



THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER

POST-CONFLICT BORDERS AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS

**PART 1: BORDER SECURITY, TRADE CONTROLS,
AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS**
BY KATHLEEN A. WALSH

**PART 2: A PHASED APPROACH TO POST-CONFLICT
BORDER SECURITY**
BY KATHERINE N. ANDREWS, BRANDON L. HUNT,
AND WILLIAM J. DURCH

REPORT FROM THE PROJECT ON RULE OF LAW IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS
FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM

AUGUST 2007

STIMSON CENTER REPORT NO. 62

Copyright © 2007
The Henry L. Stimson Center
1111 19th Street, NW
12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036

Telephone: 202-223-5956
Fax: 202-223-9604

www.stimson.org
Email: info@stimson.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments.....	iv
Preface.....	v
Executive Summary	viii
PART 1	
BORDER SECURITY, TRADE CONTROLS, AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS.....	1
<i>Kathleen A. Walsh</i>	
The Challenge of Post-Conflict Border Security	1
International Initiatives to Enhance Border Security: Survey Results.....	5
Findings on Key Issues: Stakeholders, Legal Authorities, Logistics, Training, and Technology	7
Conclusions and Recommended Next Steps.....	20
Annex 1: Methodological Note.....	22
Annex 2: A Survey of International Border Assistance Initiatives.....	24
PART 2	
A PHASED APPROACH TO POST-CONFLICT BORDER SECURITY.....	27
<i>Katherine N. Andrews, Brandon L. Hunt, and William J. Durch</i>	
Border Security in the International Sphere.....	28
Phases of Border Management with International Involvement.....	30
Financial Considerations.....	46
Conclusion	49
Annex: Technology Package Implementation and Sample Technology Costs.....	50
Select Bibliography.....	56
About the Authors.....	59

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Compton Foundation, and the continuing confidence of Stimson's president, Ellen Laipson, and its chief operating officer, Cheryl Ramp.

Kathleen Walsh deserves primary thanks for serving as a consultant to the Stimson Center on part one of this study, for creating the Working Group on Border Security and Trade Controls that met at the Henry L. Stimson Center in April 2005, and for providing a detailed conceptual guideline for part two. We also are deeply grateful to those who contributed their expertise to the Working Group. We thank Dara Francis, who served as its rapporteur, and Joshua Shifrinson, who offered highly capable assistance to Walsh on part one. Patrick Thomas, Michael Beck, Timothy Cornett, and David Davis were kind enough to take the time to comment on drafts of one or both parts of the study.

The support of our colleagues in the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations Program was indispensable throughout this process. We also thank Jane Dorsey and Marvin Lim for their assistance in turning our work into a finished product. All errors and omissions, of course, remain the responsibility of the authors alone. The views expressed in this document do not represent either the views or the policies of the US Naval War College or of the United States Government.

PREFACE

Since 2001, the Henry L. Stimson Center’s program on the Future of Peace Operations (FOPO) has worked to promote sensible US policy toward and greater UN effectiveness in the conduct of peace operations—internationally-mandated efforts that engage military, police, and other resources in support of transitions from war to peace in states and territories around the globe. Such places suffer from many deficits—in education, health, jobs, and infrastructure—but the greatest and most costly, in the long run, is their deficit in the rule of law and its impact on quality of governance, justice, and other goals of international security and aid institutions that want to promote sustainable peace and development. There is, however, no agreed definition of the term. For purposes of this and other reports in FOPO’s series on restoring post-conflict rule of law, we therefore choose to use the relatively comprehensive definition contained in the UN Secretary-General’s August 2004 report on rule of law and transitional justice. It defines rule of law as,

a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to the laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.¹

Promoting and sustaining the rule of law in war-torn lands requires a multi-dimensional approach that extends beyond the reform and restructuring of local police, judicial, and corrections institutions to:

- Early provision of public security by the international community while local security forces are reformed and rebuilt.
- International support for effective border controls, both to curtail illicit trade and to promote legitimate commerce and government customs revenues.
- Curtailment of regional smuggling rings and spoiler networks that traffic in people and commodities to finance war and, afterwards, to sustain war-time political and economic power structures.
- Strict legal accountability for those who participate in peace operations, lest their actions reinforce the very cynicism and resignation with regard to impunity that their work is intended to reverse; and
- Recognition that corruption can drain the utility from any assistance program and undermine the legitimacy of post-war governments in the eyes of their peoples.

¹ United Nations Secretary-General, *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004, para. 2.

This two-part study is one of five produced by FOPO, each addressed to one of the bullets above. *Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations* is based on the premise that building post-conflict states' capacity to control their borders reinforces broader peacebuilding efforts by restricting the activities of non-state peace "spoilers," strengthening state legitimacy, and facilitating trade and commerce. Too often, however, border security is undervalued as a component of peacebuilding, a problem this study aims to remedy with its recommendations for effective integration of border management initiatives into peace operations. For part one of this study author Kathleen A. Walsh surveyed more than 100 international border assistance and training programs. Her report, "Border Security, Trade Controls, and UN Peace Operations," found both a great deal of overlap and lack of coordination among these programs that, if remedied, could make them much more cost-effective. The second part of the study, "A Phased Approach to Post-Conflict Border Security," by Katherine N. Andrews, Brandon L. Hunt, and William J. Durch, lays out the requirements for coordinated international support to border security in post-conflict states that host international peace operations.

This study and the other four described briefly, below, can be accessed online from the FOPO homepage on the Stimson Center website (www.stimson.org/fopo/programhome.cfm).

Police. The international community's ability to provide early and effective support for public security in new peace operations has fallen consistently short over the past decade, and in many respects continues to do so. This study investigates the sources of the problem and the evolution of UN policing in size, scope, and key operational tasks and concludes that future demand for rapidly-deployable UN police can best be met with a standing UN police service and complementary police reserve force. The study is, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations*, by Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch.

Spoiler Networks. During and after conflict, the smuggling of high-value commodities such as diamonds, precious metals, and timber sustains war and then impedes peace, feeding the informal economy, evading customs, lowering government revenues and slowing its institutional recovery. The UN Security Council has imposed targeted sanctions on some countries in an effort to disrupt such "spoiler" networks. It has also appointed small teams of investigators to monitor sanctions implementation, shed critical light on these networks, recommend measures to counter them, and thus contribute to building the rule of law. These Groups or Panels of Experts face challenges, however, both in the field and in getting the Security Council and UN member states to implement their many practical recommendations. This FOPO study details these issues, highlights how implementing Panel recommendations could improve post-conflict rule of law, and makes its own recommendations about how the Panels could be better used. The study is, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts*, by Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt.

Accountability. In 2004, major problems of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and other operations became a public scandal for the United Nations. Before that story broke, FOPO had begun work on the problem of criminal accountability for personnel in peace operations. Because states retain disciplinary responsibility for their military forces in peace operations, that work focused on police and civilian personnel. As operations become more deeply involved in assisting or substituting for local government, their personnel must themselves be subject to the rule of law, and be seen as subject to it by local

peoples. FOPO found, however, that the tenuous reach of the law—any law—covering criminal acts by UN personnel on mission has left a legal and procedural vacuum filled only in part by administrative sanctions (docking of pay; job loss, blacklisting, etc.). FOPO therefore looked into the cost and feasibility of other options, some of which would require serious rethinking of criminal jurisdiction in and for peace operations. The study is, *Improving Criminal Accountability for Police and Civilian Personnel in UN Peace Operations*, by Katherine N. Andrews, William J. Durch, and Matthew C. Weed.

Corruption. As a contribution to the many efforts to contain and reduce pervasive corruption in post-conflict settings, FOPO reviewed what the world’s specialists in corruption say about how to recognize and fight it in post-conflict circumstances, especially where international peace operations are deployed. The resulting study, a meta-analysis of the English-language literature on the subject, reflects a search for consensus and insight rather than independent field research. Its principal contributions lie in its structured summaries of the literature surveyed and in how it uses that structured assessment to visualize both the patterns of post-conflict corruption and emerging best practices in fighting it. The study is, *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States*, by Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry.

All of these studies recognize that the United Nations cannot immediately “create” the rule of law in countries where it does not exist, or transform recalcitrant and abusive police into model protectors of the public trust in a few short months. Such efforts take time. Moreover, even well-equipped peacekeepers will have difficulty totally securing hundreds of miles of border in unfamiliar and rugged terrain against smuggling or spoilers, nor is it likely that the best-coordinated international efforts can completely eradicate corruption in post-conflict circumstances. The UN and its partners can, however, provide critical assistance, guidance, and support, on all of these issues, step by step, to fragile governments attempting to develop the capacity and legitimacy to effectively govern on behalf of their peoples. In short, the United Nations, its member states, and other international institutions and aid donors can help fragile states begin the rocky journey towards self-sustaining peace, good governance, and stable economic livelihoods. The common foundation on which such institutions and outcomes must be built is respect for and deference to the rule of law.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations examines current gaps in and new opportunities for improving UN peace operations' approach to border security in their mission areas, supporting higher priority for border management in future peace operations mandates and recommending better coordination in border and customs assistance programs.

This study is in two parts: part one stresses that planning for UN operations continues to underappreciate the need to address total border management in peacekeeping mandates. Part one outlines the key issues, surveys global border security and customs/export control assistance programs, addresses training needs, and outlines critical challenges ahead for efforts to improve border management in post-conflict environments and in particular, those where UN peace operations have the job of keeping the peace ad interim. Although some current operations patrol the borders of their host state, only the operations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste went beyond basic security to assist post-conflict states in collecting revenue from duties on cross-border trade—a key early source of self-funding for such states.

Part one's survey of international border security-related initiatives identified over 140 programs that are at best weakly coordinated and often duplicative. About half of the programs surveyed focused on basic border security, less than half focused specifically on customs operations, and only one-quarter were designed to enhance export controls.

The survey revealed a convergence of interests among aid and security providers and potential investors that could encourage future efforts to develop peace operations capacity for border security and to rebuild local capacity. Post-9/11 concern about international terrorism and weapons proliferation, for example, reinforce local and regional interest in better post-conflict control over cross-border transfers of goods and people. **Part one's findings suggest that a range of border security and export control issues could be addressed effectively and in mutually reinforcing fashion if donor coordination and cooperation were to increase.**

Part two of the study examines how the United Nations might better integrate border management tasks into its peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates, and emphasizes that if UN peacekeepers are to undertake border security tasks, then the Department of Peacekeeping Operations must reach out to key stakeholders with similar interests, leveraging the capabilities already to be found in their programs. Such stakeholders include the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, other international organizations, the aid agencies of individual states, NGOs engaged in monitoring illicit cross-border activities, and global industry interested in developing new and more-stable markets. Recipients of such aid, as well as their neighbors, must "buy into" efforts to improve regional border security. The alternatives to assisted capacity building are interim administrative authority of the sort applied by the Security Council to Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, or some sort of imposed border management scheme that relies for its precedent on Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1540, which impose obligations on UN member states in the areas of terrorism prevention and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, respectively.

Advocates of border security and customs aid must clearly articulate, in turn, the role of border security in undermining illicit trade and criminal groups and enhancing economic opportunities through freer flow of legitimate trade and more efficient collection of customs revenues, which may be the earliest and steadiest sources of domestic income for a government recovering from war.

Part two recommends that UN peace operations adopt a three-phased approach to building host state border security capabilities. Phase one establishes initial control over post-conflict borders and, assuming degraded availability and effectiveness of post-conflict host state forces, emphasizes the role of international forces for this purpose. The study recommends doing so with a mix of international military units and formed police units (FPUs) for this purpose, the latter used increasingly by the United Nations because they are cost-efficient and effective at providing public security in difficult settings. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Vicenza, Italy, is one venue that could be adapted to prepare FPUs for border security tasks. To support operations with border security elements in their mandates, UN headquarters will need greater ability to plan for such elements, perhaps built into its new Standing Police Capacity, and to coordinate with other organizations and donors that already have border assistance programs.

In phase two, international actors focus on building up local border security and customs capacity, training recruits for a national border security force and a customs service. In most cases some sort of vetting process will need to precede recruitment and training, to reduce the influence of political and criminal factions in the new forces. Programs at existing regional training centers for military and police personnel in peace operations could be expanded to include specific skills in border security and customs control, and greater emphasis placed on border security and customs as professional career tracks. A “train-the-trainer” approach is recommended as the most cost-effective way to strengthen local capacity rapidly. Preparing individuals within domestic border forces to provide training and leadership to subsequent recruits will also contribute to the sustainability of upgraded border security operations.

In phase three, international involvement shifts increasingly from an active to an advisory role as the national government resumes full responsibility for managing state borders. It is critical that this shift be grounded in a thorough and frank assessment of domestic capabilities. Annex 1 of part two offers a checklist of potential evaluative criteria.

Technology is an essential component of border security operations but should be introduced in a stepwise fashion matching the recipient’s ability to absorb and maintain it. Many post-conflict environments are not well suited to advanced technology and efforts to deploy technologies that local parties cannot or will not use and maintain, despite aid and training, can create enormous waste. Appropriate technology is that which is affordable and both readily used and maintained by local personnel, which may be very basic technology, initially. Increasingly sophisticated tools may be offered or requested as local capacity deepens, ideally in “packages” that build upon one another. Annex 2 of part two outlines the various technologies that might be made available at each level.

BORDER SECURITY, TRADE CONTROLS, AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS

KATHLEEN A. WALSH*

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has undergone tremendous change over the past decade. In this time, peacekeeping missions have evolved into far more complex, lengthy, and multidimensional efforts compared to UN missions conducted in decades past. Among the critical issues peacekeepers must grapple with today is the increasingly porous nature of international boundaries.

In an age characterized by expanding global trade as well as by rising international terrorism, recurring internal and cross-border conflicts, worldwide proliferation, transnational organized crime syndicates, and other far-reaching trends that are penetrating national boundaries, effective border controls have become more essential than ever to promoting national and international security. The same holds true for UN peace operations, which can be undermined by a lack of border security, or their chance for success enhanced through more effective border control capabilities.

This is part one of a two-part report. It examines current gaps in and potential opportunities for improving UN peace operations' border security efforts, identifying key issues, capabilities, workable solutions, and technologies employed effectively in other contexts for their potential application to enhancing border security in UN peace operations. It incorporates findings from initial consultations, a lessons learned seminar with border security experts from diverse communities, and wide-ranging research that included identification and analysis of current international aid programs aimed at improving post-conflict governance, and border-related governance in particular. It outlines the key issues, potential solutions, and critical challenges ahead for efforts to improve border security and trade controls in post-conflict environments and in UN peace operations in particular. It concludes by outlining initial findings and themes, and presents a list of recommendations for consideration in taking next steps.

THE CHALLENGE OF POST-CONFLICT BORDER SECURITY

The late 1990s witnessed a surge in UN peace operations. These new missions have exceeded past UN peacekeeping efforts in number, scale, duration, and complexity. Some have also required return visits by UN peacekeepers. As noted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

* This report was completed while the author served as a consultant to the Henry L. Stimson Center, in 2005. The views expressed by the author do not represent either the views or the policies of the US Naval War College or of the United States Government.

DEFINING BORDER SECURITY

Border security means different things to different scholars and institutions. Here, we adopt a broad-spectrum definition that encompasses a full range of border-related activities and capabilities, from basic border monitoring and control to a more sophisticated ability to conduct customs operations (an ability that has been part of select UN peace operations), through the institution of trade and nonproliferation-related export controls (which have not been part of any UN peace operations to date but are essential in a post-9/11 world).

Our recognition of the wide spectrum of border-related activities illuminates the critical role of border security in peacebuilding. This report frames border security objectives as complementary to and supportive of other rule of law promotion efforts in war-torn states. Border security joins an admittedly long and expensive list of tasks considered central to peacebuilding. But the dividends of border-related capacity building—such as increased security, state legitimacy, and international trade—not only facilitate but are essential for political and economic development. Insufficient attention to border security has handicapped past peacebuilding efforts.

That there is no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes border security, nor any agreement on what form of security is considered most effective or even ideal, remains an obstacle to increased implementation of border-focused international initiatives. Even at the national level, US legislation on “Enhanced Border Security” and existing Public Law governing Homeland Security activities neglect to define what is meant by the term. Post-9/11 debates over how to secure US borders also suggest the need to focus on controls imposed at conceptual versus physical borders in order to expand protections against terrorist attacks.

Moreover, the term “border security” connotes a sovereign, legal authority that raises political sensitivities for the United Nations. The UN prefers “border control” or “border monitoring,” which include monitoring of cease fires, refugees and internally displaced persons, and other humanitarian-related transactions at border crossings. It also includes the monitoring of arms trafficking and trade in embargoed items. Greater agreement on definitions will be necessary to expand implementation and coordination of border-related efforts in peacebuilding.

“Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years.”¹ Thus, peacekeeping has increasingly combined with, or transitioned into, peacebuilding in an effort to establish more sustainable social, economic, and security environments that can be maintained once peacekeepers have departed.

Accompanying these expanded missions, however, are many new challenges and increased burdens on UN personnel, funds, and resources. Among these is the issue of border control (for a discussion of the use of the terms “border security” and “border control” and their distinction, see the text box above). UN and coalition efforts at security and peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, the Balkans, and more recently Afghanistan have all been undermined, to some degree, by the extremely porous nature of the borders in these areas and the illicit trade in manufactured commodities, natural resources, arms, and other smuggled items or persons that such uncontrolled borders tend to attract.

¹ United Nations, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005*, 21 March 2005, para. 114. This observation likely refers to Paul Collier’s work on post-conflict environments, in which he finds that half of all civil wars (1960–1999) relapsed into violence in part due to inadequate or inappropriate forms of post-conflict international assistance. See Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

To deal with the increasingly wide array of challenges encountered in modern peace operations, the United Nations convened an expert panel to conduct a comprehensive re-assessment of UN peacekeeping efforts and “to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.”² Issued in August 2000, the *Brahimi Report* outlines a series of recommended changes designed to deal with challenges encountered in twenty-first century peacekeeping as well as in broader peacebuilding efforts.³ Many of these reforms have since been instituted. But neither the *Brahimi Report* nor the more recent report of the *Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* specifically addressed the need, in post-conflict environments, for peacekeepers to control access to and through the borders of the territory where peace is to be kept.⁴ Nor, with a few notable exceptions, have UN Security Council mandates authorizing either UN-led operations or operations led by other organizations focused on border security. Yet, the impact that uncontrolled borders have on the success or failure of UN peace operations has become glaringly apparent.

This lesson has been learned repeatedly: the failure to effectively manage post-conflict borders leaves post-conflict environments wide open to criminal smugglers and traffickers, undermining UN and related peacebuilding efforts. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sent 60,000 troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1995 to keep the peace amongst Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs, but deployed none of its force along Bosnia’s borders, making Bosnia a crossroads for smugglers and organized crime. The head of the UN policing mission in Bosnia, which started shortly thereafter, began to press for a Bosnian State Border Service two years into the mission’s deployment, but “UNMIBH” should have had a mandate to patrol Bosnia’s border crossings from its first day on the job.⁵ Similarly, the UN operation in Sierra Leone deployed in early 2000 without a border security mandate (the peace accord it was to implement did not provide for one) yet faced a situation in which illicit exports of diamonds not only fueled Sierra Leone’s insurgency but lined the pockets of Liberian president Charles Taylor. When NATO and the UN assumed control of Kosovo in June 1999, border control efforts focused on keeping Serb army and police units from re-entering the country, but only some of the NATO nations leading multinational brigade sectors in Kosovo paid close attention to traffic across their sectors of the border. The resulting gaps allowed Kosovo quickly to become a major waypoint for human trafficking.⁶ In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as in Sierra Leone, illegal exploitation

² United Nations, “Identical Letters dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,” *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, 1–2.

