European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock

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This report marks the conclusion of the Stimson Center’s Transatlantic Dialogue on European Capacities for Peace Operations, an element of the Center’s Future of Peace Operations project. The Transatlantic Dialogue was launched to help bridge the transatlantic divide on building effective peace operations capacities. It did so through engagement of policy specialists and thinkers from Europe and the United States, gathered in “not-for-attribution” settings in a series of meetings and roundtables. The Stimson Center hosted a series of expert panelists from American and European NGO’s, the U.S. government, and the European Union. The roundtables and affiliated meetings gave visiting European speakers ample opportunity for lively and informative exchange with American experts and practitioners. The starting premise in all of these meetings was recognition that while European nations have made key contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, Europe as a whole, particularly in the context of the European Union (EU), has the potential to do more to bridge the gap between capacity and need in peace operations.

This report tracks the evolution of EU capabilities to conduct peace operations under the aegis of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and its associated “headline goals” for military, police, and civilian contributions to peacekeeping, conflict management, and post-conflict reconstruction. It builds on topics considered and views expressed at Transatlantic Dialogue meetings in 2003 and both surveys and proposes measures to strengthen the European ability to conduct peace operations, noting both recent improvements in operational capacity and obstacles that remain in the path of operational change.

The Recent Evolution of European Union Peace Operations Capacity

The world faces a deficit in military and police capacity for post-conflict peace operations. Even the United States has learned, since ousting the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, that it cannot conduct effective post-conflict operations alone. European nations have historically been among the largest contributors of troops to peace operations, and as of this writing provide 75 percent of peacekeepers in the Balkans and 60 percent of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Critics point to Europe’s shrinking armies and defense expenditures but military end-strengths and spending levels are neither the only nor the best measures of European military needs, which are actually more structural and qualitative than quantitative. With the

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1 Peace operations can encompass both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacekeeping involves international forces deployed to monitor ceasefires or peace agreements between states, or to provide interim security following an internal war. Peacebuilding aims to reassemble the foundations of peace and to build on those foundations something more than just the absence of war.

development of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), structures and policies have been initiated that will allow EU states to both make the necessary qualitative changes and to evolve comprehensive European capacities across the spectrum of crisis management in both the civilian and military spheres.

ESDP is based on the nascent EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Capacity targets established in late 2000 under the Helsinki Headline Goals called for rapidly deployable civilian and military capabilities to be operational by 2003,\(^3\) to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks (“humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”).\(^4\) The draft European Constitution updated and reformulated tasks for EU civil and military “assets,” stressing “missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations charter.”\(^5\) These changes, however, have not yet been formalized, as the draft failed to clear the 2003 EU Inter-governmental Conference and fell victim to the stalled December 2003 Constitution Summit. The draft was to be reconsidered in late March 2004.

Capabilities targets under the Headline Goals include a European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 60,000 troops able to deploy within 60 days and to be sustained in the field for one year; a roster of 5,000 civilian police, 1,000 of whom were to be deployable within 30 days; 200 “rule of law” experts; a pool of civil administration experts; 100 civilian protection experts to be available on 24 hours notice for disaster response and humanitarian relief; and a roster of 2,000 individuals ready to deploy as part of civilian intervention teams. While a declaration of “operationality” was made at the Laeken European Council meeting in December 2001,\(^6\) critics within and outside the EU noted that this declaration was based on attaining sufficient numbers to achieve only the most limited of Petersberg tasks. The Laeken declaration has been contested in part owing to the ambiguity of those tasks and the fact that EU member states do not agree on how at least their fair share of personnel for peace operations but less than what is fair in defense spending. See also, John Hulsman, “The Guns of Brussels. Burden Sharing and Power Sharing with Europe,” Policy Review, June 2000.


\(^4\) In the early 1990s, some states and organizations used the term “peacemaking” when referring to conflict suppression by military means, which later came to be more commonly termed “peace enforcement.”


\(^6\) “Operationality” is EU shorthand for the achievement of operational capabilities, especially those specified in the Laeken declaration.
robust a capacity is required to achieve peacekeeping “operationality.” Some (Germany and Sweden, for example) think that limited capacity is sufficient, while France and the Netherlands, among others, see greater need for high-end combat troops capable of conducting peace enforcement operations. Such disagreements hamper the achievement of rapidly deployable EU forces.

