

INDICATORS OF CAPACITY: WILLING ACTORS AND OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

The effective deployment of forces—a prerequisite to providing protection to civilians in hostile environments—is one of many challenges facing traditional military and peacekeeping missions. Only a few multinational organizations can mount interventions with military forces to protect civilians from mass killings, genocide, or ethnic cleansing under their own authority. This section first considers which organizations are willing and able to authorize and lead such forces. It then looks at their capacity to conduct operations in non-permissive environments. Finally, the general operational challenges that affect all peace operations are reviewed, in the context of missions involving the protection of civilians.

WILLING ACTORS

The willingness to act usually depends on the authority to act. Five multinational organizations have authority to organize peace operations to intervene and employ force for more than self-defense: the UN, NATO, the European Union, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States.¹¹⁹ Other groups may assist these missions, such as the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG), which is designed to deploy rapidly to help set up UN peace operations.¹²⁰ Each of these organizations has a unique structure and capacity that affects its willingness and ability to intervene.

¹¹⁹ Numerous multinational groups can intervene diplomatically or politically. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe can provide observers for a peace operation; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development has supported political missions to negotiate peace in the Sudan and Somalia. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) operates under a non-interventionist framework, without the capacity for peace operations, although Indonesia has called for creating a regional ASEAN peacekeeping force.

¹²⁰ SHIRBRIG provides support for the establishment of UN operations with Chapter VI mandates, such as UNMEE in Ethiopia/Eritrea. SHIRBRIG has also supported mission planning for operations under Chapter VII, including the transition from the ECOWAS-led mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) to a UN operation (UNMIL).

The United Nations

The United Nations has a broad mandate to act against threats to international peace and security. The UN authorizes and leads peace operations and authorizes actions led by individual countries, coalitions as multinational forces (MNFs), and regional bodies in response to threats to international peace and security. Traditionally when the Security Council cited Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorized a mission to use “all necessary means” to implement its mandate, the resulting operations were referred to as “peace enforcement” missions, reflecting the charter’s language. The UN typically has not led these kinds of missions. By early 2006, the UN had increasingly taken on the leadership of many complex operations, however—most with Chapter VII mandates.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

As a collective defense organization, NATO is designed to intervene and can do so at the direction of its Member States. It has the capacity to organize and lead military interventions. NATO prefers, but does not require, a UN Security Council mandate to operate. This issue was raised regarding NATO’s actions during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia; the Alliance responded with air strikes after UN forces were attacked beginning in the fall of 1994. NATO members argued that such actions were within the authorization provided by UN resolutions on sanctions¹²¹ and resolutions establishing safe areas and a no-fly zone.¹²² NATO then deployed forces under the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), as part of the follow-on to the peace agreement reached at Dayton in 1995. NATO’s action in Kosovo in 1999, however, was taken without Council authorization, and remains controversial for that reason. NATO has since led operations in Afghanistan, where it assumed leadership of ISAF in 2003. It additionally provided training assistance to Iraqi forces and airlift and planning support to the AU mission in Darfur.

In April 1999, the NATO Strategic Concept was updated and approved to commit members of the Alliance to defend not just other members, but peace and stability in NATO’s region and periphery. Thus, the Strategic Concept provided for NATO to undertake military operations as “non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (CROs).” Peace support operations are within the CRO category and are intended to deal with complex emergencies. Such operations usually support the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The range of operations NATO will undertake

¹²¹ S/Res/713, 25 September 1991; S/Res/757, 30 May 1992; and S/Res/787, 16 November 1992.

¹²² S/Res/816, 31 March 1993; S/Res/836; 4 June 1993.

in this category includes peace enforcement, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and humanitarian relief.

The European Union

The EU has attempted to increase its military crisis response capacity, particularly since the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. According to the “Petersburg tasks” from the 1992 Western European Union Petersburg Declaration, the EU has authority to pursue a limited range of military tasks, including “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”¹²³ The 2003 European Security Strategy detailed a few more possible missions: “joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reform.”¹²⁴

The final Petersburg task, “crisis management, including peacemaking,” appears to give the EU broad authority to intervene using force. The language of this task, however, is vague and has been an item of considerable contention. Does “crisis management” include interventions to halt genocide or mass killing? The EU has no detailed strategy documents or official doctrine to answer this question. Given the difficulty of achieving agreement among EU Member States on the nature of future military activities, actions in the field may well precede an articulated military strategy. The EU may choose to improve its capacities before it identifies specific missions, including missions that view the protection of civilians as either an operational task or a specific goal. Continent-wide capacity building efforts are well underway, as dictated in a number of documents, such as the 1999 *EU Headline Goal* and 2004 *Headline Goal 2010*.

The African Union

While the AU Constitutive Act affirms the principle of non-interference by Member States in the internal affairs of others and bans the use or threat of force against other Member States, it makes a major exception for intervention “in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”¹²⁵ The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is to have “an operational structure”

¹²³ Western European Union Council of Ministers, *Petersburg Declaration* (Bonn: Western European Union Council of Ministers, 19 June 1992), 4, para. 2.

¹²⁴ Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (Brussels: European Union, 12 December 2003), <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. The *Strategy* is an important declaration of the EU’s broad strategic intent, but makes no mention of genocide, does not attempt to explain the Petersburg tasks, and does not indicate the nature of the missions towards which EU military capacity will be directed.

