

**MAKING CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PREVENTION IN AFRICA A “TOP PRIORITY:”
G8-Africa Action Plan and Considerations for Sea Island**

by

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At the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada in June 2002, participating nations turned their sights toward Africa, establishing an ambitious Africa Action Plan.¹ Stating that Africa had been “undermined or destroyed by conflict and insecurity,” G8 nations pledged that they were “determined to make conflict prevention and resolution a top priority.” Emphasis was placed on supporting African-led initiatives to quell armed conflict, develop peacebuilding and organize peace operations. The Summit built on the *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD), the African-led plan to tackle continental issues, welcoming it as a “bold and clear-sighted vision.” The G8’s Africa Action Plan committed members to support goals in line with NEPAD, both as individual and collective actions, and through their membership in international institutions.²

As a preview for the Sea Island, Georgia Summit in June 2004, this paper looks at G8 commitments within the Africa Action Plan regarding peace and security. G8 members have set ambitious goals for conflict prevention in seven areas – with multiple subtopics and benchmarks – over the next few years and through 2010. These broad commitments include support to efforts that prevent and resolve armed conflict and promote peace-building; to develop African regional and sub-regional capacities to conduct peace support efforts; to curb the illegal arms trade; to eliminate anti-personnel landmines; to address the link between conflict and exploitation of natural resources; and to increase protection for war-affected populations, especially women and children.

Two years since the African Action plan’s launch, however, G8 nations have not put Africa at the top of their foreign policy agenda. Attention is more focused on terrorism, the US occupation of Iraq and its aftermath, geopolitical repercussions in the Middle East, and diverse regional and economic challenges from Southwest Asia to trade. Yet as the Canadian government argues, support for NEPAD and the G8 goals for Africa remains important and timely:

While conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan continue to be the primary focus of global media attention, the human toll of armed conflict remains highest in Africa. Over the past decade, 77 per cent of all worldwide deaths relating to war and armed conflict have been in Africa. Half of the continent's countries have been directly or indirectly affected by armed conflict and 20 per cent

¹ The Group of 8 (G8) members are the major industrialized democracies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Meetings have also included representatives of the European Union, selected leaders from Africa, and the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

² The 2002 statement said “Our Africa Action Plan is the G8's initial response, designed to encourage the imaginative effort that underlies the NEPAD and to lay a solid foundation for future cooperation.”

of all Africans have been directly impacted. The 6 million refugees and internally displaced people in Africa represent 28 per cent of the global total.³

Africa has been challenged by multiple crises over the last two years: multiparty and ethnic violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); a coup and its aftermath in Côte d'Ivoire; ethnic attacks and horror in Sudan; the conflict and subsequent expulsion of Charles Taylor in Liberia; Mugabe's rule in Zimbabwe; the massacres by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda; and on-going efforts to encourage or sustain peace in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Burundi and along the Nigerian/Cameroon border, among others. Such challenges can also showcase leadership. In response to these conflicts, the G8, African leaders, the UN and regional/sub-regional organizations have taken action with mediation, peacekeeping, and support to peace-building.

This paper considers G8 commitments on peace and security two years after Kananaskis, focusing almost exclusively on the aspects of the Africa Action Plan centered on armed conflict: African capacity for peace operations through regional and sub-regional organizations, peace-building, and support from international organizations, especially the United Nations and external partners.⁴ This focus frames many important measures in the Plan – such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), dealing with spoilers and illicit trade, and addressing civilian protection and landmines – which the international community supports via programs and institutions in Africa but are not addressed here.⁵ The UN agenda encompasses these measures, for example, and increasingly integrates them into UN planning and management of multidimensional peace operations.⁶

In considering G8 compliance, success or failure is somewhat elusive: The G8's own benchmarks include few timelines, little by which to evaluate G8 activity or African capacity, and no baseline by which to judge "success" in supporting African capacity. How, then, are G8 actions measured against their goals and reducing conflict? What is the baseline behind the G8's own commitments: Are the action items based on clear gaps, on what the G8 could offer, or some analysis of where valuable assistance was most needed? The Africa Action Plan is roughly two years old, but it is hard to identify and attribute measurable shifts in conflict resolution directly to actions by the G8 and African actors. With these questions in mind, this paper looks first at Evian, which launched the Africa Action Plan; second, looks broadly at recent efforts by international, G8 and African actors to engage in peace operations in Africa, as well as considers the capacity for such operations; and finally, offers recommendations for meeting the G8 goals in light of the upcoming summit in Sea Island, Georgia, and its framework of prosperity, freedom and terrorism. The G8 gathering will be especially timely for considering these questions, coming at the 10th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, when over 800,000 people died.