³ The *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* is known commonly as “The Brahimi Report” after the Panel Chairman. Since its publication, a number of follow-on analyses have been published, including the Stimson Center’s own report entitled, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).

⁴ The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (New York: United Nations, 2004).

⁵ After two more years of Bosnian legislative inaction, the international High Representative responsible for implementing the Dayton Peace Accords decreed the establishment of the State Border Service (SBS) in January 2000, and the Service was inaugurated in June 2000. Bosnia’s parliament finally promulgated the supporting law one year later. By late 2004, the SBS had 2,400 border police to cover the country’s 432 border entry points and was seen as a successful model of international aid and multiethnic cooperation. Sgt. Kelly Whitteaker, “State Border Service celebrates two years in BiH,” *SFOR Informer*, 20 June 2002, www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/141/p14a/t02p14a.htm.

⁶ “Protecting the human rights of women and girls trafficked for forced prostitution in Kosovo,” Amnesty International, April 2004, web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700102004?open&of=ENG-YUG.

of high-value minerals prolonged a costly civil war. A Security Council embargo on such exports was finally imposed in 2003, but the UN peacekeeping mission there was not given authority to do much more than monitor the embargo until 14 months later.⁷ Every expert with UN peace operations experience interviewed for this project agreed that more effective border security efforts are needed as part of UN peace missions and would enhance their chance of success.

As important, a lack of attention to borders also prevents peace operations from helping a host country government re-establish revenues, the first and most reliable source of which is likely to be export/import (customs) duties. The Kosovo Customs Service was established with the assistance of the European Union and offers a positive indication of how improved border-related trade controls can contribute to both security and economic development. Receipts collected by the UN Mission in Kosovo's Customs Service funded three-quarters of Kosovo's 2004 consolidated budget.⁸

Kosovo is, however, an exception rather than the norm in peace operations conducted to date. Current peacekeeping practices, narrow mandates, political sensitivities, regional dynamics, as well as competition for resources, funding, and skilled personnel are some of the many reasons why enhancing border security and trade controls in post-conflict environments, if pursued more broadly, will be no easy task.

Yet, there is also reason to believe that improved border security is an achievable goal for UN operations, although the tools and techniques to meet that goal are found largely outside of current UN peace operations, in efforts to enhance global nonproliferation and export control mechanisms, as well as in the cross-border practices being adopted and standardized by the global trade community. In order to respond to new dynamics and opportunities arising from globalization, numerous regional and global cooperative programs have begun over the past decade to enhance border controls, modernize customs operations, harmonize trade practices, expand worldwide nonproliferation efforts, and to update export controls. The objective behind these efforts is both enhanced security and economic gain. Therefore, it is likely that these efforts can provide insights and lessons learned that would be helpful in broadening border security efforts in future UN peace operations.

The challenges confronting UN peacekeepers and others charged with enhancing international security increased dramatically following the attacks of September 11, 2001. In their aftermath, terrorist and related transnational, cross-border activities became a primary cause for concern and focus of attention for government officials, international organizations, and other institutions with global interests.⁹ Since 2001, numerous homeland security and additional cooperative international initiatives have been established to hasten the improvement of border controls at airports, seaports, and overland border crossings. At the United Nations, Member States have also acted since 9/11 to improve anti-terrorist and cross-border security efforts. In particular, UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004) lay out obligations of UN Member

⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1565, S/RES/1565, 1 October 2004, para. 4f–g.

⁸ See "To prevent smuggling we would have to stand hand by hand all along borderline," *Lajm*, in European Union Pillar of UNMIK, "Local News Monitoring," 10 March 2005, www.euinkosovo.org/monitoring/2005/10032005.doc.

⁹ William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are Suspected," *New York Times*, 26 December 2004, 1.

States to prevent transit into or across their territory of terrorists or of weapons of mass destruction, respectively. In addition, the recent uncovering of a 30-nation underground proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, plus ongoing coalition efforts to enhance security in post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Saddam Iraq, have further highlighted the entire international community's interest in enhancing border security in near and far parts of the world.

Thus, not only is the challenge of enhancing border security in UN peace operations clear, so is the opportunity that recent events and new cross-border and anti-terrorism initiatives provide. This study looks at what can be learned from these ongoing initiatives and their possible application to enhanced UN peace operations.

INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES TO ENHANCE BORDER SECURITY: SURVEY RESULTS

This section outlines the results of the Stimson Center's survey of international border security-related initiatives as well as the overall findings and conclusions of part one regarding the applicability of improved border security efforts to UN peace operations.¹⁰

Stimson's survey of international initiatives to enhance border security—whether in the form of border controls, customs operations, or export controls—produced a number of interesting results that have relevance for any future efforts to improve border security within UN peace operations.

There Are Numerous Ongoing Efforts around the World to Enhance Border Security Operations

The Stimson survey of international border security assistance and enhancement programs identified over 140 ongoing efforts sponsored by nation-states, international organizations, and regional security fora. These initiatives span the globe, though many target newly independent states, post-conflict regions, and developing countries. Some are well-defined projects with specific goals in mind; others are open-ended, global or regional outreach efforts, and a few represent political commitments to work more cooperatively and concretely to achieve a common goal of improved border security. Many of these initiatives are directed at preventing drug smuggling, human trafficking, illegal immigration, trade in illicit goods, money laundering, arms sales, and weapons proliferation. Economic development and trade facilitation are also common themes underlying many of these efforts. Since 9/11, there appears to have been an upsurge in the number and international scope of these types of assistance programs, many of which have anti-terrorist or counter-proliferation objectives.

The Majority of Programs Aim to Strengthen Basic Border Security Operations

Roughly half of the initiatives surveyed seek to put in place, or make more effective, basic border security operations (e.g., establishing or modernizing border stations, assistance and training on how to operate more effectively using established best practices for border control, better law

¹⁰ See Annex I: Methodological Note on page 22 of this report for a full explanation of the research methods used for this study.

enforcement techniques, implementing new information sharing protocols, etc.). Nearly half are also aimed specifically at improving customs operations. Many of these programs reflect an interest in facilitating and standardizing cross-border or regional trade. About one quarter of the initiatives surveyed focus primarily on improving export control mechanisms. This is not surprising since export control programs generally presuppose the existence of substantial legal, regulatory, law enforcement, border control, customs, and technological capabilities. Finally, about one quarter of the initiatives specifically identify multiple functions (e.g., improved customs operations *and* export control functions) as part of the program's overall goals, which suggests that these efforts can be pursued simultaneously or, at least, holistically.

Most of the Programs Surveyed Offer Similar Types of Assistance to Post-Conflict or Developing States

All of these programs provide some form of financial assistance, training, and/or information-sharing capabilities, all of which are intended to build confidence and capacity in the states participating in these initiatives. Many border security enhancement programs offer several forms of technical assistance. Typically, technical assistance includes supply of computer hardware and/or software and related capacity-building equipment as well as less tangible forms of assistance such as expert advice, various services, and training in modern border security techniques, technologies, best practices, and effective enforcement mechanisms.

International Cooperative Border Security Initiatives Are Not Well Coordinated

Although a large number and wide range of assistance programs were identified, there appears to be little, if any, coordination or communication among them. Each, it seems, has been initiated and implemented independent of other border security-related assistance programs (although a few are considered to be follow-on projects from earlier efforts). This suggests a greater expenditure of funds, personnel, materials, and time spent re-learning old lessons than if some of these efforts had been coordinated or if communication had been established among the programs' principals. While there are important and distinct differences in the way one conducts border security, customs operations, and export control programs (which might account for some of the programs operating in isolation from others), these activities constitute a spectrum of capability that could be more comprehensively addressed through greater cooperation and communication across international aid initiatives.

The current lack of coordination across the surveyed initiatives does not diminish the fact that these efforts share the same overall objective of improved security at international border crossings. For some of these initiatives, enhanced border security is a means to an end (e.g., facilitating legitimate cross-border trade); for others, it is an end in itself (such as in nonproliferation export control efforts). Either way, numerous efforts are underway to expand and enhance border security capabilities throughout the world. This suggests that there is a convergence of interests that might be leveraged for future efforts to improve border security functions in the context of UN peace operations. This growing convergence of interests is addressed below, along with other major findings from the first part of this project.

FINDINGS ON KEY ISSUES: STAKEHOLDERS, LEGAL AUTHORITIES, LOGISTICS, TRAINING, AND TECHNOLOGY

The study's major part one findings focus on the fundamental issues that must first be addressed before proceeding to outline more concrete measures that will eventually be necessary if border security functions are to be expanded as part of UN peace operations. These issues include identification of key stakeholders and their interests; an understanding of missions, mandates, and related questions of legal authorities in the context of UN peace operations; organizational and logistics issues; and, finally, consideration of what type of training and technology would be most appropriate and effective in this endeavor.

Key Stakeholders and an Emerging Convergence of Interests

There are several stakeholders of importance whose interests must be considered in the context of this study. They include: 1) the United Nations and UN peacekeeping support community; 2) UN Member States involved in peace operations and/or post-conflict reconstruction efforts; 3) the nonproliferation and export control community of experts, officials, and organizations; 4) global industry representatives involved in enhancing and securing cross-border trade; 5) international and non-governmental organizations involved in monitoring cross-border activities for purposes of stemming sales of small arms, eradicating human trafficking, preventing illicit trade in endangered species or other natural resources, or delivering relief aid; and 6) the states and/or regions who are the recipients of border security-related international assistance.

The interests that these key stakeholders have in enhancing border security appear to be converging. UN peace missions have become more complex, numerous, lengthy, and multidimensional than in decades past and, therefore, require more resources, expertise, and overall capabilities to deal with a broader array of missions and mandates. As demonstrated in Liberia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, if UN peacekeeping and peace support missions are to be successful, they will require more expansive border and trade control operations involving activities beyond traditional UN efforts to monitor refugee flows, aid displaced persons, and conduct other humanitarian-oriented activities. As a result, the UN is likely to have to look beyond its own institutional resources for assistance and expertise on ways to expand border security capabilities. This expertise can be found among officials in many developed countries whose work focuses on issues of homeland security and global nonproliferation; in the private sector among firms assisting government programs to improve border security functions; and in international organizations, trade associations, and multinational corporations working to bring down cross-border trade barriers by simplifying and standardizing international transit and customs processes. It is, therefore, conceivably in the UN's interest to reach out to these other sectors in an effort to leverage their capabilities and expertise and to possibly also outsource border security functions to them as part of expanded UN peace operations, if only for a period of time.

At the same time, global business investors have a rising interest in finding new markets in the developing world, but only where a reasonably stable political and economic environment can be found. It is therefore in the business community's interest to aid international efforts (such as UN peace operations) that are aimed at building a peaceful and sustainable security and economic environment in post-conflict regions. While it is unlikely that foreign investors and industry could

be involved in early stages of UN peacekeeping operations given the risks, hazards, and insurance issues these create, they could be made a greater part of later efforts at peacebuilding and reconstruction, bringing their expertise and experience to bear in helping to establish or re-create effective border security operations. To date, this coordinated, public-private sector approach has been employed in only two UN peace operations—Kosovo and Timor-Leste—both of which are exceptions in that they are missions endowed with interim administration (governing) authority.

Representing the more sophisticated and complex end of the spectrum of border security functions are nonproliferation and export controls. An effective export control system presupposes an existing and often well-functioning border control and customs system. Historically, therefore, nonproliferation and export control-related cooperation and outreach programs have focused on states that not only possess weapons of mass destruction capability but also have the necessary institutional, legal, technical, and other capabilities to implement export controls and key elements of a border control program. It is only within the last decade that nonproliferation assistance programs have begun to conduct outreach beyond these types of states, and only within the last few years that these efforts have targeted developing economies. Driving these efforts is recognition of the dangers posed by transshipment of sensitive arms and technologies through third-party, often small and conflicted states. Consequently, nonproliferation and export control assistance programs are reaching back to nations with far less sophisticated border control systems than those engaged in the past, to try to enhance their nonproliferation and trade control capabilities. In doing so, nonproliferation and export control officials have had to adopt new approaches, to re-think the type of aid and technical assistance they provide, and to reconsider the form of training and technology to employ in developing countries with limited infrastructure, resources, and skilled personnel.¹¹ These lessons and capabilities would be of particular value in UN-orchestrated efforts to build capacity for effective border security in post-conflict states.

It is also vital that the interests of recipient states be considered if border security enhancement efforts are to succeed. While border control is viewed as an important issue by government officials in post-conflict states, it is not often accorded high priority given the many other, seemingly more immediate concerns that must be addressed (such as humanitarian concerns). Oftentimes the more advanced forms of border security (i.e., customs operations and trade or export controls) are assigned even lower priority than basic border control functions. This is understandable but regrettable. Government officials in recovering states know that international aid is limited and they feel, therefore, that it must be spent on the most pressing needs, which often do not include more effective border security operations. If, as suggested here, there is a growing convergence of interests across different parts of the international community—including the peacekeeping, international trade, and nonproliferation communities—regarding the importance of border security, then this should result in higher levels of international assistance,

¹¹ The Stimson Center's Cooperative Nonproliferation program has launched the "Next 100 Project," an 18-month research and Track II diplomatic effort to translate the lessons learned from cooperative nonproliferation in the former Soviet Union into a new global standard that matches needs with capacity. Using UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the complex set of anti-proliferation requirements it places upon all states as leverage, the project goal is to extend a successful model of nonproliferation and regional economic development to the next one hundred states in need. It will also help facilitate inter-state connections to prevent the diffusion of weapons, materials and capabilities, and also simultaneously support global development, capacity building, and the rule of law. For more information, see www.stimson.org/cnp.

which could be earmarked specifically for enhancing border security functions, thereby alleviating the false choice that officials who receive international relief aid have felt they've needed to make.

It is important to convey to recipient governments the understanding that modern-day border security and trade controls are designed not only to stem illicit trade but also to facilitate legitimate cross-border transactions. This dual objective is cited as part of the mission for UNMIK's Customs Service, which is "...intended to facilitate licit trade, but crack down on smuggling, fraud and illegal trade."¹² In other words, improved border security will not undermine the country's trade, investment, and related economic opportunities as some might assume; it will in fact enhance them by providing needed revenue (from collection of taxes, licensing and other import/export fees) as well as increasing potential investors' confidence and alleviating others' concerns about the state's ability to regulate trade, limit corruption, and prevent proliferation. The "Kimberley Process" that governs the international diamond trade similarly supports this dual objective of stemming trade in illicit or "conflict" diamonds in Sierra Leone and elsewhere while enhancing trade opportunities in this natural resource for legitimate purposes. Consequently, Sierra Leone has established a Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), which contributes a percentage of the revenues and export taxes collected through legitimate diamond sales to the nation's mining communities. This initiative aims to invest earnings from diamond exports back into mining communities and gives local populations a stake in supporting legitimate trade.¹³ The DACDF has yielded some successes and suffered some setbacks,¹⁴ but it has redistributed more than \$2.5 million over the past five years into development and reconstruction projects throughout Sierra Leone.¹⁵

This dual concept of illicit trade prevention and licit trade promotion is a critical though often underappreciated aspect of border security. In today's global economy, however, it is increasingly becoming a prerequisite for global market access and trade in high-tech, dual-use commodities (including advanced information technologies) due to concerns over transnational criminal networks and possible transshipment to third-party countries of concern. Moreover, the effective prevention of trade in illicit materials and natural resources (diamonds, oil, timber) is likely to help shorten or avert conflict fueled by these illegal sales while rising levels of legitimate trade should hasten the pace of the country's reconstruction.

¹² See UNMIK Customs Website, www.unmikcustoms.org/news/news_view.aspx?NewsID=62.

¹³ Rich Man, *Poor Man, Development Diamonds and Poverty Diamonds: The Potential for Change in the Artisanal Alluvial Diamond Fields of Africa* (Ottawa and Washington, DC: Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness Publishing Inc., 2004), 11.

¹⁴ The Lower Bambera Chiefdom has used remittances from the Diamond Area Community Development Fund to build a multi-purpose community complex. The program has generated concern, however, that local chiefs in some regions of the country exert excessive influence on distribution of the funds, and that some chiefdoms have failed to properly account for money received. Ibid. Such concerns led to temporary suspension and review of the program during 2004. United States Agency for International Development, "Report on the Annual General Meeting and Learning Event of the Communities and Small Scale Mining (CASM), Salvador de Bahia, Brazil, September 18–24, 2005" (Freetown, Sierra Leone and Washington, DC: Management Systems International, 10 November 2005), 7, www.resourcebeneficiation.org/data/7734316_CASM%20Brazil%20Mt%20Report%2011%2009%2005%20final.pdf.

¹⁵ United States Agency for International Development, "USAID/Sierra Leone Operational Plan: FY 2006," 2 June 2006, 4.

States that border on countries struggling to emerge from conflict must also be made part of the process. Too often, the attraction of short-term benefits and the gains made through illicit cross-border activities have undermined international peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts. It is essential, therefore, that neighboring states also be made part of, and “buy into,” efforts to improve border security in the region. Once again, the prospect that improved border security will increase national and regional economic opportunity over the long term as well as hasten integration with the global economy is the argument that must be credibly made across the region. These efforts should also be accompanied by an appropriate level and type of assistance, training, and technology that will help ensure that the potential gains are realized.

As this section attempts to show, border security is increasingly an interest shared by each of these stakeholder communities. The fundamental challenge underlying this project has been how, in conceptual terms, to hasten this convergence of interests based on lessons learned, and to identify ways in which it could benefit expanded UN peace operations. The following sections outline how this convergence of interests might affect efforts to rebuild post-conflict environments as well as what new opportunities and challenges might arise as a result.

Mandates, Missions, and Legal Authorities

Current UN mission mandates are an obvious starting point when considering an expansion in the scope of current UN peace operations. Not only the wording but the interpretation of the mandate matter. The latter job usually falls to the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in charge of each UN mission, thereby creating an ad hoc approach to border security.

No UN mission mandate (at the time of this study) has yet involved the full spectrum of border security, which again is defined in this project to include basic border controls or patrolling capabilities, a customs operation, and some form of export controls.¹⁶ In fact, the term “export control” is nowhere to be found in UN peace operations-related documents, mandates, or planning processes. Nor did anyone interviewed for this study ever recall mention of nonproliferation and export controls as desired responsibilities of UN peace operations. In part, this reflects the line that divides state sovereignty and its related responsibilities from activities and state functions that the UN or other outside, intervening organizations can, at times, assume.

Border security, although recognized as a complicating factor in UN peace operations, is in its broadest sense considered the responsibility of sovereign governments, not of UN peacekeepers. Rather, peace operations typically include a more limited form of border *control*. This includes activities conducted on the border such as monitoring of cease fires, assisting and monitoring the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons, and other humanitarian-related transactions at border crossings in addition to the monitoring of arms trafficking and trade in embargoed items. These types of missions are specified in the mandates governing today’s ongoing peace operations.¹⁷ Other activities identified in the mandate include capacity building,

¹⁶ Notably, there is no agreed definition on what border security entails nor the best way to implement these functions in an effective manner. While it is possible to identify minimum standards, what constitutes the ideal border security system is still under debate in the US and elsewhere.