¹²⁵ African Union, *The Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Article 4, Principles (Lomé: African Union, 11 July 2000).

to implement its “decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction...”¹²⁶ It shall “anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity” and “recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments.” The PSC will also support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters.

The AU Policy Framework for establishing the African Standby Force (ASF), adopted by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in May 2003, sets forth six potential conflict scenarios of escalating intensity: *Scenario 1* (military advice to a political mission); *Scenario 2* (observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission); *Scenario 3* (stand alone AU observer mission); *Scenario 4* (regional peacekeeping force under Chapter VI); *Scenario 5* (AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission—low level spoilers); and *Scenario 6* (AU intervention, e.g., genocide situations where international community does not act promptly.)¹²⁷ *Scenario 6* is the only one in which the AU suggests an individual nation take the lead:

Based on the level of coherence required at the field HQ [headquarters] level for an intervention mission, particularly those involving an opposed early deployment, such operations are best conducted by a coalition under a lead nation.... As a long term goal, the ASF should be capable of conducting such interventions without reliance on lead nations. This would require a standing AU Multinational military HQ at above brigade level, plus the capability to assemble and deploy rapidly with prepared and capable military contingents.¹²⁸

Thus, the AU recognizes both its potential role in intervening against genocide and its current requirement to greatly expand its own capacities before it can conduct such missions.

In addition, the AU seeks to work with African regional groups to identify which missions will be conducted by whom, as well as the terms of reference and areas of responsibility for each regionally based brigade or equivalent force. The ASF is an extremely ambitious concept, and it should drive the

¹²⁶ African Union, *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (Durban: African Union, July 2002), 3. Specifically, its functions include peace support operations and intervention “pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act.”

¹²⁷ African Union, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)*, Adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (Addis Ababa: African Union, 15-16 May 2003), 3.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

development of standardized doctrine and procedures for forces, equipment lists, the recognition of capacity gaps, and policy standardization.

To meet the AU vision of African regional forces taking the lead in interventions to stop crimes against humanity and genocide on the continent, regional organizations will need to adopt frameworks and develop the means to make them a reality. African organizations will have to align with the AU Policy Framework or define the specific types of missions in which they will engage. Progress has been slow; ECOWAS has moved forward with its own arrangements, for example, as has the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa.¹²⁹ At the same, the AU framework contradicts the policies of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which is theoretically non-interventionist.¹³⁰

The Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States is composed of 15 Member States. Its security-related responsibilities were outlined in the 1999 *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*. The Mechanism seeks, among numerous objectives, to resolve internal and interstate conflicts, to strengthen conflict prevention, and to support the deployment of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions.

Authority to invoke the powers of the Mechanism lies primarily with the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council (MSC). The MSC, along with the Executive Secretary and the supporting elements of the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, and the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, the West African multilateral intervention force), applies the principles of the Mechanism at its discretion in the following situations:

- aggression or conflict in a Member State;
- conflict between Member States;
- internal conflict that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;
- serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law; and
- overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Mark Malan, *Developing the ECOWAS Civilian Peace Support Operations Structure*, Report of an Experts' Workshop convened at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana, 9-10 February 2006 (Accra, Ghana: KAIPTC, 23 February 2006), 7.

¹³⁰ Point made by Col. Festus Aboagye (ret.), interview with author, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, June 2004.

¹³¹ Economic Community of West African States, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security* (Lomé: ECOWAS, 10 December 1999), Chapter V.

A response to one of the above situations can be initiated by the MSC, a Member State, the Executive Secretary, the UN, or the African Union, and can take the form of a peacekeeping or observer mission. ECOWAS thus has authority to intervene with military forces in a range of scenarios, including those that require enforcement action. In addition, ECOWAS humanitarian assistance is an integral part of its Protocol. Accordingly, ECOWAS will “intervene to alleviate the suffering of the populations and restore life to normalcy in the event of crises, conflict and disaster.”¹³²

‘Coalitions of the Willing’

If a full-fledged intervention is launched to stop genocide, it might be led by a coalition of willing states, as opposed to any of the organizations listed above. By its very nature, such an *ad hoc* coalition would be “willing” to intervene and protect civilians. The legitimacy of a coalition’s actions, however, stands on much shakier ground without authorization from the UN or another relevant international body.¹³³ The capacity of such a coalition, obviously, will depend on which countries join the multinational force, just as it would for a force of a recognized multinational organization.

BASELINE CAPACITY TO ACT

These multinational organizations have the foundational basis and willingness to deploy forces, but what is known about their abilities to take action? What are their capabilities to plan, organize, and sustain an operation? Do they have the means to rapidly and effectively deploy forces in a Chapter VII mission? The following is a brief analysis of the basic capacities of the UN, NATO, the EU, the AU, and ECOWAS. The utility of *ad hoc* coalitions is also discussed.

