




An Alliance for Engagement

BUILDING COOPERATION IN SECURITY RELATIONS WITH CHINA



Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, editors

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Preface

I am pleased to present the latest publication of the Henry L. Stimson Center, *An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China*. This report is the culmination of a two year project exploring how the alliance between the United States and Japan could address the issue of engagement with China. The project explored the dynamics of evolving engagement strategies in both Washington and Tokyo, and examined whether the formal alliance structure that has united the United States and Japan since 1951 could be better utilized in pursuit of constructive relations with Beijing. It is clear that the interaction of these three states will be the principal determinant of stability in East Asia for the decade ahead.

In conducting the research for this publication, we gathered American and Japanese thinkers in a series of workshops and conferences held in the United States and Japan. These chapters represent the views of the core project team. While the authors did not conclude with a single set of policy recommendations, there is clearly a strong basis for consensus about core issues, and a desire to examine further the different tactical approaches the authors propose.

It is our hope that this study will be useful and provocative in focusing attention on this fascinating set of relationships in East Asia. It also serves to sharpen our appreciation for the US-Japan alliance, and to reflect on its further potential to shape and enhance security in East Asia. The Project Director, Benjamin L. Self, and I are grateful for the support we received from The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for this project. We also appreciate The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their general support of the Project for Cooperation on Japanese Security Policy.

I would welcome hearing from you if you have any questions about this project or about other work on Asian security issues at the Stimson Center.

Ellen Laipson
President
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Table of Contents

| | |
|---|------|
| Preface..... | v |
| Table of Contents | vii |
| List of Abbreviations..... | viii |
| Introduction | |
| <i>Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson</i> | xi |
| The US–Japan Alliance and China: Theoretical Perspectives | |
| The Dangers of Overreaching: International Relations Theory, the US–Japan Alliance, and China | |
| <i>Christopher P. Twomey</i> | 3 |
| Alliances in Security Communities: Theoretical Perspectives on Compatibility | |
| <i>Taku Ishikawa</i> | 30 |
| Domestic Politics of China Policymaking | |
| US Domestic Foreign Policy Process and its Impact on China Policy | |
| <i>Derek Mitchell and Yuki Tatsumi</i> | 57 |
| Japan’s Domestic Politics and China Policymaking | |
| <i>Masahiko Sasajima</i> | 79 |
| China in National Strategic Policy | |
| US Security Strategy and US–Japan–China Relations: Stabilizer and Engager | |
| <i>Robert Eldridge</i> | 113 |
| Japan’s Security Policy and US–Japan–China Relations | |
| <i>Koji Murata</i> | 129 |
| Modes of US–Japan Relations with China | |
| An Alliance for Engagement | |
| <i>Benjamin L. Self</i> | 145 |
| Multilateralism and Security Cooperation with China | |
| <i>Akiko Fukushima</i> | 166 |
| Bibliography..... | 191 |
| Notes on Project Advisors, Contributors, and Editors..... | 203 |

List of Abbreviations

ABM- Anti-Ballistic Missile (treaty)
AMF- Asian Monetary Fund
ANEAN- Association of Northeast Asian Nations
ANZUS- Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand
APEC- Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF- ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN plus three- ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea
ASEM- Asia Europe Meeting
AWACS- Airborne Warning and Control System
BMD- Ballistic Missile Defense
CBMs- Confidence-Building Measures
CCP-Chinese Communist Party
CIA- Central Intelligence Agency (United States of America)
CONUS- Continental United States
CSCAP- Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
CSIS- Center for Strategic and International Studies (United States)
DOD- Department of Defense (United States)
DPP- Democratic Progressive Party (ROC, Taiwan)
DPRK- Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DRO- Disaster Relief Operations
EAEC- East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEG- East Asian Economic Group
EASR- East Asian Security Strategy Report
GDP- Gross Domestic Product
HRO- Human Relief Operations
ICBM- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IGCC- Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
IMF- International Monetary Fund
INF- Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
JBIC-Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JCIE- Japan Center for International Exchange
JDA- Japan Defense Agency
JIIA- Japan Institute of International Affairs
KEDO- Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KMT- Kuomintang (or Nationalist party, Republic of China, Taiwan)
LDP- Liberal Democratic Party
MAD- Mutually Assured Destruction
MD- Missile Defense
MFN- Most Favored Nation (trade status)
MOFA- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MSDF- Maritime Self Defense Force (Japan)
NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDPO- National Defense Program Outline (Japan)
NEACD- Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NMD- National Missile Defense
NPC- National People's Congress (People's Republic of China)
NPCSD- North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue
NPT- Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC- National Security Council (United States of America)
NTWD- Navy Theater Wide Defense
NWS- Nuclear Weapons States
ODA- Official Development Assistance
OSCE- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PACOM- Pacific Command (United States)
PECC- Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
PFP- Partnership for Peace
PKF- Peace Keeping Forces (United Nations)
PKO- Peace Keeping Operations (United Nations)
PLA- People's Liberation Army (People's Republic of China)
PLAAF- People's Liberation Army Air Force (People's Republic of China)
PMC- Post-Ministerial Conference With Dialogue Partners
PRC- People's Republic of China
QDR- Quadrennial Defense Review (United States of America)