I. Looking at the G8 Commitments: Capacity and Support for Peace Operations

Kanasakis, 2002. Before considering Sea Island, it is worth looking at the Kanasaskis commitments made in 2002. G8 members' African Personal Representatives worked with African Leaders to produce the Action Plan at the Kananaskis Summit, which committed each G8 member to its priorities. Within it, three

³ "Canadian Peace and Security Initiatives," Canadian International Development Agency, at http://www.cida.gc.ca/cida_ind_nsf/vall/2 (as of 1 April 2004).

⁴ Primarily Sections 1.1., 1.2, and 1.6 of the Africa Action Plan (2002).

⁵ The breadth of the goals set forth by the G8 in 2002 and re-affirmed in Evian in 2003 is striking. Reporting on all the details of each section and subsection by each member, however, is beyond the scope of this paper: basic data is not readily available on all aspects and the task is huge, as demonstrated by the University of Toronto's G8 Research Group's May 2003 report which covered only one subset of one of the seven sections dealing with peace and security. See, for example: http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/evaluations/2003evian_comp_interim/index.html

⁶ See, for example, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peace Operations*, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1 December 2003. (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/>).

areas of “engagement” were aimed at supporting Africa’s ability to deal with armed conflict and peace operations.⁷ They include pledges to help⁸:

- **Resolve the principal armed conflicts in Africa**, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Angola and Sierra Leone within the next year (2003); assist disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs; support post-conflict development in the Great Lakes Region and Sudan; and endorse UN Secretary-General proposals to set up contact groups and similar mechanisms to work with African countries to resolve specific African conflicts.
- **Provide technical and financial assistance to enable African countries and regional/sub-regional efforts to better prevent and resolve violent conflicts** and undertake peace operations by 2010, including a joint plan by 2003 to further support that goal; train African forces and civilians for such efforts; and better coordinate the respective peacekeeping training initiatives.
- **Provide more effective peace-building support to societies emerging from or seeking to prevent armed conflicts**, including African-led reconciliation efforts, pre-conflict and post-conflict initiatives, collaboration among donors and international institutions, DDR of former combatants, the collection and destruction of small arms, and addressing the special needs of women and children, including child soldiers.

The commitments also covered other aspects of conflict, including combating criminal networks, spoilers, landmines, and natural resource exploitation, and strengthening civilian protection. In particular, the G8 measures call to help⁹:

- **Better regulate arms brokers and traffickers** (with the UN) to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa, use common guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms, and provide assistance in regional trans-border cooperation.
- **Eliminate and remove antipersonnel mines.**
- **Address the link between armed conflict and natural resources exploitation** (e.g., mineral resources, petroleum, timber and water), with civil society and others, through UN and other initiatives, voluntary control efforts such as the Kimberley Process for diamonds and principles of corporate social responsibility, better accountability and transparency in import or export of Africa’s natural resources from areas of conflict, and promotion of regional management of trans-boundary natural resources (e.g., supporting the Congo Basin Initiative and trans-border river basin commissions.)
- **Protect and assist war-affected populations** and facilitate implementation in Africa of UN Security Council resolutions relating to civilians, women and children in armed conflict; support African countries hosting, assisting and protecting large refugee populations.

Evian, 2003. The following year at the G8 Summit in Evian, peace operations drew even more emphasis with the follow-up “Implementation Report” to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, which was presented and endorsed with an annex on “Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace

⁷ In the spring of 2004, the Government of Canada’s website on the G8 and African Action Plan stated that there will again be “a dedicated network of African Personal Representatives” at the Sea Island Summit. These Representatives were announced at the Genoa Summit in 2001, and worked with representatives of African Leaders to develop a G8 action plan in response to NEPAD. By mid-April 2004, the United States had not announced invitations to any African leaders for the 2004 Summit in Georgia.

⁸ Sections 1.1, 1.2, and 1.6 of the Africa Action Plan.

⁹ Sections 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.7 of the Africa Action Plan.

Support Operations.”¹⁰ The Annex included an assessment of the G8 measures for peace and security, with more specific goals and achievements. (For example, the Annex pointed out that NEPAD focused on building African institutional capacity for early warning, prevention, management and resolution of conflict.)