The United Nations

To implement the recommendations of the Brahimi Report, the United Nations has made significant efforts to strengthen its in-house capacity to organize and manage peace operations, and to recruit and deploy skilled forces more rapidly and effectively.¹³⁴ Useful improvements include an increase in headquarters staff, including the establishment of a small UN standing police and rule of law capacity; the integration of civilian and military training into one office; the development of Strategic Deployment Stocks to increase effective deployments

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ *The Responsibility to Protect* opens up the idea that a force can act without Security Council authority, but such issues of legitimacy and legality are not addressed here in depth.

¹³⁴ The Brahimi Report, officially the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, offered specific recommendations to increase UN capacity for peace operations. For a review of the Panel’s recommendations and their status, see Durch, Holt et al., *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*.

and a refurbished UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy; and the creation of the DPKO Best Practices Section. The reforms were initially designed to help the UN organize and manage one new operation a year. Since 2003, however, the UN has set up five new peacekeeping missions, and substantially expanded a sixth operation. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, outlined the modern challenges facing UN peace operations in 2004:

Of the 17 current operations, five had yet to reach their mandated troop strength, and there were key gaps where the United Nations lacked critical enabling and niche capabilities, including in the maritime, helicopter, communications, and special forces fields. Rapid deployment of capable military forces was needed to help in the startup of new missions and to assist when existing missions were significantly challenged. The current United Nations standby arrangements did not provide for any such strategic reserve. The mere existence of such a capacity could deter spoilers in the first place, besides allowing for more certain risk management regarding the size of missions.¹³⁵

By 2005, the UN was managing an amazing level of personnel, equipment, and resources: 120,000 military and civilian police personnel, representing over 100 countries, rotated through UN missions in one year. Guéhenno reported that reforms were underway, but that the pace was intense as the UN chartered 319 aircraft and 52 ships, operated an aircraft fleet with 57 fixed-wing and 114 rotary-wing aircraft, and transported 580,000 passengers, while running 14 military hospitals and 120 clinics.¹³⁶

The UN continues to seek capable forces that can deploy rapidly and effectively and match the requirements of the mission upon arrival. In general, the UN cannot assume that the forces offered by Member States will have trained or operated together before arriving in an operation. There has been limited progress in regionally based training of brigades from troop contributing countries to provide the UN with more coherent forces for deployments. Despite its ability to draw on a variety of resources, the UN has yet to truly meet the Brahimi Report's recommended thirty to ninety day deployment goals for traditional and complex operations—goals that are intended to help establish operations faster and more effectively.¹³⁷ To improve the speed of deployment, the Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) aims to provide the UN

¹³⁵ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, presentation to the UN Fourth Committee, "Present-day Peacekeeping Demands Exceed Capacity of Any Single Organization," United Nations, 25 October 2004.

¹³⁶ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, "Opening Remarks of Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations," UN News Center, 31 January 2005.

¹³⁷ A recent exception is in Côte d'Ivoire, which went from having a UN political mission to a UN peace operation in 2004 with Nigerian forces already on the ground re-hatted for the UN force.

Secretariat with information about military resources that Member States are likely to offer for peace operations. While dozens of nations participate, only Jordan and Uruguay are listed at the most ready Rapid Deployment Level, having signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and agreed to deploy within an established timeframe. DPKO regularly calls on Member States to provide more enabling units, a linchpin for peace operations.

Further, DPKO requirements for effective deployment are shifting with the needs of more challenging, robust UN operations. One US military instructor of peace operations summed up the problem:

What do you do when you tell a soldier on patrol to protect a victim of crime, and he doesn't know what to do? At the UN things are changing—they are saying, 'forget infantry battalions, we want to know who's got helicopter gunships, APCs, artillery.' In order to do it right they'd need intelligence, satellites, unmanned vehicles; the UN isn't going to put blue helmets in the field if they can't protect them.¹³⁸

When UN mandates explicitly direct peacekeepers to protect civilians, this requirement adds a potential deterrent for troop contributors: some countries are not eager to provide contingents for missions beyond traditional peacekeeping in permissive environments.¹³⁹ While changing, the culture of UN operations usually presumes a relatively benign environment. Mandates to protect civilians may mean that national contingents are called on to use force and engage in potentially dangerous activities. Countries are reluctant to put their personnel in harm's way. Many countries have national guidelines that determine the conditions under which they provide forces to lead or participate in operations. Nations such as Japan are constrained from providing troops to *any* Chapter VII operation; other national contingents are prohibited from using force beyond self-defense, which affects their role in operations. While some countries take national pride in their military role in peace operations and have been consistent contributors to UN operations, mandating peacekeepers to protect civilian lives risks dissuading potential troop contributing countries from offering personnel.¹⁴⁰

In the last decade, developed countries have reduced their military contributions to UN peacekeeping. The top troop contributors to UN-led operations are

¹³⁸ US Naval Captain (retired), lawyer, and instructor on military and peace operations, interview with author, May 2004.

¹³⁹ When a developed state such as the UK takes the lead, other countries may be more willing to offer troops.

¹⁴⁰ Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-First Century* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004). Some countries have cultural norms that embrace their national military involvement in peace operations.

developing nations, with Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, and Nepal supplying the most peacekeepers as of March 2006.¹⁴¹ Many of these countries, however, are willing and have deployed to tough missions, such as in the DRC, reflecting the fact that the UN will go where the Council sends it with the forces Member States provide it.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO has conducted a number of peace support operations since the end of the Cold War. These have included the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, and ISAF in Afghanistan. NATO has also offered training to the Iraqi military since August 2004.

