

PREPARING FOR THE MISSION: TRAINING

Effective training prepares military personnel for their anticipated missions. It comes in many forms, from classroom learning to live fire practice, strategic gaming to tactical exercises, single service to joint service simulations. Training also differs depending on the levels of command, the force size, the realism of a simulated environment, and the kinds of tasks involved, as well as a nation's doctrine and goals.

Thus, not all training is created equal. Nations provide their forces general training which is standardized and used across mission types, as well as specialized or pre-deployment training which is mission- and force-specific.

At the operational level, doctrine often identifies specific tactics, techniques, procedures, and strategies for a particular mission, which helps establish the kind of training needed. Prior to deployment, force commanders request training packages that they consider most relevant to their next mission. In general, such specialized training increases in importance the more “non-traditional” the mission and where concepts are new to personnel. This instruction may be especially useful for peace support operations, to clarify the rules of engagement and mandates, and to increase preparedness for unfamiliar scenarios.

As doctrine addresses the better known concepts of civilian protection, national training is likely to cover such roles (the *Geneva Conventions concept*, *humanitarian space concept*).³³⁶ Almost all developed state militaries receive at least rudimentary lessons in their responsibilities to protect civilians as a function of international humanitarian and human rights law, such as the Geneva Conventions. Some nations offer intensive instruction on civil-military operations and cooperation (e.g., CIMIC, CMO) to work with civilian agencies and NGOs in support of the provision of humanitarian relief and assistance, although it is usually only provided to selected national forces. Training for CIMIC and CMO—the primary training most militaries receive on interacting with civilian populations—typically focuses on winning “hearts and minds,” not on preventing abusive armed groups from killing non-combatants. Other training

³³⁶ Some traditional military training implicitly suggests that civilians will be better off as the result of the greater security that may result from combat operations (the *warfighting concept*) but those training programs are not explored here in depth.

programs also address aspects of civilian protection as part of their larger goals, for NEO missions or the protection of human rights, for example.

Training for peace support operations may address additional military roles for protecting civilians, instructing recruits how to conduct patrols, secure key facilities, handle crowd control, assist disarmament programs, evacuate civilians, and work with the other components of a peace operation. These roles are not always regular features of national military training, however, as some peacekeeping tasks fall closer to policing and establishing civil order.

When a mission or a mission-type lacks doctrine, specific training is also less likely to be available, such as for UN-authorized operations charged to protect civilians. Doctrine is updated periodically, so rapid changes in the nature of military missions may require training to shift *before* new doctrine is formally approved. As current deployments in complex missions blur the line between peacekeeping and warfighting, such a shift may be needed for more robust kinds of civilian protection, and for the preparation of peacekeepers in places like the DRC.³³⁷

Peace operations often involve both complex tasks and ad hoc force structures, which complicate training. Some military leaders view training for robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement as more demanding than training for warfighting. A 2005 multinational military conference on the impact of peace and stability operations on armed forces found that “the severity of extreme peace support operations can equal, and even exceed, those of much warfighting. The diversity of tasks and their unexpected nature means that training manuals cannot cope with every eventuality.”³³⁸ In Iraq, for example, coalition forces saw their situation change dramatically after the first months of occupation. They improvised new techniques and strategies to fit their environment—situations for which they may not have trained before deployment. Moreover, training alone may not result in well-prepared forces. In Africa, for example, it can be hard to train fully formed units—the preferred method for ensuring troops can work together effectively—that then *deploy*

³³⁷ The adaptability of a force to its mission also depends on the country and its doctrine. British and French doctrines, for example, aim for rapid adaptation to new types of warfighting/peacekeeping operations.

³³⁸ Peter F. Herry, *The Impact of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations on the Armed Forces*, Report of an International Conference, 17-18 June 2005, no. 915 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2 December 2005). This report summarizes the proceedings of “The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces,” held in Paris on 17–18 June 2005, sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, the Centre d’Études en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (Ministère de la Défense), the Royal United Services Institute, the Association of the US Army, the Förderkreis Deutsches Heer, The Heritage Foundation, and the US Embassy – Paris.

together. Units are sometimes formed specifically for an operation, with individual troops “filled in” to complete a battalion, for example. When these units are deployed as one, they may receive unfamiliar equipment that they are not prepared to operate, creating a “hidden training problem.”³³⁹

Generating consistent and effective training for aspects of civilian protection may be especially challenging. For forces in hostile environments, such a role may require training associated with high-level threats and combat-like situations, training that not all peacekeepers have, or are presumed to need. Training for forces expected to take a role in a UN-led mission into Darfur, Sudan, for example, will need to address how UN forces are to deal with spoilers who threaten civilians. Without specific doctrine identifying requirements for coercive protection, it is hard to find evidence of training that addresses such missions within multinational organizations or leading peacekeeping troop contributors.

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Training for peace support operations is expanding, however, with bilateral national programs, NATO exercises, and the development of UN training guidelines, among other initiatives. National training may also shift to meet the requirements of modern operations and revised doctrine—in the US, for example. There are signs of some promising developments. Multinational exercises such as *Cobra Gold* have incorporated more realistic civilian protection scenarios. The UN has developed *Standard Training Modules* (STMs) that detail aspects of civilian protection and touch on coercive protection techniques.

Thus, it is useful to consider what training is broadly available for peace support operations and whether there is evidence of a gap in training that addresses coercive protection.³⁴⁰ Looking at UN training standards and specific national training for operations provides insight into current preparations to protect civilians. This chapter offers a broad survey of a few training programs that

³³⁹ Senior staff, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, interviews with author, Accra, Ghana, June 2004.