Agreeing on hardware and other operational capabilities is only part of the problem, however. The EU also needs the collective will to deploy them, once created. Barring political agreement on EU military strategy, this won’t happen, and the Iraq crisis demonstrated how far the EU is from a common, coherent strategy. Such agreement on strategy, built in turn upon common perceptions of threat, is needed both to use European capabilities effectively and to mend the tattered transatlantic relationship.

Whither the Transatlantic Alliance: Is this relationship worth saving?

Since the end of the Cold War, American critics of Europe and the transatlantic alliance have been arguing that U.S. and European interests have diverged, that European power is negligible and really doesn’t matter, and that, given the realities of the day, this relationship is no longer relevant. But this disengaging attitude is both shortsighted and outdated in a world where globalization and interdependence of action and markets are increasingly the norm. EU members contribute 55 percent of all development assistance and 66 percent of grant-based aid (far more than the United States), which is directed toward failing states that, unaided, could become attractive havens for terrorist groups.

The EU and its member states have helped the United States track the movements of people and finances linked to terror that the United States would be incapable of tracking alone. While Europeans and Americans may prefer different methods and emphasize different means to achieve common security objectives, they share those objectives nonetheless. And despite the Euro-critics, many of them affiliated with the current U.S. administration, the official U.S. position remains supportive of both NATO and of the EU’s quest for a security and defense identity. As U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns said in a November 2003 speech,


All the threats you face in Europe, we face in America, and we simply have to stay together…There is no hope for the US to meet these threats on our own ….I think it is critical that NATO and the EU… find a way to work together in a complementary fashion because I think that the EU is tremendously important to the future of NATO and vice versa …We in our country very much support the European Union in its quest to develop its security and defense identity and so we support the EU rapid-reaction force which is being constructed.11

The bottom line is that both sides of the Atlantic need to be engaged in a mutually reinforced fashion in order to effectively tackle the security challenges of today.

Assessing EU Military Capacities

The EU declared military operationality at the December 2001 Laeken Council meeting. The Laeken statement deemed the capacities to be on track for the 2003 goal of deploying and sustaining 60,000 troops. As of January 2002, however, the Rapid Reaction Force was operational only for light missions such as humanitarian tasks, rescue, and classic peacekeeping, with about 70 percent of the capacities needed for such missions actually available. Moreover, the EU will not have sufficient air transport capacity to meet the headline deployment goals until 2008-2012.12 The numbers pledged during the November 2000 commitment conference included 100,000 troops, but given standard troop rotation requirements, a pool of 180,000 represents the ideal minimum to ensure sustainability.13

To accelerate and rationalize military capability improvements, the Laeken Council meeting also created the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). Its nineteen working groups reported to the May 2003 Capability Conference of EU defense ministers, which slimmed down the effort to ten Project Groups. Each has a lead nation and has been tasked to generate near-term operational solutions to specific shortfalls in European military capabilities, by means of new acquisitions, leasing, multinational collaboration, or national role specialization.14 The European Council, meeting in

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14 The ten Project Groups (and their lead nations) are: air-to-air refueling (Spain); strategic lift, combat search and rescue (Germany); headquarters (UK); nuclear, biological, and chemical protection (Italy); special operations forces (Portugal); theater ballistic missile defense (Netherlands); unmanned aerial vehicles, space-based assets (France); interoperability issues, procedures for evacuation and humanitarian
November 2003, asked the “relevant Council bodies” overseeing ECAP to develop a roadmap for what had been, up to that point, a relatively ad hoc exercise and to create a Capability Improvement Chart that would enable EU governments, staff, the public, and the media to more easily track ECAP’s progress.

ECAP complements NATO development plans known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (after the November 2002 NATO Summit where it was drafted) to create an agile NATO Response Force (NRF), drawing on European niche capabilities. The Prague recommendations focus on eight specialized capabilities areas (pared down from the original 58 areas in the NATO Defense Commitments Initiative) in ways that maximize the talents and resources of NATO partners. Thus the development of niche or specialized capabilities, individually or in concert with others, is encouraged in the areas such as deployability, sustainability, communications, interoperability, and Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear (CBRN) defense. Individual examples are Norway’s Special Forces and mine clearing teams, the Czech Republic’s CBRN detection capabilities, and Slovenia’s Mountain Soldiers. Consortium examples include the cooperative efforts of Norway, Denmark and Netherlands to procure C-130 transport aircraft and F-16 fighters. By addressing key European military weaknesses, these NATO reforms will also invariably strengthen the military capacity of the EU.

