and governance reform and renewal, and transitional justice.

When considering the role of global institutions, and particularly the UN and its Security Council, in this space, a similar pattern of optimistic and pessimistic trends is evident. On the one hand, a skepticism (if not outright rejection) of international organizations has been a feature of many populist movements internationally, with states from Somalia to the United States formally rejecting or restricting UN inquiries into issues of peace or governance. At the same time, a growing body of evidence is developing on the need for truly comprehensive approaches to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the UN is embracing questions of structural reform that might improve the effectiveness of its work.

Justice Institutions: International courts and other dispute settlement mechanisms have proliferated in the second half of the twentieth century. In addition to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism, the UN Human Rights Council, and regional human rights courts provide forums for resolving legal disputes, ensuring legal certainty, and contributing to the provision of justice (including economic justice) and security.
However, recent years have shown growing discontent with international justice institutions and the judicial branch more widely. Although criticism can be self-serving, genuine concerns about the legitimacy, fairness and efficacy of these institutions and their judgements have also been raised. Reflections on the shortcomings of global justice institutions often correspond to—or are a byproduct of—questions about enforcement.

**Economic Institutions:** The current state of global economic governance for dealing with the present crisis is shaped by a decades-old structure, overlapping sets of rules, and, not least, demonstrated economic inequalities and perceived inequities. Notwithstanding the recent emergence of new trade-related disputes, the structure of today’s global economy is characterized largely by the increasing openness and integration of markets and transnational flows of trade, capital, and labor (economic globalization). This important phenomenon is further intensified by the technological advances of our time, including digital technologies and artificial intelligence, ensuring new opportunities, but also risks for global security and justice. The rules governing this sprawling economic architecture come from myriad institutions, both formal and informal, including the IMF, multilateral development banks at global and regional levels, the Financial Stability Board, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as the UN, WTO, and G20.

Among the major distinct, yet inter-related concerns underpinning the need for urgent reform are: 1) voting shares and leadership roles in the World Bank and IMF are an inaccurate reflection of the actual global economy; 2) there is not yet a consensus on how to manage global economic and closely associated environmental risks; and 3) perceived inequities have produced a call for economic justice, including positive outcomes that can be recognized by individuals, families and communities – and not merely by economic experts. The acceleration of economic and technological globalization over recent decades, as well as the reappearance of risks implicated in the 2008-9 global financial crisis, have called into question the effectiveness of our global institutions to govern effectively our interconnected global economy for the benefit of all nations and peoples.

**Objectives of the Global Policy Dialogue (GPD)**

Alongside related Global Policy Dialogues on *Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace, and Global Governance* (December 2018 in Doha), *Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement & Beyond* (October 2019 in Seoul), and *A Better Framework for Global Economic Governance: Toward an action agenda for multilateral reforms* (November 2019 in Washington, D.C.), the Global Policy Dialogue on **Global Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions** aimed to contribute ideas to a growing transnational network for global governance renewal and innovation, using current reform proposals as points of departure. Informed by a six-week e-consultation in April-May 2019, it sought to:

- Establish broad areas of consensus on priority reform innovations vis-à-vis specific global governance policy and institutional challenges.
- Identify necessary reforms in the global governance system in order to better tackle global catastrophic economic and security risks.
• Engage a broad network of organizations and individuals committed to achieving critical global governance changes by 2020, the United Nations’ 75th anniversary.

The recently adopted UN General Assembly “modalities resolution” for UN 75 (A/RES/73/299) – to initiate preparations on a “substantive, forward-looking and unifying declaration” in the run-up to the September 2020 Leaders Summit – creates new momentum and opportunities to mobilize governments, international organizations, and civil society partners to come together behind a focused call to have the high-level gathering in New York invest in meaningful changes across the entire United Nations and broader system of global governance.

The global policy dialogue gave special attention to the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations, and between the United Nations and non-state actors from civil society and the private sector (e.g., the Albright-Gambari Commission’s idea of a “UN Global Partnership”, to better harness the ideas, networks, capabilities, and diversity of non-state actors in the work of the, heretofore, primarily intergovernmental United Nations). Together, the four-part GPD series aims to advance a global consensus around several of the best recommendations for improving international responses to global catastrophic risks, such as runaway climate change, transnational threats, such as conflict and fragility, and other challenges inherent in the hyperconnected global economy. A new knowledge-based Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Reform (http://www.globalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/) will communicate these and other innovative ideas in the run-up to the September 2020 UN Leaders’ Summit.
Discussion Group #1: Global Security Institutions

During the break-out sessions, the Security and Global Institutions discussion group built on the contributions made to the e-consultation on security and global institutions and discussed in greater detail the priority reforms and necessary steps required to strengthen global security governance. The discussion group, firstly, focused on identifying several shortcomings of current global security institutions. Secondly, it took stock of reasonably ambitious yet realistic reform proposals to address the existing grievances around delivery, legitimacy, and accountability.

Summary of discussion

Session I: Working towards a shared understanding of the global problem-set and the current state-of-play

Central concerns raised during the first session were the need to close the gap between where we are and where we need to be. The uncertainty between pursuing pragmatic vs. idealistic goals, given the short time window of fifteen months until the UN’s 75th anniversary Summit in September 2020, was also underscored. Further, the group discussed the need to preserve existing institutions, frameworks, and norms, including the closely related 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Climate Accord (both agreed in 2015). While the fatigue around UN reform is recognizable, particularly in the current global political context, it was felt that a two-pronged approach should be considered in the months leading up to the 2020 Leaders Summit: recognize and seek to halt the decline of multilateralism.

While urgently needed, serious reform of the UN Security Council is unlikely but should, nevertheless, be pursued. The participants further expressed frustration surrounding the political polarization and perceived abuse of the permanent members (P5) veto power that impedes Security Council action. The importance of distinguishing between structural and political change was emphasized. It was noted that addressing the problem of political deadlock or engagement does not entail a structural solution but rather a cultural change, which could be advanced through civil-society led campaigns and the new Alliance for Multilateralism spearheaded by Germany and France.

To improve the conditions for global security cooperation, participants voiced the need for strengthening South-South cooperation (though the UN Office for South-South Cooperation was viewed as largely ineffective). The group identified the need for the UN to address its current legitimacy crisis. Problems were identified in how the UN presents itself both internally and externally, with the latter posing particularly difficulties. The UN needs to find a way to make itself more relevant to more people and governments, clearly articulating the benefits derived from engagement with the United Nations. As faith in multilateral institutions declines, we need a re-affirmation in the core principles of multilateralism and global cooperation: a “push back against the push back.”

Session II: Working toward a pragmatic reform agenda on the Road to 2020

Improve and strengthen the work of the UN Security Council

While meaningful reform of the Security Council was not seen as a viable option in the short-term, the value of continuing to pursue its membership expansion and further changes to the body’s working methods
were stressed. In the long-term, the Council needs to be reform to make it more accountable for its actions, including through “naming and shaming.” As of now, the P5 have very little incentive to change.

The group discussed a number of proposals that could at least partially address some of the Council’s current inadequacies. First, specific paths toward an improved Council included more transparency to the election of non-permanent members (the so-called elected members or “E10”). The current process usually follows from a privately negotiated identification of candidates from regional groupings, rather than a truly open election. Changes to this process could be as simple as agreeing that there would always be more candidates put forward than positions. Second, it was suggested that the UN General Assembly make more use of the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution and consider other initiatives to overcome obstacles to collective action result from a P5 member’s veto (e.g., the French/Mexican initiative and ACT code of conduct). Third, accountability of the Security Council might be improved through a performance review mechanism. Such a mechanism would be composed of independent experts capable of reviewing the Council’s performance on a range of criteria from adherence to UN core values to achievement of key goals. Expert members would hold five-year terms and be elected from a diverse set of countries, seeking to capture diverse regional and power-dynamic perspectives. Such an advisory body could be developed, depending on interest and support, as either a formal part of the UN system or an external collection of independent civil society organizations-supported reviewers.