ROK- Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SIASJ- Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
SDF- Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
SDI- Strategic Defense Initiative
SLOC- Sea Lanes of Communication
TMD- Theater Missile Defense
TRA- Taiwan Relations Act
UN- United Nations
UNCLOS- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO- World Trade Organization

Introduction

Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson

The Henry L. Stimson Center launched a project in early 2000 to explore means to ameliorate security relations between Japan and China. Drawing on previous projects on confidence-building measures (CBMs), the project director identified two major obstacles to improved security ties: the interpretation of history and the US–Japan alliance. While the history issue receives ample attention, the Alliance has been understudied in this regard. Particularly striking was that, despite its status as a critical element in the security policies of both allies and in their respective security relations with China, the US–Japan alliance had not been the vehicle for confidence-building. To investigate this issue, the Stimson Center assembled a team of American and Japanese security specialists under the guidance of a group of senior advisers to explore how the United States and Japan could build a framework for security cooperation with China by enhancing their bilateral Alliance.

At the core of this initiative was the realization that while the United States and Japan have made efforts to move their bilateral security relationship in a positive direction since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance still lacks critical elements that would allow it to play a more constructive role in regional security. The focus of this publication is to explore how the Alliance partners should link their policies to build a durable framework to integrate China—the one other nation that is most crucial in determining the shape of the region’s future—as a cooperative member of the regional order. There is substantial diversity of opinion among project participants regarding the best approach to this difficult challenge, but all agree that the security relationship between the Alliance and China demands more careful attention from policymakers in Washington and Tokyo. Furthermore, there was consensus that it is in both countries’ interest to improve coordination of their China policies. Joint pursuit of an Alliance-based engagement strategy will help to induce behavior from China needed to keep the region peaceful and prosperous.

For this publication, researchers on the project team each prepared an essay on one of four aspects of this issue: theoretical considerations of changing the dynamics of the US–Japan alliance relationship; the effect of domestic politics

on China policymaking; national strategic policy considerations; and differing modes of Alliance relations with China. During 2001, the group held private workshops in Washington DC at the Stimson Center and in Kyoto at Doshisha University, and a conference in Kyoto to refine the discussion and arguments. The papers in this volume are the product of the participants' dedicated efforts both inside and outside of these sessions. It should be noted that the project team included participants from only the United States and Japan, not from China. The idea was to first have both Allies reach agreement that their own national interests dictate the need for enhanced efforts at building security cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This approach is important in terms of domestic opinion in the United States and in Japan, because the strategy of engagement must not appear to be any kind of concession to, or appeasement of, the Chinese.

Christopher Twomey's paper leads off by exploring the implications of international relations theory for the Alliance as a tool for confidence-building and security cooperation with China. Twomey states that the dominant historical function of alliances as agents of deterrence and the clear signs that the US-Japan security relationship has been strengthened since the mid-1990s indicate that to refocus the Alliance in order to reassure China would be counterproductive. Twomey emphasizes that unilateral efforts by the United States and Japan to reassure China or joint efforts in a multilateral context have more promise for success. Taku Ishikawa continues the theoretical discussion. While he agrees with Twomey's assessment that it is difficult to disassociate the Alliance from a mold of containment, Ishikawa is more optimistic about the theoretical compatibility between the US-Japan alliance and a security community that includes China. He points to the distinct feasibility of such a community in East Asia with the US-Japan alliance as its core, but cautions that the Alliance must be careful to balance its engagement and containment functions in order for such a community to be successful. In addition, he emphasizes the need for the Alliance to avoid both the over-strengthening of its anti-China elements and complacently weakening its resolve to ensure the peaceful resolution of security issues in the region.

In a discussion of the influence of US domestic politics on US China policy, Derek Mitchell and Yuki Tatsumi conclude that while a US policy of engaging China is likely to continue over the long-term, divisions within the United States about the nature and goals of such a policy has prevented a coherent policy from being carried forward. While highlighting the involvement of Congress, interest groups, and the media in US policy toward China over the past century, they point out that the executive branch will continue to drive China policy as it has in the past, particularly when it chooses to assert itself. Mitchell and Tatsumi maintain that the post-September 11 environment provides an opportunity for