¹⁷ As of June 2007, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) managed 15 UN peacekeeping missions and three political missions, in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. See UN DPKO, “Background Note,” 30 June 2007, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.

civil-military police training, and efforts aimed at the “creation of the necessary security conditions.”

In contrast, the mandates governing peace operations in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone, stand out for the broader border security-related functions that they outline. The first two cases, both of which are transitional administration missions, call for UN assistance in the *administration* of border controls, whereas the mission mandate for Sierra Leone calls for UN peacekeepers “to coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.” This distinction between border control activities and the administration of border security functions is key to identifying what opportunities and gaps might arise in efforts to establish successful, sustainable border security capabilities.

If UN peace operations are to take on the more involved aspects of border security, then one of three conditions must exist: 1) the government of the state receiving UN assistance (assuming there is some form of government in place) must be genuinely agreeable and cooperative as a partner in efforts to improve the state’s border security capabilities; 2) some form of transitional international administration must allow the UN and/or other international actors to act on behalf of the host government to stand up the necessary elements of a working and effective border security system;¹⁸ or 3) a “hybrid operation” must be established that might involve an aspect of “earned sovereignty” or “neo-trusteeship” wherein the international community assumes the state’s responsibilities and authorities for border security functions until such time that the host government is able to take back these functions.¹⁹

Although the notion of taking away, even temporarily, sovereign functions from national authorities in situations such as post-conflict transitions remains controversial and a highly politically charged issue, the feeling among the Stimson Center’s Working Group participants was that such actions may be more, not less, necessary in the future. Notably, this view was not shared by those interviewed at UN headquarters. But the experience and demonstration of having successfully implemented more sophisticated border security functions—including a customs operations established from the ground up in the case of Timor-Leste—suggests that this approach is workable and ultimately in the interest of both the international community and the host state itself.²⁰

¹⁸ As the Brahimi Report notes, “In two extreme situations, United Nations operations were given executive law enforcement and administrative authority where local authority did not exist or was not able to function.” *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para. 19.

¹⁹ For a discussion of these proposed solutions, see Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf, and James R. Hooper, “Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty,” *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy*, vol. 31 (3), March 2004, 349–355, www.law.du.edu/ilj/online_issues_folder/Overview.pdf; and Mark Malan, “Building African Capacity for Peace Operations: A Discussion Paper,” presented to the Henry L. Stimson Center Roundtable on the Future of Peace Operations, 9 December 2004, 3; Richard Caplan, *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories*, Adelphi Paper No. 341 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Keohane, “Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276–277; and Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” *International Security*, vol. 29 (2), Fall 2004, 85–120.

²⁰ Civilian Support Group Advisors, *Timor-Leste: A Strategy for Building the Foundation of Governance for Peace and Stability* (UNMISSET, 2004), 150, [www.unmiset.org/UNMISSETwebsite.nsf/p9999/\\$FILE/CSG-Book-2004.pdf](http://www.unmiset.org/UNMISSETwebsite.nsf/p9999/$FILE/CSG-Book-2004.pdf).

Also strengthening the prospects for greater use of some form of interim administration authority in future peacekeeping missions are UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). The former requires that UN Member States make terrorism a criminal offense, that they freeze suspected terrorist finances, and that they provide whatever assistance may be necessary to track down terrorists and investigate acts of terrorism.²¹ To assist Member States in meeting these obligations, the resolution established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), one of whose main tasks is to help make states more aware of these obligations.

A similar group was established under Resolution 1540.²² This group—known as the 1540 Committee—serves a similar function, overseeing implementation and advising Member States on measures designed to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Resolution 1540 lists an extensive set of requirements with which Member States must comply. These include adopting and enforcing laws prohibiting manufacture, use, or transfer of WMD, establishing domestic trade controls, and development and maintenance of “appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.” The resolution also “invites assistance” to states that need aid in these matters from states with the capacity to provide it.

While not envisioned explicitly as part of either resolution, it is conceivable nevertheless that these sovereign obligations, where they cannot be met by existing national authorities in post-conflict settings, could serve as lawful rationales for employing some form of international interim administration to carry out these functions for a period of time. This will be particularly true with states known or suspected to be sources or transshipment points for terrorists and/or WMD.

Yet, even where international intervention provides the necessary legal authorities for UN peace operations to stand up a full-spectrum border security system, experience shows that there will remain difficult questions of organizational and institutional coordination as well as significant logistical challenges that must be overcome for these missions to be successful.

Organizational and Logistics Issues

Interviewees generally agreed that adding or expanding border security functions as part of UN peace operations would significantly complicate already strained communications, resources, budgets, and availability of skilled UN personnel. Though not insurmountable, these challenges, added to the UN’s current burdens, led the group and others to view outside assistance from private sector and non-governmental experts, international and regional security organizations, and foreign government assistance as the best way to move forward.

This advice was sensible since border control-related functions historically have been conducted in different ways in each UN peace mission. Only at the end of 2006 were responsibilities within

²¹ See the UN Counter Terrorism Committee website, www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/. See also Victor D. Comras, “The United Nations and the Fight Against Terrorism,” Testimony before the Subcommittee On International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee On International Relations, 17 March 2005.

²² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540, 28 April 2004.

the UN system for various rule of law-related activities, including the training of post-conflict countries' border security and customs forces, clearly allocated. At that time, the Secretary-General gave the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) "global" responsibility for such UN training and support—that is, whether or not it is part of a Security Council-mandated, integrated peace operation. The S-G's decision did not indicate, however, whether DPKO should routinely seek authority for border security functions in integrated missions while local capacity is built, or whether such tasks, if undertaken, should fall to the military or policing components of such missions, or to some combination thereof.²³

In the instances where customs and export control functions have been expanded as part of UN peace operations, these efforts have been taken on by regional organizations (by NATO's Kosovo Security Force or "KFOR" and the European Union) or by foreign governments (Australia in the case of Timor-Leste). But while these efforts are viewed as having been successful overall, they are not useful models for next-generation peacekeeping. Given the growing number and complexity of UN peace operations, it is unlikely that these same organizations and governments will be able to take on any additional commitments that take as much time, expense, and effort as these two earlier operations. It is possible that their example will be taken up by other regional organizations and governments in the future, but the number of times this can or will occur is likely to be limited.

Therefore, the most likely means of enhancing customs and export controls as part of UN peace operations is to effectively outsource much of these functions to other parts of the international community with assistance and inputs from governments, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, global industry partners, and, to the extent possible, domestic firms within the state(s) involved in the conflict. This basic approach has been employed in efforts to improve Afghanistan's border customs operation. Under the "Afghan Custom Operations Assistance" program (described in the Stimson survey), the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asian Development Bank (ADB), US Agency for International Development (USAID), United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), German Gesellschaft Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the US firm BearingPoint have all had a hand in modernizing and standardizing Afghanistan's customs service.

With regard to opportunities to involve the industries of post-conflict countries in such endeavors, the host government might adopt a process like that instituted in the United States to ensure sufficient defense industrial production capability and supplies in times of crisis or war. The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) is overseen by the US Department of Commerce and something comparable could be adopted by other governments for similar reasons.²⁴ Doing so could serve multiple purposes. It could make needed equipment more readily

²³ United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, "Decisions of the Secretary-General and Summary Record of Discussion from the Policy Committee Meeting of 7 November 2006," interoffice memorandum, 4 December 2006, Annex 2.

²⁴ This notion is based on interviews with US Department of Commerce officials. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has recently tapped into this process to supplement its resources for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The UN could conceivably do so as well, particularly to secure equipment needed for quick deployment to crisis areas. The system provides accelerated or priority processing of export control licenses for defense-related items. The authority for this program is found in 15 CFR Part 700 of the US Code. See also Office of Strategic

available for UN peace operations, particularly defense-related equipment used in detecting proliferated items (and keep these items from flowing out of the country). If instituted in countries where conflict breaks out, this system could aid in identifying in-country firms that could help with relief and reconstruction efforts and, in conjunction with Humanitarian Information Center efforts, give international aid organizations additional partners (and resources) already on the ground with which to work in the initial, crisis response phase, who are already familiar with the local economy, political systems, cultural habits, and language. Such a system also, once triggered in the event of conflict or crisis, could provide an immediate and legitimate source of income for the country's industrial and defense firms, where these exist. Over the longer term, domestic firms involved in this type of system could find the reward from such reconstruction-related contracts to be greater than the black or gray market opportunities that often plague post-conflict economies. While conducting business would no doubt be difficult immediately following the breakout of hostilities (much as after a natural disaster), the promise of legitimate near- and long-term business opportunities as part of the relief and reconstruction effort could offset these initial hazards and costs.

The most obvious challenge of such an outsourced approach would be how to coordinate these various efforts to ensure that they are achieving their objectives and the broader goals and priorities of the peace operation itself. All of these outside actors and their activities would have to be integrated holistically within a framework of other UN peace operations-related activities, particularly in concert with cross-border humanitarian relief efforts. This would be no easy task, but would make it possible for those with the necessary expertise and experience, particularly in customs and export controls, to aid efforts to reconstruct post-conflict environments. Moreover, as discussed earlier, it is likely that these expert communities would want to be involved given their own interests in improving border security operations.

This outsourced and networked approach might best be adopted in a phased manner. Due to the potential risks to individual security in the early stages of UN peacekeeping missions, it is unlikely that border security tasks can be conducted by anyone other than military forces or specially-trained border police units. It is only in the latter, more secure peacebuilding and reconstruction stages that the proposed network of outside experts could be involved with UN personnel in on-the-ground activities. This second stage, which could last for some time, would focus on putting in place the necessary components of a border patrol, customs system, and export control process. The work would proceed generally in that order but in a coordinated fashion. These efforts would require, a priori, the legal, institutional, regulatory, and technological reforms needed to authorize and implement border security programs—and the legal authority to make these reforms. The length of this second phase would depend on how much of a border security system already existed prior to the conflict, how much survived the conflict, and how much more work would be necessary to stand up a minimal, if not fully effective border security system.

The third phase would be transitional, with efforts aimed at leaving behind the expertise, understanding, interests, culture, and technology needed to continue the work begun in phase two. As discussed in the next section, training would be the main focus of the third stage.

Training

One of the most difficult challenges for peace operations is to create something that outlasts their presence. Too often, the progress made by UN and other assistance providers in post-conflict states is undone once the internationals have left. Appropriate and effective training is essential to building a lasting capacity, as is a steady stream of funding.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation's Training and Evaluation Service and Best Practices Section have incorporated basic border control functions into their training and briefing materials. However, since the United Nations "doesn't do border security," as remarked by one interviewee, there is at present no institutional training for the full spectrum of border security functions that this study addresses (e.g., including nonproliferation and export control licensing).²⁵ In the few instances where UN mandates include establishing customs operations, training functions have been carried out by outside organizations, governments, or regional institutions specifically established for this purpose. Thus, there is ample need and opportunity (as discussed below) to pull from the extensive amount of experience and expertise that can be found in other fields involved in improving cross-border security capabilities.

In conversations with UN representatives, US and foreign government officials, or independent and private-sector experts involved in international training programs, the same general questions arise. These include: who is to be trained, by whom, how, where, and to what end? These questions are addressed briefly in turn.

Trainers and Trainees

A "best practice" employed in international training programs is the "train-the-trainer" approach. In other words, assistance programs should train those who will have the ability, interest, and authority to disseminate what they have learned among colleagues and countrymen. This approach is used in UN training programs, in customs operations training, and in nonproliferation training efforts.

Oftentimes, however, trainees are selected by host governments with little if any input from international assistance providers. As a result, the training program's long-term success might be mixed, depending on how many students attend, what background they bring to the program, and whether or not they stay in the field. It is thus a "scattershot" approach to capacity building. Nevertheless, as these types of training programs continue, the likelihood is greater that with every class, more of the training will take hold in the right people and institutions.

²⁵ "Border Monitoring" is included among UN peacekeeping tasks for civilian police personnel and described as monitoring "any embargo imposed by the United Nations along parts of an internationally recognized border." Protection and monitoring of refugees and internally displaced persons is also a humanitarian border control function. United Nations, *United Nations Civilian Police Handbook* (New York, NY: UN DPKO, 1995), 10, D22.

Lessons Learned on How to Train

The ongoing training process just described also helps trainers to more effectively adapt what are often standardized course materials to better fit local political and economic dynamics, traditional customs, and student interests. For example, the US State Department oversees the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program starts with a standard training template and then adjusts its content as appropriate to that country or region in which the training will take place, employing relevant data, language, and other references. Current UN peace operations' training materials are also standardized, with new and different modules being developed for both general and specific skill sets.²⁶

The Location of Training Matters. Some experts involved in US-funded international training programs find that bringing foreign representatives to the United States for training provides certain benefits that cannot be found in training programs conducted overseas. Primarily, it affords the chance to train new experts outside of their everyday experience and without the daily pressures that might hinder their level of interest and participation in the program if the training session were held nearby. There is also a concern, perhaps unique to the peacekeeping field, that those trained will then be transferred to other responsibilities, having obviously gained stature and experience (and, therefore, overall usefulness) as a result of taking the course. This is considered less likely when training is conducted abroad (i.e., in the United States), perhaps because the training program is less transparent than if hosted in-country and the benefits gained or possible alternative applications are less immediately obvious to anyone but the trainee.

However, the majority of those consulted about this issue found that training programs that are conducted in-country or within the region tend to have greater success. In part this is due to the need for international instructors to prepare and understand the local or regional situation before arranging and conducting their training sessions. It also allows potentially more local experts and officials to take part in the coursework and seminars. This is particularly important in war-torn and post-conflict settings, where the ability to send trainees abroad is likely to be limited, even with international assistance.

The Value of Regional Training Academies. In addition to these programs, which can be irregular and infrequent, there is growing interest in, and efforts to establish, permanent regional training programs and academies. One example is the Police Academy system established in Afghanistan with German government funding. In concert with the United States and Afghan governments, the Afghan Police Academy (which includes regional centers around the country) plans to train tens of thousands more police and border guards. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has similarly established a training and research academy in Bishkek to aid Central Asian Republics in border security and reconstruction efforts as well as an OSCE anti-trafficking program in Tashkent that provides training in border controls and customs operations to help prevent illicit small arms and human trafficking. Countries in Southeast Asia have also established an ASEAN Coordinators of Customs Training Centers (ACCTC) "...to boost cooperation and coordinate the provision of training and technical assistance among ASEAN Members, through the ASEAN Customs Training Network." In Africa, there are the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the Kenyan

²⁶ Conversations with UN Training and Evaluation Service personnel, March 2005.

Peace Support Training Centre, as well as recognized centers of excellence such as the Nigerian War College and the Peacekeeping School of Mali that could be expanded to include more border security-related coursework. For details on these programs, consult the Stimson Center's survey on international border security initiatives.

The idea of establishing regional academies is appealing for a variety of reasons. First, it exploits the benefits of training programs that are both regularly scheduled and local. Second, the academies could be expanded to offer a full spectrum of border security-related coursework and perhaps even offer internationally recognized certification in these fields. Third, if several regional academies are established in areas prone to conflict, such as Africa, then the trainers, and possibly also trainees, at one academy might be deployable to nearby regions to assist in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts for a period of time. This would require coordination among the regional academies regarding curricula and training programs, as well as regular communication and information sharing among the academies' staff.²⁷ Such a plan would also offer recently graduated trainees on-the-ground, practical experience.

The Value of a Professional Career Path in Border Security. The idea of regional academies also promotes—or could be adapted to promote—a professional career path for border guards, police, military, and others interested in pursuing a respected, well-paying, stable, and interesting international career. Similar to police and military careers, it could be possible to develop a profession for border security operations that is internationally recognized. Ideally, this would include all skills and functions ranging from border patrols and monitoring of humanitarian concerns (i.e., refugees and internally displaced persons), to customs operations and nonproliferation and export control expertise. Given the related but distinct skills that each type of activity requires, these functions could constitute separate educational and professional career paths. Such an opportunity would be especially important in a post-conflict setting since it would provide border guards, customs officials, police and others an added incentive to do their jobs well (in the hopes of promotion, educational benefits, international postings, etc.) and could help alleviate the temptation to use their position for illicit activities. Such “career accreditation” would also help relieve the shortage that already exists in the West, much less in developing countries, in the number of experienced export control licensing officers.²⁸

Technology

The issue of technology in the context of improved post-conflict border security operations is complex. Simply making available the world's most advanced and capable technology will not work, according to all the experts consulted for this project. Rather, it is vital that the technology employed be appropriate to the task, the environment, level of infrastructure, and the users' general educational and training background.

²⁷ One idea for Africa would be to establish regional training academies in different corners of the continent, for instance in southern, western, and northeastern Africa with the ability to aid and assist border security needs of other regions that may be overburdened or need emergency assistance.

²⁸ This idea is adapted from a study calling for an international professional corps of export control officials. See Michael Beck, “Certification for Licensing Officers and Export Control Compliance Managers,” paper prepared for the Sixth International Conference on Export Control, 10–11 August 2004, www.exportcontrol.org/index.php/pagetype/pastconferences/id/1379/itemid/2145.html.

This is not to say that advanced or computerized means of conducting border checks, customs clearance, and export control licensing is not the goal; it would be, ultimately. However, in post-conflict settings, the technology employed must, in the first instance, be able to function in the worst of circumstances (i.e., if there is a re-emergence of conflict, frequent or complete loss of electricity and other services, or other misfortunes). For this reason, simple technology is best. Thus, it will be necessary to institute a border security system that can fall back or default to a simple paper and pencil process if events dictate so. For the same reason, laminated, hard copies of all training materials are viewed as essential, based on lessons learned in both UN peacekeeping training and in nonproliferation-related training efforts in developing and newly independent countries.

Once a *basic* capacity has been established, then efforts to institute more sophisticated mechanisms can and should proceed. This graduated approach could also constitute a form of educational and technological training, providing skill sets that could be constructively applied in other contexts as well. More advanced forms of technology, moreover, could be provided and integrated relatively easily by utilizing standardized, online, and off-the-shelf or modular computer software, hardware, and information resources such as international codes for classifying commodities and commercial software programs that provide logistics, training, and standard or harmonized customs information, such as the Advance Cargo Information System and Automated System for Customs Data.²⁹ There are, in addition, agreed, multilateral lists of nonproliferation export controls available online from those international regimes that could easily be made part of the system. Using these existing platforms, and with assistance from outside organizations, private-sector businesses, and others who share a common interest in standardizing cross-border processes and procedures, a relatively advanced, full-spectrum border security system could be stood up quite rapidly.

As a recent US Government report concluded with regard to technology that was quickly contracted and developed for the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11, haste in deploying technology can create enormous waste; the same holds true for international border security modernization and enhancement efforts.³⁰ Anecdotal evidence abounds in the nonproliferation field. For instance, there are reports of expensive technology sitting on shelves, being put to alternative use, or sold outright to pay for border guards' basic needs, such as food, shelter, energy, transportation, or simply for cash and to pay bribes or debts. In some remote foreign locations, technology as simple as a flashlight can go unused if the users are not shown how to

²⁹ The Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS), is "a logistics information system designed to improve transport efficiency by tracking equipment and cargo on transport modes (rail, road, lake/river) and at interfaces (ports, internal clearance depots (ICDs) and by providing information in advance of cargo arrival. ACIS provides both public and private transport operators and ancillaries with reliable, useful and real-time data on transport operations such as the whereabouts of goods and transport equipment." The Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) is "a computerized customs management system which covers most foreign trade procedures. The system handles manifests and customs declarations, accounting procedures, transit and suspense procedures...The ASYCUDA software is developed in Geneva by [the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and]...takes into account the international codes and standards developed by ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation), WCO (World Customs Organization) and the United Nations. ASYCUDA generates trade data that can be used for statistical economic analysis." For more information, see the Stimson Center survey and the following websites for ACIS and AYSCUDA, respectively, www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1979&lang=1 and www.asycuda.org/.