**Upgrade the Peacebuilding Commission into an empowered Council**

As an alternative to Security Council reform, some participants argued for the Peacebuilding Commission to be upgraded into an enhanced Council, either (1) formally, by developing it with newly mandated authorities to lead on policy development, coordination, resource mobilization, and prevention in second and third-order conflicts not taken up by the Security Council; or (2) informally, by encouraging states to use the Peacebuilding Commission as a venue for enhanced coordination and planning, without necessarily a formal change of mandate. In both approaches, the Security Council would maintain its current role and focus on hard security issues, while issues of “soft security”—such as climate change, human rights, and conflict prevention—would be under the purview of the PBC. Some participants argued, however, that elevating the PBC too quickly could make it fall victim to great power politics. Strategically framing and pacing the role of the PBC is vitally important to the success or failure when pursuing reform. The immediate goal is to empower the PBC, possibly through increased linkages with the Peacebuilding Fund, to expand its scope of operations to include prevention and mediation efforts. These efforts could represent initial steps toward establishing the PBC as one of the principal organs within the UN (e.g., possibly in place of the all-but-defunct Trusteeship Council) working to advance peace and security worldwide.

**Enhance the Role of Regional Organizations**

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has identified increased partnerships with regional organizations (ROs) as one of his principal goals for strengthening the international system. Several discussion group participants also stressed Regional Organizations as vitally important to strengthening the UN system. Such partnerships should take into account the asymmetry between regional organizations and the UN, in terms of resources, mandates, and geographic reach. Additionally, the division of labor between ROs and the UN should be part of any effort to enhance the work of the UN and its relationship with Member States. Lastly, ROs are currently working to assist Member States in the implementation of the Sustainable Development
Goals, including Goal 16 on sustaining peace and inclusive governance, which represent further fertile territory for mutually beneficial collaboration with the UN system.

Address Multilateral’ Legitimacy Crisis

Despite a general consensus on the twin democratic and legitimacy deficits suffered by the United Nations, there were disagreements on how to best address these closely inter-related and fundamental issues. One proposal introduced was the establishment of a parliamentary network to advise the General Assembly on all matters of UN governance, which could potentially evolve into a more authoritative parliamentary assembly. The network would consist of elected representatives from national and regional legislative bodies, and it could also include representatives of stateless persons such as refugees, nomadic and indigenous people, etc. In the end, consensus on the concept and approach toward realizing a parliamentary network were not reached. However, the need to ensure a voice in UN governance by unrepresented groups was acknowledged as meriting further study and debate.

Discussion Group #2: Global Justice Institutions

The Global Justice Institutions discussion group explored the sources of discontent with international justice institutions and reflected on their added value in governing and responding to global risks and transnational threats. The overall aim of the discussion was to analyze current and emerging challenges to international justice and how improved structures for resolving international legal disputes and the system of rules can better contribute to the provision of justice at the global level.

Summary of discussion

Session I: Working towards a shared understanding of the global problem-set and the current state-of-play

During its first breakout session, the Global Justice Institutions discussion group focused, in part, on the role of international justice institutions in supporting the UN and other multilateral institutions in delivering on their objectives. Consideration was given to the effectiveness of these institutions, their legitimacy, and their judgements, as well as how they relate to a changing geopolitical context. By the end of this opening session, several key challenges were identified. The main themes included a lack of legitimacy, a lack of effectiveness, a lack of enforcement, and the need to employ litigation more strategically.

Regarding the (real or perceived) lack of legitimacy, recent years have manifested various criticisms of some international justice institutions. The current U.S. National Security Advisor has recently decried the International Criminal Court and pushed the U.S. government to revoke visas of some ICC personnel. It was also pointed out that the ICC and International Court of Justice are sometimes perceived as “colonial” institutions, due both to the under-representation of formerly colonized populations in these global institutions and their disconnect with non-Western cultural norms and practices relating to justice. However, during the discussion, as in the preceding e-consultation, it was pointed out that criticisms of the ICC and attempts to erode its legitimacy are frequently self-serving, being voiced or promoted by leaders accused of violating human rights and other international norms (in the hopes of securing their immunity from prosecution). Moreover, participants noted that although a number of countries have threatened to leave the
ICC, few have made good on their threats. Two countries—the Philippines and Burundi—have effectively withdrawn from the ICC, and Malaysia, which was close to signing the Rome Statute, refrained from doing so, though primarily for internal political reasons.

It is often alleged that the ICC primarily targets African countries. While the number of defendants from the Global North is, indeed, low, many African cases have actually been self-referred. Not surprisingly, the issue of possible head of state immunity, a recent source of controversy at the ICC, has been particularly popular among African states. Such ongoing controversy and debate about the fundamental tenets of international criminal law can contribute to the hampering of effective prosecutions by the ICC. At the same time, such prosecutions have also given rise to skepticism towards the ICC among some African countries.

It was explained that the African Union has been the primary forum for coordination on the issue of head of state immunity and that peer pressure within the organization plays an important role. Instead of leaving the ICC en masse, AU countries are currently pursuing a strategy of finding a majority in the United Nations General Assembly in order to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on this matter. However, while upholding such immunity may prevent African (and possibly other) departures from the court, it could also come at the price of condoning impunity for core crimes by leading perpetrators, which is at odds with the original rationale for the ICC.

The issue of enforcement was also addressed during the discussion. The rulings of international courts are regularly ignored due to insufficient enforcement measures, as is the case in the South China Sea arbitration before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Under the UN Charter, the enforcement of ICJ judgments is entrusted to the UN Security Council, where the five Permanent Members have a veto. Similarly, the ICC suffers from an inability to get its warrants enforced and executed, among other issues. Moreover, while the ICC can have cases referred to it by the Security Council, there are no objective criteria as to how cases should be referred. Thus, referrals have been criticized as being subject to the whims of the P5.

Participating experts were, however, clear to point out that the absence of strict enforcement should not always discourage states from bringing cases altogether. Litigation can also be of strategic use as judgments from international courts carry both normative and legal authority and can be used as a political tool (e.g. to draw attention to grievances). For instance, the Marshall Islands attempted to bring a suit at the ICJ against the nuclear weapons powers over nuclear tests. The suit failed at the preliminary stage for want—not un-controversially—of the existence of a “legal dispute” with the nuclear weapons powers in question, who were thereby shielded from exposure to ICJ jurisdiction. Regardless of the outcome, the case brought considerable attention to the consequences of nuclear testing and questions of fairness relating to the impacts on affected (primarily non-nuclear) states.

Despite the complexity of the subject matter, the discussion identified some systemic global challenges that the international justice system could already address, like the potential role of the ICJ in the climate change debate through the provision of advisory opinions, as well as issues such as head of state immunity.

Session II: Working toward a pragmatic reform agenda on the Road to 2020

Reinforcing the ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN

While the UN Charter declares the International Court of Justice to be the United Nations’ principal judicial organ and is often referred to as the ‘World Court’, it is under-utilized and lacks the power to enforce its
decisions. A stronger ICJ, with broader jurisdiction, should be able to address some of the abovementioned problems. One means of strengthening the ICJ in its current form is through the creation of an international judicial training institute to prepare international judges to serve on international courts, and to help states and their legal experts access the knowledge needed to better engage the ICJ (and other international courts). A secondary benefit of such an institute could be as a place of exchange where justices, lawyers, and clerks could be introduced to judicial norms and legal practices reflecting global legal and cultural diversity. This would support the further internationalization of international justice, addressing concerns as to the Eurocentricity of global legal institutions. Efforts should also be undertaken to ensure that all states support the ICJ through a call or campaign to encourage countries to sign up to its so-called “optional clause,” which requires acceptance of the general compulsory jurisdiction of the court (for which so far only 73 countries have done).