³⁴⁰ Military training is a vast area of practice and experience, and this study is far from a comprehensive review of its many aspects.

touch on civilian protection issues, with a focus on UN, US, multilateral, and bilateral initiatives.

UNITED NATIONS TRAINING

Training for multilateral troop deployments can occur both at the national and multinational levels (e.g., by joint exercises or through multilateral organizations). The training of military personnel for UN-led missions, however, is considered a national responsibility. Countries are urged to provide skilled and capable peacekeepers. Most major troop contributing countries focus their training on good soldiering, preparing forces for multiple environments and achieving a baseline of readiness for missions. UN operations are well served when nations provide solid basic training, including the ability to follow the chain of command and to understand the ROE.

General Approach

The DPKO has traditionally offered very limited training services. Given its restricted authority and capacity, the UN does not provide general training to soldiers. Most training is offered as pre-deployment training by DPKO, for senior staff and troop contributors prior to leaving for their UN mission,

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augmented with some in-mission and rapid deployment training. The emphasis is on ROE, a central aspect of training but not the whole picture, and countries are not required to participate.³⁴¹

With a small staff, DPKO offers teams for “train the trainer” workshops and assistance to regional training centers, and focuses on developing and disseminating training

standards for use by troop contributors in their national programs. In the past, the UN has had no guarantee that the personnel offered by nations for peace operations meet basic UN standards, such as speaking the designated mission language.³⁴² The DPKO now sends assessment teams to identify some training gaps and offers to certify that countries have trained their forces to UN

³⁴¹ DPKO officials, interviews with author, New York, August 2004, February 2006, and March 2006.

³⁴² Senior civilian training official, DPKO, interviews with author, February 2006. Language skills are a real challenge; the UN test for mission language skills does not require even a score of fifty percent to pass. Language barriers between UN staff and peacekeepers can undermine effective training efforts.

standards. The UN is also able to provide some training in the field after personnel arrive, which includes instruction by UN agencies beyond the DPKO (reflecting the civilian personnel who work on protection within missions.)³⁴³ Under-prepared peacekeepers could still benefit from extra training. A DPKO survey of over 100 Member States on their use of UN training materials resulted in responses from only thirty-eight countries, with less than ten reporting that they fully used the materials.³⁴⁴

Traditionally the UN has not coordinated directly with many national training programs or training centers—and had difficulty getting information about what kinds of bilateral training nations receive or offer for peace operations.³⁴⁵ The United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) also supports research, seminars, and a training program run primarily as distance learning, available worldwide with courses in peace operations. UNITAR training modules, however, do not deal directly with civilian protection or interventions for that purpose.³⁴⁶

The UN approach to training has changed, however. With the jump in UN peace operations and deployed personnel levels since 2003, Member States recognized the need to improve the coordination and depth of training for these missions, especially as their complexity and demands have grown. In March 2004, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping pushed for multiple approaches:

In the area of training, the Committee supports enhancing the coordination of the DPKO's military, civilian police and civilian training activities, and requests that the Secretary-General report, at the next session, on ways to further improve this coordination, including the feasibility of establishing a single multidimensional training unit... [and] the strengthening of training coordination at United Nations Headquarters. It also fully endorses the establishment of mission training cells and would welcome more detailed information on how these will function. It supports the Department's new focus on providing national and regional peacekeeping training centres with the necessary guidance for training peacekeeping personnel. Also welcome was the introduction of Standardized Generic Training Modules.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ Training is offered in coordination with Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, OCHA, and other UN agencies, especially on issues such as human rights.

³⁴⁴ Senior civilian training official, DPKO, interviews with author, February 2006.

³⁴⁵ DPKO, Training and Evaluation Service, interviews with author, August 2004.

³⁴⁶ Harvey Langholtz, Director, UNITAR Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations, interview with author, June 2004. The 2005 and the 2006 course catalogues reinforce this point. See "Training for Peace Support Operations for UNITAR POCI," www.unitarpoci.org/media/brochure.pdf.

³⁴⁷ UN General Assembly, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Faces Major Challenge With 'Almost Unprecedented' Surge In Creation, Expansion Of Peacekeeping Missions, Special Committee Told," GA/PK/180, UN Press Release, 29 March 2004.

In November 2005, DPKO brought military and civilian training together under a new Integrated Training Service (ITS), subsuming the former Training and Evaluation Service (TES). In early 2006, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping affirmed the “high importance” of training efforts in light of the demand for UN peacekeeping.³⁴⁸ The Committee expressed support for the development of a DPKO training strategy and policy for cooperation with regional and national training centers. It also welcomed the ITS, and urged improvement of UN training standards and their adoption as national training curricula. Further, the Committee encouraged partnerships between countries experienced in peace operations and those newer to the missions. It particularly welcomed the only mandatory pre-deployment training for UN peacekeepers—on prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse and an accompanying Code of Conduct.

UN Standardized Training Modules

Given DPKO’s knowledge of what UN missions demand, its recent publication of training standards is an innovative way to help improve the preparation (and evaluation) of future peacekeepers. These training modules are the result of wide consultations between Member States, the UN, participants in peacekeeping operations, and other agencies over many years of seminars and workshops. These materials are still couched as “guidance” that needs to be “complemented by national training material whenever available.”³⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the materials are provided to national and multinational training centers around the world—from Malaysia to Argentina, India to Canada, Ghana to Italy. Many training centers are linked through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC), a network of national institutions, which facilitates better understanding and training efforts, working with the UN to identify training needs internationally.

The training modules come in three levels and set standards for classroom-based training. Beginning in 2002, TES developed *Standardized Generic Training Modules* (SGTMs), or level-one modules, to outline minimum standards for all troops deployed in UN peacekeeping operations. Lessons range from fundamentals (“Introduction to the United Nations,” and “Cultural Awareness”) to more functional discussions of subjects like logistics and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse. The next series, STMs, the level-two and -three modules, are designed respectively for specialized personnel and mission leadership. Together, these modules reflect both the types of tasks for which the

³⁴⁸ A/60/19, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*.