US decision-makers to focus on areas where the two countries may cooperate, rather than on those issues that divide them, and an environment in which the United States may usefully engage China in dialogue on a variety of issues of mutual interest, including, but not limited to, counter-terrorism. They also contend that the ability to forge a workable domestic consensus on US China policy will be a critical element for successful alliance cooperation with Japan on how to engage China. Delving into the intricacies of Japan's China policymaking processes, Masahiko Sasajima stresses that any framework for Japan and the United States to deepen security cooperation with China will depend on concerted efforts by Japan and China to move beyond decision-making mired on emotions and suspicions tied to issues of history. In a series of illustrative examples, Sasajima's essay lays out how history has been a source of mutual distrust in policymaking, diplomatic negotiations, and dialogue on a range of issues, pointing out that misperception perpetuated in both countries causes unnecessary apprehension. Raising the example of China's cautionary response to the Maritime Self-Defense Force's deployment of ships to the Indian Ocean as part of the global anti-terrorism coalition, he contends that China's response to more recent developments in Japan's military posture is no different than in the past.

Exploring how US national security strategy impacts relations with China, Robert Eldridge argues that the United States, along with Japan and other nations in the region, has the ability to positively shape the strategic and political environment in East Asia in a way that would encourage a more cooperative, transparent, and responsible China. However, he claims that in the context of the US-Japan alliance, too much emphasis is placed on the security dimensions of the relationship. He suggests that the full potential of the overall Alliance, particularly in political, economic, and social contexts, should be more fully employed. In his essay on Japanese security strategies, Koji Murata writes that the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 have reinforced the necessity for Japan and the United States to deepen and enlarge the scope of cooperation beyond the limits of the revised Guidelines and the temporary Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. He calls for a more reciprocal security alliance that is not limited to bilateral modes of cooperation, but expands to include collaboration on UN peacekeeping operations and other multilateral modes of cooperation.

In the final section devoted to examining different modes of US-Japan security cooperation with China, Benjamin Self explains why the Alliance should approach relations with China in a linked way despite differing national interests and other inherent difficulties. He argues that China policies pursued separately by both Japan and the United States have not considered the interests of the other alliance partner, too often leading to hurtful anxiety when either

US–China or Japan–China ties seem to strengthen or worsen. Self prescribes the establishment of a secretariat for joint coordination between Japan and the United States as a means to bolstering the utility of the Alliance on a range of security issues, but specifically with regards to building security cooperation with China. Akiko Fukushima’s piece draws lessons from past and current methods for maintaining security relations with China, both practiced together and separately by Japan and the United States, since the 1990s. Making the point that it is difficult to find concrete evidence that bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral dialogues have led to a more peaceful security environment in East Asia, she notes that less tangible gains of reduced mistrust can be identified. She concludes that the United States and Japan will most successfully engage China in security cooperation by doing so both together and separately because of the limitations of each approach on its own.

NEXT STEPS: LAUNCHING ALLIANCE-BASED DIALOGUE WITH CHINA

The project *An Alliance for Engagement* has explored the incentives and obstacles to making the US–Japan alliance a mechanism for pursuing security cooperation with the PRC. There are ongoing debates about the ease of doing so, but there is also general consensus that greater communication between the Allies and enhanced coordination of policies regarding China and security are vital elements in ensuring stability while promoting progress. The Alliance is not yet well suited to this task—it lacks the depth of institutionalization and the routine patterns of consultation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) brought to the Partnership for Peace (PFP)—but the Alliance is changing. As it moves into a new phase of greater active function and a larger Japanese role, the Alliance should also strengthen its channels of communication with other countries and institutions. The connections between the US–Japan alliance and other American alliances in Asia have greatly improved since the mid-1990s, most notably in the cases of the US–Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) alliances. The US–Japan alliance relationship with China now also demands priority.

The next step in this project must be to include China’s perspective and initiate an informal, non-governmental dialogue between the Alliance and China. This new dialogue should learn from existing dialogue processes that include China, but should explicitly reject trilateralism in favor of cooperation-oriented, positive-sum discussions between two sides. Building on common interests in preventing conflict, fighting terrorism and piracy, stemming proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, avoiding an arms race, advancing

humanitarian action, buttressing multilateral institutions and preserving the stability that enables prosperity, experts from the Alliance and the PRC can begin to approach contentious issues in a constructive manner. They can then work toward developing an agenda for official dialogue at various existing venues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and at an eventual official Alliance–PRC dialogue. The effort is well worth making.

The Stimson Center would like to first and foremost thank The Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for its support that made this project and publication possible. We also thank The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their support of the Japan Project’s ongoing work on Japanese security policy and regional security cooperation in East Asia. The Center also would like to express thanks to Doshisha University for hosting sessions in Kyoto and co-organizing portions of the project. Deep gratitude is due to all project participants for their devotion of time and effort to the project. The guidance and direction of the project advisors was invaluable, and the willingness of paper authors to grapple with a difficult topic greatly appreciated. Also, the editors of this publication would like to recognize colleagues and interns at the Stimson Center who were instrumental in editing, and in some cases, in translating sections of this publication.