The assessment focused on one area of the 2002 commitments (Section 1.2), however, where the G8 pledged to provide technical and financial assistance for an African capacity by 2010 for peace support operations. Further, it noted that G8 leaders agreed to pursue three “key, inter-related actions” to implement this commitment: 1) creation of a joint plan by 2003 for development of African capability to undertake peace support operations, including at the regional level; 2) training African peace support forces, including through the development of regional centers of excellence for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support, such as the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre; and 3) coordinating better peacekeeping training initiatives.

Without referencing the other six Africa Action Plan sections on peace and security, the 2003 Annex report suggested measures to increase African capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts, and to run peace operations. These included establishing regional logistic depots, enhancing regional peace training centers, supporting joint exercises and regional peace efforts. The report argued that donors needed a database to track their activities in support of capacity development for complex peace operations and related activities. G8 and African partners were interested in accepting a UN offer to build a database on peacekeeping training assistance (originally set up in 1996, run by Training and Evaluation Service of DPKO) through a linked website.¹¹ For the near term, added recommendations included:

- **African Union Consultation.** Have an AU-hosted annual consultation on capacity building with donors, peace and security institution; and smaller experts meetings for more detailed strategies;
- **UN Linkages.** Build support so the UN can continue outreach to the AU and also develop arrangements to partner on planning and strategic management capabilities (could also address options to fund African-led missions);
- **Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) Links.** Support the AU and regional organizations learning more about the SHIRBRIG as a model for the African Standby Force; and
- **Capacity Mapping.** Development of the UN website.

The Evian report recognized actions by individual African states, the AU, some African regional organizations, the UN and individual donors (both G8 and non-G8) in the right direction. It also pointed out that increasing African capacity first required determining what was needed to meet the African goals – and then assessing current African state abilities, identifying capacities available to African peace support operations, identifying the gaps or weakness, and finally, determining how to fill those gaps. The Chairman’s Summary on Africa from Evian thus urged action on these items and review of these options no later than 2005.¹²

¹⁰ Document available on the G8 website for Evian, at: http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/implementation_report_by_africa_personal_representatives_to_leaders_on_the_g8_african_action_plan.html

¹¹ At the UN website for DKPO’s TES, the section on the database is “under construction.”

¹² The Summary stated, “Our discussions with the Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa, the Leaders of countries represented on the NEPAD Steering Committee, demonstrated our common will to contribute to the development of Africa. We endorsed the report prepared by our Africa Personal Representatives. We agreed to widen our dialogue to other African Leaders on NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan. We invite interested countries and relevant international institutions to appoint senior representatives to join this partnership. We will review progress on our Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report.”

http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/chair_s_summary.html

II. Looking at Implementation

What have G8 nations done to meet their goals? This paper next considers their efforts to help to resolve conflicts in Africa, to assist in training and to provide support to African-led initiatives.

Resolving Conflicts. G8 proposals to increase African capacity for peace operations and conflict resolution raise the question of whether these initiatives are aimed at building greater overall capacities to deal with conflict – or are intended to reduce the burdens for peace operations or direct involvement in Africa for developed states. It is a fair question, given the overall reduction in developed states' participation in UN-led peace operations, which are disproportionately in Africa.

From 1991-1998, four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, France, Russia and the United States) were among the top 20 nations contributing to UN peace operations and provided about 17 percent of personnel. During 1999-2003, only two (UK, USA¹³) remained within the top 20 while contributing less than four percent of overall UN peacekeeping personnel. The top 10 contributing nations from 1999-2003 were all developing countries, including three African nations (Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya), which accounted for nearly 60 percent of the deployed UN peacekeepers during that time. By April 2004, the top 10 contributing nations had added another African country, Ethiopia, to its ranks, but no major developed nation was even within the top 20 contributors. As of April 2004, other G8 members Japan, Russia, and Germany – who traditionally provide few personnel to UN peacekeeping operations – each were contributing 300-400 peacekeepers.¹⁴ Japan had increased its troop contributions (about 400) and continued to pay 20 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget. Canada, long a supporter of peacekeeping, had 227 troops and civilian police in UN missions; Italy was providing about 171 personnel; and the United States and the United Kingdom each accounted for 550 UN peacekeepers.

Many developed states with highly-skilled armed services are stretched by their increased military commitments, however, such as in the Balkans, in Afghanistan (with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and the US-led coalition force), and with the US-led occupation in Iraq. Yet major powers also intervened recently in demanding African conflicts, primarily to help stabilize immediate crises, such as the British deployment to Sierra Leone (2000), French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire (2002) and to the DRC (2003) as the lead of a European Union force, and the limited American military back-up to ECOWAS troops in Liberia (2003). The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, composed of 16 nations (mostly developed and European) and five observers,¹⁵ played a pivotal role in establishing the UN peace operation in Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000) and more recently supporting transitions from ECOWAS missions in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire to UN-led operations. SHIRBRIG is also planning to help establish a new UN mission in Sudan if that transitions to a peace operation later in 2004.