³⁴⁹ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Standardized Training Generic Modules,” Military Division, DPKO, www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm.htm.

UN wants countries to prepare their personnel and the relative priority it assigns to those anticipated roles.

The SGTMs address the need for peacekeepers to observe international humanitarian law and to support humanitarian access. For example, the SGTMs on “Legal Framework for United Nations Peace Operations,” “Human Rights in Peacekeeping,” and other lessons clearly outline the legal restraints on the use of military force and explain to peacekeepers their obligation to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law. One section of the module states that:

International humanitarian law is relevant to United Nations peacekeeping because many peace operations are deployed when conflict may still be active or may flare up again. Post-conflict environments may also have characteristics, such as large civilian populations that have been targeted by the warring parties, prisoners of war and other vulnerable groups, to whom the Geneva Conventions would apply. United Nations peacekeepers must always be mindful of existing international standards and norms that govern their daily activities. The Geneva Conventions generally apply in a peacekeeping context.³⁵⁰

The module emphasizes the role that many operations play to monitor and promote respect for human rights, a “fundamental obligation” of the UN: “[A]ll peacekeepers should be aware of human rights law and its applicability in their daily tasks. Peacekeepers must never do anything in their official or personal conduct that could be a violation of human rights.”³⁵¹

The SGTM on “Civil-Military Coordination” describes ways that peacekeepers and civilian organizations can offer each other support, with the peacekeepers’ presence providing security and “an enabling environment that allows others [civilians] to do their job.” For instance, peacekeepers can guard relief supplies and refugee camps, share information, escort humanitarian convoys, offer space for humanitarian goods on military trucks, ships, or aircraft, help pitch tents, rebuild local infrastructure, and provide potable water to civilian populations.³⁵²

An SGTM lesson on the UN Charter, international law, and rules of engagement (in a section on ROE) explains the concept of using force to defend civilians, preferably with a commander’s permission and when competent local authorities

³⁵⁰ SGTM 3, “Legal Framework of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Military Division, DPKO, www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm.htm.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² SGTM 10, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination,” Military Division, DPKO, www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm.htm.

are absent.³⁵³ Likewise, the SGTM on humanitarian assistance instructs troops to fully respect state sovereignty when supporting humanitarian missions—except when the host fails to meet certain key responsibilities. It maintains:

The only exception [to the norm of non-intervention] is in cases of genocide or other gross human rights abuses or humanitarian disasters where a Government has, in the view of the Security Council lost the ability to appropriately protect and serve its population. In these exceptional cases the Security Council may approve a humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter... Primary responsibility for the protection and well being of a civilian population rests with the government of the state or authorities that control the territory in which the population is located.³⁵⁴

This module acknowledges the fundamental challenge of civilian protection when peacekeepers face situations where a sovereign state has failed a population. The module suggests that one answer is a Council-authorized humanitarian intervention to provide protection, but offers no further details. Likewise, peacekeepers are not given guidance about how to handle their responsibilities in the murky zone of a Chapter VII operation when the state and other actors do not protect civilians from large-scale violence.

UN Standards: Closer to Protection?

A 2005 briefing on the draft STM 3 on humanitarian assistance from a human rights perspective discussed how peacekeeping forces could help protect civilians.³⁵⁵ The roles cited were those associated with traditional peacekeeping, ranging from monitoring and alerting civilians to risk, providing deterrence by presence, working with humanitarian partners, and reporting human rights violations. The briefing recognized that force might be used, but primarily framed the situation as one in which the room for humanitarian interaction with the military was reduced.

The ITS published the more advanced *Standardized Training Modules 2 and 3* for senior civilian and military mission leadership in March 2006. STM 2 is designed for UN military, police, and key personnel, while STM 3 is targeted at mission leadership. Representing the work of many nations, the modules will continue to be developed and updated to improve guidance to countries on training.

³⁵³ SGTM 3 “Legal Framework of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Military Division, DPKO, Slide 18, point 1.8, www.un.org/depts/dpko/training/sgtm/sgtm.htm.

³⁵⁴ SGTM 9, “Humanitarian Assistance,” Military Division, DPKO, Slide 6, internal document on file with authors.

³⁵⁵ Michael Dell’Amico, STM 3, “Humanitarian Assistance: Challenges and Opportunities in an Integrated Mission Context,” UNHCR, Geneva, presented in Abuja, 12-22 April 2005.

For this next level of training, an STM 2 module on *Protection of Human Rights by Military Peacekeepers* outlines principles that could help prepare UN peacekeeping personnel for operations with civilian protection mandates—and move toward a greater operational capacity for missions to meet their mandates in hostile environments. The module aims to “address the use of, or the credible threat to use, UN mandated military force to protect human rights and enforce the rule of law.”³⁵⁶ The course outline offers detailed, tactical and operational options to protect human rights and “to anticipate human rights protection tasks...and when resources and mandate may be inadequate to fulfil those tasks.”

This STM outline reflects a detailed and innovative draft module prepared by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).³⁵⁷ The draft guidance, aimed squarely at protecting civilians in non-permissive environments, is clear that at times “protection refers to armed protection.” While this module is not intended to prepare troops for “coercive protection” operations, it ably offers training on exactly the questions that peacekeepers have about such missions. The outline explains the compelling rationale for peacekeepers using armed protection. It argues that:

Use of armed force goes to the very essence, the human rights centre of gravity of UN mandated military forces. Without the inherent capability to project their will by force of arms, every other human rights function of military peacekeepers is weakened, commensurately reducing their value to their peace operations human rights partners.³⁵⁸

In other words, protecting civilians using armed force is both worthwhile itself and necessary to support the effectiveness of other, non-coercive human rights efforts.