*Strengthening the ICC and seeking its universality*

If political violence continues to spread and a relatively high number of annual casualties from armed violence persist, the case will only grow for strengthening the International Criminal Court, including as a tool for conflict prevention. In this regard, the acceptance of the Rome Statute should be widened with the ultimate goal of universal ratification. An interim step toward achieving this objective might be a concerted outreach campaign by a globally representative group of states (and the EU) and civil society actors supporting the ICC. With mandatory compliance, including through support from the UN Security Council, it will be harder for states to ignore their treaty obligations, thereby making the ICC more relevant to the rest of the world.

Another avenue through which to strengthen the ICC is to use the upcoming reviews of the court (its functioning, not its mandate) as a chance to identify and remedy weaknesses. As was also discussed during the preceding e-consultation, there are many perceived flaws in the ICC, ranging from an inability to prosecute, its vulnerability to political pressure from powerful states, some questionable or weak jurisprudence, and even a lack of cultural awareness in the Court. Recently, court officials have signaled an openness to an external expert review. The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) may also push for a review of the ICC. With these reviews, there will be ample opportunity to find and address existing weaknesses in its operation.

*Enhancing the complementarity of international and regional judicial bodies*

While the ICC and ICJ provide an international framework for the provision of justice, more should be done to harness and hone the valuable contributions of regional bodies in support of their work. For example, the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights could be expanded to prosecute war crimes at a regional level, as a complement to the ICC. Similarly, the mandates of regional courts could be expanded to human rights issues, where this is not yet the case. While there are proposals for additional regional courts around the world, including in South-East Asia, none have yet been created. Support, through financing and capacity-building, for new and existing regional courts could render them more responsive and help to sensitize judicial approaches to specific cultural and local contexts. For
example, the proposed Latin American and Caribbean Criminal Court against Transnational Organized Crime (COPLA, for its acronym in Spanish), supported chiefly by the Government of Argentina, should be considered to address the crimes laid out in the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (also called the Palermo Convention), which disproportionately affect Latin America. In addition, some participants called for the creation of an international anti-corruption court (along the lines proposed by Integrity Initiatives International). The creation of similar specialized courts—focused on the key risks facing their communities—should also be explored, and global legal experts could work with their founders to ensure that such bodies complement, rather than compete with or otherwise undermine, bodies like the ICC and ICJ.

Bolstering the UN human rights architecture

The discussion group recommended further empowering the High Commissioner for Human Rights and strengthening the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Specific provisions to support the latter included reopening a dialogue and initiating a process for strengthening the UNHRC, strengthening the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) instrument, and elevating the Council’s status as a principal organ of the UN. During the discussion, some tension emerged over the extent to which countries with poor human rights records should be permitted to serve on the UNHRC. Criticisms notwithstanding, the added value of having countries with poor human rights records present is the exposure to such norms and the opportunity to gain experience by participating in objective evaluations of human rights performance. Strengthening the overall UN human rights architecture, including the treaty bodies and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, would help to ensure greater independence, further promote the architecture’s legitimacy, and provide access to additional resources.

Discussion Group #3: Global Economic Institutions

The Global Economic Institutions discussion group gave attention to the major challenges associated with a sense of “slow-growing disorder” in our system of global economic governance. Despite coordinated stimulus plans for the global economy between 2008 and 2010 through, in particular, G20 Summit-level meetings, economic globalization and technological advances are fueling new fears and anxieties that, in effect, undermine support for collective action through global and regional institutions. The discussion group also considered the effectiveness of global and regional systems to deal better with current and emerging challenges, shaped by decades-old structures, overlapping sets of rules, and, not least, demonstrated economic inequalities and perceived inequities.

Summary of discussion

Session I: Working towards a shared understanding of the global problem-set and the current state-of-play

A central theme of the discussions was the shifting landscape following the 2008-9 global financial crisis. The rate of expansion on trade has decreased markedly. Between 1994 and 2008, the rate of expansion for trade was twice that of GDP. Since 2008, however, trade levels have reached near parity, indicating a deceleration of international trade. Further, while global GDP is currently at record-high levels, the aggregate Debt-to-GDP ratio has increased significantly over a short period of time. The ratio was at 225%
in 1999, but it has risen to approximately 320% today. The crisis presents another problem: the crisis did significant damage to the legitimacy of experts and international financial institutions that has yet to be fully remedied. Further, as partisan politics continue to play a larger role in the perception of these issues within many countries, it has become more difficult to propose meaningful policy solutions without falling victim to ideological clashes.

Issues of fairness and inequality were also considered at length. Smaller countries with “balance of payments” issues were felt to hold limited leverage over international financial institutions and are, thus, less able to advocate for themselves effectively. Concern was also expressed about how the U.S. has repeatedly avoided consequences for violating established norms and regulations, frequently excusing its actions in the interest of national security. Fairness and inequality concerns were also voiced vis-à-vis the utilization of “tax havens” by multinational corporations and the ultra-wealthy. A prominent example shared was Amazon, one of the world’s largest companies, whose profits where not taxed, in 2018, by the U.S. federal government.

The role of technology was also a point of interest. While the advancement of technology has made accessing and interacting with financial institutions easier, concerns were raised over some of the potential obstacles and disruptions that could also arise. First, the potential of cyber-attacks is omnipresent. In a system that is ever more reliant on technology, the damages from cyber related attacks are potentially catastrophic. Second, as advancements are made in the fields of artificial intelligence and automation, there will undoubtedly be a disruption to labor markets. Third, the role and functioning of cryptocurrencies remains somewhat imprecise and difficult to comprehend. Some argued that the rise of cryptocurrencies (in terms of becoming applicable in people’s everyday lives) was inevitable, while others contended that they should be regarded as a largely peripheral topic at this time, as international financial institutions were unlikely to engage anytime soon with cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrency faces notable critics among economists, finance ministers, and central bankers.

There was also a question of pragmatism versus idealism. There is a need to identify solutions that are both in line with idealistic outcomes and pragmatic enough to reasonably expect that principal actors would seek to enact them. Participants debated whether it would be more beneficial to propose a comprehensive package of global economic governance reforms or to pursue more piecemeal and incremental approaches. Finally, it was also pointed out in the discussion that global economic governance institutions can often play a key role in facilitating or countering effective solutions to other types of global catastrophic risks and crises, e.g. international trade affecting drivers of climate change, or financing of violent conflicts, and that there is therefore a need to break down silos and to devote more attention to non-conventional aspects of global economic governance.

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Strengthening G20 – UN Relations

One part of the group’s discussion centered on the “G20+” proposal. For the G20 to play a more substantial role, it needs to more effectively interface with the United Nations. A relevant description can be found in the GPD Background Brief (drawing on the six week e-consultation that informed the 5-6 June Global Policy Dialogue): For the G20 to truly become the “premier forum” of global economic and financial governance, it needs an upgrade to what was termed, in the 2015 Albright-Gambari Commission report, a “G20+.” This would entail assembling the G20 at the Heads of State level every two years at UN
Headquarters, timed to coincide with the start of the UN General Assembly in the third week of September in New York. While the main policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority setting on critical issues for the world economy, including in the areas of crisis response and reducing global inequality, it should establish formal links with intergovernmental organizations for implementation and follow-through.