³⁰ See United States Government Accountability Office (formerly General Accounting Office), *Information Technology: Homeland Security Should Better Balance Need for System Integration Strategy With Spending For New and Enhanced Systems*, GAO-04-509 (Washington, DC: May 2004), www.gao.gov/new.items/d04509.pdf.

operate it. Experience and lessons learned in nonproliferation training in developing countries also show that for training purposes, pictures of illicit items, weapons, parts, and other commodities of concern are quite effective in aiding trainees to identify the most important items they must focus on and prevent from being trafficked.

With these cautions in mind, there is much that technology can do to enhance border security functions in a post-conflict environment. Given the lack of extensive infrastructure typical in many (though not all) peace operation locations and post-conflict settings, it would also be useful to investigate new applications of existing technologies that could help to quickly and affordably boost border security capabilities. Some ideas suggested by those consulted for this project hold promise. For example, as are likely to be soon deployed along the US-Mexico border, balloons using radar, and drone aircraft employing video surveillance could enhance and expand border security capabilities along what are often very long and remote borders in post-conflict regions. While these are high-tech tools in some respects, they could be used relatively easily in remote areas while the data they gather could be relayed directly to a central headquarters (where there is likely to be more infrastructure and electricity available) for collection and analysis by appropriately trained experts.³¹ Although cost would be a concern (such balloons cost \$5,000 or more and appropriately capable drones start at roughly \$40,000) these technologies are being considered for large-scale deployment along US borders and are already a fixture in post-9/11 US military operations. Their cost is likely to fall over time as supply grows and commercial competition arises.³² Similarly, where illiteracy is not a concern, the use of battery-operated pocket computers and bar code-type scanning, potentially with a wireless communications capability, could prove useful in implementing a low-cost, high-value customs system that could link officials and data from near and far-flung border posts to a central data repository in the capital city. Wireless communication systems are being deployed all around the globe to serve commercial interests, particularly in remote areas where legacy telecommunications systems do not exist, thereby providing potential for new and innovative applications of existing and relatively simple technology that could be employed for border security purposes.

This potential also opens up the possibility of networking with international organizations and experts, which would allow, for instance, border security guards in Central Asia who suspect but are unsure of the proliferation potential of certain imports or exports to contact an expert elsewhere in the world and in real time to ask for their input. Developing countries such as China, for instance, already have a group of experts-on-call for similar types of inquiries from their own licensing officials; there is no serious reason to think that this approach could not be expanded and even internationalized. Business enterprises are thinking along similar lines as well, and could be pulled into efforts to find technology solutions to unique challenges posed by remote

³¹ One company that supplies surveillance balloons for US commercial (and potential government) customers describes the process this way: "The concept is simple. A tactical commander who needed 12 hours of coverage would fill a 6-foot wide balloon with helium or hydrogen, attach a Styrofoam carton with a radio inside and release it. . . . After the batteries ran out, the radio would drop to Earth by parachute and could be recovered with GPS technology or programmed to self-destruct. . . . [the company] steers the balloons and tracks them on computers and projection screens from its south Chandler facility." Stephanie Paterik, "Valley Company's Balloons May Aid GI's Communication," Arizona Technology Council, 7 April 2005, www.aztechcouncil.org/article.cfm?id=419&nav=ATC.

³² Ibid. See also a report released by Congressman Jim Turner, entitled *Transforming the Southern Border: Providing Security and Prosperity in the Post-9.11 World* (Washington, DC: Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 2004), specifically Chapter 4: Technology, www.house.gov/hsc/democrats/pdf/press/sbreport/br_final.pdf.

stations and post-conflict environments.³³ Such a networked capability would also facilitate development of an early-warning system to alert officials and international authorities to pending crises and allow a potentially more rapid response.

Most important of all, regardless of the technology employed, is whether a culture of compliance and professionalism takes hold. Oftentimes, lax border and trade controls are not an issue of technology but of competing interests and corrupting influences. Technology will not counter these dynamics. Indeed, it is more likely to feed them without a coordinated, long-term, phased, flexible, capacity-building approach such as that outlined in this study.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS

...the time is now ripe for a decisive move forward: the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships.

— UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005)³⁴

A number of themes and conclusions emerge from this analysis. First of all, part one of this study demonstrated that potential opportunities *do* exist for enhancing UN peace operations by incorporating best practices, lesson learned, and ideas generated from other fields that also deal with border security concerns. Although there remains a conceptual and communications gap between these worlds, there is an obvious and growing convergence of interests that should be hastened and exploited.

It is abundantly clear that if improved border security and trade controls are to become part of future UN peace operations, certain components and capabilities will be needed. These include the following:

- An appropriately broad mandate and/or transitional administration authority;
- A coordinated, holistic approach from beginning to end of the peacebuilding process;
- Extensive coordination, within the UN system as well as between the public and private sectors;
- An approach to implementation that anticipates challenges that will arise at different phases of peace implementation;
- An expanded approach to training that leverages resources in different parts of the world to build capacity more quickly and that allows for rapid deployment of trained individuals as needed;
- A focus on professionalizing border security skills on a regional and international scale;

³³ See, for example, IBM's strategy for revising customs operations to match new technological and financial realities in IBM Global Services, "IBM Customs Agency Solutions," 2003, www-1.ibm.com/industries/government/doc/content/bin/CustomsAgencySolutions-enterprisearchitectureGD510-3393.pdf.

³⁴ A/59/2005, para. 112.

-
- Technology that is appropriate for the situation, with an eye toward expanding the capacity and skill set as quickly as the post-conflict environment allows;
 - A modular approach to networking training efforts, technology, and long-term innovations that could be used to enhance border security and trade control processes, particularly in remote areas; and
 - A sustainable capability and culture of compliance that can only arise where border security and trade controls are viewed as in the interest of all parties, particularly countries and regions emerging from conflict.

The next step was to dig deeper into the issues highlighted in this report to outline what specific authorities, capabilities, and technologies would be needed to pursue the more promising ideas, approaches, and reforms suggested to improve UN border security operations. The outcomes of that process are the focus of part two of this volume, which constitutes a preliminary strategy and roadmap for the UN and other governments to consider in implementing the first concrete steps that will be necessary to improve border security operations as part of UN peacekeeping missions.

PART 1, ANNEX 1

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE: A THREE-TIERED APPROACH TO ANALYZING ENHANCED POST-CONFLICT BORDER SECURITY AND TRADE CONTROLS

In order to address the complex set of issues encountered in contemporary peace operations and in modern-day border security operations, the Stimson Center undertook, in the first stage of this study, three activities designed to highlight potential opportunities as well as lessons learned and best practices. These included: 1) a comprehensive survey of ongoing international cooperative initiatives to enhance border security, customs, and export control operations; 2) interviews with leading experts involved in these programs or in related efforts, as well as experts on UN peacekeeping issues; and 3) convening of a high-level, expert working group involving government, UN, nonproliferation, think tank, international organization, and private sector analysts to discuss these issues and to outline key concerns, lessons learned, potential prospects, and next steps in expanding border security capabilities for UN peace operations.

These early activities concentrated on identifying existing international assistance programs and cooperative initiatives aimed at enhancing border security, customs operations, and/or cross-border nonproliferation and export control mechanisms. (See Appendix I for the list and description of the initiatives.)³⁵ The survey found over 140 ongoing international assistance and cooperative programs aimed at improving functions related to border security. Some are bilateral but many are regional or multilateral efforts. The objectives underlying many of these initiatives vary, ranging from nonproliferation and anti-terrorism activities, to programs designed to stem trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW), drugs and other smuggled commodities, and programs targeting illegal immigration and human trafficking. Other programs are designed primarily to facilitate cross-border trade in order to enhance national, regional, and global economic opportunities but have security cooperation elements.³⁶

Supplementing the survey work, the author conducted a series of interviews in person and via telephone with a diverse group of experts possessing practical experience in UN peace operations, international training and exchange programs, homeland security operations and technologies, nonproliferation and export control reform efforts in the US and abroad, government strategies on peacekeeping, defense trade, and logistics issues, private-sector software programs to improve company and country compliance with trade controls, and US reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. While many of those contacted were at first unsure of the connection that their expertise might have to either UN peace operations or to international border security enhancement efforts, they warmed quickly to the subject and outlined how the lessons learned, best practices, strategies, and methodologies that they had employed might have cross-over

³⁵ Appendix available online at www.stimson.org/fopo/?SN=FP20050613842#bordersecurity.

³⁶ Programs designed merely to facilitate trade (with no border enhancement component) were not included in the Stimson database.

application to the types of concerns raised in post-conflict environments and UN peace operations. In fact, these conversations led many to want to participate further in this study.

About twenty of those interviewed therefore also took part in a half-day Working Group meeting hosted by the Stimson Center in mid-April 2005. (See Appendix II for a rapporteur's report and Appendix III for a complete list of interviewees and Working Group participants.)³⁷ The Working Group was convened as a brainstorming exercise and organized around a list of key issues that included missions and mandates, legal authorities, logistics, training issues, and technology concerns. While the four-hour meeting could not cover all of the issues involved in contemplating heightened border security capacity for UN peace operations, it produced a very lively discussion on the critical issues, opportunities, and challenges that must be taken into account. It also highlighted the perspectives of different interest groups and their stake in such reforms.

This report is a synthesis of the information and insights gained through these three activities. It outlines the findings from the Stimson Center's survey, followed by a list of critical issues and a list of recommendations for possible next steps.

³⁷ The Working Group Rapporteur's Report is available online at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Border_Controls_AppII_Rapp_Report.pdf. The Working Group Participant's List is available at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/Border_Controls_AppIII_Attendees_and_Interviewees.pdf

PART 1, ANNEX 2

A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL BORDER ASSISTANCE INITIATIVES

The following is a sample of the findings from a survey conducted by the Stimson Center in 2005 to identify past and existing initiatives aimed at strengthening local government activities in the areas of border security, export control, and customs. The survey included 141 programs, initiatives, and aid packages sponsored by international organizations, regional organizations, and individual states. The findings of this exhaustive survey were compiled in an easy-to-use, easy-to-compare format. A sortable, electronic version of the entire survey is available online at:

www.stimson.org/fopo/xls/BorderControlsAppendix_WebVersion.xls

The following two pages offer a snapshot of the survey, which offers: an informative description of each initiative; whether it addressed the three broad issue areas of border security, export controls, and/or customs; types of activities involved; and general information on initiative partners, sponsoring actors, sources, and contacts.

International Cooperative Initiatives for Enhanced Border, Trade, and Customs Security				
Initiative	State / Org Sponsor(s)	Date Begun	Description	Partners
ACIS Port, Rail, and Lake Tracker	UNCTAD	late 1980s	"ACIS stands for Advance Cargo Information System. ACIS is a logistics information system designed to improve transport efficiency by tracking equipment and cargo on transport modes (rail, road, lake/river) and at interfaces (ports, internal clearance depots (ICDs)) and by providing information in advance of cargo arrival. ACIS provides both public and private transport operators and ancillaries with reliable, useful and real-time data on transport operations such as the whereabouts of goods and transport equipment, and thus improves day-to-day management and decision-making. ACIS also produces regular statistics and performance indicators which enable management to remedy deficiencies and to make full use of the existing infrastructure and equipment capacity."	Country / regional railways (e.g., Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Zambian Railways)
Afghan Custom Operations Assistance	World Bank, IMF, ADB, USAID, BearingPoint, DFID, GTZ	2003	"World Bank support focuses on custom modernization and harmonization that will help the trade facilitation in the country. To help Afghanistan increase revenue from trade, reduce corruption, and prevent smuggling across its borders, the World Bank approved a \$31 million IDA credit in December 2003 aimed at helping the government establish a more efficient customs and transit regime. The WB has also o provided support for restructuring and capacity building of the Ministry of Commerce."	Afghanistan
Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI)	USA [DHS/CBP]	1988	"The Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI) is a priority undertaking by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) that is designed to counter the smuggling of drugs and the possible introduction of implements of terror in commercial cargo and conveyances. ACSI focuses on each aspect of the commercial transportation process and offer a more comprehensive approach to dealing with this problem. Since February 1998, under the auspices of ACSI, CBP officers have been detailed overseas to assist exporters, carriers, manufacturers and other businesses. These officers aid in the development and implementation of security programs and initiatives to safeguard legitimate trade from being used to smuggle drugs. ACSI teams consists CBP officers who provide border protection expertise, provide security training, speak at seminars, and perform limited site surveys at manufacturing plants and port facilities. ACSI teams are traveling to work with BASC companies in Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic."	Central American States; over 100 ACSI Deployments
APEC: Best Practice in Secure Trade Report	APEC	2005	"Undertaken as part of the STAR initiative [see below, p25]. Examines the experiences of several APEC economies in securing their trade. • Main aim to disseminate information on best practice and lessons learned to assist in future efforts in counter terrorism measures." ... "Five Case Studies: US/Thailand STAR-Bangkok/Laem Chabang Efficient and Secure Trade (BEST) Project • Chile's Graficación Marítima (GRAFIMAR) geographical information system • Malaysia's Karsof™ Total Airport Security System • Australia's Advance Passenger Processing (APP) system • Indonesia's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Anti-Terrorist Financing (ATF) Regime."	

Initiatives for Enhanced Border, Trade, and Customs Security (continued)									
Initiative	Issues			Types of Activities				Status	Source(s)
	Border Security	Export Control	Customs	Technical	Financial	Info-Sharing	Other		
ACIS Port, Rail, and Lake Tracker			x	x			Training	ongoing	www.railtracker.org/About.asp ; www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Pages&sp_id=393 ; www.escwa.org.lb/wsis/meetings/apr04/docs/transp_E.pdf
Afghan Custom Operations Assistance			x	x	x		Training	ongoing, expected aid through 2007	www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/AFG/2004/CSP-AFG-2004.pdf (p.23 in Appendix); www.adbi.org/files/2004.04.bk001.afghanistan.postconflict.pp.73-74 ; on funding, see www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/AFG/2004/CSP-AFG-2004-app1.pdf
Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI)			x	x			Training	ongoing	www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/partnerships/acsi.xml
APEC: Best Practice in Secure Trade Report	x					x	Best Practices; Lessons Learned Study	Briefed in 2005, presumably ongoing	www.apec.org/apec/documents_reports/counter_terrorism_task_force/2005.MedialibDownload.v1.html?url=/etc/medialib/apec_media_library/downloads/taskforce/ctff/mtg/2005/pdf.Par.0029.File.v1.1

A PHASED APPROACH TO POST-CONFLICT BORDER SECURITY

KATHERINE N. ANDREWS, BRANDON L. HUNT, AND WILLIAM J. DURCH

This part of Stimson’s post-conflict border security study outlines and estimates the resource requirements of potential options both to improve the border support capabilities of UN peace operations and to help host states (re)build their own border management capacities. We identify specific authorities, capabilities, and technologies required to achieve these objectives, and illustrate their likely costs (with precise estimation dependent on precise case circumstances).¹

Effective post-conflict border management requires early physical control of border areas and the goods and people that transit them, a task that may fall initially to international forces. It most likely will require building up local capacity—both people and equipment—probably in several stages over time, such that international border presence can be reduced as local capacity grows. At the earliest point possible that does not jeopardize security, full responsibility for border security and attendant management of customs and related functions will revert to national authorities. The need for effective border management extends beyond post-conflict recovery, moreover, as host governments are obligated under Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1373 to take steps towards meeting international standards with regard to, respectively, deterring trafficking in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and countering international terrorist activity.²

We will discuss each phase of border security responsibility and what it may require of international forces and the host state. Because part one of this study addressed the training requirements inherent in reestablishing local border security capacity, this discussion will focus on forces and technology. In particular, it will stress the utility of technology transfer based on turn-key packages of technologies (border security “kits”) of varying technological sophistication. This paper’s proposals are geared towards settings in which UN peace operations are deployed, but the capacity-building elements of these recommendations would be applicable to other circumstances as well.

¹ This part of the border security study benefited greatly from a detailed conceptual outline produced by Kathleen A. Walsh under an informal memorandum of understanding with the Stimson Center and obtained by the Center pursuant to a Freedom of Information Request to the US Naval War College dated 14 July 2006, NWC 20060010, per letter of the Staff Judge Advocate dated 27 July 2006. The authors closely consulted this outline in crafting part two and therefore owe an informational debt to Ms. Walsh, although the language, details, and of course any errors contained in this report are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Naval War College nor the US Government.

² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540, 28 April 2004; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001.

BORDER SECURITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

Part one of this study showed that insecure borders and unrestrained flow of people and goods across them have detrimental consequences for peacebuilding efforts and for the ability of governments to profit from legitimate interstate trade. The continued flow of resources and recruits to insurgent groups in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the steady flow of opium out of Afghanistan,³ and the illicit cross-border trade in oil and gasoline in Iraq⁴—despite the substantial presence of US and allied forces there—demonstrate how border insecurity in states destabilized by conflict can have serious consequences for local, regional, and international security.

The international community therefore has a strong interest in directly reducing the dangers posed by weak borders in post-conflict states by doing more to supplement border security at an early point in the peace implementation process. This runs counter to the tendency of international and domestic actors alike to assign border security relatively low priority in early-stage post-conflict transitions. The director of Ghana's immigration service recently singled out "porous borders" as "sources of violent conflicts in Africa" and criticized governments' failure to deal with the problem.⁵ A March 2007 UN report on cross-border issues in West Africa, while stressing the value of "inter-institutional and inter-mission collaboration" to curb cross-border problems, failed to mention any specific program to strengthen border security functions.⁶ The UN report is emblematic of the contradiction between the international community's verbal recognition of border problems in general and its failure to actually come to grips with those problems in most post-conflict countries.

The level of support and involvement in border security required of international peacekeepers and aid donors has of course varied. In East Timor, for example, the UN reported that "[t]he systematic destruction of public infrastructure and records as well as the departure of the Indonesian administration in December 1999 left a vacuum in all areas, including customs and immigration arrangements," and international peacekeepers were the primary providers of border security.⁷ In other cases, local forces may be available but tainted by involvement in the recent conflict, requiring revetting and retraining of force members. Security sector reform programs in post-conflict states, which typically focus on rebuilding national police and military forces, should thus be expanded to assist in reforming or developing state border forces as well.⁸

³ Karen DeYoung, "Afghanistan Opium Crop Sets Record: U.S.-Backed Efforts at Eradication Fail," *Washington Post*, 2 December 2006.

⁴ James Glanz and Robert F. Worth, "Attacks on Iraq Oil Industry Aid Vast Smuggling Scheme," *The New York Times*, 4 June 2006.

⁵ "Porous Borders Cause of Africa's Instability," *Graphic Ghana*, 2 April 2007. The director made these comments at the Parliamentary Training Workshop on Managing Ghana's Border Security, sponsored by African Security Dialogue and Research, the United Kingdom Defence Advisory Team, and Ghana Immigration Service.

⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on cross-border issues in West Africa*, S/2007/143, 13 March 2007, para. 1.

⁷ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor*, S/2000/53, 26 January 2000, para. 54.