The distinctive aspect of the module is its discussion of “Armed Protection Tasks” for military forces. The module describes seven techniques that peacekeepers can employ to defend the human rights of civilians:

- *Mission Development*
- *Full Rapid Response when Witnessing Human Rights Violations*
- *Staged Rapid Response to Witnessed Human Rights Violations*

³⁵⁶ Integrated Training Service, “Protection of Human Rights for Military Personnel of Peace Operations,” Module 3 of “Human Rights for Military Personnel of Peace Operations,” STM 2-1 *United Nations Officers Common Training*, DPKO, as updated February 2006.

³⁵⁷ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Protection of Human Rights by Military Peacekeepers,” Mil-POHRT Manual, Section C, draft Module 3, UN OHCHR, unpublished and undated draft (number 8). OHCHR has continued to develop this draft module further, one of a package of coordinated modules being developed as guidance on human rights for military personnel of peace operations.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, slide one.

- *Interposition Operations*
- *Standing Physical Protection of Human Rights Victims*
- *Providing Human Rights Operational Space for Partners*
- *Conflict Containment and Restoration of Law and Order*

The appropriate armed-protection option depends on the nature of the environment, the mission, and the mission's capacity.

The section on *mission development* addresses the need for peacekeepers to adapt their responses as human rights realities change on the ground. It suggests that peacekeepers use a “manoeuvrist approach,” allowing field commanders to make tactical decisions based on rapidly changing facts on the ground. If a situation deteriorates unexpectedly, the module argues that peacekeepers must not simply go about business as usual. Even without an explicit mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat, “the implied human rights role of peacekeepers is extensive.”³⁵⁹ At the same time, missions must avoid taking on new tasks beyond the original intent of the mission without the necessary resources and rigorous analysis to avoid “mission creep.”³⁶⁰

The module teaches that one option is that of *full rapid response*, where a peacekeepers' job is to respond *every time* they witness human rights abuses. Preferably, this response will be unarmed or action will have prevented the abuse from occurring in the first place. The response can involve the use of armed force, if necessary. Peacekeepers should first ensure their own protection and then attempt to end physical violations against others through “interpositional manoeuvres, or fire, or a combination of both.” They will need to conduct incident follow-up and potentially detain violators.³⁶¹ If the mission lacks capacity for a preventive response, they should still take *some* action, even if it is just to condemn the violence publicly. The *staged rapid response* option, for example, involves peacekeepers sending “a clear signal to the violators and to the victims” that human rights abuses are illegal.³⁶²

Interposition operations might be needed to separate parties to a conflict, such as an armed group and a civilian population, or hostile civilian populations. Specific interposition tactics include permanent or recurring presence of troops, cordon-and-search operations, and patrols. They also might involve rapid

³⁵⁹ Ibid., 9.

³⁶⁰ One US training expert observed that mission creep is really the result of poor planning by those who have not anticipated what a mission requires, such as military planners inexperienced in the requirements of peace and stability operations. US military training expert, interview with author, June 2006.

³⁶¹ Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Protection of Human Rights by Military Peacekeepers,” 10.

³⁶² Ibid., 12.

reaction to specific incidents to “reinforce interpositional presence” and “may require the deployment of overwhelming force.”³⁶³

The other protection options, *Standing Physical Protection of Human Rights Victims*, *Providing Human Rights Operational Space for Partners*, and *Conflict Containment and Restoration of Law and Order*, are relatively well-understood (if not yet effectively implemented) and are not addressed in detail in the module. *Standing Physical Protection*, for example, involves establishing protected areas for civilian populations, such as those established during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where peacekeepers can use traditional techniques of area defense.

Overall, this draft module offers a framework within peacekeeping where personnel can use appropriate, coercive military responses to stop and prevent human rights abuses. It stresses that the principles of minimum use of force, impartiality, and consent do not justify *inaction* in the face of atrocities and, where human rights are violated, “neutrality will certainly run the risk of being immoral, and in situations where international law has created a duty to act, neutrality will be ‘illegal.’”³⁶⁴ Indeed, the module recognizes that impartiality may require a peacekeeper to make clear to hostile forces in the mission area that “protecting the rights of civilians in your AO [area of operations] is the key reason that the UN has sent you to that country. So as to ensure that you fulfil your military duties and to ensure that the UN is not accused of failing in its responsibilities, you consider it your duty to protect the rights of all civilians.”³⁶⁵

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The draft module is unique. It firmly establishes responsibilities for peacekeepers in the context of human rights, and prepares military personnel to consider a range of techniques, including coercion, to protect civilians. Its recognition of the link between human rights and the use of military force goes beyond what is generally in UN guidelines and PSO doctrine to date. Such a module could fill a gap in most guidance for Chapter VII operations and benefit current operations that come close to coercive protection, such as in the DRC.

³⁶³ Ibid., 14.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., 3.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., slide 19.

Overall, UN training modules do not address how countries should understand the meaning of UN mandates to “protect civilians under imminent threat” or how military forces should prepare to operate in missions with such mandates. While the larger problem is achieving clarity at the policy, conceptual, and doctrinal levels, UN training guidance needs to address this mission role and better support the personnel deploying to such operations today.

MULTINATIONAL & BILATERAL TRAINING INITIATIVES

If UN training efforts for peace support operations are still in their infancy, especially for addressing civilian protection as a coercive action, what other training programs for peace operations, whether strategic, operational, or tactical, address civilian protection? Numerous bilateral and multinational efforts try to increase the capabilities and skills of peacekeepers. Various countries run peace operations training programs for foreign militaries. With too

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many training programs to survey fully here, it is worth looking at a few examples of these international and national programs.