It was felt that efforts needed to be undertaken to improve G20 institutionalization within the broader system of global economic governance. As of now, the G20 has very little institutional memory (or even a secretariat) and does not maintain a consistently functioning and accessible website. It was further expressed that the G20 could play a more active role, in conjunction with other international institutions, within realms that were not strictly economic. Again, from the GPD Background Brief:

The Albright-Gambari Commission proposed the establishment of a modest secretariat to promote better-integrated economic, social, and environmental approaches to international problems by G20 governments, international organizations (global, like the UN; regional, like the AU; and sub-regional, like ASEAN), civil society organizations, and the business community. This secretariat could take many forms, including a virtual secretariat (electronically joined up but physically distributed) or an “IPCC model” of experts to inform decision-making.

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Strengthening

There was a general consensus that the IMF would be the principal body for action for the next regional or global financial crisis. Thus, the group felt that there were urgently needed reforms to ensure that the IMF is prepared to respond quickly and effectively to future crises. Further, some expressed that the IMF needed to undergo some general reforms to make it, on the whole, a more efficient, representative, and equitable organization.

The major reform areas identified can be separated into two groups. The first is the establishment of defined norms and expectations of Member States. These norms would establish things like acceptable Debt to GDP ratios and exchange rates. Further, the overhauled IMF would clearly articulate progressive steps to be taken when states are found to be out of compliance with agreed norms and expectations, scaling-up from something as minor as a written notification of a violation to the imposition of fines or loss of voting rights. This was also seen as a way to help correct some of the issues of asymmetry currently noted within the IMF and its Member States.

Secondly, the group discussed the need to reform the process for determining Special Drawing Right (SDR) allocations. From a legal point of view, the IMF can create liquidity, but in actuality, it has its hands tied procedurally. Currently, the allocation of SDRs is dependent upon 85% agreement within the board of the IMF. There was some discussion around possibly establishing a pre-approved amount of SDRs that could be utilized immediately at the onset of a crisis. This was seen largely as a political issue, rather than a technical one.

World Trade Organization Strengthening

Another major source of concern in global economic governance is the blockage of nominating new Appellate Body Members at the WTO. There was a discussion surrounding the necessity of improving the decision-making process in key aspects of the WTO dispute settlement process. There has been a growing tension between the United States and other WTO Members over allegedly trade-restrictive measures that the U.S. has imposed on them. Complaints regarding WTO’s Appellate Body predate the Trump
Administration, though tensions between the WTO Members and some Divisions of its Secretariat and the U.S. have arguably intensified during his term. The U.S. has refused to approve any new appointees to the Appellate Body. With two of the three current members reaching the end of their terms in December 2019, the Appellate Body will effectively cease to operate. If this occurs, there will be no formal mechanism to appeal the settled disputes by a panel within the WTO, and the “semi-judicial” stage may be eliminated from, arguably, the most successful system in the world for settling disputes.

New Global Currencies and Financing Global Public Goods

New crypto and other (alternative kinds of) currencies, such as community-based currencies, occupied a unique position in the group’s discussion. The rise of cryptocurrencies over the last several years has been prolific, with tens of thousands of such currencies coming into existence. Further, there was discussion that Facebook may, if antitrust law allows them, pursue the opportunity to develop a new kind of crypto currency that can be used by its 2.7 billion members worldwide. On June 12, 2019, Facebook announced the creation of the Libra Association to bring a new cryptocurrency (Libra) into the world in 2020. Facebook exempted itself from currency ownership liabilities by structuring the association as a democracy to be governed by 100 entities. In the eyes of the anti-trust lobby, for one, that makes it a much more viable project. Participants voiced concern about the urgency and sensitivity with which to approach the topic of cryptocurrencies, with some saying that governments need to recognize that their ascension is inevitable and to stay “ahead of the curve.” Meanwhile, others felt that the international monetary system would not embrace cryptocurrencies and debated their importance to global economic health may not be one of the more pressing concerns to consider in global economic governance at this time. This notion was supported by the lack of legitimacy some within the international financial institutions view crypto due, in part, to its importance to illegal activities and lack of central bank oversight.

Cross-cutting Themes

This action plan has explored three key facets of global governance: security, justice, and economic institutions. Within both the discussion groups and plenary sessions, several cross-cutting themes emerged that underscore the complex interconnectivity of the global system and the impacts each set of institutions has on the other. Among the cross-cutting themes were issues of financing, participation, representation, legitimacy, and climate change.

Concerns surrounding chronic funding gaps for public goods and the financing of international organizations were underscored in all three discussion groups. Imbalances in the global financial system disproportionately affect developing countries and can exacerbate poverty. Illicit financial flows and the abuse of tax havens undermine faith in government institutions which, in turn, can fuel political instability and conflict that negatively impacts security and justice promotion efforts.

Issues of participation, representation, and legitimacy also permeated through the security, justice, and economic groups. Nationalist movements worldwide are effectively pushing back against and questioning the legitimacy and inclusivity of international institutions. The 2008-9 global financial crisis called into question the design and functioning of the global financial and economic institutions. Similarly, frustrations about UN Security Council’s composition and rules of procedure, and the skepticism in influential quarters
around the legitimacy and impartiality of global justice institutions, such as the ICC and ICJ have also been raised.

The fragmentation of international institutions and international law further informed the discussion on participation, representation, and legitimacy. To successfully address concerns of corruption, misconduct, and ineffectiveness, improved mechanisms for accountability and oversight in global governance are needed. Introducing a new UN Parliamentary Assembly as a new mechanism for oversight and more participatory governance was discussed in the security discussion group as a way to address the widely perceived legitimacy crisis in many multilateral institutions.

Climate change was also highlighted as a significant cross-cutting theme for all three discussion groups. The economic and justice effects of climate change are expected to be most acutely felt in the developing world, where industries such as agriculture and fishing compose larger segments of the economy. In addition, the growing links between climate change, refugee movements, and violent conflict—at the very least, exacerbated by climate change—were also emphasized.

The role of education, science, and universities was also identified as a common theme in the discussion groups. Consideration was given to the role of expert advisors for issues such as conflict prevention and mitigating/adapting to climate change. Further, a formal mechanism for more training judges and prosecutors in international law was suggested. More integration with experts from universities and think tanks was seen as potentially beneficial to the work of multilateral institutions.

Finally, the need for a human security focused approach was a synergistic link between the groups. Since the 1990s, the concept of human security has been introduced in the peace-security agenda and entailed a focus on people rather than states, making it less military and territorial, more human-oriented. It also influenced the development and human rights agendas, adding urgency in their traditionally slow, state-dependent modes of operation.
Annexes

Global Policy Dialogue
on Global Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions

5-6 June 2019
The Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.

Agenda

Note: The two-day meeting will employ the Chatham House Rule where substantive contributions will be made on a not-for-attribution basis.

4 June: Arrival of participants
Optional welcome dinner at 7:00 pm at the Beacon Hotel, the Overlook room and Patio.

Day 1: Wednesday, 5 June 2019

Note: kindly bring your passport or US identification with you on the first day of the event.

7:00am-8:30am: Breakfast at the Beacon Hotel (those who wish to walk together to the near-by Stimson Center located at 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, 8th floor, we will gather at 8:30 am in the lobby of the Beacon Hotel; see map too in your packet)

9:00 am: Welcome by Co-Conveners and Objectives of the Global Policy Dialogue

9:10 am: Introductions by participants

9:30 am: "Global Security, Justice & Economic Institutions in Crisis: Opportunities, Challenges, and Threats to the Post-World War II World Order” (lead-off presentations by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Founding Chair, Savannah Center for Diplomacy, Democracy, and Development in Abuja; Yadira Soto, Senior Adviser, The Organization of American States; Ambassador (Dr.) Khalid Fahad Al-Khater, Director of the Policy & Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar; Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, Permanent Representative of the European Union to the UN; and Ambassador (Dr.) Adonia Ayebare, Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations (chair: Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian Foreign Minister and Chair of the World Refugee Council)

Methodology for three Discussion Groups introduced by the facilitating partners

11:00 am: Full Group Photo followed by coffee/tea

11:15 am: Meet in Discussion Groups (Session I) with a focus on current global challenges and international responses:

(1) Security: UN Security Council, UN General Assembly Reform (e.g., creation of a UN Parliamentary Network or Assembly), and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.


