



Declaratory Diplomacy: Rhetorical Initiatives and Confidence Building

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editors**

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About the Project

The Henry L. Stimson Center has been working to promote confidence-building measures (CBMs) in regions of tension since 1991. Our CBM Project programming now focuses primarily on India, Pakistan, China, and Japan. We have also carried out workshops in Latin America and the Middle East and briefings for officials and visitors from these regions.

The Center's CBM programming has six main components:

- First, we hold a series of meetings on CBMs in Washington for diplomats and military attachés, media, executive and legislative officials, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations. These meetings provide an opportunity to discuss problem-solving ideas in a congenial setting.
- Second, we commission papers to stimulate thinking and problem-solving CBM approaches within regions of interest. We are interested in developing the theory as well as the practice of CBMs. Towards these ends we compare CBM experiences in different regions. We are also interested in collaborations across borders to encourage networking. We publish commissioned work as funding permits.
- Third, with local co-sponsorship, we convene workshops on CBMs within countries of interest, reaching key target audiences: government officials, military officers, journalists, academics, and researchers.
- Fourth, we host a Visiting Fellows program, whereby talented individuals from India, Pakistan, and China carry out research and writing on the theory and practice of CBMs at the Stimson Center.
- Fifth, we publish and distribute widely materials on CBMs. We also place our CBM publications and non-published work on the Stimson Center's website (www.stimson.org).
- Sixth, we moderate a cross-border internet dialogue, known as the Southern Asia Internet Forum, designed to generate open dialogue, and broaden the scope of discussion, among

individuals working on security issues in the region.

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List of Abbreviations

ABACC	Argentine–Brazilian Agency for Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association
ALALC	Latin American Free Trade Association
APNW	Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BPA	Basic Principles of Relations Agreement
CBMs	Confidence-building measures
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNEA	National Commission for Nuclear Energy (Argentina)
CNEN	National Commission for Nuclear Energy (Brazil)
CSBM	confidence and security building measure
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSCME	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDC	Inter-Dominion Conference
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
JWG	joint working group
LoC	Line of Control (Kashmir)

LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty
MENA	Middle East and North Africa economic summit
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the South
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFU	“No-First-Use”
NPT	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NWFZ	nuclear weapon free zone
PICAB	Argentine–Brazilian Programme for Integration and Co-operation
POW	Prisoners of War
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
UN	United Nations
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Preface

The idea of doing a comparative assessment of the use and misuse of “declaratory diplomacy” was born out of frustration. In South Asia, where the Henry L. Stimson Center has been working to promote confidence-building measures since 1991, positive-sounding public declarations by Indian and Pakistani political leaders are commonplace, but usually devoid of constructive intent. After such a dismal track record, how would a national leader in the subcontinent go about convincing skeptical audiences that a positive, new initiative was being sincerely undertaken?

To answer this question, we decided to analyze leadership declarations elsewhere that succeeded in alleviating tensions in troubled bilateral relationships. The Brazil–Argentina case provided many examples of successful declaratory diplomacy; the Israel–Egypt and United States–Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cases presented mixed results, but offered useful clues to success.

Like so many others before us, we then burdened Professor Alexander George for help in structuring our case studies. Ideally, our cases would have been jointly authored by experts in each of the pairings of interest. We were unable to do so, but perhaps others who pursue this rich subject matter will succeed in these match-ups. We are grateful to our case study authors, Deborah Welch Larson, Emily Landau, P.R. Chari and Paulo S. Wrobel, for taking on the assignment of analyzing the intent and impact of public declarations. Their patience with the lengthy germination of this project is much appreciated. They are the first to plough this difficult terrain; others who follow will benefit from their labors—as well as from first person accounts of diplomatic initiatives that are not now in the public domain. Special thanks go to Paulo Wrobel for stepping in at the eleventh hour to help with the Argentina–Brazil case, and to Luis Bitencourt for his insights into this case.

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Introduction

Michael Krepon and Jenny S. Drezin

Well chosen words delivered in public declarations by national leaders can be essential elements within broader strategies to reassure neighbors, demonstrate good will, reinforce common interests, open lines of communication, break deadlocks, and promote regional stability and security. Public declarations can also be used to reinforce enemy images, mobilize for war, as well as other negative pursuits. This study investigates the use of public declarations by national leaders to build confidence and reassurance across borders. We are interested in the question of how words can fit into larger political strategies to help promote détente, reconciliation, and peace making.

Public declarations can be one form of confidence building.¹ Declaratory confidence building can take the form of joint summit statements, negotiated agreements of a declaratory nature—such as non-attack pledges—and/or unilateral statements. Unilateral statements can be choreographed in advance, or they can be offered with little or no prior notice. When crafted with great empathy for target audiences, public declarations can be a powerful tool for peace building and reconciliation. Far more often, seemingly conciliatory public declarations directed at an estranged neighbor or an adversary fail to serve useful purposes, or have little lasting effect. In India and Pakistan, for example, national leaders regularly make conciliatory declarations that prove to be hollow. In contrast, national leaders in Brazil and Argentina have used public declarations to excellent effect, helping to transform once-strained relations. Between these two poles, the record of declaratory confidence building in US–Soviet and Israeli–Egyptian relations is quite mixed.

This project investigates all four pairings, seeking to gain greater clarity on the positive use of public declarations by national leaders for confidence-building purposes. In

¹For a review of the other tools in the CBM “toolbox,” see Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill, and Jenny S. Drezin, eds., *Global Confidence Building* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, forthcoming). See also Johan Jørgen Holst, “Confidence–Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework,” *Survival* 25, no.1 (January/February 1983): 2–15; Johan Jørgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, “European Security and Confidence–Building Measures,” *Survival* 19, no.4 (July/August 1977):146–154; R.B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch, *Confidence-Building Measures and International Security*, Institute for East–West Studies, Monograph Series no.4 (New York: Institute for East–West Security Studies, 1987); Brian J. Gillian, Alan Crawford, and Kornel Buczek, *Compendium of Confidence-Building Proposals*, 2d ed., Department of National Defense, Canada, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Extra-mural Paper no.45 (Ottawa, 1987); Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe, eds., *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* (New York: Institute for East–West Security Studies, 1983).

order to investigate the success or deficiency of public declarations, we have explored the “politics” of this practice, the motivations of practitioners, and the context in which they have operated. We have sought to go beyond facile explanations of “political will” as a necessary condition for success in conflict resolution. Clearly, declaratory measures can succeed as part of a broader strategy when national leaders want them to work and when they have the same definitions of what constitutes “success.” But what if “political will” is tenuous or absent on one side and strong on another? What if a political leader wants improved relations but powerful domestic constituencies do not? When and why have declaratory initiatives been helpful in such situations? What about situations where definitions of success vary? Can declaratory initiatives, properly prepared and advanced, still bring the parties closer together?

In dealing with controversial national or international security issues, leaders must carefully plan the content of their speech as well as the political context in which they speak. The words they choose are obviously important, but the location and timing of public address can also be extremely important. Words absent reinforcing action are unlikely to be convincing. Private discussions can be critical to the success of public declarations. These preparatory steps, as well as the symbology of political address may, indeed, be more important than the spoken word.

FOUR CASE STUDIES

Deborah Larson’s essay, “Words and Deeds: The Role of Declarations in US–Soviet Relations,” concentrates on four important public addresses: President John F. Kennedy’s famous speech at American University in June 1963 which helped pave the way for the Limited Test Ban Treaty; the May 1972 summit announcement by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of “basic principles” to guide bilateral relations; the famous joint declaration by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1985 that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought; and the December 1988 speech by General Secretary Gorbachev before the United Nations General Assembly discussing changes in Soviet society and announcing dramatic reductions in conventional forces. Three of these declarations positively altered the course of US–Soviet relations. The “Basic Principles Agreement” had negative effects.

Emily Landau’s essay on “The Role of Public Declarations in Egyptian–Israeli Relations” focuses on three declarations: Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s historic speech

in November 1977 before the Israeli Knesset; Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's April 1990 proposal for ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction; and a series of public addresses by Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres calling for a "new Middle East" in 1994. Landau's analysis of the role of declarations in Egyptian–Israeli relations naturally dwells on the psychological needs of the parties. For those seeking Arab–Israeli reconciliation, Sadat's journey and public address had profoundly positive ramifications. In sharp contrast, the public statements of Mubarak and Peres had little impact.

Leadership declarations on the subcontinent have done little to enrich the barren soil of Indo–Pakistani relations. Thus, P.R.Chari has far less to work with than either Larson or Landau. As Chari notes, leadership declarations in South Asia are designed primarily for domestic audiences and serve the political agenda of elite groups. The most successful agreement between India and Pakistan, the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, was brokered by the World Bank. As Chari's essay clarifies, this accord was not preceded by dramatic or notable public commentary from leaders on either side. Chari also focuses on the 1972 Simla Agreement, which includes guiding principles for Indo–Pakistani peace, as well as proposals initiated by India and Pakistan at separate times for a "No War Pact" or for a Treaty of Friendship. These pledges have not been convincing.

It proved difficult for the editors to commission a full-fledged study of the most successful case of leadership declarations—that between Argentina and Brazil. Paulo Wrobel came to our assistance in the latter stages of the project, offering a concise but illuminating account of this rapprochement. Wrobel focuses on presidential declarations in two areas—nuclear and economic cooperation—noting the connectivity between both realms, as well as the common use of these declarations by national leaders to consolidate civilian rule. Wrobel dwells on the 1985 Puerto Iguazu–Foz do Iguacu Joint Declaration and the Common Declaration on Nuclear Policy, the 1986 Act for the Integration of Brazil and Argentina, the 1987 Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy, the 1988 Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy, and the 1988 Ezeiza Joint Statement.

A CAUTIONARY NOTE

By offering four case studies, we have sought to develop a better understanding of why some public declarations have improved bilateral relations and why others have failed. We believe that a careful study of our four case studies could help produce useful ideas for those who wish to transform a troubled bilateral relationship. While there are no guarantees for success, these pairings provide lessons to be learned and mistakes to be avoided.

While these four case studies suggest important lessons, their authors would be the first to recognize that far more investigation is required to fully capture the dynamics of successful declarations and the reasons for failure. First person accounts are essential in reconstructing declaratory initiatives, but political leaders are often not accessible to scholars and their memoirs might not tell the whole story. Moreover, the essential preparatory work for successful declarations may understandably be hidden from view. The passage of time, more forthcoming accounts from political leaders and their advisers, and much more digging will be required to learn more about the declarations analyzed in these case studies. The art and practice of declaratory diplomacy has not been studied before. Absent prior analytical work to draw upon, the case study authors and the editors are all keenly aware of the limitations of this volume. We hope that this study will encourage others to extend, deepen, and improve upon our analysis. We also hope that this study will help develop the theory as well as the practice of declaratory diplomacy.

Words and Deeds: The Role of Declarations in US–Soviet Relations

Deborah Welch Larson

Can declarations of peaceful intentions help improve relations between adversarial states? Do statements of principle have any value as a means of building confidence between rival states? The problem with most conciliatory declarations is their lack of credibility. The target state finds it difficult to believe professions of peaceful intent from an adversary. As a result, throughout the Cold War, US and Soviet leaders repeatedly asked the other to prove their good intentions by deeds, not words.

Nevertheless, public statements of principle by governments, either unilateral or joint, have their uses. Declarations can help gain public adherence to a policy—domestic or foreign. What makes declarations particularly attractive for this purpose is that a leader can issue a declaratory statement without seeking ratification from a legislature. Declarations can then be used to undermine opponents of cooperation within a state, making it easier for a leader to continue down the path of conciliation.

Under certain conditions, declarations may reassure the other side of a state's peaceful intentions. The ability of declarations to bring the United States and Soviet Union closer together depended on the statement's credibility, specificity, and verifiability. Some symbolic declarations were inherently credible, and changed adversarial relations by improving the political climate. For example, statements recognizing the other as a legitimate partner, admitting fault, or identifying shared interests in avoiding war had a positive impact, without need for further implementation. Recognition of the other state's legitimacy is a prerequisite for more substantive cooperative measures.

Other types of statements in the US–Soviet context, however, needed additional measures to make them credible. Statements announcing specific cooperative actions were more believable than declarations of general intent, as long as the target state could verify whether the action was carried out. Bilateral declarations in which the superpowers committed themselves to specific actions—such as establishing a hotline or not orbiting nuclear weapons in space—helped create greater mutual confidence. Each state could see whether the other side was keeping the agreement. As George F. Kennan stated, in dealing with the Soviets it was

better “to stick to strictly specific agreements which left aside all questions of motive and purported only to specify what each of us would do, when we would do it, and under what conditions it would be done.”¹

Statements announcing specific cooperative actions were more believable than declarations of general intent.

Declarations in which the superpowers promised to observe certain general ethics or norms often made relations worse. Such declarations fostered different and often conflicting interpretations of

the rules, and lacked detailed provisions for implementation. Each state interpreted the language to its own advantage, leading to mutual recriminations and blame when neither lived up to the other’s expectations. Declarations in which a leader proclaimed his government’s desire for peace and cooperation had little impact on the other side, which asked for “deeds, not words.”

For reasons of ideology and history, the Soviets made more extensive use of all types of declarations than did the United States. Lenin had stressed the importance of making declaratory statements on peace and disarmament to appeal to the masses. Later, the Soviet government negotiated basic principles agreements with major powers such as Turkey, France, India, and China. The Soviets had great fondness for ritual and symbols, and they preferred general agreements—which could be interpreted in various ways—to agreements comprised of detailed provisions.

The Soviets were more likely to initiate declarations, either unilateral or negotiated, to presage a major shift in policy. Often, these policy changes coincided with leadership transitions marked by the death of Joseph Stalin, the rise of Nikita Khrushchev, or the succession of Mikhail Gorbachev. The new leader sought to announce new policy directions by means of declarations. Alternatively, a shift in the military balance, such as the Soviets’ orbiting of *Sputnik* or the attainment of strategic parity, also furnished a pretext for announcing a new policy.

¹ George F. Kennan, *Nuclear Delusion: Soviet–American Relations in the Atomic Age*, expanded edition (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), xxi.

Below I shall briefly survey the role played by public declarations in US–Soviet relations during the Cold War. I will then analyze four declarations that were particularly significant in the development of the superpowers’ relationship: John F. Kennedy’s June 1963 American University Speech; the 1972 agreement on Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (BPA); the statement issued by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1985 declaring that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought; and Gorbachev’s speech to the United Nations (UN) in December 1988. Kennedy’s American University speech portrayed the Soviet Union as a limited adversary; it further helped to persuade Khrushchev to sign the first major arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). At the time, the BPA seemed to symbolize the shift to a more cooperative relationship between the United States and Soviet Union, but the superpowers’ failure to observe the agreement later contributed to much disillusionment about détente in the United States and Soviet Union. The Reagan–Gorbachev declaration on nuclear war reassured both sides that the other was not planning to initiate a nuclear attack. Finally, Gorbachev’s December 1988 speech signaled to the Eastern Europeans that they were free to adopt regimes of their own choosing and notified the rest of the world that Soviet foreign policy would no longer place ideological expansion ahead of cooperation to achieve common global goals.

PUBLIC DECLARATIONS IN US–SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR

Disagreements over the meaning of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, signed by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet general secretary Joseph Stalin at the Yalta summit in February 1945, contributed to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance and the emergence of US–Soviet enmity. The declaration committed the three countries to supporting Eastern European efforts to restore internal peace and form provisional governments “broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people.”² The declaration, however, lacked any enforcement mechanism; it required only that the signatories “consult” with each other “on

² U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), (hereafter cited as *FR.*, followed by appropriate year and volume) 977–78.

the measures necessary to discharge the[ir] joint responsibilities,” and even then only if all three powers agreed on the need to do so.³

Given the Yalta declaration’s open-ended nature, Stalin probably thought it was harmless rhetoric.

The vague phraseology of the Yalta Declaration concealed conflicts over the degree of control that the Soviets would exercise over Eastern Europe. The

Soviets claimed that they were entitled to “friendly governments” because the Germans had used Eastern Europe as a springboard for the invasion of the Soviet Union. The declaration did not define “broadly representative” or “free elections.” Given the Yalta declaration’s open-ended nature, Stalin probably thought it was harmless rhetoric. While Roosevelt’s interpretation is still disputed, his failure to propose any enforcement measures or sanctions suggest that he did not expect Stalin to obey it to the letter. FDR rejected the State Department’s proposal for an Emergency High Commission to coordinate policy in liberated areas, which originally accompanied its proposal for a declaration on liberated Europe; Roosevelt felt that the American people would not want to assume responsibility for the internal problems of the liberated countries. He presumably proposed the declaration because he wanted to put the best face on Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Otherwise, Roosevelt feared, the American people might become disillusioned and return to advocating isolationism.⁴ If that was Roosevelt’s intention, however, his plan backfired; the failure of the Soviets to observe the Yalta declaration disappointed the American public and increased its mistrust of the Soviet Union.

Less than two weeks after Yalta, the Soviet Ambassador pressured the Romanian king to install a communist-led government. The Romanian communists then appointed party members to all important judicial and municipal posts and systematically arrested and executed political opponents. Invoking the Declaration on Liberated Europe, the US Ambassador to Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, proposed consultations on Romania. Soviet

³ Ibid., 977–78.

⁴ Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 114; Calendar Notes on the Meeting with the President, 19 January 1945, Edward R. Stettinius Papers, University of Virginia, Charlottesville; Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1949), 394.

foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov responded that consultations were unnecessary.⁵ In Bulgaria, the Soviets relinquished government control to the Communists, who imprisoned and executed many opposition politicians. The American and British governments suggested to the Soviet Union that their three governments, as signatories of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, agree on rules to be observed in the forthcoming Bulgarian elections and that they monitor the implementation of such rules. Molotov again refused, saying that there was no need for outside interference.⁶

Ambassador Harriman charged that the Soviets were deliberately violating the Yalta agreements. Since he was neither present at Yalta nor briefed about the summit, President Harry S. Truman, who assumed office when Roosevelt died in April 1945, initially accepted Harriman's interpretation of the Yalta Declaration. Truman challenged Stalin to live up to his agreements on Eastern Europe. Stalin, however, insisted that he was entitled to friendly governments in areas bordering the Soviet Union. After relations between the United States and Soviet Union became tense, Truman recognized the governments of Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria after each added a few opposition politicians to the cabinet—even though they had not conducted free elections—to prevent further deterioration of relations. By then, however, the dispute over the meaning of the Yalta declaration had already aroused mutual suspicions.⁷

American and Soviet officials each announced and justified their shift to a Cold War policy in public statements. In a 12 March 1947 speech to Congress, President Truman described a

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world divided between two alternative ways of life, one based on the will of the majority, the other on the will of a minority forcibly imposed by terror and oppression. He declared, "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting

⁵ *FR: 1945*, V, 485n; Burton Y. Berry to Stettinius, 28 February 1945, *ibid.*, 487–88; Berry to Stettinius, 2 March 1945, *ibid.*, 492; Molotov to Harriman, 4 March 1945, *FR: 1945*, V, 497–98.

⁶ Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 567–68.

⁷ Larson, *Origins of Containment*, 150–56, 181–83, 246–48.

attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”⁸ At the founding meeting of the Cominform (September 1947), Andrei Zhdanov similarly claimed that the world was divided into opposed camps, imperialist and anti-imperialist.⁹

Following Stalin’s death in March 1953, Soviet leaders publicly declared their peaceful intentions to reassure the United States, but with little effect.¹⁰ On 15 March 1953, Soviet premier Georgi Malenkov announced that there was no dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union that could not “be decided by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding.”¹¹ Malenkov had challenged the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of conflict between capitalist and socialist worlds.

In his April 16 “Chance for Peace” speech, Eisenhower replied that the United States would negotiate when Soviet words were matched by deeds. As examples of such deeds, he mentioned a Korean armistice, free elections in Eastern Europe, and the signing of the Austrian State Treaty.¹²

In his 12 March 1954 election speech before the Supreme Soviet, Premier Malenkov warned that continuation of the Cold War could lead to a “new world war” which would mean the “end of civilization.”¹³ This was the first time that any Soviet leader had conceded that a nuclear war would not just destroy capitalists. Malenkov suggested that peace was not only possible, but that nuclear weapons made it *essential*. Because Soviet nuclear weapons would deter the capitalists from launching an attack, he argued, the Soviets could safely reduce

⁸ Harry S. Truman, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey,” Message of the President to the Congress, 12 March 1947, *Department of State Bulletin* 16 (23 March 1947), 534. Truman’s policy statement later became known as the Truman Doctrine.

⁹ David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 255–56.

¹⁰ George W. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982), 23; James G. Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994), 30.

¹¹ Charge in the Soviet Union Beam to Department of State, 18 March 1953, *FR: 1952–54*, VIII, 1132.

¹² Address by President Eisenhower, 16 April 1953, reprinted in *FR: 1952–1954*, VIII, 1151–52.

¹³ “Rech’ tovarishcha G.M. Malenkova,” *Izvestiia*, 13 March 1954, 2, quoted in Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 336.

military expenditures, which would release funds for increased production of consumer goods.¹⁴

Western analysts welcomed Malenkov's statement because it seemed to accept mutual deterrence. Malenkov's boldness, however, got him into trouble at home. Conservatives who favored high defense expenditures and priority for investment in heavy industry accused Malenkov of ideological heresy. Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin objected that humanitarianism would not restrain the imperialists from using nuclear weapons. First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev maintained that a nuclear war would only mean the end of capitalism. By late April, Malenkov was forced to retreat and claim that nuclear war would destroy only the "capitalist system."¹⁵

In February 1955, the Soviets went far toward meeting Eisenhower's test of "deeds, not words" when they promised to sign the Austrian State Treaty, a specific, verifiable action. The United States and Soviet Union had held over 250 negotiating sessions on Austria's fate, but the Soviets delayed signing. After a preliminary four-power conference of ambassadors, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the treaty on 15 May 1955.¹⁶

Khrushchev had persuaded other members of the Presidium that Moscow should agree to the Austrian State Treaty in order to prove to the West that the Soviets had no aggressive intentions. Despite his belligerent rhetoric about nuclear weapons, Khrushchev shared Malenkov's views on the need to improve relations with the United States. On the same day that Malenkov announced the Soviet willingness to withdraw from Austria, he resigned as premier and was replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, while Khrushchev remained first secretary of the Communist Party. Khrushchev, however, held real power while Bulganin remained

¹⁴ Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 101–2; Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 336–37.

¹⁵ Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 19; Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union*, 100, 106, 110–11; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 208; Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind*, 48.

¹⁶ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle Over Austria, 1945–1955* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 148–50; Deborah Welch Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty," *International Organization* 41 (Winter 1987): 46–47.

merely a figurehead.¹⁷ Because the Austrian State Treaty met Eisenhower’s requirement of “deeds not words,” the President agreed to a high-level meeting with the Soviets at Geneva in July 1955. This was to be the first summit meeting of the Cold War.¹⁸

On 10 May 1955 the Soviets announced a disarmament plan that accepted important aspects of the Anglo–French proposal in United Nations-sponsored disarmament negotiations. For example, the Soviets proposed reducing the conventional forces of the United States,

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Britain, France, and the Soviet Union to equal levels, instead of proportional reductions perpetuating Soviet superiority. The Soviet plan called for a single international control agency, with expanding powers and a permanent staff of inspectors; these inspectors

would be allowed to go behind the “Iron Curtain” to carry out on-site inspections. In addition, the Soviets offered to establish control posts at major intersections in order to monitor troop movements.¹⁹

Was the Soviet proposal offered in good faith, or was it merely propaganda? The Soviets had a history of using disarmament proposals for propagandistic purposes. Lenin had instructed the Communists to propose peace and disarmament in order to “expose” the hypocrisy of capitalist governments to the masses. After the Communists took power in 1917, the Kremlin realized that statements on peace could gain foreign support for the isolated Soviet regime. Before the Geneva conference on postwar economic reconstruction in 1922, Lenin argued that the Soviet government should make disarmament statements to strengthen

¹⁷ William J. Tompson, *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 141; Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 338–39.

¹⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: 1953–1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1963), 505–6.

¹⁹ Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1961), 292–95.

pacifist liberals in the capitalist states.²⁰ Under Stalin, the Soviets had used disarmament proposals to appeal to world opinion. For example, in 1948 the Soviets proposed a one-third reduction across the board in the armed forces of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, but they were unwilling to reveal the size of the Soviet military from which reductions would be made. The Soviets called for banning nuclear weapons without control measures to ensure that bombs were not being clandestinely stored or produced.²¹ The Soviet disarmament representative's decision to publicly unveil the 10 May 1955 proposal without consulting the United States, in violation of the secrecy rule of the five-power disarmament talks in London, suggested that the Soviet government was concerned with maximizing its propaganda gains.²² Subsequent evidence, however, suggests that the Soviets intended the 10 May 1955 declaration to serve as the basis for negotiations with the United States.²³

Not only did US officials view the Soviet offer as propaganda, but they believed that it would be too risky to enter into a disarmament agreement with the Soviet government. The following September, the US representative

Not only did US officials view the Soviet offer as propaganda, but they believed that it would be too risky to enter into a disarmament agreement with the Soviet government.

at the disarmament negotiations, Harold Stassen, announced that the United States was placing a “reservation” on all previous US positions on disarmament, pending further study of inspection methods and control arrangements. In other words, the United States was no longer bound by its earlier acceptance of the Anglo–French disarmament proposal.²⁴

Although the Soviet disarmament proposal of 10 May 1955 did not elicit a positive response from the United States, it—along with other conciliatory Soviet actions such as signing the Austrian State Treaty, recognizing the West German regime, and establishing

²⁰ Franklyn Griffiths, “Inner Tensions in the Soviet Approach to ‘Disarmament,’” *International Journal* 22 (Autumn 1967): 594–95.

²¹ Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, 136–38, 141.

²² *Ibid.*, 294.

²³ Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double Bind*, 70; Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 340–41.

²⁴ Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control*, 311–14.

rapprochement with Yugoslavia—helped convince many in the United States that Soviet policy was becoming less belligerent. The Geneva summit meeting held in July 1955 by the leaders of Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union further reduced tensions, leading to the first détente of the Cold War, the “spirit of Geneva.”²⁵

After the Soviets launched the first artificial satellite, *Sputnik*, in October 1957, Khrushchev initiated another series of unilateral declarations. His immediate goal was to persuade Eisenhower to agree to a summit meeting at which they could discuss disarmament and the German question.²⁶ By making public statements, Khrushchev probably hoped that he could mobilize public opinion to put pressure on Eisenhower to agree. On 10 December 1957, Premier Bulganin sent a public letter to President Eisenhower appealing for bilateral talks to end the Cold War and the arms race. The Soviet Premier suggested that Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union suspend nuclear tests for two to three years. He also recommended establishing a nuclear-free zone in both Germanies, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Finally, Bulganin proposed that he and Eisenhower discuss these issues at a summit conference.²⁷

Following Bulganin’s letter, on 6 January 1958, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet government would reduce its troops by 300,000, including 41,000 to be withdrawn from East Germany and 17,000 from Hungary. The Soviet statement described the military cutback as a “new serious contribution to the cause of easing tension and creating an atmosphere of confidence in the relations between states” and called on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers to take similar actions to bring an end to the arms race.²⁸

²⁵ Deborah Welch Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust: US–Soviet Relations During the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), chap. 2.

²⁶ In this context, the German question refers to a complex of issues, including whether there would be one or two German governments and whether West Berlin would be under West German or East German control. Since there was no peace conference after World War II, the allies had not settled Germany’s postwar regime and boundaries.

²⁷ Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs: 1958* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 42–43, 66–68; Elmer Plishke, “Eisenhower’s ‘Correspondence Diplomacy’ with the Kremlin—Case Study in Summit Diplomacy,” *Journal of Politics* 30 (1968): 145–48.

²⁸ William J. Jordan, “Soviet Announces a Cut of 300,000 in Armed Forces,” *New York Times*, 7 January 1958.

Yet the Soviet military reductions and declarations of peaceful intent had little effect on the US government. On 12 January 1958, Eisenhower publicly replied to Bulganin that he would attend a summit conference only if lower-level

On 31 March 1958, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced that the Soviet Union was suspending all nuclear tests and invited Great Britain and the United States to do the same.

officials had first discussed the issues so that there were “good hopes” for agreement. The State Department scoffed at Khrushchev’s troop reductions because Western intelligence could not verify whether Khrushchev had actually carried them out.²⁹

On 31 March 1958, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced that the Soviet Union was suspending all nuclear tests and invited Great Britain and the United States to do the same.³⁰ This time the United States could independently monitor whether the Soviet Union lived up to its commitment, because the Soviets had not yet tested underground. Eisenhower was sympathetic to the idea of a test ban; he regarded nuclear testing as a potential health hazard and public relations disaster. Eisenhower proposed to Khrushchev that East and West technical experts meet to discuss a control system for verifying a test ban. Khrushchev agreed to an experts conference in early July–August 1958, which drew up a monitoring system for a test ban. Eisenhower then proposed that the nuclear powers enter negotiations for a test ban on 31 October, and that they suspend nuclear testing for one year from that date.³¹ After some pre-deadline nuclear tests, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union entered into a voluntary moratorium which lasted nearly three years—until the end of August 1961—amounting to arms control by declaration.

Khrushchev’s statements about disarmament and peace did not persuade Eisenhower to attend a summit meeting. The US public generally accepted Eisenhower’s argument that

²⁹ Dana Adams Schmidt, “Eisenhower Bids Soviet Join a Ban on Space War,” *New York Times*, 13 January 1958.

³⁰ William J. Jordan, “Soviet Announces Atom-Test Halt with Conditions,” *New York Times*, 1 April 1958; Stebbins, *The US in World Affairs: 1958*, 52.

³¹ Felix Belair, “Eisenhower Note to Khrushchev on Arms Ready,” *New York Times*, 28 April 1958; Felix Belair, “US and Britain Give Plan to Halt A-tests if Soviet will Confer on Controls,” *New York Times*, 23 August 1958.

summits had to be well-prepared, or they could endanger bilateral relations. The Soviet leader's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing was a more credible indicator of the Soviets' desire for an agreement. The American public was growing more worried about the potential health risks of nuclear testing. Public opinion in the United States and Western Europe therefore reinforced Khrushchev's initiative by creating pressure for reciprocal measures.

When President Kennedy took office in January 1961, Premier Khrushchev and President Leonid Brezhnev sent him a cable in which they called for "step by step" efforts to "remove the existing suspicion and mistrust, to grow the seeds of friendship and businesslike cooperation" between the two countries.³² As a first step, on 25 January, Khrushchev released two US RB-47 pilots, who had been shot down near the Soviet Union in July 1960. Khrushchev also withdrew his demand that the United Nations discuss the American U-2 flight shot down over Sverdlovsk in May 1960.³³ The Soviet concession, while minor, was their first conciliatory gesture since the U-2 incident and it helped improve the atmosphere for negotiations. Khrushchev hoped that he and Kennedy could resume the negotiations that under Eisenhower had collapsed over Berlin and the test ban.³⁴

To reciprocate Khrushchev's release of the RB-47 pilots, Kennedy announced at a press conference that he was continuing Eisenhower's suspension of military flights over the Soviet Union.³⁵ He also lifted a ban on the import of Soviet crab meat, and waived the requirement that Soviet journalists be fingerprinted. Finally, in late February, Kennedy privately invited Khrushchev to a get-acquainted meeting.

Yet this public exchange of concessions ended abruptly, largely because of Kennedy's military buildup and Khrushchev's impatience to achieve a Berlin solution.³⁶ During his June 1961 meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, Khrushchev threatened to give the East Germans

³² "Khrushchev Sees Hope for Accord," *New York Times*, 21 January 1961.

³³ Osgood Caruthers, "Freeing of Fliers Khrushchev Idea," *New York Times*, 27 January 1961.

³⁴ Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust*, 109–111.

³⁵ James Reston, "A Change in Atmosphere," *New York Times*, 26 January 1961.

³⁶ Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs: 1961* (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962), 68; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: Greenwich House, 1983; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 304; Larson, *Anatomy of Mistrust*, 113.

control over access routes to West Berlin unless there was a German peace treaty in six months. At the end of August 1961, Khrushchev broke the moratorium on nuclear tests by testing extremely high-yield weapons in the atmosphere. The United States resumed nuclear tests in the atmosphere at the end of April 1962, and the Soviets initiated a second round of atmospheric testing in August.³⁷

Kennedy and Khrushchev stared into the abyss of nuclear war in the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis; they resolved afterwards to make renewed efforts at disarmament and arms control. In his 10 June 1963 commencement address at American University, Kennedy asked Americans to reexamine their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. To demonstrate good faith, Kennedy pledged that the United States would refrain from atmospheric nuclear testing so long as others did the same.³⁸ Kennedy's declaration not only broke the stalemate in the test ban negotiations, but helped to produce détente. On 25 July, representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain initialed the first major arms control agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to prohibit nuclear testing in the atmosphere and under water.³⁹

The United States and Soviet Union agreed by mutual declaration to ban nuclear weapons from space vehicles in orbit. In October, both countries supported a resolution whereby the signatories agreed not to place nuclear weapons in outer space. Some Pentagon officials had argued against a ban on nuclear weapons in space without on-site inspection to verify whether the Soviets were cheating.

After some pre-deadline nuclear tests, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union entered into a voluntary moratorium which lasted nearly three years—until the end of August 1961—amounting to arms control by declaration.

³⁷ "A-Testing in Air in Next Few Days," *New York Times*, 25 April 1962; Tad Szulc, "Russians Resume A-Testing in Air; Blast 2d Biggest," *New York Times*, 6 August 1962.

³⁸ Commencement Address at American University in Washington, 10 June 1963, *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy 1963* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1964), 461–63.

³⁹ Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs: 1963* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 71; Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 733; Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 218.

Despite Defense Department opposition, President Kennedy decided on a declaratory ban; he chose a United Nations resolution rather than a treaty or executive agreement to avoid the necessary Senate ratification. This informal agreement later evolved into the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.⁴⁰

Mutual mistrust, domestic political constraints, and Kennedy's assassination put the brakes on US–Soviet rapprochement. On 13 December 1963, Khrushchev announced a 4.3 percent cut in Soviet military spending, and suggested that he might resume the previously postponed unilateral reductions in Soviet conventional forces. President Lyndon B. Johnson replied that the US defense budget would be cut by \$400 million. Khrushchev then suggested that they might make progress in disarmament through a policy of “mutual example.”⁴¹ Khrushchev's troop reductions, however, incited opposition from Soviet military leaders and were never fully implemented.⁴² In 1964, Khrushchev was deposed by more conservative members of the Presidium.

During the Cold War, the United States made relatively few unilateral arms control declarations. One such measure was President Nixon's 11 November 1969 pledge that the United States would never engage in biological warfare and his renunciation of all but defensive uses of chemical weapons. In support of his declaration, Nixon ordered that all existing American germ warfare weapons be destroyed.⁴³

Several important US–Soviet declarations were negotiated during the détente of 1972–75. These negotiated declarations, as opposed to unilateral statements, reflected growing mutual trust and recognition of shared interests. At the May 1972 summit, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Basic Principles of Relations agreement (BPA) in order to establish a new code of conduct for the superpowers in the détente era, but it was too ambiguous to guide their behavior in concrete situations. The BPA called on the superpowers to conduct their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, to avoid military confrontations, to refrain from

⁴⁰ Raymond L. Garthoff, “Banning the Bomb in Outer Space,” *International Security* 5 (Winter 1980/81): 34–35.

⁴¹ Horelick and Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*, 155.

⁴² William J. Tompson, *Khrushchev: A Political Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 265.

⁴³ James M. Naughton, “Nixon Restricts Use of Chemical Arms,” *New York Times*, 11 November 1969.

competing for unilateral advantage, and to prevent situations that would aggravate international tension.⁴⁴

The highlight of the June 1973 Washington summit between Brezhnev and Nixon was the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War (APNW). In this statement, the two states pledged to refrain from threatening or using force against the other or its allies. Additionally, both states agreed to consult one another immediately in situations that could lead to nuclear war not only between the superpowers but also between either of the superpowers and a third country.⁴⁵ Yet, neither of these political crisis prevention agreements, the BPA or the APNW, restrained the superpowers during the October 1973 Arab–Israeli War. Later, critics in the United States charged that the Soviet Union had violated the rules of détente. Ironically, the two crisis prevention agreements probably exacerbated US–Soviet tensions by raising unrealistic expectations among the American public about the end of superpower competition.

In August 1975, at the height of the détente period, a thirty-five nation summit, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki agreement was divided into three parts or “baskets.” Basket One, on security, included ten principles of interstate behavior, including the abolishment of the use of force or threats, the inviolability of postwar frontiers, and the respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and military confidence-building measures. Basket Two encompassed cooperation in economic and commercial relations, science, and the environment. Basket Three called for the expansion of both human contacts and circulation of information.⁴⁶

The Helsinki accord was neither a treaty nor an agreement; it had no legal force. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarded the conference with disdain. He had agreed to the

⁴⁴ Alexander L. George, “The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972: Origins and Expectations,” in *Managing US–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 108–110; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 326–33; Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)* (New York: Random House, Times Books, 1995), 252–53.

⁴⁵ George, “The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972,” 111; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 277–78; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 376.

⁴⁶ For a discussion, see John J. Maresca, “Helsinki Accord, 1975,” in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, ed., *US–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 106–22.

Soviets' long-standing request for a European security conference in return for Soviet concessions on SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)⁴⁷ and Berlin. Kissinger was also trying to placate Western European allies, who wanted a large multilateral conference in which they could participate in the developing East–West détente. He allowed the Europeans to take the initiative in negotiating the agreement. The US national security adviser regarded the exercise as meaningless and said that he would accept whatever was agreed upon by other participants. Kissinger and Nixon believed that the Helsinki agreement merely duplicated what had already appeared in the UN Charter and bilateral treaties between West Germany and its neighbors. Although Soviet leaders did not like the human rights provisions, they signed the agreement anyway in order to attain Western recognition of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and facilitate economic cooperation.⁴⁸

As the détente waned, the Helsinki Final Act exacerbated US–Soviet relations. US conservatives attacked President Gerald R. Ford for attending the Helsinki conference, because the document allegedly recognized Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Later, conservatives cited the Soviet government's failure to observe the Helsinki agreements as proof that the Soviets could not be trusted.⁴⁹

Gorbachev issued more declarations than any Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He intended to end the Cold War in order to secure a peaceful environment in which he could implement his domestic reforms. On 30 July 1985, four months after taking office as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Gorbachev announced that he was unilaterally suspending nuclear tests until the end of the year; he offered to extend the moratorium if the United States reciprocated.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ From 1969–1972, the United States and Soviet Union conducted the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to limit antiballistic missile systems and strategic offensive weapons. At the Nixon–Brezhnev summit in Moscow, the SALT I agreements were signed on 26 May 1972.

⁴⁸ William G. Hyland, *Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1987), 114–119; Maresca, "Helsinki Accord, 1975," 109; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 345–48.

⁴⁹ Hyland, *Mortal Rivals*, 120, 128.

⁵⁰ Seth Mydans, "Soviet to Stop Atomic Tests; It Bids US Do Same," *New York Times*, 30 July 1985.