⁸ "The necessary interaction between border guards and the military and police in border regions strengthens the argument that border systems should be included within SSR [Security Sector Reform]. All SSR programmes must set priorities but partial reform that excludes border systems encourages obstruction and corruption. The role of border guards invariably involves close working relationships (and rivalries) with both military and police forces, not least because the geographic border is also the psychological and professional border between military and police roles and duties. The rationale for including border forces within the broad political processes and reform programmes that address the function and role of military and police is clear." Alice Hills, "Border Control Services and Security Sector

Although the international community will not always need to substitute fully for local border security forces when it arrives to help implement a peace agreement, it should be willing and able to do so when necessary. International actors thus should have at their disposal a strategy for deploying, training, and equipping border security forces that facilitates international as well as local capacity to perform this function. Moreover, training and equipping programs should aim to return control over borders to the host government at the earliest feasible date, using technology that the host state can both afford and maintain.

Since late 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been responsible for all UN police and law enforcement training, which includes customs and border security forces. This responsibility applies not only where there is an integrated peace operation but also wherever the UN is engaged in such training and support. To leverage the vast array of international initiatives to strengthen border security in weak states, DPKO must be prepared to coordinate not just with other UN system members but also with non-UN entities with border security support programs.⁹

There are two distinct yet highly interrelated functional aspects of border security. Physical border security consists of the actual monitoring of the interstate border area and channeling the flow of people and materials to designated entry and exit points. Customs and export control refers to the regulation of the flow of people and materials into (customs) and out of (export control) the state through those designated points.

Physical Border Security

Physically securing borders requires the creation of infrastructure—guard posts, observation points, and aerial or marine surveillance—to allow for consistent monitoring and prevention of illegal activity. Effective physical border security should hamper illegal or informal trade and trafficking networks, decrease violent crime in border regions, and reduce interference from external peace spoilers. Border length and topography are key determinants of the specific requirements of a national border force, including the number of force members sufficient for effective monitoring and the skill sets and equipment necessary for navigating particular types of border terrain.

Customs and Export Control

Customs and export control rely on border security personnel to direct traffic through designated border entry/exit points for their inspection. Customs personnel also are required to ensure compliance with any applicable regulatory frameworks, including the earlier noted international obligations pursuant to Security Council resolutions. Effective customs and export controls enhance international security by deterring or curtailing the movement of certain goods (such as weapons and sanctioned commodities) and people (such as individuals under travel ban or on a terrorist watch list).

Reform,” Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper Series, No. 37, July 2002, 7.

⁹ United Nations, “Decisions of the Secretary-General and Summary record of discussion from the Policy Committee Meeting of 7 November 2006,” Interoffice Memorandum to Members of the Policy Committee, 24 November 2006, Annex 2, Rule of Law: Baskets and Sectors.

In a post-conflict environment, the regulation of certain goods can be crucial to the peace process. High-value commodities, such as diamonds and gold, have filled the coffers of violent factions and consequently protracted conflict by giving them the means to extend their armed activities. Charles Taylor, the indicted former leader of Liberia, earned some \$100 million a year in revenue from illicit trade.¹⁰ The Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) controlled over ninety percent of the country's diamond mines by 2000 and earned \$70 million through diamond exports in 1999 alone.¹¹ The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the rebel force that controlled a large area of Angola throughout the 1990s, sustained its fight against the Angolan government with an estimated \$5 billion earned by exporting "blood diamonds."¹² Revenue from the sale of such high-value commodities could have been of considerable benefit to reconstruction efforts and economic development in these countries.

PHASES OF BORDER MANAGEMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Although the strategy proposed here would apply to cases where the UN takes on interim governing authority, we focus on the far more common circumstance in which the UN has responded to a request for peace and security assistance from a sovereign government and/or through a recognized peace agreement. We presume the approval and support of state leaders for the goal of building domestic capacity to manage national borders effectively, as the absence of such buy-in effectively precludes sustainability for internationally implemented border management programs.

We also assume that Security Council mandates for UN peace operations would provide for such assistance. As Kathleen Walsh noted in part one of this study, aside from transitional administrations with temporary governing authority, few operations have been given border security functions—either direct authority or capacity building tasks—and then only when the need has become alarmingly apparent. If international forces are to help meet the border-related needs of war-torn states, these habits must change. The Council needs to make border security an integral part of future peace operations mandates, assuming the support of the host government. To coordinate and complement the peace support efforts of the UN, the broader aid and development community must also recognize that border security, customs, and export controls need to be part of every peacebuilding strategy.

We envision such support unfolding in three phases: the first using international forces as necessary to re-establish control over cross-border movements—both into and out of the host state; the second focusing on rebuilding host-state border security capacity; and the third enabling host-state resumption of full border management responsibility.

Phases one and two would overlap as domestic border forces and customs officers are trained, function alongside and, as they gain experience, replace international personnel, who are gradually withdrawn. The final withdrawal of operational international border control units would

¹⁰ Tom Kamara, "The Liberian Horror Film We Didn't Miss," *The Perspective.org*, 23 August 2000, www.theperspective.org/channel4.html.

¹¹ Harmonie Toros, "Security Council Nears Agreement on Sierra Leone Diamond Ban," *Associated Press*, 29 June 2000; Louis Goreux, *Conflict Diamonds*, Africa Region Working Paper Series no. 13 (Washington, DC: World Bank, March 2001), para. 63.

¹² John Cherian, "The End of Savimbi," *Frontline* (Madras) 19, No. 5, March 2002.

mark the transition to phase three. The withdrawal of international training and advisory teams would mark the end of phase three.

All major steps in these phase transitions should be supported by honest and thorough assessment of indigenous capabilities, with appreciation for each state's particular circumstances. Removing international forces too soon would leave critical security needs unmet and ending financial and training support too soon would risk the collapse of local forces. Staying on too long, on the other hand, may create unwanted dependencies. As a primary goal of controlling points of entry, analysis of host state capacity initially should stress the development of military and security competence to restrain the cross-border movements of illicit actors and trafficked goods.

As capacity building efforts move into customs operations and trade controls, a number of extant evaluative frameworks can be leveraged to assess capacity growth and formulate strategies for continued progress. The World Bank, through its participation in the Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade (GFP),¹³ has developed "A Toolkit for Audits, Analysis and Remedial Actions" to assess the customs management and "trade facilitation" capacities of states.¹⁴ The World Customs Organization, also a core partner of the GFP, has evaluated the customs administration capacity of sixty states through its Columbus Program, which follows up with each state, post-appraisal, to develop a plan of action for meeting capacity needs. Another GFP participant, the UN Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, has developed a "Guide to Trade Facilitation Benchmarking" to advise states in comparing their processes and policies with those of peer organizations and companies for the purpose of identifying and adapting better practices wherever improvements can be made.¹⁵ UN peace operations could coordinate with such initiatives and resources to improve the effectiveness and sustainability of their border security capacity-building efforts.¹⁶

Phase One: Establishing Initial Border Control with International Forces

Establishing control over borders should begin as soon as possible following cessation of major hostilities, and optimally should be addressed in any peace agreements that precede the deployment of a peacekeeping operation.¹⁷ Attending to a post-conflict country's border control needs at the outset of its transitional period is crucial to achieving long-term stability. The early stages of peace are characteristically precarious and marked by the threat of conflict resurgence.

¹³ The World Bank Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade "aims at pulling together all interested parties, public and private, national and international, who want to help achieve significant improvements in transport and trade facilitation in World Bank member countries. The Partners have together agreed to design and undertake specific programs towards meeting this objective, making use of their respective comparative advantage in the subject matter in a coordinated fashion." The GFP has a significant number of additional resources on trade facilitation and evaluation of border management performance, available at www.gfptt.org/Entities/AboutUs.aspx.

¹⁴ John Raven, "Transportation and Trade: A Toolkit for Audit, Analysis and Remedial Action," Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade, 6 January 2006, <http://12.130.2.113/Entities/ReferenceReadingProfile.aspx?id=11540e46-9b1a-4e8a-9b2c-229a313d471f>.

¹⁵ United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, www.unece.org/cefact. United Nations, "Guide to Trade Facilitation Benchmarking," 6 March 2007, www.gfptt.org/uploadedFiles/2a33d916-1248-491e-8ec5-05465d55ec10.pdf.

¹⁶ For more information on the World Customs Organization, see www.wcoomd.org.

¹⁷ "[C]ontrol over the borders has to be adequately addressed in the cease-fire agreements and other political documents prior to the establishment of the UN peacekeeping mission. Failure to have an agreement on this issue will prevent the initiation of the first steps." United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute official, communication with authors, November 2006.

The permeability of a nation's borders typically plays a role in fueling conflict; failure to change that could unravel the peace process. Early and meaningful efforts to tighten the host country's borders are therefore critical not only to establish peace but also to maintain it.

This lesson has been clear in Afghanistan, where border security remains a severe problem despite five years of international security and reconstruction support. In the early stages of US and international force deployment to Afghanistan, Stimson Center experts urged US planners to meet the country's border security challenges vigorously. Victoria Holt argued that early strategies for stabilization and reconstruction overlooked the complete absence of domestic capacity to control national borders, a gap that would take an estimated eight years or more to fill.¹⁸ William Durch mapped out an expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from its initial 5,000 troops to 18,000, allocating 6,500 troops to secure major roads and border transit points.¹⁹ A 2005 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, based on substantial in-country research, recommended that the government and international community "target attention, resources, and military forces on key border crossings and adjacent regions in an effort to confront criminal networks, make regional and local governors more effective and accountable, and reduce the illicit trafficking in poppy."²⁰ In other words, the need for border control in Afghanistan was not adequately addressed in initial peacebuilding efforts.

The US Department of Defense had promised training programs in Afghanistan, but when responsibility for the borders shifted from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of the Interior in the Afghan government, aid from the US Department of Defense was suspended because of legislation limiting defense training of civilian police.²¹

NATO's peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, ISAF has not had ultimate responsibility for ensuring the security of Afghanistan's borders but is mandated to actively assist the Government of Afghanistan and international agencies present by providing counsel and coordinating skills relevant to border security. The main problems persisting for the Afghan Border Police are uneven levels of training and readiness, irregular and overdue salary payments, and inadequate equipment. Equally problematic for the assertion of central government control of borders, some portions remain under the control of independent warlords and militia leaders.²²

Formed Police Units and Border Security

Although peacekeeping mandates historically have neglected border security, military peacekeepers can and have been assigned general border security duties, especially in Kosovo, eastern Congo, Burundi, and Liberia. Indeed, bringing some degree of security to an extensive

¹⁸ Victoria K. Holt, "Peace And Stability In Afghanistan: U.S. Goals Challenged By Security Gap: Expanded ISAF Could Bridge Gap Until National Afghan Security Forces In Place," Peace Operations Factsheet Series (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2002), www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/AfghanSecurityGapfactsheet_063102.pdf.

¹⁹ William J. Durch, "Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options" (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, revised 28 June 2003), www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/afghansecurityoptions070103.pdf, 17.

²⁰ Morgan Courtney, Hugh Riddell, John Ewers, Rebecca Linder, and Craig Cohen, "In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," Summary Report by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2005), 22, www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/inthebalance.pdf.

²¹ Durch, "Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan," 14, 16.

²² Civilian expert with International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) Headquarters. Informal discussion of NATO activities in Afghanistan, Washington, DC, 3 November 2006.

border region may require numbers of troops and resources that only mechanized or airmobile infantry battalions can bring to bear.

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has, for example, roughly twenty companies of infantry (about 3,000 troops at 150 per company, or one-fifth of its total force) based in border areas: twelve based in land border towns and eight in cities and towns on the seacoast. These are in addition to forces based in and around the capital of Monrovia and its seaport and airport, as well as potential forces that could quickly reinforce border garrisons from bases twenty to forty kilometers inland.²³

Infantry are, however, rarely trained in law enforcement or crowd control and would therefore not be a first choice to provide security at major land border crossing points, airports, or marine terminals. An appropriate international police contingent may instead provide critically needed border management capacity that complements that of military peacekeepers and supplements or even substitutes for the capacity of the host state.

To date, the only UN peace operation with identifiable border security personnel has been the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with 200–250 border police stationed at five entry points—ten to seventy-eight personnel each. These officers also participated in joint patrols with troops from NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).²⁴

Particularly useful for such border duties may be organized police units that have trained and worked together. The German *Bundesgrenzschutz* (Federal Border Guard) or the Indian Border Security Force, for example, are paramilitary police forces that have border security as their primary duty,²⁵ and other countries employ similar forces for handling border management tasks. UN peace operations could draw on the analogous “formed police units” (FPUs)—also referred to as stability police units—to take on border security functions in mission host states. The UN has deployed comparable paramilitary units to peacekeeping missions for nearly two decades and, more recently, the number of FPUs in UN peace operations has grown steadily. As early as 1988, Italian *Carabinieri* were assisting the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the “policing and control of all cross border movements to and from Israel.”²⁶ A paramilitary police unit (called the “multinational specialized unit”) began working with NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia in 1998, and ten formed police units were requested for UNMIK in July 1999. By October 2006, thirty-four FPUs were in the field, and a further twenty were authorized to be deployed, sixteen of them for a UN mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.²⁷

²³ United Nations, *Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*, S/2006/376, 9 June 2006, para. 20.

²⁴ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999, para. 60; Derek Chappell (editor), *UNMIK Police Annual Report 2000*, Pristina, 2000, 12, www.unmikonline.org/civpol/reports/report2000.pdf.

²⁵ William J. Durch, “Keepers of the Gates: National Militaries in an Age of International Population Movement,” in Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell, eds., *Demography and National Security* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 119.

²⁶ *Arma dei Carabinieri*, “Mission Abroad,” www.carabinieri.it/Internet/Multilingua/EN/MissionAbroad/03_EN.htm.

²⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 1706, S/RES/1706, 31 August 2006. UN Department of Peacekeeping official, communication with authors, 13 October 2006; Michael Dziedzic and Col. Christine Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations,” USIP Briefing, June 2006, www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0616_coesp.html.

FPU would be an appropriate choice to supplement military units as border control forces because they have more robust, paramilitary capabilities than traditional UN police and focus on law enforcement and public order activities much more than do military units. FPU tend to have greater interoperability with military forces than do conventional police units and, like military contingents, these forces are typically self-contained and logistically self-supporting. The United Nations can thus reimburse states for the costs of FPU deployments much as they reimburse states for military units. States presently receive no such reimbursements for the secondment of individual police officers, and the daily “mission subsistence allowance” paid to individual officers make them a much more costly option for the UN, per capita, than FPU or military units, especially for large-scale tasks such as border security. FPU therefore would be the more cost-effective UN policing option for border security tasks.²⁸

The number of FPU needed for each UN peace operation would vary according to the extent of existing troop presence along the host state’s borders and the degree to which terrain, border length, and continued conflict augment border security challenges. In Liberia, UNMIL’s standing border presence (not including reinforcements) amounts to one soldier per kilometer of land border and two per kilometer of seacoast, and roughly one company per major entry/exit point, with higher density for the capital area. Given these numbers and the border postings maintained by UNMIL with non-specialist troops, a 100–125 officer FPU could suffice to provide security at one major border-crossing point or point of entry.²⁹ More than one unit may be needed to cover a major terminal, and additional units would be needed to cover minor border-crossing points, and they could be supplemented with immigration and customs control officers. To control the wider border, the police contingent should receive support from the mission’s military contingents in routine patrolling and border surveillance, especially in more dangerous parts of the border.

UN Border Security Support Structures

Structures to support this proposed UN responsibility should be established in New York and be geared towards rapid deployment to the field. Within the Police Division of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), a three- to four-person unit could be designated to lead strategic planning for borders and customs operations in peacekeeping missions. This unit would have responsibility for liaising with and supporting field personnel; monitoring progress in local capacity building; and coordinating with donor states and organizations supplying equipment and training to ensure that their capacity-building programs, UN operations’ programs, and host state needs all mesh in content and timing.

One person in the unit might focus on physical border security issues, one on customs and export controls, and a third on the donor community. The unit chief would pull these elements together, make sure the unit’s work was integrated with the overall work of the Police Division, and keep border and customs issues on the table in DPKO’s integrated mission planning process.³⁰ The unit would keep in touch with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which has evaluated border regions around the world to determine how insecure borders facilitate

²⁸ Dziedzic and Stark, “Bridging the Public Security Gap.”

²⁹ Major border-crossing points and points of entry would be all-weather roads, rivers, seaports, or airports that can support substantial traffic throughout the year.

³⁰ The UN’s integrated mission planning process is intended to coordinate the roles of military and civilian actors in the operation of peacekeeping missions.

international crime and worked with regional partners to identify best practices for fighting human trafficking.³¹ Information-sharing between DPKO, UNODC, and other entities involved in border security initiatives will facilitate the development of efficient and effective policies.

One UN mechanism for monitoring sanctions violations is particularly valuable in supplying information on border security gaps and illegal cross-border activity in mission host states. The Security Council sends Panels of Experts (“Panels”) to investigate violations of targeted UN sanctions on trade in arms and valuable commodities as well as individuals’ contraventions of travel bans and asset freezes.³² Panels follow the evidence they collect to other countries, which provides a larger picture of illicit activity than local intelligence can provide. In Liberia, for example, the Panel investigated the payment of import taxes on petroleum products and documented a shortfall of over \$10 million between January and September 2006—a significant amount considering the income for the period should have been \$15.39 million.³³ A report from the Panel working in Sudan revealed there was no customs presence along either side of the border between Sudan and Chad in the Darfur region to enforce the arms embargo, travel ban, or financial sanctions.³⁴ The Panel recommended that an “in-depth assessment be undertaken of the Customs and border control capacity of the countries bordering Darfur.”³⁵

Currently in proposal for DPKO is the establishment of a Standing Police Capacity, a permanent, rapidly deployable police force that could facilitate future implementation of an international border security force. The proposal recommends a force of twenty-seven persons, divided into two advisory teams, to provide public security and initiate police reform in the start-up phase of a peacekeeping operation.³⁶ Each team should include at least one individual cross-trained in the requirements of border security and customs issues, who could assess relevant gaps and guide planning for UN police contingents to take on border management functions. The Standing Capacity could be enlarged if need be to accommodate these skills.

In missions, a Border Management Section within the police contingent should have operational responsibility for border-related tasks and responsibility to liaise with the mission’s military division, neighboring states’ border security services, and donors’ field staff, endeavoring to

³¹ See, for example, UNODC’s 2005 report on the Iran-Afghanistan border region, which evaluated security measures, observed rates of cross-border traffic, and noted enforcement challenges presented by the local terrain. Roberto Arbitrio, “Iran, Mission Report,” a report for the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, February 2005, www.unodc.org/pdf/iran/other_activities/dlo/Mission_report-Iranian_border_with_Afgh.-Febr.05.pdf. UNODC also reported on transnational crime in West Africa, with analysis of how regional smugglers moved drugs, diamonds, humans, and arms. See *Transnational Organized Crime in the West African Region* (New York and Vienna: United Nations, 2005), www.unodc.org/pdf/transnational_crime_west-africa-05.pdf, and “Trafficking in Human Beings: Technical Cooperation Projects,” www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_projects.html.

³² For more on Panels of Experts, see Alix J. Boucher and Victoria K. Holt, *Targeting Spoilers: The Role of UN Panels of Experts* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming 2007).

³³ United Nations, *Letter dated 13 December 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2006/976, 15 December 2006, para. 116.

³⁴ United Nations, *Letter dated 2 October 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2006/795, 3 October 2006, para. 95.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 104.