While growing NATO-EU convergence on closing military capacity gaps may save money, it is not clear that planned NRF capabilities mesh well with peace operations requirements. Airlift, logistics support, and mine clearance capabilities are important for both peace operations and military action but the value-added for peace operations of other sophisticated capabilities to be integrated into the NRF is generally much lower. If NATO and EU nations focus on the costly, cutting-edge technologies of high-end warfare at the expense of training and preparation for peacekeeping, the peace operations capacity gap will not close. Constant dialogue and monitoring will be needed to ensure that these peacekeeping needs are defined and met as the NRF develops and force inventories evolve. NATO members pledged regular consultation on these issues at Prague.

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In December 2002, the EU concluded the Berlin-Plus arrangements with NATO, which address EU access to NATO’s collective assets and capabilities (including planning facilities and logistical support).

Assessing EU Civilian Crisis Management Capacities

EU civilian capacities for crisis management are much more developed than its military instruments. The methodology for developing the civilian side was similar to that for the military, with targets set (including those for rapid deployment) and commitment conferences held to encourage achievement of those targets.

The EU has set up structural mechanisms to support its civilian crisis management capacity. The ambassadorial-level Political and Security Committee advises EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and is the EU’s counterpart to NATO’s North Atlantic Council. The Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM) consists primarily of diplomats, reinforced with police and legal experts; together with the EU Military Committee, it provides advice to the Political and Security Committee.

EU civilian crisis management capacity can be divided into four categories: policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. The development of each is assessed in turn.

Policing. The EU’s 2000 Feria Council meeting set a target of 5,000 police officers to be available for peace operations, with 1,000 to be deployable in 30 days. At the November 2001 Police Capabilities conference held in Brussels, ministers committed to providing the 5,000 police officers, although not specific individuals. The rapid deployment target was met, at least on paper: about 1,000 officers were committed, including 13 rapidly deployable integrated police units, and two rapidly deployable police headquarters from the French Gendarmerie and Italian Carabinieri. The commitment outcomes of this conference were a key element in the declaration of operationality.

In 2001, the EU created a small, geographically diverse Police Unit in the Council Secretariat, with eight police officers, some with paramilitary police backgrounds (e.g., Carabinieri) and others civilian. However, those working within the civilian crisis management arena at the EU have noted that the small size of the Police Unit (both in absolute terms and as compared to the military planning unit) has made it difficult to plan and conduct policing in peace operations.

Rule of law. The EU has made rule of law a priority, particularly in light of lessons learned in the Balkans and East Timor, where it was apparent that investing in police capabilities requires investing in the next steps in the chain of custody. As seen in

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19 Except where noted, civilian capacity assessment data is drawn from discussions with EU personnel, as well as the Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations Roundtable, “Regional Capabilities and the United Nations: The Impact of European Capacity-Building,” held 17 June 2003.
the early days of Kosovo operations, an arrest is hardly worth making in the absence of a magistrate, prosecutor, judge, or jail.

A rapid deployment target of 200 rule of law experts evolved from responses to questionnaires sent to member states asking them how many judges, prosecutors and associated experts they had in the field in operations that could be described as crisis management. While the number seems small, it reflects the difficulties inherent in finding judges who are willing to go abroad, who speak appropriate local languages and who are ready to work in primitive conditions.

The EU exceeded its targets after a call for contributions yielded a pool of 300 judges, prosecutors and rule of law experts, who are now listed in a database maintained by the Council Secretariat. Some 60 are ready for rapid deployment.

The idea that these Rule of Law experts could be either on stand-alone missions or better integrated into a police component is something the EU is looking at now. It is also looking to better integrate a few police and rule of law experts into in the first wave of an operation along with the military.

Civilian Administration. Although the EU’s headline goals for crisis management did not include quantitative targets for experts in civil administration and infrastructure, as of June 2003, there were 160 such experts in a database, ready to deploy.