As for resolving conflicts in Africa, there are both increased opportunities for ending conflicts and the parallel need for securing peace with conflict resolution, peace operations and peace-building efforts. Numerous UN-led missions are underway in Africa, including peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (10,866 peacekeepers) Sierra Leone (nearly 12,000 peacekeepers), Ethiopia/Eritrea (about 4,000 peacekeepers), Liberia (about 11,500 peacekeepers), Western Sahara (231 peacekeepers), and Côte d'Ivoire (30 peacekeepers authorized now; will increase with UN takeover in April 2004). Since the G8 adopted the Africa Action plan, the first new peace operation established by the UN is a hand-off from the operation initially led by ECOWAS in Liberia.

¹³ The US personnel contribution to UN-led peace operations is almost completely in civilian police, however, not military personnel.

¹⁴ Peacekeeping personnel in UN peace operations include military observers, civilian police and troops. Information is available on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website. See, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>

¹⁵ Senegal is the sole African country that is an observer.

African forces make up a high percentage of UN peacekeepers in Africa, but also provide personnel to UN peace operations outside of Africa. When developing nations provide personnel for peacekeeping missions, they frequently require outside material and financial support – from the United Nations and outside partners – for transportation, logistics, equipment, and enabling units. The challenge for the African Union and sub-regional organizations is transitioning their forces to a higher level of self-sustainability and establishing their own management and planning staffs, logistics capacity, and financial strength to organize and run missions.

Added tensions include the AU's desire to authorize continent-wide actions while sub-regionals organizations, such as ECOWAS, may resist seeking their authority before taking action; fear from recipient countries that peacekeepers infected with HIV/AIDS threaten local populations with infection (fewer militaries can deploy brigades that are free of HIV infected personnel); and concern that an increased African capacity will facilitate disengagement by Western and developed countries.

African Organizations & Operations. In 2002-2003, ECOWAS spearheaded peacekeeping deployments in response to conflicts in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) alongside French troops, and to Liberia (ECOMIL), providing approximately 5,000 troops to support these operations. Both peacekeeping operations are now led and managed by the United Nations, with ECOWAS troops "re-hatted" for the UN mission. ECOWAS also conducted mediation in Guinea-Bissau and had troops from its member states in the UN mission in Sierra Leone. Evaluations of ECOWAS' role are underway.¹⁶ Its ability to deploy troops fairly swiftly is striking given the small planning staff at ECOWAS headquarters, its lack of financial, managerial and material resources, and its limited ability to communicate with the field.¹⁷ For ECOWAS capacity and effectiveness to increase, technical and logistical assistance is needed, as well as a stronger staff and planning capacity in Abuja and a re-evaluation of its early warning efforts. Reportedly key components are missing, such as communications capacity and fax machines at the early warning centers for ECOWAS, defeating their purpose.¹⁸

Yet no other sub-regional organizations in Africa have the mandate and capacity to deploy troops and manage field operations on par with ECOWAS. Most are focused more on mediation and peace-building efforts.¹⁹ The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a leading advisory/mediation in Sudan and Somalia. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a mixed record (with the SADC framework being used to justify intervention on behalf of the government of the DRC) but it has also played a role in attempts to mediate peace in DRC and deployed troops in Lesotho

¹⁶ The US Department of Defense's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, for example, is assisting the ECOWAS Secretariat with an after-action review to evaluate the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). The Review is intended to lead to recommendations for improving future peacekeeping operations, to inform US and international partners' assistance to building ECOWAS capacity, and to assist ECOWAS in developing a methodology for conducting future after-action reviews. (From ACSS factsheet, 15 March 2004). The UN also conducted a study of the UNMIL start-up phase, which included looking at the ECOWAS-UN handoff and the "re-hatting" of the existing troops. See *Lessons Learned Study on the Start-Up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia*, Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, April 2004. Study cited in, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations," Report of the Secretary General, A/58/694, 26 January 2004.

¹⁷ Reportedly ECOWAS had only two planners for the mission in Liberia.

¹⁸ Briefing, Jason Ladnier and Patricia Taft, *Fund for Peace*, Washington, DC, March 2004.