³⁶ United Nations, *Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations: budget performance for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and budget for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/696, 24 February 2006, paras. 93–95.

coordinate the transfer of technology to host country institutions so that donors provide compatible and complementary equipment. Ideally, such transfers would use the technology packages discussed below as programming guidelines.

Within the Section, a Customs and Export Control Unit would focus on regulating (and, in collaboration with the host government, taxing) cross-border flows of goods and people. It would manage field teams based at primary entry/exit points. The number of customs and export control officers required would depend on the size of the mission area and the ability of the host state to contribute qualified personnel. These officers would serve as individual experts-on-mission, not members of formed units.

A Border Security Unit would manage forces responsible for security at those entry points, working closely with the rest of the international police contingent and the mission's military forces, whose job it would be to maintain security along the wider border. All border-focused elements of the mission should have access to aerial surveillance output from a mix of piloted aircraft and drones. The military contingent also could include maritime/riverine capabilities, as dictated by border geography. FPUs' aptitude for interoperability with the military could facilitate the coordination of surveillance and intelligence through the mission's Joint Mission Analysis Center as well as coordination of operations through the mission Joint Operations Center. The Border Security Unit should have primary responsibility for advising the Head of Mission on coordinating border-related mission activities with neighboring states and their border security forces. Where the risk of cross-border activities by armed groups is particularly high, however, the mission's military contingent should have primary responsibility for dealing with the problem. Where peace operations function along common borders, joint patrols may be useful in deterring such activities. UNMIL and the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, for example, periodically conduct joint patrols along those countries' common border.³⁷

Funding and Training for International Border Security Personnel

FPUs already receive some training relevant to border security, but the United Nations must promote expanded preparation for border management tasks in order to generate a sufficient number of FPUs dedicated specifically to border security duties. The UN should begin consultations with its member states about supplying formed police units with experience relevant to border security operations. It also needs to encourage states to expand their FPU training programs to encompass border security skills. To provide adequate support to FPUs once they are deployed to UN peacekeeping missions, mission plans should ensure the provision of proper surveillance and mobility equipment.

As part of this process, the UN should develop standards and sample curricula to ensure the compatibility of different contributors' border forces within missions, just as they currently do for other tasks, such as human rights monitoring and community policing. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units—established in March 2005 in Vicenza, Italy—is a promising example of international collaboration on training FPUs for international missions and could be

³⁷ United Nations, *Tenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*, S/2006/821, 17 October 2006, para. 40; United Nations, *Twelfth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*, S/2007/133, 8 March 2007, para. 27.

encouraged to further develop its border security doctrine and training programs (including “train the trainer” courses).³⁸

Existing training programs can mitigate the financial burden of training FPU personnel for border security tasks. The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana, has already established a Border Management Course.³⁹ The Russian Police Peacekeeping Training Centre also includes training for border police deployed in peacekeeping operations.⁴⁰ National training programs, such as the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training and the Chilean Joint Center for Peacekeeping Operations, or regional academies, such as the South African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, offer cost-effective opportunities to enhance the relevant skill-sets of police personnel. The UN should work with these institutions to expand emphasis on border security in coursework. The UN could also seek to engage trainers from these facilities in DPKO planning for border security tasks and in the development of relevant guidance materials for UN police.

Phase Two: Developing Host State Border Security Capacity

Training and equipping indigenous border management forces should begin as early in the reconstruction process as possible, as building a new border service takes time. The Timor-Leste Border Service, staffed by 179 Timorese officers, was collecting taxes and duties in excess of original projections about two years after inception. The Bosnian State Border Service, created under UN auspices, took four years to become fully functional, owing more to internal political obstacles than to problems with training or equipping the force. The UNMIK Customs Service was staffed nearly entirely by Kosovans and became operationally compliant with EU standards within five years of its creation.⁴¹

Outside actors involved in building domestic border security capacity will likely include military peacekeeping forces, UN police personnel, and civilian contract advisors. As described in part one of this study, transferable expertise in border security can be found in various national governments, international organizations, trade associations, and multinational corporations involved in advancing legitimate cross-border trade. There are, however, areas of specialization. Military and paramilitary police personnel typically enforce security of borders, while civilian actors focus on development of customs, export-import control mechanisms, and border security technologies and the technical skills to use them. For example, in Timor-Leste, UN police developed the core curriculum for border police, but military and technical advisors also offered training in specialized subjects, with the goal of developing “self-sustainable trainers with specialized knowledge in their respective areas.”⁴² Both military and police advisors were

³⁸ Arma dei Carabinieri, “CoESPU Activities,” http://coespu.carabinieri.it/Internet/Coespu/02_%20Activities.htm.

³⁹ Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, “Training Agenda,” www.kaiptc.org/training/agenda.asp?nav=4.

⁴⁰ Russian Police Peacekeeping Training Centre, www.ptc.h10.ru/eng/eng_index.htm.

⁴¹ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (for the period 27 July 2000 to 16 January 2001)*, S/2001/42, 16 January 2001, para. 35; see also United Nations Mission in Kosovo, “Review of UNMIK Customs Service 2004,” Pristina, Kosovo, 2004, www.unmikcustoms.org/Upload/viewUCS.pdf; Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland, “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in *Twenty-first-century Peace Operations*, ed. William J. Durch (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 94–95, 104.

⁴² United Nations, *End of mandate report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*, S/2005/310, 12 May 2005, paras. 29–30.

assigned to the Timor-Leste Border Patrol Unit, with international police given the “primary role for the training and mentoring,” while UN military advisors facilitated cooperation with the Indonesian military, which patrolled the other side of the border.⁴³ The United States has adopted an innovative border security training initiative in Tajikistan, deploying a team of “Shadow Wolves,” an elite unit of Native American customs and immigration patrol officers employed by the Department of Homeland Security. The unit uses traditional Native American tracking techniques to prevent drug trafficking and illegal migration in the harsh terrain along the US-Mexico border. In Tajikistan, these officers have shared their skills, adapted to address the challenges of the local environment, with Tajik border guards, customs officers, and other government officials.⁴⁴

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) leads an extensive border security training program that offers a model useful for capacity-building in post-conflict states.⁴⁵ Since 2001, DCAF’s Border Security Programme has supported Western Balkan governments’ development of reliable border security systems that comply with European Union requirements. DCAF’s training program addresses all levels of border management authorities. For leaders and senior specialists, DCAF hosts workshops and working groups of donors and recipients on various themes in border management. For regional commanders, training emphasizes EU standards of professionalism and offers opportunities to exchange information and best practices.⁴⁶

DCAF’s program for training more junior border agents might be particularly useful for post-conflict states with significant numbers of inexperienced personnel. Designed for station commanders who have yet to assume their duties, the program entails two weeks of study visits during which trainees practice the routine tasks expected of them and role-play scenarios replicating what they can expect to see on the job. These scenarios are tailored to circumstances found within participants’ countries. The training covers specific topics such as border checks, stress management, and leadership. DCAF also brings young officers who show particular promise to the Swiss Army’s Centre of Excellence in Mountain Training in Andermatt to train with peers from EU member states, promoting exchange of lessons learned and best practices.⁴⁷

⁴³ United Nations, *Progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*, S/2005/99, 18 February 2005, para. 35.

⁴⁴ One US trainer said, “We were here not only to train them, but to learn from them as well. This is their country, their terrain. They know what’s out on their green [land] border. We wanted to share our skills so they could adapt them to their patrol areas to use them most effectively,” US Embassy in Dushanbe website, Press Release, “Shadow Wolves Train Tajik Border Guards,” 13 March 2007, http://dushanbe.usembassy.gov/pr_03132007.html.

⁴⁵ The Swiss government established the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in October 2000 to promote democratic and civilian control of security sector organizations, i.e. police, intelligence agencies, border security services, paramilitaries, and military forces. DCAF researches central challenges in democratic governance of the security sector and collects best practices in meeting those challenges, providing support through advisory programs and practical work assistance to governments and international organizations. See www.dcaf.ch.

⁴⁶ International Advisory Board for Border Security, “Lessons Learned From The Establishment of Border Security Systems,” General Information on Past, Present and Future Activities” (Geneva: DCAF, 30 January 2007), 1–4, www.dcaf.ch/border/_publications.cfm?navsub1=18&navsub2=3&nav1=3.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

TECHNOLOGY AND US BORDER SUPPORT TO TAJIKISTAN, 2005–2006

Tajikistan is an example of the phased approach that begins with international forces providing border security followed by international assistance in the form of successively advanced packages to support local forces.

Following Tajikistan's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the country's infrastructure was severely damaged by a five-year civil war (1992–1997). To increase stability and protect its borders, the Commonwealth of Independent States (predominantly the Russian Federation) dispatched troops to Tajikistan, primarily along the 1,206-kilometer Tajik-Afghan border. Because Russian border security personnel were scheduled to leave in 2005, the international community, particularly the United States, expanded assistance to the Tajikistan Border Guard in the form of packages that offered higher levels of technology over time. France, Germany, China, the OSCE and the EU have also provided border assistance to Tajikistan.

In 2005 and 2006, US packages were supplied through the State Department's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) program. Discussions with the Tajikistan Border Guards prioritized meeting basic operational requirements of power, transportation, and communication, as well as meeting standard equipment shortfalls. The first package included gas and diesel generators, several types of vehicles (passenger vans, jeeps, and off-road trucks), radios (handheld, mobile and base stations; using long-range HF and shorter-range VHF/UHF frequencies), receivers for global positioning satellite signals, summer and winter uniforms, binoculars, radiation pagers to detect nuclear materials, and "customs interdiction" tool kits.

The second package, announced in September 2006, sought to expand the effectiveness of the force through greater mobility and coverage by supplying all-terrain vehicles for the mountainous Pamirs region, patrol boats for the Pyanj River, night vision scopes, and radio frequency scanners. The United States will also provide computer systems and projectors "to increase the training capacity of the Border Academy and Headquarters" and thus the future capacity of the Border Guards service. The second package was valued at \$585,000, and is part of a \$9 million agreement concluded in 2005 for a combination of direct aid to the Border Guards, funds for the UNODC Border Security Project, and money to build a training facility in the eastern city of Khorog under the auspices of the International Organization for Migration. EXBS works with the Virginia National Guard's State Partnership Program to provide training for the Border Guards in handling hazardous materials.

Sources: US Embassy in Dushanbe, Press Releases, "U.S. Military Delegation Meeting with President of Tajikistan," 15 April 2005, "U.S. Government Provides Assistance to Tajik Border Guards," 26 September 2005, "Equipment for Tajik Border Troops," 22 September 2006; US Department of State, "US Assistance to Tajikistan, Fiscal Year 2006," 28 November 2006, www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/77766.htm; Kevin P. O'Prey, "Keeping the Peace in the Borderlands of Russia" in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1996).

In many post-conflict settings, building up the ranks of indigenous border agents may be difficult. War may have severely depleted local police capacity and the police, as an arm of government, may well have participated in the late conflict. The government they served may have no history of even-handed protection of the civilian population and may have been so ravaged by war that effective internal security institutions will need to be created anew—a major challenge for weak, newly formed, and underfunded post-war governments.

The actual tasks associated with long-term institution-building vary with local circumstances. Where police forces remain largely intact but associated with one faction (as in Mozambique⁴⁸),

⁴⁸ For a case study on Mozambique, see James L. Woods, "Mozambique: The CIVPOL Operation" in Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998).

they may require only modest reforms—revetting or retraining, adding officers from other parties—with the goal of depoliticizing the force. In states with higher-functioning police and military forces, training may commence with more advanced techniques and technologies. Where police forces must be entirely rebuilt, as in Kosovo and East Timor, or substantially reduced or restructured, as in Bosnia, a more costly and comprehensive international effort may be needed to redesign, reorient, and re-equip the force.

To the extent that organized crime has exerted influence in the border region—as it likely has—its agents and capabilities may well be intimidating and/or corrupting to a newly formed border force, hence the desirability of initial international operational support and the need for both careful vetting of recruits to new local forces and ongoing performance monitoring. Local police forces—including border agents—need to be effective, accountable, and oriented towards service to the public, not to political elites. Failure to keep corrupt agents out of the new force or to adequately instill respect for legitimate governance will reduce the long-term durability of domestically-based border security.⁴⁹

Host state border management forces should be dedicated solely for border management tasks, and additional internal security challenges should not become cause for redirecting paramilitary border forces. Domestic unrest, natural disasters, or other conflicting demands on national forces could tempt a government to divert units from border regions as augmenters. Negligence in border operations as a consequence of competing concerns will likely be counterproductive, however, if increased opportunities for illegal cross-border activity contribute to domestic instability. Border security assistance could be structured to boost support to governments when internal security requirements become more pressing.

Border Management Technologies: Appropriate Levels, in Upgradable Packages

Because they involve long distances, large numbers of goods and people in motion, and myriad data management issues, the border security, customs, and export control fields can benefit significantly from technical “force multipliers.” A new or regenerated force, drawn from the labor pool available to a post-conflict state where education levels are likely to have been well below the median, will have to introduce technology gradually.

But, as argued in part one, gradual need not mean piecemeal. Packages of technologies, whose elements fit well together and are designed to facilitate transition from one package to the next, can allow police forces and customs agencies to progress in border security capacity at a pace that matches available financial and training support with absorptive capacity. Optimally, the first version of each technology package level will be expanded upon and supplemented by innovative technology trials, but the first-run packages themselves must be effective enough for local authorities to control their borders at some minimally acceptable level.

⁴⁹ Mark Shaw, “Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies-Conference Summary and Overview,” Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, 30 August–1 September 2000. See also Alix J. Boucher, William J. Durch, Margaret Midyette, Sarah Rose, and Jason Terry, *Mapping and Fighting Corruption in War-Torn States* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, March 2007).

Packages should be assembled to meet the different needs and capacities of states as measured in terms of human capital (prior professional experience, literacy) and physical infrastructure—especially electric power, telecommunications (landlines, radio, and cellular), and transportation (roads, bridges, railroads, ports, and airfields). Each of these factors affects a country’s ability to use available border/customs technologies and the utility of particular technologies.

Annex 1 describes three packages of technology (A, B, and C) suited to various stages of local absorptive capacity. We outline the first two packages here, as they are most applicable to phase two. This package approach aims to get an effective border security system in place quickly and to lay the groundwork for its long-term sustainability. The transfer of basic equipment supports rapid resumption of border security functions and collection of excises. Experienced international advisors can assist domestic actors with training in the operation and maintenance of equipment and in proper techniques and procedures for border and customs control.

Package A meets basic needs of environments with poor or badly-damaged infrastructure, low economic development, and limited literacy. Package B adds more complex technologies and some computerized assets, with more specialized communications capacity. Package C, intended for deployment when host state forces are capable of exercising sole responsibility for border security, includes still more modernized technology mostly geared towards improved monitoring and communications capabilities.

Package A can be deployed not only in regions with low economic development but where infrastructure has been badly damaged or destroyed. The goal is to allow at least some host state border security activities to be restored very early in the conflict recovery period, reducing the time that international forces need to be present, or permitting their involvement to tail off to an advisory or supplementary surveillance presence faster than might otherwise be the case.

Package A also offers a fall-back option if states regress or relapse into conflict, which limits waste in reconstruction efforts. If, for example, a state using Package B technology were to undergo a crisis that destroys its capacity to use this more advanced package, that state should be able to revert to Package A with substantially less effort than it would take to create a new lower-tech system from scratch.

Package B incorporates more electronics, including handheld data recorders, contraband detectors, dedicated secure radio systems, computerized databases, and night-vision capacity. These items require more electrical power and greater computer literacy on the part of personnel. These technologies are critical as a bridge between low and advanced levels of capacity. Package B aims to sustain the capacity growth initiated with Package A technologies and assist states in developing the infrastructure needed for self-sufficient border operations. The progress facilitated with Package B is intended to be self-reinforcing, as more effective border controls accelerate progress by extending national capacity to reduce the illicit trafficking that sustains organized crime. Promoting legitimate commerce as border crossings become safer and customs excises become predictable will also contribute to government solvency and governing capacity.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ The technology in Package B can reduce corrupt activity by increasing the automation of customs operations and replacing paper-based identification with computerized formats. A paper for the World Bank’s Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade argued that, “A searching enquiry should be mounted into the possibility of

Both here and in Annex 2, the technologies discussed are illustrative, rather than definitive, of each package. They can, however, be compared with the two rounds of technology transfer announced to date by the US government to support the border security forces of Tajikistan, as discussed in “US Border Support to Tajikistan, 2005–2006” on page 39.

Issues and Strategies Related to Funding Technology Packages

Because the task of mentoring indigenous actors in border security has been undervalued by the international community, it tends to receive less financial and political backing than other sectors and phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Funding sources are limited for those elementary initiatives needed to get local forces restarted early and sustained beyond the immediate aftermath of conflict. International security providers also should be persuaded that border security is vital to creating stability, not only in the immediate post-conflict period (“phase one” in this paper, where international border support is or should be at its maximum), but in the medium term, when local forces are being rebuilt and responsibility for border and customs functions is transitioning back to them (“phase two”). Finding funding for training and sustained programmatic support requires convincing donors that border security tasks fall into a category of public service as basic as water, sanitation, and education; and that, done properly and coupled with effective trade and development policies, can produce a legitimate return on investment similar to that generated by investments in other critical public goods and services.

The technology packages discussed above could be designed so as to be deployed readily, implemented promptly, and adapted to suit environments at different stages of development. Some key technologies may be available at low cost to the host country through existing public and private sector aid programs. Higher technology components would tend to drive up the costs of later-stage programs but some of those costs could be offset by increased customs revenues generated by more effective border management.

Because the package approach offers a roadmap from basic to advanced systems, it can reduce the cost and effort involved in planning moves from one level of technology to the next and avoid uneconomical tendencies to deploy technology that is too advanced for early adoption and sustained maintenance by host state forces. The package approach allows the way ahead to be outlined in general terms, with benchmarks, prerequisites, timeframes, and other metrics made clear to both the suppliers of technology and to recipient governments. Decisions to augment or upgrade the packages should reflect, ideally, the joint judgments of local authorities, donors, and on-site trainer-mentors, who are well-placed to assess local needs and absorptive capacity. The

automating many border crossing movements, especially those where goods belonging to large, well-known traders are being moved by necessary information on vehicle, consignments and driver could be incorporated in a secure smart card at the outset of the journey and checked at the frontier by the driver, through a card reading device connected directly to Customs headquarters. This would offer exceptional security and reduce the opportunity and need for Customs corruption.” Raven, “Transportation and Trade: A Toolkit,” 78. Some US programs distributing radiation detectors to foreign governments recognize technology’s role in mitigating corruption. One program uses multi-level communications systems that transmit data—for example, when an alarm is turned on or off—to officials at multiple locations and to progressive levels of command. See also US Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries,” GAO-06-311 (Washington, DC: GAO, March 2006), 17.

implementation of common technology packages by adjacent states or regional organizations would further promote border force interoperability and regional security cooperation.

International peacekeepers may, from the outset, employ technologies more advanced than those concurrently available to or usable by host-state forces. Peacekeepers should, however, build into their operational plans the use of technologies that local personnel can learn to operate with international training support; use jointly with international border forces; and, ideally, inherit as their own operational kit when those forces depart. In other words, international border management operations should be geared, from their earliest stages, with transition to local control in mind. The aim of building local ownership would argue for close coordination of technology planning for international forces and planning for the technologies to be incorporated into packages for local use. At a minimum, any equipment left behind by international forces needs to be consistent with ongoing train-and-equip programs, lest such equipment delay or sidetrack the evolution of local capacity rather than make a cost-effective contribution to it.