For African nations, for example, programs include those of the UK (*British Military Advisory and Training Team, BMATT*), France (*Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities, RECAMP*) and the US (*African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance* program, ACOTA, and now, *Global*

Peace Operations Initiative, GPOI). Knowledgeable military officers from Great Britain, France, and the United States involved in these programs did not think that the training addressed the role for personnel in missions mandated to “protect civilians” within a peace operation or as a mission in itself. Applicable tasks are taught, however, even if a common concept of civilian protection is not.

The US, for example, has not traditionally included coercive use of force as part of its bilateral peacekeeping training programs. The US launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, seeking to prepare African peacekeepers to respond to future crises. ACRI included general tasks that could apply to protection missions (e.g., protect non-combatants, conduct patrols, defend a convoy, and control civilian movement).³⁶⁶ The 1998

³⁶⁶ US Department of the Army, *African Crisis Response Initiative Program of Instruction May 98* (Fort Bragg, NC: US Department of the Army, Headquarters, 3rd Special Forces Group, 12 May

program set out a goal, characterized under “Protection Skills,” to ensure that each trainee unit was “able to protect itself, civilians in its care and the operation. These skills are critical to operational effectiveness.”³⁶⁷ Under human rights training, the manual urges that the goal of the peacekeeping mission is “to ensure the safety and security of the civilian population,” but ACRI did not train on the use of lethal force or provide trainees with lethal equipment. The instruction list from ACRI prepared forces for Chapter VI-type missions and stressed “the importance of using minimal necessary force while avoiding collateral damage.”³⁶⁸

In 2002, the ACOTA program replaced ACRI. ACOTA was designed to include simple shooting instruction and military drills, and could include provision of lethal military equipment. ACOTA has used modular segments based on a DPKO-sanctioned Program of Instruction (POI). This POI covers human rights, refugee protection, force protection, lethal training for combat situations in peace enforcement missions, and includes command and staff training through computer simulations. The instruction also includes practical role-playing exercises emphasizing ROE, mandates, and decision-making in scenarios in which civilians are in harm’s way—and those in which a mission mandate changes to Chapter VII.

Under the Global Peace Operations Initiative, announced in 2004, the US aims to help train 75,000 personnel for peacekeeping by 2010, with a specific focus on African forces. GPOI also intends to offer training for lethal operations. While increasing personnel and capacity for peace operations led by the UN and by regional organizations, GPOI does not yet have an explicit component regarding the protection of civilians. GPOI training is based on UN guidelines, previous US training efforts and US doctrine, as well as host-nation training objectives and doctrine. As discussed in the previous section, however, US peace operations doctrine provides few details on approaches for peacekeepers to protect civilians.

Training centers offer another venue for preparing personnel for peace operations. The Lester Pearson Center in Canada, for example, has been a leader in training and education on all aspects of peace operations. No courses, however, are known to have addressed civilian protection specifically.³⁶⁹ When approached, experts involved with the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers were not aware of any training on civilian

1998), www2.apan-info.net/gpoi/documents/ACRI%20Program%20of%20Instruction_May%20098.doc.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Pearson senior staff, interview with author, June 2004.

protection.³⁷⁰ Newer training centers are expanding to look at the challenges in current peace operations, especially as regional actors become more involved. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, for example, is designed to serve multiple audiences, including ECOWAS, the AU, the UN, and the international community, with a focus on operational issues for civilian and military personnel.³⁷¹ The Center hosts a wide range of meetings, including training programs with the UN, RECAP and IAPTC and sessions to develop the STM series.

Until protection is introduced by a major troop contributor or the UN as a component of training, however, it is unlikely that KAIPTC or other regionally-based training centers will introduce curricula or training scenarios that address civilian protection as a specific component of a PSO or intervention force. These programs suggest the importance of UN standards, which they follow, and demonstrate how a gap in concepts or doctrine can affect the instruction recommended for training.

AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: THE UNITED STATES

National training programs prepare their forces for the missions they anticipate. The United States, for example, is not a major contributor to UN-led peace operations. It is, however, beginning to focus more on how it prepares American forces for stability and peace operations. The US military trains broadly for offensive, defensive, stability, and support missions, with pressure to cover all the areas required by traditional military missions. The philosophy is that realistic training leads to success in operations. For stability and peace operations, much training has been *ad hoc* prior to deployment.

The US Approach

There has been a fundamental tension within the US over whether current training programs truly prepare American armed forces for complex peace and stability operations — let alone for specific civilian protection tasks. The US has not focused on preparing for peacekeeping missions generally, or developed extensive training programs for these operations. Some officials at military training institutions argue that neither US Army nor joint military training programs are sufficient for likely scenarios for US armed forces deploying to post-conflict environments, and that contingent leaders (i.e., battalion, brigade)

³⁷⁰ This reflects multiple interviews with training experts knowledgeable about IAPTC, which does not have a formal membership. This research did not include a comprehensive review of all the 90-plus participants in IAPTC activities; individual training centers may address civilian protection issues. See the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, www.iaptc.org/about.html.