Gorbachev's unilateral moratorium, which lasted eighteen months, made little impact on the Reagan administration's attitudes toward the Soviet Union. United States officials claimed that the Soviet Union had carried out an accelerated series of tests before the moratorium began, and would not need to test for a while anyway. Thus, the Soviet test halt was just a propaganda ploy. The Soviets' moratorium on nuclear testing stimulated some support for a comprehensive test ban in Congress. Yet U.S. public support for a moratorium had waned since 1958, perhaps because underground tests were not considered to endanger public health.⁵¹

In November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev ended their first summit in Geneva with a joint statement that "a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought."⁵² They also agreed that the two sides would "not seek to achieve military superiority."⁵³ The impossibility of winning a nuclear war might seem to be self-evident, a truth not in need of ratification by international agreement.

Nevertheless, Soviet military doctrine had maintained that if a nuclear war were unavoidable, the Soviets would prevail. The Soviet doctrinal emphasis on "war-winning" had previously provoked Defense Secretary Caspar

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Weinberger and other conservatives in the Reagan administration to adopt similar rhetoric in US military doctrines. The Geneva statement, however, diminished the power of such rhetoric, as well as undermined Reagan hard-liners favoring both strategic modernization and the Strategic Defense Initiative—building defensive systems in space.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Michael R. Gordon, "Arms Tests and the Art of Public Relations," *New York Times*, 21 August 1986; Tom Wicker, "A Rebuke on Testing," *New York Times*, 10 August 1986; Jonathan Fuerbringer, "White House and Congress Chiefs Reach an Accord on Arms Control," *New York Times*, 11 October 1986.

⁵² "Summit Meeting Agreements," *American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1986), 427.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 427; Don Oberdorfer, *The Turn: How the Cold War Came to an End; The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1990* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991), 153.

⁵⁴ Strobe Talbott, *The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), 287; Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 37, 530.

On 15 January 1986 Gorbachev proposed a three-stage program to abolish nuclear weapons by the end of the century. In the first stage, the superpowers would eliminate all medium-range missiles and reduce their strategic arms by fifty percent in five to eight years. There would be a ban on development, testing, and deployment of space-based defensive weapons. In the second stage, beginning in 1990, other nuclear powers would join the effort, and battlefield nuclear weapons would be eradicated. The third stage would witness the destruction of all remaining nuclear weapons. Gorbachev said that “special procedures” could be worked out for verification, including on-site inspection.⁵⁵

Gorbachev’s 15 January disarmament proposal may appear propagandistic, a continuation of the Soviets’ “ban the bomb” offensives of the early Cold War. Nevertheless, Gorbachev probably took it seriously. Its authors, the first deputy foreign minister Georgi Kornienko and Chief of the Army General Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev, believed that the United States and Soviet Union would be safer and just as secure with much smaller stockpiles of nuclear weapons.⁵⁶

Most State and Defense department officials, on the other hand, believed that a world without nuclear weapons would be more dangerous and insecure.⁵⁷ The American public, furthermore, regarded Gorbachev’s disarmament plan as too ambitious. Secretary of State George Shultz preferred to begin with less risky, smaller steps, such as eliminating medium- and shorter-range ballistic missiles. In line with the American preference for smaller, step-by-step agreements, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at their December 1987 summit in Washington.⁵⁸

Gorbachev’s 7 December 1988 address to the United Nations was another watershed moment in US–Soviet Relations. In his speech, Gorbachev admitted that new means of

⁵⁵ Serge Schemann, “Gorbachev Offers to Scrap A-Arms within 15 Years,” *New York Times*, 16 January 1986.

⁵⁶ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 597.

⁵⁷ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 699–702, 704–705, 708–709; Bernard Weinraub, “Reagan ‘Grateful’ for Soviet Plan on Nuclear Arms,” *New York Times*, 17 January 1986; Michael McGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), 195.

⁵⁸ Michael R. Gordon, “How to Destroy the 2,611 Missiles,” *New York Times*, 9 December 1987, 1.

communication, information, and transportation no longer permitted states to develop as “closed societies.”⁵⁹ Previously, Soviet leaders had contended that Western attempts to obtain greater freedom for the movement of peoples and ideas amounted to interference in Soviet internal affairs. Gorbachev acknowledged that two great revolutions, the French revolution of 1789 and the Russian revolution of 1917, had a major impact on history and people’s way of thinking. But today, Gorbachev affirmed, a different world existed in which progress had to be based on universal human interests. Fundamental principles had to be adopted for building this new world.⁶⁰ For example, “force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy.”⁶¹ In addition, “freedom of choice is a general principle that does not admit any exceptions.”⁶² Each nation should share its ideas and try to prove the advantages of his own system, through deeds as well as words, but this struggle of ideology should not be carried over into mutual relations between states.⁶³

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Gorbachev’s December 1988 statement on “freedom of choice” foreshadowed Soviet forbearance during the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989. To give greater credibility to his words, Gorbachev announced that he was

cutting Soviet military forces unilaterally by 500,000 before the end of 1990. Six tank divisions, or about 50,000 Soviet troops, were to be withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary. In addition, the Soviets would pull out 5,000 tanks from Central Europe, about half the Soviet tanks based in those satellite nations, and 5,000 from the European portion of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev further declared that he was withdrawing 800 combat aircraft and 8,500 artillery systems from the Soviet Union and Central Europe

⁵⁹ M.S. Gorbachev’s United Nations Address, 7 December 1988, *Pravda*, 8 December 1988, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Daily Report-Soviet Union*, 7 December 1988 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-88-236), 11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 12–13.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 13.

area. Just as important as the numerical reductions, Gorbachev promised to reconfigure remaining Soviet forces for defensive purposes—such as withdrawing assault landing troops and bridge-crossing equipment from Soviet divisions.⁶⁴

Gorbachev's troop cuts and restructuring provided the first evidence that the Soviet military had abandoned the offensive posture that had frightened the West. The removal of roughly half the Soviet tanks based in the satellite nations would greatly impair the Soviet offensive capability. The aircraft that Gorbachev withdrew amounted to ten percent of the Warsaw Pact's European theater airplanes, and the cut in artillery would reduce Warsaw Pact firepower along the central front by twenty percent.⁶⁵

In sum, the impact of declarations on US–Soviet relations varied according to their purpose and form. Declarations that recognized the other's legitimacy or admitted fault improved bilateral relations by helping to build greater mutual trust and by creating a favorable domestic political climate for cooperative agreements. In the American University speech, for example, Kennedy accepted the Soviet government as an equal partner in preventing a nuclear war and controlling the arms race. Gorbachev's December 1988 speech admitted that technological developments and economic interdependence no longer made it possible for the Soviet government to close off its society from contact with Western ideas and philosophies. He also implied that the Soviet government had been at fault in trying to impose its ideology on Eastern European states. Unilateral arms control measures such as Soviet troop cuts or nuclear test moratoria helped to create a favorable atmosphere for negotiation in so far as they were verifiable. Public conciliatory statements and offers to negotiate were more influential if prepared in advance by diplomacy and followed by concrete actions.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 17–18.

⁶⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee, "The New Soviet Approach to Europe," in *The New Europe: Revolution in East–West Relations*, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38 (1991), 16; Michael McGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991), 271–72; David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs: America & the World* 68 (1988–89), 75.

Declarations where the superpowers promised to observe general principles in their relationship—such as the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, the BPA, APNW, and the Helsinki agreements—were least successful. In the BPA, the superpowers promised to refrain from competing for unilateral advantage and to conduct their relations on the basis of equality, promises which presumed that the United States and Soviet Union would become friends rather than rivals. Any statement of principle that ideological rivals could both accept was apt to be too vague or ambiguous to guide state behavior or to furnish a standard by which to monitor the other's conduct. The superpowers had different interpretations of such concepts as “democratic,” “free elections” or “equality.” The officials who negotiated these principles were often aware of these differences but chose to ignore them in order to obtain an agreement. Public opinion, however, was not informed about the equivocal meanings of the terms, and grew disillusioned when the rhetoric proved to be empty.

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IMPORTANT DECLARATIONS IN US–SOVIET RELATIONS

American University Speech

President Kennedy made the American University Speech in order to rescue the deadlocked test ban negotiations, but his statement later served as a charter for US–Soviet détente. The United States and Soviet Union had again come to an impasse in the test ban negotiations over the issue of on-site inspection. On 19 December 1962, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a letter offering two or three on-site inspections a year—the first time that the Soviet government had accepted *any* on-site inspection since the U-2 incident in May 1960.

Regarding Khrushchev's letter as a real breakthrough, Kennedy replied that the United States would need about eight to ten on-site inspections to monitor a test ban.⁶⁶

But the Soviet leader had the mistaken impression that three inspections a year would be enough for Kennedy to sign the treaty. The US representative at the test ban talks, Arthur Dean, had made some vague remarks which Khrushchev had interpreted as indicating that two to four inspections a year would be enough. Kennedy, however, calculated that the Senate would reject any treaty that contained less than seven on-site inspections a year. When Kennedy responded by proposing eight to ten inspections, Khrushchev was embittered by this apparent betrayal. The Soviet leader had expended much political capital to persuade his colleagues in the Presidium to allow any on-site inspection.⁶⁷ In a 20 April interview with the editor of the Italian newspaper *Il giorno*, Khrushchev charged that the United States had repudiated its own negotiating proposal once it appeared that the Soviets might accept it. He maintained that "certain American circles" wanted to install "under the appearance of inspections, centers of investigation" on Soviet territory.⁶⁸ The Soviets showed signs of returning to a hard line confrontational policy toward the United States. Soviet airplanes buzzed two American helicopters over Berlin. In Laos, the Soviet government blocked efforts by the international control commission to monitor the Geneva neutralization agreement.⁶⁹

Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review*, had previously scheduled an interview with Khrushchev in Moscow. Before the journalist left, Kennedy asked Cousins to tell the Soviet leader that the President wanted a test ban. During the interview, the Soviet leader complained that if Kennedy had wanted a test ban, he could have had one. Finally,

⁶⁶ Max Frankel, "Soviet Proffers On-Site Checking in an Atom Pact," *New York Times*, 21 January 1963; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 728; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 896–97; Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, 178–81.

⁶⁷ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 896; Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban*, 178–81, 186–87; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 100, 103.

⁶⁸ "Khrushchev Says West is Forcing Test-Ban Review," *New York Times*, 22 April 1963.

⁶⁹ Harry Schwartz, "Khrushchev Speaks Out in Harsher Tones on the East–West Problems," *New York Times*, 28 April 1963.

Khrushchev said that he accepted Kennedy's explanation that there was an honest misunderstanding. "But the next move is up to him," the Soviet premier insisted.⁷⁰

President Kennedy felt a sense of urgency to achieve a test ban. The coming autumn season offered ideal conditions for nuclear testing, and there were indications that the Soviets were preparing for another round of tests. If the Soviet Union conducted another series of nuclear tests, the United States would have to follow suit, and the chances of achieving a test ban would evaporate. Kennedy informed a press conference that time was urgent; if they did not achieve a test ban agreement by summer, they would never get one. The "nuclear genie would be out of the bottle."⁷¹

At the end of April, President Kennedy and British prime minister Harold Macmillan sent a letter to Khrushchev proposing to send high-level representatives to Moscow for a new round of negotiations on the test ban. Eager to conclude a test ban, partly for domestic political reasons, Macmillan had persuaded Kennedy to make one last effort to negotiate a test ban in Moscow. Kennedy was skeptical about whether Khrushchev would reciprocate any concessions they might make on inspections, but he went along with the British Prime Minister.⁷²

The first question that Khrushchev asked when he received the letter was whether it accepted the Soviet proposal for three inspections. When he found that it did not, Khrushchev harangued on how a test ban was really of no importance.⁷³ Thus, if Kennedy had not made the American University speech, the Soviet leader might not have been receptive to new high-level emissaries.

⁷⁰ Norman Cousins, "Notes on a 1963 Visit with Khrushchev," *Saturday Review*, 7 November 1964, 20–21, 58.

⁷¹ Max Frankel, "Kremlin Rebuffs Western Effort on Test-Ban Pact," *New York Times*, 25 April 1963; Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*, 189, 194–95; Richard P. Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs: 1963* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 16–17; Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 729.

⁷² *FR: 1961–1963*, VII, 655–56, 659–61, 663–67, 670–71, 676–68.

⁷³ Kohler to Rusk, *FR: 1961–1963*, VII, 686.

If Kennedy had not made the American University speech, the Soviet leader might not have been receptive to new high-level emissaries.

In his 8 May reply, Khrushchev argued that on-site inspection was not needed to monitor underground explosions. Soviet seismic stations, for example, had detected recent

French tests in the Sahara. Therefore, the West had demanded inspection in order to introduce North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence officials onto Soviet territory. The Kennedy–Macmillan statement, he said, merely restated old Western positions and could not provide the basis for an agreement. Khrushchev further maintained that the content of the British–American message was announced to the press several days before he received it, and suggested that Kennedy had made the proposal for domestic political reasons, to show that he had initiated a “constructive” step. Even so, Khrushchev agreed to try discussions in Moscow with high-level representatives of the United States and Britain.⁷⁴

Seizing upon Khrushchev’s grudging acceptance, Kennedy and Macmillan proposed that American and British representatives go to Moscow at the end of June or early July.⁷⁵ Kennedy decided to make a major speech that would appeal for peace and reassure Khrushchev about his desire to conclude a test ban. To demonstrate his good faith, the President planned to renounce atmospheric testing if the Soviets would reciprocate. In an April 30 letter, Norman Cousins had advised Kennedy to make a dramatic peace initiative. Kennedy intended to offer the Soviets the opportunity for a new cooperative relationship.

In case the negotiations with Khrushchev were successful, Kennedy also wanted to begin building domestic support within the United States for a test ban treaty. The American public was highly suspicious of the Soviet Union, particularly after Khrushchev’s clandestine attempt to install medium-range missiles in Cuba. Moreover, after years of Cold War rhetoric, the public did not accept the legitimacy of the Soviet government; the Soviet threat was total, encompassing ideology, lifestyles, economics, and military competition. Accordingly, the

⁷⁴ Khrushchev to Kennedy, 8 May 1963, *FR: 1961–1963*, VII, 693–99.

⁷⁵ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 899.

language of the Kennedy's speech was crafted as much to reassure the American public about the risks of cooperating with the Soviet Union as it was designed to appeal to Khrushchev.⁷⁶

Kennedy recognized that offering another moratorium on nuclear testing might arouse political opposition in the United States. On the other hand, a ban on atmospheric testing carried little risk because it could be monitored without inspection. An appeal for cooperation with the Soviets might taint Kennedy with the charge that he was "soft on communism." Nevertheless, Kennedy could afford to take these political risks due to his firm handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis.⁷⁷

Kennedy asked presidential speech writer Theodore Sorensen to draft the speech. Advisers who were consulted on the speech included National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Deputy National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, Tom Sorensen (Theodore's brother), and White House staff members Carl Kaysen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Kennedy did not ask for contributions from Defense and State because he wanted a fundamentally new approach, free from the usual threats of nuclear destruction, boasts of US superiority, and lectures of Soviet untrustworthiness.⁷⁸

Kennedy's initiative in proposing new talks gave credibility and meaning to his rhetoric. The Soviets knew what they should do to reciprocate the President's overtures. Kennedy had planned to use the speech to publicize his proposal to send special emissaries to Moscow, but he received Khrushchev's acceptance on 8 June, allowing him to make a public announcement of the forthcoming talks in Moscow. There is no evidence, however, that Khrushchev was notified in advance that Kennedy was about to make a major speech.

Kennedy admonished that "we must reexamine our own attitudes-as individuals and as a nation-for our attitude is as essential as theirs."

⁷⁶ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 730; Max Frankel, "Harriman to Lead Test-Ban Mission to Soviet in July," *New York Times*, 12 June 1963; Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 600.

⁷⁷ Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*, 212.

⁷⁸ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 730; Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 900.

Kennedy chose to build his speech around the theme of peace. “Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave,” he averred. “I am talking about genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living.” Some argued that it was useless to speak of world peace until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopted a more enlightened attitude. While he hoped that they would, and believed that the United States could help them do so, Kennedy admonished that “we must reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a Nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs.”⁷⁹ Kennedy’s statement overturned one of the psychological foundations of the Cold War—the belief that the enemy was solely responsible for creating tensions.

“No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue.” Americans might find communism repugnant, Kennedy acknowledged, “but we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements—in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture and in acts of courage.”⁸⁰ Kennedy contended that the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union shared an abhorrence of war. He reminded Americans of Soviet suffering during World War II: at least 20 million lives were lost; millions of homes and farms were burned or sacked; a third of the nation’s territory was turned into a wasteland.⁸¹

In short, both the United States and the Soviet Union had a mutually deep interest in halting the arms race and establishing peace, Kennedy declared. “Agreements to this end are in the interests of the Soviet Union as well as ours – and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations, and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.”⁸²

“So let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved.” And if we could not end now our differences, “at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.” Kennedy’s admonition to “deal with the world as it is” implied that the United States would

⁷⁹ Commencement Address, *Public Papers*, 460.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 461.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 461–62.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 462.

have to learn to get along with the countries in the Soviet sphere. Kennedy exhorted Americans to conduct their affairs “in such a way that it becomes in the Communists’ interest to agree on a genuine peace.” Above all, “nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”⁸³

By their actions, the Soviets signaled that they were impressed by Kennedy’s speech. The President’s speech was reprinted in the Soviet papers *Izvestia* and *Pravda*. A few days later, the Soviet Union stopped jamming Western radio broadcasts

Khrushchev warmly praised the American University speech, saying with deep feeling that it was the best speech made by any president since Roosevelt and that it had taken courage on Kennedy’s part.

after fifteen years of almost continuous interference. The Soviets also, in contrast to their earlier opposition, agreed to accept safeguards proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On 20 June, the United States and Soviet Union agreed on a hot line teletype link between the White House and the Kremlin. Most importantly, in a 2 July speech in East Berlin, Khrushchev declared that he was willing to agree to a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water, marking the first time that the Soviets had accepted a limited ban. Later, Khrushchev warmly praised the American University speech to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman, saying with deep feeling that it was the best speech made by any president since Roosevelt and that it had taken courage on Kennedy’s part.⁸⁴

Despite his praise of the speech, Khrushchev remained suspicious of Kennedy. In a 14 June interview with editors of *Izvestia* and *Pravda*, Khrushchev said that on the whole, Kennedy’s speech had made a “favorable impression” on him, but that the President’s words would mean little unless they were “followed by deeds.”⁸⁵ If Kennedy had not followed up his

⁸³Ibid., 462.

⁸⁴ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 733; “US and Soviet Sign ‘Hot Line’ Accord in Geneva,” *New York Times*, 21 June 1963; Arthur J. Olsen, “Khrushchev Links 2 Treaty Drives,” *New York Times*, 3 July 1963; Harriman to Rusk, 15 July 1963, US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1963–1963*, 7:801; Harriman to Rusk, 27 July 1963, in Ibid., 862.

⁸⁵ Max Frankel, “Khrushchev Stand Dims US Hopes,” *New York Times*, 17 June 1963.

declaration with a diplomatic initiative to achieve a test ban, the Soviets' favorable reaction to the speech might have been short-lived.

Kennedy's speech helped undermine opponents of US–Soviet cooperation in the United States. Some Republicans in Congress complained about Kennedy's failure to consult with them before offering not to test in the atmosphere. Other Republicans worried that the Soviet government might mislead the US government in the forthcoming negotiations in Moscow. The Republican leader, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, asked whether the "high-level" meeting in Moscow would be "another case of concession and more concession to Khrushchev to achieve some kind of a test ban treaty."⁸⁶ On the whole, however, the positive response of Americans to Kennedy's American University Speech undercut the position of test ban treaty opponents.

Kennedy's American University speech did not change the international security environment. The Limited Test Ban Treaty did not prevent the development of more sophisticated weapons through underground testing, nor did it foreclose the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to other states. Yet, Kennedy's speech did alter the political atmosphere and legitimize further cooperative agreements.

In a 19 July 1963 speech, Khrushchev said that he regarded the test ban as merely the starting point of a whole series of tension-reducing steps, including a nonaggression pact, a freeze or reduction in military budgets, reciprocal stationing of military observers in East and West Germany, reduction of foreign troops in both parts of Germany, and a final settlement of the German problem.⁸⁷ Privately, Khrushchev proposed to Kennedy that they agree to a statement recognizing existing borders in Europe. Although the president accepted European boundaries, he was unwilling to formalize them through a declaration for fear of arousing French and West German ire. Kennedy was disinclined to offend West German Chancellor

⁸⁶ Max Frankel, "Harriman to Lead Test-Ban Mission to Soviet in July," *New York Times*, 12 June 1963; "Senators See Possibility of Kennedy–Khrushchev Parley," *New York Times*, 11 June 1963.

⁸⁷ Stebbins, *The United States in World Affairs: 1963*, 74.

Konrad Adenauer again, so soon after the abortive Berlin negotiations, especially when he did not know if talks with Khrushchev would be successful.⁸⁸

Whereas the Soviets wanted to move toward political solutions, the United States preferred agreements on military cooperation, such as inspection and communication measures that would reduce the risks of miscalculation and diminish fears of a surprise attack.⁸⁹

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Among the subjects of interest to the United States were an agreement to halt production of fissionable weapons material and transfer quantities to peaceful uses, establishment of nuclear-free zones in Latin American and Africa, the scrapping of United States B-47 and Soviet Badger bombers on a one-to-one basis, and measures to reduce the risk of accidental war.⁹⁰ Kennedy's advisers were also concerned about exceeding what the American public deemed acceptable. Even the October decision to provide export licences for the Soviets to buy American wheat was politically controversial, so much so that Kennedy did not inform congressional leaders until a few hours before he announced his decision to authorize the sale of \$250 million in wheat to the Soviet Union.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 105; Max Frankel, "'Next Step' in Cold War Is Tough," *New York Times*, 22 September 1963; Charles R. Planck, *The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy: 1955–1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 40–43.

⁸⁹ Memorandum for the Record, 10 July 1963, National Security File, Departments and Agencies, "ACDA–Disarmament Harriman Trip to Moscow Part IV," John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.; Frankel, "'Next Step,'" Planck, *Changing Status*, 40–43.

⁹⁰ Instructions for Honorable W. Averell Harriman, 10 July 1963, National Security File, Meetings and Memoranda, "National Security Council Meetings, 1963, no. 515, 7/9/63," John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.

⁹¹ Sorensen, *Kennedy*, 742.

Basic Principles Agreement

The new relationship that Kennedy had envisioned in his American University speech appeared on the verge of realization nine years later at the Moscow summit meeting between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in 1972. On 29 May, the final day of the summit, the General Secretary and President signed, with great ceremony, an agreement entitled Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (BPA).⁹²

By means of an agreement on basic principles, the Soviets tried to commit the United States to principles that they had long advocated in international politics, such as equality and peaceful coexistence. In January 1972, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had approached Kissinger with the suggestion that US and Soviet leaders sign a declaration of principles at their forthcoming summit in Moscow. The Soviets had recently agreed on statements of principle with France and Turkey. It was difficult for Nixon to refuse, since he himself was planning to sign a similar declaration of principles with Chinese leaders during his visit to Beijing the following month.⁹³

Although the Soviet government had proposed the declaration, Dobrynin evaded Kissinger's requests for a Soviet draft. Finally, on 17 March, Kissinger offered his own statement calling for the superpowers to behave with mutual restraint, avoid interfering in other countries' internal affairs, and forgo efforts to achieve unilateral advantage. He heard nothing further about the declaration from the Soviets until his April 1972 visit to Moscow to prepare for the summit.⁹⁴

The timing of Kissinger's trip was awkward; military developments in the Vietnam War had placed the national security adviser in a weak bargaining position. On March 30, the North Vietnamese had sent troops across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam, inflicting heavy losses on the South Vietnamese army. Kissinger warned the Soviets that the summit

⁹² For the text of the agreement, see "Text of Basic Principles, May 29," *Department of State Bulletin*, 66 (26 June 1972): 898–99.

⁹³ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1131–32.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1132.

was in jeopardy unless the North Vietnamese were more cooperative in his talks with them on ending the war. Dobrynin then invited Kissinger to visit Moscow to discuss not only summit preparations but

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Vietnam. At first, Nixon refused to allow Kissinger to go; he feared that the Soviets would string the national security adviser along, inhibiting Nixon from escalating the war against North Vietnam. Kissinger assured Nixon that he would be free to bomb North Vietnam and that summit preparations would inhibit the *Soviets* from reacting to US bombing.⁹⁵

Approving Kissinger's visit with reluctance, Nixon ordered him not to discuss any subject but Vietnam until he had reached an understanding with Brezhnev. According to Kissinger's hand-written notes, Nixon emphasized "the need for a single standard" of conduct applying to the Soviet Union as well as the United States.⁹⁶ The United States, Nixon said, "could not accept the proposition that the Soviet Union had the right to support liberation movements all over the world while insisting on the Brezhnev Doctrine inside the Soviet orbit."⁹⁷

While in Moscow, Kissinger delivered Nixon's threat to cancel the summit. But he was reluctant to press Brezhnev too hard on Vietnam. Just four days before Kissinger's visit, the United States had bombed fuel storage depots in the Hanoi–Haiphong area and had hit four Soviet merchant ships. Kissinger was grateful that the Soviets only protested verbally; they did not cancel summit preparations. In his memoirs, Kissinger claims that he did not believe that the Soviets had the power to halt the North Vietnamese offensive. Besides, Brezhnev did offer to send a high-level Soviet representative to Hanoi with the US negotiating proposal.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Ibid., 1121, 1135.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 1136.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 1136.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 1121–22, 1144–45, 1147–48, 1156–57.

Kissinger then resolved several SALT issues with Brezhnev and completed negotiations on a basic principles agreement. Brezhnev handed Kissinger the Soviet version of the national security adviser's 17 March draft. The Soviets had expanded Kissinger's original six principles into twelve and seasoned them with *Pravda*-like rhetoric. Brezhnev grandly invited Kissinger to "strengthen" the Soviet draft.⁹⁹ Overnight, helped by his aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger developed a counter draft. Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko then agreed on a statement of twelve principles the following day.¹⁰⁰

Nixon ordered Kissinger to take a hard line on Vietnam and to cut his stay short.¹⁰¹ Nixon was so preoccupied with Vietnam that he gave little attention to the substance of Kissinger's negotiations either on SALT or the BPA. The President was convinced that Moscow and Hanoi were in collusion to prevent him from bombing the North. He wanted Kissinger to refuse to discuss the summit until Brezhnev committed himself to achieving a settlement. When Kissinger ignored these orders, Nixon grew increasingly angry. President Nixon had hoped to use the threat of canceling the summit to obtain Soviet cooperation in Vietnam.¹⁰²

Kissinger negotiated the BPA by himself, without consulting or even informing the State Department. In contrast, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was deeply immersed in formulating the Soviet position. Differences in the involvement of the two bureaucracies reflected the varying level of importance that the two states attached to the declaration of principles. Soviet professionals probably helped to ensure that the document reflected Soviet conceptions of *détente* more than those of the United States. If State Department officials had been consulted, they might have warned Kissinger about the significance of terms such as "peaceful coexistence" and "equality."¹⁰³

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1150.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 1150–51.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1134.

¹⁰² Richard Nixon, *Richard Nixon: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 591–92; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1154–1163.

¹⁰³ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1250; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 252; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 330–31.

In the end, the document was an uneasy amalgam of US and Soviet language. The first principle affirmed that in the

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nuclear age, there was no alternative to conducting relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and social systems should not interfere with the development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage.¹⁰⁴ The Soviets interpreted “peaceful coexistence” as meaning a relaxation of tensions only between states while the class struggle between societies continued.¹⁰⁵ Thus, peaceful coexistence allowed the Soviets to enjoy a détente with the United States while continuing to support national liberation movements. Kissinger had ignored Nixon’s order to “insist on a single standard” which would not allow the Soviets to support revolutions in the Third World.¹⁰⁶

The second principle stated that the United States and Soviet Union should try to prevent the development of situations that could exacerbate US–Soviet relations. Therefore, the two states should avoid military confrontations. They should always exercise restraint in their mutual relations and be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. The security relations of the two states should be based on equality and renunciation of the use or threat of force.¹⁰⁷

The third principle stated that the superpowers had a special responsibility to prevent situations of international tension from developing. Accordingly, they would try to promote conditions in which all countries could live in peace and security and not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs. Other principles called for holding summit meetings when necessary, making an effort to limit strategic arms, developing commercial and economic ties, cooperating in science and technology, deepening cultural ties, establishing joint commissions, and renouncing special privileges.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ “Text of Basic Principles, May 29,” 898.

¹⁰⁵ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 45–47.

¹⁰⁶ George, “The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972,” 108–110.

¹⁰⁷ “Text of Basic Principles, May 29,” 898.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 899.

At the summit, Nixon did not confront the Soviets over the notion of “peaceful coexistence” or their support for national liberation movements in the Third World. The US involvement in Vietnam may have pushed Kissinger and Nixon toward accepting Soviet language in the basic principles. They were grateful that Brezhnev had gone ahead with the summit despite US bombing of Hanoi and mining of Haiphong Harbor.¹⁰⁹

Brezhnev regarded the BPA as the most important achievement of the summit, more important even than SALT.

At his first meeting with Nixon, Brezhnev said that he was committed to improving relations with the United States. Therefore, he regarded the BPA as *the* most important achievement of the

summit, more important even than SALT.¹¹⁰ Afterwards, Soviet press commentaries referred to the BPA as a major achievement of the summit. Many commentators exulted that a document recording the leading capitalist power’s acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence had been added to the canon of international law. A secret Central Committee report sent to party elites observed that the BPA was a Soviet initiative, and had been based on a Soviet draft. The Soviets could use the basic principles to restrain aggressive circles in the United States. The report claimed that Nixon *had to sign* a document accepting the principle of peaceful coexistence because of changes in the correlation of forces.¹¹¹ While Nixon, in effort to gain advantage in the Third World, sought to constrain Soviet competition, the Soviets sought to make such competition safer—to ensure that the United States would not employ nuclear threats, or other challenges over attempts to expand Soviet spheres of influence. The Soviets may have believed that Nixon had promised to avoid confronting them over Soviet adventures in the Third World.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ George, “The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972,” 110.

¹¹⁰ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1208–1209.

¹¹¹ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 332–33. The Soviet concept of the “correlation of forces” incorporated not only the balance of power between two adversaries but social, economic, diplomatic, political, and psychological factors affecting their relative power. See Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 63. For a more extended discussion, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 77–97; and Michael J. Dean, “The Soviet Assessment of the ‘Correlation of World Forces’: Implications for American Foreign Policy,” *Orbis* 20 (Fall 1976): 625–36.

¹¹² Coit D. Blacker, “The Kremlin and Détente: Soviet Conceptions, Hopes, and Expectations,” in George, *Managing US–Soviet Rivalry*, 127–28.

Equality was important to the Soviets not just for prestige but also because they believed that US recognition of the Soviets as an equal would put US–Soviet relations on a more stable basis. The United States would no longer be able to dictate to the Soviets from a position of strength.¹¹³ The Soviets also believed that strategic equality entitled them to claims for influence around the world, just like the United States. At the summit, Gromyko insisted on negotiating a set of principles to guide negotiations for peace in the Middle East. Although he went along with Gromyko’s request, Kissinger did not believe that the BPA entitled the Soviets to participate in Middle East peace negotiations.¹¹⁴

Nixon and Kissinger viewed the declaration as a complement to SALT and the bilateral agreements on environment, space, technical cooperation, incidents at sea, and the establishment of an economic commission just concluded in Moscow. The agreement on strategic arms limitation would control the nuclear arms race. But a reduced risk of nuclear war would not mean much if Soviet adventurism continued in the Third World. Hence, there was a need for a code of conduct to regulate Soviet behavior. To give the Soviets greater incentive to play by the rules, the United States entered into cooperative arrangements with the Soviets on economic, scientific, and cultural issues.¹¹⁵

At his press conference after the summit, Kissinger stated that the declaration marked a major transformation in the relations of the superpowers from a period of “rigid hostility” to one of restraint.¹¹⁶ Kissinger told the press that perhaps there would be an “exchange” before either side took a step such as building another submarine base in Cuba, and a “possibility for restraint within each government that might not otherwise exist.” He suggested that Moscow and Washington would consult and follow the principles “to prevent crises.”¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 251–52.

¹¹⁴ Blacker, “The Kremlin and Détente,” 121–4; Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1141–42.

¹¹⁵ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1153–54.

¹¹⁶ “News conference of Dr. Kissinger,” 29 May, Kiev, *Department of State Bulletin*, 26 June 1972, 891.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 893–94.

On the other hand, Kissinger also characterized the principles as an “aspiration and an attitude,” implying that the superpowers might not always live up to them. Nevertheless, Kissinger said that it was an “event of considerable importance” that two countries whose relations had been characterized by “irreconcilable hostility” were making an effort to “state some principles which could reduce the dangers of war and which would enable them to

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promote a more stable international system.”¹¹⁸

Kissinger explained that he and Nixon had tried to create “vested interests” in a more cooperative US–Soviet relationship. He

admitted that waving a piece of paper would not prevent either side from flouting the principles.¹¹⁹ When a journalist asked if the US mining of Haiphong would have violated the spirit of the declaration, Kissinger replied defensively that “no set of principles can be used like a cookbook that can be applied to every situation.” Instead, he said, “we are talking here about a general spirit which regulates the overall direction of the policy.”¹²⁰

The BPA improved the psychological atmosphere of US–Soviet relations, at least in the short-term, but was too vague and nebulous to serve as a code of conduct. It was unclear what specific actions were proscribed by the BPA. For example, what did it mean to forgo seeking unilateral advantage? Did that mean that the superpowers were not supposed to compete? Neither the Americans nor the Soviets believed they made a sacrifice by signing the document; Washington had conceded only that the Soviets had attained strategic parity with the United States. Moscow reserved the right to continue the class struggle and to support national liberation movements even while pursuing a cooperative relationship with the United States.

Neither Washington nor Moscow proposed procedures to implement the basic principles, such as consulting periodically on potential crisis situations. Nor were any follow-

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 885.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 884–85.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 886.

up meetings held to discuss the meaning of the terms of the declaration. Both leaders may have wanted to avoid specific discussions so that they could interpret the text as they wished. In that respect, the BPA was a “pseudo agreement.”¹²¹ The BPA was part of what was later called the “overselling” of détente—the exaggeration by Nixon and Kissinger of the cooperative aspects of US–Soviet relations.¹²²

In drawing up the principles, Kissinger and Gromyko did not concern themselves with how the agreement might be interpreted by foreign

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audiences. Western Europeans regarded the BPA as an attempt to form a superpower condominium at the expense of their interests. European officials also objected to the US acceptance of “peaceful coexistence.”¹²³ Both North Vietnam and Egypt were enraged by what they perceived as the Soviets’ selling out of their interests. In July 1972, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt.¹²⁴

After the October 1973 Middle East War, some conservatives accused the Soviets of having violated the spirit of the BPA by failing to warn the United States of Egyptian plans to attack Israel. The Soviets’ arming of the Arab countries might also be viewed as inconsistent with the principle of preventing the development of situations that could exacerbate relations between the two states. Kissinger himself, however, did not accuse the Soviets of violating their obligations under the BPA. In the real world, he admitted, it would be too much to expect the Soviet Union to give out in advance information about the timing of the Egyptian attack.

¹²¹ George, “The Basic Principles Agreement of 1972,” 110.

¹²² Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 64.

¹²³ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1273.

¹²⁴ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington: Brookings Institution and Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 135.

Kissinger’s admission suggests that he regarded the BPA as too idealistic to serve as a detailed guide to action.¹²⁵

The United States also could be accused of having violated the BPA. Kissinger’s attempts to drive a wedge between Egypt and its Soviet ally contradicted the principle of forgoing efforts to seek unilateral advantage. During the October 1973 war, the United States put its nuclear forces on a heightened state of alert to deter Brezhnev from sending Soviet forces into the area. The US nuclear alert—its last of the Cold War—could be persuasively argued as inconsistent with the rule of refraining from the use or threat of force.

Even if Brezhnev had intended to live up to the BPA, he had less incentive to do so after President Gerald R. Ford signed the Jackson–Vanik amendment into law in 1975. This amendment to the 1972 trade bill linked Soviet most-favored-nation status to public assurances by the Soviet government on Jewish emigration. Brezhnev was willing to offer such guarantees in private, but was unwilling to make a humiliating public concession to Senator Henry Jackson. The Soviets therefore failed to gain the economic benefits that they had been promised in the 1972 trade agreement. In December 1974, Brezhnev suffered a stroke, and was too feeble to deny Soviet military requests for high levels of spending. Deprived of any economic incentive not to seek advantage in the Third World, the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Angola, South Yemen, and Ethiopia.¹²⁶

Words cannot commit a state to act against what its rulers define as the national interest, furthermore, it is unwise to expect them to do so.

The main problem with the BPA was not that it was ambiguous, however. Rather, the Soviets had no interest in restraint in the Third World after 1975, and the United States had no incentive to allow the

Soviets an equal role in the Middle East. Because of ideology, aspirations to be a great a power, and military influence in internal politics, the Soviet Union probably would have sent arms and advisers to Africa even if the principles had expressly prohibited such conduct.

¹²⁵ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 434–37.

¹²⁶ Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 505–513; Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Random House, Times Books, 1992), 189, 191.

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US–Soviet Rhetoric During the Reagan Administration

Soviet intervention in the Third World contributed to the presidential election of Ronald Reagan, a staunch anticommunist. The early Reagan administration's often harsh rhetoric aggravated US–Soviet tensions. In 1981, KGB headquarters instructed its residencies in NATO capitals to be alert for signs of mobilization for an attack. The largest peacetime military intelligence operation in Soviet history was called Operation Ryon, an acronym of the Russian words for Nuclear Missile Attack. Soviet generals perceived Reagan's increases in the defense budget as part of an effort to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union. In spring 1982, the Defense Department's Defense Guidance report for 1984–1988, which committed the United States to “prevail” in a protracted nuclear war was leaked to the press. In March 1983, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to put missile defenses in space. Moscow believed that the real goal of SDI was to provide a shield behind which the United States could launch a first strike against the Soviet Union without fearing retaliation.¹²⁷

In November 1983, tensions between the United States and Soviet Union erupted into a war scare. From 2–11 November 1983, the United States and its NATO allies carried out a highly realistic “nuclear release” exercise, called Able Archer 83, designed to test command and communication procedures for the use of nuclear weapons in war. This type of military exercise had been conducted regularly. What now alarmed the Soviets was that the exercise was more extensive—NATO forces moved all the way from a state of normal readiness to general alert—and different message formats were used for the transition. Soviet military doctrine held that an actual NATO nuclear attack was most likely to be carried out in the guise of a simulated attack. In response to the threat, Moscow ordered selected Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft in East Germany and Poland to be placed on alert. Units of the Soviet Fourth Air Force also shifted to a higher state of readiness. Some KGB representatives erroneously reported to Moscow that NATO troops were moving. On 8–9 November, according to KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB sent a flash cable to overseas embassies calling urgently

¹²⁷ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 523, 527–28; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 270–271; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 36–37, 112.

for any information on possible US preparations for a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union.¹²⁸

In a letter to Reagan, Gorbachev suggested that they agree on the inadmissibility and impossibility of winning a nuclear war, and that they renounce efforts to achieve military superiority.

The Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, informed President Reagan in December 1983 that Soviet military intelligence had instructed its posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union would not be

surprised by war. Reagan was sobered to learn that the Soviets might genuinely fear that the United States would launch a nuclear attack against them.¹²⁹ In March 1984, British intelligence, presumably relying on Gordievsky (who was serving as a “double agent” for them), advised the United States that the Soviets had believed that a nuclear war might be imminent during Able Archer.¹³⁰

Gorbachev had initiated the Geneva declaration on nuclear war. In a 25 September 1985 letter to Reagan, Gorbachev suggested that they agree on the inadmissibility and impossibility of winning a nuclear war, and that they renounce efforts to achieve military superiority. In their instructions to Gorbachev for the forthcoming Geneva summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KGB, and Ministry of Defense maintained that the best that could be expected from the meeting was a joint statement that “nuclear war is unacceptable and unwinnable.”¹³¹

Yet, even this modest objective proved difficult. The Reagan administration was divided over whether it was in the US interest to cooperate with the Soviet Union on arms control and other security problems. High-ranking Defense Department and CIA officials

¹²⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 65–66; Gates, *From the Shadows*, 270–72; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 138–39.

¹²⁹ Gates, *From the Shadows*, 271–72.

¹³⁰ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 66–67; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 138–39.

¹³¹ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 624–25; Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 152; Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 585–86.

opposed signing an agreement with the Soviet Union. During the fall, lower-level State Department officials worked with representatives of the Soviet Embassy to draft a communique of agreed-upon principles and declarations. Secretary of State Shultz did not inform the Defense Department, for fear of inciting Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's opposition. In late October, Shultz explained the draft to Reagan, who gave his approval. When Weinberger learned about the communique through leaks, he was irate and took his objections to Reagan. Weinberger persuaded Reagan that a prenegotiated communique would allow bureaucrats to put words into his and Gorbachev's mouths before they even had a chance to discuss the issues.¹³²

In mid-November, when Ambassador Dobrynin visited the State Department to finalize the communique, Shultz informed him that the United States could not agree to anything; they would have to wait until the summit to work out the text of the statement even though it would be "chancy."¹³³ Shultz, however, convinced Reagan that it would be a good idea to have prepared the ideas and language for an "agreed statement" as opposed to a "communique," a term too reminiscent of the détente era, just in case they had an opportunity to achieve something constructive in Geneva.¹³⁴ Lower-level Soviet and US officials continued their work and agreed on a statement on nuclear war such as Gorbachev had suggested.¹³⁵

Once he was in Geneva, Reagan decided to go ahead with negotiations for an agreed statement. In light of the heavy press attention to the first US summit in a decade, the public would be disappointed and alarmed by the inability of the parties to sign a joint statement. Shultz assigned Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway to head the US drafting team, which included Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Palmer, and Colonel Robert Linhard, an arms control expert on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Negotiations for the agreed statement covered several contentious issues besides the declaration on nuclear war, such as the linkage between an

¹³² Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 151.

¹³³ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 151–52.

¹³⁴ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 597.

¹³⁵ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 152.

intermediate nuclear forces treaty and strategic defenses, strategic arms reductions, cultural exchanges, regional conflicts, and human rights.¹³⁶

At the meeting, Reagan also agreed to a joint press conference at the conclusion of the summit during which he and Gorbachev could present the communique and make short speeches. Reagan was initially opposed to a press conference because he thought it was undignified for the heads of the world’s two superpowers to deal with “impudent reporters” trying to shout each other down.¹³⁷ Reagan’s decision was perhaps swayed by the fact that Gorbachev had already scheduled a press conference.¹³⁸

The Soviets regarded Reagan’s acceptance of the declaration on nuclear war as extremely significant. For Gorbachev, the declaration meant that the two parties would not continue stockpiling and modernizing nuclear weapons. Gorbachev reported to the Supreme

The Soviets regarded Reagan’s acceptance of the declaration on nuclear war as extremely significant.

Soviet that the joint statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war was among the most important achievements of the Geneva summit. Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who expressed skepticism about whether Reagan was sincere in not seeking military superiority, confided to retired US general, David Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the one real achievement of the Geneva summit was President Reagan’s concession that there could be no winner in a nuclear war.¹³⁹

The Reagan administration, in contrast, viewed the joint declaration on nuclear war as “atmospherics” rather than as a major achievement. The US mass media gave it very little attention.¹⁴⁰ Reagan had declared that “a nuclear war can never be won and must never be

¹³⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 409–410; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 603.

¹³⁷ Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 585.

¹³⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 152.

¹³⁹ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 411; Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 241–42.

¹⁴⁰ Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 240–41.

fought” in a 1983 speech before the Japanese Diet, a major foreign policy address in spring 1984 at Georgetown University, and in an address to the United Nations a year later.¹⁴¹ Certainly the declaration had no immediate impact on the Reagan administration’s military doctrine. As late as January 1987, Secretary of Defense Weinberger avowed that the Soviets believed that a nuclear war could be fought and won.¹⁴²

It took time for Gorbachev to adapt his new thinking into changes in Soviet military doctrine and force configurations. In fall 1986, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev revised Soviet military doctrine to be more consistent with Gorbachev’s foreign policy. The new Soviet military doctrine was officially presented to the world in a May 1987 Warsaw Pact statement. Henceforth, Soviet military forces would be primarily aimed at preventing war, instead of achieving victory should war break out. Soviet forces were to fight defensively, in order to bring war to a swift conclusion, rather than carrying the fighting to the enemy’s territory. The new Soviet defensive doctrine made possible Gorbachev’s 1988 reductions in conventional forces.¹⁴³

Reagan and Gorbachev repeated the statement about the impossibility of winning a nuclear war several times at their subsequent meetings. The surprisingly significant impact of the Geneva declaration can be attributed to Gorbachev’s innovations in Soviet military doctrine and force structure. The West lagged behind the Soviets in altering its strategic doctrine, largely because Washington did not quite believe that the Soviet doctrine had truly changed.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Address by President Reagan Before the Japanese Diet, Tokyo, 11 November 1983, doc. 489, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1983* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 1038; “American Leadership is Back,” Address by President Reagan Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 6 April 1984, doc. 2, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1984* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 8; “Free People . . . Do Not Wage War on their Neighbors,” Address by President Reagan Before the UN General Assembly, 24 October 1985, doc. 4, *American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1985* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).

¹⁴² Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 532.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 529–30.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 530–33.

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At his May 1988 summit meeting with Reagan in Moscow, Gorbachev proposed a statement of principles to guide US–Soviet relations. At his meeting with Shultz in April, Gorbachev had claimed that the Soviets preferred

agreement on general principles to the American case-by-case approach of focusing on specifics. Agreement on general principles would make it easier to reach specific agreements.¹⁴⁵ Without giving any advance warning to the State Department, at his meeting with Reagan, Gorbachev proposed a statement that international relations must be based on peaceful coexistence, equality of all states, noninterference in internal affairs, and freedom of sociopolitical choice. Reagan found nothing objectionable in Gorbachev’s language, but said that he would have to consult with his delegation.¹⁴⁶

Reagan’s advisers were adamantly opposed to the declaration. Secretary of State Shultz contended that Gorbachev’s statement was a return to détente-era declarations in which the Soviets had interpreted declarations as they wished, allowing them to move into Afghanistan. Soviet experts warned that the Soviets had used peaceful coexistence as a code for a truce between governments while the class struggle continued. Even freedom of sociopolitical choice was viewed as suspect, they maintained, because it could mean that states were free to choose communism. Swayed by this advice, Reagan rejected Gorbachev’s proposal despite the Soviet leader’s great anger and disappointment.¹⁴⁷ Ironically, this time, the Soviet leader did interpret the principles in line with American preferences, but US officials imposed on him views they had derived from the lessons of the 1970s détente.

Unable to obtain a joint statement, Gorbachev later incorporated many of the same principles into his December 1988 speech to the United Nations. The speech repudiated basic tenets of Soviet foreign policy since Lenin and elaborated the Soviet leader’s new thinking. He also anticipated that a successful appearance in the global arena would strengthen his

¹⁴⁵ Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 287–88.

¹⁴⁶ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1104–5; Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 301.

¹⁴⁷ Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 1105; Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 302–303.

political position at home and overcome increasing resistance to change. Gorbachev addressed the United Nations at a period of transition in US–Soviet relations. The Soviet leader had established a cordial relationship with Reagan, but he did not know the newly elected president, George Bush. While he was in New York, Gorbachev intended to get better acquainted with Bush and to find out if he would continue Reagan’s policies.¹⁴⁸

In the speech, Gorbachev apologized for past Soviet policy and outlined a design for a new world order. The new age demanded interstate relations based on more than political ideology. This did not mean that states should “[give] up [their] convictions, philosophy, or traditions,” but rather the ideological struggle “must not be carried into mutual relations between states.”¹⁴⁹

Gorbachev accepted Western conceptions of human rights, as in the 1948 General Declaration on Human Rights, after years of Soviet refusal to concede the legitimacy of Western inference in their internal affairs. In order to involve Soviet society in restructuring, the process had to be made truly democratic. Under the label of democratization, Gorbachev said, the process of restructuring in the Soviet Union had been extended to politics, the economy, spiritual life, and ideology.¹⁵⁰ The General Secretary proudly reported that there were no people in the Soviet Union who had been imprisoned for their political or religious convictions. The problem of exit and entry would also be “resolved in a human spirit.”¹⁵¹

Gorbachev declared “a new historical reality,” had emerged, a “turnaround from the principle of over-abundance of weaponry to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense.”¹⁵² To demonstrate the Soviets’ readiness to contribute to this process, by deeds as well as words, the Soviet Union over the next two years would unilaterally reduce its conventional forces by a half million. He also announced an earlier Warsaw Pact decision to

¹⁴⁸ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 459–60.

¹⁴⁹ M.S. Gorbachev’s United Nations Address, 7 December 1988, *Pravda*, 8 December 1988, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Daily Report-Soviet Union*, 7 December 1988 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-88-236), 13.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 17.

withdraw six Soviet tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to disband them by 1991. Assault landing formations and units, and assault river-crossing forces, along with their armaments and combat equipment, would also be withdrawn from the same countries.¹⁵³ The Soviet leadership had been considering making troop reductions since early 1988, when the Politburo received news that the budget deficit was worse than expected, and that the shortage of consumer goods could lead to political instability. Without some reductions in military spending, there would be no resources to tackle the consumer goods deficit. In July 1988, Gorbachev had asked the Soviet General Staff to conduct studies of troop reductions.¹⁵⁴ On October 31, Gorbachev met with his advisers to discuss the speech. All agreed that it was time to make significant cuts in Soviet armed forces.¹⁵⁵

Gorbachev's admission of fault for past Soviet errors, together with his concrete concessions, made his declaration credible to the West.

Gorbachev's admission of fault for past Soviet errors, together with his concrete concessions, made his declaration credible to the West. By acknowledging previous Soviet errors, the psychological balance

between the two states was altered. The United States leaders recognized that Gorbachev's apology carried the risk of diminishing his own and the Soviet Union's prestige; they could not dismiss the statement as cheap propaganda or as having ulterior motives. Yet, if Gorbachev had not made the unilateral arms reductions, it is doubtful that the speech would have made such a significant impact on the West. Gorbachev's unilateral troop cuts and reconfiguration of Soviet forces to a defensive stance were significant because the changes objectively reduced the threat that the Soviets posed to the West. Perhaps even more important, the concession lent credibility to his statements about refraining from the threat or use of force and accepting other states' right to choose their own domestic political systems. This effect was intentional. Gorbachev knew that he had to make unilateral cuts in order to

¹⁵³ Ibid., 17–18.

¹⁵⁴ Harry Gelman, *Gorbachev and the Future of the Soviet Military Institution*, Adelphi Paper No. 258 (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 29; Oberdorfer, *The Turn*, 319–20.

¹⁵⁵ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 459.

make his words credible. He recalled that “people would believe us only if we translated our intentions into deeds.”¹⁵⁶

Gorbachev could make such bold, risky statements because several conservatives had recently been demoted in the 30 September shakeup of the Politburo. On 5 August, when Gorbachev was on vacation, the number-two leader in the

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Communist Party, Yegor Ligachev, made a speech attacking the new direction of Soviet foreign policy and reaffirming the importance of class struggle. Gorbachev’s close adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, defended the priority of universal human values over class interests. At a 30 September Central Committee plenum, Ligachev lost his position as the party secretary responsible for ideology, and was appointed to head a new secretariat commission on agriculture. Yakovlev was placed in charge of the secretariat’s commission on international affairs. Vadim Medvedev, a liberal party secretary, replaced Ligachev as head of ideology. In addition, the conservative Andrei Gromyko and Mikhail Solomentsev resigned from the Politburo.¹⁵⁷

When he made the December 1988 speech, Gorbachev probably did not anticipate that Eastern European countries would abandon communism and the Warsaw Pact; he hoped that they would adopt economic reforms similar to those in the Soviet Union. But Gorbachev was prepared to follow the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and independence, freedom of choice, and noninterference in internal affairs at the cost of losing the Soviet empire.¹⁵⁸ There is no evidence that Gorbachev ever seriously considered using force in Eastern Europe to stop the fall of communist regimes. He recalled that Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979 had “turned into

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 459.

¹⁵⁷ Garthoff, *The Great Transition*, 363–64.

¹⁵⁸ Anatoly Chernyaev, “The Phenomenon of Gorbachev in the Context of Leadership,” *International Affairs* 6 (June 1993): 45.

liabilities, Pyrrhic victories.”¹⁵⁹ At a May 1990 meeting, President George Bush argued that a united Germany had the right to decide for itself which alliance it would join. It was then that Gorbachev surprised his own advisers by unexpectedly agreeing with Bush that Germany had a sovereign right to choose whether to join NATO.¹⁶⁰ According to Chernyaev, Gorbachev realized that he could not advocate “freedom of choice” while denying Germany’s right to choose its alliance.¹⁶¹

CONCLUSIONS

Declarations played a modest but necessary role in the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Declarations accepting the legitimacy of the other regime are essential for security cooperation. For that reason, Kennedy’s American University speech was important because it recognized the Soviet Union as a state with whom the United States shared important interests. Even the 1972 BPA, which failed, taught the superpowers that their mutual interests were limited by differences in ideology. Declarations also helped to establish the meaning of individual foreign policy actions. For example, Gorbachev’s December 1988 speech described a world order where states would cooperate in solving global problems, despite ideological differences, and settle disputes without resorting to threats or use of force. In this way, Gorbachev’s statement framed such actions as the unilateral Soviet troop cut and withdrawal of tanks from Europe.

Declarations played a modest but a necessary role in the rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

By explaining and justifying major foreign policy changes to both the domestic and international public, statements of principle, like Kennedy’s American University speech or Gorbachev’s 1988 speech, helped to lay the foundation for further agreements. The 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan agreement that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought implicitly

¹⁵⁹ Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, 484.

¹⁶⁰ Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 277–78.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 279.

undercut the logic of the arms race. For if nuclear superiority was meaningless, then why should both sides continue to stockpile more and more nuclear warheads? Such declarations undermine domestic opponents of reconciliation and make it easier for leaders to travel down the path of rapprochement. Of course, not all declarations gain domestic support. The Helsinki Final Act furnished a convenient target for opponents of US–Soviet détente, who accused the Ford administration of having “sold out” Eastern Europe. By the time of the Helsinki conference in 1975, détente was already expiring, under the strain of broken US economic commitments and Soviet intervention in Africa.

The impact of declarations on US–Soviet relations depended on their type—symbolic statements, announcements of specific actions, negotiated statements, or statements of conciliatory intent. The credibility of such statements varies greatly, depending on such factors as cost, specificity, and verifiability. Symbolic statements such as recognition of the adversary’s legitimacy or acceptance of blame have inherent credibility; they consummate a new reality by themselves. In general, declarations announcing actions are more persuasive than statements of general intent. Unilateral arms control concessions are persuasive if they involve significant reductions of non obsolete weapons that can be verified by outside observers. For example, one problem with Khrushchev’s unilateral troop cuts in the 1950s was that the US government could neither verify the size of Soviet conventional forces from which reductions were supposedly made nor determine whether the reductions were actually carried out. Declarations of peaceful intent backed up by deeds, such as Khrushchev’s unilateral nuclear test moratorium or Gorbachev’s reductions in Soviet troops and tanks, helped to create greater mutual trust during the Cold War. Unilateral statements of a desire to cooperate have limited impact unless the government also takes appropriate actions.

In most cases, joint understandings negotiated at a summit should refer to specific actions and have clear procedures for implementation. The superpowers had different interpretations of the meaning of the Yalta Declaration and the BPA, based partly on ideology and experience. When such differences later emerged, as they inevitably do, mistrust grew. Worst of all are declarations that commit the parties to maintain an attitude or posture, such as restraint, recognition of equality, and so forth. Such general principles are difficult to implement. Little attention was given to implementation of the BPA because the two parties were making pledges about the “spirit” of their future conduct. The international context helped to determine the degree of impact of conciliatory statements. Conciliatory statements and peace proposals that were issued at the height of Cold War tensions made a much greater

impression on foreign and domestic audiences. For example, the sentiments expressed in Kennedy’s American University speech today seem commonplace, even if the rhetoric was eloquent. If Nixon made such a speech in the 1970s détente period, it might have gone unnoticed. Similarly, Reagan’s agreement that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought was significant against the background of the 1983 Soviet war scare.

Unilateral statements of a desire to cooperate have limited impact unless the government also takes appropriate actions.

International and domestic pressures influenced whether the two states actually carried out declaratory statements. The

Kremlin had no intention of implementing principles in the Helsinki Final Act that called for democracy, respect for sovereignty, and human rights; yet Gorbachev ended up doing just that, at the cost of losing the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. By 1988, Gorbachev realized that arms control agreements alone would not end the Cold War. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could end its international isolation by adopting democracy and respecting human rights.

Negotiations between the United States and Russia over NATO’s planned expansion illustrate the insufficiency of words unless backed up by deeds. The United States tried to reassure Russia over the addition of former Warsaw Pact countries to NATO by means of a NATO declaration that the alliance had no “intention, no plan, and no need” to station nuclear weapons on the territory of former members of the Soviet-led alliance.¹⁶² NATO also promised not to put substantial forces onto the territory of new members. Russia found these assurances inadequate. At the Helsinki summit in March 1997, President Bill Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a new charter for NATO–Russian relations which would include the assurances about not stationing nuclear weapons in the former Warsaw Pact states.¹⁶³ The Founding Act, signed by Yeltsin and Clinton in Paris in May 1997, reiterated NATO’s assurances that it had no “intention, no plan, and no reason” to put nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor would it put substantial foreign forces there.¹⁶⁴ What

¹⁶² Alison Mitchell, “Summit Talks End with Agreements, but not for NATO,” *New York Times*, 22 March 1997.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ Craig R. Whitney, “Russia and West Sign Cooperation Pact,” *New York Times*, 28 May 1997.

made this declaration potentially more binding was the establishment of a permanent NATO–Russia council in Brussels, which will hold monthly meetings. Yeltsin would have preferred a legally binding treaty, but to avoid the need for ratification by the Russian parliament as well as the sixteen current NATO members, he accepted a statement signed by their leaders. United States officials may have wanted to use a declaration rather than a treaty to avoid constraining their choices in the future.¹⁶⁵

The Cold War has shown that progress in developing cooperative relations between states is not always irreversible. Failure to empathize with the other state’s perspective and to understand its security needs can lead to increased hostility and mistrust. Such mistrust can be overcome, but only if governments are willing to accompany declarations with appropriate actions—deeds as well as words.

¹⁶⁵ Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Agrees to NATO Plan Pushed by Clinton to Admit Nations from Eastern Bloc,” *New York Times*, 15 May 1997.

The Role of Public Declarations in Egyptian–Israeli Relations

Emily Landau

Over the years, Egyptian–Israeli relations have not been characterized by the use of mutual declarations in order to enhance confidence and reassurance; in fact, public declarations made in an attempt to convey conciliatory intentions have been the exception rather than the rule. However, when used, the impact of such declarations has been highly significant for the relationship between these two Middle East states, but not always favorable. In fact, the cases to be examined below demonstrate both successes and failures in the use of declarations. In this essay, I will examine the reasons for these results, in order to draw more general conclusions about the factors that must be taken into account to make positive use of public statements and improve bilateral relations.

In this essay, focus will be placed on declarations that seek to increase stability in interstate relations. However, a broad distinction should be drawn between so-called deterrence-oriented statements — which promote a kind of stability — and statements presented in a more conciliatory or forthcoming manner. This essay will deal only with the latter: declarations intended to foster a more positive interstate atmosphere, with an eye to reconciliation. The decisive selection criterion will be whether the declaration involves a positively-stated element geared toward advancing peace, stability, or cooperation, without explicitly deterring, compelling, or coercing the other side.

While the presence of a clear, reassuring element in the declaration, specifically addressing the other side’s concerns, might serve as better criterion for selection, such a restricted definition would limit the body of declarations applicable in the Egyptian–Israeli case. I will include cases where the declarer’s reassurance motive is arguable, but where there is, nevertheless, an attempt to communicate the message in a relatively conciliatory manner. Even if the declarer’s clear self-interest seems to be the motivating force behind the declaration, the declaration must be pursued in a framework geared toward increasing stability or cooperation. While the declarations chosen will fall at different points along the “self-serving”–“other-serving” continuum, in all cases there is at least some attempt to accommodate the other side and address common interests and concerns. Moreover, in some

cases, the target of declarations is not only the attitudes of decision-makers and the public on the other side, but domestic public opinion as well.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) are commonly viewed as strategies of reassurance.¹ In other words, they are measures or steps specifically designed to overcome certain problems of mistrust that hinder cooperation between adversaries who have a basic shared interest in advancing such cooperation. The aim of this essay will be to examine whether the declarations under review have had a reassuring effect, and to analyze the reasons

Confidence-building measures are commonly viewed as strategies of reassurance.

for their success or failure in doing so. However, as stated above, the declarations will not be selected on the basis of whether they are specifically designed to foster confidence and reassurance. If only

declarations aimed to reassure were under review, the interesting question would probably be their potential to create such reassurance through words alone. Thus, if the reassurance motive in such declarations is treated as given, creating credibility through conciliatory intentions is the major concern.²

The definition of declarations adopted here, however, serves to broaden the scope of the cases considered and compared, and sharpen our sensitivity to additional questions of

¹Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1987), 41–61. For a review of the theoretical underpinnings of CBMs and CSBMs see, for example, Michael Krepon, “Conceptualizing and Negotiating CBMs” in Shai Feldman, ed., *Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East*, JCSS Study no. 25 (Tel Aviv: JCSS, 1994), 41–44; Michael Krepon, ed., *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, 2nd edition (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995); and Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, “Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Middle East,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 20, no. 1 (March 1997): 143–171.

²In his analysis of the Egyptian–Israeli peace process, Herbert Kelman relates to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s November 1977 initiative as a “strategy of unilateral reward,” which clearly involves an element of reassurance embodied in offers, concessions, and conciliatory gestures. While Kelman relates to the initiative’s verbal and nonverbal aspects, his discussion of the strategy of unilateral reward, and the reasons for its possible failure, is useful. The first reason he cites concerns the possible lack of interest on the receiving side, while the other two relate to the question of *credibility*, *i.e.*, if the gestures are reinterpreted as tactical maneuvers, or read as a sign of weakness. See Herbert Kelman, “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier: An Analysis of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Process,” *Negotiation Journal* 1 (July 1985): 214–216, 218.

whether and how reassurance is created in more ambiguous situations. While the distinction between “words” and “concrete actions” is important in terms of credibility, other factors may be of even greater salience in assessing the impact of conciliatory declarations. One such factor is whether the initiator understands and empathizes with the overall concerns of the other side. This refers to the question of how conciliatory intentions are presented and received, projected and perceived. Here the focus is not on questions of credibility *per se*, but rather on a state’s sensitivity to the implications of seemingly conciliatory intentions within the broad context of interstate relations. A related factor, relevant in particular to Egyptian–Israeli relations, is that interstate relations must be considered in both their bilateral and multilateral contexts. While some declarations target bilateral aspects of the two countries’ relations, others are stated in multilateral (regional) terms, but have clear bilateral implications. Still other declarations are viewed by one side as multilateral, but perceived by the other side to possess bilateral implications that concern them. The tension between these two contexts, often existing simultaneously, influences the measure of reassurance derived from any particular declaration.

Another significant question is whether the issue itself is approaching resolution. I refer here to what I. William Zartman calls “the way out.” This concept refers not to a specific, mutually acceptable proposal, but rather to a sense that a settlement is a distinct possibility.³ A related question is whether there is a commitment on the part of both parties to pursue cooperation, with the major obstacle being the need to create conditions for mutual confidence, or whether there is a more basic conflict of core interests at stake. The interplay among these factors may determine the effect of conciliatory declarations in reassurance, and they will be considered in this analysis.

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Ultimately, these additional questions are relevant for understanding those declarations that seek specifically to reassure. Thus, by broadening the scope of declarations

³ See I. William Zartman, “The Middle East—The Ripe Moment?” in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David Dewitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), 284–85.

considered, we are able to highlight issues that might otherwise be glossed over due to the specific focus on words versus deeds.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Throughout the history of Egyptian–Israeli relations, declarations of the type defined above have not played a prominent role in attempts to improve bilateral relations or increase overall stability in the Middle East. Until the peace process began in the late 1970s, despite a number of overtures for peace, these types of public declarations were not common.⁴ Israel issued several statements in the early 1970s that sought to create a measure of stability

The confidence-building process that developed between Israel and Egypt following the 1973 war featured concrete steps in the military realm rather than public declarations.

regarding nonconventional capabilities. These statements—which clarified that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region—had undertones of deterrence. The confidence-building process that developed between

Israel and Egypt following the 1973 war featured concrete steps in the military realm rather than public declarations. Thus, it is difficult to identify a history of unilateral statements, joint statements, or negotiated agreements of a declaratory nature between Egypt and Israel before the peace process of the late 1970s.

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s dramatic initiative in November 1977, including his speech before the Israeli Knesset, was an important and interesting development in terms of the deliberate use of declarations for conciliatory purposes. Statements made in this context will be the first case study examined in depth below. While the long-term implications of Sadat’s initiative are open for debate, particularly in light of the difficulties encountered in the current peace process, a broad consensus regards Sadat’s moves to break the initial psychological barrier to peace as a success.

⁴ For a review of peace overtures in the 1949–1952 period, see Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab–Israeli Negotiations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

During the 1980s, however, conciliatory declarations regarding bilateral relations remained uncommon. There are several possible reasons for the absence of such communicatory CBMs. Because a bilateral peace agreement had been signed by this time, declaratory overtures may have been viewed as unnecessary. In addition, Sadat's successor, President Hosni Mubarak, has been less inclined to issue clear-cut statements than his predecessor.

Most importantly, perhaps, was Egypt's attempt to establish itself as a mediator in Arab–Israeli efforts to reach a comprehensive regional peace. Egypt had long viewed itself as the leader of the Arab world. Having signed a peace agreement with Israel, it turned its efforts to the regional context in order to uphold its commitment to work toward the goal of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In 1985, and again in 1989, Egypt proposed initiatives for pushing forward peace negotiations. In 1985, Mubarak drew up a peace plan that focused on peace talks between a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation and Israel; in 1989 he drew up a ten–point plan leading eventually to elections in the West Bank and Gaza. This plan was an attempt to clarify the May 1989 Israeli government's peace plan and to initiate dialogue.⁵ Pursuing its role as mediator, Egypt accordingly issued statements and proposals designed to move the process forward. These statements, however, did not focus specifically on Egyptian–Israeli relations, even though these relations had not developed into the warm peace that many, especially the Israelis, had expected.

This regional emphasis formed the background for two additional clusters of statements and declarations in the 1990s that will be examined here in depth. These two interesting clusters of unilateral declarations were not related directly to negotiations between Israel and potential peace partners—the Palestinians or the Syrians. Rather, they were intended to enhance dialogue on arms control and the building of cooperative regional structures—two major aspects of regional security that became central features of Arab–Israeli relations, especially after the beginning of the 1991 Madrid peace process, and were of direct importance to both Egypt and Israel.

Since the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed, regional security and regional cooperation overall have been major topics of dialogue between the two states.

⁵ On the 1985 initiative, see *Time*, “In Search of Partners,” 11 March 1985, 36; on the 1989 initiative, see *New Outlook*, “The Egyptian 10-Point Plan,” September–October 1989, 50; Hosni Mubarak, interview by CNN, 2 October 1989.

However, these topics have also been the major arena of potential confrontation between them, due to different understandings of how best to approach these issues. Moreover, bilateral and multilateral aspects of the two states' relations have become intertwined. When one state attempted conciliatory declarations on important regional questions, bilateral relations were sometimes overlooked, complicating the ability of both sides to create a sense of reassurance. For example, as will be discussed below, the Egyptian quest for regional arms control was implicitly coupled with Egyptian fears of an Israeli rivalry for hegemony in a more stable Middle East. The complicating effect of these bilateral concerns made it more difficult for both to reassure each other about mutual regional concerns.

The following sections will take a closer look at the three clusters of declarations mentioned above: the events surrounding Sadat's 1977 initiative; statements regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; and statements regarding the creation of regional cooperative structures.

SADAT'S INITIATIVE

The most outstanding declaration in Israeli–Egyptian relations is former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's dramatic speech before the Israeli Knesset directed to the Israeli public in a special session of the Knesset on 20 November 1977. After several months of contemplation and quiet consultation with several key world leaders, Sadat initially proposed

The most outstanding declaration in Israeli–Egyptian relations is former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's dramatic speech before the Israeli Knesset.

the idea of going to the Knesset as a bid for peace in the People's Assembly in Egypt on 9 November. Several days later, Sadat informed US officials that he was serious, pledging to travel to Israel to speak before the Knesset if he received an invitation. Israeli prime minister

Menachem Begin issued an invitation, and on 19 November, Sadat flew to Israel. In his speech before the Knesset Sadat conveyed a message of security, safety, and peace to the Israeli public.

The drama surrounding Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem has drawn considerable attention, prompting a number of studies examining its role as a strategy of reassurance or a

CBM.⁶ In fact, the singular nature of Sadat's visit (in every way) might make it difficult to draw any more general conclusions about the specific role of declarations. Particularly, the fact that the speech was delivered in the Israeli Knesset—so that Sadat's words were immediately placed in the context of an outstanding deed—complicates the task of pinpointing the individual contribution of the declaration itself to advancing reconciliation.

However, while the cumulative effect of Sadat's visit—the high price Sadat paid by coming, and the irreversibility of his action—confirms its value as a , for analytic purposes it may be more productive to attempt to disentangle words from deeds, and examine the various components separately.

While the visit in its entirety make it an unique event, the speech might be more readily analyzed in a comparative context. In his account of Egyptian–Israeli peace

Sadat's Knesset speech was intentionally designed to break "the psychological barrier to peace."

negotiations, then-Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmy emphasizes the importance Sadat placed on his speech before the Knesset, indicating that the words he intended to deliver were uppermost in his mind when planning his trip to Jerusalem.⁷

Sadat's Knesset speech was intentionally designed to break "the psychological barrier to peace," which he believed constituted 70 percent of the problem.⁸ This psychological barrier was perceived to be manifest within the population at large, and Sadat's message was directed specifically to the Israeli public. Sadat's message—as was evident in the content of his speech—did not communicate new ideas regarding the conditions for achieving peace, or

⁶ See Janice Gross Stein, "Confidence Building and Dilemmas of Cooperation," in Gabriel Bendor and David Dewitt, eds., *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 209–212; and Herbert C. Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier," 213–234.

⁷ Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 256.

⁸ "Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a complicated psychological barrier between us—a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection, a barrier of fear of deception, a barrier of hallucinations around any action, deed or decision, a barrier of cautious and erroneous interpretation of all and every event or statement." As-Sadat Knesset speech; For the text of Sadat's address, see http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html; accessed on 26 April 1999. According to Fahmy, Sadat never actually mentioned the "psychological barrier" prior to his Knesset speech. (279–280) However, the centrality of this notion in the speech itself is clearly significant. See also Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier."

signify any change of Egypt's official position on this issue. Sadat clarified that the purpose of his visit was neither to forge a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, nor to end the state of war and postpone the resolution of the conflict to another stage. He urged the establishment of a just (comprehensive) peace, which to him meant the return of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and statehood.⁹ In fact, Sadat's policy positions had already been conveyed to Begin in preliminary meetings in Morocco between Israeli foreign minister Moshe Dayan and Sadat's envoy Hassan Tuhami. Sadat was also aware of Begin's position and his willingness to make substantial territorial concessions in Sinai but not in the West Bank or Gaza.

Even though Sadat clarified in his speech that he had no intention to pursue a separate peace with Israel, ultimately Sadat agreed to a separate peace—with significant territorial concessions on the part of Israel. Although Sadat insisted on a comprehensive solution, he conveyed a tacit willingness to pursue a bilateral agreement in the first stage. Primarily, Sadat realized that for any movement to occur, the psychological barrier had to be overcome.

In fact, Sadat's attempt to confront the psychological barrier head-on was the most important element of his message to the Israeli public. Sadat aimed to convince the Israeli public of the sincerity of his peaceful intentions, subject to his explicit conditions. Even though both Sadat's speech and Begin's response in the Knesset conveyed nothing new on the crucial issues, it is significant that both leaders struck a noticeably milder tone than in the past.¹⁰ While Sadat mentioned the Palestinian problem several times, and the need to reach a just solution to their plight, it was the promise of "no more war," as well as Sadat's explicit mention of the importance of Israel's security concerns, that spoke directly to the Israeli

⁹ "Conceive with me a peace agreement in Geneva that we would herald to a world thirsty for peace. A peace agreement based on the following points: Ending the Israeli occupation of the territories occupied in 1967; achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state; third, the right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, which will be secured and guaranteed. . . ; fourth, commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the UN Charter. . . ; fifth, ending the state of belligerency in the region." As-Sadat Knesset speech, *ibid.*

¹⁰ Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process, 1977–1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 52.

public.¹¹ Shlomo Avineri has commented recently that Israeli understanding of peace as more than a state of non-war explains the emotional response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. In addition to the words, Sadat's warm tone and friendly style convinced Israelis that peace in the messianic sense had come.¹²

Raymond Cohen, in his study of the cultural chasm between Israel and Egypt, draws attention to the Egyptian

Sadat appreciated the importance of the verbal message to the Israeli public.

propensity for nonverbal communication and symbolic political gesture.¹³ He claims that through the years, Egyptian officials often did not realize that while this mode of expression was clear to the Egyptian, it "was only dimly discernible to the Israeli."¹⁴ In light of Cohen's analysis, Sadat's speech to the Knesset takes on even greater significance: Sadat appreciated the importance of the verbal message to the Israeli public. The speech, delivered in Jerusalem with a message regarding the end of the state of belligerency, succeeded in convincing Israelis that Sadat wanted peace.

The political conditions surrounding Sadat's initiative have been analyzed in depth in a number of important studies focusing on Egyptian–Israeli relations in general, and the

¹¹ "What is peace for Israel? If it means that Israel lives in the region with its Arab neighbors in security and safety, to such logic I say yes. If it means that Israel lives within its borders secure against any aggression, to such logic I say yes. If it means that Israel obtain all kinds of guarantees that insure those two factors, to this demand I say yes." As-Sadat Knesset speech. See also Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier," 220; Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process*, 59–60. Bar-Siman-Tov highlights public opinion surveys taken in Israel immediately following Sadat's visit underscoring the positive effect of the visit.

¹² Shlomo Avineri's response to the ninth B'nai B'rith World Center "Jerusalem Address," delivered by Bernard Lewis on "The Middle East Towards the Year 2000: Patterns of Change," 19 February 1996, <http://bnaibrith.org/worldcen/jeraddr/pattchan.html>; accessed on 1 February 1999.

¹³ Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian–Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990) 72–73.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 73; see also 162–163.

peace process in particular.¹⁵ Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov argues that Begin's victory in the May 1977 elections, and the foreign policy change that this brought about, regarding the Arab–Israeli conflict, enabled Sadat to carry out his initiative. Bar-Siman-Tov notes that while expectations had been that Begin's rise to power would decrease the chances for achieving a settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict, in fact Begin "introduced a grand new design, with two seemingly contradictory aims: retaining Israeli control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and achieving peace treaties with the Arab states and especially with Egypt."¹⁶ Begin was determined to "launch Israel on a new era of peace" as a means of securing his place in history. Moreover, according to Bar-Siman-Tov, "Sadat's decision was made only after he had become convinced, through direct and indirect exchanges with Israel, that Israel would respond positively" to his initiative.¹⁷

It is clear that Begin himself was aware of Sadat's position in advance, and that his own conception of Sadat's intentions was not altered as a result of the visit. Begin had signaled his willingness to negotiate, and had put forth his terms. Sadat, in turn, was convinced that Begin was a strong leader capable of carrying through with peace negotiations.¹⁸ However, key decisionmakers in Israel's government and defense establishment were unaware of the exchanges that had taken place between Israel and Egypt in the months preceding November 1977 (Begin and Dayan kept these contacts secret), and were thus skeptical about both the visit and Sadat's intentions.¹⁹ According to Bar-Siman-Tov:

¹⁵ In the analysis below I will be referring to the following studies: Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier;" Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process*; Cohen, *Culture and Conflict*; Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*; Melvin A. Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983); and William B. Quandt, *Camp David. Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986).

¹⁶ Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process*, 32.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 19, 21, 32B33.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 26B27.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 35B39.

The failure of Israeli decisionmakers to conduct thorough deliberations on Sadat's initiative not only prevented serious preparation for the visit and its consequences but also led to a breach between the decisionmakers and the military establishment. . . . Nevertheless, this failure did not prevent Begin from realizing that Sadat's initiative was a significant change, and his immediate and positive response enabled the emerging process to go forward.²⁰

Egypt's insistence on a comprehensive, rather than separate peace remained a major point of divergence between Israel and Egypt throughout the negotiations. While Egypt finally agreed to a formula whereby the Palestinian problem would be dealt with at a later time and signed an essentially bilateral peace agreement, it never officially abandoned its position. The question of a separate peace was an issue that plagued negotiations during 1978 and 1979. As Kelman points out, it was the active role of the US in pushing for an agreement that led the two sides to the Camp David Accords and to the peace treaty in 1979.²¹ However, at the stage of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the positions of both sides were clear. While Sadat had hoped for some reciprocal act from Begin after his Knesset speech that would signal his agreement to a comprehensive arrangement, he seems to have been assured of—prior to his arrival—an Israeli concession on Sinai. It was on the basis of this assurance that Sadat traveled to Israel.

Regarding the Egyptian domestic front, and the wider Arab front, the situation was somewhat more complex. Sadat realized that his speech in the Knesset would be unpopular, and, according to Friedlander, he took certain steps to mitigate this opposition in advance. In choosing the members of his delegation to Jerusalem, he "carefully balanced every adviser opposed to his plans with one loyal to his views."²² Moreover, he sought to create the impression that his visit was designed to bring peace and prosperity to Egyptians. On 9 November, in his address to the opening session of the People's Assembly, Sadat dramatically revealed that he would be willing to speak at the Knesset if this would advance the cause of peace, a gesture applauded by assembly members. According to the account provided by

²⁰ Ibid., 47

²¹ Kelman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier," 221B224.

²² Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, 85.

Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian foreign minister who resigned in protest on the eve of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Sadat was supposed to follow a prepared text for this speech, but, "suddenly he departed from it and emotionally declared that he was ready to go anywhere in the world, even to Jerusalem, to deliver a speech and address the Knesset if this would help save the blood of his sons."²³

However, Fahmy contends that the audience did not take this statement at face value: the applause did not signify an approval of Sadat's idea. Rather, the audience had been swept away by Sadat's readiness to go anywhere in the world to "save the blood of his sons."²⁴ From the available accounts, it is difficult to know whether Sadat had planned this speech in advance, or whether he suddenly decided to disclose an idea that he had been contemplating. While his announcement clearly achieved a measure of dramatic effect, he left his advisors confused.