1:00 pm: Lunch

2:00 pm: Individual Discussion Groups report back and common issues identified.

3:45 pm: coffee/tea

4:00 pm: “Challenges to the United Nations and Priorities of the Secretary-General on the Road to 2020 (UN 75)” – Keynote Address by Mr. Fabrizio Hochschild, Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on the Preparations for the Commemoration of the United Nations’ 75th Anniversary

5:30 pm: End of Day 1 (immediate departure for the evening program by bus to the World Bank)

6:00-7:00 pm: Reception at the World Bank (located at 1818 H St. NW.; Passport or ID needed)

Brief Welcome Remarks

Dr. Augusto Lopez-Claros (Host), on leave from the World Bank and Senior Fellow at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University
Ambassador João Vale de Almeida, Permanent Representative of the European Union to the UN
UN Under-Secretary-General Fabrizio Hochschild, Special Adviser on the Preparations for the Commemoration of the United Nations’ 75th Anniversary
Bettina Luise Rürup (Event Co-Sponsor and Moderator), Executive Director of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office at the United Nations in New York.

7:00-9:00 pm: “The Crisis of Global Governance as the UN Approaches 75: The Urgent Need for a Re-Imagined World Order” – Welcome Dinner at the World Bank and moderated discussion with Secretary Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Secretary of State and Ambassador to the United Nations; Professor Ibrahim Gambari, former Nigerian Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations and UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Dr. Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian Foreign Minister and Chair of the World Refugee Council
Co-Moderators: Brian Finlay, President of the Stimson Center and Dr. Rama Mani, Convener of the Oxford Enacting Global Transformation Initiative and former member of the Commission on Global Governance Secretariat

Note: The bus (meeting in front of the World Bank where you were dropped-off at 6:00 pm) will return at 9:00 pm to the Beacon Hotel.

Day 2: Thursday, 6 June 2019

7:00am-8:30 am: Breakfast at the Beacon Hotel (those who wish to walk together to the near-by Stimson Center, we will gather at 8:30 am in the lobby of the Beacon Hotel; see map too)

9:00 am: Recap of Day 1 and Overview of Day 2 (summarizing the reform proposals from the six-week e-consultation found in the GPD Background Brief in your packet)
9:15 am: **Meeting in Discussion Groups (Session II – please meet in same groups as Day 1)** Discuss reform ideas for each individual group’s topic from Day 1, with particular attention to:

- Relevant, innovative proposals from recent global institutional innovation initiatives.
- Fresh ideas and perspectives, as well as help to build greater global support, for ongoing reform efforts *from within* the United Nations, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, International Financial Institutions, and G20.
- How to build consensus on a select number of innovation and renewal proposals.

11:15 am: coffee/tea *(or feel free to bring into your groups if you need more time)*

11:30 am: **Discussion Groups** report back and common issues identified (with initial responses to the recommendations shared by Fabrizio Hochschild, Natalie Samarasinghe, and Maher Nasser)


2:30 pm: **Special Theatrical Performance by Dr. Rama Mani, Convener of the Oxford Enacting Global Transformation Initiative**

2:45pm: “Five Minute Stretch” *(please feel free to bring coffee/tea into the concluding session)*

2:50 pm: “**Specific actions for advancing a global governance renewal, innovation, and reform agenda in 2019–2020**”

*Lead-off presentations:*
- **Segment One** with Maher Nasser (UN Department of Global Communications)
- **Segment Two** with Professor Sultan Barakat (Global Policy Dialogue on Preventive Action, Sustaining Peace, and Global Governance held at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies), Professor Ibrahim Gambari (UN 75 Dialogue for Africa), Dr. Adriana Abdennur (UN 75 Dialogue for The Americas), and Keeyong Chung (Global Policy Dialogue on Climate Governance: Innovating the Paris Agreement & Beyond in Seoul)
- **Segment Three** with Natalie Samarasinghe (Together First), Fergus Watt (UN 2020), and Kate Sullivan and Dr. Magnus Jiborn (the Global Challenges Foundation’s Risk Mitigation Framework);

As needed, continuation of the morning’s discussion and then transition into the concluding plenary, which will address:

- How can current global governance innovation efforts be strengthened through enhanced global multi-stakeholder partnerships (e.g., through new coalition-building efforts, such as the UN2020 Initiative and the Together First campaign)?
- How should the Leaders Summit at United Nations Headquarters, in September 2020, and its preparatory process be organized to maximize the substantive contributions of the largest number of well-informed state and non-state actors? What lessons can be adapted from the Post-2015 Development Agenda (SDGs), the 2015 Paris COP, and other major multilateral diplomatic forums and agreements in recent years?
● Toward which innovation proposals from this Global Policy Dialogue on Global Security, Justice, and Economic Institutions could UN 2020 and Together First encourage deliberation over the next fifteen months? What specific activities should have highest priority and by whom should they be undertaken?

● How can efforts focused on specific “silos” (e.g., peace, climate change, poverty and inequality, and human rights) be connected to one another and better linked to broader global governance reform initiatives to generate mutual benefits? Could prevention and/or risk-mitigation approaches provide a useful framework for assessing the relationships between silos and possible solutions to the common global challenges they face?

● How can the United Nations and other global institutions be encouraged to collaborate more closely and effectively with regional institutions, civil society, and the business community to improve the governance of today’s most pressing global challenges?

4:45 pm: Summary and concluding remarks by the Co-Conveners

5:00 pm: Conclusion of the Meeting

7:00 pm: Optional Dinner
Participants List

Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Igarapé Institute (Rio de Janeiro) and the Together First campaign
Madeline Albright, Formerly with United States Department of State and currently with Albright Stonebridge Group
Saqr Al-Mohannadi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar
Khalid Al-Khater, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar
Shaikh Jabor Al-Thani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar
Amb. Adonia Ayebare, Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations
Lloyd Axworthy, World Refugee Council
Sultan Barakat, Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Tom Brookes, The Elders
Kaysie Brown, United Nations Foundation
Andreas Bummel, Democracy Without Borders and Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
Brian Finlay, The Stimson Center
Sara Burke, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office
Keeyong Chung, Global Green Growth Institute (Seoul)
Guillaume Dabouis, Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations
William Durch, The Stimson Center
María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, United Nations General Assembly
Ibrahim Gambari, formerly with the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
Florence Gor, World Federalist Movement and the UN 2020 Initiative
Maja Groff, Hague Academy of International Law and the Together First campaign
Fabrizio Hochschild: Special Adviser for the Commemoration of the United Nations 75th Anniversary
Victoria Holt, The Stimson Center
Jeffery Huffines, CIVICUS International and the UN 2020 Initiative
Magnus Jiborn, Global Challenges Foundation
Miles Kahler, American University and the Council on Foreign Relations
Giovanna Kuele, Igarapé Institute
Joris Larik, Leiden University and The Stimson Center
Volker Lehmann, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office
Joshua Lincoln, The Bahá’í International Community
Michael Liu, Chinese Initiative on International Law and the Together First campaign
Augusto Lopez-Claros, Global Indicators Group, World Bank Group
Wendy MacClinchy, UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General
Rama Mani, Enacting Global Transformative Initiative, Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford
Amb. Cecilia Nahón, former Ambassador of Argentina to the U.S. and American University
Maher Nasser, UN Department of Global Communications
Jens Orback, Global Challenges Foundation
Cristina Petcu, The Stimson Center
Richard Ponzio, The Stimson Center
Vesselin Popovski, Jindal Global University, India
Edna Ramirez Robles, GoBizGlobal and Together First Initiative
Jimena Leiva Roesch, International Peace Institute
Luise Rürup, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Office
Natalie Samarasinghe, Office of the President of the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly and Executive Director of the United Nations Association – UK
Conor Seyle, One Earth Future Foundation
Yadira Soto, Organization of American States
Kate Sullivan, Global Challenges Foundation
Mary Waters, United Nations Information Centre
Fergus Watt, UN 20202 Initiative and the World Federalist Movement
Jonah Wittkamper, NEXUS and Healthy Democracy Coalition
Jürgen Zattler, World Bank Group
Uzra Zeya, Alliance for Peacebuilding
Cross-cutting links between security, justice, and economic development


- This book synthesizes the existing empirical research on governance and peace to argue that sustainable peace requires effective, accountable, atnt to their populations. Far from being discrete areas of international impact, these different systems must be treated as directly interrelated and self-sustaining.