In recent years, NATO has significantly expanded its membership and embarked on ambitious attempts at military transformation. Following its 2002 summit in Prague, NATO eliminated the post of Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and replaced it with a new head of Allied Command, Transformation, in charge of directing the transformation of alliance forces to meet evolving operational demands. The Alliance accepted seven new members in March 2004, bringing its total to twenty-six and asserted, in its 2004 Istanbul summit, that “the door to membership remains open.”¹⁴²

The newly operational NATO Response Force (NRF) represents the most high-profile result of NATO’s efforts at transformation. It consists of 25,000 rapidly available, self-sustaining troops, deployable anywhere in the world within five days. The NRF includes air, land, and maritime components; it will reach full operational strength in October 2006. During its short history it has already deployed to two crisis response missions: providing relief for the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in September 2005, and for those of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

As a highly mobile, self-sustaining rapid reaction force, the NRF appears uniquely prepared to respond to a fast moving genocide, such as occurred in Rwanda in 1994. According to NATO, possible NRF missions include everything from non-combatant evacuation to operations, including humanitarian and crisis response, peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and embargo

¹⁴¹ UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations,” 31 March 2006, www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/march_2.pdf. There are varied reasons for this shift, including reticence to serve under UN command and military and peacekeeping commitments tying up forces elsewhere. National decisions also depend on funding, political leadership, and the perception of the last mission. Since Somalia, for example, the US has had a general aversion to US troops serving in UN-led operations.

¹⁴² NATO, *Istanbul Reader’s Guide* (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 2004), 9.

operations.¹⁴³ There is room within this spectrum for forceful intervention to stop a genocide or mass killing, specifically as peace enforcement in a hostile environment.

The European Union

The EU has progressively taken larger steps towards developing its multilateral military capacity. One important driver of change has been the deployment of real world missions under the EU flag. The EU began in 2003 with Operation Concordia, a preventive military deployment of 350 troops in Macedonia, and can now also boast of having fielded missions in the DRC, Bosnia, and elsewhere. The EU Institute for Security Studies counts twelve EU missions altogether, although only a handful of these represent deployments of any significant size (Operation Artemis in the DRC and Operation Althea in Bosnia, for example); many more were exclusively civilian deployments (e.g., Operation Proxima in Macedonia and the EU Police Mission in Bosnia).¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the most impressive EU mission thus far, Operation Artemis in the DRC, was a French-led coalition in almost every meaningful respect—except its name. France provided the operational headquarters and most of the military personnel, including the operation commander and the force commander.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the EU has offered substantial military assistance in a number of the world’s key hotspots and may, in fact, be generating new multilateral capacity simply by so acting.

The EU is also engaging in a broad effort to expand and coordinate its constituent nations’ military capabilities. The EU Headline Goals laid out capability targets, but these have not resulted in any significant increase in national military funding. One large-scale initiative is the EU’s proposed 60,000-strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which was targeted to be fully operational by 2003. In practical terms, however, the development of the RRF may have been postponed as states pursued the newer Battlegroups concept, first proposed by the UK and France in 2003 and adopted by the EU in June 2004 as part of Headline Goal 2010. The concept envisions the development of eleven multinational EU Battlegroups, or roughly 1,500-troop strong, self-sustaining, rapidly deployable crisis response battalions that could arrive on the ground outside Europe within ten days. These Battlegroups are provided for six month periods by EU Member States. As of February 2006, one EU Battlegroup was

¹⁴³ NATO, “Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats,” NATO Briefing, December 2004, 9, www.nato.int/docu/briefing/capabilities/html_en/capabilities09.html.

¹⁴⁴ Giovanni Grevi, Dov Lynch, and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ Catriona Mace, “Operation Artemis: Mission Improbable?” *European Security Review*, no. 18, International Security Information Service, Europe, July 2003.

reported to be operational, with the expectation that there will be two fully operational Battlegroups in place by January 2007.

The Battlegroups concept appears to mirror the force structure and size of Operation Artemis, a mission that had clear protection goals. Although never explicitly linked to civilian protection by the EU, the ability to respond quickly to an emerging crisis has been critical to efforts to protect civilian populations in the past. In addition, the UN has welcomed the development of the Battlegroups as either “Bridging Forces” (to help DPKO as it prepares a new mission or as it expands an existing one) or as “Over the Horizon Reserve Forces” (to respond under a UN mandate to contingencies beyond the capacity of the UN itself).¹⁴⁶ Both types of missions could potentially help stem a rapid spread of violence against civilians, a situation to which the slower moving UN would be less prepared to respond appropriately.

The European Defense Agency (EDA) helps Member States improve their military capacity in a coherent manner, with a continent-wide vision in mind. As EU defense budgets remain mostly static, the EDA effort is focused on improving efficiency rather than pursuing any significant expansion of capacity. It seeks to help improve the interoperability of forces, to change procurement patterns (so that fewer “logistics tails” are needed when equipment from multiple militaries is used in the same mission), to avoid an overlap in force capacities, to specialize according to comparative advantage, to develop niche capabilities, to augment much needed strategic lift capabilities, and to lower the percentage of conscripts in military ranks. The EU remains, however, a relatively small-time military player on the world stage in proportion to its economic might. Recent developments may reflect the emergence of new EU capacity or simply the reorganization of what is already there.