Fahmy maintains that Sadat both disregarded the advice of his top advisors and kept them in the dark regarding his plans before to the Jerusalem trip.²⁵ Although directly opposed to Sadat's visit, Fahmy writes, "Despite all my reservations about the trip to Jerusalem, I would have accepted the move even if I did not agree with it, had Sadat set forth a coherent rationale and discussed it with his senior colleagues."²⁶ Seeing only benefits to Israel, Fahmy objected to Sadat's initiative. Regarding the speech itself, Fahmy notes that Sadat did not depart from the collective Arab stand in order to prove to the Arab public and to the Egyptians

²³ Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, 265.

²⁴ Ibid., 266. See also the account provided by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his book *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem* (New York: Random House, 1997), 111–13. In a recent account by Maurice Guindi, who covered Sadat's visit first hand, he comes to the same conclusion: ". . .almost everybody, including Arafat and even the Egyptian cabinet ministers, took Sadat's words as a figure of speech intended to underline his keen desire for peace." Maurice Guindi, "Days of Wine and Roses," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 20–26 November 1997.

²⁵ Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace*, 281; see also Dina Ezzat, "Sadat's Elusive Dream," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 20–26 November 1997.

²⁶ Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, 281.

that he was the best advocate of the Arab cause. “Covertly, however, [Sadat] continued to make major concessions to Israel, something which he admitted only later.”²⁷

Kelman argues that Sadat overestimated the extent of wider Arab support that he would receive; in fact, the widespread rejection of his initiative in the Arab world contributed to an erosion of his domestic support. Kelman suggests that a “strategy of unilateral reward,” with its accompanying elements of drama and surprise, is particularly vulnerable to such problems, as there is no time to prepare domestic constituencies, and to secure their support.²⁸

While Sadat clearly made attempts to gather domestic support for his initiative, it seems that his efforts were too little, too late. According to Kelman, this lack of support had an impact on Israeli attitudes, making Israelis less willing to pursue a comprehensive, long-term peace. Sadat’s ability, however, to move forward even without Arab support for a separate peace with Israel set the stage for starting the process. In Kelman’s words:

Sadat’s failure to pay adequate attention to the impact of his initiative on Arab and domestic Egyptian constituencies limited the effectiveness of his strategy by reducing the credibility of the rewards he was offering, particularly as inducements for Israel to embrace the concept of a comprehensive peace. Yet, it was this relative disregard of Arab and domestic constituencies that helped to make Sadat’s initiative possible in the first place.²⁹

In assessing Sadat’s initiative, particularly his address to the Knesset, it is useful to view the short-term and long-term implications separately. The long-term, positive impact of the Knesset speech was not wholly successful. According to Kelman, a number of difficulties

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 284

²⁸ Kelman, “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier,” 222–224. In Maurice Guindi’s account (“Days of Wine and Roses”), he notes that during the months in which Sadat pondered the idea, he did discreetly sound out certain “key world leaders whose responses had been encouraging.” Whatever prior consultations were held seem to have been with foreign leaders rather than domestic constituencies.

²⁹ Kelman, “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier,” 222–223.

arose in the years that followed, such as the conflict between the “separate” versus “comprehensive peace,” the effects of ambivalence and polarization in domestic politics, and the impact of frustrated expectations.³⁰ Moreover, Sadat’s lack of attention to domestic constituencies is underscored by Egypt’s continuing reluctance to pursue normalization with

Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, and especially his speech to the Knesset, illustrated to the Israeli public his sincere intention to negotiate peace and abandon the option of war.

Israel until a comprehensive peace is achieved. A public opinion poll conducted by *Al-Ahram Weekly* in December 1994 found that most Egyptians still believed that a “psychological barrier” continues to haunt Egyptian–Israeli relations.³¹

However, the short-term impact of the Knesset speech—the most important in creating the conditions for initiating negotiations—was powerful, especially on the Israeli public. Although both sides clearly shared an interest in pursuing cooperation and had a three-year history of confidence building in Sinai, Egypt and Israel in 1977 needed to overcome a very real psychological barrier. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, and especially his speech to the Knesset, illustrated to the Israeli public his sincere intention to negotiate peace and abandon the option of war.

Sadat’s speech was purposely designed to build confidence and overcome psychological obstacles that stood in the way of reaching an agreement that both sides had an interest in achieving. The speech focused on bilateral relations between Israel and Egypt, although Egypt insisted that the Palestinian problem had to be solved as well, in the context of a comprehensive peace. With the value of an Egyptian–Israeli agreement relatively clear to both sides, the overriding concern was the mistrust that existed on both sides.³² Sadat

³⁰ Ibid., 221–231. See also commentaries that appear in a special section of *Al-Ahram Weekly* on the occasion of the 20 year anniversary of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem: 20–26 November 1997.

³¹ Quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, “Egyptian–Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), 74. See Dina Ezzat, “Sadat’s Elusive Dream.”

³² As Kelman points out, “The Sadat initiative and the ensuing peace treaty could not have occurred unless Egypt and Israel perceived a political settlement as congruent with their respective national interests.” “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier,” 214.

attached great importance to overcoming the psychological barrier, and saw it as a necessary condition to begin negotiations. He recognized that the lack of communication and the mistrust that existed between the two countries was a serious danger in itself. As he explained in answer to a question asked during an interview with CBS just one week after his visit to Jerusalem, a state of mutual mistrust could lead to misunderstandings of intentions, that could in turn actually escalate to a war that neither side desired.³³

EFFORTS TO CONTROL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The second cluster of declarations relates to wider regional concerns about the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, and the potential enhancement of regional security that may be gained by addressing the issues associated with them. A convenient point of departure in discussing both Egyptian and Israeli declarations in this regard is President Mubarak's proposal of early April 1990 to rid the region of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. An initial statement to this effect was issued by Mubarak on 8 April, when he said that "Egypt is trying its best to declare the Middle East an area clear of weapons of mass destruction."³⁴ Mubarak's call came in the wake of a series of events

³³ The question posed to Sadat related to his statement several months earlier that he would never meet with Israel as long as a single Israeli soldier remained on Egyptian territory. What made him change his mind? In his answer, Sadat explained in detail the explicit dangers of miscalculation: "Could you imagine that we could have been involved in a battle with the Israelis two weeks ago. Why? The Israelis had begun military maneuvers in Sinai, and they announced it. Al-Jamasi, the commander in chief, was closely watching and following everything. Each side was prepared. Well, when they began their maneuvers, Al-Jamasi began to conduct maneuvers here on the same scale. They announced their maneuvers, but Al-Jamasi did not announce ours. Therefore, when I met with 'Ezer Weizman, the Israeli defense minister, he asked me: 'were you planning to attack us 10 days ago?' I said to him: 'No. Why?' He said: 'There were unusual movements on your side.' I said: 'This was a maneuver, because you were conducting maneuvers in Sinai at that time.' 'Well,' he said 'this was due to a report by our intelligence, because the Israeli intelligence was also prepared just like mine was, and no one wanted the other to launch the first strike.' Therefore, they sent their reports to the defense minister in Israel saying that the Egyptians were making preparations. My intelligence services also considered the size of the Israeli maneuvers in Sinai unusual. Well, if there had been an error on the part of either side, we would have gotten involved in a war against our wills. . . . I did not know before I went that they were in such a state. However, I thought that if we destroyed the psychological barrier between us, we could avoid any such errors, and I was right in making the visit." Anwar As-Sadat interview with CBS, 28 November 1977.

³⁴ John Fullerton, "Egypt's Mubarak Urges Nuclear, Chemical Arms Free Middle East," *Reuters News Service*, 8 April 1990.

beginning with reports that Iraq was attempting to illegally acquire nuclear triggers, and Iraqi fears that Israel might attempt a strike similar to the 1981 air attack on Iraq's Osiraq nuclear site. The *New York Times* revealed in late March that Iraq had the capability to strike Tel Aviv with its missiles, and experts explained that Iraq was signaling its determination to retaliate against any attempt by Israel to attack its chemical or other military facilities.³⁵ On 2 April, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein issued a specific threat to "make the fire eat up half of Israel if it tries [to strike] against Iraq."³⁶

These events focused attention on the dangers of unconventional weapons in the Middle East, and triggered the Egyptian campaign to rid the region of weapons of mass destruction. Mubarak made a quick trip to Baghdad and Jordan in an attempt to defuse the regional tensions that these events provoked, and his initial declaration was made upon his return. A week later, Egyptian foreign minister Esmat Abdel Meguid sent a letter to UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, with three recommendations for the control of WMD: "All weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological—should be prohibited in the Middle East; all nations of the region should meet equal and reciprocal commitments in this regard; and verification measures should be established to ascertain full compliance of all states."³⁷

As will be discussed further below, Mubarak's April 1990 initiative was intended not only to elevate the general level of concern regarding WMD in the Middle East, especially following Saddam Hussein's threat, but also to press Israel on the nuclear issue. However, the specific timing of the proposal, as well as its wording (particularly when compared to previous and later statements that spoke directly to Israel), indicate—at least at face value—a broader effort toward increasing regional stability. Reducing the tension surrounding states' attempts to develop and/or secure WMD and clarifying that the overall goal must be to deal with these weapons so that they do not constitute a threat was crucial to this endeavor.

³⁵ Shlomo Shamir, "Iraq Is Capable of Launching Missiles to Tel Aviv," *Ha'aretz*, 1 April 1990.

³⁶ Voice of the Masses, Baghdad, 1030 GMT, 2 April 1990 (BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts (afterwards *SWB*), ME/0730, A/3, 4 April 1990).

³⁷ See Carol Berger, "Egypt: Government Presses for High-Tech Weapons Ban," *Independent*, 19 April 1990, 15. See also "Egypt: Mubarak Holds Talks with Fellow Members of Arab Co-operation Council," *Middle East Economic Digest*, 20 April 1990, 15.

Over the years, Egyptian references to the dangers of unconventional weapons tended to focus primarily on Israel's perceived potential in the nuclear realm. In his 1990 proposal, Mubarak's use of the term "weapons of mass destruction"—which refers to chemical and biological, as well as nuclear weapons—combined with the fact that Israel was not mentioned by name, demonstrates that he did not intend to single out Israel.³⁸ As Israel's stated intention has been to work towards the creation of a weapons of mass destruction free zone, the aim of Mubarak's initiative was seemingly compatible with Israel's goals, although each state defined their framework for achieving this goal in very different terms.

Mubarak's proposal is often regarded by Egyptian officials and analysts as a point of reference for the beginning of dialogue on arms control in the Middle East.

Mubarak's proposal is often regarded by Egyptian officials and analysts as a point of reference for the beginning of dialogue on arms control in the Middle East, which they believed should focus on dealing with WMD in a regional context. However, the following five years saw a steadily increasing focus on Israel's assumed nuclear option in several different forums: the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks that began in 1992 as part of the Madrid Peace Process; during the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993; or the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of April–May 1995. While Israel's assumed nuclear activity had been an ongoing Egyptian concern since the early 1960s,³⁹ the first half of the 1990s is singular in the intensity of Egyptian diplomatic efforts to deal with WMD in the Middle East in general, and with Israel's assumed nuclear capability in particular.⁴⁰

³⁸ See Yoram Nimrod, "A Nuclear-Free Middle East?" *The Jerusalem Report*, 6 December 1990. Nimrod believes that in his proposal, Mubarak made significant modifications of the traditional Arab position on disarmament.

³⁹ Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, *Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus Publishing House, 1994) (Hebrew).

⁴⁰ Possible explanations for this emphasis have to do with the sense of opportunity provided by the convening of the ACRS working group, the sense of urgency that was associated with the approach of the NPT Review Conference, and the personal interest in this issue displayed by Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa.

Egyptian officials provided different reasons for this focus on Israel, the most important of which was the differential attention given to Iraq and Israel in the nuclear realm, especially as the inspections in Iraq were in full force.⁴¹ The effect of Mubarak's April 1990 initiative, which at least initially focused on tensions surrounding regional efforts to secure WMD (without singling out Israel and the nuclear realm), was mitigated as a gradually increasing emphasis was placed on Israel alone. Indeed, Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa's campaign shifted focus almost exclusively to Israel's nuclear activity. The nuclear issue became a major source of tension between the two states; it was ultimately at the heart of an ACRS dispute between Israel and Egypt that led to the indefinite postponement of these talks after December 1995.⁴²

To understand this intensified focus on Israel, one must take a closer look at the dynamics of the regional Middle East context, both at the time of Mubarak's initiative and in the following years. At the time of the initiative, Egypt was concerned by the implications of Iraq's attempts to establish itself as Israel's primary nuclear challenger in the Arab world.⁴³ However, it was difficult politically for Egypt to condemn Iraq's efforts. Egypt was also concerned by what it believed Israel was pursuing in the nuclear realm, and the implications of Israel's qualitative edge in the Middle East.



⁴¹ For a more detailed discussion of Egyptian motivation on the nuclear issue see for example Emily Landau, "The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group: 1994–1996" in Mark Heller, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1995–1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). What seems to have concerned Egypt most was Israel's integration with an overwhelming qualitative edge into a peaceful Middle East, which would threaten Egypt's regional standing.

⁴² See Bruce Jentleson, *The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Talks: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, IGCC Policy Paper, no. 26 (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California, IGCC, 1996).

⁴³ See for example Fullerton, "Egypt's Mubarak."

Thus, we find a rather odd statement issued by the Egyptian Foreign Minister at the time of Mubarak's initial proposal, Esmat Abdel Meguid, expressing support for Mubarak's efforts to stop the unconventional arms race in the Middle East. In the same

Egypt perceived the unconventional weapons race as inherently dangerous, but believed that no course of action could be pursued without first addressing Israel's qualitative edge.

breath, however, Meguid supported Iraq's right to defend itself, claiming that Iraq was merely the victim of an unfair campaign waged by Western nations.⁴⁴ Egypt perceived the unconventional weapons race as inherently dangerous, but believed that no course of action could be pursued without first addressing Israel's qualitative edge. Otherwise, any Arab state seeking unconventional capability could justify its actions in terms of its right to self-defense.

Following the 1991 Gulf War and the measures taken by the international community against Iraq, Egypt progressively came to Iraq's defense. This development was a reaction to what was viewed as the intolerable double standard being employed by the West regarding nuclear activity in the Middle East. While Iraq was subjected to the full thrust of the West's sanctions and intrusive measures, Israel was allowed to conduct its affairs undisturbed. When the ACRS working group was established in 1992, Egypt viewed it as the proper forum for pursuing negotiations on the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Subsequent developments served as triggers for intensifying efforts to pressure Israel to discuss the nuclear issue. Once Egypt began this highly visible campaign, which included linking its support for the CWC and the indefinite renewal of the NPT to Israel's willingness to sign the NPT, it could no longer compromise its position. When Egypt was pressured by the US to back down from its demand regarding the NPT Review Conference, it transferred the thrust of its demand to ACRS, effectively putting a halt to all activity geared toward normalizing relations between Israel and the Arab states until Israel agreed to include discussion of a NWFZ on the immediate agenda of ACRS.

⁴⁴ Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic, 1500 GMT, 18 April 1990 (FBIS-NES-90-076, 19 April 1990).

From the beginning, Israel did not believe that Mubarak's 1990 initiative addressed its regional security concerns in any meaningful way. While Israel was committed to the goal of creating a region free of weapons of mass destruction, certain stages had to be passed for it to begin discussions on this issue, particularly, achieving a peaceful regional environment.

Israel did not believe that Mubarak's 1990 initiative addressed its regional security concerns in any meaningful way.

For Egypt, concerns regarding regional stability caused it to press for these discussions. Regional politics were an additional important factor, as Egypt hoped to use

this issue as a means of solidifying its leadership position in the Arab world. Yet, it was this same regional context that made Israel particularly wary, especially in light of the reports of nuclear activity in Iraq and Iran. The issue also had bilateral implications which served to further complicate matters. Egypt was concerned about its probable future rivalry with Israel over regional hegemony after peace had been achieved. Thus, Israel's qualitative superiority increasingly became a concern to Egypt as progress was achieved in peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel and Jordan.

On the Israeli side, the most dramatic statement in the same time period was Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's speech at the CWC in Paris in January 1993, in which he specifically mentioned nuclear weapons in the category of WMD that had to be dealt with in a regional context.⁴⁵ Here Peres made a clear concession in terms of Israel's traditional stand on the nuclear issue by explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ In an interview with Peres several days later, he clarified that the precondition for disarmament is peace:

What we are saying to our Arab neighbors and to the entire world is that one cannot start building a house from the second floor. One must start from the first

⁴⁵ In Peres's address to the CWC, he said, "In the spirit of global pursuit of general and complete disarmament . . . Israel suggests to all countries of the region to construct a mutually verifiable zone, free of surface-to-surface missiles and of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons." *Reuters News Service*, 13 January 1993.

⁴⁶ In a report on Israel radio the day before Peres's speech, it was noted that "[t]his is the first time an Israeli leader will publicly declare Israel's readiness to participate in disarming the Middle East of nonconventional weapons." *Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el* in Hebrew, 0500 GMT, 12 January 1993 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS-NES-93-007*, 12 January 1993). (afterwards *FBIS*)

floor and work upwards. The first floor is peace, and the second floor is a Middle East completely free of nonconventional weapons and missiles.⁴⁷

In an attempt to deal with the difficulties that arose in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group discussions in late February 1995, Israel proposed to address the nuclear issue by beginning discussion of a NWFZ within a specific time framework—two years after signing peace agreements with all regional states, including Iran and Iraq. According to one report, this proposal was an attempt by Peres to strike a deal with Egypt whereby Israel would agree to discussions on a NWFZ and Egypt would end its campaign against Israel. According to Peres's aides, the Egyptians rejected the deal and continued their campaign even more intensely.⁴⁸

In late December 1995, Peres answered a reporter's question regarding Israel's nuclear intentions by saying, "Give me peace, and I'll give up the atom."⁴⁹

Following an uproar over his statements in security circles (that felt he had conceded too much), Peres almost immediately defused his statement by clarifying that the peace to which he referred embodied all states of the region, including Iran, Iraq, and Libya.⁵⁰ According to one report in the media, Peres's aides explained that his statement "was motivated by his desire to overcome Arab opposition to Israel's nuclear capabilities and fulfill a US request for Jerusalem to make some gestures

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psychological obstacles, but rather
serious security concerns.***

⁴⁷ Tel Aviv Educational Television Network in Hebrew, 1400 GMT, 15 January 1993.

⁴⁸ See Steve Rodan, "Clear and Present Option," *Jerusalem Post*, 7 June 1996. See also *Ha'aretz*, 23 February 1995; *Ha'aretz*, 24 February 1995; and *Ma'ariv*, 2 March 1995.

⁴⁹ *Ha'aretz*, 24 December 1995.

⁵⁰ *Ha'aretz*, 26 December 1995; see also interview with Shimon Peres by Ruba al-Husari in Jerusalem: London, *Al-Hayah* in Arabic, 28 December 1995 (FBIS-NE8-95-250, 29 December 1995).

that would resolve the disagreement over the NPT.”⁵¹ However, the statement achieved nothing, leaving the issue unresolved, and the ACRS working group inoperative.

Why were both the initial proposal made by Mubarak, as well as Peres’s statement, unable to create a more favorable atmosphere for arms control dialogue, even though each side made attempts to accommodate the other? This seems to be due primarily to the fact that there was only a relatively weak measure of agreement between Egypt and Israel on the issue of arms control. Both agreed that the general goal of arms control in the unconventional realm, if achievable, would ultimately increase regional security and prove mutually beneficial. But the essential questions of when, how, and under what conditions remained open. Moreover, the issue involved other parties who, on the one hand, had a direct bearing on the kind of agreement to be reached, but who did not intend to join a regional process to advance this goal. In this case, the problem of reconciliation faced (and continues to face) not only psychological obstacles, but rather serious security concerns. Each side views the issue as touching upon its most basic interests. Israel is concerned with its continued survival in the Middle East, while Egypt is concerned about its continued dominant role in the region. Unilateral statements which communicate general objectives and goals in this regard, *i.e.*, a general desire to establish a weapons of mass destruction free zone, are not effective in and of themselves for dealing with these types of concerns. The issue is complex, with both bilateral and multilateral implications that are difficult to consider separately. Both sides are still far from having achieved a mutual sense of a “way out.”

THE NEW MIDDLE EAST

The third cluster of declarations under review involve statements by Shimon Peres (then serving as foreign minister in Yitzhak Rabin’s government) regarding his vision for the new Middle East.⁵² Peres advocated economic cooperation and integration in the Middle East

⁵¹ Rodan, "Clear and Present Option."

⁵² The most comprehensive elaboration of Peres’s vision appears in his book, *The New Middle East* (Rockport, Mass.: Element, 1993). Peres, who had long held the vision of a new Middle East, first addressed this topic in his capacity as foreign minister in Rabin’s government in 1992. At that stage, he stressed the importance of the multilateral peace talks that focus, among other issues, on economic issues that could lead to the establishment of an economic base for peace. The signing of an accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993 provided an important impetus to Peres’s vision of a new Middle East: he viewed lasting peace as the result of work on two tracks: closing wounds of the past and building a new

as an important basis for lasting peace in the region. In his book, Peres elaborates on a number of economic programs to improve the regional economy. In general, Peres's ideas were advanced in what he perceived as a conciliatory framework, with a vision for the Middle East in the 21st century. Peres spoke of "a new Genesis which would spawn a new Middle East commonwealth;" he suggested "[embarking] on a new beginning to open the arms of the region, fertilize the land and connect the mountains, desert and sea, to irrigate and make fertile again."⁵³

Before taking a closer look at the impact of Peres's statements on Arab states (especially Egypt), it is important to note that Peres's vision of an integrated Middle East was also directed at domestic

Peres advocated economic cooperation and integration in the Middle East as an important basis for lasting peace in the region.

Israeli audiences. He wished to emphasize that while Israel was being asked to make significant territorial concessions in the framework of the peace process—without achieving a noticeable improvement in its security situation—the fruits of these peace efforts were more readily tangible in regional cooperation.⁵⁴ Peres did not hide the fact that his vision clearly

Middle East (Costas Paris, "Peres Says Mideast Peace Means Economic Cooperation," *Reuters News Service*, 23 November 1993) However, while these initial statements discussed the vision, the major focus of this essay will be placed on the impact of Peres's later statements, especially those associated with the first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summit held in Casablanca, Morocco in October 1994. The reason for this is that prior to that time, Peres's statements had been voiced in primarily international (especially European) fora in an effort to secure the interest and financial support of Europe and the US. At the MENA conferences, Peres spoke strongly for the first time of his idea in a forum that included Arab states, including Egypt. Moreover, especially at Casablanca, Peres spoke about the realization of his vision. The impact of these statements at such a gathering was very significant.

⁵³ See "Middle East Peace: The Beginning of an End to Enmity," *Daily Telegraph*, 14 September 1993, 13; and a speech delivered by Peres at Princeton University, as reported by Steve James, "Peres Outlines New Middle East," *Reuters News Service*, 29 September 1993.

⁵⁴ In a speech to a special Knesset plenum session in answer to motions concerning the agreement with the PLO on the Gaza/Jericho First plan in 1993, Peres used the image of the new Middle East: "The entire nation will rally around the flag and the book of prayers, and all nations will march toward economic cooperation for the sake of the future of the entire region." (Jerusalem Channel 2 TV in Hebrew, 1208 GMT, 30 August 1993; *FBIS-NES*-93-167, 31 August 1993). In the opening of the Winter Session of the Knesset, 23 October 1995, Peres devoted his remarks to the Taba Accord. In response to statements questioning Israel's gains from the Oslo 1 and Oslo 2 agreements, Peres noted that they allowed the convening of the Casablanca summit and new economic systems that "will propel the Middle

served Israel's own interest to become integrated into the Middle East, by expanding and normalizing regional ties; rather, he hoped to emphasize this message to the Israeli public. Nevertheless, Peres believed that he was offering important benefits to the Arab world as well, stimulating economic growth and development throughout the region.

In Peres's opening speech to the first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summit in Casablanca, Morocco (October–November 1994), he spoke about the unprecedented aim of the conference "not to negotiate peace politically, nor to sustain peace militarily, but to build peace economically." He presented the choice before the 300 million people of the Middle East to either "remain poor and bitter, wearing the cloak of protest and the mantle of fundamentalism, or to become 300 million producers and consumers investing in posterity, to enter the 21st Century as equals with the most developed nations."⁵⁵ In a closing speech at the same conference he said, "I do believe that over the last two days we are witnessing the birth of a new Middle East, we are witnessing a new spring, an economic spring, coming to our midst. . . ."⁵⁶ The *Jerusalem Post* quoted Peres as saying that the Casablanca Summit had transformed the Middle East into a region looking towards economic cooperation.⁵⁷

The general atmosphere at the Casablanca summit was positive regarding the prospects for regional economic cooperation. In his opening speech, King Hassan II of Morocco spoke of the importance of the summit in terms of its ability to "consolidate the pillars and to provide peace with the means to become widespread, durable, and inclusive of the entire region."⁵⁸ Crown Prince Hasan of Jordan adopted the terminology of a "new Middle

East from the nineteenth century into the twenty-first." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs internet homepage: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH016f>; accessed on 1 February 1999.

⁵⁵ RTM TV, Rabat, in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 30 October 1994 (*SWB-Middle East*, 1 November 1994).

⁵⁶ RTM TV, Rabat, in Arabic, 1327 GMT, 1 November 1994 (*SWB*, 3 November 1994).

⁵⁷ Jose Rosenfeld, "Peres Calls Conference Middle East 'Revolution,'" *The Jerusalem Post* in English, 1 November 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-212-S*, 2 November 1994).

⁵⁸ RTM TV, Rabat, in Arabic, 1738 GMT, 30 October 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-211-S*, 1 November 1994).

East,” emphasizing the need to adopt new thinking and fresh perspectives. He drew attention to the peace treaty with Israel signed shortly before the summit and the mutual commitment to the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME). Moreover, in a news conference on the final day of the summit, Hasan rejected the equation of submission and normalization.⁵⁹

Egypt, however, was much less enthusiastic. Foreign Minister Musa’s speech emphasized Egypt’s belief that resolving the Arab–Israeli dispute was the starting point for a new era in the Middle East, and that economic cooperation could not take its proper course until peace was complete.⁶⁰ The less enthusiastic Egyptian approach was apparent in other statements made by Musa prior to the summit. On one occasion, when discussing Egypt’s role at the summit, he noted that things were moving forward “whether we like it or not,” and that Egypt needed to cooperate with these developments within an Egyptian, national, and pan-Arab framework; Egypt’s role was to push regional projects onto the right course.⁶¹

Egypt’s reticence to promote economic cooperation reflected suspicions that Israel viewed itself (with US backing) as central to the process of regional economic integration.⁶² This view reinforced Egyptian concerns that Israel sought regional hegemony in the Middle

⁵⁹ For these (and other) statements made during the Casablanca summit see FBIS supplement reports on the Casablanca Economic Conference for the Middle East and North Africa: *FBIS-NES-94-211-S*, 1 November 1994 and *FBIS-NES-94-212-S*, 2 November 1994.

⁶⁰ Cairo MENA in Arabic, 1950 GMT, 30 October 1994, and Cairo MENA in Arabic, 2030 GMT, 31 October 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-211-S*, 1 November 1994).

⁶¹ Cairo MENA in Arabic, 2100 GMT, 15 October 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-200*, 17 October 1994). See also Cairo MENA in Arabic, 1250 GMT, 22 October 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-205*, 24 October 1994).

⁶² According to the Egyptian press, Israel not only offered the benefits of economic collaboration, but also questioned Egypt’s political and economic leadership, vowing to improve things once they assumed leadership. Gerges, “Egyptian–Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” 70.

Egypt's reticence to promote economic cooperation reflected suspicions that Israel viewed itself (with US backing) as central to the process of regional economic integration.

East; Israel's economic strength was viewed as an additional component of its perceived qualitative edge.⁶³ Such concern was coupled with a sense that Israel was ignoring Egypt's role in the Middle East.

At the Casablanca Summit, Peres emphasized Cairo's future role as a center of economic activity in the region, due to its potential and resources, but he did not make it a common theme in his statements.⁶⁴ Only following the Casablanca Summit—once he recognized the negative reaction to his ideas in Egypt, as reflected by the Egyptian press—did Peres attempt to reassure Egyptian officials regarding Israel's intentions vis-a-vis the new Middle East. During a visit to Egypt, he reassured government officials and industrialists that Israel did not intend to play a hegemonic role in the new Middle Eastern economy.⁶⁵

Accordingly, at the second MENA conference in Amman, Jordan, in October 1995, Israel played a more modest role, hoping to allay Arab fears about Israel's regional economic strength.⁶⁶ In an interview in December 1995, Peres tempered his message:

When we began talking about a new Middle East I gave Europe as an example. I can now give another example, namely Asia and what is taking place there. . .

⁶³ See Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, "Israel's Contemporary Qualitative Security Edge in Arab Eyes," in Shlomo Gazit, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance, 1993–1994* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 164–181. Commentaries in the Egyptian press warned of the danger of possible Israeli hegemonic tendencies vis-a-vis the establishment of a common market in the Middle East in 1993. See Raafat Soliman, "Finding Common Economic Ground," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 16–22 September 1993; Mona Qassem, "Prospects for a Regional Market," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 4–10 November 1993; and Wahid Abdel-Meguid, "Where Does Israel Fit In?" *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 30 December 1993–5 January 1994.

⁶⁴ Cairo MENA in Arabic, 1345 GMT, 1 November 1994 (*FBIS-NES-94-212-S*, 2 November 1994).

⁶⁵ See especially Dan Avidan, "Once We Go Forward, Once We Go Back," *Davar*, 6 January 1995 (Hebrew); and *Ha'aretz*, 5 January 1995.

⁶⁶ See statement by Yossi Beilin in David Makovsky, "Beilin: Nation to take 'Lower Profile' at Summit," *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 October 1995 (*FBIS-NES-95-208*, 27 October 1995).

Perhaps my mistake was that I talked about a new Middle East when I should probably have talked about a Middle East in a new phase. What I say is this. . . if you want to modernize your economy and if you want to join the competition, you should do so, otherwise you will remain in the rear.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the image of Israel trying to dominate the region economically lingered. Egypt strove to minimize Israel's role at the third MENA conference, held in

Egypt, through the Cairo conference, sought to distance itself from Peres's vision of the new Middle East.

Cairo in the end of 1996. The perception that Israel was seeking to dominate the process was more pervasive: "Cairo was fully aware that the propositions for economic, technical, scientific, and environmental cooperation evolved within a closed circle of influence that sought to promote Israel as the cornerstone of the system. Such an arrangement does not conform with the nature of mutual cooperation in the region."⁶⁸ Speaking in stronger terms, Yusuf Boutros-Ghali, the Egyptian minister of state for economic affairs, rejected the proposition that any one nation would be the economic center of the Middle East: "It was a misconceived idea to put Israel . . . as the central hub. The valid idea for the integration of the Middle East, is to put *a bloc* at the core of the integration of the Middle East."⁶⁹

Egypt, through the Cairo conference, sought to distance itself from Peres's vision of the new Middle East. Mubarak publicly termed the meeting an economic conference rather than summit, and invitations were sent to foreign ministers rather than heads of state. In addition, "Regional cooperation at this conference was redefined to cover all forms of regional cooperation, including or excluding Israel."⁷⁰ In this vein, Musa emphasized the importance of inter-Arab cooperation as a main component of regional cooperation.⁷¹

⁶⁷London, *Al-Hayah*, in Arabic, 28 December 1995 (FBIS-NES-95-250, 29 December 1995).

⁶⁸Taha El-Magdoub, "Pursuing a Realistic Regional Role," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 19925 September 1996.

⁶⁹*SWE*, 16 November 1996, ME/2771 MED/18 (Emphasis added).

⁷⁰"Redefining Regional Cooperation," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28 November–4 December 1996.

⁷¹Cairo MENA in English, 1950 GMT, 14 November 1996 (*SWE*, ME/2771, MED/18, 16 November 1996).

Moreover, while some representatives emphasized the purely business aspects of the conference, Egypt used the opportunity to re-emphasize the link between a comprehensive peace and regional economic cooperation: “The unanimous message was that one cannot be separated from the other: that no party can enjoy the economic benefits of peace and cooperation unless steps are taken toward a just and comprehensive peace.”⁷² How did Egypt come to associate the vision of a “new Middle East” with Israel’s hegemonic designs for the region, and what accounts for this change in perception? The following analysis attempts to show that this process, and the impact of Peres’s declarations, cannot be properly analyzed and assessed without taking into account Egypt’s stand regarding additional regional developments.

Many in the region saw the initial Casablanca summit as an opportunity for increased regional cooperation. In particular, participating nations appear to have agreed that economic cooperation would reinforce and support peace; economic growth was perceived as a significant step on the road to a comprehensive, just, and durable peace. By the time of the Cairo economic conference, however, the overall tone was noticeably different. Some nations, particularly Egypt, maintained that the achievement of a comprehensive peace was a precondition to economic cooperation—which was perceived as a manifestation of normalization of relations with Israel. As Amr Musa said in an interview in July 1996: “[The new Middle East] must be the reward of peace. The reverse is nonsense; that would mean asking everyone to enter into the new Middle East before peace is achieved.”⁷³

It appears at one level that the changed atmosphere at the Cairo conference can be traced to the lack of progress in the peace process; the Egyptian government, in particular, cited

Egypt feared that in promoting regional economic integration, Israel was attempting to bypass Egypt to establish direct ties with other Arab states.

⁷² “Redefining Regional Cooperation.” For more on these issues, see Mona Qassem, “MENA III Balance Sheet,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 28 November–4 December 1996.

⁷³ Amr M. Moussa, “A Nationalist Vision for Egypt,” *Middle East Quarterly* (September 1996), 62.

Israeli intransigence in the peace process following the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister in May 1996.⁷⁴ Egypt's position that peace must come before normalization received increased Arab support. In several inter-Arab fora following Netanyahu's election, Arab states warned that they might reconsider movement toward normalizing relations with Israel if no progress was made in the peace talks.⁷⁵ Viewed in these terms, it would seem that Peres's vision of a "new Middle East" was initially accepted, and even implemented, and that it was thereafter derailed by threats to progress in the peace process.

At another level, however, while this account helps to explain the approach of many of the participating Arab states,⁷⁶ it does not fully address the serious Egyptian reservations about the regional process from the beginning—in particular, their reaction to Peres's vision and declarations following the Casablanca summit. Nor does this account fully explain the complex regional dynamics concerning the relationship between peace and cooperation. Ironically, in 1994, Egypt seems to have been concerned not with the lack of progress in the peace process, but rather with the fact that progress was being achieved so rapidly, and most importantly, without its own active mediation. While the Casablanca summit spurred specific concerns about Israel's intentions in the economic realm, Egypt's fear of a challenge to its regional role and standing from Israel was much more profound. Since Egypt began cultivating the role of mediator in the Arab–Israeli negotiations in the 1980s, the Egyptian government and press have stressed its centrality to the peace process, and to any regional development.⁷⁷ Egypt feared that in promoting regional economic integration, Israel was

⁷⁴ See for example Mubarak's claim that the policies of the Netanyahu government have harmed prospects for economic cooperation in the Middle East. Egyptian Space Channel, Cairo, 1206 GMT, 30 November 1996 (SWB, 2 December 1996).

⁷⁵ See the final communique issued by the Arab summit held in June 1996. Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt Radio Network, 1205 GMT, 23 June 1996 (FBIS-NEI-96-122, 24 June 1996). See also the reports on the Arab foreign ministers meeting in September 1996, and Arab League meeting in November 1996. *Reuters News Service*, 26 September 1996 and 1 December 1996.

⁷⁶ See for example the explanation provided by Martin Kramer, "The Middle East, Old and New," *Daedalus* 126, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 101.

⁷⁷ Egypt repeatedly emphasizes Sadat began the peace process and thereafter, Egypt was pivotal in moving the process forward. More explicitly, Mubarak maintained that the Egyptian role could not be marginalized: "the Egyptian role is pivotal to the peace process. . . . It is not a question of 'might and might not' because the Egyptian role is active and indispensable." "Egypt's Role Indispensable," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 12–18 December 1996.

attempting to bypass Egypt to establish direct ties with other Arab states. Fawaz Gerges writes:

Egypt's foreign policy elite seem to have reached a consensus that the current peace process will further erode their country's power vis-a-vis other regional players, particularly Israel. They already sense this subtle shift of fortunes in the 'unseemly rush' by Persian Gulf and Maghreb Arabs to do business with Israel without any coordination with Egypt. In the post-peace era, Egyptian mediation between Israel and the other Arab states will no longer be needed, since Israel will have direct access to other Arab states and Egypt cannot compete with the more dynamic Israeli economy."⁷⁸

Several weeks before the Casablanca summit, Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty without Egypt's active mediation. In addition, it was reported that, in the coming weeks, Israel would establish official ties with Oman and Qatar; that Israel and Tunisia had finalized the establishment of diplomatic relations; and even that Israel had established contacts with Bahrain and the UAE during the summit.⁷⁹ These reports confirmed the rapid rate of

normalization between Arab states and Israel, and raised Egyptian fears of regional marginalization. It is interesting to note in this regard links to the other major multilateral effort in the Middle East, the Madrid peace process, which also involved Israel. In the ACRS

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working group, Egypt rejected Israel's emphasis on CSBMs as a first stage in the process, and advocated instead that the nuclear issue be the first issue of discussion (see above discussion). CSBMs, like economic cooperation, were regarded by Egypt as a manifestation of normalization of relations with Israel.

⁷⁸ Gerges, "Egyptian–Israeli Relations Turn Sour," 76.

⁷⁹ Paris AFP in English, 2036 GMT, 31 October 1994, and Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew, 1100 GMT, 1 November 1994 (FBIS-NES- 94-211-S, 1 November 1994).

In sum, Egypt believed that Israel was seeking to become integrated into the region on a superpower standing, positioning itself to dominate the region both militarily and economically.⁸⁰ Egypt believed Israel was acting to change the face of the Middle East and mold it into something that Israel could control—an ominous development for Egypt in light of the extent of Israel’s qualitative edge. Moreover, Egypt was wary of other manifestations of regional normalization that did not go through Cairo, and that posed a threat to its leadership role in the Middle East. Israel’s perceived intentions in the Middle East—such as when it expressed the desire to join the Arab League—reinforced preconceived Arab fears of Western and Israeli imperialism.⁸¹ Others were concerned that Israel only sought cheap Arab labor to fuel their economic and technological growth.⁸²

The creation of a framework for cooperation in the Middle East also touches upon sensitive issues of Arab identity. The concept of “Middle Easternism” is not accepted as an alternative to Arab identity. In a recent discussion of this issue, Martin Kramer suggests that the Euro–Mediterranean initiatives are perhaps more acceptable to Arab states because “Mediterraneanism” is seen as less threatening than “Middle Easternism.” Kramer writes,

In a broad Mediterranean framework, Israel is not an economic giant but one more partner, effectively balanced by Europe. The ‘Mediterranean option’ also marginalizes the United States and offers a flicker of hope that some kind of great power rivalry

⁸⁰ For a typical statement in this vein see an article by Mohamed Sid-Ahmed written in the wake of the economic summit in Casablanca: “The challenge Israel poses to the Arabs today is that it continues to perceive its security in terms of the need to maintain an edge over its neighbors, military at a previous stage, economic and technological in the new context of peace. Only Egypt can demonstrate concretely that Israeli hegemony is an inadmissible challenge to Arab-pan-national security.” “The Middle East Market and Egypt,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 24–30 November 1994.