In addition to contributions of equipment, international actors can contribute services, such as advanced aerial border surveillance or satellite mapping, that may be critically important to effective border enforcement but also beyond the resources of the host government. (For a table of remotely-piloted vehicles with demonstrated or potential utility for border monitoring, see table A2 in the Annex.) Companies that have developed the necessary technology—for example, EarthData’s GeoSAR Mapping—could be contracted to provide state-of-the-art maps that would assist in border monitoring and surveillance. Geographic information systems—technologies that create maps with location-linked overlays of critical information (from humanitarian needs to crime patterns, force deployments, minefields, and refugee movements)—have proven their worth in many peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.⁵¹

As part one of this study made clear, there is already substantial international support for border control programs from a range of international organizations, government programs, and corporate initiatives. Many of these initiatives stem from growing concerns about potential proliferation of WMD and their components, while others exist to spur international trade. In addition to the database of aid programs noted in Annex 2 of part one, which lists donors and aid programs as of spring 2005 that could fund improvements in basic security or customs functions, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has assembled a database of EU-funded border assistance programs focused specifically on WMD.⁵²

Coordination

Some disjointedness among programs with different objectives (e.g., physical security, customs, and export controls) is understandable given distinct differences in the way these programs are

⁵¹ For more on EarthData’s GeoSAR project, see www.earthdata.com/servicessubcat.php?subcat=ifsar. Geographic information systems are one of the essential services provided by the humanitarian information centers (or systems) supported by the UN’s Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Action in many crisis zones. Since 2000, these have included Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, Niger (drought relief), Sumatra and Sri Lanka (tsunami relief), and Pakistan (earthquake relief). See www.humanitarianinfo.org.

⁵² Ian Anthony, Aline Dewaele, Rory Keane, and Anna Wetter, “Strengthening WMD-Related Border Security Management Assistance,” Background Paper 7 (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2005), www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/BP7.pdf.

conducted. Yet the present lack of coordination produces avoidable inefficiencies in border security assistance programs, including excess cost and failure to leverage lessons learned. Even activities focused on different border security functions could benefit significantly from increased coordination and communication because these activities all involve common tasks and expertise.

New and previous aid efforts by the same state often are not well-coordinated, sometimes meaning the deployment of entirely new systems without leveraging existing equipment, technologies, training levels, and lessons learned. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited examples of such problems with coordination in US initiatives to provide radiation detection technologies to other nations.⁵³

The most effective package approach would have central coordination. A UN agency (UNODC, for example, coordinating in turn with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations or whichever regional institution was running peace support operations in a host state) could serve in this role. Other possible candidates include international NGOs such as BORDERPOL, a professional association founded in 2000. This voluntary association of border policing and management experts strives to support coordination and mutual assistance among all border policing services and agencies.⁵⁴

Phase Three: Host State Assumption of Full Responsibility for Border Management

When international actors leave a post-conflict country, local authorities must be able to shoulder full responsibility for border control functions. Outside advisors and trainers may remain, but in diminishing roles and for the purpose of providing training and initial support for new technology. In this phase, national border security agents should be capable of progressively improving domestic systems with the assistance of outside actors. In this phase, post-conflict states could seek expanded coordination with other governments to strengthen compliance with international guidelines, such as those outlined by the UN's 1540 Committee, on controlling cross-border movement of WMD and their components.⁵⁵

In phase three, domestic border forces should coordinate regularly with their counterparts in neighboring states, building on relationships established in the previous two phases. Border agencies must maintain those relationships and exchange relevant information on a routine basis with their regional colleagues to facilitate mutual awareness of suspicious cross-border activity, trends in the movement of people (legal and illegal), and evolving best practices in border security. Many of today's post-conflict states have neighbors that lack effective border security, which adds to the challenges of securing such borders but makes communication and collaboration with neighbors who do have effective forces all the more crucial. A regional border security assistance program may be a promising overall approach. Additional benefits of regional cooperation can be efficiencies of scale in providing training and purchasing equipment, cooperation in visa issuance, as well as improved interoperability of forces if states agree to use

⁵³ US GAO, "Combating Nuclear Smuggling," 2.

⁵⁴ BORDERPOL, www.borderpol.org.

⁵⁵ United Nations, 1540 Committee, "Guidelines for the Conduct of its Work," <http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/work.html>.

common or compatible equipment.⁵⁶ Such collaboration may be particularly appropriate for regions that are already developing trade agreements, which will require mutual enforcement.

In phase three, border security forces should also coordinate and engage with international bodies that can assist their work. Organizations such as UNODC, the GFP, and BORDERPOL could offer connections to border security enhancement initiatives (much of the evident international networking on border security remains focused on developed states in Europe, North America and elsewhere). Border officials could periodically attend international symposia endorsed by such organizations. Regional symposia may be particularly useful in building networks of professional relationships and sharing good field practice.⁵⁷ As described earlier, DCAF's training program for regional commanders provides one model for systematic information-sharing among nations with common borders. For travel support, continuing international aid may be vital, and the travel support should of course meet pre-established, capacity-building guidelines. The organizers and vendors who underwrite large conferences are of course looking for returns on their investments and these venues will have many more alternatives on display than are contained in any given version of technology package "C," intended for deployment in phase three. However, recipients who are informed about such alternatives will be better able to negotiate appropriate technology packages with donors or to ask their advisory teams about the utility and cost-effectiveness of alternative candidates for upgrade packages as absorptive capacity and budgetary leeway grow.

Package C is a deliberately high-tech package intended to help countries meet international trade and security requirements that is nonetheless built from commercial, off-the-shelf hardware and software designed to be upgraded over time as absorptive capacity increases and funding becomes available. Package C aims to give border security forces longer-range ground and aerial surveillance capabilities, including remotely-piloted vehicles, where appropriate; more sophisticated and more widely distributed night-vision capabilities and ground sensor networks; links to secure international data networks that will facilitate compliance with Security Council Resolution 1373 (on national actions to stem international terrorism); and access to detection technologies facilitating compliance with Resolution 1540 (on interdiction of WMD-related items). A limiting factor for Package C would be the host state's ability to pay for these more advanced technologies while maintaining the well-educated force needed to operate and maintain them.

Cost-mitigating factors would include Package C's emphasis on commercially available (rather than custom-built) technology that is designed to be upgraded periodically. As a country's economy develops, upgrades will become increasingly essential to its capacity to engage with the global economy, as lack of adequate technological capabilities will obstruct compliance with international trade and security protocols and hence obstruct the state's participation in global trade. Building on an industry-standard technological foundation and stepping up to planned

⁵⁶ DCAF International Advisory Board for Border Security, "Study on Elements of Regional Approach for Border Management in the Western Balkans," nd, 7–10.

⁵⁷ Examples of meetings supported by BORDERPOL include the International Border Management Symposium to be held in December 2007 in London, in conjunction with a commercially-sponsored International Security and National Resilience Conference, and a Global Border Security Conference and Exhibition in San Antonio held in May 2007, www.borderpol.org.

upgrades could allow greater cross-use of available foreign aid funding and technologies as compared to a program based on proprietary equipment and software from a particular donor.

An example of such technology presently in use or being evaluated for use in most of Europe, in Russia, Central Asia, and several states in the Middle East is the “Tracker” export control program, whose basic software is available free of charge.⁵⁸ FGM Inc., the company behind the Tracker program, has learned over time and in upgrading and redesigning its software platform that using an open-source, modular software and hardware architecture is the best option for providing an effective system that is adaptable to different circumstances, levels of economic development, languages, and so on. This upgradability is now built into the Tracker system and has been used to good effect by such programs as the well-regarded Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).⁵⁹

FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Using international forces to provide initial border security in post-conflict states can be a costly endeavor, but there are numerous ways to mitigate the overall cost to international actors and to ensure that the overall process encourages host state progress towards establishing customs revenues and competent local forces.

The international community should view initial costs as investments, the dividends of which include greater international security and stability as well as new trading partners. The need for post-conflict start-up capital in many sectors is often self-evident, but border security, customs, and export controls, when properly implemented, are uniquely positioned to offset initial investment costs by generating legitimate revenues for the government and contributions to regional and global security that ultimately benefit the investors as well.

Investment Costs

The majority of costs to the international community will be front-loaded, influenced most heavily by the length and topography of the border, the condition of post-war infrastructure, government and local forces, and the character and intensity of the threats to be countered.

The bulk of the cost in phase one would be for personnel, which we recommend be a mix of military units and specialized FPUs. A military battalion of about 800 troops (twenty-five percent of whom on average qualify for “specialist” UN reimbursement rates) costs the United Nations \$30–40 million annually. A 125-person FPU costs the organization about \$5–8 million annually.⁶⁰ (Mission financial reports suggest that the per capita costs of FPUs are slightly higher than those of troops in units, although their reimbursement mechanisms are similar.) Individual police officers, who are classed as experts-on-mission and receive personal mission subsistence allowances (MSA) but whose salaries continue to be paid by their home governments, cost the

⁵⁸ For more information on the Tracker software see www.trackernet.org.

⁵⁹ For more details, see www.fgm.com/assets/DOCS/Tracker_Case_Study.pdf and www.esri.com/news/arcnews/spring06articles/imsma-gis.html.

⁶⁰ Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt, and William J. Durch, *Enhancing UN Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations* (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, forthcoming 2007).

UN an average of \$60–80 thousand a year, including equipment; 125 such officers would thus cost the organization \$8–10 million a year, without the advantage of unit training or cohesion.

The administrative staff and customs and export control agents would also be experts-on-mission but, as UN contract employees would be paid UN-scale salaries and benefits in addition to MSA; their annual per capita cost would thus be \$170,000–\$190,000. A four-person support unit at UN headquarters would cost about \$740,000 per year.⁶¹

Border training could be incorporated into host state police training programs, with initial emphasis on train-the-trainer programs so that mostly local personnel would staff the training program after the first half-year or so, with international advisors available for consultation and for training on advanced technologies. Use of local materials and labor contracted by local firms for construction and maintenance would both save donors' money and create local employment.⁶² Taking advantage of established, relevant train-the-trainer programs at regional or international centers could expedite the process of building local expertise, further decrease reliance on expensive international personnel, and potentially speed up the transfer of responsibilities to local leadership.

In addition to training personnel, adequate operational infrastructure (headquarters facilities and border posts) must be built. New or improved roads, bridges, communications, and power lines may be needed to facilitate access to and from border areas and to maintain presence once access is gained. The technology packages outlined in Annex 2 can mitigate some of these issues, for example by including localized power sources for major transit points, but over the longer term the infrastructure issues must be addressed to restore a viable economy that will generate the revenues that customs agents collect. Commercial trucks require paved road networks; railways require well-maintained tracks, roadbeds, and switches; airports require well-maintained runways and effective air traffic control; and seaports require navigable channels and operational facilities to handle bulk or containerized cargo.

The technology that has been vetted for use in border management can be expensive but there are cost-saving measures to be derived from the recommended implementation strategy, from greater efficiency, and from incentive structures. The implementation strategy reduces the likelihood of pushing technology faster than domestic agencies can absorb, operate, and maintain it. In the past, technologies have been distributed but not utilized, thus diminishing or nullifying the impact of assistance. The package strategy, on the other hand, encourages effective use of the technologies in stepwise fashion. Appropriate technology can also reduce overhead costs by improving efficiency in addressing border security needs and processing customs transactions, offsetting the

⁶¹ Headquarters support costs assume one P-4 unit chief at \$81,943 base salary, three P-2 staff at \$54,382, benefits equaling one-half of base salaries, the New York post adjustment rate of 67.2 percent (based on the 1 December 2006 adjustment circular) and other “non-post-related” costs (office space, travel, communications) of 21 percent. United Nations, *Performance report on the budget of the support account for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/61/733, 8 February 2007, table 1.

⁶² For a study of cost-effectiveness measures that also boost local economic output, see Michael Carnahan, Scott Gilmore, and William Durch, *Economic Impact of Peacekeeping*, a report done for the UN DPKO Best Practices Section by the Peace Dividend Trust of Ottawa (New York: United Nations, 2006).

initial cost of the technologies and of the training to use them.⁶³ Donor incentive structures are already in place to encourage adoption of low-cost and even no-cost technology platforms as discussed earlier.

Investment Payoffs

The benefits of enhanced border management can be categorized in real financial terms, such as customs revenues, and also in terms of less quantifiable but still real social benefits, such as domestic security and crime reduction. These benefits apply not just to the implementing state but to its immediate neighbors and—especially with the higher-end technologies aimed at controlling traffic in WMD—also benefit the greater international community.

The most concrete financial returns from enhancing border management is the increase in customs revenues. After five years of international assistance, UNMIK Customs (staffed by 500 Kosovans) brought in 72.5 percent of the revenue reported in Kosovo's Consolidated Budget for 2004, amounting to €436 million.⁶⁴ It is clear that effectively targeting international trade is important to establish a consistent stream of income for governments that lack access to high-value natural resources.

Related to the increase in government revenues, established customs and export controls also strengthen and stabilize the formal economy and formal trade networks while simultaneously disrupting informal, black-market trade. Increases in the formal economy and trade provide tangible benefits to the post-conflict environment, increasing employment and promoting industry. Border management itself creates steady jobs and a need for equipment, some of which may be locally obtainable; the recommendations of this report should be met locally whenever possible.

Foreign investment will follow the stabilization of the region, the implementation of border controls, and the development of the economic sector. As foreign investment increases, so will economic development and international trade, encouraging even more foreign investment. The existence of a functioning border control and security capability will greatly enhance the prospects of foreign investment, jumpstarting the development cycle. The developing world offers lucrative opportunities to investors, but they are deterred by the likelihood of conflict, corruption, and bureaucratic delays. Effective border and customs management would appeal to these investors.

⁶³ An example is the PHARE program, which supports Central and Eastern European countries seeking European Union accession. A 1999–2002 phased operational and technological assistance initiative aimed to strengthen the border management capacity of Bulgaria's National Border Police Service. PHARE documented the initiative's impact on the efficiency of border operations, especially mobile document-checking equipment, which freed agents from static checkpoints, and upgrades to mobility and communications equipment. Program monitors reported decreased document check times and increased number of checks made in a wider swath of the border zone. See "Mobile units for border control and surveillance on the Bulgarian-Turkish and Black Sea borders and implementation of the EU best practices for integrated border control in the border area – second stage," CRIS Number: BG 2004/006-070.03.02, 2002, Annex 4: "Survey on the Available Equipment for State Border Guard and Necessity of Investments and Technical Assistance – Feasibility Study," http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fiche_projet/document/BG-2004-006-070.03.02%20Mobile%20Units.pdf.

⁶⁴ DSRSG Office for News and Communication, "UNMIK Customs Service: €436 Million Revenue that Constitute 72.5% of Kosovo Consolidated Budget in 2004," Press Release, 27 January 2005, www.euinkosovo.org/uk/press/press.php?archive=true&amount=70.

The financial benefits of domestic and international security—the products in part of effective border management—are difficult to quantify but are no less important. International and regional security is crucial to establish trade flows, especially in land-locked states with no direct access to international shipping. Regional actors have often had a hand in otherwise intra-state conflicts; effective border security will help to hold back external forces that undermine local stability and in the process strengthen the domestic legitimacy of the government.

CONCLUSION

Both the national government and the international community have a stake in national border security and control. Insecure borders threaten domestic security, which can degrade regional and international security and stability. Unfettered cross-border flows of goods and people can subvert national authority, fuel an informal economy, and keep legitimate revenues from reaching state coffers. These problems also challenge international stability and the economies of neighboring states, and provide safe havens for illegitimate actors.

International expertise can be harnessed to help secure borders in fragile states with limited internal capacities to do so. Initiatives that are most likely to succeed in closing the capacity gaps in states emerging from conflict are those that work collaboratively with host governance institutions and aim to transfer needed skills and technologies to local authorities. The United Nations, with a primary objective of promoting international peace and security, should be a leading player in enhancing the role of peace operations and the international community in strengthening border security around the world.

The package approach outlined in this report offers an opportunity to the United Nations and other international actors to expand their assistance to border security initiatives in a cost-effective and coordinated manner. By integrating lessons learned from previous post-conflict reconstruction efforts, the technological package approach is a strategy that warrants wider discussion.

Effective border control is crucial for curbing illicit activities, monitoring cross-border trade flows, and establishing regular state revenues, thereby enhancing stability within a post-conflict state. Failure to establish a basic level of border control will hurt all other efforts to develop a well functioning economy and government, and reduce the prospect of a viable and sustainable peace. Border control therefore demands recognition as a central, inextricable goal of post-conflict peace operations.

PART 2, ANNEX

TECHNOLOGY PACKAGE IMPLEMENTATION AND SAMPLE TECHNOLOGY COSTS

The equipment lists included in the following description are illustrative rather than definitive.

Package A: Basic Capabilities for Initial Domestic Border Security Forces

Package A is designed to implement local border security operations rapidly, with support from international stability police units, advisors, and trainers. This package provides a baseline of comparatively low-tech equipment that gets operations up and running while reducing the time required for operability training, maintenance training and resources required for either. It focuses on providing basic capacity to control cross-border activity and minimize trafficking (whether in weapons, drugs, valuable minerals, or people) at major seaports, airports, river and lake crossings, and all-weather roads crossing the border. The package should take into consideration language differences and literacy gaps by making extensive use of illustrated materials to aid in identification of goods, and voice recorders to reduce the need for written reports. It also introduces elements to deter corruption, promote accountability, and establish central communications and archiving of data. As much as possible, equipment should be sourced from local industries.

Package A Equipment List

Security-related:

- Personal weapons, crew-served weapons, armored cars
- Geography- and season-appropriate uniforms and other apparel (i.e., boots, jackets)
- Supply trucks, 4x4 vehicles, other ground transport (e.g., dirt bikes, horses)
- Watercraft as needed for riverine or harbor patrol, boarding of incoming vessels
- Binoculars and higher-powered spotting scopes
- Daytime aerial surveillance using small fixed-wing aircraft
- Secure checkpoints and sleeping accommodations
- Traffic control or blocking devices (barricades, chicanes, spike strips)
- Power sources (i.e., generators, solar panels, battery banks, backup kerosene lamps)
- Flood lamps for major transit points (other crossings close at dusk)

Customs-related:

- Basic vehicle and cargo inspection tools: socket sets, screwdrivers, wrenches, hammers, crowbars, mirrors, flashlights, reflectors, flares, ropes, axes
- Laminated maps and cards with rules and procedures (text and pictorial)
- Pictures of high-profile/contraband items or commodities
- Duplicating receipt books (carbon-copy or equivalent) for accountability
- Dictaphones or other voice recording devices with unalterable storage mechanisms, as alternative or backup to written records
- Central national recording library with UNODC backup library
- Wireless communications relying on cell network (secure or coded-text transmission)

- Lists with names and photos (when available) of individuals banned from travel; also information on individuals and corporations linked to illicit trade and violations of international sanctions

Package B: For States with Mid-level Border Security Capacity

This package would introduce more advanced technologies but still emphasize ease of attaining proficiency while minimizing maintenance. Physical enhancements would include: dedicated communication systems; use of pocket computers with wireless communications, global positioning system (GPS) capabilities, and built-in digital cameras; compilation and use of computerized information regarding trafficking patterns and goods, including initial use of geographic information systems; and after-dark surveillance capability (infra-red detectors and night-vision scopes) to increase nighttime surveillance of border areas adjacent to crossing points. Technologies of Package B should be configured to build on the basic infrastructure of Package A. Such essential assets as weapons, vehicles, checkpoints, barriers, and lighting are assumed already in place. Package B would use more electronics, require more electrical power, and require that daily procedures include docking all battery-powered devices in their chargers at shift-end.