¹⁹ For a fuller list of sub-regional groups that have conducted peacekeeping operations, see "The Peacekeeping Capacities of African Regional Organisations," Eric Berman and Katie Sams, *Conflict, Security & Development*, 2:1 2002.

(1998). The Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) has conducted mediation in Central African Republic, since late 2002, supported by France.²⁰

The African Union deployed its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, the African Mission to Burundi (AMIB), with military forces from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa (about 3,000 troops.) The USA, United Kingdom and France provided some financial support.²¹ The AU saw its role as establishing the Burundi mission, with the expectation it would be taken over by the UN longer-term. The AU has also played a role alongside UN operations as a mediator in the DRC, in a liaison mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea, and with an observer delegation in Western Sahara. More recently, it played a role in hosting talks between the Sudanese parties in the conflict over Darfur and offering to send observers to that war-torn region.

In 2003, the AU African Chiefs of Defense affirmed their commitment to create Standby Brigade Groups sub-regionally, part of the plan to create an African Standby Force (ASF) by 2010 to manage complex peacekeeping operations. In the shorter term, the AU goal is to have a headquarters capacity to manage smaller missions, establish basic brigade-level planning elements and to see regional development of the standby brigades or brigade groups by June 2005. The Chiefs of Defense also recommended crafting a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN to support the AU headquarters and to set up an on-call UN support team, including African units in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), and consulting the UN on doctrine, training and exercises, logistics support, and standards.

Progress was made at the AU meeting in Libya in February 2004 with commitments to creating a multinational African Standby Force of approximately 15,000 troops by 2010. The leaders also agreed to develop five standby brigades as regional forces by 2005 (despite advice to start with a more realistic level of two regional brigades), established to intervene in conflicts and to prevent genocide. This Force is expected to draw from the militaries of South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt, among others, but will require financial, material and planning support from developed countries. The EU Commission President announced that the EU would offer funds for peace support operations by the African Union.²² This support will be critical, since the AU is heavily reliant on outside funding from non-African state and has few stocks in its depot to support deployments. It also lacks sufficient planning and managerial capacity at its headquarters in Addis Ababa and needs an improved capacity to deploy and sustain skilled troops in a peace operation.

The United Nations – through its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and other offices – has provided consultative support to the African Union in its development of plans for the ASF and its security architecture for future operations. In addition to helping the AU consider its own needs to develop the ability to plan, organize, deploy, manage, and sustain peace operations, the UN has offered support for evaluating the AU Situation Room, assisted with shaping the scenarios and planning for regional brigades, and staffs the small UN liaison office for the African Union in Addis Ababa.

With help from the EU, the African Union has modeled itself on the European Union and benefited from its support for developing its peace operations capacity and that of its sub-regional groups, as well as other efforts to increase conflict prevention, support DDR and overall capacity-building. In March 2004, the EU announced it would provide €250 million euros (\$300 million) to support an “African Peace Facility” in the form of assistance to promote African peacekeeping in Africa through both African-led operations and increasing member state capacity for undertaking those missions; Africans also pledged to provide a small percentage of their allocations in development to the facility as well. In its statement the EU linked this

²⁰ France with about 300 soldiers; CEMAC with about 380 troops.

²¹ “As Big Powers Hold Back, Continent Works to Strengthen its Capacities,” *Africa News*, 27 October 2003.

²² “EU Gives 250mln Euro to Africa Peacekeeping Force,” from Reuters (reported in *UN Wire*), 31 March 2004.

work back to NEPAD, announcing that it "will constitute an important contribution to one of the key priorities of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) – peace and security in Africa."²³ The European Union further explained that that the facility

is based on the principle of African ownership. The Peace Facility will support African led peacekeeping operations in Africa as well as capacity building for the emerging security structure of the African Union. The Peace Facility will not finance European peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations financed under the Peace Facility will be initiated and implemented by the African Union and/or sub-regional African organisations. The African Union will play a central role in the decision making concerning peace keeping operations under the Peace Facility.²⁴

It is fair to note that even with a much greater capacity to conduct peace operations than either the African Union or ECOWAS, the UN faces a struggle in deploying its missions rapidly and effectively into the field; in matching mandates to missions; in recruiting skilled peacekeepers; in planning, managing, overseeing and deploying operations effectively; and in linking logistical and enabling support with troop contributing countries.