³⁷¹ The Nigerian National War College handles strategic training and the Peacekeeping School in Koulikaro, Mali handles tactical training.

emphasize combat-related tactical training for their soldiers preparing for deployments. One Army training expert suggested that while eighty percent of US military missions are civilian-related, eighty percent of training requested is for combat.³⁷² As for protecting civilians as a role for forces within stability and peace operations, US military experts offered that they know of little training that squarely addresses civilian protection outside of traditional approaches of international humanitarian law—or as the stabilizing result of going after bad guys in traditional warfighting. As for specific training, one Army expert familiar with US approaches said, “I don’t know of any modules that are focused on protection.”³⁷³

This lack of training, in part, goes back to doctrine. “If it is not in doctrine,” one US military official pointed out, “they won’t teach it.”³⁷⁴ US training is driven by doctrine, in addition to commanders’ perception of what they will face on the ground and current training programs. For example, commanders use the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) as the basis for building joint

mission-essential task lists (JMETLs), the common language for identifying tasks and training objectives for specific missions.³⁷⁵ But within the task lists of the UJTL, there is virtually no discussion of the protection of civilians—except for the evacuation of non-combatant US nationals. The training checklist *does* recognize US military support to those who are expected to protect civilians, describing the assistance to restore order (described as a rule of law question) and assistance to host nations with displaced persons. If no task is identified to protect civilians, then it is likely to be harder to identify how to train personnel. Further, there is little reason to believe it is a presumed task for US service members.

There has been a fundamental tension within the US over whether current training programs truly prepare American armed forces for complex peace and stability operations – let alone for specific civilian protection tasks.

³⁷² Workshop, *Operational Capacities for Civilian Protection Missions*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 8 December 2004.

³⁷³ Ibid. The US prepared for an intervention with a training package for Haiti, when General Joseph Kinzer reportedly used the National Simulation Center to train his forces for that mission in the mid-1990s.

³⁷⁴ Workshop, *Operational Capacities for Civilian Protection Missions*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 8 December 2004.

³⁷⁵ US Department of Defense, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.04B: Universal Joint Task List* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1 October 1999), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsd/m3500_4b.pdf; US Department of Defense, *The Joint Training System, A Primer for Senior Leaders* (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1998), 16, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/jtsprim.pdf.

Three major US centers for pre-deployment training provide some scenarios involving civilians: the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Hohenfels Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. Fort Irwin is seen as focused on traditional combat operations. One NGO participant in a 2004 training session there described it as “a waste of time” since the exercise did not realistically incorporate NGOs and emphasized more force-on-force operations.³⁷⁶ An Army major who had served in Sarajevo found the NTC training “stifling” in its concentration on heavy forces and felt it did not reflect “the way it works.”³⁷⁷ Hohenfels, which focuses on force maneuver training for all United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Combat Battalions, includes support for NATO training with Germany, France, Canada, and the Netherlands and training for peace operations prior to deployments such as Kosovo. Its training reportedly includes role-playing by civilians.³⁷⁸ Many consider Fort Polk to be the site most likely to train US troops in realistic scenarios prior to deployment in stability or peace operations.³⁷⁹ Training, in three-week mission readiness exercises, includes civilians posing as local inhabitants of the future deployment area. One official involved in training by the JRTC, however, stated that the Center’s sessions were not realistic enough and did not provide sufficient training for likely peace and stability scenarios.³⁸⁰

The US Army’s 1998 *Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package* includes a combination of classroom-learning lesson plans and situational training exercises to address ROE and issues such as the use of force.³⁸¹ While not an explicit discussion of civilian protection, the sample ROE used in the lessons are from *Operation Restore Hope* (the UN intervention in Somalia in 1992) which allow for the use of deadly force to defend the lives of persons in areas under US control. Training tasks include delivering supplies or humanitarian aid, convoy security, controlling civilian movement, and reacting to civil disturbance.

³⁷⁶ CARE staff person, interview with author, Washington, DC, October 2004.

³⁷⁷ US Army Major, interview with author, Washington, DC, October 2004.

³⁷⁸ SFC Richard Hendricks, “COBs: The Civilian Element,” *Soldiers Online*, April 1999, www.army.mil/Soldiers/apr1999/features/cob.html. Hendricks writes that civilians “have been used at CMTC since the early 1990s to portray civilian ethnic groups and organizations that Army units might encounter when deployed. The COB’s mission is to add realism to situations where units might have to deal with civilian populations while conducting military operations.”

³⁷⁹ Workshop, Operational Capacities for Civilian Protection Missions, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 8 December 2004.

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁸¹ US Army, Chapter 4. “Rules of Engagement Application,” *Stability and Support Operations Training Support Package*, Training Circular 7-98-1, Headquarters, Department of the Army, 5 June 1997, <https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/11116-1/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm>.

Another training expert suggested that there was increased interest in considering the role of US military police, simulations with human factors, and scenarios more reflective of current challenges.³⁸² Situational examples and the ROE used during the 1992 Los Angeles riots in turn demonstrate the application of and preparation for the use of force when civilians are at risk, which could apply elsewhere. Indeed, one experienced US Army Colonel who helped lead the Army task force in Los Angeles thought it had direct application to peace operations requiring the protection of civilians, perhaps more so than other areas of training and doctrine.³⁸³

There are signs of change in the US, however.³⁸⁴ Traditionally, the US military has considered peace operations to be “peripheral” to its wartime mission, while believing that well-trained and disciplined troops make the best peacekeepers.³⁸⁵ The Pentagon, however, is re-evaluating US preparation for peace and stability operations. The 2005 DoD Directive 3000.05 establishes policy and responsibility for planning, training, and preparing for conducting stability operations, framing them as a core activity of the US armed forces.³⁸⁶ The Directive offers few specifics, but cites the “immediate goal” of stability operations as providing the local population with security, restoring services, and meeting humanitarian needs. Training will include exercises, games, and as needed, “red-teaming.”³⁸⁷ Likewise, DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review discusses changes to training for stability and reconstruction operations (though it does not mention protection training specifically).³⁸⁸ The use of role-playing scenarios at Army training centers (including Fort Irwin and Fort Polk) is producing more realistic training, which could be useful to apply to peace and stability operations, as it has been done for counter-insurgency and preparing US forces for deployments to Iraq.³⁸⁹ The question is how much the US will invest in more effective training for future stability and peace operations versus continue its focus on traditional warfighting and related operations.