- This brief fact sheet provides an overview of existing resources supporting how and why to use multistakeholder collaboration as a tool for addressing complex coordination problems.

Peace and security


- This report assesses recent trends in subnational conflict, arguing that conflict is becoming less urbanized, more ideological and particularly religious, and more conventional than in the past.


- This report examines the Colombian DDR process through a gender lens and argues that although Colombia included a gender framing to the peace process, the implementation has fallen short of gender-inclusive work with the result that the differing needs and expectations of men and women in the DDR process are not being effectively met.

Economic Institutions


- This discussion paper explores the ways that diaspora investment might be structured more strategically by national and international financial institutions to effectively support development in fragile and conflict-affected states.
Recent Publications by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Global Economy

Schäfer-Gümbel, Thorsten, et al. (December 2018): Fair Play in World Trade – Towards a Social Democratic Redesign of Trade Policy
Trade policy must be based on fair multilateral rules and take all aspects of sustainability into consideration. What we need is a new trade policy, one which can be shaped and rebuilds trust, strengthens democracy and the rule of law, and enforces justice.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/15109.pdf

Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko, et al. (January 2019): Knowledge and Politics in Setting and Measuring SDGs
The papers in this Global Policy Journal Special Issue show how the open multi-stakeholder negotiations helped craft more transformative goals. However, there was slippage in ambition when targets were selected. The choice of indicators interprets norms, carries value judgements and implicit political agendas.

MacFeely, Steve (November 2018): The 2030 Agenda – An Unprecedented Statistical Challenge
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent the first ever democratically forged agreement on universal development. Although the goals were agreed by all UN Member States, statisticians are defining the meaning of the 2030 Agenda targets and will thus be the ones to determine whether the Agenda is ultimately pronounced a success, a failure or something in-between.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14796.pdf

Martin, Matthew and Griesgraber, Jo Marie (October 2018): 2018 Financial Impact Report: "Are the Multilateral Organizations Fighting Inequality?"
In 2018 policies of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group (WBG) were assessed based on their efforts in reducing economic inequalities. The IMF’s performance shows overall improvement over 2017 while the performance of the World Bank is mixed. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14814.pdf

Stanley, Marcus (September 2018): Reforming Bank Governance: 'Top-Down' Reform and Bank Resistance
The 2008 financial crisis laid bare serious issues in the governance of banks around the world. In response, regulators focused on reforming the traditional top-down corporate governance framework operating through boards of directors. Looking back at the failure of reforms since 2008, this paper proposes ways in which “regulation from below” can provide an alternative to a purely “top-down” approach.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14712.pdf

Lerner, Stephen, et al. (September 2018): Tipping the balance – Collective action by finance workers creates ‘Regulation from below’
While debates abound over regulatory oversight of large banks, little attention has been paid to the role that commercial bank employees might play to foster better banking practices. Instead of relying on legal and supervisory systems to take on the entire task of financial regulation “from above”, this paper argues that employees of banks and financial institutions can collectively assist regulatory efforts “from below”.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14711.pdf
UN in Global Peace and Security Architecture

Conca, Ken et al. (October 2017): Climate Change and Global security: What Role for the UN Security Council?
Amid growing concerns that climate change will affect international peace and security, over the last decade the issue has emerged on a regular basis on the agenda of the UN Security Council. This publication examines options for meaningful Council action on climate-related challenges to peace and security. The paper also addressed whether action on climate change could trigger transformation of the Security Council. [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13767.pdf]

Kane, Angela (April 2019): The Nuclear Ban Treaty between Aspiration and Reality
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a key pillar of the world’s global arms control architecture. At the same time, discontent about the slow progress in nuclear disarmament led to the adoption of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in September 2017. As Member States are gearing up for the 2020 Review Conference of NPT parties, this publication outlines a number of concrete steps to be taken to dispel tension and improve the atmosphere for finding consensus. [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/15401.pdf]

McCandless, Erin (Ed.) (May 2018): Forging Resilient Social Contracts: A Pathway to Preventing Violent Conflict and Sustaining Peace"
This is an 11-country research and policy dialogue project that aims to revitalize the social contract amidst conflict and fragility and to advance policy and practice for preventing violent conflict and for achieving and sustaining peace. [http://www.socialcontractsforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/UNDP-Preventing-Violent-Conflict-FINAL_WEB.pdf]

Advancement of Multilateralism

Christensen, Tomas Anker (January 2018): President or paper tiger? The role of the President of the General Assembly of the United Nations
The UN General Assembly has become more actively involved in tackling global challenges, which alters the political and diplomatic role of its President. This publication advocates for strengthening the General Assembly’s Presidency as an institution. [http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/14068.pdf]

In a reshaped multilateral order, democracy on the national and global levels are mutually reinforcing and a reformed, well-resourced and more democratic UN is at the center. [https://www.fes-connect.org/trending/make-the-united-nations-patriotic-again-donald-trump-at-the-general-assembly/]

Together First (July 2019): How to save the world? Then lessons from the history of global governance reform
The report presents why previous reform efforts have had only limited impact, and how we can avoid making the same mistakes in 2020. [https://together1st.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/00006722_T Together First Report V7.pdf]
President of the General Assembly’s Keynote Address


Statement delivered on the second day of the Global Policy Dialogue by
H.E. Mrs. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, President of the 73rd Session of the UN General Assembly

Professor Gambari, Co-Chair of the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance and former Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Dr Lloyd Axworthy, distinguished member of the Commission and former Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr Fabrizio Hochschild, Special Envoy for the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, Dr Conor Seyle, Director of Research at the One Earth Future Foundation, who is moderating this session,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It is such a pleasure to join you today for this timely Global Policy Dialogue on Global Security, Justice and Economic Institutions.

I’m so grateful to The Stimson Center, Global Challenges Foundation, One Earth Future Foundation and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York for the invitation – and for this fantastic initiative. And I must thank Brian, William and Victoria as well as Richard and Cristina for all their support. These Dialogues are focused on the most important issues that we are discussing at the United Nations but, dare I say, you are doing so with more openness, creativity and ambition than Member States generally allow themselves.

So I am sorry to interrupt the fascinating discussions that you have been having over lunch. But I hope I can provide, with my remarks, some further food for thought and – crucially – for action. I would like to focus on four “tipping points” – planetary, economic, social and political – and their implications for the health and future of the international system. I will then set out four deficits in the system that need to be addressed if we are to avoid these tipping points, before concluding with some thoughts on how we can move forward.

Yesterday, you discussed the challenges facing the United Nations and threats to the rules-based international system put in place after the Second World War. Let me try to summarize: we are in trouble.