Complex operations pose major challenges, especially in the nexus between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Funding for well-known and popular UN programs in this realm can still face funding questions, for example. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are widely recognized as needed. Yet the UN primarily funds these programs through voluntary contributions from Member States, rather than through the UN mission budgets for peace operations, which would integrate it directly in the planning for the mission and guarantee initial funding. The "Brahimi Report"²⁵ recommended that DDR funding be included in the start-up phase of a mission's budget; the UN mission budget for Liberia did include it but remains controversial due to concerns (such as from the United States) that "reintegration" is most appropriately funded with development monies. This and other challenges face the better-equipped and better-staffed UN Secretariat offices – and demonstrate what is involved with operationalizing the ambitions for a stronger African capacity.

Bilateral Support: Training Centers and Programs. One of the strongest areas of existing support to African-led efforts for peace operations is in training.²⁶ G8 nations (and others) have provided direct support both to peacekeeping training centers in Africa as well as bilateral assistance and training programs to African militaries and civilians for peace operations. With much fanfare, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center opened in Ghana in January 2004 with German Chancellor Schroeder at its inauguration. Germany provided direct aid, as did other G8 countries – Canada, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the USA – among other Western countries. Africa is the home to various peacekeeping training centers, such as those in Nigeria, Mali, Kenya and Zimbabwe, as well as other institutes that support civilian and military training. Many of these sites receive support from G8 countries as well. ACCORD and Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa have worked with the Norwegian government to host civilian training for peace-building, for example.

²³ *Ibid.*, Reuters (reported in *UN Wire*), 31 March 2004.

²⁴ "European Commission Welcomes Member States Approval of the European Commission's for a Euro 250 Million African Peace Facility," European Commission, 31 March 2004. See <http://www.euireland.ie/news/development/0304/africanpeacefacility.htm>

²⁵ The Brahimi Report is the informal name given to the August 2000 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which was chaired by UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.

²⁶ For a fuller review of compliance with G8 commitments to support training of African forces and civilians and better coordinate peacekeeping training initiatives, see "2002 Final Kananaskis Compliance Report," May 2003, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto G8 Research Group (Toronto, Canada); pages 44-54.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom all have bilateral training programs to African militaries. Specific programs include the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT), the U.S. African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, and France's Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities (ReCAMP) program. SHIRBRIG, has conducted exercises (in Demark in 2003, for example) that bring together members and observers to gain knowledge, which in 2003 included African participation and interest from representatives of the AU.²⁷ Italy is supporting training for peacekeepers in 2004, and held a seminar on conflict in Africa in 2003 with African and EU leaders.

In March 2004, Canada signed an agreement with ECOWAS for peace and security initiatives, including funding for its Peace Fund and for scholarships for West African civilians and military personnel to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana.²⁸ Canada created a \$500 million Canada Fund for Africa at the Kananaskis Summit to support the Africa Action Plan. \$25 million helps Africans strengthen their peace and security capacity, improve individual and community security, and address the needs of war-affected children. Canada also supports an improved AU early warning system and management capacity for ECOWAS to conduct peace operations (e.g., funding salaries for seconded staff from ECOWAS member states at the Abuja headquarters).²⁹

The UK is also supportive of the G8 commitments, and provides funding through its Africa Pool to support the capacity of African countries and organizations for peacekeeping operations. In February 2004 Great Britain launched a new initiative, the Commission for Africa, to increase support for the Africa Action Plan and NEPAD. Aimed at producing a report by spring 2005, the Commission will evaluate policies within Africa and internationally and identify areas of success and failure, including conflict resolution and peace-building. The Commission sets the groundwork for the UK's agenda when it hosts the upcoming G8 summit in 2005.

III. Recommendations: Challenges for the G8, Considerations for Sea Island

A full assessment of the Africa Action Plan is not scheduled for Sea Island. The G8 members should continue to emphasize the peace and security aspects of the Plan, however, building on the work of Kananaskis and Evian, leading up to its review in 2005 and aiming to meet the goal of greater African capacities by 2010. With the themes of prosperity, freedom and terrorism, the Summit's agenda should include a sober look at G8 commitments to press forward on improving African capacities for peace operations and conflict resolution. Can Africa resolve the principal armed conflicts in the region? Is the African Union on the path to more capacity to plan, manage, and sustain AU-led peace operations by 2010? Is there more effective peace-building? Is African security a "top priority?" Despite much activity, none of these questions can be answered with a resounding "yes." Much more needs to be done. Some recommendations include:

- **Reframe Support for African Capacity to Deal with Conflicts.** There is wide recognition that state failure and regional conflicts can directly concern stable nations, not just their neighbors, undermining prosperity and providing havens for illegal activities, including terrorist networks.³⁰ Indeed, the Bush Administration's *National Security Strategy* acknowledges that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones," which certainly applies to conflicts in Africa.³¹ Yet such

²⁷ One African country, Senegal, is an observer to SHIRBRIG.