The African Union

The AU moved beyond declarations when its Peace and Security Council entered into force in December 2003. The PSC incorporates operational components, including a Continental Early Warning System and an African Standby Force.¹⁴⁷ The ASF is to be the means of intervention, with multidisciplinary civilian and military components on-call from their own countries and ready for rapid deployment. With troop contingents provided by Member States, the ASF will have the capacity to engage in a range of mission types, from observation, to peace support, to interventions in response to genocide. Cooperation with the UN and its agencies is encouraged, but the

¹⁴⁶ United Nations, “Non-paper: Employment of EU Battle Groups Concept in Support of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” internal UN document, 4 June 2004.

¹⁴⁷ African Union, *Protocol*, Article 2.

Security Council's authorization is not required. The chain of command for the ASF will be through the Chairperson, the African Union Commission's appointment of a Special Representative, and a Force Commander.¹⁴⁸ Member States are expected to rapidly provide well-equipped contingents as well as "all forms of assistance and support" to their troops once deployed. The AU also plans to support the ASF to undertake "humanitarian activities" and to establish regional mechanisms in the form of five regional peacekeeping brigades.¹⁴⁹

The African Union, however, recognizes its dependence on support from the United Nations:

Where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union's activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁵⁰

This relationship is fundamental, since the AU has neither its own forces nor troops on-call prepared to deploy rapidly and effectively. The AU also lacks sufficient headquarters management and planning capacity (there are few military personnel on the Commission staff), logistics and enabling units, airlift, ground transportation, a mobile communications system, and teams of AU civilian experts and advisors that can deploy to the mission on short notice. "No country can self-deploy easily in Africa, except South Africa," reported a former Ghanaian military officer with AU experience, "It is not an unwillingness to go; its just that there is no capacity to send in troops and sustain them."¹⁵¹

The AU Commission, in its development of the ASF, is expected to collaborate with the UN Secretariat to assist in coordinating external support for its capacity-building in support of ASF training, logistics, equipment, communications, and funding.¹⁵² The AU has declared that the ASF will be operational by 2010, with some regional capacity in place earlier. With the exception of ECOWAS, few regional groups currently have the capacity to organize such stand-by forces. Most regional organizations in Africa were started for economic purposes; those with peace and security mandates are just beginning to develop capacity, beyond diplomatic and early warning

¹⁴⁸ A military staff committee will also be established to advise the Peace and Security Council.

¹⁴⁹ African Union, *Protocol*, Article 15.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 17.

¹⁵¹ Senior staff (and retired Ghanaian military) officer, interview with author, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, June 2004.

¹⁵² This is both a practical approach and one suggested in the AU *Protocol*, Article 13, African Standby Force.

functions.¹⁵³ Progress is underway in eastern Africa, where the development of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) offers a regionally-based force. The Southern Africa Development Community may also move toward a more robust military capacity, part of a contribution to the ASF.

Increasing international attention is focused on providing support to the ASF and enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. Capacity building for African-led peace operations has developed quickly through partnerships with the African Union in support of AMIS in Darfur, with major initiatives by the European Union, via the G-8 Africa Action Plan, and by bilateral initiatives.

The Economic Community of West African States

In the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol, the organization expressed its aim to deploy peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions, including missions to intervene in humanitarian crises and threats equivalent to genocide. In part, however, the Protocol established a formal policy that reflected much of its operational reality for over a decade. ECOWAS deployed to Liberia in 1990 and remained embroiled in the civil war until its withdrawal in 1997. The organization also sent forces to Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998), Côte d'Ivoire (2002), and, once again, to Liberia (2003).

In addition to its frequent deployments since the 1990s, ECOWAS is developing the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). In 2004, the Defense and Security Commission approved the ESF concept, calling for a regionally based 6,500-strong force, made up of a 1,500-strong military “task force” and a 5,000-troop brigade. Plans call for the ESF to be able to deploy 1,500 troops within 30 days, to be followed by the remaining 5,000 troops within 90 days.¹⁵⁴ The ESF represents part of the continent-wide plans for the African Standby Force, although ECOWAS is moving forward without doctrine and training guidance from the African Union. Development of the ESF remains in the early stages, with funding and logistics posing challenges for the organization. A Peace Fund, established to finance the strengthening of ECOWAS capacity through contributions by Member States, remains largely unfunded. With focus and partner support, however, ECOWAS may yet meet its goal of having the ability to deploy and manage an effective complex peace support operation by 2010, coinciding with the ASF goals.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Including IGAD, SADC, the Economic Community of Central African States, the East African Community, the Arab-Maghreb Union, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

¹⁵⁴ Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan, *African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2005), 25.

¹⁵⁵ A 2005 workshop with ECOWAS leadership suggests this focus. Malan, *Developing the ECOWAS Civilian Peace Support Operations Structure*, 24.