Civil Protection. At the Göteborg Council Meeting in June 2001, EU members agreed to establish two or three assessment teams, on 24-hour call with dispatch time within three to seven hours, primarily for response to natural disasters such as earthquakes. Additionally, members set targets for intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons to be available on short notice, with the goal of dispatching specialized resources in two to seven days.

Supporting Elements for Civilian Crisis Management. All four civilian capabilities targets (policing, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) were assessed at the ministerial conference of November 2002. EU Foreign Ministers concluded that the civilian targets were met or exceeded, with full operationality within the context of EU crisis management.

That conference also noted the need to establish a planning and mission support capability in the Council Secretariat, which parallels the recommendations for the UN Secretariat contained in the 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (also known as the Brahimi Report). As of this writing, such capacity was still pending.

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20 The Brahimi Report set out 28 concrete recommendations to improve the capacity and effectiveness of UN peace operations. The recommendations include a call for member states to cooperate in regional groupings to develop and train coherent capacities for military and civilian police for UN peace operations, with standardized regional training and rosters of troops as well as police, penal experts and judicial experts able to deploy rapidly to those operations. General Assembly and Security Council, Report of the Panel on
Beyond quantitative targets, the EU has been working on training, finances, interoperability, rapid deployment concepts, procedures, exercises, and civil-military coordination. With regard to coordination, the EU is working on a broad civil-military coordination (CIMIC) concept to encompass all actors in Brussels as well as in the field, both internal and external to the EU.\textsuperscript{21}

By late 2003, the EU had conducted two military crisis management exercises. CMEC 02, held in June 2002, focused primarily on military instruments. CMEC 03, held 19-25 November 2003, was the first EU/NATO table top crisis management exercise to test both military and civilian instruments. It built on lessons learned from Operation Concordia and focused on how the EU would undertake an EU-led mission using NATO assets and capabilities.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{Training and Pooling of Expertise: Models of Coordination and Cooperation}

The European Union’s training concept can truly be viewed as a model of cooperation for other nations to emulate, as well as an effort that seeks to increase the global capacity for crisis management. European police and civilian rule of law training is the most advanced in the world. Germany has a well developed training program for civilians for peace operations, and keeps national civilian and rule of law rosters of individuals ready for deployment. The German state of Baden Württemberg has a federally funded Police Training Center dedicated to training UN CivPol.

EU training capacity for civilians has progressed since the creation of a pilot project in October 2001. The European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is geared toward developing a cadre of well trained civilians in the areas of civil administration and rule of law, able to be quickly recruited and deployed to crisis management operations for the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or EU.\textsuperscript{23} This effort not only fulfills many of the EU’s goals for civilian crisis management but also will support the Brahimi Report recommendations for increased UN capacity, by establishing pools of rapidly deployable,


\textsuperscript{23} Training for the pilot project has been implemented by the EU Group on Training which consists of project partners from 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For additional information, see www.aspr.ac.at/euproject/main.htm.
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pre-trained civilians for peace operations. In developing its training modules, the EU has sought to complement existing OSCE and UN training standards to give its program maximum impact.

The second phase of the EU pilot project (January-July 2003) implemented four core and ten specialized courses held in nine EU member states. The two week core courses emphasized basic mission knowledge for conflict settings, the interrelation of functional tasks in mission, as well as common management culture. The specialized courses included Rule of Law, Human Rights, Democratization and Good Governance, and Organizing Civil Administration. Other modules developed but not implemented included cross-cutting topics relevant to both rule of law and civil administration: Conflict Transformation, Press and Public Information -Media Development, and Mission Administration and Support. The program was open to participants from EU member states as well as a select number of participants from outside the Union (Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe). There were 101 participants in the four core courses and 163 in the ten specialized courses. Lessons learned and recommendations for further action were reported to an October 2003 conference of representatives from the EU, OSCE, and UN, plus representatives of non-governmental institutions, who discussed the impact of these findings on training and recruitment of civilians as well as the relevance of these capacities to other parts of the mission lifecycle.24