³⁸² Workshop, *Operational Capacities for Civilian Protection Missions*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 8 December 2004; US Army officer and participant, interview with author, March 2006.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ The US Military Academy at West Point, for instance, developed a class to look at “winning the peace” in a post-conflict scenario to address modern circumstances faced by its graduates.

³⁸⁵ Lt. Col. Brent Bankus, “Training the Military for Peace Operations: A Past, Present and Future View,” in Robert M. Schoenhaus, ed., *Peaceworks 43: Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, April 2002).

³⁸⁶ US Department of Defense, Directive 3000.05.

³⁸⁷ “Red-teaming” refers to training in which personnel play the role of an adversary to identify weaknesses in current operational practices.

³⁸⁸ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 6 February 2006.

www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf.

³⁸⁹ Dexter Filkins and John F. Burns, “Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for Battle,” *The New York Times*, 1 May 2006; Wells Tower, “Under the God Gun: Battling a Fake Insurgency in the Army’s Imitation Iraq,” *Harper’s Magazine*, 1 January 2006.

Developments in NATO might push the US to reevaluate its training.³⁹⁰ NATO partners are expected to prepare for non-Article V missions (i.e., peace operations and peacebuilding). The US Joint Forces Command (Norfolk, VA) is developing better scenarios for simulation of likely joint operations and is working on a crisis-response mission task list for operations involving NATO. One Joint Forces official pointed out that the US did not have preparation for such crisis-response missions “in their tool kit.”³⁹¹ This effort could result in more regularized training for operations likely to involve civilian protection, involving multiple services and countries.

Given the breadth of US training programs, it is likely that some programs will address aspects of protecting civilians, including coercive protection. As discussed in the previous section on doctrine, however, identifying these areas is difficult without a common language or recognition of protection as either central to or the goal of an operation. Even with these challenges, many argue that militaries can train up quickly to meet the situations they will face; the issue is how those situations are defined in advance.

Selected Exercises and Simulations

Exercises and simulations help train military personnel on key skills, aiding them by rehearsing missions and honing their skills for specific situations. One established training series with relevant civilian protection aspects is the US-sponsored *Cobra Gold*, an annual US military multinational exercise developed with Pacific Command (PACOM). In 2005, the exercise was led by the US Marine Corps, and included the United States, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, India, and multiple military, UN, and civilian actors.³⁹² Those involved in its planning at the US Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (Hawaii), which reports to PACOM, said it involved civilian protection scenarios, including military use of force to defend UN

³⁹⁰ NATO has the Working Group on Training and Education for Peace Support Operations (TEPSO), which is designed to help coordinate national training and education programs, to assist with standardization, and to identify new training objectives based on lessons learned. The authors were unable to access information on whether TEPSO addresses training for civilian protection missions.

³⁹¹ US official, Joint Forces Command, interview with author, October 2004. This initiative is viewed as especially important by those who believe the US military is still reluctant to accept non-traditional roles.

³⁹² *Cobra Gold* aims to help simulate and train multinational forces in a contingency operation involving humanitarian aims: “Using a United Nations Chapter VII and NEO scenario, Cobra Gold unites existing bilateral exercises into a regional exercise framework and demonstrates the ability of several nations to rapidly deploy a JTF [Joint Task Force] to conduct joint/combined operation in a Small Scale Contingency.” See Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, <http://coe-dmha.org/cobragold.htm>.

mandates and both UN and local personnel.³⁹³ Troops faced a Chapter VII scenario involving a hand-off from an intervention force to a UN force and were required to form a transitional administration. Lessons learned from the Malaysia exercise are slated to be incorporated into the design of *Cobra Gold 2007*, which will be the PACOM-GPOI Capstone Exercise.

The United Kingdom's Peacekeeping Team in the Foreign Commonwealth Office is involved in a series of map-based role-playing exercises known as MapEx. The aim of these exercises is to help implement the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, improve on past operations' capacities, increase interoperability and planning experience, and help create training capacities within participating nations. Past operations include *Blue Pelican* (UK, France, and ECOWAS in Nigeria), *Blue Elephant* (Thailand), *Blue Puma* (Argentina), *Blue Lion* (Senegal), *Blue Tiger* (Bangladesh), and *Blue Jaguar* (Paraguay), with more exercises planned.³⁹⁴ These exercises simulate complex operations, with civilians at risk and with mandates that mirror those of current UN peace operations.

One simulation model for peace support operations is the Deployable Exercise Support (DEXES). A project of US Southern Command, DEXES is a simulation program designed to support bilingual international training exercises in military operations other than war. DEXES is a computer-based simulation that charts complex factors that influence the success or failure of peace operations. It uses discrete events and player choices to influence a broad set of variables describing social interaction in the host country. Variables include the pace of economic growth, the level of civil unrest, the amount of political participation, and the level of popular support for the peacekeeping forces, among others. An event or player choice that causes a change in one variable will cause changes in other related variables. For example, if a peacekeeping convoy accidentally runs over a civilian, DEXES calculates a slight decrease in popular support for the peacekeeping forces and a potential increase in the perceived bias of the peacekeeping forces. If not addressed, these shifts spur changes in other variables, such as a decrease in political participation and an increase in armed conflict. DEXES includes variables for social conditions such as ethnic distrust, civil unrest, armed conflict, the number of displaced persons, public health conditions such as the daily civilian mortality rate, political conditions including government corruption and competence, economic conditions, and the public opinion of various ethnic groups. DEXES is often

³⁹³ John Otte and Sharon McHale, Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, interviews with author, October 2004; Otte, interviews with author, January 2006.