The greater prevalence of more costly types of handheld technology will require new accountability measures for equipment, such as check-out and check-in systems that associate the piece of equipment with the individual user and penalize loss or damage through negligence. Such measures could be as simple as signed duplicating ledgers or as sophisticated as bar-code or radio-frequency identification (RFID) readers feeding into computerized equipment user/usage databases that are locally updated but also report automatically to a central location. Ledgers are not reliant on electric power. Automated databases can help to minimize the potential for erroneous or corrupted record keeping.

Package B Equipment List

- Dedicated radio infrastructure including both shortwave (for long-distance reporting) and very high/ultra high frequency systems (VHF/UHF) for line-of-sight communications; base stations, repeaters, backpacks (for shortwave) and VHF/UHF handhelds
- Wireless, GPS-enabled pocket computers with visible-light photo capacity (for time- and position-stamped photos of inspected materials, events, or conditions along the border), tied into geographic information systems, to generate border-area maps with activity overlays and data on hot-spots
- Radiation pagers to detect radioactive contraband
- Computerized information networks at major transit centers
- Night-vision capabilities (infrared and image-enhancement technologies, generation 1 and 2)
- Increased aerial surveillance using infra-red scanners and video recording
- Video surveillance at major border-crossing points

Package C: Advanced and Upgradeable Capabilities to Meet International Obligations

This package would be deployed only after Package B had been fully implemented and it was clear that the technology training had been absorbed. Advanced technology upgrades could include more expansive and comprehensive computerized, digital networks; advanced screening and scanner technology, with such machines at more transit points; commercial drone aircraft for aerial surveillance; advanced, aerial radar-mapping technology (e.g., EarthData’s GeoSAR Mapping⁶⁵), contracted as needed; and advanced sensor and tracking equipment, including RFID smart cards for tracking interstate traffic and assessing customs duties without on-site cash payments.

Costs of training for border security tasks will increase with the level of sophistication in technology, and most of these costs will need to be picked up initially by outside parties. Locally sustainable training programs should be encouraged, however, to increase indigenous involvement in and ownership of domestic border security, and to generate positive local economic opportunities.

Package C Equipment List

- Advanced aerial surveillance, possibly including drones with day/night capabilities
- Video surveillance at all border-crossing points with vehicular traffic
- RFID tracking systems and SmartCards for levying customs duties
- Portable “radiation pagers” and fixed radiation detection “portals” for detection of radioactive materials
- High-tech sensors and monitors to quickly scan large shipments for contraband
- International communications networks linked with regional neighbors and global non-proliferation and anti-terrorism databases

Each of these packages would require an appropriate training regime for both operating and maintaining the equipment.

Costs and Resources

Estimating the costs of a border security assistance/transformation program is exceedingly difficult because of the numerous local variances that need to be taken into account. The cost can be dramatically different depending on the scale of the program, geographical dynamics of the host country and regional relationships. Additionally, the sources for technology and personnel can shift cost estimates.

The geographical attributes of the area are a key consideration when costing out border security programs. The nature of the terrain will affect the type of technology required for effective border controls: deserts versus forests, mountains versus plains, land borders versus shorelines (oceanic, lakeside, or riverine). The length of the border and the number of states sharing the border will also affect the size of the force and the complexity of its tasks. Airports—both highly-developed, international airports and remote, unpaved landing strips—offer entry points the patrolling of

⁶⁵ www.earthdata.com/servicesubcat.php?subcat=ifsar.

which affect costing estimates. Liberia, for example, has only two major airports where customs agents would probably be permanently stationed, but eighty-six other airstrips are scattered about the country.

Infrastructure, human capital, and local security levels also affect the costs of border security. Without a power grid, border forces could only use what they could power locally with a generator and solar cells. Regional instability will tend to dictate needs for personnel and for a more robust capability, both of which would drive up costs. The effectiveness and integrity of neighboring border security agents and the ability of the state receiving international assistance to coordinate with them would tend to decrease costs over the long term.

All these factors make an accurate cost estimate difficult. Costs for the international personnel required, both FPU and trainers, can be estimated by looking at cost estimates in the annexes of the FOPO report on UN civilian police.⁶⁶ Figuring out the cost of technology and training is more cumbersome as it is directly dependent on local requirements, but table A1 offers costing data for some common technologies and table A2 presents data on appropriate drone aircraft surveillance systems.

⁶⁶ Smith, Holt, and Durch, *Enhancing UN Capacity for Post-Conflict Police Operations*.

Table A1: Sample Cost Estimates for Technology in Packages

	Technology	A	B	C	Cost
Vehicles & Transport	4x4 pickup	x			\$18,000
	4x4 vehicles	x			\$18,500
	Light cargo truck	x			\$119,000
	Patrol boats		x		\$9,000
	Troop-carrying patrol vehicle		x		\$23,500
Force Protection	Ballistic helmet	x			\$150
	Anti-fragmentation vests	x			\$250
	Ballistic shield	x			\$2,000
	Complete equipment for 125 person formed police unit	x			\$6,000,000
Monitoring & Detection	Binoculars	x			\$50
	High-powered optical sighting scope	x			\$200
	Radiation pager	x	x		\$1,500
	Airfield aeronautical survey	x			\$8,500
	Wireless, GPS-enabled pocket computer with camera		x	x	\$500
	Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers		x		\$600
	Night-vision sighting scope, all weather		x		\$3,500
	Customs interdiction tool kits		x		\$28,000
	X-ray screening equipment		x	x	\$30,500
	Radio frequency identification (RFID) tag reader			x	\$2,000
	Radiation portal monitor			x	\$55,000
	Drone aircraft surveillance systems			x	see next page
Communications	HF antenna masts	x			\$300
	HF mobile radio with GPS option	x			\$2,500
	HF radio manpack	x			\$3,500
	HF radio base station with data capability	x			\$4,500
	UHF mobile radio, trunking		x		\$1,000
	UHF radio handheld secure, trunking		x		\$1,500
	VHF mobile radio, secure		x		\$3,500
	VHF handheld radio, secure		x		\$3,500
	VHF radio base station, secure		x		\$4,500
	Guyed antenna tower kit		x		\$6,000
	VHF radio repeater, secure		x		\$14,000
	Satellite phone			x	\$3,000
	Satellite modem			x	\$6,000
	Power Sources	5 KVA generator	x		
Solar panel system (power/charging)		x			\$800–\$2,000
50–60 KVA generator		x			\$9,000
125 KVA generator			x		\$13,000
Facility Development	Security lighting	x	x		\$2,000
	Accommodation units (3-module)	x			\$10,000
	Prefabricated office	x			\$15,000
	Accommodation units (6-module)	x			\$20,000
	10' chain link fence with razor wire (per mile)	x	x		\$425,000
	Closed-circuit television (CCTV) video surveillance		x	x	\$30,000

Note: Estimates are in 2005–2007 US Dollars, rounded to the nearest \$50 (for technology <\$1000) or \$500 (technology >\$1000). Abbreviations: HF = high frequency; VHF = very high frequency; UHF = ultra high frequency; KVA = kilovolt amp.

Sources: United Nations Procurement Service, "2007 Acquisition Plan," www.un.org/Depts/ptd/; Michael Dzedzic and Col. Christine Stark, "Bridging the Public Security Gap," USIPeace Briefing (June 2006); West Virginia High Technology Consortium Foundation, Emergency Response Technology Database, www.htfwo.org/ertProgram/technologies; CHIEF Law Enforcement Supply, www.chiefsupply.com; NewEgg.com, www.newegg.com; US Environmental Protection Agency, "Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Radio Frequency Identification," www.epa.gov/EPA-IMPACT/2005/September/Day-13/i18025.htm; Government Accountability Office, "Combating Nuclear Smuggling," GAO-07-133R, 17 October 2006; GlobalSecurity.org, "US-Mexico Border Fence," www.globalsecurity.org/security/systems/mexico-wall.htm.

Table A2: Characteristics of Drone Aircraft Surveillance Systems

	Endurance (hrs.)	Payload (lbs.)	Altitude Ceiling (ft.)	Wingspan (ft.)	Payload Options	Cost (US\$) V = Vehicle S = System
Dragon Eye† Aero Vironment (USA)	1	1	1,000	3.8	1, 2	\$125,000 (V&S)
Raven† Aero Vironment (USA)	1.5	2	3,000	5	1, 2	\$35,000 (V) \$250,000 (S)
Silver Fox Advanced Ceramics (USA)	10	5	16,000	7.8	1	\$216,000
BQM-147 Exdrone BAI Aerosystems (USA)	2.5	25	10,000	8.2	1, 2, 3, 4, 6	n/a
Aerosonde Aerosonde Robotic Aircraft (Australia)	30	11.5	15,000	9.5	1, 2, 4, 6	\$40,000 (V&S)
Border Eagle† Integrated Dynamics (Pakistan)	3	8.8	10,000	10	1, 2	n/a
Shadow 200 AAI Corporation (USA)	4	50	15,000	12.8	1, 2, 3	\$275,000 (V); \$36,000,000 (S)
Pioneer Pioneer UAV, Inc. (USA)	5.5	75	15,000	16.8	1, 2	\$1,000,000 (V)
Ka-137§ Kamov Company (Russia)	4	176	16,000	16.4	1, 2, 3, 4	n/a
Vulture Advanced Technology & Engineering Co. (So. Africa)	3	82	16,000	17	1, 2, 4	n/a

† indicates battery-powered systems; § indicates rotary-wing aircraft; n/a = not readily available at time of publication

Payload Options: 1 - electro-optical camera (daylight video); 2 - infrared camera (thermal imaging); 3 - chemical-biological-radiological sensors; 4 - communications relay (over-the-horizon); 5 - synthetic aperture radar (foliage/topsoil penetration, mine detection); 6 - communications jamming.

Advanced Options (used by more sophisticated/costly drones or by systems in development): radio frequency scanners; electronic signals Intelligence; moisture and geothermal sensors (footpath identification); ground penetration radar (minefield detection, tunnel detection); magnetic anomaly detector (tunnel detection).

Sources: NASA Wallops Flight Facility, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle," see uav.wff.nasa.gov; Global Security.org, "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/uav.htm; US DoD "Unmanned Aircraft Roadmap 2005–2030," www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf; Shepard Group, "UAV Datasource," www.shephard.co.uk/UVonline/UVSpecs.aspx; and NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, "Homeland Security Workshop Summary," www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/civuav/dhs_docs.html.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barton, Rick, and Morgan Courtney. "In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan." CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Program presentation, 18 July 2005. www.csis.org/images/stories/pcr/InTheBalancePresentation.pdf.
- Beck, Michael. "Certification for Licensing Officers and Export Control Compliance Managers." Paper prepared for the Sixth International Conference on Export Control, London, UK, 10–11 August 2004. www.exportcontrol.org/index.php/pagetype/pastconferences/id/1379/itemid/2145.html.
- Caplan, Richard. *A New Trusteeship? The International Administration of War-torn Territories*. Adelphi Paper no. 341. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Civilian Support Group Advisors. *Timor-Leste: A Strategy for Building the Foundation of Governance for Peace and Stability*. UNMISSET, 2004. [www.unmisset.org/UNMISSETwebsite.nsf/p9999/\\$FILE/CSG-Book-2004.pdf](http://www.unmisset.org/UNMISSETwebsite.nsf/p9999/$FILE/CSG-Book-2004.pdf).
- Durch, William J. "Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options." Henry L. Stimson Center presentation, 28 June 2003. www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/afghansecurityoptions070103.pdf.
- Dziedzic, Michael, and Col. Christine Stark. "Bridging the Public Security Gap: The Role of the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in Contemporary Peace Operations." USIP Briefing. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2006. www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/0616_coespu.html.
- ESRI. "IMSMA GIS and Analysis Tools Support Demining Efforts." *ArcNews Online*. Redlands, CA: ESRI, Spring 2006. www.esri.com/news/arcnews/spring06articles/imsma-gis.html.
- Ferguson, Chris. "Police Reform, Peacekeeping and SSR: The Need for a Closer Synthesis." *Journal of Security Sector Management* 2, no. 3 (September 2004).
- FGM, Inc. "Tracking Dangerous Materials and Strategic Goods to Minimize the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction." Tracker Case Study. Reston, VA: FGM, 2006. www.fgm.com/assets/DOCS/Tracker_Case_Study.pdf.
- Hills, Alice. "Border Control Services and Security Sector Reform." Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper Series, no. 37, 2002.
- Holt, Victoria K. "Peace and Stability in Afghanistan: U.S. Goals Challenged By Security Gap: Expanded ISAF Could Bridge Gap Until National Afghan Security Forces In Place." *Peace Operations Factsheet*. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, June 2002. www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/AfghanSecurityGapfactsheet_063102.pdf.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 2004–2005*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005.

- . *The Military Balance 2006*. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.
- Jones, Seth G., Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, K. Jack Riley. *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005.
- Krasner, Stephen D. "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States." In *International Security* (Fall 2004).
- London Conference on Afghanistan. *The Afghanistan Compact*. 31 January–1 February 2006. www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1134650705195.
- Metcalf, Liz. "Canadians toughen border security in Afghanistan." *CTV.ca News*. Toronto: CTV.ca, 3 August 2006. www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060718/afghanistan_border_060730/.
- Montero, David. "The bribe to exit Pakistan: 15 cents; Afghanistan, Pakistan agreed last week to joint patrols of their border, but official crossings remain lax." *Christian Science Monitor*. 30 August 2006. www.csmonitor.com/2006/0830/p05s01-wosc.html.
- Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan Public Affairs. "New Radios Aid Afghan Border Police Operations." *Defend America*. Arlington, VA: United States Department of Defense, 14 November 2005. www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2005/a111405dgl.html.
- Peake, Gordon, and Kaysie Studdard. "Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands." *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 4 (Winter 2005).
- Perito, Robert M. "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified." USIP Special Report, no. 137, April 2005.
- Shane, Leo, III. "Officials: Weak border security a threat to Afghanistan." *Stars and Stripes*. Washington, DC: *Stars and Stripes*, 7 August 2006. www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=38244&archive=true.
- Shaw, Mark. "Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies-Conference Summary and Overview." In *Crime and Policing in Transitional Societies*. Seminar Report, Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand, 30 August–1 September 2000. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2001.
- Suhrke, Astri, Kristian Berg Harpviken, Are Knudsen, Arve Ofstad, and Arne Strand. *Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan*. Report R 2002, no. 9. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2002.
- Thier, J. Alexander. "Afghanistan." In *Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*, edited by William J. Durch. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006.
- Tschirgi, Neclâ. *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges*. New York, NY: International Peace Academy, 7 October 2004.

- United Nations. *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. New York: UN, 2004.
- . *Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2006/376. 9 June 2006.
- . *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A/55/305–S/2000/809. 21 August 2000. Annex.
- . *Letter dated 7 December 2005 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Security Council*. S/2005/745. 7 December 2005.
- . *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security – Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan*. S/2006/145. 7 March 2006.
- . *Statement by the President of the Security Council*. S/PRST/2006/38. 9 August 2006.
- . *Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia*. S/2006/159. 14 March 2006.
- United Nations. *UN Civilian Police Handbook*. New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 1995.
- United Nations Mission in Kosovo. *UNMIK Customs Website*, www.unmikcustoms.org.
- United Nations Mission in Liberia. “Swedish Peacekeepers receive UN peacekeeping medals; UN Envoy reiterates UNMIL’s commitment to deal robustly with any security threat in Liberia.” Press Release. 13 March 2006. www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmil/pr34.pdf.
- United Nations News Service. “As Liberians return home, UN agency to close regional office in southern Guinea.” 5 September 2006. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19726.
- . “NATO forces in Afghanistan should do more to curb drug trade, UN official says.” 12 September 2006. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19795.
- . “UN’s Liberia envoy, Sierra Leonean authorities discuss joint border patrols.” 9 August 2006. www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19448.
- United States Government Accountability Office. “Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries.” GAO-06-311. Washington, DC: March 2006.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M., John Edward Porter, and Stuart E. Eizenstat. *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security—A Report of the Commission for Weak States and US National Security*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, June 2004.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Katherine N. Andrews is a Research Assistant with the Future of Peace Operations program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. Ms. Andrews' areas of research include improving accountability for civilian personnel with UN peace operations and monitoring US policy on UN- and regionally-led peacekeeping. Prior to the Stimson Center, she was the Peacekeeping Fellow at Refugees International, where she focused on strengthening both UN and US capacity for effective peacebuilding. She also spent two years working for the AmeriCorps national service program and has done volunteer work in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. She holds a B.A. with honors from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

William J. Durch is a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where he co-directs the Future of Peace Operations program. His temporary secondments while at Stimson include serving as project director for the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report) and as scientific advisor to the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Before joining Stimson, Dr. Durch was assistant director of the Defense and Arms Control Studies program at MIT, research fellow at Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, and foreign affairs officer in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has taught at both Johns Hopkins SAIS and Georgetown. His most recent publications include *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations* (USIP Press, 2006), *Who Should Keep the Peace?* (Stimson Center, 2006) with Tobias Berkman, and "The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping," with Scott Gilmore and Michael Carnahan (Ottawa: Peace Dividend Trust for the DPKO Best Practices Section, 2006). He holds a doctorate in political science (defense studies) from MIT.

Brandon L. Hunt was first a researcher for the Future of Peace Operations program and then Program Coordinator at the Stimson Center, September 2006–August 2007. He subsequently joined the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution as a Research Assistant. Mr. Hunt's research focuses on transnational security issues, peace support operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and African regional security, and he is the author of "Reconstructing Stability: A New U.S. Office" (*Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 2006). He holds an M.A. in International Politics and Security Studies with distinction from the University of Bradford (UK), during which he conducted field research in Sierra Leone, and he holds a B.A. in Political Science with honors from Calvin College, where he spent a semester at Daystar University in Kenya.

Kathleen A. Walsh was a consultant to the Stimson Center for part one of this report. She subsequently was appointed Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, where she teaches courses on policy making and joint military policy and also lectures on China. Previously, Prof. Walsh consulted on international and Asian security affairs at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Stimson Center, and Los Alamos Technical Associates. As a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center, she led the Technology & Security Program, and at DFI International, she directed the firm's China- and export control-related studies. Among other works, she is author of *Foreign*

High-Tech R&D in China: Risks, Rewards, and Implications for US-China Relations (Stimson Center, June 2003) and *U.S. Commercial Technology Transfers to China* (US Department of Commerce, 1999) as well as numerous published articles, government and private-sector briefings, and Congressional testimonies. She holds an M.A. in International Security Policy from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, and a B.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University.

ABOUT THE FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS PROGRAM

The *Future of Peace Operations* program builds a broader public dialogue on the role of peace operations in resolving conflict and building lasting peace. Peace operations comprise peacekeeping, the provision of temporary, post-conflict security by internationally mandated forces and peacebuilding, those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a war-torn society create a self-sustaining peace.

The program's goals are to advance, through research and analysis, the capacity of peace operations to promote the rule of law, protection of civilians, and regional security; enhance US peace operations policy by building bridges between the Administration, Congress, international organizations, and NGOs; and to advance UN reforms for peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to bring those reforms to the attention of key public and policy audiences. For detailed information about our projects, please visit www.stimson.org/fopo.

The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security through rigorous, nonpartisan analysis and results-oriented outreach on many of the most enduring and challenging problems of national and international security.