ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT:
from COOPERATION to CONFRONTATION?
2013–2017

Compendium of works from the China Leadership Monitor

ALAN D. ROMBERG
Preface

Brian Finlay and Ellen Laipson

It is our privilege to present this collection of Alan Romberg’s analytical work on the cross-Strait relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. Alan joined Stimson in 2000 to lead the East Asia Program after a long and prestigious career in the Department of State, during which he was an instrumental player in the development of the United States’ policy in Asia, particularly relating to the PRC and Taiwan. He brought his expertise to bear on his work at Stimson, where he wrote the seminal book on U.S. policy towards Taiwan, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice, and facilitated countless meetings between policymakers and scholars of the U.S., Taiwan, and the PRC.

Alan was also a contributor to the Hoover Institution’s China Leadership Monitor on the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangle, and these three volumes collect his essays written between 2013 and 2017. These volumes accompany volumes 1-3, From Confrontation to Cooperation, which compile Alan’s articles written between 2006 and 2012. We have reprinted the body of Alan’s work for the Monitor so that his meticulous record and analysis of a decade of cross-Strait relations can be an ongoing resource for students, scholars, and practitioners.

We are thankful to Dr. Alice Lyman Miller, editor of the Monitor, for reflecting upon Alan’s contributions in the introduction to these three volumes. We are also grateful to Alan’s colleagues for enriching Alan’s work throughout his career and for their support now, especially Jeffrey A. Bader, the members of the Harvard University Taiwan Studies Workshop led by Professor Steve Goldstein, and Yun Sun, each of whom wrote reflections to close each volume.

Over almost two decades at Stimson, Alan worked with and mentored many staff and interns. Our gratitude goes to the East Asia team who worked closely with Alan for many years, especially Program Co-Directors Yuki Tatsumi and Yun Sun. Assisting Alan in his thorough documentation and study of cross-Strait developments were many dedicated interns, including Ran Zheng, Emily Chen, Xiao Han, Rongfei Gou, Michelle Chang, Antonio Liao, Guan Wang, Emily Law, Sandy Lu, and Summer Tan. Thanks are also due to Research Associate Pamela Kennedy and Research Intern Summer Tan for helping to prepare this book for publication, and to former Research Associate Hana Rudolph for supporting Alan’s research.
Finally, a special thank you to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in D.C. for recognizing the value of Alan’s work, supporting his research during his years at Stimson, and for making this publication possible.

Sincerely,

Brian Finlay
President and CEO

Ellen Laipson
President Emeritus
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I began as the China Leadership Monitor’s founding general editor in 2001. The Monitor was inspired by a good idea by Michel Oksenberg, who had played a central role in the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in 1979. Mike observed that analysis of Chinese leadership politics – once a staple of the China-watching field – was disappearing from public discourse about contemporary China and U.S.-China relations.

As political science departments turned to investigating issues in Chinese affairs that were susceptible to quantitative methods, as area studies were in decline, and as U.S.-PRC normalization afforded direct access to aspects of China previously impossible, academic China specialists could increasingly tell us about issues in ward politics in Shanghai or anti-Japanese protests in local Fujian. But dissections of the political balance of power in the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo remained a black box and rarely appeared in even the most prominent academic journals on contemporary China. Journalists working in Beijing on occasion wrote about leadership politics, but most brought to their work little or no background in Chinese affairs or in the politics of communist political orders, and their tours in China were usually too short to enable them to build the long-term perspectives needed to follow the Chinese leadership. From its inception, the Monitor sought to address the emerging gap that Mike perceived.

The intended audience for the Monitor has been American policy-makers in government and the broader policy-interested public. Writing analysis of leadership politics for the Monitor therefore requires several skills: precision and clarity; deep background in the history of Chinese politics; thorough acquaintance with proven Kremlinological methods of analyzing elite politics as they apply to the leadership of the People’s Republic; big files and a good memory; a direct, get-to-the-point writing style, and a large dose of humility ingrained from the difficulty of penetrating the black box of Politburo politics. Neither the quantitative preoccupations of contemporary political science nor the social science jargon of academics address these requirements well. The pool of potential candidates therefore has drawn largely from specialists in the U.S. Government, analysts in the public policy think tanks that seek to inform government policy, and academics who have some government experience under their belts.
The Monitor has regularly published four, later three issues a year. A team of the same authors write for each issue, each writing on the specific policy area in which they have recognized expertise. The Monitor’s first writers on the politics of Chinese foreign policy were Tom Christensen, who left the group in January 2006 to serve as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia under the Bush administration, and Bob Suettinger, a career analyst of Chinese affairs who had served several years as Asia director on President Clinton’s National Security Council and who pinch-hit for Christensen for five issues.