The October conference report recommended future training cooperation, in light of the EU mandate for the creation of a coordinated EU training policy for ESDP encompassing civilian and military dimensions as well as implementation of the joint UN-EU declaration on cooperation in crisis management from September 24, 2003. The goals for future training cooperation as listed in the conference report include: increasing the rapidly deployable pool of well trained civilian experts, enhancing information exchange and cooperation between the EU and other international organizations, developing a joint EU-UN training course with common standards and requirements, developing training assessment criteria, and supporting creation of competent pools of personnel for specialized mission tasks.25

Assessing EU Field Operations

Since the Laeken declaration of “operationality” in December 2001, the EU has engaged in four distinct operations: two civilian crisis management missions and two Rapid Reaction Force missions. The EU’s first civilian crisis management mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), replaced the UN’s International Police Task Force in January 2003 with 500 international police officers. Its priorities were refugee return, security, and combating organized crime. As the vanguard ESDP civilian crisis management mission, EUPM laid the groundwork for future missions, acting as a

25 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
test bed for policies and procedures. The mission was developed from scratch, with very few resources, setting precedents on a variety of important structural and operational issues. It helped to clarify the legal basis for EU interaction with external actors and issues related to coordination with the European Commission. It set new standards for the conduct of fact finding missions, the selection of police officers and the involvement of non-EU countries in EU missions, as well as in command and control, communications, security, operational back-up, and operational coordination with the UN and SFOR. It led to new decision making support mechanisms, financial support arrangements, and a 24-hour EU Situation Center. Planning for future missions, such as Operations Concordia and Artemis, drew upon many of the precedents set by EUPM, including how to report to the UN Security Council on ESDP operations.

The first deployment of the EU Rapid Reaction Force, Operation Concordia, occurred in March 2003. Concordia took over from a NATO-led force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and ran until 15 December 2003, handing off to the EU policing operation Proxima (see below).\(^{26}\) NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson hailed Concordia as a groundbreaking event: “By taking on its first military mission, the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defense Policy has come to an age.”\(^{27}\)

The EU gauged Concordia to be a success, noting the relatively secure environment in Macedonia and emphasizing that the types of security issues now requiring attention, such as trafficking and organized crime, could better be tackled by police. Others expressed doubt that Concordia had achieved its goals and argued for at least a substantial overlap with deployment of Proxima. The International Crisis Group emphasized the precariousness of the security situation, compounded by lax implementation of the Ohrid peace agreement and the delicate ethnic balance.\(^{28}\) Ethnic Albanians also expressed concerns, fearing potential instability caused by the departure of Concordia.\(^{29}\) This view was not shared by the EU and the Macedonian government.

The third EU mission and the first to deploy outside Europe was Operation Artemis, a French-led, Security Council-authorized military mission to secure the town of Bunia in the Northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from June to September 2003. Artemis provided welcome respite to the people of Bunia and to the UN mission MONUC, which subsequently was strengthened and successfully accepted a handover of security responsibility from Artemis.\(^{30}\) Deploying Artemis gave the EU a chance to

\(^{26}\) Hereafter referred to as Macedonia.

\(^{27}\) “Remarks by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Handover Ceremony,” *NATO Speeches*, 31 March 2003, online at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030331a.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030331a.htm).


showcase its ability to act without recourse to NATO assets, in a robust peace enforcement environment, and directly addressed the argument about whether the RRF could or would deploy outside Europe. This mission was only possible, however, because a powerful nation with an interest in the region agreed to take the lead. Moreover, the limited duration and nature of the mission did not really test the depth or sustainability of EU military capabilities.

The fourth EU mission and second civilian crisis management endeavor, Operation Proxima, deployed in Macedonia on 15 December 2003 with a mandate to monitor, mentor and advise the local Macedonian police, aiming toward development of “an efficient and professional police service adhering to appropriate standards of European policing.” Bart D’Hooge, head of mission and police commissioner for Operation Proxima, previously worked in Bosnia and Macedonia with the OSCE. Proxima’s mandate was to run for at least a year. The mission was to use “proximity policing,” oversee the integration of larger numbers of ethnic Albanians into the police force, and combat organized crime. The EU was to deploy officers to the Interior Ministry in Skopje as well as to the former flashpoint regions of Tetovo and Kumanovo, where many ethnic Albanians live.