²⁸ "Canada helps Africans prevent and resolve violent conflict," News Release, Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, 9 March 2004, (<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=109>).

²⁹ Data available on the website of the Canadian International Development Agency, as of 31 March 2004: http://www.cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/AllDocIds/3EC6BC93E59EF25285256D1000518AFB?OpenDocument.

³⁰ Doug Farrah of *The Washington Post*, for example, has written about the connection between the illegal diamond trade in West Africa and al-Qaeda.

³¹ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: September 2002).

a view has not led automatically to creation and maintenance of tools for conflict prevention and peace operations. Africa and its challenges should be put more squarely in that framework, and the long-term interests of the G8 in Africa portrayed as directly related to prosperity and security, as well as more traditional humanitarian interests.

- **Demonstrate Tangible US Support for African Capacity and Continued G8 Engagement.** With the USA hosting the Sea Island summit, the Bush Administration could face a spotlight on its own efforts. The US has a chance to announce its new “Global Peace Operations Initiative.” This draft initiative would greatly expand US foreign military train and equip efforts, including constabulary training, for peace and stability operations. In concert with other G8 countries, this US investment could increase the ability of African nations to support more capable, available peacekeepers.³² In lieu of supporting standing brigades, the Initiative focuses on training (with G8 partners) 75,000 troops over five years for peace enforcement and constabulary roles; the goal would be 10 African battalions. Equipment, transport and logistical support are central as well to address the shortage in capable personnel for such operations and could involve \$661 million over five years, with training of more than 30,000 troops in Africa. This Initiative would dramatically increase the small US resources now dedicated to training African militaries and assisting sub-regional institutions’ efforts toward peace operations.³³ The question is whether the US moves forward and launches the program before the end of 2004; Sea Island would be a fitting site to announce US intentions.
- **Establish a Timeline and Benchmarks for Meeting the G8 goals of the Africa Action Plan and Evian Annex.** While the G8 has identified key goals and themes as a focus, there is no roadmap, timeline, or specific achievable benchmarks outside the goals for an African Standby Force capacity. The G8 members should embrace their own goals by creating a framework and clearer timetable for Sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.6 of the Africa Action Plan. In particular: Where are the gaps in African and international capacity? How best can they be filled? What role can the G8 play in filling them? How will results be measured?
- **Recognize the Capacity Gap – and the Coming Crunch.** An immediate challenge for dealing with conflicts in Africa is the *capacity gap* for peacekeeping: how to organize, support and manage current and on-the-horizon operations with sufficient, skilled peacekeepers to deploy effectively in Africa? That challenge will be exacerbated this year and beyond as peace operations experience a growth spurt. UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno recently called the creation and expansion of UN missions “almost unprecedented” in number and scope, with a focus on Africa. Current African UN peace operations continue in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sierra Leone, the DR Congo, Western Sahara and Liberia. The UN is taking on an expanded mission in Côte d’Ivoire; a new UN peace operation was picked up from the AU in Burundi; and the UN and its member states will face addition competition for its resources with added missions expected in Haiti and Sudan this coming year. By recognizing this pace, the G8 could help establish more specific benchmarks for its own work in developing capabilities for rapid and effective deployments for peace operations (e.g., meeting the UN goals of deploying within 30 days to 90 days of Security Council action). While difficult, it would be a measurable benchmark against which to judge capacity-building and ordering priorities with the Plan.

³² Many questions remain about this initiative and its operational aspects, including what doctrine would be used, what equipment is provided, how countries are chosen, how standards are set, and what gaps are being closed, etc.

³³ The primary funding source for direct US bilateral support to African military training is through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program which is funded at \$15 million in fiscal year 2004 (FY04), with \$15 million requested from Congress for fiscal year 2005 (FY05). Additional support to ECOWAS is provided through the Africa Regional program (State Department budget); funding for this area was \$9 million in FY04 and is request at \$45 million in FY05. The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program supports training to militaries including Africa, but less than \$2 million as requested for its FY05 budget.