Christensen’s departure required finding a replacement to cover his package of the politics of Chinese foreign policy-making, arguably the foremost topic among those addressed by the Monitor. As in the case of enlisting ghost-busting services, the basic question was, “Who ya gonna call?”

At that point I had known Alan Romberg for almost 30 years. I knew of his long, distinguished service at State, especially in posts on U.S. relations with Asia. In debates in informal settings over that time, I had heard him expound credibly on issues ranging from intermediate missile deployments in Europe, Japanese defense policy, Hong Kong politics since unification with the PRC, Beijing’s approach to the two Koreas, and, of course, sensitive issues in U.S.-China relations. He had graduated from Princeton, my own alma mater, but I did not hold that against him. He seemed the right guy.

I was delighted, therefore, when he agreed to join the crew of Monitor analysts. But there was a catch: he preferred not to cover all of Chinese foreign relations, only the PRC-Taiwan cross-Strait relationship and the U.S. role in it. I knew from numerous previous informal interactions that this topic was of sustained interest to Alan. In addition, his Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations had been published by Stimson three years earlier and offered the most authoritative and thorough analysis of the Taiwan question in U.S.-China relations available. So his proposal was sensible, and I agreed. I resolved the need for Monitor coverage of the larger topic of Chinese foreign relations by gaining funding for a seventh slot in the Monitor crew and recruiting Carnegie specialist Michael Swaine, who remains a regular and reliable contributor.

The Monitor’s crew of authors is not exactly an anarcho-syndicalist autonomous collective. But its internal dynamic does seem to replicate the collective leadership ground rules that Deng Xiaoping sought to instill and that seemed to prevail for a long time in the Politburo we all sought to analyze. Each member is a recognized authority on the topic they cover for the Monitor, and each possesses a strong personality and holds strong opinions. As a group they often came to divergent conclusions about the same topic, and I recognized at the outset that there could be no hope of imposing an office line on the issues of the day – much better to let our intended readership
see our differences and draw their own conclusions. Nevertheless, what members of the Monitor group shared in common has been only the most nominal respect for the authority of their general secretary...er, I mean, general editor.

Consequently, editing the Monitor has been a great school in the personalities, character, priorities, and foibles of the publication’s authors, in addition to their analytical and writing skills. Alan’s precision and clarity with regard to sensitive political questions was immediately apparent from an exchange we had over the heading in the Monitor’s table of contents for his first submission, in January 2006. Without much reflection I had proposed the rubric “China-Taiwan-United States.” Alan responded immediately by proposing the rubric “PRC-Taiwan-United States,” reflecting the prevailing ambiguities of contending ideas of what constitutes “China” in the triangular relationship.

Over time, I came to appreciate that, in addition to the many other skills he brought to the Monitor, Alan was a master of the art of strategic submission. At the beginning of each project year, we negotiate deadlines for submission of drafts for the issues to appear that year, taking into account anticipated major events in leadership politics such as party congresses and Central Committee plenums, National People’s Congress sessions, and the like. These agreements in deadlines turned out to be less like mandatory state plans and more like advisory plans. Some authors, marching to some inner clock set by experience in government bureaucracies or by an admirably compulsive need to get things done, reliably hit the negotiated deadlines. Others dithered, torn by the hope for some new shred of evidence that would clarify an ever-ambiguous interpretive picture or by demanding professional schedules or by innate tendencies in favor of procrastination. The resulting spread in submissions between those who hit deadlines and those who did not could be a matter of weeks.