What’s next on the agenda for EU engagement in peace operations? The Council of the EU has approved pursuit of an EU military mission to succeed the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR). In the past, NATO military commander General James Jones had been skeptical of the need and capacity of the EU to replace SFOR, arguing that EU efforts should be more focused on rule of law issues. In November 2003, the United States expressed support for transitioning peace operations in Bosnia to EU control by 2006, but this statement likely reflected less an American confidence in EU capabilities than a desire to remove US military forces from Bosnia.

35 Chamberlain, “US Ambassador to NATO Calls for Increase in German Arms Spending.”
The Way Forward

The EU’s headline goals have been declared operational. Are the capacities behind these declarations sufficiently well-developed? Where are the remaining capabilities gaps and how can they be reduced or eliminated?

On the military side, there is a gap between forces committed and the ability to deploy and sustain them, and a gap between declared capacity and trained, deployable and interoperable capacity. Although the EU claims to have 100,000 troops ready to deploy, only a small percentage of these troops could realistically be committed to EU missions at any one time. Many troops are “triple-hatted” for the EU, the UN and NATO, counted within the declared capacity of all three organizations even though they cannot be in more than one place at a time.

On the civilian side, particularly with regard to CivPol, there is the gap between numbers committed and numbers available. The police counted as available for EU deployments are for the most part on active duty in their member states and are also already double-hatted for the UN and the OSCE. There is no standby Euro-CivPol capacity, so individuals must be recruited for each mission. The creation of pools of commonly trained CivPol and Rule of Law experts would help remedy deployment readiness deficiencies. Close coordination with the UN would help reduce capacity competition in this area, but EU members’ national policing needs will be the true determinants of the availability of European CivPol.

A Coherent European Strategy?

Equipment gaps and double-hatting have commanded the most attention but an integral and possibly more pressing roadblock to achieving coherent capacities is the lack of internal agreement on Europe’s *Leitmotif*, that is, answers to such questions as, “What is Europe?” and “What is its proper relationship to the transatlantic alliance?”

Issues of strategy and identity matter. They influence the way capacities are developed. Internal disagreement on such issues hinder the ESDP project and, in important ways, seem as crippling now as in 1991, when the first Bush Administration was not eager to get involved in then-disintegrating Yugoslavia, and Europe had neither the capacity nor the will to act in a coherent manner. The 1999 Kosovo crisis brought home to Europeans the need to work on developing a security and defense consensus and a coherent capacity to act. While the EU’s members have worked hard to forge this consensus, divisions remain.

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Javier Solana took a stab at creating a unifying European Security Strategy in June 2003, with a draft concept paper entitled, “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” It was adopted with minor changes at the Brussels Council meeting in December 2003. It is not clear, however, that all EU members share the same interpretation of the text. While the draft was adopted largely un-edited, the contentious section referring to the use of force to respond to threats received an important wording change, replacing the term “pre-emptive engagement” with “preventive engagement” (which contemplates the use of civilian more than military tools). The strategy paper outlines three main threats to European security—terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed states/organized crime—and pledges a more robust European response to these threats. Its language is sufficiently ambiguous, however, as to leave room for disagreements on both strategy and identity.

Autonomous Planning Capacities: Struggle between Atlanticism and Gaullism?

Is Europe integrating in order to complement existing international arrangements and to function as a capable transatlantic partner or in order to serve as a counterbalance to the American “hyper-power”? If, in this simplistic reduction, Europe chooses the latter role, then progress on ESDP will suffer due to resistance by the United States and by many of the small, newly acceding EU states.

This struggle over European identity has played out in part in the EU’s fight over whether to create a separate command and control capacity outside of NATO’s structure, and outside Brussels city limits, in the nearby town of Tervuren. The few states supporting this concept—France, Luxembourg, Germany and Belgium—touted it as necessary for autonomous EU military action, particularly should NATO become preoccupied with command and control needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.K. remained suspicious of the proponents’ motives, however, and sought to keep EU security and defense capacities firmly rooted in NATO, which British Prime Minister Tony Blair has called on many occasions the “cornerstone” of European security. The British are also not eager to upset their close allies in the United States, which looked askance at this apparent attempt by France, in particular, to steer the EU in the counterbalancing direction. Washington was particularly critical of this proposal for a separate EU headquarters structure outside NATO, seeing needless duplication, a threat to the role of NATO, and a violation of the spirit of NATO-EU collaboration. Washington would of course also like to maintain a

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39 “New Missions Require More Usable Forces Says Secretary General,” NATO Update, 3 November 2003, online at www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/11-november/e1103a.htm. Such disagreements will likely be further complicated by the EU’s expansion to 25 members in spring 2004. Many assume that the new EU members and new NATO candidates (NATO also is slated to expand by May 2004) will side with the British and American view that the Union needs to remain linked to NATO and that a separate EU command and control structure would be unduly divisive.
degree of influence in the EU’s planning, an interest served by integrating EU planning within NATO.