⁸¹ “To the Arab political mind, the concept of the Middle East is linked to Western imperialism, or rather to the establishment of Western hegemony over the region; the Middle East project is closely associated with the West’s tireless vigilance in ‘protecting’ Israel and its expansionist policies.” Gamil Matar, “Quicksand in our Eyes,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 12–18 December 1996. See also: Gerges, “Egyptian–Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” 69, “Israel hopes to construct a new regional order that is Middle Eastern instead of Arab, in which Israel would be the dominant economic power. Thus, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres recently called for expanding the Arab League’s membership to include Israel. . . .”; and Aluph Ben “The Long Road to Reconciliation,” *Ha’aretz*, 5 January 1995 (Hebrew).

⁸² See for example Hassan Hanafi, “Minds, Manpower and Money,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 5–11 December 1996.

might be reintroduced into the region, and enhance Arab maneuverability vis-a-vis Israel.” Nevertheless, Mediterraneanism is also not readily accepted as an alternative to Arab–Islamic identity.⁸³

Shimon Peres, who sparked the official and public debate over regional economic cooperation with his statements, believed that regional economic cooperation and development were an attainable dream; he further felt that the first economic summit in Casablanca actually symbolized the beginning of this process. While he intended to generate goodwill by clarifying Israel’s positive commitment to a new Middle East, stressing Israel’s willingness to be not

The creation of a framework for cooperation in the Middle East also touches upon sensitive issues of Arab identity.

only an active member of the region, but a leader in advancing regional economic development, Peres probably believed the benefits of economic

cooperation were self-evident. He laid the groundwork for his ideas in meetings with Europeans and Americans in order to gain their support for the project. Once initiated, with the support of Morocco, Jordan, and (to an extent) several Gulf states, Peres did not expect his statements would elicit a negative response. However, his declarations clearly struck a negative chord in Egypt, and underscored—rather than dissipated—extant fears. Peres’s statements demonstrated a lack of understanding of Egyptian concerns. In light of the previous discussion of Egypt’s broader regional considerations, greater attention to these matters may or may not have succeeded in mitigating the opposition to economic cooperation. Nevertheless, a milder tone, coupled with greater emphasis on Egypt’s central role in the region, may have increased the prospects for success.⁸⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The final section of this essay draws general inferences and conclusions regarding the role of declarations. When declarations are specifically designed to create reassurance, it is critical to make them credible. This effect can be achieved either by reinforcing statements

⁸³ Martin Kramer, “The Middle East, Old and New,” 101–102 (quote appears on 102).

⁸⁴For a recent commentary published in the Israeli press on Israel’s apparent lack of sensitivity to Arab concerns, including specific reference to the vision of the new Middle East, see Zeev Maoz, “The Guilty Party is the Enemy,” *Ha’aretz*, 9 September 1997 (Hebrew).

with actions or by providing proof that the words spoken are sincere, by demonstrating the price paid by speaking them. Of the declarations examined here, only those made by Sadat were specifically designed and intended to reassure. Following a number of preliminary meetings, Sadat believed that he could negotiate a bilateral settlement with Begin that would not compromise the goals of a comprehensive peace.

Facing an absence of confidence in his overtures for peace from Israel, Sadat realized that he needed to take a dramatic step to clarify his intentions. Moreover, he knew that he must convince the Israeli public of his sincerity; the decision to deliver his speech in Jerusalem increased the probability that his intentions would be taken seriously. Sadat not only understood the Israelis' concerns, he understood the importance of making his declared intentions credible. Unfortunately, his neglect of domestic constituencies eventually proved costly. Paradoxically, as noted by Herbert Kelman, greater attention to his advisors and to domestic opinion probably would have paralyzed Sadat. Thus, domestic discontent may have been a price that he was destined to pay.

In discussing other statements, this essay purposely considered cases where the intent of the declarations' issuers was not

When declarations are specifically designed to create reassurance, it is critical to make them credible.

necessarily to reassure, but rather to display a measure of conciliation toward the other side. These cases reveal the difficulties inherent in making conciliatory statements and the problems resulting from the inability of these declarations to deal with serious security concerns. It is extremely difficult to create reassurance between states through declarations if there is only limited mutual interest to cooperate, and little confidence in a mutually acceptable agreement. Statements designed to have a conciliatory effect are unlikely to have real impact in and of themselves. In the case of statements on WMD, Egypt and Israel held divergent understandings of the issues and defined their agendas in different terms, making it difficult to build confidence. However, in the long-term, when a "way out" materializes, the cumulative impact of past conciliatory statements may be evident.

Declaratory statements are likely to have a positive impact only when all participants perceive a “way out,” when a state is committed to overcoming the suspicions of other states, and when the nature of these suspicions can be correctly identified and assessed.

Statements surrounding the idea of a “new Middle East” are salient to issues of peace and cooperation in the region. On the surface, cooperation seemed to be of mutual interest to all parties involved, and its benefits self-evident. Regional economic cooperation did not

threaten obvious security concerns; the negative response that greeted Peres’s pledge to advance this process initially surprised many observers. However, Peres did not appreciate the complexity of regional dynamics and the concerns of his Arab colleagues. One major structural constraint in moving his proposals forward was the overlapping bilateral and regional contexts. Normalizing relations with other Arab states was threatening to Egypt, which felt its regional role was in jeopardy. Peres might have alleviated Egyptian concerns by clarifying his intentions and reaffirming Egyptian–Israeli bilateral relations.

In conclusion, it is clear that the use of declarations as a diplomatic tool is complex. While credibility is a serious and difficult issue, it is not the only factor. As a means of building confidence, declarations have certain structural limitations; they are difficult to tailor to fit different situations. Declaratory statements are likely to have a positive impact only when all participants perceive a “way out,” when a state is committed to overcoming the suspicions of other states, and when the nature of these suspicions can be correctly identified and assessed. Even when cooperation is in the best interests of all parties, conciliatory declarations must be refined to target specific concerns; declarations which miss the mark or backfire may increase, rather than decrease, suspicions over motivation and intention.

Declaratory Statements and Confidence Building in South Asia

P.R. Chari

Positive declaratory statements by adversarial countries can serve conciliatory purposes. Declaratory statements can encourage or initiate movement towards resolving a difficult political problem. Unlike military-related confidence-building measures (CBMs), positive statements do not require verification to establish their credibility. Declaratory statements can be made unilaterally, bilaterally, or within the framework of an international agreement. Moreover, statements made before or after bilateral meetings, pledges not to use force in bilateral relations, and promises more generally designed to defuse bilateral and regional tensions can serve as positive declarations.

In the case of India and Pakistan, national leaders have occasionally made positive declarations, but to little effect. The empirical evidence suggests that CBMs, including positive declaratory statements, have been difficult to initiate and sustain in the Indo–Pakistani milieu. The few positive declaratory statements issued by Indian and Pakistani leaders are found in documents of pious intent, such as election manifestos, joint statements, or bilateral agreements. These statements, rarely pursued, are issued as cosmetic devices, or are designed to impress the international community.

The need to assure domestic audiences in the two countries, particularly segments of the elite—the armed forces, feudal elements, the scientific establishments, rightist and

In the case of India and Pakistan, national leaders have occasionally made positive declarations, but to little effect.

conservative forces—explains the plethora of negative statements that vilify the other side. The motivations and intentions behind positive declarations by the leaders of one country are thus greeted with extreme suspicion by the other. Nehru recognized the danger of negative rhetoric in a speech made to Parliament in early 1950 entitled “We cannot be enemies forever:”

Unfortunately the old traditions of diplomacy have been forgotten in the modern world. Diplomacy in the olden days may have been good or bad, but people at least did not curse one another in public. The new tradition today is to carry on publicly a verbal warfare in the strongest language. Perhaps that is better than fighting but it leads to fighting, [or] rather may lead to fighting.¹

Several decades later, in 1982, Pakistani president General Zia ul-Haq echoed these sentiments:

While the dialogue between our countries continues, it is best in my view that they eschew statements which deliberately create a sense of crisis. . . .The political leadership as well as the media on both sides have a vital role to play in educating public opinion on the right lines. Facts, responsibly presented, would automatically correct the distorted images seen through the emotional looking glass.²

In India and Pakistan, declaratory statements are insufficient to generate faith in the other side's intentions, as recent Indo-Pakistani exchanges demonstrate. In a congratulatory message to the Indian prime minister, H.D. Deve Gowda, after he assumed office in June 1996, then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, effusively declared that an opportunity existed for:

Laying the foundations of a peaceful South Asia based on equitable conflict-resolution and reconciliation. We need to engage ourselves, without further loss of time, in this process for peace. The Government of Pakistan, therefore, looks forward to working with your Government to create an environment, which will be conducive to peace, security and development.³

The Indian media reacted cautiously to this initiative. An editorial in *The Indian Express* advised Premier Bhutto that "her first and foremost task should be to call off her

¹Sarvepalli Gopal, ed., *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1948-53*, vol 2 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1983), 133.

²Rajendra Sareen, *Pakistan: The India Factor* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1984), 199.

³Mohammad Malick, "Pak Keen to Open New Chapter with Gowda," *The Indian Express*, 5 June 1996.

government's patronage of the terrorist organizations in Kashmir and elsewhere in India."⁴ Another national daily advised that India should accept Premier Bhutto's

In India and Pakistan, declaratory statements are insufficient to generate faith in the other side's intentions.

offer in order "to test Ms. Benazir Bhutto's sincerity: whether, in fact, she has shed her known allergy to a summit meeting with her Indian counterpart." Later, the *Times of India* warned that Premier Bhutto's message was based on a "time-tested strategy," and "rational calculations."⁵ Foreign affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam argued that an established leader was in an advantageous position to deal with the newcomer because, "If the newcomer rejects the invitation then it will be a propaganda advantage to the side offering to talk. If he accepts the invitation then the initiator knows that the former would not commit himself substantively on any issue or even may reject the proposals of the initiator. In either case the initiator reaps the benefit."⁶

This reaction by the Indian press demonstrates that statements by national leaders are often not taken at face value. The Indian Government, on the other hand, responded favorably to Bhutto's conciliatory message, suggesting a resumption of the bilateral talks between the two foreign secretaries that had been suspended in January 1994. The Bhutto government did not pursue this suggestion because of mounting domestic political difficulties; neither did the Indian government pursue this initiative with any vigor due to its own domestic priorities. Again, bilateral discussions came to a standstill. Bhutto's initiative withered away long before her Government's dismissal in October 1996.

A similar exchange occurred following Nawaz Sharif's election as Pakistani prime minister in February 1997. The two Prime Ministers—H.D. Deve Gowda and Nawaz Sharif—agreed to resume foreign secretary-level talks, but again, domestic political instabilities in India limited progress. The replacement of Prime Minister Gowda by Inder Kumar Gujral in April 1997 provided a boost to this reconciliation process; the two Prime Ministers quickly affirmed their commitment to improving Indo-Pakistani relations.

⁴"Basis for Talks," *The Indian Express*, 6 June 1996.

⁵"Seizing the Initiative," *The Times of India*, 6 June 1996.

⁶K. Subrahmanyam, "The Pakistani Dilemma," *The Economic Times*, 9 June 1996.

Recognizing the importance of economics in improving relations, Nawaz Sharif expressed his hopes that the two countries could work toward an amicable understanding. For his part, Prime Minister Gujral agreed to discuss Kashmir in the agenda of the Indo–Pakistani talks, signifying a change in the Indian approach.⁷

In pursuit of these commitments, the foreign secretaries met in June 1997 and identified eight issues, including peace and security issues and Kashmir, which were to be addressed by separate working groups.⁸ There was much optimism that this re-engagement, especially the inclusion of Kashmir in the dialogue, would progress to further normalizing Indo–Pakistani relations.⁹ In subsequent meetings, however, the priority to be accorded these two specific issues led to breakdown in the talks. While Pakistan wanted them to be discussed exclusively, India wanted to address all eight issues in an integrated manner.¹⁰

The May 1998 nuclear tests furthered a precipitous deterioration in Indo–Pakistani relations.

In November 1997, the Congress party withdrew support from the Gujral government, forcing early elections. In the subsequent general elections, held in March 1998, a coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gained the majority of seats. Another ritual process of congratulatory messages and effusive acknowledgments followed. But the BJP's first major

⁷ "Political Notebook: Scanning a Landmark," *Mainstream*, 28 June 1997. India contends that the accession of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 was a lawful act; therefore Pakistan has no role in discussions concerning the affairs of that state.

⁸The complete text of the "Joint Statement on Working Groups," signed by the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries on 23 June 1997 can be found at: <http://www.stimson.org/cbm/sa/joint.htm>; accessed 19 April 1999.

⁹ For a discussion of media reactions to the Indo–Pakistani dialogue, see Michael Newbill, "English Media Commentary in India and Pakistan on Confidence-Building Measures, 1990–1997," in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill, and Jenny S. Drezin, eds. *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, 3rd Edition (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998): 151–188.

¹⁰ Thomas Abraham, "Foreign Secretaries Hold 'Talks About Talks,'" *The Hindu*, 26 October 1997: <http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1997/10/27/front.htm#Story1>; accessed on 19 April 1999, and C. Raja Mohan, "Gujral, Sharif Clear Way for Resumption of Talks," *The Hindu*, 16 January 1998: <http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1998/01/16/front.htm#Story1>; accessed on 19 April 1999.

decision was to stage nuclear tests in May 1998, ostensibly due to security considerations involving China and Pakistan. Pakistan followed India's tests later that month, furthering a precipitous deterioration in Indo-Pakistani relations. An attempt to reconcile their differences was made during the South Asian Associate for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit meeting held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in July 1998, by reviving the foreign secretary-level talks, with little success. The talks once again broke down amid acrimonious exchanges over the priority to be accorded to the Kashmir issue in bilateral negotiations.¹¹

There are many reasons for the recurrent breakdowns in the dialogue. The most persuasive factor is that initiating confidence-building measures require a minimum level of trust between countries, a sentiment often absent in Indo-Pakistani relations. This lack of mutual trust not only impedes conciliatory processes from working effectively, but it also exacerbates tensions in the bilateral and regional environment by encouraging the use of belligerent statements for domestic political purposes.

Mistrust is also reinforced by political and social institutions in both India and Pakistan. For example, the media has played a significant role in heightening differences between the two countries. The press often criticizes positive declaratory statements as being impractical, weak, confused, and idealistic. Negative statements, on the other hand, are lauded for their realism, sense of purpose and responsibility, and nationalism. In this hostile atmosphere, political leaders must be resolved to stand above negative posturing; they also must be willing to invest their personal careers in bettering Indo-Pakistani relations.

The press often criticizes positive declaratory statements as being impractical, weak, confused, and idealistic.

The use of positive declarations to achieve this purpose has not worked effectively. Weak political leadership in both countries in the past decade has not produced significant, positive gestures. Instead, governments have been preoccupied with immediate problems of political survival. Since the impact of declaratory statements in the Indo-Pakistani milieu has

¹¹Harinder Baweja and Zahid Hussain, "Breakdown," *India Today*, 10 August 1998: <http://www.india-today.com/itoday/10081998/cover.html>; accessed on 15 April 1999.

been marginal, I will address confidence-building and declaratory measures from a different angle than the others in this collection.

I will first review important Indo–Pakistani agreements reached in the first decades following independence until the 1971 War, when East Pakistan seceded to form Bangladesh, and then I will describe more recent declaratory measures. Thereafter, I will look in greater detail at three case studies: The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), the Simla Agreement (1972), and the No-War Pact and Friendship Treaty proposals (1981–82). The Indus Waters Treaty remains a landmark agreement that has survived two Indo-Pakistani conflicts since its conclusion. The Simla Agreement has not been abrogated, but repeated violations of its spirit and intent have rendered its many provisions practically meaningless. The No-War Pact/Treaty of Peace and Friendship proposals were wholly infructuous. I will investigate the mixed record of success and failure in these three cases to draw appropriate lessons for future Indo–Pakistani encounters. Finally, some general conclusions will be drawn regarding the positive declarations and agreements reached between the two countries.

EARLY INDO–PAKISTANI AGREEMENTS

Seven important agreements, embodying positive declarations, were negotiated between India and Pakistan in the first twenty-five years of their existence. The impact of these initiatives varies, but they are useful in understanding the historical development of Indo–Pakistani relations and attempts at confidence building.

14 December 1948 Accord

Following the partition of British India into the two new nations of India and Pakistan, an Inter-Dominion Conference (IDC) was formed to address the outstanding issues of this division. The IDC reached decisions on the protection of life and property of minority communities, boundary disputes, evacuee property, insurance policies, museums and stores. Both sides also agreed to urge their media not to indulge in hostile propaganda, and instead to stimulate hope and confidence among minorities, discouraging mass exodus and encouraging evacuees to return to their homes.¹²

¹² Sarvepalli Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 2d ser., vol. 9, 20 December 1948–15 February 1949 (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1990), 245 n. 2. This Conference was held in New Delhi 6–14 December 1948 and then in Karachi 10–13 January 1949.

Violations of the promise not to indulge in hostile propaganda, reaffirmed in the 1966 Tashkent Declaration and the 1971 Simla Agreement, have been the norm. The Tashkent Declaration emphasized that future relations between the two countries “shall be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other,” that both states shall “discourage any propaganda directed against the other country,” and even “encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations.”¹³ Similar invocations were made in the Simla Agreement. But rather than honor these agreements, elites in both countries have encouraged the use of hostile propaganda against each other in the media. India and Pakistan addressed this volatile issue again at a meeting between the foreign secretaries in July 1990, declaring that the establishment of political CBMs required the “ending of hostile propaganda and the avoidance of interference in each other’s internal affairs.”¹⁴

Liaquat–Nehru Agreement (8 April 1950)

This agreement, reached between Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Jawarharlal Nehru, held that the minorities in India and Pakistan (Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan) would owe their primary loyalty to their state of residence. Moreover, the Agreement enjoined both countries to ensure that their minority communities would have:

... complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country’s civil and armed forces.¹⁵

Because the context in which this agreement was negotiated is often overlooked, its significance has rarely been appreciated. As late as 1950, both countries were still coping with the effects of the large-scale communal rioting that had erupted during Partition, resulting in a massive exchange of minority populations between both countries. This exodus, which

¹³Text of the Tashkent Declaration in *Crisis Prevention, Confidence-Building and Reconciliation in South Asia*, Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds. (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), 251-52.

¹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, “Mending Fences” in *Crisis Prevention*, 13.

¹⁵ Text of Liaquat–Nehru Agreement in *Ibid.*, 242.

continued after Independence, combined with communal riots in West Bengal and migration from East Pakistan (which rapidly increased in February 1950), led Nehru to seriously contemplate war with Pakistan. He also considered resigning from the government to grapple with this problem in his personal capacity, but was prevailed upon to remain in office.¹⁶

However, both leaders recognized the need to establish a working relationship with one another so that further communal tragedies could be averted. Emphasizing the need to

Violations of the promise not to indulge in hostile propaganda have been the norm.

comply with this agreement, Nehru stated, “We have had many agreements in the past, and we have had many breaches of agreements also. . . .This particular agreement both in regard to its contents and its

timing has a peculiar significance and importance. Our future depends upon the measure of compliance in Pakistan and India.”¹⁷

Indus Waters Treaty (1960)

The Indus River and its tributaries rise and flow through both India and Pakistan. The problem of equitably sharing the Indus River waters arose immediately after both countries became independent in 1947. Because rivers are vital to supporting the region’s predominantly agricultural economy, river water sharing is a highly emotional subject in South Asia. The origins of the Indus River waters, which rise in Tibet and India and pass through India, posed a potential problem for Pakistan. Diversion of these waters by India could deprive Pakistan of a vital irrigation source, precipitating an international crisis. Yet, by not utilizing these waters, India would have deprived its East Punjab province of urgently needed water, causing domestic crises. Negotiation, which involved eight years of hard, often acrimonious bargaining under the aegis of the World Bank (1952–1960), eventually resolved this difficult problem. Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty offered a compromise by which the two countries could cooperate in managing their common river waters. Despite the tensions and

¹⁶ Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 2, 1947–1956 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 83–86.

¹⁷ Sarvepalli Gopal, ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 2d ser., pt. 2, vol.14, 8 April 1949–31 July 1949 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 5.

hostilities that have distinguished Indo–Pakistani relations over the intervening years, this mutually beneficial treaty has survived.¹⁸

Direct Communication Links

The installation and use of Indo–Pakistani voice links, also popularly termed “hotlines,” has been erratic. While the voice links have proved useful in resolving routine border disputes and addressing bilateral tensions in some cases, they have failed to avert major hostile confrontations, such as during the Brasstacks (1986–87) crisis.¹⁹ Such links have existed between the two Directorates of Military Operations since the 1965 Indo–Pakistani War, but these links were not used as political instability in East Pakistan increased during 1971, culminating in the Indo-Pakistani War in December 1971. The voice links were re-established in 1972 and routinely utilized until the Brasstacks crisis revealed their fragility. As analysts have noted,

Information shared through the hotline was deemed unreliable because of mutual suspicions; hence, information supplied on Pakistani request was also only minimally complied with. It is evident that “communications flies in the face when the other guy doesn’t believe you” and that hotlines can be useful only when there is trust between the countries establishing them.²⁰

The lack of trust between the Indian and Pakistani governments has seriously eroded the use of hotlines.

¹⁸ The complete text of the Indus Waters Treaty can be found in *Crisis Prevention*, 245–250.

¹⁹ This crisis ensued from a large-scale military exercise held by India near the Indo–Pakistani border, code-named “Brasstacks.” It was followed by military countermeasures being taken by Pakistan and “defensive” movements by India, leading to a confrontation between the two armies. A major conflict by accident or design seemed imminent at this stage, but it was averted by the good sense displayed—although belatedly—by the two leaders President Zia ul-Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. There is some evidence also that US president Ronald Reagan persuaded the two leaders to defuse this serious crisis. See Kanti P. Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995) for an account of this crisis.

²⁰ Bajpai *et al.*, *Brasstacks and Beyond*, 41, citing former Indian chief of army staff Gen. K. Sundarji.

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The crisis fueled by the rising tensions and violence in Kashmir in the spring of 1990—which, according to some observers, possessed a nuclear dimension—illuminated the need for

fail-safe communications between India and Pakistan.²¹ The two countries, therefore, decided to revive these linkages, and re-establish regular telephone communications between the two Directors General of Military Operations. The intentions of the contacts were to exchange information on military exercises, maneuvers, and airspace violations, in addition to defusing tensions and resolving disputes along the border.

These hotlines were used in 1992 and 1993 to defuse the crisis generated by political groups in Pakistan-held, or “Azad,” Kashmir, who attempted to illegally cross the Line of Control (LoC) and enter Jammu and Kashmir in protest. In 1993, communication links were extended further to include sector commanders along the LoC in the Murree–Baramula and Poonch–Rajauri sectors. These hotlines were to be activated on an “as required” basis. Also in 1993, direct communication links between the Pakistani and Indian Air Forces, and communications between naval vessels/aircraft of the two navies (when entering the proximity of the other) were also established.²² The effectiveness of these communication links during

²¹ This crisis developed as a result of a serious deterioration of the internal situation in the Indian state of Kashmir in the latter half of 1989. In order to confront the serious law and order problems in the state, India moved three divisions and large bodies of paramilitary forces into Kashmir in the spring of 1990, alarming Pakistan which then took counter-movements and “defensive” measures. Increased political tensions between the two countries gave rise to fears of a military confrontation, but leaders on both sides, wisely, soon began to de-escalate the sense of crisis. A special US mission, headed by Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, also helped defuse this situation by visiting both countries to persuade them to back down, which enabled them to do so without losing face. The fuller dimensions of this crisis—including questions about its nuclear component—are being re-evaluated in a forthcoming study by P.R.Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen. For other discussions of these events, and particularly the nuclear aspect, see Seymour Hersh’s controversial exposé, “On the Nuclear Edge,” in *The New Yorker* (29 March 1993:56–73); Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., “Conflict Prevention and Confidence-building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis,” Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper no. 17 (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994); and Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo–Pakistani Crisis,” *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 79–114.

²²Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, “CBMs in South Asia: Practice, Problems and Prospects,” *Regional Studies* 9, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 38.

crisis situations remains debatable. But their availability in peacetime permits tensions and developing crises to be defused without escalating into conflict.

Non-Attack Pledges

Despite three military conflicts, India and Pakistan have largely refrained from attacking non-military targets. Although never codified, India and Pakistan

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agreed to restraint measures in recognition of their mutual vulnerabilities. For example, during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the Indian Chief of the Air Staff telephoned his Pakistani counterpart and “reached an informal agreement not to use their respective air forces in the open, desert-like area of the Rann of Kutch. They both reasoned that infantry without natural cover and without mechanized armor would be acutely vulnerable to attacks from the air. Both sides honored this arrangement throughout the three-month-long skirmishes.”²³ Such restraint, however, was lacking during both the September 1965 and the December 1971 wars when armor in desert areas was subjected to air attacks. No further examples of explicit non-attack pledges are known. However, there appears to have been a tacit understanding during these hostilities to spare population centers, places of worship, and major economic targets of no relevance to the war effort. These unwritten rules were largely followed, primarily due to the sense of mutual vulnerability to retaliation experienced by the armed forces and political leadership on both sides.

Tashkent Declaration (1966)

Brokered by the Soviet Union, this declaration formally concluded the Indo–Pakistani War of September 1965. The two countries declared “their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations . . . and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples.”²⁴ Both countries also officially acknowledged the United Nations Charter which enjoined nations to avoid the use of force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means.

²³Ganguly, “Mending Fences,” in Krepon and Sevak, *Crisis Prevention*, 12.

²⁴Tashkent Declaration, in *Crisis Prevention*, 250–1.

Furthermore, the cease-fire line which divided the former princely state of Kashmir between Indian- and Pakistani-held regions, was restored to its pre-September 1965 position by a mutual troop withdrawal. India returned the strategic Haji Pir Bulge in Kashmir, a concession bitterly resented by the Indian Army.

The Tashkent Declaration also called for the “non-interference in the internal affairs of each other,” including the avoidance of negative statements directed at the other side.²⁵ Further normalization measures included restoring diplomatic relations and returning the High Commissioners to their posts, resuming economic and trade relations, communications and cultural exchanges, implementing existing agreements, repatriating prisoners of war, promoting bilateral meetings at all levels, and organizing joint Indo–Pakistani bodies to suggest further steps for the two countries to pursue. Despite these pious declarations, implementation of these measures was slow. Their progress was halted by developments in East Bengal that culminated in the December 1971 conflict and the emergence of Bangladesh.

Simla Agreement (1972)

This treaty, signed in the Indian hill station of Simla, officially ended the 1971 Indo–Pakistani conflict which led to the creation of the new state of Bangladesh from what was once East Pakistan. In this declaratory agreement, both countries pledged to “put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations, work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent.”²⁶ Pledges were made to settle mutual differences through bilateral negotiations, refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of one another, and prevent the dissemination of hostile propaganda. Most importantly, the agreement fostered confidence-building measures, including: resuming communications; promoting travel, trade, and cooperation in agreed fields; exchanges in the areas of science and culture; and withdrawing troops to their respective side of the international border.

²⁵Ibid., 250.

²⁶ The text of the Simla Agreement can be found in *ibid.*, 251–3.

However, more important issues were postponed for future negotiations, including the repatriation of the prisoners of war and civil internees, a final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue, and the resumption of diplomatic relations. In a statement to the press immediately following the signing of the Simla Agreement, Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto asserted, “If we implement the agreement with sincerity and goodwill we can give to our people peace with honor and progress which we have not found for so long. Today we have that opportunity. I have no doubt that we can set the foundation of a durable peace which we owe to our people.”²⁷ Unfortunately, however, no further summit meetings were held to take up these pledges, and the promises embodied in the Simla Agreement have not been fulfilled.

The promises embodied in the Simla Agreement have not been fulfilled.

RECENT CBMS

Since 1971, Indo–Pakistani wars have been replaced by crises. The Brasstacks (1986-87) and Kashmir-related (1990) crises, briefly described above, drew pointed attention to the dangers inherent in large-scale movements of armed forces in the vicinity of the Indo–Pakistani border, either for military exercises or internal security purposes. More significantly, these crises highlighted the lack of communications, or the recurrent breakdown of communications, between the political and military leaderships of the two countries. These events provided an opportunity to re-evaluate the need for CBMs in order to prevent crises sparked not by design, but by accident or misperception. The CBMs established in this area are described below.

Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (1988)

In this declaratory agreement, India and Pakistan pledged to “refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in any action aimed at causing the destruction of,

²⁷ “Beginning a New Era of Peace: Bhutto,” *The Times of India*, 4 July 1972.

or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.”²⁸ Both countries are required to exchange lists identifying their installations and facilities annually, and to inform one another of any changes made to the lists. Implementation of this agreement was delayed considerably.²⁹ Under this agreement, it is presumed that all nuclear facilities and installations in the two countries have now been declared. Yet, in the absence of an inspection procedure, it cannot be determined whether the lists are complete, or if sensitive installations and facilities—specifically, small enrichment plants—have been concealed.

Despite these doubts, the agreement begins to institutionalize transparency in Indo–Pakistani relations. Other attempts have been made to extend this agreement. India and Pakistan exchanged “non-papers” in early 1994 in which several CBMs were suggested for consideration. One of the non-papers presented by India suggested that the non-attack agreement be extended to population centers and economic assets. Another Indian non-paper proposed that both countries declare a no-first-use of nuclear capabilities—an agreement freezing the nuclear capabilities of the two countries. These non-papers, however, have yet to materialize into agreements.

After the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, India categorically declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapon states, and that it would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries.³⁰ Pakistan has declared its readiness to accept a No-War pact with India, but has refused to subscribe to any no-first-use declarations, arguing that Pakistan’s defense required a nuclear deterrent to assure its security against the stronger conventional forces of India.

Control of Cross Border Crime (1989)

This accord called for biannual meetings between designated officials of the Pakistan Rangers and the Indian Border Security Force to review border infractions such as smuggling,

²⁸ The complete text of the Agreement can be found in *Crisis Prevention*, 254–5.

²⁹ Ironically, information regarding these installations and facilities has long existed in the public domain.

³⁰ “PM declares no-first strike,” *The Indian Express*, 5 August 1998: <http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19980805/21750694.html>; accessed on 14 April 1999.

drug-trafficking, and illegal crossings, and to promote interaction between the two paramilitary forces that police the Indo–Pakistani border. These forces are under the command of the Ministries of the Interior and Home in Pakistan and India, and have gained ascendancy over the years as internal security problems have heightened. The biannual meetings envisaged under this agreement have been held only sporadically and they have not proved helpful in controlling the smuggling of drugs, alcohol and arms.

Agreement on Prevention of Airspace Violations and for Permitting Overflights and Landings by Military Aircraft (April 1991)

This measure prohibits the flying of armed, fixed-wing aircraft within ten nautical miles of the international border, armed rotary aircraft within one nautical mile, and any other kind of aircraft within one thousand meters of the border. It also calls on India and Pakistan to give one another advance notice of any air exercises or special air activity in the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The agreement does allow aircraft to operate within one thousand meters of the border after due notification in special circumstances, such as during mercy missions. Military aircraft are also permitted to fly through each other's airspace after giving advance notice, and are subject to pre-conditions regarding flight routing and non-carriage of photographic equipment/war munitions.³¹ There are periodic claims by both countries that the airspace agreement has been violated.

Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, Maneuvers, and Troop Movements (April 1991)

This notification measure commits India and Pakistan to make prior declarations of major exercises and deployments by land, naval, and air forces. Information regarding these major exercises and force deployments must be transmitted, in advance, to the other side within a specified time frame, and in considerable detail.³² The impact of this declaration is unclear. For instance, while the agreement stipulates that the redeployment of division-size forces within 150 kilometers of the border for either internal security or non-military duties

³¹ The complete text of this agreement can be found in *Crisis Prevention*, 255–57.

³² This agreement can be found in *ibid.*, 257–258.

requires prior notification, this provision has been circumvented by introducing troops piecemeal into the specified zone. In total, such redeployments could add up to more than division strength.³³

Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (August 1992)

In this agreement, both countries forswore the development, production, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons. They also pledged to cooperate with each other in the finalization and adoption of a comprehensive Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and to become original parties to that convention when it was finalized. Both India and Pakistan subsequently entered and ratified the convention, with India joining as an original party, and Pakistan entering after the CWC came into force. The joint declaration proved effective in committing both countries to enter the Chemical Weapons Convention after it was enacted, but the CWC declarations subsequently made by both countries—India declaring a previously unacknowledged stockpile and Pakistan declaring no such stockpile—did not build confidence.

THREE CASE STUDIES

Among the recent agreements and declaratory measures, three deserve greater attention to derive appropriate conclusions on the role of declarations in Indo–Pakistani relations. These agreements are the Indus Waters Treaty, the Simla Agreement and the series of proposals for a No-War Pact/Treaty of Peace and Friendship. For each initiative, I will evaluate the role of public diplomacy, including declaratory statements, as they contributed to negotiations between the two countries. I will also look at the impact these agreements and proposals have had on their bilateral relationship.

The Indus Waters Treaty (1960)

³³ John Sandrock and Michael Maldony, “The History and Future of Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia,” Background Paper written for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, (Washington, D.C.: 14 November, 1994), A–8.

The partition of British India did not address the question of distributing the waters of the Indus and Ganges basins between India and Pakistan. Because huge populations living in these areas are dependent on the waters of these rivers, the emergence of an Indo–Pakistani dispute regarding the allocation of these waters seemed inevitable.

Establishing a distribution system for the Indus River waters was complicated by three factors. First, the manner in which the storage capacities and link canals were constructed by India in the upper reaches of the Indus rivers

While India considered the canal waters to be their inheritance from Partition, Pakistan argued that these waters were to be used jointly by the two countries.

was of obvious concern, lest Pakistan be denied the waters of the three eastern rivers by the upper riparian state. Second, partition led to some serious imbalances in the division of water. Although most of the areas irrigated by the Indus River were situated in Pakistan, the headworks of many of the irrigation projects were located in India.³⁴ Third, many farmers were dependent on the irrigated lands in Pakistan for their traditional source of grains.

An early conflict over the distribution of the Indus Waters was averted by a “Standstill Agreement” reached by the Chief Engineers of West Punjab (Pakistan) and East Punjab (India) in December 1947 to continue the traditional discharges from the headworks in India through 1 April 1948.³⁵ However, Pakistan became alarmed when the East Punjab Government in India, citing the lapsed agreement, discontinued discharges from these headworks on 1 April, denying the Pakistani Punjab of irrigated water during a crucial sowing period.³⁶ While India considered the canal waters to be their inheritance from Partition, Pakistan argued that these waters were to be used jointly by the two countries. Subsequent negotiations to restore the Indian release of the canal waters resulted in the “Inter-Dominion

³⁴ Irrigation engineers use the term “headworks” to describe barrage and sluice gates arrangements that regulate the flow of water into a canal system and downstream river.

³⁵ Jagat S. Mehta, “The Indus Water Treaty: A Case Study in the Resolution of an International River Basin Conflict,” *Natural Resources Forum* 12, no. 1 (February 1988), 70.

³⁶ Aloys Arthur Michel, *The Indus Rivers: A Study of the Effects of Partition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), 196.

Agreement” which required Pakistan to deposit payments with India for charges related to canal development and maintenance.³⁷

This interim agreement, signed in May 1948, made attempts to recognize the important nature of the dispute, and to give assurances for future conduct: “Without prejudice to its legal rights in the matter the East Punjab Government has assured the West Punjab Government that it has no intention suddenly to withhold water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources.”³⁸ Nevertheless, continued disagreement over the interpretation of this agreement led to a stalemate over an equitable solution to the dispute.

Continued disagreement over the interpretation of the “Standstill Agreement” led to a stalemate over an equitable solution to the dispute.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission, visited India and Pakistan on assignment from *Collier’s* magazine, and addressed

this conflict in an important article, suggesting that, “this unnecessary controversy can be solved by common sense and engineering, to the benefit of the people who live by the waters of the Indus River.”³⁹ Lilienthal recommended that India and Pakistan endeavor to share and jointly develop the Indus River waters, and he shared his ideas with senior World Bank officials who approached the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers to offer their offices to mediate this dispute. Upon India and Pakistan’s acceptance of this proposal, the World Bank requested that both countries present their individual proposals to the Bank.⁴⁰

India’s proposal called for the identification of sites within its territory for constructing storage and link canals. The costs and benefits involved would be proportionately

³⁷ Michel, *The Indus Waters*, 202–205; N.D. Gulhati, *Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1972), 69–70.

³⁸ Excerpt from the “Inter-Dominion Agreement,” cited in Michel, *The Indus Waters*, 203.

³⁹ Sisir Gupta, “The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960,” *Foreign Affairs Reporter* 9, no. 12 (December 1960), 155, citing David E. Lilienthal, “Another ‘Korea’ in the Making?” *Collier’s* 128 (4 August 1951).

⁴⁰ Michel, *The Indus Rivers*, 219–26.

shared by the two countries. Pakistan, on the other hand, laid total claim to the three western rivers, and allowed India very limited control (30%) of the three eastern rivers.⁴¹ These diametrically opposed views could not be reconciled during negotiations between engineers from the two countries and the Bank's representative, and it became clear that India and Pakistan would not be able to agree on a formula which involved sharing an integrated Indus Basin water system.

This breakdown persuaded the Bank to present its own proposal for the partition of the Indus rivers in 1954, apportioning the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. A transitional period was envisioned, during which India would allow Pakistan to continue making "historical withdrawals" from the rivers allocated to India until it made alternative arrangements.⁴² Each country was permitted to construct irrigation works on its own territory and at its own cost. But India was to bear the cost of Pakistani link canals in proportion to the benefits that India would accrue for itself (during their passage through India).⁴³

Pakistan conditionally accepted the World Bank's proposal to partition the Indus River in August 1954. A second phase of discussions began in December 1954. Although the discussions were intended to be terminated by the end of September 1955, they dragged on without resolution. Several transitional agreements were reached during this period of extended negotiations to continue India's traditional discharges to Pakistan. But Pakistan was adamant in its call for some reservoir storage in the replacement plan to meet its irrigation needs. Consequently, the Bank modified its proposals to include the provision of storage facilities at India's expense. This change was accepted by both countries.⁴⁴

Finalized in August 1960, the treaty adhered to the Bank's earlier proposal to divide the Indus River between India and Pakistan. India was permitted non-consumptive use of the

⁴¹ Mehta, "The Indus Water Treaty," 72.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 73.

⁴³ M.S. Rajan, *India in World Affairs, 1954-56* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1964), 492.