For Alan, this situation evoked a strategy that tried to reconcile his characteristic respect for professional discipline in hitting deadlines and his preoccupation for timeliness in analysis – even in a quarterly publication. Sometimes Alan submitted close to the deadline, but he would then insist in a chain of emails on revising what he had submitted in light of some new development or piece of evidence. Later on, he developed the technique of carefully watching the submissions by other members of the crew and timing his submission not to be absolutely last, but close enough to it to allow him to present his most up-to-date analysis. Eventually, we agreed that he could post his submissions on the Stimson Center’s website ahead of their appearance in the Monitor, but that did not alter his shrewd tactics of strategic submission.

For me as editor, managing the various of tactics of submission deployed by Alan and his Monitor colleagues was a course in appreciating the different sensibilities of talented analysts while extending sufficient latitude to coax their best analytical efforts. I have long pondered how much my understanding of the dimensions of
leadership politics in Hu Jintao’s frustrated second term as party general secretary reflected this experience as Monitor editor.

Between January 2006 and September 2017, Alan wrote 37 articles for the China Leadership Monitor on the complex dynamics of cross-Strait relations and the U.S. role in them. Each reflected his deep understanding of the triangular politics, his exhaustive research apparent in his footnotes, the clarity of his straight-ahead prose, and his abiding interest and concern for this sensitive area in U.S. foreign policy. They will stand for a long time as representing not the first cut at history but rather something much closer to history’s final cut.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>4NPP</td>
<td>4th Nuclear Power Plant</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air defense identification zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIIB</td>
<td>Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank</td>
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<td>AIT</td>
<td>American Institute in Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ARATS</td>
<td>Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASS</td>
<td>Chinese Academy of Social Sciences</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence building measures</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
<td>China Central Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Central Executive Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPC</td>
<td>Communist Party of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPPCC</td>
<td>Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EACS</td>
<td>European Association for Chinese Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECFA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>EY</td>
<td>Executive Yuan</td>
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<td>FEPZ</td>
<td>Free Economic Pilot Zones</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>HFAC</td>
<td>House Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICAO</td>
<td>International Civil Aviation Organization</td>
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The 18th Party Congress laid out a “steady on course” approach to cross-Strait relations, continuing to emphasize economic, cultural, and educational exchanges in the near term while seeking to lay a foundation of political trust for future political and security dialogues, including a peace accord. In a Taipei conference with both Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) representatives in mid-December, People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials reiterated this patient approach while also calling for step-by-step progress. DPP participants, however, challenged the sincerity of PRC assertions of patience, charging that Beijing was shifting the agenda toward political issues to step up the pace and narrow the options to one: unification.

Hu Jintao’s Report to the 18th Party Congress

In his report to the 18th Communist Party Congress, outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao reiterated the basic elements of the cross-Strait policy of the People’s Republic of China, albeit with a couple of interesting insertions and omissions. Hewing closely to the points he has made over the past several years, including in his landmark December 31, 2008 speech, Hu gave pride of place to the “irresistible historical process” of complete reunification. But to achieve success, consistent with the often-stated emphasis on moving in an orderly fashion, he noted that “above everything else” (首先) one needs to ensure peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

Obeisance to the “one China principle” remains a central requirement, Hu said, stressing that China’s territory and sovereignty have always been indivisible and no division would be tolerated. Accordingly, both sides should scrupulously oppose “Taiwan independence,” persist in their common position on the 1992 Consensus, and more strongly uphold their common adherence to the “one China framework,” seeking common ground on that basis while reserving differences.
This was the first reference made to the “1992 Consensus” in a document as authoritative as this. Part of the explanation might be that this is the twentieth anniversary of the Consensus. But more to the point, Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Wang Yi noted that writing this point into a formal document of the congress demonstrates the degree of seriousness with which it is taken as a constituent part of the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.\(^3\)

Whether mention in Hu’s speech signals that the “1992 Consensus” will be good enough as a basis for progress in all areas of cross-Strait relations, including political relations, is an open question, but the use here is certainly suggestive. What is clear, however, is that the core element remains “one China.” This is demonstrated by the next sentence when, addressing the Democratic Progressive Party, Hu said: “We are ready to conduct exchanges, dialogue, and cooperation with any political party in Taiwan as long as it does not seek Taiwan independence and recognizes one China” (对台湾任何政党，只要不主张“台独”，认同一个中国，我们都愿意同他们交往，对话，合作).\(^4\)

Hu adopted an explicit – and instrumental – approach in saying why China should build on existing relationships. It should deepen economic cooperation to increase common interests, expand cultural exchanges to enhance a common sense of national identity, and further people-to-people contacts to cultivate mutual goodwill.