The original Headquarters proposal by Belgium, France and Germany also discussed capacity to operate under the European Convention’s concept of “Strategic Co-Operation.” This concept was controversial among the EU’s smaller members because it allowed the more capable countries to circumvent the Union’s “qualified consensus” decision-making procedure, potentially leaving smaller, less capable states out of the decision-making plans and structures.

After an emergency summit of NATO Ambassadors called by U.S. Ambassador to NATO Burns on 20 October 2003, support for the Tervuren planning cell faded. On 14 November, Germany declared that it would accept the existing, small planning cell in Brussels in lieu of a separate operational headquarters cell.40 The December 2003 EU Presidency laid this debate to rest by establishing a further EU planning cell at NATO-SHAPE and a NATO liaison in the EU Military Staff, designed to enable the EU to undertake operations in which NATO, as a whole, was not engaged and to promote greater transparency between the two organizations.41

Divisions over strategic cooperation versus qualified consensus decision-making widened after the failure of the December 2003 European Constitution Summit to agree upon voting rights. France thereafter sought to circumvent the stalled institutional structures, revisiting the concept of a “two-speed” Europe with a core of founding members (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) proceeding with defense convergence and decision-making. This initiative once again alarmed many of the small and acceding member states; Italy and Luxembourg resisted the idea and Germany was hesitant to go along, particularly given the concerns that such a policy would raise with neighboring Poland. Provisions within the Nice Treaty do allow groups of member states to proceed in certain policy areas absent consensus, through the concept of “enhanced co-operation” but that process requires at least eight state-participants and the acquiescence of the other members, which seems unlikely. Concerns remained that France and others might try to circumvent EU defense cooperation structures altogether.42

How to move beyond divisions to build a common European strategy? There have been at least two recent suggestions. Charles Grant, director of the Center for European Reform, proposed that the UK, France and Germany bridge their differences and work

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together to shape the ESDP into coherent European policy. Bringing the UK into such an effort could help reassure the Union’s smaller members that their concerns would be addressed. EU Military Committee Chairman Gustav Hägglund suggested de-linking defense cooperation issues from the general EU voting issues that have blocked progress on the EU Constitution. Here, too, there would need to be some sort of assurance that smaller states’ interests would be respected.

France and other proponents of the “core Europe” concept should take care not to push it too hard or too far. Because if EU members define themselves vis-à-vis the United States rather than each other, they risk perpetuating the divisions and the stalemates, which may only grow wider and deeper as the EU expands.

Financing European Capacities: Rationalizing Defense Expenditures and Making Better Use of Current Funds

Current European national defense budgets cannot meet the Helsinki Headline Goals. While the forces may be pledged, the EU must rely on the limited airlift/transport, intelligence and command and control provided by NATO. European forces cannot quickly reach post-conflict destinations on their own, do not have integrated intelligence systems, and are not sustainable over time. The need for modernization is real but the economic and political environment in Europe is such that defense budgets are very difficult to increase. These states are predominantly social democracies whose publics value social services and oppose shifting resources to the military. Moreover, structural factors increasingly will prevent the transfer of funds from the social to the military sphere. These factors include a growing elderly population and a declining birthrate, such that tax revenues will be generated by a steadily smaller segment of the population, unless augmented by immigration. Over time, governments will be hard-pressed even to sustain spending and avoid substantial social service cutbacks.

These constraints can be seen at work in the EU’s one-time economic engine, Germany. While Germany has increased its contributions to peacekeeping and is working to create more professional and deployable armed forces, economic difficulties and structural issues suggest that needed increases in the defense budget are unlikely. The U.S. Department of Defense reported in July 2003 that German defense spending is expected to remain at about 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through 2006. Indeed, only five of the fifteen current EU member states have defense budgets that exceed two percent of GDP, and only France and the U.K. have significantly increased their budgets for military equipment. Most EU members have decreased their expenditures.