⁴⁴ *Keesings Contemporary Archives* 11, (25 January–1 February 1958), 15984.

western river waters within its territory, meaning it could use these waters without diminishing the river's total flow. Speaking on the occasion of signing the Indus Waters Treaty, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed,

This is indeed a unique occasion and a memorable day, memorable in many ways, memorable certainly in the fact that a very difficult and complicated problem which has troubled India and Pakistan for many years has been satisfactorily resolved. It is also memorable because it is an outstanding example of a cooperative endeavor among our two countries as well as other countries and the International Bank.⁴⁵

For his part, Pakistani president Ayub Khan acknowledged Nehru's personal contribution to the success of the negotiations in a broadcast to the nation. He noted that this contribution "helped to remove certain obstacles that had arisen over arrangements relating to the transition period."⁴⁶ At the signing ceremony, he also added, significantly, that "[t]he implementation of the treaty would call for continued co-operation between the two countries for many years to come. . . . I have no doubt that if we work in the same spirit and harmony, it will promote trust and understanding between the peoples of our two countries."⁴⁷

Despite the acceptance of the treaty's intrinsic merits by the two leaders, there was widespread dissatisfaction in India with the treaty. Many Indians felt that Pakistan had benefitted unfairly

The Indus Waters Treaty not only continues to work effectively, but it also serves as a model CBM for future Indo–Pakistani agreements.

from the deal because Pakistan was allocated some four-fifths of the total flow of the Indus River and provided substantial funds to enable its future development of the Indus basin. Others criticized the partitioning of the Indus River waters. The ideal solution, they insisted, would have been negotiation of holistic development of the river basin. This would have

⁴⁵ Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, vol. 4 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1983), 292–3. Statement at the time of signing the Canal Waters Treaty, Karachi, 19 September 1960.

⁴⁶ "Success of Canal Waters Talks: FM Ayub Khan's Statement," *Asian Recorder*, vol. 6, no. 14 (24–30 September 1960), 3558.

⁴⁷ "Indo–Pakistan Canal Waters Treaty: FM Ayub Khan's speech," *ibid.*, 3573.

allowed the fullest exploitation of its irrigation, hydroelectric power and navigational potential. The World Bank, however, reached the very early conclusion that political realities prevented the possibility of an integrated development of the Indus Valley by a single authority. Moreover, as President Ayub argued, “an ideal solution when negotiated can seldom be obtained. . . . This is the best we could get under the circumstances many of which, irrespective of merits, are against us.”⁴⁸ At some propitious future time it may yet be possible for both countries to negotiate a sequel to the Indus Waters Treaty which would provide a more holistic alternative to the development of the Indus basin according to the principles of spatial development.

While the agreement can be criticized for partitioning the Indus basin rather than establishing a cooperative arrangement for exploiting the rivers as an integrated system, the results achieved by the treaty have endured. The Indus Waters Treaty not only continues to work effectively, but it also serves as a model CBM for future Indo–Pakistani agreements. Management of the Indus River waters has been successfully insulated from the vicissitudes of Indo–Pakistani relations over the intervening years. In April 1978, India and Pakistan extended the treaty with an agreement pertaining to the Salal hydroelectric project on the Chenab River.⁴⁹

The Indus Waters agreement provides that waters of the three western rivers and three eastern rivers of the Indus River waters system be directed to Pakistan and India respectively. In effect, the treaty delineates Indo–Pakistani rights and obligations to the Indus River Basin by partitioning the waters. Furthermore, the treaty has established a mechanism for the cooperative settlement of possible future disputes by creating a Permanent Indus Waters Commission with one Commissioner representing each country. In addition to resolving differences regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty, the Commission must also “establish and maintain cooperative arrangements for the implementation of this treaty and [to] promote cooperation between the parties. . . .”⁵⁰ Should the Commission prove unable to

⁴⁸ “Pakistan: End of the Water Dispute,” *The Round Table*, no. 201 (December 1960), 73.

⁴⁹ This later Agreement can be seen in *Crisis Prevention*, 253–54.

⁵⁰ Indus Waters Treaty, *ibid.*, 248.

resolve any dispute, the treaty calls for a neutral expert and, upon certification, a Court of Arbitration for adjudication.

By using its financial leverage, the World Bank was able to nudge India and Pakistan into resolving their dispute.

The role of the World Bank, to which Nehru had paid handsome tribute, was crucial in overcoming many of the obstacles encountered in negotiating the treaty. By using its financial leverage, the Bank was able to nudge India and Pakistan into resolving their dispute. The World Bank contributed over \$1 billion for the needed storages, link canals, and other construction works. Approximately half of this sum was contributed by the United States alone. The World Bank and other donors each provided \$250 million.⁵¹ These funds were consolidated into an Indus Basin Development Fund, which was to be administered by the World Bank.

Furthermore, the presence of the World Bank, and its financial offers, were instrumental in keeping both countries at the negotiating table. As the lower riparian state, Pakistan could not risk a breakdown in talks leading to an interruption in water supplies. For its part, India's second five-year plan was dependent on massive economic aid from the World Bank and from the developed countries that were members of the Bank.⁵² Most importantly, the World Bank "was able to make both India and Pakistan winners in the Indus Waters settlement, since each country received more irrigation water as a result of the agreement."⁵³ The incentives offered by the World Bank also succeeded in diluting India's traditional objection to multilateral negotiations with Pakistan.

⁵¹Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States, 1941–1991* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1993), 150–2.

⁵² Mehta, "The Indus Waters Treaty," 75.

⁵³Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 152.

The crucial role of the World Bank in bringing negotiations over the Indus Waters Treaty to a successful conclusion suggests the utility of third party mediation in the many disputes between India and Pakistan.⁵⁴ Most of the Indus Waters negotiations were conducted in Washington, London, and Rome, not in the sub-continent. The practice of rotating these discussions alternately between the two countries in the same fashion as the foreign secretary-level talks was not used, suggesting that it was deemed better to have these negotiations in neutral territory.

The crucial role of the World Bank in bringing negotiations over the Indus Waters Treaty to a successful conclusion suggests the utility of third party mediation in the many disputes between India and Pakistan.

However, the subsequent Salal agreement was achieved through purely bilateral efforts that built on the previous treaty. Neither third party intervention nor bilateralism can therefore be seen as ideal in all situations.

The success achieved in these Indo-Pakistani negotiations underlines the need for an appropriate political climate; the timing of negotiations is therefore essential. The Ayub government in Pakistan, which came into power in 1958, was favorably disposed towards a resolution of the Indus Waters dispute, and acted accordingly: “It appraised the position

realistically, distinguished between major and minor issues, and took urgent decisions on all matters of importance.”⁵⁵

Indian and Pakistani leaders should refrain from angry polemics, even if unable to contribute positive statements, when delicate Indo-Pakistani negotiations are underway.

A final lesson is the role of public declarations in facilitating or obstructing Indo-Pakistani

⁵⁴It is possible, of course, to cavil at the World Bank formula of partitioning the Indus rivers and not seeking a more comprehensive solution for distributing its waters that would have conformed to some overarching principles of spatial development. This approach would have provided a more optimal allocation of the Indus river waters. Still, the World Bank’s mediation did succeed in reaching a modus vivendi in a reasonable period of time; otherwise the ideal solution might have taken decades to negotiate.

⁵⁵“End of the Water Dispute,” 73, n.17. The initial negative declaratory statements made by President Ayub, never formally pursued, were clearly designed to garner public support and strengthen his military regime, which had overthrown a civilian government.

agreements. The avoidance of harsh statements by Nehru—despite provocations—had a positive effect on the outcome of these negotiations. No doubt, Nehru’s high standing in the international community and his unquestioned hold over Parliament and the Congress party enabled him to adopt a statesman-like posture in these negotiations. President Ayub recognized Nehru’s role and refrained from making harsh statements to negatively affect the negotiations, except for some initial statements designed to consolidate his domestic position. Ayub placed a mutually agreeable solution over other alternatives, publicly advocating his wish for an “honorable settlement” with Nehru.⁵⁶ This case thus illustrates that Indian and Pakistani leaders should refrain from angry polemics, even if unable to contribute positive statements, when delicate Indo–Pakistani negotiations are underway.

The Simla Agreement (1972)

The Simla Agreement was signed by Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after India’s decisive victory in the 1971 War, and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh from what was once East Pakistan. The 1971 War dramatically shifted the balance of power on the sub-continent in India’s favor.⁵⁷ Pakistan’s disadvantages were great—not only the loss of East Pakistan, but also the capture of some 93,000 civilians and military personnel by India. Nevertheless, Bhutto, Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, favored “direct talks without outside interference.”⁵⁸

The Preamble to the Simla Agreement offers several guiding principles for future Indo–Pakistani relations. These include: ending “the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their

The Simla Agreement envisages the establishment of non-military CBMs between the two countries in the areas of communications, travel, trade and economic cooperation, as well as cultural and scientific exchanges.

⁵⁶*Asian Recorder*, vol. 4, no. 1 (22–28 November 1958), 2366.

⁵⁷ For a good account of this conflict, see Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo–Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947* (Boulder, Color.: Westview Press, 1994), and Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990).

⁵⁸ “Direct Talks with India is Pakistan’s Policy,” *The Statesman*, 20 January 1972.

relations;” working for a “friendly and harmonious relationship;” and establishing a “durable peace in the sub-continent.”⁵⁹ The Simla Agreement also calls for “basic issues and causes of conflict,” i.e., Kashmir, to be resolved by peaceful means and that the cease-fire line (subsequently renamed the Line of Control) should be respected by both sides “without prejudice to the recognized position of either side,” and that neither side “shall seek to alter it unilaterally.”⁶⁰ The agreement envisages the establishment of non-military CBMs between the two countries in the areas of communications, travel, trade and economic cooperation, as well as cultural and scientific exchanges. In addition, the Simla Agreement calls for representatives of the two governments to meet to discuss the possibilities for a “normalization of relations” at subsequent meetings.⁶¹

The Simla Agreement has not been put into practice. Indeed, Pakistan’s well-documented encouragement of cross-border militancy in Kashmir clearly violates the agreement’s specific injunctions. Discussions over normalization have not taken place. The establishment of non-military CBMs, moreover, has made little progress, and the goal of seeking durable peace in the sub-continent remains elusive. Yet, significantly, the Simla Agreement has not been abrogated by either country. It continues to offer a *modus operandi* for pursuing the elusive goal of normalizing Indo–Pakistani relations and seeking durable peace in the sub-continent. Absent political will among Indian and Pakistani leaders, and the appropriate political climate, a framework for the realization of peace will be of little lasting help.

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Subsequent observers have maintained that at Simla, Bhutto was “personally inclined” to accept the status quo to resolve the Kashmir problem and had agreed to create conditions in Pakistan favorable to converting the Line of

⁵⁹ Text of the Simla Agreement, *Crisis Prevention*, 251.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 252. See Article 3 (ii).

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 252, Article 6.

Control in Kashmir into the international border.⁶² This highly controversial contention is supported by a March 1972 account by a senior Indian journalist, who attributed to Bhutto the following remarks:

We have been to war several times over Kashmir. . . . Each time Kashmir has been the key issue in the conflict, directly or indirectly. The problem has not been resolved for us by military means. You have not resolved it politically either. In today's situation it is for you to solve the problem. *You set the tone. I cannot set the pace any longer.*[Emphasis in original].⁶³

In another interview Bhutto asserted, "We can make the cease-fire line as a line of peace. Let the people of Kashmir move between the two countries freely. One thing can lead to another. Why should it be ordained on me or Shrimati Gandhi that we resolve everything today? We should set things in motion, in the right direction."⁶⁴ Perhaps Bhutto nurtured the hope that if Kashmiris on both sides of the cease-fire line interacted, they would find a way to resolve the knotty Kashmir problem. Bhutto could have hoped that an answer to the Kashmir problem might emerge by shifting the onus to the Kashmiris, a solution which might also have been acceptable amongst the Pakistani public.

Part of the difficulty in reconciling the Indo-Pakistani positions on Kashmir stemmed from the different emphases both countries placed on various points of negotiation. For India, it was important to convert the cease-fire

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line in Jammu and Kashmir into an international border. To do this, India had to rescind its claims to Pakistani-held Kashmir. For Pakistan, however, securing the repatriation of its

⁶²P.N. Dhar, "LoC As Border: Bhutto's Deal with Mrs. Gandhi," *The Times of India*, 4 April 1997.

⁶³Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA), *News Review on South Asia*, March 1972, 63. The Indian journalist was Dilip Mukherjee reporting from Karachi.

⁶⁴IDSA, *News Review on South Asia*, April 1972, 72. The Indian journalist was Kuldip Nayar, Resident Editor, *The Statesman*.

civilian and military Prisoners of War (POW) assumed great importance. Relatives of the POWs mounted considerable pressure on the government to secure their release, and held many demonstrations throughout Pakistan.⁶⁵

Bhutto showed a desire to unilaterally release Indian POWs captured on the western front to assist the process of repatriation of the Pakistani POWs. Nevertheless, he refused to yield to Indian pressures in this regard:

If you use prisoners to milk Pakistan, there will be only two alternatives open to me. Either I capitulate and accept whatever line you wish to draw in Kashmir or elsewhere. . .or I go to my people and tell them there is no alternative to confrontation. . . .A political crisis or instability in Pakistan is not to your advantage.⁶⁶

Bhutto criticized India's obduracy in not returning the POWs claiming that keeping them would become "counter-productive . . . [on account] of diminishing returns."⁶⁷ The POWs were, in other words, a "wasting asset."⁶⁸ The POW issue contained an important financial component. India provided rations to the POWs, as well as accommodation, medical facilities, and clothing—a tremendous financial strain. India also faced adverse international publicity for holding the POWs, especially on occasions when they were killed in desperate attempts to escape the camps.

The POW dilemma was avidly discussed in the media and influenced the negotiating positions of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Several high-level leaders in all three countries made declarations to allay the doubts and suspicions of their domestic populations, hardening national positions before the bilateral negotiations even began.

⁶⁵ "Bhutto Ready to Visit Delhi for Talks on POWs; Demonstrators Promised 'Good News' Next Month," *Hindustan Times*, 13 February 1972.

⁶⁶ Quoted in IDSA, *News Review on South Asia*, March 1972, 64.

⁶⁷ Quoted in IDSA, *News Review on South Asia*, April 1972, 73.

⁶⁸ Z.A. Bhutto's interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave in *Newsweek*, 3 April, 1972.

Despite these underlying issues, the Simla Agreement was negotiated and signed on 2 July 1972. Shortly after, Indira Gandhi modestly commented, “This [Simla Agreement] was just a beginning.”⁶⁹ In contrast, Bhutto was more confident, he declared, “I had gone to India with two vows—first to get our territory back and then get back our POWs. I have done the first in five months. . . . I will get the POWs back too because India cannot keep them for long.”⁷⁰

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Specifically, the Simla Agreement called for a withdrawal of forces deployed across the international border and to turn the cease-fire line in Kashmir into an

officially-delineated Line of Control (LoC). These withdrawals were to commence upon entry into force of the agreement and to be completed within 30 days thereafter. Although technical difficulties prevented this from happening, troops were withdrawn by 15 September 1972. The replacement of the earlier cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir with the LoC however, proved more difficult than anticipated, and was not settled until 1973.

In retrospect, India secured recognition of two major principles guiding its relations with Pakistan: the need to resolve bilateral disputes without recourse to force and instead, through bilateral

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negotiations. Although India returned more captured territory than Pakistan, India failed to establish the LoC as a permanent international border. While Indian troops were withdrawn and both countries renounced the use of force to solve disputes, Pakistan had yet to convince India to free its POWs, and had failed to secure the final status of Kashmir through the self-determination of its people.

The agreement sparked different responses in India and Pakistan. In India, commentators criticized the agreement for returning the captured territories in [West] Pakistan

⁶⁹ “PM: Simla Agreement a Beginning,” *The Indian Express*, 7 July 1972.

⁷⁰ “Diplomatic ‘Coup’ for Bhutto,” *Motherland*, 4 July 1972.

while simultaneously holding on to the POWs. As events proved—as was correctly foreseen by Bhutto—the POWs ultimately became an embarrassment to India. Some Indian commentators have criticized Indira Gandhi for returning the captured territories in West Pakistan rather than using them as a bargaining tool for settling the Kashmir dispute. One could contend, however, that Mrs. Gandhi had wanted to strengthen Bhutto's domestic position in the interests of enabling him to address the Kashmir dispute as well as other contentious issues.

The Simla Agreement negotiations re-emphasized the centrality of Kashmir, and the need for a resolution of this core issue. The Simla Agreement negotiations also underscored the need for Indian and Pakistani leaders to help, rather than embarrass, each other with inflammatory declarations. Indira Gandhi, who preferred Bhutto's civilian leadership to any potential military dictatorship in Pakistan, seemed to grasp this instinctively, offering conciliatory public statements, hoping they might better enable Bhutto to deal with his domestic constituencies.

It became quickly apparent that the Simla Agreement would not lead to a “durable peace” in South Asia. The failure to implement the Simla Agreement's provisions can be partially attributed to diplomatic fatigue. Gandhi's and Bhutto's reluctance to make any move that might further provoke hardline domestic constituencies is another factor. A second summit meeting, envisioned in the agreement, never materialized; later, a marked deterioration in the domestic political positions of Bhutto and Indira Gandhi made it much more difficult for them to initiate discussions to implement further provisions of the agreement. Despite the solid domestic position of both leaders, neither leader seized opportunities to improve Indo-Pakistani relations.

Perhaps the most important lesson of this case study relates to the difficulties inherent in both public and secret diplomacy in Indo-Pakistani relations. In public diplomacy, especially given emotional issues like Kashmir, popular opinion can be easily inflamed. Leaders are therefore tempted to make hard, uncompromising statements to please a watchful public, leaving little room for them to retreat once negotiations begin. On the other hand, secret diplomacy is difficult to carry out, especially given the highly-charged atmosphere in both countries. For example, Pakistanis considered Bhutto's verbal assurance in Simla on 2

July 1972 to maintain the status quo in Kashmir to amount to “treasonable activity.”⁷¹ Bhutto’s private assurance about the future status of Kashmir to Indira Gandhi was made public by P.N. Dhar in 1995.⁷² Secret diplomacy in the Indo–Pakistani context therefore is not without its perils, and is further disadvantaged by the possibility of unwarranted and potentially detrimental disclosures.

NO-WAR PACT/PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY PROPOSALS

India and Pakistan have both offered No-War Pacts—a vow not to initiate military action—to each other, although this offer has served different purposes at different times. The ancestry of No-War Pacts, joint defense arrangements, and peace and friendship treaty proposals can be traced to a statement made by Prime Minister Clement Attlee before India and Pakistan became independent. Expressing his anguish over the partition of British India, he claimed, “I earnestly hope that this severance may not endure, that the two new dominions we now propose to set up may come together again to form one great member of the Commonwealth.”⁷³ This statement was well received in India since many Indian leaders “were convinced that Pakistan, like the prodigal son, would return to the fold of Mother India.”⁷⁴ Yet, in Pakistan, many considered Attlee’s hope anathema to their new state. Hoping to resolve this misunderstanding, Girija Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, informed US officials in April 1948 that “a political reunion. . . was most unlikely in the foreseeable future, but that he would hope for an understanding

⁷¹Nawaz Sharif made this claim when he was out of power as a way to denigrate then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. An authoritative discussion of this episode may be seen in Abdul Sattar, “Simla Pact: Negotiation Under Duress,” *Regional Studies* 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1995), 43.

⁷² Subrahmanyam, “The Simla Pact.”

⁷³ N. Mansergh and Penderel Moon, *Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power, 1944-47*, vol.10 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982), 312.

⁷⁴ Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press, 1986), 180.

which would permit joint defense of the Indian sub-continent whose critical frontier now lay in Pakistan. . .”⁷⁵

Jawaharlal Nehru’s No-War proposal of August 1949 was the first initiative in this genre. Making the proposal during a press conference, Nehru called for a joint Indo–Pakistani pledge that the two countries would not resort to war over seemingly intractable problems.

There is no evidence to suggest that Nehru had laid any groundwork for this initiative by giving advance warning of his proposal to Pakistan’s leaders.

Jawaharlal Nehru’s No-War proposal of August 1949 was the first initiative in this genre.

Rather, he had probably offered

the proposal to mitigate the mounting Indo–Pakistani tensions over the mass migration of Hindus from East Pakistan into India. Large-scale communal rioting had also commenced on both sides of the border. Nehru may have felt compelled to offer a No-War Pact to prevent a further deterioration in Indo–Pakistani relations.

Nehru was realistic enough, however, to admit that “[s]uch a declaration does not, of course, put an end to the problems which will have to be dealt with separately. But we did think, and we do think, that it creates a favorable atmosphere to deal with those problems.”⁷⁶ In response to Liaquat Ali Khan’s complaint that India had not formally approached Pakistan, Nehru reconveyed the No-War Pact proposal through diplomatic channels in December 1949. Liaquat Ali then informed the Pakistani Constituent Assembly that “. . . the only way to promote peace is to resolve major disputes. A joint declaration will carry conviction to no one unless it is supported by evidence of some concrete action. . . . At least a procedure for settling them can be laid down.”⁷⁷ Pakistan felt that a mere declaration was insufficient, and that some tangible effort was needed to address important Indo–Pakistani contentions, especially the problem of Kashmir. Pakistan has maintained this basic policy over the years.

⁷⁵*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948*, vol. 5 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 503.

⁷⁶ Sarvepalli Gopal, ed., *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, 2d ser., pt.1, vol. 14, 15 November 1949–8 April 1950 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 15.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 31, n. 3.

Nevertheless, in February 1950, Nehru issued a draft declaration in the following terms:

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan . . . hereby declare that they will not resort to war for the settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. They further agree that the settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through peaceful methods of negotiation and mediation, and if these should fail to bring settlement, by resort to arbitration.⁷⁸

In November 1950, however, Nehru admitted to Parliament that, although the correspondence in regard to his proposal had expanded in volume and included the canal waters and evacuee property disputes, “we have achieved no solid result.”⁷⁹ Still later, in August 1951, Nehru confessed to failure in his address to Parliament. “Since we want to avoid war, we offered Pakistan a no-war declaration which Pakistan did not wholly accept or agree to. And even a few days ago, this offer was repeated but they declined to accept it unless Kashmir was left out of it.”⁸⁰ A No-War declaration excluding the case of Kashmir would have been meaningless. Although this No-War Pact proposal was never officially withdrawn, no further efforts were made to pursue it.

Later, Pakistan took the initiative. In April 1959, President Ayub Khan suggested to India the “joint defense” of South Asia. Its genesis lay in Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s belief expressed in March 1948,

. . . that it was of vital importance to Pakistan and India, as independent sovereign states, to collaborate in a friendly way jointly to defend their frontiers both at land and sea against any aggression. But this depends entirely on whether Pakistan and India can resolve their own differences and grave domestic issues in the first instance.⁸¹

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 67.

⁷⁹ Gopal, ed., *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches*, vol.2, 177.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁸¹ *Dawn*, 12 March 1948.

Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Choudhury made this offer again, in virtually identical terms, in April 1953.

There is no evidence to suggest that President Ayub's offer was preceded by any prior consultations with Indian leaders.

A No-War declaration excluding the case of Kashmir would have been meaningless.

Yet it would be an overstatement to

suggest that this was an empty gesture made only for domestic purposes. Ayub's offer was clearly prompted by his concern that the Chinese entry into Tibet constituted a security threat to South Asia. It was therefore designed to forge Indo-Pakistani cooperation to meet this shared danger. However, Ayub was conscious that India's aversion to military pacts and adherence to non-alignment made it difficult to accept this proposal. He conceded that India and Pakistan could pursue their separate foreign policies and safeguard their own frontiers; a mere understanding in regard to joint defense would suffice.

But Ayub's joint defense offer was subject to the condition that the Kashmir and canal water problems must first be settled, a provision disliked by Nehru.⁸² Questioning its basic premise, Nehru asked, "As for a common defense policy, against whom was this to be directed?"⁸³ The joint defense proposal was officially rejected by India on the grounds that it was a "ploy to reopen the Kashmir dispute and as a means for Pakistan to claim a spurious equality."⁸⁴ Pakistan deemed India's No-War Pact proposal to be equally unrealistic.

⁸² S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), 233.

⁸³ Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, vol. 3, 1956–64 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 92, citing Nehru's speech in the Rajya Sabha on 4 May 1959.

⁸⁴ David Taylor, "The Changing Pattern of Indo-Pakistan Relations," in Wolfgang P. Zingel and Stephanie Zingel, eds., *Pakistan in the 80s: Ideology, Regionalism, Economy, Foreign Policy* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1985), 556.

Pakistan feared that accepting a No-War Pact with India countenanced turning the Line of Control into the international boundary, relegating the final status of Kashmir to a non-issue.

In addition to Nehru's No-War Pact offer to Pakistan in 1949, similar overtures were made by Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965, Indira Gandhi in 1968 and 1972, and Morarji Desai in 1977, and by Indian foreign minister Narasimha Rao in

February 1980.⁸⁵ Pakistan uniformly rejected these offers—an extraordinary situation in which the weaker state repeatedly rejected the stronger power's offers for peace. In this instance, Pakistan feared that accepting a No-War Pact with India countenanced turning the Line of Control into the international boundary, relegating the final status of Kashmir to a non-issue. Pakistan preferred to emphasize resolving the core dispute of Kashmir before proceeding to grapple with other Indo-Pakistani disputes. Other, non-official views, in contrast, held that a No-War Pact would enlarge the volume of trade and exchange of technology between the two countries, encourage freer travel of intellectuals and professionals on both sides, improve regional stability, and reduce external interference in South Asia.⁸⁶

These early Indo-Pakistani interactions on generic non-use of force proposals highlighted both countries' bargaining positions at that time. Despite the special emphasis India placed on bilateral negotiations, Nehru's draft declaration of 1950 suggested that New Delhi was not averse to arbitration. The need for India to define its position towards China, inherent in Pakistan's joint defense proposal, was soon to change; the border conflict of 1962 has since deeply embedded China in India's security consciousness.

On 15 September 1981, Pakistan offered India a Non-Aggression Pact. This offer was included within an extensive official statement on Pakistan's acceptance of a \$3.2 billion economic and military aid package from the United States. The offer concluded:

If India is inclined to banish its unfounded fears it shall not find us wanting in fully reciprocating to any gesture on its part for establishing good-neighborly

⁸⁵ R.G. Sawhney, "Zia's Peace Offensive," *Strategic Analysis* 8, no.3 (June 1984), 230.

⁸⁶ Sareen, *Pakistan: The India Factor*, 21–25.

relations. On our part we are prepared to enter into immediate consultations with India for the purpose of exchanging mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force in the spirit of the Simla Agreement.⁸⁷

There is no evidence that President Zia had given advanced notice to Indian leaders about these proposals. On the contrary, the proposals appear to have been almost casually introduced into a larger statement accepting the

Similar to the circumstances of Nehru's No-War Pact, Zia issued his offer for a Non-Aggression Pact during a time of high Indo-Pakistani tensions.

much-debated military and economic aid package from the United States. Similar to the circumstances of Nehru's No-War Pact, Zia issued his offer for a Non-Aggression Pact during a time of high Indo-Pakistani tensions. The autumn of 1981 had been marked by frequent clashes between Indian and Pakistani armed forces along the border amid reports that Pakistan was covertly importing nuclear equipment from abroad. Zia's dramatic offer was probably intended to allay India fears about the US provision of a large aid package to Pakistan.

A subsequent clarification by Pakistani foreign minister Shaibzada Yakub Khan explained that Pakistan was not offering a No-War Pact, but a "non-aggression and non-use of force" agreement.⁸⁸ This clarification went largely unnoticed in India, as India was undoubtedly concerned with the American military aid package being provided to Pakistan, and particularly the acquisition of 40 F-16 warplanes. Indeed, some years later, Zia stated, "When Pakistan learnt that India truly depicts itself to be fearful of Pakistan due to the induction of 40 F-16 aircraft, we offered a no-war pact. There is nothing else involved except to assure India."⁸⁹

⁸⁷ "Pakistan for Early Talks with India," *Business Recorder*, 16 September 1981.

⁸⁸ "Pak Press Undermines Zia's 'Bridge of Friendship,'" *The Times of India*, 22 October, 1981.

⁸⁹ Sareen, *Pakistan: The India Factor*, 174-5.

New Delhi initially protested that Pakistan had not sent any formal proposal through recognized diplomatic channels, sparking a procedural controversy. To end the dispute, Zia announced that he would send a formal proposal to India to fulfill its requirements.⁹⁰ The reaction of the Indian media was mixed. Many individuals felt that Pakistan's Non-Aggression Pact was intended for the US Congress, which was to commence debate on the US administration's \$3.2 billion aid package to Pakistan.

Officially, India reacted positively, declaring that India stood by its original No-War Pact offer,

. . .with no exceptions, no conditions and no variations. . . . Our attitude will thus be positive on the basis that Pakistan's 'offer' constitutes an acceptance for the first time of India's offer of a no-war pact which has stood intact since 1949 and as further amplification of the Simla agreement.⁹¹

India also declared that the two countries must settle their mutual problems by bilateral discussions. Nevertheless, Indira Gandhi remained skeptical about the sincerity of Pakistan's offer. Referring to Pakistan's acquisition of sophisticated arms from the United States, she claimed, "the proposal makes no sense. You can't talk of peace and prepare for war."⁹²

India's response reflected a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, rejecting Pakistan's offer would have been unconscionable, since it embodied India's own past proposals. Accepting Pakistan's offer, on the other hand, would

India declared that while it was not averse to accepting Pakistan's Non-Aggression Pact offer, it needed clarifications about its precise implications.

⁹⁰ "Indo-Pak Exchanges on No-War Offer," as cited in IDSA, *News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean*, November 1981, 1116.

⁹¹ India's official response was presented by Narasimha Rao, then Foreign Minister, in statements made to both Houses of Parliament. See "India Stands by 1949 No-War Pact Offer," *The Times of India*, 25 November 1981.

^{92a} "Indo-Pak Exchanges," *News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean*, 1116.

imply that India had no objection to Pakistan's receipt of the massive aid package from the United States. The Defense Ministry drew the Indian Parliament's attention to two important considerations. First, the arms being acquired by Pakistan were "more likely to be used in the eastern direction." Second, Pakistan was in a position to acquire nuclear capability "at any time."⁹³

India declared that while it was not averse to accepting Pakistan's Non-Aggression Pact offer, it needed clarifications about its precise implications. According to Indira Gandhi, "India had always extended the hand of friendship towards Pakistan but now when it was buying armaments from the United States there was a postscript to the deal for a no-war pact with India."⁹⁴ As Pakistan did not clarify the implications of its proposal, India laid out seven principles for the suggested pact. These were: strict adherence to the Simla Agreement; provision of a better life for their people; creation of a tension-free atmosphere; commitment to Panchsheel ("peaceful co-existence"); equality, mutual benefit and bilateralism in relations between the two countries; eschewing of war and threat of use of force so as to settle all disputes bilaterally and peacefully; and adherence to non-alignment—the essence of which is non-involvement in great power confrontation.⁹⁵

India thus explicitly tried to enlarge the ambit of this pact and include its traditional foreign policy concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan. These exchanges tempered the mood for the Indo-Pakistani foreign minister-level talks at the end of January 1982. At its start, Indira Gandhi declared to the Pakistani team of journalists accompanying the official delegation that India would never attack Pakistan, "war pact or no war pact." Further, India was willing to enter a Friendship Treaty with Pakistan similar to the one it shared with the Soviet Union.⁹⁶

⁹³This assessment was conveyed to the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) by Shivraj Patil, Minister of State for Defense. See "No-War Pact a Diplomatic Offensive," *Statesman*, 2 December 1981.

⁹⁴ "PM Sets Terms for No-War Pact," *The Indian Express*, 20 December 1981.

⁹⁵ These "principles" were laid out in an *aide memoir* to Pakistan on 24 December 1981. "Shahi-Rao Talks Begin on 30 January," *Patriot*, 29 January 1981.

⁹⁶ "Indo-Pak Talks on No-War Pact Proposal," as cited in IDSA, *News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean*, February 1982, 1476–77. India signed a "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" with the Soviet Union in August 1971. "Apart from the symbolic significance of the treaty, it ensured the support of a veto-wielding superpower for India, thus affording India a measure of protection from possible censure in the Security Council. In addition, the treaty offered India protection in the event of attack by a third party." Ganguly, *Origins of War*, 105.

Indeed, India had offered a Friendship Treaty to Pakistan at Tashkent.⁹⁷ While agreement on renouncing the use of force did not materialize, an important decision was taken to establish a joint Indo–Pakistani commission to expand bilateral relations in the areas of trade, travel, communications, and cultural exchanges.⁹⁸ The two countries also agreed to explore the No-War Pact/Friendship Treaty proposals at a future meeting between the two foreign secretaries.

The focus of controversy then became whether talks in the Joint Commission should precede or follow the No-War Pact/Friendship Treaty negotiations. India urged that the two proposals proceed separately

A tension existed between Pakistan’s effort to focus narrowly on a simple declaration, and India’s attempt to enlarge the declaration’s scope to include other issues.

because they were independent of one another. Pakistan, in contrast, contended that “it was realized that such a treaty was premature. The principal objective of the non-aggression pact was to create the necessary atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence in the context of which alone could such a treaty acquire relevance.”⁹⁹ An exchange of letters between Indira Gandhi and Zia persuaded Pakistan to hand over a draft of the Non-Aggression Pact to India. India, in turn, found it vague and unacceptable, claiming that Pakistan needed to bring “the formulations in the draft in line with the seminal principles which should guide both countries in evolving a relationship of peace, friendship and cooperation.”¹⁰⁰

A tension thus existed between Pakistan’s effort to focus narrowly on a simple declaration, and India’s attempt to enlarge the declaration’s scope to include other issues. Indira Gandhi summed up India’s position stating that:

⁹⁷*The Times of India*, 2 January 1966.

⁹⁸“Indo–Pak Talks, *News Review on South Asia and Indian Ocean*, 1476–77.

⁹⁹ This was stated by Pakistani foreign minister Yakub Khan during a press interview. See “No-War Pact is in Both Countries’ Interests: Yakub,” *The Muslim*, 16 May 1982.

¹⁰⁰ “Fresh Bid to Begin Meaningful Talks,” *The Statesman*, 8 June 1982.

The substance of a no-war declaration was incorporated in the 1972 Simla Agreement. Pakistan has now come forward with a proposal for a no-war pact. We are ready to take it up once more. In fact, I have publicly affirmed that, pact or no pact, India will not attack Pakistan. I have proposed a treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation which would include non-aggression commitments and affirm strict adherence to non-alignment by both countries and a resolve to settle all differences by bilateral negotiations. I have also suggested a joint commission as a mechanism for continuous consideration of bilateral co-operation.¹⁰¹

A great deal of diplomatic maneuvering marked these exchanges. The substance of these proposals was a pledge to avoid conflict and resolve Indo–Pakistani disputes by peaceful negotiations. Instead of pursuing this essential goal, the two countries did little more than talk about the possibility of negotiations, and were more concerned with the peripheral objective of scoring debating points against each other to impress their domestic audiences.

The late 1980s witnessed a considerable heightening of Indo–Pakistani tensions and instabilities. Hostility was accentuated over nuclear issues, the Sikh militancy in the Punjab, war scares, and the heightened tensions over Kashmir. The general atmosphere was hardly conducive, therefore, to the pursuit of the Non-Aggression Pact or Friendship Treaty. Consequently, these proposals faded away.

The two countries did little more than talk about the possibility of negotiations, and were more concerned with the peripheral objective of scoring debating points against each other to impress their domestic audiences.

The above series of Indo–Pakistani proposals reveal several distinctive themes. First, both governments relied only on public diplomacy. There is nothing to suggest that any effort was made to further these proposals through either quiet diplomacy or unofficial channels. The sheer volume of

declarations, most of which were negative, was remarkable during this episode. It is obvious that the main purpose of these proposals and counter-proposals was not the pursuit of peace,

¹⁰¹ *Selected Speeches and Writings of Indira Gandhi*, vol. 5, 1 January 1982–30 October 1984 (New Delhi: Publications Division, 1986), 367.

but diplomatic advantage. Secret diplomacy—which might have been more effective—was not even contemplated.

Second, both governments relied on the press to engage in much of this open diplomacy. Zia's initial offer of the Non-Aggression Pact was made to the press. Nehru proposed his original No-War Pact offer to Pakistan in August 1949 at a press conference. Indira Gandhi issued a counter-offer of the Friendship Treaty in a meeting with Pakistani journalists. Government officials received notice of official statements only after they had been issued to the press. This was clearly an exercise in public relations rather than diplomacy.

Third, the nature of these public exchanges in the press suggests that they were actually designed to serve another ulterior purpose, one directed toward the international community. For instance, the timing of Zia's initial offer suggests that it was directed at the US Congress. The domestic populations of both countries were the secondary target audiences. One commentator has argued that

It is obvious that the main purpose of these proposals and counter-proposals was not the pursuit of peace, but diplomatic advantage.

Pakistan's proposed Non-Aggression Pact was designed “. . . to weaken the ‘hawks’ and reinforce the ‘doves’ in India. . . .Were it not for the ‘liberals’ through the media in seminars and in Parliament, the Indian government would in all likelihood have rejected the offer outright.”¹⁰²

Fourth, these declarations were also intended to embarrass the other country. It would be naive to believe that the two countries issued their numerous public statements with purely conciliatory intentions. For instance, Pakistan's Non-Aggression Pact offers formed part of a continuum of similar overtures from India. In April 1980, Zia suggested a mutual reduction of forces. In November 1981, he proposed a mutual inspection of each other's nuclear facilities. Zia was able to portray these initiatives as his “peace offensive” *vis-a-vis* India. Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi claimed:

¹⁰²Rita Manchanda, “Double Speak in Indo-Pakistani Relations,” *Strategic Analysis* (September 1986), 63–64.

[T]he Government of Pakistan is actively engaged in efforts designed to accelerate the process of normalization of relations with India as envisaged in the Simla Agreement. We have made several substantive proposals to India in this regard, including the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement. . . . A positive response by India to these proposals would greatly contribute to the building of mutual confidence between the two countries.¹⁰³

India's rejection of these proposals, and its delay in responding positively to Pakistan's sudden Non-Aggression Pact offer, reflected badly on India while highlighting Zia's seemingly genuine commitment to peace. Indeed, India's handling of these declaratory exchanges was inept. A perceptive observer noted, ". . . an excessive skepticism shown publicly about the Pakistani offer, however justified it might have been, has gone against our interests. Pakistan has fully exploited it by branding us as a reluctant and hesitant party to an apparently peaceful move."¹⁰⁴ The public debate in India, which accurately reflected the official position, was more concerned with exposing Pakistan's malign intent than with discussing the proposal's contents and possibilities. Consequently, the Indian public quickly forgot that Pakistan's Non-Aggression Pact proposal was based on earlier offers made by India, and reflected a possible desire among Pakistan's ruling elite to improve Indo-Pakistani relations.

The public debate in India, which accurately reflected the official position, was more concerned with exposing Pakistan's malign intent than with discussing the proposal's contents and possibilities.

A sharp contrast distinguishes this case from the two others studied. The Indus Waters Treaty is a functioning agreement and a model non-military CBM in the bleak landscape of Indo-Pakistani relations. Although the Simla Agreement has not been fully implemented, it does provide

a blueprint for proceeding with the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations whenever the

¹⁰³ These sentiments were expressed by Niaz A. Naik, Pakistan's Ambassador to New Delhi, in a letter to the *New York Times* published on 23 December 1981 responding to an article by Selig Harrison criticizing the Reagan administration's decision to provide \$3.2 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. *Morning News*, 24 December 1981.