³⁹⁴ Peacekeeping Team, Conflict Issues Group, Foreign Commonwealth Office, UK, interview with author, October 2004.

used during Command Post Exercises in order to simulate the passage of time.³⁹⁵

While simulation models such as DEXES can be extremely useful in training for peace support operations, they do suffer from several drawbacks that limit their effectiveness. First, the advanced technology required to run such sophisticated simulations means that significant time is required to master the technical aspects. Most nations do not own and operate simulation technology, so the first several days of a multinational exercise are often spent learning how the technology operates. Second, the high costs of simulation technology make it inaccessible to the majority of countries, particularly developing nations that provide the bulk of contemporary peacekeepers. Finally, almost all simulation expertise is provided by private contractors, further increasing the costs of running exercises.

CHALLENGES: IMPROVING TRAINING FOR PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Broadly speaking, there is growing awareness that UN peace operations and other missions need to protect civilians under threat. Current military training efforts address this role primarily in basic, traditional approaches of support to humanitarian action, to rule of law, and in concert with international humanitarian law. There are few signs that training for peacekeepers or national forces has adjusted to address civilian protection more directly as a military role, or to offer guidance to forces deploying under UN mandates to protect civilians. Civilian protection “is on the radar screens,” as one US military training expert said, pointing to the UN mandates, but there is “not really” any training to prepare them for upholding these mandates.³⁹⁶

Is basic military training with *ad hoc* civilian protection training sufficient to prepare personnel for modern operations mandated to protect civilians? Many UN and military experts argue that protection missions require troops with basic military skills and good command and control in the operation, not specific training for civilian protection. Some countries with little doctrine on peace support operations or coercive protection missions may have well prepared troops nonetheless. Others point out that militaries can train up quickly to meet the situations they will face. The nature of civilian protection offered by

³⁹⁵ For example, a force might train for a particular scenario typical of the early stages of a peace operation. Overnight, DEXES could simulate the passage of months, and present an entirely new scenario the next morning, typical of a later stage of peace operations.

³⁹⁶ Workshop, *Operational Capacities for Civilian Protection Missions*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 8 December 2004.

personnel may depend on the threat facing the mission, and therefore the important issue is the level of intensity at which troops fight and operate, not specialized skills. This view is popular: well-trained troops will generally be better at any mission, even unfamiliar ones, than those who lack basic skills and coherent leadership. Such a point underlies a larger debate about specific training for peace support and stability operations. The other point of view is that training prepares individuals to respond—but that response may be completely inadequate or dangerous if it is applied in the wrong situation. When military personnel are not ready for a situation and have not had realistic training for it, they may respond poorly and be unprepared for unfamiliar missions, such as those required by mandates to protect civilians in a PSO by military forces trained solely for combat.³⁹⁷

Specialized training or the development of discrete “civilian protection” training packages is not universally seen as the single answer, however. Many peace operations trainers express dismay at the number of balkanized training packages already circulating through the UN and other institutions. Rather than develop another such package, military planners should place greater emphasis on integrating training for civilian protection into current training for missions where civilians are under threat, and on integrating civilian protection concerns across the mission-planning and training process—whether for peace operations or military interventions. The enduring challenge is using training to address gaps and to generate a common understanding of future missions. Those gaps are hard to address if they are not recognized in the first place.

As peace operations now involve the use of force, experienced military and political leaders of UN missions consider better training for such operations to be critical for peacekeeping forces. Leadership is also vital to a mission’s success, yet senior leaders, both civilian and military, may themselves lack training on how to approach the questions of protecting civilians, potentially with the use of force. One DPKO training expert suggested that training could precede civilian protection policy and doctrine if clear, trainable tasks are identified. “You must suss it out,” the official suggested, noting that the protection of civilians was intrinsic to tasks for which peacekeepers trained, such as DDR, as well as “common sense” and a “basic” component of human rights work.³⁹⁸ Such common sense may be insufficient, however, if aspects of the mission are unfamiliar.

At some level, therefore, training that treats the protection of civilians as an explicit goal or the central task of a mission—whether led by the United

³⁹⁷ US military training expert, interview with author, June 2006.

³⁹⁸ Senior official, Integrated Training Service, DPKO, interview with author, 1 February 2006.

Nations, a lead nation, or a coalition—*is* necessary. While a baseline of well trained forces is required, training for missions involving civilian protection should recognize that the environment and required decision-making are not equivalent either to traditional combat or to traditional peacekeeping scenarios.

With the development of new tools to prepare forces for modern peace and stability operations, there is an opportunity to integrate operational concepts of protection and increase the preparation of today's militaries for the real scenarios they may face. Many of these concepts are suggested in the UN's useful draft module, *Protection of Human Rights by Military Peacekeepers*. The

At some level, therefore, training that treats the protection of civilians as an explicit goal or the central task of a mission—whether led by the United Nations, a lead nation, or a coalition—is necessary.

next step should be to expand these limited forays into civilian protection training and to make them a regular feature of the training provided to all troops deploying to regions with civilians at risk. As the UN strengthens its training guidance and other national and other multinational programs expand, these programs should address the

roles for military personnel in the protection of civilians more directly, tackling issues from impartiality to the use of force, from working with humanitarian organizations to providing physical protection in hostile environments. Training should also engage peacekeepers and clarify what is needed—or not needed—in pre-deployment versus general training. Additionally, it should demonstrate to leaders and personnel when a UN mission can no longer offer protection and when, therefore, only an intervening force can offer the kind of physical protection to civilians required. Such an approach would enhance the preparedness of personnel and leaders for current and future operations, especially in the difficult environments where peacekeepers operate today, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.