46 European Convention, WG VIII, 16 December 2002, para. 40.
Appropriate European capacities to efficiently and effectively deal with peace operations and crisis management will require carefully targeted spending and strategic decisions about how member states structure their militaries and develop and procure their equipment. Coordinating efforts driven by NATO’s Prague Commitments, with parallel efforts under the European Capabilities Plan (ECAP), can help to focus spending on capacities useful to both NATO and the EU. A proposed European Armament, Military Capabilities and Research Agency, to fund research and stimulate investment in defense technologies, could build on existing small industrial partnership arrangements under the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation, whose members include Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Spain, and Sweden. Philippe Camus, the head of the Franco-German European Aeronautic, Defence and Space company (EADS), Europe’s leading aerospace and defense group, recently supported establishment of such an agency as a way to harmonize Europe’s requirements for procurement and planning and enable Europeans to “face up to their responsibility within the Western alliance adequately to fund advanced [research and development].”

Reaching beyond questions of procurement and development, Javier Solana has recommended establishment of a European Defence Agency by the summer of 2004. On 17 November 2003, Solana gained European defense ministers’ approval of the new agency, which would “advocate higher and better co-ordination [and] deeper investment by member states, promote stronger and better coordinated European Research and Technology efforts in security and defense and promote steps to make the European defense industry more competitive.”

Has Europe created effective institutions and appropriate means to address crises in a timely manner? Although military capacities remain disappointing and a more robust response capacity is unlikely for at least five years, the EU is doing what it can to close these gaps. EU and NATO negotiators agreed on arrangements for sharing NATO assets (“Berlin-Plus”) and there are modest co-located mission planning capabilities. Four EU-led field operations have been undertaken to date. The European Defence Agency will give efforts to bridge military capacity gaps an institutional home. The way forward will be determined, however, largely by the outcome of the debate on the European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003, and by resolution of the divisive “core Europe” issue that arose from stalled negotiations on the EU Constitution.

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47 Ibid., para. 34.
European Capacities for Peace Operations: Taking Stock

The EU, NATO, and Complementarity

A review of ESDP policy and capacity development reveals a common thread of integration into existing international structures. The European Union has taken care to establish consultative mechanisms with both the United Nations and NATO. ESDP declarations repeatedly reaffirm the collaborative context of all EU ambitions.

The EU recognizes the United Nations as the primary, though not sole, legal authority for military crisis intervention. As evidenced in the 24 September 2003 joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crisis management, the EU is committed to deepening cooperation with the UN, developing a joint consultative mechanism as a way to lead to enhanced cooperation in the areas of mission planning, training, communication, and sharing of best practices. The EU also continues to maintain good working level ties with peers in the UN, with plans to share training models and make civilian rosters available to UN missions.

On the military side of the house, the EU maintains ongoing contact with NATO, having gotten past the issue of a separate EU planning headquarters. Berlin Plus arrangements worked well in their first test, Operation Concordia in Macedonia. The alignment of ECAP with the Prague Capabilities Commitments and the planned EU-NATO crisis management exercise will increase integration and interoperability, which should in turn contribute to improved transatlantic collaboration and greater global capacity for peace operations.

Conclusions

As they grow in size and shared membership, NATO and the EU find that they have growing interest in working together so as to build on their respective strengths in a manner that fairly shares the burden of crisis and conflict response. A fair share does not mean a strict high-low end division of labor; the needs are more nuanced than that. A division of labor that maintains Europe’s focus on such “soft power” issues as CivPol and Rule of Law, and leaves to the United States the more demanding military tasks, will also leave Europe with little transatlantic leverage: it can neither counterbalance nor collaborate on military matters if it lacks the necessary tools. EU members therefore should be encouraged to further develop their military capabilities and, if they choose to develop niche capabilities, to select those that are also useful to peace operations.

On the civilian side, the EU’s crisis management capabilities are a valuable addition to the international toolkit, as is its integrated concept of civilian-military crisis response. Above all, however, EU members need a coherent strategy that seriously considers policy and action options to drive collective action in a world from which they cannot afford to be isolated, and in which they cannot afford to be passive.