¹⁰⁴ P.B. Sinha, "Pindi's Offer of No-War Talks," *Strategic Analysis* 5, no. 9 (December 1981), 465-66.

political moment is right. The exchanges between the two countries in the No-War Pact/Friendship Treaty discussions, however, stand apart; instead of reflecting a genuine commitment to improving Indo–Pakistani relations, the various proposals reveal the high levels of mutual mistrust between the two countries.

CONCLUSION

The record of Indo–Pakistani declaratory diplomacy reflects efforts to garner domestic support instead of improving bilateral relations. Rather than promote security and confidence building, such declarations have often exacerbated existing regional tensions. Nevertheless, declaratory statements do possess the potential to alleviate instabilities in South Asia. For example, a public declaration by the South Asian heads of government at a South Asian Associate for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit pledging non-interference in the internal affairs of their neighbors would go far towards mitigating existing suspicions in the region, fortifying communications and enhancing transparency between estranged nations.

The reality, however, remains that declaratory diplomacy in the Indo–Pakistani context is often driven by ulterior motives. The media, the intelligentsia, and government officials devote much energy to exposing the supposed negative motives behind peaceful initiatives. Weak political leaders, moreover, believe any concessions they might make would provide an opportunity for the domestic opposition to label them as traitors. Instead, leaders often seek the approval of domestic constituencies by vilifying the adversarial country, re-affirming existing prejudices, and drawing attention to long-unresolved issues such as Kashmir. Consequently, positive declarations have often proven ineffective.

The case studies discussed above suggest that Indian and Pakistani leaders have used declaratory statements in treaty negotiations to assure domestic constituencies that national interest would remain supreme, and to consolidate the leader's stronghold. The leaders needed to convey the impression that they were standing firm and not yielding to external pressure. Declaratory statements in the Indo–Pakistani context have been ploys in a bilateral diplomatic game, have been perceived as such by the leadership and power elites in both countries. The acrimonious debate artificially generated around these proposals further worsened Indo–Pakistani relations. Perhaps the most instructive lesson to be derived from these episodes is the ease with which India and Pakistan can—unconsciously perhaps—adopt each other's

traditional negotiating positions. This suggests that their negotiating positions are not inflexible; rather they are largely guided by tactical considerations based on calculations of immediate gains and losses.

Three examples of such changes in traditional negotiating positions are worth noting. First, while India has traditionally adhered to the principle of bilateralism in Indo–Pakistani relations, Pakistan has usually sought the intervention of outside powers. In the case of the Simla Agreement, however, Pakistan conceded to direct talks with India. Furthermore, in the Indus Waters Treaty case, India was not averse to World Bank intercession—no doubt because of offers of financial assistance for the related engineering works and, more generally, for its Five Year Plan.

Second, Pakistan has traditionally insisted that the core dispute of Kashmir must first be resolved before other Indo–Pakistani issues could be discussed. India, on the contrary, has

Declaratory statements do possess the potential to alleviate instabilities in South Asia.

avored a more broad-based approach in which Kashmir could be discussed along with other matters. In the case of the Simla Agreement, however, these positions were reversed. Pakistan

called for pursuit of a step-by-step approach to resolve other issues before grappling with the Kashmir dispute. India, in contrast, proposed converting the cease-fire line into an international border, indicating that it was willing to rescind its consistent position that it had a claim to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Similarly, Pakistan's Non-Aggression and Non-use of Force Pact proposal bore an obvious resemblance to India's repeatedly offered No-War Pact. India had always argued in favor of using a simple declaration to set the stage for more substantive talks. Pakistan had urged that core issues like Kashmir should first be resolved. However, Pakistan has also argued in favor of making a simple Non-Aggression declaration without linking it to any other issues. Eventually, India retreated from its traditional position that a No-War Pact declaration would be sufficient for improving Indo–Pakistani relations, and would permit negotiations to proceed on other issues. India came to believe that an effective declaration must be more substantial and tangible, offering specific measures to be undertaken by both countries.

Empirical evidence suggests that resolutions to lingering Indo–Pakistani disputes are more likely to be reached when new governments come to power in either or both countries. For instance, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) was finalized by the Ayub government, which seized power in 1958. The Simla Agreement (1972) was negotiated less than seven months after Z.A. Bhutto assumed power. The Janata government, which came into power in India in 1977, reached a compromise solution on the Salal project within a few months of taking office. The H.D. Deve Gowda government in India and the Awami League Government led by Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh—both then in office for only a few months—quickly concluded an agreement on the long-standing Farakka dispute in 1996. Despite its short tenure, the Gujral government enunciated a doctrine changing India’s relations with the smaller countries of South Asia, precluding reciprocity. On the other hand, the Zia and Indira Gandhi governments, in power for long periods of time, were unable to reach any agreement on the Non-Aggression Pact/Friendship Treaty proposals.

Why are new governments in India and Pakistan more favorably disposed towards resolving long-outstanding disputes? Conceivably, they are able to adopt an innovative approach to resolving old disputes. They also may be able to avoid becoming enmeshed in the vested interests in both countries that have a stake in continued Indo–Pakistani tensions. New governments could optimize their ability to achieve diplomatic success by making early affirmations of their commitment to improving Indo–Pakistani relations. Declarations to promote peace and stability are routinely made by political parties in their election manifestos. These could become the points of departure for them to press for a genuine effort to normalize Indo–Pakistani relations. Naturally, political will is needed to muster the political courage required for making this break with the past. That is the essential pre-requisite for all such overtures.

From Rivals to Friends: The Role of Public Declarations in Argentina–Brazil Rapprochement

Paulo S. Wrobel

Governments possess resources that enable committed leaders to minimize or solve enduring national and international disputes or rivalries. In cases where coercion or the use of force is not an option to resolve disputes, leaders can improve relations through dialogue and diplomatic negotiations by informing their own public, the target country, and the international community that a process of change is imminent.

Reforming defense policies can be a key component in demonstrating the political will to improve relations between hostile countries. Changing military doctrines, training and weapons procurement, developing a more co-operative approach to security through confidence-building measures (CBMs), combined with a commitment to establishing closer economic links and fostering bilateral trade and investment, can help defuse enduring disputes.

This paper focuses on the role of public declarations in forging political and economic rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil. Following decades of relations marked by suspicion and rivalry, Argentina and Brazil embarked on a series of initiatives after 1985 that enabled both countries to collaborate in political, security, economic, and cultural spheres.

BACKGROUND

Argentina and Brazil share a common geographical area in South America and a distinct, yet intermixed, colonial past. Argentina and Brazil share the Rio de la Plata basin—an area where Portuguese and Spanish *conquistadores* colluded in their ambition to conquer new land for their respective crowns. After achieving independence from the Iberian crowns in the early nineteenth century, the Argentine Republic and the Brazilian Empire inherited a series of unresolved territorial disputes from their colonial powers, involving Paraguay and Uruguay, the other two nations of the Rio de la Plata basin. Although Brazil did not settle disputes with its neighbors over its precise national boundaries until the early twentieth century, it had consolidated most of its vast territory under a single authority by the

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middle of the nineteenth century. This achievement was by no means an easy task, given the enormous size of the country, and came about as a result of the enlightened work of the empire's

political elite. In contrast, the Argentine Republic's nineteenth century experience was marked by infighting between contending factions—those favoring a federalist republic—struggling against the strong centralist tendencies of the city of Buenos Aires. Argentina's unification and territorial consolidation under a single authority was completed by the 1880s; nevertheless, the process left a strong mark on the Argentine psyche concerning alleged territorial losses to its neighbors.

Despite this inheritance of unresolved territorial disputes and numerous periods of muted hostility, the Argentine–Brazilian relationship was not defined by open hostility for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To be sure, there was competition on many levels, and their respective defense policies reflected mutual suspicion, but their bilateral relationship was not adversarial. After the mid-1850s, neither country resorted to coercion or the use of force to resolve territorial disputes, and during the only general war that took place in the Plata region—the Triple Alliance War (1864–1870)—Argentina and Brazil were allied against Paraguay.

Argentina and Brazil perceived each other as rivals, not enemies. Indeed, since their consolidation as viable nation-states in the late nineteenth century and until the mid-1980s, both countries kept a mutual distance from each other, despite sharing the abundant natural resources of the Rio de la Plata basin. For most of the twentieth century, their physical integration was hampered by security concerns, particularly following World War II. With the growing influence of the armed forces in their respective body politics—in particular the rise of Germanic influences among members of the civilian and military elites—priority was given to defending their national territories against a potentially aggressive neighbor. Consequently, communication and physical integration between the two neighbors was limited. The benefits of developing closer economic, political, and cultural relations were not considered until very recently.

Since 1945, the most acrimonious bilateral dispute concerned the control of water resources along the Alto Parana basin. In 1966, Brazil and Paraguay concluded the *Ata de Iguacu*, announcing their intention to build a huge Brazilian–Paraguayan hydroelectric plant,

Itaipu, on the Parana River, on the Argentina–Brazil–Paraguay border. The Treaty of Itaipu was signed in Brasilia in 1973. However, Buenos Aires feared that Brazil’s project would hinder its own plans for the water resources development in the area. For almost a decade, the dispute soured bilateral relations and hampered efforts to forge closer economic and political links.

The dispute over water resources was finally resolved by intense diplomatic negotiations. In October 1979, the Itaipu–Corpus

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Multilateral Treaty on Technical Cooperation was concluded, ending the dispute to the satisfaction of all three neighbors and opening the way for a dramatic improvement in relations. After the conclusion of the Itaipu–Corpus Treaty, Brazilian president Joao Figueiredo visited Argentina, the first Brazilian leader to do so in more than four decades. Figueiredo, the last president of the military rulers who had governed Brazil for 21 years, visited Buenos Aires in May 1980 and signed, among other agreements, a series of accords to collaborate on nuclear issues. Reflecting their shared opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Argentina and Brazil agreed to co-operate and exchange technical information, materials, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Following the resolution of the water resources dispute and the Brazilian president’s successful visit, an unexpected and traumatic event took place in Argentina that further improved bilateral relations: the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Argentina was fully absorbed by its territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel. This conflict, which almost led to a war in 1978, was prevented by the Vatican’s offer to mediate. After avoiding a war with Chile, Argentina invaded the British South Atlantic islands in April 1982, starting a brief, but important, war with the United Kingdom.

The actions taken by Brazil during this turbulent period were seen by Buenos Aires as generally supportive. Brazil remained neutral during Argentina’s conflicts with Chile and the United Kingdom. With regard to the Falklands/Malvinas issue, Brazil criticized the use of force by Argentina but declared its neutrality during the war and supported a negotiated solution. Meanwhile, it backed Argentina’s claims for sovereignty over the disputed South Atlantic islands. Furthermore, Brazil’s efforts to mediate the conflict between Buenos Aires and London were seen by Argentina as very positive. As a result, Argentina recognized Brazil as a trustworthy partner. After hostilities ended in June 1982, Buenos Aires chose Brazil to represent its interests in London until full diplomatic relations with United Kingdom were

restored in 1990. Thus, despite rivalry and historical suspicions, Brazil's actions and policies during the most traumatic period of Argentina's recent history—disastrous military rule, near conflict with Chile and the Falklands/Malvinas War—were fundamental to building trust between the two countries.

Argentina's intention to forge a closer relationship with Brazil was matched by Brazil's intention to do the same.

Argentina's defeat in the war against Britain hastened the end of its domestic military rule. General elections were held in September 1983, and President

Raul Alfonsín was elected with a mandate to ensure that Argentina's recent past was not repeated. Among his main achievements, President Alfonsín started to resolve the enduring territorial conflict with Chile during his six-year term, and significantly improved relations with Brazil.

Fortunately, Argentina's intention to forge a closer relationship with Brazil was matched by Brazil's intention to do the same. While still under military rule, Brazil initiated a policy of improving relations with its South American neighbors, and Argentina was considered the key country in this effort. The initiative was accelerated after 1985 when a politician, José Sarney, became the first civilian president. Soon after taking power, President Sarney met with President Alfonsín, and thereafter a series of diplomatic initiatives and presidential visits took place. The aim of these exchanges was to deepen the process of cultural, political, and economic rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil.

PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES

The presidents of Argentina and Brazil became directly involved in the initiatives that led to closer bilateral relations, and on many occasions their joint public declarations played a decisive role in galvanizing public support for the diplomatic process. Although bilateral relations had improved under military rule, civilian leaders had a much deeper commitment to improving ties. Indeed, decades of military training and doctrine based on mutual suspicion left sectors of the armed forces resistant to changing the established pattern of relations. However, their resistance did not lead senior officers to interfere with or hinder presidential initiatives. Instead, they accepted incremental change. One of the measures devised to build trust between the armed services was to encourage bilateral meetings. Since 1987, the senior

staff of the armed forces have met annually, with the aim of better understanding their respective defense priorities.

The lack of mutual interest that prevailed for so long amongst the economic elite in both countries was a result of the dearth of knowledge about the potential benefits of closer economic relations. There were very few channels of communication or other institutionalized means for exchanging information between the private sectors and business associations. Moreover, a tradition of closed economies, protectionism, and import substitution policies led both countries to raise even higher barriers against increasing trade and investment in the early 1980s. Powerful business groups that influenced economic and trade policy making, particularly industrial and agricultural associations, had to be persuaded that there was reason to improve bilateral economic relations. As with the armed forces, incremental changes occurred, eventually leading to the extraordinary increase in the flow of trade and investment between Argentina and Brazil.

Adding to the diplomatic successes already mentioned—the end of the dispute over water resources, a successful Brazilian presidential visit after four decades, and Brazil’s supportive

Although bilateral relations had improved under military rule, civilian leaders had a much deeper commitment to improving ties.

policies during the most turbulent period of Argentine recent history—new ideas and perceptions were informing public policies in Argentina and Brazil by the mid-1980s. The two countries increasingly shared the view that the world was changing fast and that their governments and societies were ill-prepared to face change. In particular, elites in both countries understood trends in the international economy towards regionalism and stiffer economic competition in a similar way. As a consequence, both societies recognized the need to open and modernize their economies, as well as to foster closer economic links.

There were also political reasons to induce change. Both presidents were eager to consolidate civilian rule and end their relative isolation in regional and world affairs. Argentina became internationally isolated after decades of unpredictable and erratic foreign policy, culminating in disputes with Chile and Britain. Meanwhile, Brazil was committed to ending its relative isolation in South America. A continent-size country with an inward-looking tradition, Brazilian elites became convinced that they needed to open the economy to foreign trade and investment as a way to realise national and global potential. Hence,

Argentina and Brazil had their own separate, but complementary, reasons for engaging in dialogue and beginning negotiations to forge closer relations.

When the view in favor of change became prominent among the newly empowered civilian elites, several bilateral groups and organizations were formed to exchange information and foster closer economic, political, and cultural links. These developments created a positive bureaucratic dynamic. As a result, after governmental officials and private groups established new channels of communication and began meeting more often, a better mutual knowledge and understanding of the tremendous potential for closer relations reinforced the process of rapprochement.

The commitment of national leaders in favor of improved relations was also bolstered by the economic and foreign ministries. After a decade, a radical transformation occurred in economic, political, and cultural relations. Argentina and Brazil now sustain an open and frank political dialogue. Bilateral trade has multiplied more than five times between 1990 and 1997.¹ Investment and joint ventures are booming, and top priority is being placed on moving ahead with economic integration and political consultation through the mechanism of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR).²

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC DECLARATIONS IN NUCLEAR AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Once the decision was taken to improve bilateral relations, presidential diplomacy was effectively used to implement this decision. A series of public declarations was issued to lend momentum to the bilateral agenda, either during presidential visits or through carefully prepared meetings. Two areas of the agenda's focus were nuclear and economic issues. There was a concerted effort to jointly introduce radical measures to change established policies in the nuclear and economic areas.

¹United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean*, 1997 ed. (Santiago de Chile: ECLAC, 1998), 558–585.

² MERCOSUR, established in 1991 with the participation of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has taken steps to function as a free trade area and a customs union as of 1 January 1995, a process that is to be completed by 2006. MERCOSUR's long-term aim is to achieve a fully integrated common market, including free movement of goods, services and people. See Paulo Wrobel, "MERCOSUR: The Common Market of the South," in Michael Krepon, Khurshid Khoja, Michael Newbill, and Jenny S. Drezin, eds., *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998), 231–32.

Economic and political relations began to noticeably improve after civilian rule was restored in both nations in 1985. On 30 November, presidents Alfonsín and Sarney met at the border town of Foz do Iguacu with the official aim of inaugurating a new bridge between the countries, the Tancredo Neves bridge. While there, President Alfonsín unexpectedly asked to visit the Brazilian–Paraguayan Itaipu power plant. This was considered an exceptional gesture of goodwill, given the contentious history behind the building of the power plant. Even if the water problem that disturbed their relations for a decade had been solved, it was still a sensitive issue in Argentine–Brazilian relations. Obliging, the Brazilian delegation took him to visit Itaipu, symbolically closing this rift.

The border town meeting venue was full of significance. Indeed, previous presidential meetings had taken place in border towns. In 1947, for example, the ceremony

The Puerto Iguazu–Foz do Iguacu Declaration included concrete and carefully-planned measures to promote cooperation and economic integration.

inaugurating the first bridge linking the two countries—the Uruguayana–Passos de los Libres bridge—took place in the Brazilian border town of Uruguayana with Presidents Eurico Dutra and Juan Peron present. A second meeting of presidents again took place in Uruguayana in 1961, this time between the Argentine president Frondizi and Brazilian president Quadros.

Continuing this tradition, the Foz do Iguacu meeting in November 1985 coincided with the inauguration of a second bridge linking the two countries. “Building bridges” between the countries now took on a metaphorical meaning, the symbol of a new era. This border area came to symbolize resolve to initiate or implement a number of joint projects for physical integration, including projects on transport and energy.

During the meeting, in a very friendly atmosphere, the presidents issued their first joint declaration, the Puerto Iguazu–Foz do Iguacu Joint Declaration, with the stated purpose of establishing closer relations. The Puerto Iguazu–Foz do Iguacu Declaration included concrete and carefully-planned measures to promote cooperation and economic integration. It focused on easing severe economic strain by improving communication between the two countries. It also included the Iguacu Declaration on Nuclear Policy, which reaffirmed both countries’ intention to continue collaborating on nuclear issues. The latter initiative started the process that led to the establishment of a bilateral system to monitor nuclear programs, radically changing Argentine–Brazilian policies toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

NUCLEAR RELATIONS

The most striking initiative taken by national leaders was the implementation of a policy to end a perceived nuclear competition in South America. This gradual and complex process succeeded in changing entrenched views and surmounting a series of obstacles laid down by a powerful coalition of interests in the nuclear sectors of both countries.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina and Brazil were viewed by many interested Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) observers as countries on the nuclear threshold. Even if they did not appear to be engaged in a fierce competition as in other world trouble spots, their refusal to join the NPT, the establishment of a Latin American nuclear weapon free zone (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), and the leading role played by the military in their secretive nuclear programs, were all understood as a potential threat to nuclear non-proliferation and regional security.³

The Iguacu Declaration on Nuclear Policy of November 1985 established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on nuclear issues to regularly exchange technical information and assure each other that their respective nuclear programs were only for peaceful purposes. With the technical and legal cooperation, the exchange of technicians and scientists, and the co-ordination of policies toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the main activities of the JWG were dialogue, information exchange, and consultation. A series of nuclear CBMs followed, and created the mutual trust and the technical expertise required to develop a unique, bilateral safeguard system.

Mutual presidential visits to hitherto secret nuclear installations, and the public declarations that followed, played a decisive role in assuring each other and the international community of their peaceful intentions. The presidential visits began in July 1987, when President José Sarney, following an invitation by President Alfonsín, visited the Pilcaniyeu uranium enrichment plant near Bariloche. Until then, Argentina had not publicly admitted that this uranium enrichment facility existed; therefore, the highly symbolic nature of the visit was

³ On 14 February 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was opened for signature at Tlatelolco, Mexico. The treaty was the first to ban nuclear weapons in a populated area. For more information, see Enrique Román-Morey, "Latin America's Treaty of Tlatelolco: Instrument for Peace and Development," *International Atomic Energy Association Bulletin* 37, no. 1 (1995). This article can also be found at: <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull371/morey.html>; accessed on 18 April 1999.

clear. Opening the facility to the scrutiny of a delegation headed by the Brazilian president allowed both leaders to end secrets and mistrust, and announce a new policy based on openness in nuclear matters. During the visit, the Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued, stating the mutual intention to end any secrecy surrounding their nuclear program, as well as to continue to deepen their cooperation. This joint statement helped to further build trust and reassure domestic and international audiences about the peaceful purposes of their nuclear program.

In response to the invitation to visit Argentina's enrichment plant, in April 1988 President Sarney invited President Alfonsín to the navy-controlled Aramar uranium enrichment facility in the Iperó nuclear complex in the state of São Paulo.

Mutual presidential visits to hitherto secret nuclear installations, and the public declarations that followed, played a decisive role in assuring each other and the international community of their peaceful intentions.

This facility had served as a secret nuclear installation before Brazil opened it to Argentina. During the visit, the presidents issued another declaration, the Iperó Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy, which continued the process of building mutual trust and assuring the domestic and international communities of their peaceful intentions. Moreover, the Iperó Joint Statement announced the decision to turn the JWG on nuclear issues into a permanent commission on nuclear policy, institutionalizing what had hitherto been an ad-hoc group.

President Sarney made a final visit to the Ezeiza nuclear facility near Buenos Aires in November 1988. Similar to the two previous visits, the presidents issued a public declaration, the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy, once again reaffirming their commitment to pursuing dialogue and furthering cooperation on nuclear issues. Thus, by using public declarations and presidential visits, as well as by institutionalizing nuclear dialogue and cooperation through the Permanent Commission on Nuclear Policy, Argentine and Brazilian leaders were able to directly impact the pace and goals of their nuclear agendas. Furthermore, they assured the international community that the new civilian leadership was firmly in control of their respective nuclear programs.

Unilateral initiatives also contributed to building mutual trust concerning the intention of their respective nuclear programs, and assured the international community of the peaceful purpose of their nuclear programs. In December 1983, when President Alfonsín was assuming office as the first civilian leader elected since the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Argentine

nuclear energy commission announced that it had mastered uranium enrichment. Before the announcement was made public, Argentine officials had briefed Brazilian authorities. Following the Argentine example, President Sarney privately informed President Alfonsín in September 1987, before the official announcement was made in Brazil, that Brazil had independently mastered the capability to enrich uranium.

Three years later, in September 1990, another unilateral initiative, taken under new Brazilian president Collor de Mello, took the unprecedented step of bringing personal associates and the media to a military installation in the Cachimbo area, in a remote part of the Para state, in the heart of the Amazon rain forest. There, he symbolically closed a huge shaft, allegedly built by the armed forces as a nuclear test site. Continuing his policy of controlling the nuclear program, he gave a speech to the United Nations General Assembly in the same month announcing that Brazil was radically changing its nuclear policy and abandoning any attempt to build a nuclear weapons program.

The process of building mutual trust in the nuclear arena through joint declarations culminated in November 1990, when new presidents Carlos Menem in Argentina and Collor de Mello in Brazil met with the purpose of deepening the policies initiated by their predecessors. During their meeting, the two presidents issued the Foz de Iguazu Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy. In this declaration, they formally renounced nuclear weapons, accepted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, adhered to an amended version of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, abandoned the option to carry on peaceful nuclear explosions, and approved a common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and installations.⁴

In July 1991, in Guadalajara, Mexico, during a meeting of the Latin American and Iberian heads of state, Presidents Menem and Collor de Mello signed the Treaty of Guadalajara, formalizing all the initiatives taken since the Foz do Iguacu Declaration in 1985. In consultation with the IAEA, a Joint Safeguard Agreement was concluded and approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. Then, in the presence of both presidents, the agreement was signed at the Agency headquarters in Vienna on 13 December 1991.

⁴The amended version of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was proposed in February 1992 by the presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Contracting Parties approved a series of amendments which today make it easier for countries in the region to accede fully to the Treaty. For more details see John R. Redick, *Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil*, Occasional Paper no. 25 (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1995).

To implement a common system of accounting and control, a unique bilateral organization was established to monitor nuclear installations and materials, known as the Argentine–Brazilian Agency for Accountability and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Since beginning operation in July 1992, the ABACC has developed a successful bilateral safeguard system to monitor all nuclear installations and materials in possession of both countries, carried out by Argentine and Brazilian inspectors who have free access to all nuclear facilities.

The nuclear competition in South America never reached the same intensity as that between other countries, such as India and Pakistan or the United States and the former Soviet Union. As rivals, the nature of the Argentine–Brazil competition was unique; neither country partook in threats or the actual use of force. Moreover, their shared opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation regime derived from the view that the regime was discriminatory, not from a decision to develop nuclear weapon capabilities. In the end, it appears that Argentina and Brazil developed their nuclear programs as a way to raise their international profile and keep the nuclear option open in case of need, rather than as a means to introduce nuclear weapons into their defense strategies.

Even so, observers of the nuclear non-proliferation environment remained suspicious. Since the establishment of the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEA) in the mid-1950s, Argentina’s nuclear program has been a cause of national pride, supported by all sectors of society. Under the leadership of committed civilians and military officers, CNEA not only insulated itself from the twists and turns of Argentina’s unstable political system, but it also developed an indigenous capability to master nuclear fuel cycles.

In contrast, Brazil’s nuclear policy was marked by a lack of continuity and disputes between groups over competing technological strategies of nuclear development. Brazil established a National Commission for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) at about the same time as Argentina, but it failed to design and implement a coherent nuclear policy. It was only in 1975, when Brazil concluded an ambitious nuclear agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, that nuclear issues attracted greater attention, not all of it favorable.⁵ Even though

⁵ Brazil’s agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany was a vast package containing the construction of eight nuclear power reactors in Brazil using German technology, and lasted until the end of the century. For the first time, the agreement included the transfer of sensitive technology, allowing Brazil to master the complete nuclear fuel cycle. The agreement was criticised by many within and outside Brazil and contributed to a new international awareness about nuclear non-proliferation issues. An article that helped spark US interest on the agreement is Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All.” *Foreign Policy* 23 (1976): 155–201.

the Brazilian government was authoritarian at the time, its deal with Germany was openly criticized by many in the nuclear community and left the public deeply divided. Some sectors fully supported the agreement with Germany, arguing that Brazil's energy needs and the alleged massive transfer of technology to the country's industry, justified the huge financial costs. Other sectors were critical of both the financial burden and the technology chosen, and were suspicious about the real intention behind such an ambitious purchase. Thus, unlike Argentina, Brazil's nuclear program was never a source of national unity or pride.

Building mutual trust and ending the international community's suspicions about their nuclear agenda became a priority for both countries.

During the period of military rule in both countries, resources were diverted to secret nuclear installations and the armed forces controlled parts of their respective nuclear programs away

from public scrutiny. Sectors of the armed forces favored developing a nuclear program for military purposes, but were unable to gain the upper hand in determining national nuclear and defense policies.

The civilian leadership that followed in both countries thus strove to unambiguously affirm their commitment to developing a peaceful nuclear program. Building mutual trust and ending the international community's suspicions about their nuclear agenda became a priority for both countries. Due to their unwavering opposition to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Argentina and Brazil had been denied the opportunity to purchase certain dual-use technologies needed for economic development from abroad. As a consequence, Argentine and Brazilian efforts to affirm their peaceful nuclear intentions are partly explained by the need to acquire such technology. Furthermore, the Argentine and Brazilian administrations implemented CBMs in the nuclear sector as a way to consolidate and demonstrate civilian control over their respective nuclear programs.⁶

Direct presidential involvement in nuclear diplomacy played a key role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence. Successful and well-publicized presidential visits to previously secret nuclear installations, followed by presidential public declarations stating the intention

⁶ Paulo S. Wrobel, "Brazil, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Latin America as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone" (Ph.D. diss., King's College, University of London, 1991). See also David Myers, "Brazil: Reluctant Pursuit of the Nuclear Option," *Orbis* 27, no. 4 (1984): 881–911.

to collaborate, were used to end mutual suspicion, reinforce their commitment to peaceful nuclear programs, and demonstrate support for developing a

Direct presidential involvement in nuclear diplomacy played a key role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence.

bilateral system to monitor and control nuclear installations and materials. In fact, the idea of a bilateral safeguard system was first proposed by President Alfonsín in 1985. At the time, President Sarney could not accept it, given the fierce opposition of influential groups, in particular amongst members of the armed forces and officials in the Ministry of Foreign Relations. As the process of cooperation and mutual understanding evolved, President Collor de Mello was able to gather the support of a closer group of advisors, surpassing the remaining resistance, and embracing the idea of a bilateral safeguard system. However, the Brazilian congress took much more time to approve the safeguard system than the Argentine congress, showing that there was some lingering resistance to the idea of a bilateral safeguard system among nationalist politicians in Brazil.

Some members of the armed forces and the bureaucracy opposed such conciliatory measures, particularly the idea of a bilateral monitoring system. Moreover, it was difficult to convince some sectors of the nuclear community to accept a full-scope safeguard agreement with the IAEA, given that they had strongly rejected such an agreement for two decades. Ultimately, however, the military and civilian personnel who had resisted the bilateral and multilateral safeguards both accepted the agreement, perhaps persuaded that Brazil needed to improve its international image and clear up any remaining suspicion about its nuclear program. By announcing their intention to pursue only peaceful purposes, the Argentine and Brazilian leaders helped heighten public awareness about previously secret policies and thereby marginalize those individuals opposed to an open and peaceful nuclear program.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Mirroring the CBMs established in the nuclear arena, a series of joint declarations were issued proposing economic cooperation. As preferential trade agreements and economic integration spread from its European roots to other regions of the world, Argentina and Brazil understood the need to deepen their economic links with one another to keep up with new trends in the international economy.⁷

⁷ On this international economic trend, see Jeffrey A. Frankel, *Regional Trading Blocs in the World Economic System* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997).

Furthermore, both countries were confronting the worst economic crisis to hit Latin America since the 1930s depression, which left the leadership few other alternatives besides implementing radical economic reforms. In this context, economic and political cooperation became a requirement for opening the economies. During the 1980s, a combination of

Economic and political cooperation became a requirement for opening the economies.

mounting foreign debts, sluggish economic growth and macroeconomic instability forced virtually every Latin American

country to abandon the import substitution industrialization model that had dominated the region since the 1940s.⁸ Throughout the region, governments implemented radical economic reforms, opening closed economies to foreign trade, investment, and competition.

In order to stimulate bilateral trade and investment, Argentina and Brazil laid the foundation for closer economic relations. Because the region had a history of failed attempts at economic integration, rhetoric was not enough to achieve this goal—instead, concrete measures to inform and engage society in the process had to be implemented. Ambitious proposals for economic integration in Latin America started in the late 1950s, and in 1960, the Treaty of Montevideo established the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC). Despite some modest gains in increasing regional commerce and the persistence of the rhetoric in favor of integration, political disagreements and economic difficulties slowed the ALALC down and led to the creation of a more modest organization. In 1980, the Treaty of Montevideo II was concluded, establishing the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). Following the lead of the ALADI, Argentina and Brazil concluded partial agreements to liberalize bilateral trade. Moreover, perhaps inspired by the European Economic Community, they highlighted specific areas requiring attention, hoping to attract private groups and further bilateral economic cooperation.⁹

⁸ The import substitution model of industrialization refers to a series of government policies that aim to produce goods internally that a given country had hitherto imported. This policy promoted the implementation of tariff and non-tariff barriers to impede the importation of goods, combined with government subsidies and market protection for the domestic producers of goods. See Warner Baer “Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations,” *Latin America Research Review* 7, no. 1 (1972).

⁹ A good summary of the integration efforts from a Brazilian perspective is Rubens Barbosa, “O Brasil e a Integração Regional: a ALALC e a ALADI (1960–1990)” in Jose Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque, ed., *Diplomacia para o Desenvolvimento, Sessenta Anos de Política Externa Brasileira, 1930-1990*, vol. 2 (Sao Paulo: Cultura Editores Associados e Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1991). In English, a good source is S. Laird, *MERCOSUR–Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996).

Following the November 1985 Foz do Iguacu meeting, the two presidents signed the Act for the Integration of Brazil and Argentina, in July 1986 in Buenos Aires. This agreement established the Argentine–Brazilian Programme for Integration and Cooperation (PICAB), as well as working groups to exchange information and prepare agreements in twelve areas, including capital goods, wheat, foodstuffs, facilitation of trade, bi-national companies, and energy. These working groups met regularly, helping to increase mutual trust and vested interest as well as helping to develop the expertise required to facilitate economic integration.

Yet, despite genuine intentions to foster cooperation, economic conditions of the late 1980s continued to prevent serious economic integration. The debt crisis, hyperinflation, high levels of capital flight, and a total lack of confidence among domestic and foreign investors placed Argentina and Brazil on the brink of economic disaster. Programs adopted to stabilize their economies had failed, standards of living were on the decline, and the social and political crises that emerged during the consolidation of democratic rule incited public insecurity about the future. In Argentina, sectors of the armed forces rebelled three times against the civilian government. The final year of the Sarney government in Brazil was marked by spiraling levels of inflation, causing social distress. The Sarney government was followed briefly by the Collor de Mello government, and Collor de Mello resigned in December 1992 to avoid impeachment by the Congress after numerous allegations of corruption and malpractice. Therefore, political and economic stability were required to allow further cooperation. It was only after their economies had stabilized—Argentina after April 1991 and Brazil after July 1994—that both countries were able to more quickly implement integration measures.

The Brazilian and Argentine leadership was committed, and they persisted in agreements that intended to deepen integration.

Nevertheless, the Brazilian and Argentine leadership was committed, and they persisted in agreements that intended to deepen integration. The Treaty of Integration, Cooperation, and Development, concluded in November 1988, was a decisive step forward, moving integration beyond measures to stimulate bilateral and regional trade. This treaty was much more ambitious than previous agreements, and set a ten-year timetable for creating a common market between Argentina and Brazil. In July 1990, the presidents concluded the Buenos Aires Act, which quickened the timetable for a common market to 1995. Following the Buenos Aires Act, and now incorporating Uruguay and Paraguay (two smaller economies closely associated with Argentina and Brazil), the Treaty of Asuncion was signed in March

1991 establishing MERCOSUR. The Treaty of Asuncion entered into force in November 1991, and MERCOSUR started to function as a partial free trade area and a customs union after 1 January 1995, a process to be completed by 2006.

Similar to the nuclear area, economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil resulted from a combination of unilateral and joint measures. Both governments wished to foster economic relations after they realized that their state-led economies that prevailed for

Similar to the nuclear area, economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil resulted from a combination of unilateral and joint measures.

so long—based on protectionism, import substitution, and closed economies—had failed. As a consequence, governments needed to put their houses in order, stabilizing the economies and stimulating the proper conditions

for functioning market economies. Nevertheless, the history of failed attempts to establish working policies to stimulate regional commerce and investment required political will, committed leadership, plus popular support and involvement.

CONCLUSION

After the leaders of Argentina and Brazil decided to radically transform their bilateral relations, they issued a series of joint initiatives to bring their countries closer together, particularly in the nuclear and economic areas. Opposition to the proposed changes appears to have stemmed more from inertia and lack of mutual knowledge than from deeply ingrained hostility towards one another.

In this context, leaders issued public declarations stating their intentions to develop peaceful nuclear programs and closer economic ties. Beyond this, leaders used public declarations to set up concrete objectives and timetables; to give a purpose and sense of direction to the rapprochement process; to inform public opinion and garner public support; and to reassure the international community about their commitment to improving relations. Furthermore, leaders used public declarations to make clear that improved bilateral relations were a top priority.

Public declarations in the nuclear area, particularly during the transition to civilian rule, served the additional purpose of affirming the control of the civilian leadership over the armed forces. Moreover, they assured the international community that the civilian leaders

were abandoning nuclear policies that had previously attracted suspicion and criticism. Although some sectors in both nations sought to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, they were never able to mobilize support and implement policies in concert.

In Argentina, openly stating the intention to improve relations with its most important neighbor helped end the period of isolation following the Falklands/Malvinas War, and contributed to its reintegration into the international community. In Brazil, better relations with Argentina ended its relative isolation in South America, helping to raise its international profile. Furthermore, using public declarations to unambiguously assert intentions to foster closer economic, political, and security relations helped mobilize and engage different government agencies and the private sector. Declarations were particularly essential for economic integration, where the role of the government was clearly limited.

While leaders might offer a vision for forging closer economic, political, and security links, it is important to note that public support is integral to realizing such a vision. Public declarations are thus essential for informing and educating the general population, motivating private agents, and giving a purpose and a sense of direction to the rapprochement process. The series of public declarations issued by Argentina and Brazil in the crucial period between 1985 and 1994 helped to do just that, transforming their relations from rivalry into friendship.

Declaratory Diplomacy and Confidence Building

Michael Krepon and Jenny S. Drezin

There is no literature of “declaratory” confidence building to draw upon. As in any first attempt to clarify principles of successful practice, we are keenly aware of the difficulties of extrapolating from limited data. Since key data on declaratory confidence-building measures (CBMs) will remain elusive, given the secrecy surrounding decisions by national leaders to make important public declarations, we must start with the limited information available. Our case study authors have done an admirable job of ground breaking. We gratefully draw upon their work to suggest keys to successful practice, as well as practices to avoid if national leaders truly seek to use public declarations as part of a broader effort to alleviate tension and promote reconciliation. Insights can also be drawn from the abundant literature on strategies of deterrence, negotiation, and communication. We delve into this literature in order to understand ways by which declarations can be employed tactically in a more comprehensive strategy to build trust, lessen tension, and facilitate successful negotiation. The extent to which declaratory diplomacy succeeds depends on re-enforcing actions taken by political leaders before, concurrent with, or following the declarations.¹

LEARNING FROM DETERRENCE THEORY

Deterrence rests on threats and negative consequences. Declaratory CBMs, properly employed, deal with promise and positive outcomes. If there are rules of successful deterrence, might there not also be opposite rules of public reassurance? We have therefore investigated deterrence literature to explore its reverse effects as well as to borrow from its psychological precepts. Examining the basic underpinnings of deterrence theory might therefore help to suggest precepts of confidence building, with specific reference to the use of public declarations in developing trust. The following overview does not purport to be a comprehensive

Deterrence involves communicating a convincing threat to an adversary in the hope that the use of force will not be necessary. Public statements meant to reassure must also be credible, either through symbolic or practical effect.

¹The Authors are grateful to Alexander George for his critique of this chapter.

summary of deterrence literature; instead, we focus on the communication of deterrent messages.

Deterrence, as described by Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, requires “a credible capability to inflict unacceptable costs [as] the best means to prevent challenges.”² Successful strategies of reassurance, on the other hand, must suggest a sufficiently credible non-threatening posture, or at least one that can offer the intended audience some benefit. Deterrence involves communicating a convincing threat to an adversary in the hope that the use of force will not be necessary. Public statements meant to reassure must also be credible, either through symbolic or practical effect. The demonstrative effect of reassuring public statements should therefore be no less important than the demonstration effect of deterrent gestures. As Thomas C. Schelling emphasized in *Arms and Influence*, “The paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself and one’s country.”³ The “fear factor” has no place in declaratory initiatives to re-enforce broader strategies of reassurance. Credible reassurance and successful partnership require calm, rational leadership.