‘Coalitions of the Willing’

Coalitions also offer an option for countries to come together to use force. In comparison to multinational organizations such groupings have operational advantages and disadvantages.¹⁵⁶ In coalitions, nations commit to a particular mission, which can enhance the achievement of common goals and help to organize specific forces and support to accomplish the mission. This approach may increase unity of effort and reduce varied interpretations of mandate goals. Coalitions are usually led by a single, powerful country, which may provide more straightforward command and control arrangements than multinational organizations, in addition to increasing the commitment of military and civilian leadership and resources from the lead nation. In the long run, coalitions may have fewer costs, as they disband once the mission is completed.

Without a formal organizational structure, however, coalition forces are likely to face basic challenges in interoperability. Many factors need melding: equipment, training, doctrine, and communications systems, as well as leadership style and interpretations of rules of engagement. Militaries in a coalition typically will not have trained together prior to deployment. States may pull out of a coalition if

Coalitions may be useful for short-term, urgent operations with specific goals.

their political circumstances change at home or the situation on the ground is more difficult than expected. They also may lack the legitimacy provided by participating in a mission led and authorized by a recognized multinational organization. Coalitions might suffer

from higher costs without an institutional structure and face less coherent political decision-making if the situation changes abruptly.

Coalitions may be useful for short-term, urgent operations with specific goals. Because intervening to stop genocide and mass killing might require a rapid, short-term, large-scale response, and the robust use of force, coalitions are a likely and suitable approach. To achieve success, however, the coalition would need to be able to work in concert with other international efforts and hand leadership of follow-on peacekeeping responsibilities to a capable organization once the immediate crisis is resolved.

WHAT IS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO ACT AND PROTECT?

Any peacekeeping mission or intervention force can face major operational issues. Before deployment, for example, missions require authorization and

¹⁵⁶ William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, *Who Should Keep the Peace? Providing Security for Twenty-first Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming), 62.

commitments for the provision of effective troops and personnel. Multinational operations may operate with limited logistical, planning, leadership, and rapid reaction capabilities. Analytic and intelligence data, communications systems, and public information are also important to mission success.

A large and thoughtful body of scholarly literature is written on *when* to intervene—and the legal, political, and normative implications of humanitarian intervention. Other studies have considered the broad capacities needed for any deployment of forces in peace and stability operations, presuming that capable forces are likely to be better at protecting civilians. There are relatively few practical, detailed analyses of *how* third-party intervention forces can best protect civilians caught in conflict; specific operational requirements are thus largely missing from the literature. Likewise, as discussed in subsequent chapters, there is a limited body of analysis considering such protection missions by military actors. What might a force designed to stop mass killing *look* like?

The ICISS report looked briefly at this question. It pointed out broad requirements for a successful intervention: a strong coalition with substantial political resolve; a unified military approach; and unified operational objectives. Effective interventions also need

There are relatively few practical, detailed analyses of how third-party intervention forces can protect civilians caught in conflict.

clear and appropriate mandates, sufficient resources, a strong command structure, effective civil-military relations (including a recognition that military actions might undercut the distribution of humanitarian aid in the short term), the appropriate use of force (so as to save as many lives as possible and avoid alienating the local population), a willingness to incur casualties, and an effective public information campaign.¹⁵⁷ Forces need to be mindful that, in almost all cases, they will transition to peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. To avoid creating a hostile local populace they should, for example, avoid using overwhelming force or excessive targeting of national infrastructure.

The ICISS recognizes that the protection of civilians remains important after a mass killing is abated. It points to key “protection tasks” in the post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding phase, after an initial intervention force has established security. These include the protection of minorities; security sector reform (including the effective deployment of civilian police); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (including, potentially, coercive disarmament); de-mining; and the pursuit and arrest of war criminals. The Commission

¹⁵⁷ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, 58-64.

concludes that these operational issues need increased attention and that the Secretary-General should develop new doctrine to address them.¹⁵⁸

Scholars who think about operations to prevent or stop genocide often start with the presumption of an effective military capacity capable of controlling the environment.¹⁵⁹ Micah Zenko, for example, notes the advantages of using robust, rapidly deployable forces to end genocide or mass violence in its earliest stages; and the need to move beyond the traditional components of peacekeeping (consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force)—and in some cases defeat a declared enemy.¹⁶⁰ Some analysts have offered views on how to structure missions to halt mass killing and to determine capacity requirements. Alan Kuperman focuses on the *limits* of humanitarian intervention primarily because “the killers” move so much faster than “the interveners,” and most civilians could be dead before help arrives.¹⁶¹ He thus emphasizes early warning and recommends the use of light, rapidly deployable forces. Michael O’Hanlon offers three main steps to gain control over a country experiencing extreme violence. First, intervening forces must “establish lodgments,” and ensure their ability to defend themselves. Second, forces must establish strongholds in key population centers and seize key facilities to gain general control over the territory. Finally, they must pursue any residual elements of resistance and establish security in smaller cities and towns.¹⁶² O’Hanlon is cognizant of the dangers of insurgency and argues that significant military resources and long-term deployment may be necessary.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 65-67.