Turning to the more sensitive aspect of Beijing’s cross-Strait agenda, he called for “jointly exploring” cross-Strait political relations and making “fair and reasonable arrangements” (合情合理安排)\(^5\) for them under the “special condition that the country is yet to be unified.” He expressed the hope that the two sides would discuss the establishment of a cross-Strait military security trust mechanism, stabilizing the situation in the Strait, and reach a peace agreement through consultation, opening new prospects for peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

**PRC efforts to temper reactions in Taiwan**

Although Hu attached no timetable to such efforts, the fact that he raised them at all gave rise to considerable speculation that Beijing will press the political and security agenda during Ma’s second term. After seeing the initial nervous reaction in Taiwan, TAO Deputy Director Ye Kedong explained that what Hu laid out was not a blueprint for tomorrow, but the Mainland’s policy toward the island over the coming 5–10 years. Furthermore, Ye added, Beijing would maintain consistency and continuity in policy, moving step-by-step to consolidate and deepen cross-Strait relations in accordance with the formula of “first the easy, then the hard.”\(^6\)

The TAO spokesman followed with similar comments a few days later, adding a point that wasn’t new but was intended as a reminder that Beijing is looking not for stasis but
continuing progress: “Political issues in cross-Strait relations are a reality and we will have to deal with them sooner or later” (两岸政治议题是客观存在的，迟早要面对).7

Despite the Taiwan media reporting that prompted these “explanations,” Taipei’s formal reaction to Hu’s comments on political and security talks came only belatedly. Speaking some four weeks after Hu’s report was delivered, the recently appointed head of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Wang Yu-chi, said that Hu’s remarks and other commentary surrounding the 18th Party Congress indicated that the Mainland would step up pressure for political talks, especially on signing a cross-Strait peace accord. Wang pushed aside any notion of such an accord, observing that it was not a priority for Taipei. In any case, he said, Beijing would eventually need to clarify what kind of peace accord it was looking toward. It could not be in the form of an armistice pact or a mutual non-aggression treaty, he said, as those models would not fit current circumstances. Moreover, he said, if it meant something related to unification, this would not be acceptable to people in Taiwan.8

President Ma Ying-jeou also noted that political negotiations were “not the most urgent issue” at this point, but went beyond that to voice a cautionary note that “pushing the envelope is not helpful for strengthening bilateral [i.e., cross-Strait] ties.” Rather, he said, “it is our goal to build a solid and long-lasting cross-Strait exchange structure, so that future administrations can continue to promote peace across the Taiwan Strait.”9

Ma supplemented these statements several days later in an interview with a local paper, picking up many of the same arguments Wang Yu-chi had used to question the purposes of a peace accord. Seeming to deny the logic of a point he made in October suggesting that Taiwan would need to “cautiously consider” at some point in the next decade whether to conclude a peace treaty,10 Ma reverted to a question he appeared to be asking in the spring of 2011:11 in light of the fact that an accord was not needed to bring about a cease-fire or armistice or to jumpstart a productive relationship, and in light of all the other cross-Strait relationships that already contribute to consolidating peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, “do we still need a peace accord?” (還需要...和平協議?).12

As he had in the run-up to the 18th Party Congress,13 TAO Director Wang Yi devoted several articles, speeches, and interviews to laying out at great length the rationale and particulars of Beijing’s consistent cross-Strait policy going forward. He stressed the critical relationship between the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the overall national strategy of China’s peaceful development, noting that, as the Taiwan issue relates to China's core interests, Taiwan-related work holds an important strategic place in the overall work of the party and state.14 Based on “an objective analysis of Taiwan-related issues,” he said, it is important to maintain determination and patience in cross-Strait work15 and, while not losing sight of the
ultimate goal of reunification, it is necessary to move step-by-step in accordance with reality. On this last point, as he put it, it is necessary to “effectively grasp the relationship between keeping in mind the long-term goal and basing ourselves on reality; between comprehensive improvement and breakthroughs in key areas; and between accomplishing positive results and advancing in an orderly manner.”