We have just 11 years to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – and only one to turn the tide on carbon emissions. This alone is a crisis of epic proportions. But it is only one of the pressing challenges we face. We need to address long-standing problems, such as poverty and inequality. One in two of us – one in two – still lacks access to proper sanitation, social protection and essential health services. If you are a woman, an older person, a person with disabilities, or from a rural, minority or indigenous community, you are more likely to have missed out on the gains of the past seven decades, to be marginalized and suffer abuse. We need to address emerging challenges – such as the major shifts in demography and technology, which offer opportunities but only if we manage them well.

And then there are the sweeping big-picture trends: urbanization, mobility and displacement, and the transitions in the global political landscape – as power mutates to encompass factors such as energy security and cyber capability; as it shifts horizontally and vertically; as the world is becoming more multipolar, but also more polarized.
Dear friends,

This is a huge agenda for the international community.

For policy-makers, it can feel overwhelming – and I say this as someone who has served as a foreign minister and defense minister. How can we find time for global governance reform when there are so many immediate challenges? How can we create a priority agenda when everything is urgent?

Let me suggest one potential approach: a focus on “tipping points” – not only the areas where we are close to a point of no return, but also in terms of the actions that could help tip the scale back in our favor. There are four I want to set out today.

The first, of course, is climate change. We know we face a “hard deadline” on carbon emissions and we have, in broad terms, the knowledge, science and technology to meet it. We are even making progress on political will. But there are many pathways to zero carbon – we are unlikely to have definitive answers on which to prioritize in the required time-frame. Our best bet, therefore, is to focus on the most transformative, scalable steps we can take immediately to tip the scale.

The second is economic. Global growth is slowing. Markets are volatile. In many countries, deficits remain too high to stabilize. The remedial action taken during the last financial crises was clearly insufficient. The IMF has warned that storm clouds are gathering again. And there is lingering public resentment: that the banks were saved at the expense of the average worker. The whole-sale transformation we need – in economic policy and governance – is challenging to pursue politically, at least for now. But there are immediate things we can do, such as ensure our actions are based on evidence, rather than ideology; and that IFIs create a better safety net for the poorest countries.

The third tipping point is the fraying of the social contract as the gains we have made over the past decades are slowing, even reversing. Moreover, these gains were never shared equally. Despite prolonged periods of growth, wealth has not been equitably shared, let alone trickled down. It is sobering to think that just 26 people own as much as the 3.8 billion who make up the poorer half of humanity - only 26 people. Governments are less able to provide a credible guarantee to their citizens.

Today, issues that were traditionally domestic – job creation, for instance – have a global dimension. Which brings me to my last tipping point: the health of our multilateral system. These trends have produced a crisis of confidence in governments and institutions.

Justified concerns about unchecked globalization have mutated into a backlash against the very principles that give power to the people, such as human rights, gender equality and social justice. We are seeing a rise of nationalist sentiment, in extremism, in attacks of international laws and norms. This is creating a difficult environment for the decisions we need to take in the coming months and years. Just when we need multilateralism more than ever, global cooperation is being questioned, even undermined in some quarters.

We must use the 75th anniversary of the UN to galvanize commitment to multilateralism, and to change the way we do business. It is a chance to make the UN more effective, more transparent, more accountable and more relevant to “we the peoples”.

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Ladies and gentlemen,

But the picture is not all gloomy. We continue to make progress. A couple of weeks ago my friend Inga Rhonda King, who spoke here yesterday, organized the first ECOSOC presidential lecture with Professor Steven Pinker. It was a refreshing reminder that, globally, we have made huge strides forward on almost every metric. And the international system, with the UN at its heart, has played a crucial role in this success story.

Even at this difficult time, multilateralism is working. The adoption last year of the compacts on refugees and on safe, orderly and regulation migration show that we can still make progress, even on the hardest of issues. We know that multilateralism works. But where are we to direct our efforts? We have – in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in the Paris Agreement – our blueprint to save the world.

They are the product of years of negotiations, of research and analysis, of the biggest stakeholder consultation in UN history. They offer hope and guidance. They address many of the factors fueling dissatisfaction with the international system, from material deprivation to poor governance. Implementing them will do more to convince people of the value of multilateralism, than any speech or campaign.

So we know what to do. But how do we get there? Next year, we will mark the UN’s 75th anniversary. This is a golden opportunity to galvanize commitment to multilateralism, and to change the way we do business. It is a chance to make the UN more effective, more transparent, more accountable and more relevant to “we the peoples”.

The commemoration is an opportunity to give further impetus to the ongoing reform initiatives – designed to improve our peace and security architecture, our management processes, and our development system. But it is also an opportunity to make progress on addressing four major deficits in the UN system:

First, the democracy deficit, which has seen the Global South in general, and Africa in particular, underrepresented – most prominently in the Security Council, of course, but also in IFIs. But in also how we involve all segments of society in the decisions that lead to global commitments and their implementation at national level.

Second, the solidarity deficit, which we see in the divide between those who mandate peace operations and those who put their citizens and their citizen’s lives on the line. Which we see in our approach to refugees – developing countries host the lion’s share, over 80%, while rich countries are reluctant to accept significant numbers. These are just a couple of examples.

Third, the stakeholder deficit. Our multilateral system has not found meaningful ways to include the multitude of actors – parliamentarians, local government, civil society, the private sector, trade unions, youth, cities – in global decision-making and delivery. Often, these actors are better placed to engage with constituencies, build public support for sustainable lifestyles and to provide services. It is time we redefined what we mean by a truly global partnership.

And fourth, the communications deficit. We at the UN have still not found ways to capture the public’s imagination, to tell success stories and communicate our challenges. We are yet to provide meaningful answers to those who have lost faith in the international system, and to push back against those who peddle misinformation.
Dear friends,

Revitalizing the General Assembly is a crucial element of addressing all these deficits – and I was delighted to see this reflected in the “Innovation Agenda for UN 75” report just released by The Stimson Center. The Assembly is our “Parliament of humanity and for humanity”, where the Global South has made its voice heard, and secured gains on issues from south-south cooperation to the right to development. It is in the Assembly that I have sought, this session, to increase stakeholder participation through events and outreach.

And while my role is to support Member States, first and foremost, I also believe that the President of the General Assembly must do more to communicate the value and work of the UN. My overarching theme has been: making the UN relevant for all. My seven priorities were geared to resonate with people – women’s leadership; youth, peace and security; environmental action; decent work; migrants and refugees; persons with disabilities and supporting a more effective UN.

I have already held discussions with the President-Elect of the 74th session, Ambassador Tijani Muhammad-Bande – Professor Gambari’s compatriot – on how these priorities can be taken forward. I have worked with Member States to adopt a forward-looking, action-focused outcome document for the UN’s 75th anniversary. We have also started discussions with the Special Envoy Fabrizio to ensure that the initiatives of the Secretary-General reinforce the intergovernmental vision and process.

And I am greatly encouraged by Stimson’s “20 ideas for 2020” report, by the work being done by Fabrizio, and by initiatives such as Together First and UN2020 – who I was delighted to host at an event on the future of multilateralism earlier this year.

Dear friends,

We must use the 75th anniversary of the UN to galvanize commitment to multilateralism, and to change the way we do business. It is a chance to make the UN more effective, more transparent, more accountable and more relevant to “we the peoples”.

We must start by using the preparatory process itself to strengthen confidence and trust in the UN – by engaging all segments of society in a multi-stakeholder process to complement the intergovernmental one. This is what I have been advocating, as Member States lead the arrangements for the anniversary. And we must ensure that the anniversary results in more than warm words. The commemoration must reaffirm the values and principles set out in the Charter. But it must also build on the UN’s achievements and the action plans we have already agreed.