National leaders can demonstrate their sincerity through a broad-gaged strategy that includes symbolic gestures as well as public declarations. Demonstrable commitment to confidence building may well require re-enforcing actions, particularly when sincere declarations of good will follow many hollow public statements. If re-enforcing actions accompany positive declarations, reciprocal action would be wise if the initiator is vulnerable politically for taking the initiative. Reassuring public declarations from seemingly bellicose national leaders may not be credible unless backed by symbolic gestures or re-enforcing steps.

Proclamation of reassurance, like deterrence, function most effectively when they are believable.

Declaratory CBMs, like deterrence, will always be considered through a foreign and domestic lens. Perceptions can become reality. Deterrent statements are most effective when, in the perception of the intended audience, the declarer appears ready and able to engage in violent actions. Proclamations of

² Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Beyond Deterrence,” *Journal of Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (1986), 6.

³ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 37.

reassurance, like deterrence, function most effectively when they are believable. Credible public declarations of reassurance are especially necessary when national leaders have a capacity to threaten one another with grave damage. In deterrence theory, as Patrick Morgan has written, the ability “to ‘convince’ is to penetrate and manipulate the thought processes of the opposing leaders so that they draw the ‘proper’ conclusion about the utility of attacking. This gives the effectiveness of deterrence a psychological dimension that is only partially related to the deterrer’s retaliatory capabilities, for it is in the persuasiveness of the message about these capabilities, rather than the capabilities themselves that determines success or failure.”⁴ Robert Jervis noted further, “Unless statesmen understand the ways in which their opposite numbers see the world, their deterrence policies are likely to misfire; unless scholars understand the patterns of perceptions involved, they will misinterpret the behavior.”⁵ Similarly, successful strategies of reassurance require among other things, an understanding of the psychology of the intended audience. Knowledge of the political and international constraints under which an opposing leader is operating is critical, as well as whether the opposition is united or fragmented. When enemy images are deeply rooted, or when previous positive declarations have proven to be hollow, political leaders who wish to improve bilateral relations must have an exquisite sense of “the other’s” psychology and ways to affect it.

As Jervis explained, attentive public and national leaders have a tendency to favor their own policy over other proposed alternatives, to overestimate their ability to understand the other’s intentions, and to “assimilate new information to pre-existing beliefs.”⁶ People tend to see what they already expect to see. Declaratory CBMs need to jar pre-existing mindsets, an especially difficult task, which is why re-enforcing actions are essential. When prior declarations of good faith have been empty or when adversarial images are deeply rooted, reassuring declarations, absent accompanying symbolism or action, are unlikely to affect mindsets. The choice of words and re-enforcing actions can demonstrate empathy, increasing the probability of improved bilateral relations. As Lebow and Stein explain:

The defending state is expected to define and publicize its commitment, and to do its best to make that commitment credible in the eyes of its adversary. Would-be challengers are expected to assess accurately the defender’s capability and resolve. The repetitive cycle of test and challenge are expected to provide both sides with

⁴ Patrick Morgan, “Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, with contributions by Patrick M. Morgan and Jack L. Snyder, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 125.

⁵ Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” in Steven E. Miller, ed., *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 57.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 76–69

an increasingly sophisticated understanding of each other's interests, propensity for risk taking, threshold of provocation, and style of foreign policy analysis.⁷

An effective strategy for declaratory initiatives, like deterrence, would clarify the commitment of national leaders, since credibility is no less important for reassurance than for deterrence. Political risk taking for reassurance can demonstrate credibility, just as risk-taking behavior can re-enforce deterrence. Leaders who wish to reconcile with adversaries cannot depend on words alone; they must undertake a coherent and comprehensive strategy that demonstrates "credible commitment."

Deterrence requires a correct "reading" of another's likely actions, or as Schelling said, "what the other player expects us to do in response to his choice of moves."⁸ Private undertakings to move toward reconciliation are essential, but insufficient. Public declarations can re-enforce private commitment by national leaders, defining and publicizing their commitment to lessening tension and improving bilateral relations. Well chosen words require

Public declarations can re-enforce private commitment by national leaders, defining and publicizing their commitment to lessening tension and improving bilateral relations

a deep understanding of another political culture. Whether strategies of deterrence or reassurance are pursued, declarations can be most effective when potential conflict as well as common interests coexist between two parties. The ground is fertile

for effective declaratory initiatives when parties share deep antagonisms as well as similarities. Countries such as India and Pakistan are profoundly alienated despite their closeness. After decades of separation, these "cousins" know one another quite well. Even after many hollow declarations of reassurance, this natural affinity could provide the basis for effective, meaningful strategies of reassurance. Leaders in both India and Pakistan know what messages and re-enforcing actions can be compelling; they have simply lacked the political will to express them and to use accompanying symbols to best advantage.

Declaratory initiatives and deterrent messages both serve important roles in conflict management. Deterrence "works" with a common acceptance of unacceptable risk. As

⁷ Lebow and Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," 6.

⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 10.

Condoleezza Rice has noted, “Deterrence in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union preclud[ed] any concept of meaningful [nuclear] superiority.”⁹ Mutual recognition of unacceptable risk can also provide national leaders with considerable room to maneuver for reassurance measures. When the stakes of mutual antagonism have risen, for example, because of offsetting nuclear weapons and missile programs, publics increasingly demand reassurance that war will not break out. Offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities, however, are not a prerequisite for deterrence or reassurance since states can also be deterred by the costs of conventional conflict. The daunting costs of war still do not ensure peace, as is painfully evident in the Middle East and in South Asia. If national leaders wish to make the long, hard journey of reconciliation, well crafted public declarations—no less than properly trained and equipped military forces—are essential elements of a broader strategy of peace making.

Offsetting nuclear weapon capabilities do not necessarily increase prospects for effective strategies of reassurance. The four cases under review suggest no solace in this regard. In the most successful case—that of Argentina and Brazil—both countries renounced the nuclear option. Offsetting nuclear capabilities can either lead to reassurance or to increased tensions. The case of India and Pakistan remains a work in progress. At least initially after their nuclear tests in May 1998, overt nuclear capabilities served to heat up the Kashmir dispute. Notwithstanding statements of reassurance, nuclear weapons are not determinative in this regard; political leadership matters more than offsetting nuclear capabilities. Outcomes depend on the nature and intensity of the efforts made by national leaders to reassure. In dealing with nuclear dangers, soothing declarations without reinforcing actions are unlikely to be persuasive. For example, India did not find China’s “No-First-Use” (NFU) declaration reassuring, since Beijing’s nuclear posture and future plans remain opaque. Similarly, Pakistan has not been reassured by India’s adoption of a NFU declaration.

While declarations of deterrence and reassurance are geared towards foreign audiences, they must be forged in the crucible of domestic politics.

While declarations of deterrence and reassurance are geared towards foreign audiences, they must be forged in the crucible of domestic politics. Distortions can easily result when

⁹ Condoleezza Rice, “SALT and the Search for a Security Regime” in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, Alexander Dallin, eds., *US–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 294.

tailoring messages at home for use abroad. As Lebow and Stein noted, self-congratulatory announcements of military prowess might be useful at home, but viewed as a challenge abroad. “Hard” deterrent messages might provoke, or even exacerbate the very behaviors they were designed to prevent. Hard messages can also harden antagonistic resolve, prompting heightened competition by means other than overt warfare. As John F. Scott has noted, “[Deterrence] is not sufficient to change behavior, so much as to suppress it, and serves little to change underlying motives.”¹⁰ Properly crafted declarations of peaceful intent, on the other hand, could have the opposite effect, undermining powerful constituencies that oppose reconciliation and empowering groups that wish to bring about rapprochement. The most effective and affecting public declarations reflect considerable knowledge of the intended foreign audiences. Declaratory initiatives have to be crafted for domestic, as well as foreign audiences. “Soft” messages might be helpful abroad, but politically disabling at home, undercutting domestic support necessary for rapprochement. Hard messengers who deliver soft messages are the ideal combination for declaratory initiatives.

One can never know with clarity the reasons why deterrence works, since there are always multiple contexts for restraint. In contrast, the keys to effective reassurance are not mysterious, even if they cannot be quantified. Effective strategies of reassurance require nuanced, empathetic declarations re-enforced by actions or symbolic gestures that lend credibility to such declarations re-enforcing actions are more important than words.

Successful declaratory initiatives are consciously crafted to undermine established threat perceptions and to change behavior. As Sir Michael Howard explained, deterrence and

Declaratory initiatives must somehow reassure domestic as well as foreign audiences.

reassurance have multiple connections. Deterrence of an adversary can require reassurance at home and among allies. Hard deterrent messages can raise questions about the messenger, undermining reassurance. For most of the Cold War, as Howard noted, “[the peoples of Western Europe] remained reassured . . . whether this reassurance came from shrewdness or self-delusion, from confidence in American nuclear supremacy, or basic disbelief in the reality of any Soviet threat, it would probably be impossible to say. In any case throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, deterrence and reassurance both worked.”¹¹ Declaratory initiatives must

¹⁰ John F. Scott, “Deterrence and Détente,” in *National Security and Détente* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), 332.

¹¹ Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980’s,” *Foreign Affairs* 61, no.2 (Winter 1982–83), 309.

somehow reassure domestic as well as foreign audiences, an extraordinarily difficult requirement. Deterrence can also provide the basis for reassurance strategies by India and Pakistan, but this will require political leadership of a kind that has been missing on the subcontinent for many decades. Nor has such leadership been evident in the Middle East in the aftermath of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Reassurance strategies have also been absent in US–Russian relations in the immediate post-Cold War period. In contrast, leaders in Argentina and Brazil did not need to expend energies on deterrence, and proved up to the task of providing reassurance.

DRAWING FROM NEGOTIATION THEORY

As Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing have written in *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, bargaining is a process of deciding upon allocation of commonly desired utilities.¹² The process of advocating a common good can lead to reconciliation. As prominent negotiation theorists emphasize, successful negotiations change perceptions of conflict from a zero-sum to a win-win situation.¹³ Declaratory CBMs can feed into this process, constituting essential adjuncts to successful negotiations.

Properly crafted and prepared declarations can build domestic political support for negotiations while undercutting constituencies opposed to reconciliation.

Properly crafted and prepared declarations can build domestic political support for negotiations while undercutting constituencies opposed to reconciliation. If a political leader has been sending hard messages to

foreign audiences, and if these messages worry important domestic constituencies, reassuring statements can help at home as well as abroad. In this context, President Ronald Reagan's joint declaration in 1985 with President Mikhail Gorbachev that a nuclear war could never be won and must never be fought was a masterstroke. If, however, political leaders appear weak at home, conciliatory declarations may compound domestic difficulties.

¹² Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing. *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

¹³ See I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Bergman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) and Roger Fisher and William Ury with Bruce Patton, eds., *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

Declaratory initiatives can provide important flexibility to negotiators, as they can induce—but need not require—reciprocity. Declarations, of course, are not legally binding. Nonetheless, when they are convincing (by combining public statements with re-enforcing actions) they can facilitate reciprocal steps. As Alexander George has written:

A strategy of reciprocity may achieve some results even when the leaders of the target country are not eager for a relaxation of tensions. This can occur when the conciliatory actions of the side initiating the strategy make a favorable impression on public opinion in the target country, thereby generating pressure on its leaders to make some kind of reciprocal gesture. Thus, on one occasion Khrushchev quite appropriately referred to his use of the strategy of reciprocity as ‘waging peace,’ and there are elements of this also in some of the actions and announcements that Gorbachev has made in order to generate indirect pressure on US leaders by means of Western European and domestic American opinion.¹⁴

If national leaders wish to disengage, for whatever reason, they can do so, citing insufficient reciprocity. Or, if they wish to pick up the pace of negotiations, they can cite appropriate responses from abroad as a reason for doing so.

Judiciously crafted declaratory CBMs have the potential to support negotiations in many ways, helping to jump start stalled talks, as well to generate public support or to muffle criticism. As Zartman has noted, “[T]he major means of improving trust about past information is simply to establish a record of verifiability, including the use of independent sources of information or even the other party’s sources. If the negotiator is caught in a bluff it will damage his credibility and impair his credentials for future negotiations with the same party.”¹⁵

Declaratory initiatives work best when they accompany positive actions that are both externally verifiable and draw upon powerful symbolism. The use of symbolism associated with public declarations and their reaffirmation by concrete steps are especially important in regions rife with hollow declarations, such as South Asia. India and Pakistan, for example, have failed to engage in sustained, structured negotiations over divisive issues. Only in October 1998 did both countries finally agree to a negotiating framework to discuss Kashmir, peace and security, and a host of less contentious issues. After their May 1998 nuclear tests, both countries immediately reverted to prior formulas, declarations of non-aggression pacts

¹⁴Alexander George, “Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,” in George, Farley, and Dallin, eds., *US-Soviet Security Cooperation*, 703.

¹⁵Zartman and Berman, *The Practical Negotiator*, 29.

and “no first use” pledges which are unlikely to be credible in the absence of substantive agreements confirming non-hostile intent.

In the US–USSR pairing where structured negotiations were a common occurrence, public declarations were particularly useful during rough passages. For example, the joint declarations by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that a nuclear war could never be won and should never be fought made no changes in their respective nuclear weapons employment policies or doctrine. Nonetheless, this declaration had considerable positive impact on the tenor of bilateral relations. As Deborah Larson noted in her essay, this joint declaration soothed Soviet concerns over President Reagan’s agenda toward the USSR, while at the same time undercutting hard-liners at the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff.

Public declarations may also be useful under certain conditions in the pre-negotiation phase. According to Zartman, “The principal function of prenegotiation is to build bridges

While there is no inappropriate time for positive declarations, such statements are particularly welcome at the beginning phase of a negotiation.

from conflict to conciliation, with the [corresponding] changes in perception, mentality, tactics, definitions, acceptability levels, and partners.”¹⁶ While there is no inappropriate time for positive declarations, such statements are particularly welcome at the beginning phase of a negotiation. National leaders can use declaratory initiatives to convey to both domestic and foreign audiences an image of self-confidence rather than weakness. More often, belligerent public declarations are used to mask weakness, or to bluff a potential adversary. Ideally, declarations demonstrate strength as well as negotiating flexibility.

Alexander George distinguishes between bargaining—a process of simultaneous exchange—and reciprocity, or gestures made in the hope that an adversary will engage in reciprocal actions.¹⁷ These can occur more-or-less simultaneously or in sequence. Declaratory initiatives can facilitate both bargaining and reciprocity, or they can be unilateral in nature without expectation of reciprocal action. Still another variation is the use of a public declaration that appears to be unilateral, but that has been previously conveyed privately to

¹⁶ I. William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: Phases and Functions,” in Gross Stein, ed. *Getting to the Table—The Process of International Prenegotiation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 13.

¹⁷ George, “Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,” 623.

the intended audience in order to facilitate the desired reciprocal response. Documentation of this sophisticated approach is often quite elusive, but there is at least anecdotal evidence of its use in one important case. In 1991, President George Bush and his national security team were justifiably concerned over the disposition of tactical nuclear weapons at a time when the Soviet Union was collapsing. In September 1991, Bush publically declared his intention to remove from deployed status tactical nuclear weapons that did not meet high standards of safety and security. In October, Mikhail Gorbachev took reciprocal action.

It would not be surprising if the experienced Bush team provided Gorbachev with prior notice of the prospective US declaration. Were the Bush-Gorbachev initiatives “wired” in advance? If so, to what extent? President Bush and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, suggest that some prior understandings were in place.¹⁸ The Bush-Gorbachev initiatives can be described as RUMs or “reciprocal unilateral measures.” RUMs permit arms control without written agreement. According to George Bunn and David Holloway, “[RUMs] are actions (not just words) that one of two rivals takes without written obligation to the other, in order to (1) reduce tensions and start cooperative bargaining with the other (2) elicit reciprocity from the other, and/or (3) reduce its military effort without reducing its own security, but without any informed expectation of specific reciprocity.”¹⁹ Public declarations appear to be essential complements to RUMs.

A strong advocate of RUMs was psychologist Charles Osgood.²⁰ His strategy of “graduated reciprocation in tension reduction,” or GRIT, involved one side initiating a series of accommodating measures and carrying these out within a certain schedule, whether or not the other side reciprocated. Such unambiguously conciliatory steps were to be implemented over a prolonged time period to provide maximum impact. Whereas the initiator of a GRIT strategy invites the other side to reciprocate, he or she does not specify the particular steps to be taken. Alexander George has built upon Osgood’s work. George notes that regularly spaced initiatives, even if they remain unilateral, might effectively establish credibility with an adversary. Reciprocity can be rewarded with slightly more conciliatory gestures, and

¹⁸ George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York, Random House, 1998), 546.

¹⁹ George Bunn and David Holloway, “Arms Control without Treaties? Rethinking US–Russian Strategic Negotiations in Light of the Duma–Senate Slowdown in Treaty Approval,” CISAC Working Paper, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University (February 1998), 6.

²⁰ See Charles Osgood, “Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 3, no.4 (December 1959): 295–325; Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

hostility can be met with an appropriate response “only to the degree necessary to restore the status quo.”²¹ Declaratory initiatives are ideally suited for GRIT strategies, but could be politically risky for the initiator without the expectation of reciprocation by the other side. The greater the initiative undertaken, the more credible and powerful the accompanying declaration should be—and the greater the political risk to the initiator.

George Bunn and David Holloway have analyzed other strategies for bringing about reciprocal unilateral measures. A “tit-for-tat” approach has the initiator offering conciliatory steps only with suitable reciprocation by an adversary. A variation on this theme, “conditional reciprocity,” asks adversaries to reciprocate in a specific manner, with specific steps.²² These gambits are similar to bargaining in that they ensure that concessions taken on one side will be reciprocated by the other. As Marie Desjardins has noted, “The issue of reciprocity is particularly important for states with no history of cooperation with one another and who do not trust one another.”²³

Declaratory initiatives are compatible with various strategies encouraging reciprocity, in that trust building is central to the process. Eventually, if not immediately, unilateral gestures require responses in kind; the more significant the gesture or declaration, the greater the need for reciprocity. Herbert C. Kelman provides an example of one such “unilateral” gesture in describing Anwar Sadat’s dramatic initiative to visit Jerusalem in 1977: “Sadat’s offers, concessions, and conciliatory gestures represented unilateral initiatives, but they were not unconditional. There was a definite expectation of reciprocal acts and, indeed, some prior assurance that these would be forthcoming.”²⁴

As Kelman advised, important and politically adept gestures can entail acknowledgment of past wrongs without necessarily

Words alone are not enough, but words combined with symbolic actions can have enormous power: Actions provide content to words.

²¹George, “Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,” 706.

²² See Bunn and Holloway, “Arms Control without Treaties?” 7–8.

²³ Marie Desjardins, “Rethinking CBMs: Obstacles to Agreement and the Risks of Overselling the Process,” *Adelphi Paper 307* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 25.

²⁴ Herbert Kelman, “Overcoming the Psychological Barrier: An Analysis of the Egyptian–Israeli Peace Process,” *Negotiation Journal* 1, no. 3 (July 1985), 215.

expressing guilt for such actions.²⁵ Words alone are not enough, in Kelman's view, but words combined with symbolic actions can have enormous power: actions provide content to words. Thus, the eloquence of Sadat's words to the Knesset in Jerusalem on 19 November, 1977 have been widely forgotten, but not the action itself.²⁶ West German Chancellor Willy Brandt combined words with actions to similar dramatic effect in December, 1970 when he visited the site of the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw, Poland. Walking slowly to the simple granite slab that memorializes the 500,000 Jews massacred by German forces during World War II, Brandt fell to his knees—as if to seek atonement for Nazi Germany's genocidal actions. "No people," he said, "can escape from their history."²⁷ No post-war Japanese leader has been able to summon such words or to combine them with symbolic gestures to demonstrate comparable regret. In stark contrast, every expression of Japanese regret has involved tortured negotiations over word-smithing.

Public declarations and unilateral steps were at the core of President Mikhail Gorbachev's strategy to take the enemy image of the Soviet Union away from the Reagan administration and the American public. Gorbachev succeeded in doing so through a series of unilateral measures, artfully combining symbolism with substance. For example, Gorbachev acknowledged publicly that the Krasnoyarsk radar constituted a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. In the negotiation end-game of the Stockholm accord on confidence-building measures, he accepted foreign inspectors on Soviet soil for the first time; and as Deborah Larson details in her chapter on US–Soviet declarations, Gorbachev announced stunning reductions in Soviet conventional forces at the United Nations in 1988. After Gorbachev's declarations and accompanying initiatives, skeptics within the Reagan administration and on Capitol Hill were marginalized by denigrating Gorbachev's words.

DECLARATORY INITIATIVES AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

²⁵ Telephone interview with Herbert Kelman, 6 March 1998.

²⁶ See Michael Krepon, "Will the Bus Diplomacy Work?" *The Hindu*, 16 February 16 1999.

²⁷ Description of Brandt's gesture can be found at *Time Magazine's* website for Man of the Year in 1970. "Willy Brandt: On the Road to a New Reality," 4 January 1971: <http://cgi.pathfinder.com/time/special/moy/1970.html>; accessed on 21 April 1999.

Effective use of public declarations to build confidence requires exquisite sensitivity to a foreign audience and a foreign culture. As Harold Saunders has noted in his introduction to the *Psychodynamics of International Relations*:

Focusing primarily on states amassing military and economic power to pursue their own objectively defined interests in competition with other states does not adequately describe how nations relate. Relations between nations today are increasingly a continuous political process of complex interaction among policy-making and policy-influencing communities on both sides of a relationship.²⁸

A multi-level approach to public declarations necessitates looking beyond elites to mass audiences. Reaction to public declarations are rooted in cultural as well as political contexts. As Raymond Cohen has noted, international relations “are, in many cases, a form of intercultural relations.”²⁹ Successful negotiation requires bridging cultural differences as well as security concerns. The use of language by national leaders can demonstrate ignorance or sensitivity to a foreign culture and the concern of a mass audience abroad. Declaratory initiatives can be highly effective when they are sensitive to cultural differences.

Successful negotiation requires bridging cultural differences as well as security concerns.

Cultural differences between India and Pakistan are obviously not as great as between the United States and the Soviet Union, or between Israel and Egypt. Nevertheless, Indian and

Pakistani leaders have demonstrated time and again a tone-deafness in their public statements. A succession of Indian prime ministers have pointedly refused to refer to the Kashmir issue as a “dispute,” and have limited their discussion of the subject to the reversion of Pakistani-held territory to India. These public declarations are geared, of course, to domestic audiences in the full knowledge of their negative impact on bilateral relations.

One particularly useful public declaration and accompanying action would be for the government of India to give Pakistan the house where the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad

²⁸ Saunders, “An Historic Challenge to Rethink How Nations Relate,” in Vamik D. Volkan, Demetrios A. Julius, and Joseph V. Montville, eds., *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990–1991), 9.

²⁹ Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian–Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 8.

Ali Jinnah, lived in Mumbai (Bombay) for use as a consulate. This gesture was previously offered by the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1978, but implementation was blocked by local authorities and red tape. What might have been a culturally-sensitive gesture instead reopened wounds.

In contrast, when President Anwar Sadat spoke to the Israeli Knesset in November 1977, he opened his remarks with the following message: “I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life and establish peace. We all love this land, the land of God, we all, Moslems, Christians, and Jews, all worship God. . .” In Sadat’s sensitive opening remarks, a painful divide was transformed into a bridge. Later, Sadat returned to this theme:

Any life that is lost in war is a human life, be it that of an Arab or an Israeli. A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or an Israeli. . . .For the sake of them all, for the sake of the lives of all our sons and brothers, for the sake of affording our communities the opportunity to work for the progress and happiness of men, feeling secure and with the right to a dignified life, for the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child born in our land, for all that I have taken my decision to come to you, despite all the hazards, to deliver my address.³⁰

No leader in India or Pakistan said such words after each of their three wars, or during the terrible carnage in Kashmir from 1989 until the late 1990s. Instead, words in India–Pakistan relations have been used to wound, not to heal. For example, on 19 March 1998, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif issued a public letter of “felicitation” on the assumption to power of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee: “We hope that the Bharatiya Janata Party government under your leadership can bring forth a firm resolve to join us in building a happier, more prosperous future for our peoples. I assure you that we, in Pakistan, are ready to go the extra mile in journeying towards cooperative and good neighborly relations with India.” On the very same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad issued a statement declaring that “Indian State terrorism in Kashmir and in Pakistan has confirmed their credentials as a terrorist state.”³¹ Seldom have mixed messages been so stark, or so concurrent.

The cultural divide between the United States and Iran has been profound since the Iranian revolution and subsequent hostage taking. Notably, President Mohammad Khatami used public declarations and the medium of CNN to seek a new chapter in bilateral relations.

³⁰ For the text of Sadat’s address, see http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/sadat_speech.html; accessed on 26 April 1999.

³¹ Documents issued by the Embassy of Pakistan, Washington, D.C., 19 March 1998

In an interview with Christian Amanpour, broadcast on 7 January 1998, Khatami offered to bridge the cultural divide:

At the outset, I would like to congratulate all free and noble women and men especially the followers of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him), on the occasion of the New Year. . . . We are at the close of the 20th century, leaving behind a full century of inequality, violence, and conflict. We pray to the Almighty to enable us to begin a new century of humanity, understanding, and durable peace, so that all humanity can enjoy the blessings of life. Once again, I would like to present my felicitation to all the followers of Jesus Christ, to all human beings, and particularly to the American people.

Khatami then proceeded to discuss the historical clash between religion and liberty:

In my opinion, one of the biggest tragedies in human history is this confrontation between religion and liberty which is to the detriment of religion, liberty, and the human beings who deserve to have both. The puritans desired a system which combined the worship of God and human dignity and freedom.”³²

In this skillful way, Khatami opened the door to “Track Two” initiatives in the face of powerful opposition to reconciliation within his own country. The effectiveness of Khatami’s declarations, however, have been mitigated by forces that are apparently outside his control.

Divergence between intention and comprehension can be seen as a principle form of failure in public declarations.

Raymond Cohen emphasized three pertinent questions across cultures where differences of interpretation between speaker and audience are likely to occur. First, what is the

signal? By this he referred to the form of communication through which the initiator has attempted to state his or her case or to begin dialogue. The second question referred to the message the speaker intended to convey. The third referred to the way in which that message was perceived. Divergence between intention and comprehension can be seen as a principle form of failure in public declarations. As Cohen noted, communication— particularly that which is public, verbal, and geared towards the foreign audience—rests on “manipulation of a shared symbolic system.”³³ When cultures are not conversant in the same language or

³²From a transcript of the Khatami interview, See <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html>; accessed on 21 April 1999.

³³ Cohen, *Culture and Conflict*, 11.

symbols—when an overture is not correctly interpreted—frustration, misunderstanding, and ultimately failed policy efforts are likely to ensue. Here the contrast between the India–Pakistan and Argentina–Brazil cases are most stark. In both pairings, there is an intimate understanding of a neighbor. In the Argentina–Brazil case, that understanding was used for positive effect. In South Asia, intimacy has bred negativity.

As Luis Bitencourt has noted, Brazilian and Argentine leaders used joint declarations issued at symbolic venues to assure each other that the commitments reached were “real.” Public declarations granted legitimacy to commitments. Since the declarations were linked to the opening of previously secret nuclear facilities, they had immediate context, while solidifying civilian control over enterprises that were once the province of military establishments.³⁴ In South Asia, declarations in the nuclear area have studiously avoided transparency or verification.

The effective use of public declarations requires words that do not offend, words that are respectful of cultural differences, and words carefully chosen to connect with “the other.” Why are such words so rarely spoken? According to Robert Oliver in *Culture and Communication*:

It is evident that the speech of diplomacy is subject to almost intolerable difficulties. . . . In the first place, there are comparatively few platitudes that have worldwide acceptance and sufficient vitality to be realistically effective. The division of the world between the communistic and democratic ideologies is the most harrowing example. And, in the second place, the positions from which diplomats can formulate and state their policies are subject to the strains and stresses of domestic politics.³⁵

Another obvious reason why effective public declarations are so rare is because extraordinary national leaders are so rare. Reconciliation in the most intractable cases is extraordinarily difficult for domestic political reasons, among others constraints. Sometimes it takes an extraordinary political leader to surmount these constraints. Lesser leaders must walk a fine line between reaching out to a foreign audience, while being mindful of powerful

Another obvious reason why effective public declarations are so rare is because extraordinary national leaders are so rare.

³⁴ Fax transmission from Luis Bitencourt to Michael Krepon, 20 March 1998.

³⁵ Robert Oliver, *Culture and Communication: The Problem of Penetrating National and Cultural Boundaries* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1976), 11.

domestic constituencies. It is a simple matter to offer declarations that re-enforce one's position at home while seeming rigid and uncompromising to an adversary. It is another matter entirely to offer conciliatory expressions geared toward a foreign audience that might provoke a domestic backlash. The Arab–Israeli conflict awaits another Anwar Sadat or Yitzhak Rabin. Left to their own devices, as Raymond Cohen has noted, “Egyptian and Israeli elites. . . have never been able to draw upon a common fund of assumptions about the nature of language, society, politics, violence, and negotiation.”³⁶

Israeli notions of defense and security, for example, are informed by the status of Jews as a historically victimized people. As psychiatrist John E. Mack wrote in an analysis of victimization among national groups in conflict:

International relations are dominated by the maneuvering of national groups whose members, perceiving themselves as having been victims or potential victims, seek to avoid so once again, frequently by violent actions that create new cycles of vengeance and victimization. Northern Ireland and the Middle East, for example, are arenas in which these cycles seem to repeat forever.³⁷

Perhaps now, the Northern Ireland issue can be dropped from the roster of seemingly intractable conflicts. Here, words of reconciliation, courageous Irish political leaders, and the strong mediation efforts of the United States may turn the tide. In the Middle East, long-standing third party efforts by the United States have proved immensely useful, but the words and exertion of U.S. leaders cannot substitute for those of the parties in dispute. Mutual notions of victimization, inherent in Israeli and Palestinian collective consciousness, make symbolic and verbal gestures particularly meaningful.

Salient cultural differences can be compounded by differences in the use of language and negotiating tactics. According to Cohen, most Israelis have a straightforward approach to public speaking: “Insinuation is lost on the Israeli. Subtlety or allusiveness in speech, if grasped at all, is not particularly admired. Since ‘face’ plays much less an important role in the culture, one is less sensitive to what others say. Hints and roundabout expressions are simply unnecessary.”³⁸ Compare this approach to the use of language in Arabic-speaking

³⁶ Cohen, *Culture and Conflict*, 9.

³⁷ Mack, “The Psychodynamics of Victimization” in Volkan, Julius, Montville, eds. *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships*, 125.

³⁸ Cohen, *Culture and Conflict*, 45.

societies, where hyperbole often reigns, and where much information is relayed by implication, indirection, or nonverbal communication.

Declaratory initiatives in the Arab–Israeli context must somehow surmount these and other cultural barriers. Egypt’s Sadat and Jordan’s King Hussein managed to bridge this gap, but they stand out as remarkable exceptions. Just as differences in Israeli and Arab culture and communication styles have complicated the Middle East peace process, so too, did US and Soviet differences in communication deepen divisions during the Cold War. Public declarations were an essential component of communist ideology. As Larson stresses in her essay, Vladimir I. Lenin insisted on “the importance of making declaratory statements on peace and disarmament to appeal to the masses.”³⁹ The communist idea of popular struggle—and public address as a vehicle for that struggle—initially led Soviet officials to push for generally worded agreements and declarations, “the ambiguity of which [could] be exploited to Soviet advantage.”⁴⁰ Soviets leaders then could adhere to a vague agreement only in the manner in which they found most advantageous. Needless to say, expressions of this kind by Kremlin leaders—such as the joint statement of principles signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Richard M. Nixon, did far more harm than good to bilateral relations. Eventually, US–Soviet negotiations turned to concrete manifestations of threat reduction, which diminished the need for declaratory initiatives. Not until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev were unilateral and joint declarations, coupled with concrete steps of military reduction, utilized effectively to transform US–Soviet relations.

CONCLUSION

What, then, are the keys to successful use of public declarations to build confidence in broader strategies of reconciliation? The case studies reviewed in this volume are far from definitive and will undoubtedly be supplemented by future accounts. Nonetheless, the core elements of successful declaratory diplomacy are evident from the preceding chapters. The most important key, of course, is political leadership willing to take risks for reconciliation. Absent this condition, the guidelines that follow are of academic interest only.

1. Combine words with powerful imagery and symbols.

³⁹ In this Report, Larson, “Words and Deeds,” 2

⁴⁰ Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, “The Pursuit of Power and Influence Through Negotiation,” in Hans Binnendijk, ed., *National Negotiating Styles* (Washington, D.C.:Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 1987), 24.

While words used by risk-taking leaders may have been forgotten, their images linger, such as Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling before a memorial at the site of the Warsaw ghetto, or President Anwar Sadat speaking before the Israeli Knesset. Civilian presidents in Argentina and Brazil issued their joint declarations at symbolic venues to re-enforce their commitment to friendly, good neighborly relations. These locations for leadership declarations—once-secret nuclear facilities and a site where a controversial dam was to be constructed—turned potential sources of bilateral friction into symbols of cooperation. When Indian prime minister A.B. Vajpayee visited Lahore, Pakistan, in February 1999—ten years after the last summit between Indian and Pakistani prime ministers—he pointedly visited the site where Pakistan’s founding father proclaimed the need for a separate homeland for Muslims on the subcontinent. By doing so, the leader of India’s Hindu nationalist party signaled India’s acceptance of Pakistan before a nationwide audience, as well as his desire for improved relations.

2. Use words freighted with empathy for “the other.”

When President John F. Kennedy delivered his speech calling for a nuclear test ban at American University in June, 1963, he emphasized mutual interests, avoided invective, and asked his fellow Americans to re-examine their attitudes toward Russia, a country whose wartime losses were “equivalent to the devastation of this country east of Chicago.” Kennedy went on to say, “So, let us not be blind to our differences—but let us also direct attention to our common interests. . . . We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future.”⁴¹ Sadat’s moving speech before the Knesset fourteen years later used remarkably similar phrases, breaking down differences between Arabs and Israelis and appealing to common tragedies over bereavement resulting from past wars.

3. Use evocative words to link short-term tactics with long-term strategy.

When Anwar Sadat appeared before the Knesset in 1977, he offered a vision that facilitated Israeli concessions in pulling back from positions in the Sinai. Mikhail Gorbachev’s United Nations speech in 1988, as he himself noted, was subject to derision as being “a little too romantic” and “floating above reality.”⁴² For example, Gorbachev talked about “de-ideologizing” relations and renouncing the use of force—concepts that could easily be dismissed when spoken by previous Soviet leaders. He then announced deep cuts in

⁴¹ For more on this speech, see Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981), chap. 16.

⁴² United Nations General Assembly, A/43/PV.72 (8 December 1988), 13.

conventional forces which lent credence to his words while isolating skeptics in the United States. At the same time, these initiatives were essential for revitalizing the Soviet economy. Argentine and Brazilian leaders used joint declarations regarding nuclear co-operation as a vehicle for reaffirming civilian control over their respective militaries and as means to normalize relations. For Indian prime minister Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, the immediate task in early 1999 was to reduce nuclear dangers resulting from their decision to test. The longer-term goal, vocalized by both leaders, was a normal, good-neighborly relationship.

4. Combine promising words and verifiable actions.

The more surprising the statement or the source, the more necessary are verifiable actions that lend meaning to the declaration. Gorbachev at the United Nations not only made the lofty call for a transformation of Soviet relations with the United States and Warsaw Pact countries, he also re-enforced his words with extraordinary troop demobilization and withdrawals. When the track record of bilateral relations is poor, and when prior declarations have proven to be hollow, actions need to support hopeful words. Conversely, words need to clarify and re-enforce positive actions. The practice of Argentine and Brazilian leaders to combine declarations with symbolic venues and commitments to transparency in once-secret dealings provides a model that deserves emulation elsewhere. As David Cortright has noted, “A concrete offer is much more likely than a vague promise to break through the noise of other forms of communication and to be taken seriously.”⁴³

5. Timing matters.

Declarations can have particular utility in changing the dynamics of troubled bilateral relations in the aftermath of crises, wars, and leadership changes. President Kennedy’s speech paving the way for the Limited Test Ban Treaty followed the searing experience of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Reagan–Gorbachev declaration that a nuclear war could not be won and must not be fought eased Soviet concerns after a series of crises and a lengthy nuclear war scare in 1983. This seemingly unremarkable joint statement also isolated hard-right ideologues within the Reagan administration. The seminal events of India-Pakistan wars in South Asia were followed by declarations devoid of content. It remains to be seen whether the nuclear testing on the subcontinent—another seminal event—will produce a different approach to leadership declarations.

⁴³ “Incentives Strategies for Preventing Conflict,” in David Cortwright, ed., *The Price of Peace, Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 275.

6. Pave the way to successful public declarations with private dealings.

Surprise announcements to domestic and foreign audiences should not come as a surprise to the national leader one wishes to reach. Successful reciprocity is more likely to come with private preparation. The model for such interaction is the Bush–Gorbachev initiatives in September–October 1991 to remove nuclear weapons from deployed status or from inventories that did not meet high standards of safety and security. President Bush phoned Gorbachev before the speech was given, and the details of the US initiative were provided in a letter before the announcement. As President Bush later recounted, “Gorbachev reacted positively [to his phone call], although he could not yet tell me precisely what moves they would make in response. He asked if this was a unilateral move, which it was.”⁴⁴ Bush’s unilateral action was reciprocated, in his view, because “a real air of cooperation had developed. . . . [A] genuine collaborative feeling.”⁴⁵

Carefully chosen words by national leaders can become powerful vehicles for confidence building within a broader peace making effort. Regardless of differences in nationality and political culture, the right fusion of words, symbols, and actions can resonate deeply, cutting away layers of cynicism, touching a spirit of hopefulness that lies within and isolating those who cannot budge from their grievances. Declaratory initiatives can be particularly effective during periods of anxiety or growing public dissatisfaction with enduring disputes. Very few public addresses by national leaders in recent decades continue to resonate. On precious rare occasions, however, well–chosen words have facilitated constructive action between adversaries. Even when the passage of time clouds memory over the words spoken, the resulting actions remain lasting monuments to courageous leadership.

Few remember the words spoken by Anwar Sadat in 1977 before the Israeli Knesset—words that facilitated Israel’s disengagement from the Sinai and the construction of a durable peace. Soviet President Gorbachev’s extraordinary speech before the United Nations in 1988 has also been forgotten, but not the indelible impression he left. After the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy used evocative words to help engineer the Limited Test Ban Treaty. These words, too, have not been etched in memory, but the atmosphere is now blessedly free of nuclear testing.

⁴⁴ Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 546.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 546.

The right combination of words, symbolic gestures, and actions can mobilize support and isolate recalcitrant forces at home and across troubled borders.

The elements of successful declaratory diplomacy are not hard to identify. The right combinations of words, symbolic gestures, and actions can mobilize support and isolate recalcitrant forces at home and across troubled borders.

Declaratory diplomacy cannot stand alone; it must be embedded in a larger strategy of reconciliation. Visionary leaders have used the tactic of public address to support broader strategies of reconciliation to produce historic accomplishments. There is no shortage of opportunities to use the keys to successful declaratory diplomacy—only a shortage of national leaders willing to help establish the political conditions in which declaration initiatives could be properly employed.

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