- **Strengthen UN capacities, and with it, UN-Africa Union and sub-regional connections.** Even with efforts to increase AU and ECOWAS capacity to manage and support operations, they are not able to conduct sizeable peacekeeping operations without support. The UN, after a concerted reform effort to improve its own capabilities in the last few years,³⁴ still faces challenges such as the finite number of capable military and civilian personnel available for peace operations. In the next year, peacekeeping troop levels are expected to increase from 48,000 to over 70,000; another 10,000-plus personnel will be needed as civilian personnel, civilian police and rule of law teams. Annual costs will grow too, driving UN budgets up. Operations in Africa are often the hardest to recruit sustained forces from Western, sophisticated militaries. Despite recent EU, French, British and SHIRBRIG nations' direct engagement in peace operations in Africa, these have been the exception, not the rule. Shortfalls and delays in recruiting and deploying skilled civilian policing occur regularly, especially for French-speaking countries, and police and rule of law experts can be critical to successful transitions to peacebuilding. The UN, therefore, should continue and expand on its partnering with the AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations for planning and strategic management capabilities, to provide advice and training, and to support regional and national training centers.
- **Marry African and G8 Capabilities.** One of the greater challenges facing the effective and rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions is the UN's lack of enabling units, logistical support and transport for its missions, for which it depends on member states to support deployments.³⁵ The United States and other G8 states excel in this area, with a high capacity for air and sealift, the key transportation and logistical support often needed for deploying peacekeepers and civilian specialists into crisis areas. To match these support capacities with African forces and personnel, the G8 members should participate more fully in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System, which helps provide the UN with better information about what nations could contribute to a UN operation – and to match contributors' capabilities for more effective deployments.³⁶ To help deploy forces to Africa, UNSAS can link G8 and African nations for matching capacities, personnel and logistics. Most African nations within UNSAS, if listed, at the most rudimentary Level I. Six of eight G8 members are at Level 3 (except Japan, which does not provide military support to UN peacekeeping missions, and the United States, which is only at Level I). Six Africans at Level III are Zimbabwe, Zambia, Nigeria, Ghana, Chad, and Benin.³⁷ None are at the Rapid Deployment Level, however, which gives the most data to the UN about capacities. In addition, the G8 should support the AU's call for a logistics base in Africa, or support expansion of the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi to be able to sustain deployment of more than one multiple peace operations each year.³⁸
- **Develop Better Civilian Police, Rule of Law and Peace-building Capacities.** There is a huge need for qualified, available and skilled civilian police (CivPol), and rule of law experts (judges, corrections, penal and human rights), to serve in peace-building and peace operations. The UN has a shortage, and

³⁴ For details on the implementation of the peacekeeping reforms launched by the 2000 Panel on UN Peace Operations ("the Brahimi Report"), see *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle and Moira Shanahan, The Henry L. Stimson Center (www.stimson.org/fopo), Washington DC, December 2003.

³⁵ This can be a critical factor even for missions led by developed nations, such as when US lift and logistical support provided key aid to Australia's intervention in East Timor under a UN mandate.

³⁶ The UNSAS system is based on volunteer pledges by Members States to contribute specified resources within agreed response time for United Nations peacekeeping operations. When necessary, they are requested by the Secretary-General, and, if approved by the Member States, are deployed.

³⁷ Most recent data provided by UN DPKO, *Status Report of the UN Stand-by Arrangements System*, as of 15 July 2003. Country updates may not be reflected in documents available on the DPKO website.

³⁸ The UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, is currently configured to support deployment of one new complex UN peacekeeping operation annually. Given the current pace of UN operations, this is not sufficient in 2004.

also has too few professional staff at UN headquarters to manage the more than 4,000 CivPol deployed in UN operations. This is an area where added capacity within Africa could benefit African peace operations, whether led by the UN or an African organizations. Options to increase the supply of such personnel include bilateral training programs; EU contributions of police contingents; and efforts to “adopt a country” to support increased training and capacity. Additionally, creating a certification process with EU, AU, and ECOWAS members to identify and standardize the characterization of qualifications and skill levels for those offered by member states as CivPol (and rule of law experts) would help support more effective deployments in the field. Use of standardized profiles to reflect these qualities would also enhance recruitment, retention, and effectiveness in the field. Further, candidates could also be listed in an UN database, to include other experts on rule of law, for short-term call-ups.

The agenda for Sea Island on peace and security in Africa could be huge, but that is unlikely to happen. In considering compliance with the Africa Action plan, the answer remains elusive without clearer benchmarks for either G8 activity or African capacity. Nevertheless, the US has a chance to steer the summit toward identifying its own and other nations’ real contributions to supporting African initiatives to thwart conflict and sustain peace, and should take the opportunity to do so.