In the last years, we have seen many important reports and reviews of the UN’s three pillars. The commemoration is an opportunity to consider the most transformative next steps in each of these areas, and work towards realizing them.

This is our chance to overhaul our multilateral engine; to put us on the path to achieving the vision of the 2030 Agenda; to convince and convert the skeptics, and to multiply our supporters. We cannot miss it.

Thank you.
Just Security 2020

In seeking to advance the analysis and recommendations of the Albright-Gambari Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, the Stimson Center’s Just Security 2020 Program aims to build a more capable United Nations and other global institutions to better cope with existing and new global challenges, in the face of growing mass violence in fragile states, the threat of runaway climate change, and fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks. Effective problem solving requires both global collaboration and attention to serious deficits of justice as well as security, to create what we call “just security.” In 2020, the program will give special attention to influencing the preparations, including the political declaration, for the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations (UN 75) Leaders Summit, planned for September 2020 in New York.

In its 2015 report, “Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance”, the Albright-Gambari Commission offered—with an eye toward UN 75—some eighty-five innovative reform proposals that combine new norms, tools, networks, and institutional changes with a new global ethic, with the aim of focusing policymakers, opinion leaders, and global civil society and the business community on the need for more dynamic and creative global solutions to looming global challenges. It further presented a bold, yet practical action plan for improving global governance, and ways to mobilize diverse actors to advance reform to better respond to twenty-first-century threats and opportunities. Research from leading global scholars for the Albright-Gambari Commission was updated, in 2018, in Just Security in an Undergoverned World, published by Oxford University Press. In addition, the Commission’s earlier analysis was updated and a prioritized “Twenty Global Ideas for 2020” put forward in An Innovation Agenda for UN 75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020.

The Just Security 2020 program is designed to ensure that UN 75 is not a one-off event but the “launch pad” for a sustained conversation and intergovernmental process post-2020 toward meaningful global systemic change. It is built around three interconnected tracks of activity, namely:

1) **Policy dialogues and public/policymaker engagement** → convene global and regional policy dialogues to promote consensus on priority global governance reform innovations in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict management, climate governance, global cyber-economic management, and human rights and humanitarian action;

2) **Research, policy analysis, and outreach** → conduct research, policy analysis, and outreach to refresh and refine the findings and recommendations of the Albright-Gambari Commission and pair them with other global governance renewal and reform innovations;

3) **Global network building** → Employ the knowledge Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Innovation to promote results of the program’s research, engage scholars and policy experts worldwide in 2020 deliberations, and continue to actively support four civil society organization-led coalition building networks: UN 2020 Initiative, the Together First campaign, the UN 75 Research Network, and the Global Town Halls project.

Two other dimensions critical to the work of the Just Security 2020 program are:

**Educate and Empower Youth** – the program aims to activate young people’s leadership potential and empower them with the knowledge base and other tools to become active global citizens and champions of effective multilateral governance, by: i) engaging young people in shaping a forward-leaning global governance innovation and renewal agenda for deliberation and promotion in the run-up to the UN 75 Leaders Summit and beyond; and ii) encouraging their active participation in global and regional policy dialogues, e-consultations, and global coalitions oriented toward young people, such as Together First.

**Effective External Communication** – by focusing on public awareness-raising and outreach, the program seeks to: i) tailor many of its knowledge products and activities to a broad, global audience for
increased understanding; and ii) contribute to a public discussion on the urgent need for UN and broader global governance innovation in the run-up to the September 2020 UN 75 Leaders Summit and beyond.

Select recent knowledge products and other activities:

- Published Report: *An Innovation Agenda for UN 75: The Albright-Gambari Commission Report and the Road to 2020* (June 2019)
- Published Edited Book: *Just Security in an Undergoverned World* (Oxford University Press, 2018), co-edited by Dr. William Durch, Dr. Joris Larik, and Dr. Richard Ponzio
- Supported and shaped the UN General Assembly (A/RES/73/299) Resolution on preparing the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations (June 2019)
- Published a USIP special report on Afghanistan, an occasional paper, several new op-eds, and presented the program’s research at multiple international conferences and in the media
- Co-organized numerous international public and expert events on global governance renewal

Global policy dialogues are now under preparation on the themes of *Climate Governance* in Seoul (October 2019), *UN 75 Regional Perspectives* in Africa and the Americas (Feb.-March 2020), and a *Roadmap for the UN We Need* in San Francisco (June 2020). Their recommendations will be showcased on the Platform on Global Security, Justice & Governance Innovation, which aims to inform a diverse, global multi-stakeholder effort to advance progressive global governance innovation and renewal.

About Stimson

The Stimson Center is a nonpartisan policy research center working to protect people, preserve the planet, and promote security and prosperity. Stimson’s award-winning research serves as a roadmap to address borderless threats through concerted action. Our formula is simple: we gather the brightest people to think beyond soundbites, create solutions, and make those solutions reality. We follow the credo of one of history’s leading statesmen, Henry L. Stimson, in taking “pragmatic steps toward ideal objectives.” We are practical in our approach and independent in our analysis.

Please visit (and register for future updates) here:
http://www.platformglobalsecurityjusticegovernance.org/
WHAT IS THE FUTURE WE WANT?

Society Declaration

Global cooperation

everlasting collective action more than a single initiative

Renewing multilateralism: we need a global cooperation.

We need to influence the outcome of

The UN75 Civil Society Forum in May

Support the proposed UN75 Sustainable Future

sustainable aspirations for a just, peaceful and equitable world

can help realise our shared commitment to collective action

to explore how renewed regional, national, and local levels
dialogues and events at global, regional, national and local levels
can organise UN75 Civil Society

In partnership with the UN, a new cross-border sectors, sectors that require greater international cooperation to address the rise and multilateralism is being called into question by powerful actors.

At a time when nationalism is on the rise and multilateralism is being challenged, we need greater international cooperation.

What is the future look like if the 21st century

21st century.

Meet the challenges of the century. To this end, we involve the voices of all:

Global problem solving, global partnerships, and global multilateralism.

We believe that strengthening the UN system means supporting a people-centered approach to collective action.

To this anniversary of the United Nations in 2020 as an opportunity to take stock and

The UN2020 initiative is dedicated to

WHAT IS UN20202?
**TOGETHER FIRST**

A GLOBAL SYSTEM THAT WORKS FOR ALL

**SHARED PROBLEMS**
Climate change. Weapons proliferation. Cybercrime. Terrorism. Pandemics. The major risks we now face are global. Viable solutions depend on global cooperation. And it cannot be left to states alone.

The job of coordinating the global response needs to be based on a truly global partnership which includes civil society, business, parliamentarians and leaders at all levels if it is to be successful.

**SHARED SOLUTIONS**
In 2019 and 2020 Together First is leading a global initiative to:

- Identify workable ways to address global risks through broad-based global consultations
- Produce a ‘to-do’ list for the international community by prioritising the leading ideas
- Mobilise our diverse network to make these solutions a reality

**COUTNDOWN TO 2020 – OUR OPPORTUNITY TO ACT**
The UN’s 75th anniversary must be the starting point of a global governance transformation. Together First is campaigning for the September 2020 world leaders’ summit to discuss, agree and initiate the reforms we urgently need, based on an inclusive action plan.
ABOUT US
Together First is a rapidly growing network of global citizens, civil society organisations, practitioners, business leaders and activists from all over the world.

We are committed to fair, open and inclusive solutions to improve our shared ability to address global catastrophic risks. We are driven by the urgent need to expand the boundaries of political possibility.

PLEASE JOIN US!
We are actively looking for NGOs, think tanks, individuals, partners and donors to join us:

www.together1st.org

We are grateful for the support of the Global Challenges Foundation

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