¹⁵⁹ Michael O’Hanlon, *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003); Michèle Flournoy, Julianne Smith, Guy Ben-Ari, Kathleen McInnis, and David Scruggs, *European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategies and Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 October 2005); Patricia Taft with Jason Ladnier, *Realizing ‘Never Again’: Regional Capacities to Protect Civilians in Violent Conflicts* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, January 2006); Colonel Scott R. Feil, *Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans? Early Intervention Reconsidered*, ISD Report, Vol. 3, no. 2 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, April 1997); Kristiana Powell, *Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect: The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime*, Monograph Number 119 (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, May 2005); Mike Denning, “A Prayer for Marie? Creating an Effective African Standby Force,” *Parameters* 34, no. 4, (2004/2005); Paul D. Williams, “Military Response to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” *International Peacekeeping*, Volume 13, No. 2, June 2006, 168-183; Major Brent Beardsley, “Lessons Learned or Not Learned From the Rwandan Genocide,” 7th Annual Graduate Student Symposium, Royal Military College of Canada, 29-30 October 2004; Michael O’Hanlon and Peter Singer, “The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity,” *Survival* 46, no. 1 (Spring 2004).

¹⁶⁰ Zenko, “Saving Lives with Speed: Using Rapidly Deployable Forces for Genocide Prevention,” 3-19.

¹⁶¹ Kuperman, “Humanitarian Hazard,” 64.

¹⁶² O’Hanlon, *Saving Lives with Force*, 18.

Two writers with defense experience, Cliff Bernath and David Gompert, suggest that new technology might reduce the force requirements for forcible humanitarian intervention.¹⁶³ They argue that “net-centric warfare,” developed by the US primarily to fight terrorism, might be useful during humanitarian interventions. They suggest that small, mobile groups of highly trained soldiers can use aerial surveillance, satellite and human intelligence, and satellite-linked communications networks effectively to support an intervention at minimal expense—and thereby reduce political concern about large-scale troop deployments. Troops could track and predict the movement of “killing forces” and arrive in civilian population centers *before* those forces attack. In the event of a fast-moving genocide like in Rwanda, light net-centric forces could fly into theater faster than traditional forces. As a result, Bernath and Gompert believe new military technology may decrease the military requirements, and hence the necessary political will, for such successful military interventions.

William O’Neill, an international lawyer and human rights expert, examines current practice in peace operations and how troops have embraced their new protection-oriented tasks.¹⁶⁴ He details encouraging trends, finding that peacekeepers have begun to embrace more readily cooperation with humanitarian organizations, to promote the rights of IDPs, to conduct preventive patrols and to offer physical protection to civilians threatened by violence. For the most part, O’Neill does not try to design an intervention force *per se*, focusing instead on activities that peacekeeping missions can take to protect civilians across a range of threats.

The ICISS and these various studies are part of a valuable literature on aspects of the operational issues involved in the use of coercive protection missions for stopping violence against civilians. This literature, however, is only a start. Most studies do not offer details on what a potential mission looks like or its force requirements, or the preparation required for such operations. That job thus remains in the hands of today’s practitioners, namely national militaries, civilian leaders, and multinational organizations.

Key Themes

Many experts judge readiness to stop mass violence by the ability to deploy forces in sufficient numbers quickly and effectively. (In Rwanda, 800,000 civilians were killed in 100 days.) To augment their responsive capabilities,

¹⁶³ Clifford H. Bernath and David C. Gompert, “*The Power to Protect*”: *Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings* (Washington, DC: Refugees International, July 2003). Gompert et. al., *Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing*.

¹⁶⁴ O’Neill, *A New Challenge for Peacekeepers*; O’Neill and Cassis, *Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced*.

multinational organizations and national militaries are increasing the speed at which they can get troops into regions of instability. As noted above, the EU is developing 1,500-troop strong Battlegroups of highly mobile forces that can deploy to crisis regions outside Europe within ten days, as needed.¹⁶⁵ The goals of other organizations are more modest. The UN target of deployment within thirty to ninety days would still be too late to prevent a large-scale campaign of violence or genocide. The AU and ECOWAS also strive to move quickly, but often rely on outside partners for lift and logistics support. Of the world's militaries, the US, UK, France, and NATO are the most capable of deploying rapidly, with sufficient logistics support and planning capacity to intervene, and presumably, to halt a quickly spreading, large-scale genocide in a country of any great size. Other nations have been willing to move quickly, however, especially if given support.

Some argue that the international community would need to deploy upwards of 100,000 well-trained and well-equipped troops to the DRC and 50,000 to Darfur to halt ongoing mass killings in those two countries alone.¹⁶⁶ Others contest that the number of troops necessary to protect civilians effectively is exaggerated, perhaps to mask a lack of political will. For example, General Roméo Dallaire has argued that expanding UNAMIR's force level to 5,000 could have halted the Rwandan genocide. Others are skeptical that such few troops could have made a significant difference.¹⁶⁷

Military force levels alone can be misleading, since militaries are organized with assumptions about troop readiness and training. (Force-sizing is an area of study itself.) For every US soldier in the field, for example, one soldier is expected to be returning from a mission to retrain and another is preparing to deploy. But few active militaries have sustained this three-to-one ratio; Ghana and the US are both reportedly overworked at two-to-one ratios.¹⁶⁸ Thus, even when there is political and institutional will, certain kinds of forces might not be available. Limits on troop availability may result in tradeoffs between sending personnel to one mission and training them for another.

Another question is whether militaries can accurately inform political leaders of the capacity requirements for effectively protecting civilians in various circumstances. Political skepticism regarding humanitarian interventions might be fed by a military skepticism regarding the potential for success in such

¹⁶⁵ The US 82nd Airborne Division, in comparison, can be anywhere in the world in three days.

¹⁶⁶ O'Hanlon and Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation," 81; Bradford Plumer, "Do Something...But What?" *Mother Jones*, 4 May 2005.

¹⁶⁷ O'Hanlon and Singer, "The Humanitarian Transformation."

¹⁶⁸ France also attempts to maintain this three-to-one ratio, which is one reason why it limits its deployments.

missions, given limited resources—a problem compounded by the lack of proper studies or evaluations of the operational implications of such missions.

Generally, even with ambitions to conduct more effective operations, multinational organizations face a global shortage of skilled troops available for peace and stability operations.¹⁶⁹ These organizations depend on the strength of the national contingents supplied by their members to succeed. UN operations routinely face delays in recruiting troops to meet authorized force levels. European military spending and force structure have not kept pace with the expansion of peacekeeping demands, and the US military has focused on warfighting and counterinsurgency. Increases in headquarters and operational capacity within regional organizations do not match their ambitions—yet. Nor have sufficient forces always filled the slots for coalition missions such as ISAF and AMIS. Moreover, many troops may not be prepared for robust activities involving civilian protection. With the modern shift toward “complex” UN peace operations, there is an important emphasis on militaries honing skills to support development, reconstruction, and long-term peacebuilding tasks. While these skills are needed for many peace operations, more traditional combat skills are also needed for missions involving the use of force to protect civilians.

Additional capacity questions include the availability of moving parts, such as transportation and logistics, areas often lacking in multinational organizations. The AU Mission in Sudan, for example, relies heavily on outside funding and such support from the EU, European countries, Canada, and the United States, among others. Without major assistance, even AMIS’ halting deployment would have been impossible. For other organizations, such as the EU, the interoperability and efficiency of multinational forces remain serious concerns. EU Member States have historically procured military equipment from different sources to meet their national needs. As a result, the equipment available to the EU as a whole is duplicative, and this often results in inefficiencies. This is one reason why, despite the high number of total troops in its Member State militaries, the EU is still a relative military lightweight.

For the protection of civilians, therefore, the questions of tasks and strategy may make a greater difference in determining force requirements and evaluating success. If missions aim to provide physical protection to civilians with military force, then those operations *may* require large or highly mobile forces to protect

¹⁶⁹ For enumerations of such ambitions see *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002) and European Union, “Security Strategy.” For troop shortfalls, see O’Hanlon, *Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention*.

individuals dispersed over large, ill-defined areas.¹⁷⁰ An operation with too few forces could limit assistance to civilians outside specifically identifiable areas—a camp, for example—or exclude those in a neighboring town. Such limits were apparent in MONUC in the eastern DRC in 2003, which is one reason that the EU approved deployment of a French-led force to provide protection in a

A baseline capacity is central to a successful intervention, but the force structure alone does not provide for coercive protection.

specific, highly volatile region where MONUC capacity was insufficient. Alternately, if the threat to civilians does not come from general lawlessness and numerous roving militias operating over vast areas, fewer forces might be sufficient. In some cases, defeating a single group

of poorly trained and equipped militia might serve to end genocide—indeed, this may have been the case in Rwanda. The nature of the specific situation at hand and, therefore, the resulting strategy, likely determine the number and type of troops necessary for effective civilian protection.

Is There Sufficient Capacity to Protect?

This broad overview of international operational capacity has highlighted the five organizations that have authority, and some capacity, to deploy military missions and to act to protect civilians from violence. Are they prepared to intervene against violence as suggested by *The Responsibility to Protect*, however? The UN, NATO, the EU, the AU, and ECOWAS generally are organized to take on peace support operations and/or military interventions. They have the components of presumed capacity: the authority to act; a capacity to organize and deploy military personnel; and some foundational basis to support missions in which the protection of civilians is a component of a peace operation or the goal of an intervening force. Without agreement on the force structure needed for such missions, it is best to judge these groups as somewhat capable, depending on the requirements of the operation.

Many recommendations to increase capacity are not unlike those for any successful military operation enabled to use force. This suggests that while a baseline capacity is central to a successful intervention, the force structure alone does not provide the full operational picture for coercive protection. When militaries prepare for their roles, they use key tools—rules of engagement, mandates, doctrine, and training—to get ready for their anticipated missions. What is the state of these tools, and what does that tell us about the preparedness

¹⁷⁰ The protection of IDP camps in Darfur, for example, requires covering an extensive area with poor roads, few airports, villages that are not all identified on maps, and little local capacity to sustain deployed forces.

of forces today and about how to prepare them for missions in the future? As O'Neill suggests, recent years have witnessed a marked effort within multinational organizations to improve their capacity to deploy forces effectively.¹⁷¹ How do these groups—the UN, NATO, the EU, the AU, and ECOWAS—and their members measure up in the use of these tools to prepare forces for operations aimed at interrupting genocide or leading peace operations with coercive protection elements? This study now turns to those specific areas of military preparation and their treatment of the protection of civilians, a way of understanding what current troops serving in multinational operations or with intervention forces may have as guidance.

¹⁷¹ O'Neill, *A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally Displaced*.