Wang Yi also made an argument that could easily resonate with policymakers in Washington as they think about the importance of a strong domestic base for effective external policies. He said that, in the final analysis, the factor that will affect and determine cross-Strait relations the most is what happens in terms of the Mainland’s continuous growth and progress.

Along with the further enhancement of the Mainland’s comprehensive strength, we will have greater qualifications and capabilities to continuously consolidate and deepen the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and lay a more solid foundation for the ultimate realization of the nation’s complete reunification.

Now, however, with the discussion in Taiwan focused on concerns over possible Mainland pressure to step up the pace and move quickly to political dialogue, Wang, as he had done so often in the past, decided it was necessary to put matters in perspective. In particular, he apparently felt compelled to respond to MAC Chairman Wang Yu-chi’s comments about likely PRC pressure to engage in political talks by clarifying not only what the Mainland’s policy was but also what it was not. He seized the occasion of a visiting Taiwan delegation with Taiwan press in attendance to place the issue in context.

We have said many times that, first of all, our policy toward Taiwan seeks to maintain continuity, orderliness, and consistency. On the basis of the development of the situation and the needs of cooperation and exchanges, naturally it will also change with the times. But this requires discussion and consultation between the two sides...

Let’s not presume there are problems that have not been discussed, OK? These are all questions that, if everyone wants to discuss in the future, we can discuss...

Our position hasn’t changed. Our focus now is on economic cooperation. We want to deepen economic cooperation. There are many things we need to do, for example Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) follow-on discussions. We still have much to do regarding cooperation in the areas of industry, investment, culture, education, and so forth...

Other questions exist, that’s an objective reality. And we can’t turn a blind eye to them. But we want to go through an appropriate process of continuously exchanging views so as to create conditions [for handling them].

As long as the two sides oppose Taiwan independence and uphold the “1992 Consensus,” he said, peace and stability can be maintained in the Taiwan Strait and the people of Taiwan can continue to pass their days quietly.  

**Red, Blue, and Green all meet at the Taipei Forum**

Readers may recall that a large cross-Strait conference on “Strengthening Identification and Mutual Trust and Deepening Peaceful Development” was originally to be held in Taipei in June but was aborted when the Ma administration denied visas for a number of Mainland participants. The conference was eventually rescheduled for December and attended by a delegation of over 40 people from the Mainland (minus the former People’s Liberation Army officer whose inclusion had been a proximate cause of the visa denials in the summer). The conference turned out to be an important opportunity, especially for a senior Mainland delegation, to lay out the PRC’s approach directly to a Taiwan audience.

Attending in his capacity as director of the Research Center on Cross-Strait Relations, TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu put great stress on the issue of upholding “one China” and the “1992 Consensus.” He emphasized that, while the two sides did not read “one China” in the same political way, they agreed that theirs is not a state-to-state relationship, and argued that they should develop cross-Strait relations on that basis, seeking common ground while reserving differences. While praising the fact that such a conference could at least talk about politics, including reference to “one China,” Sun sought to allay concerns about a radical shift in Beijing’s approach by stressing continuity of policy and describing the PRC’s goal at present as consolidating and strengthening mutual trust.

Although he encouraged work by the two sides on the content of a peace accord (a TAO spokeswoman suggested this could be done through academic and other non-governmental discussions), Sun echoed Hu’s report by observing that prospects for a peace accord were also tied up with “making fair and reasonable arrangements” (做出合情合理的安排) regarding overall political relations and establishing a military mutual trust mechanism, and that these efforts would take a long time. For now, Sun argued, the basic focus should be on seeking to resolve political differences and making arrangements for further development of cross-Strait relations.

In light of this approach, Sun dismissed as an “over-interpretation” (過度解讀) the notion popular in Taiwan that the Mainland was anxious about a peace accord and wanted to use this conference to apply pressure on Taiwan.

Some DPP members raised questions about holding such a seminar at all, implying that the MAC’s decision to allow it to take place was an example of pandering to the TAO and that the conference was “obviously” designed to lay the foundation for
a cross-Strait peace agreement and political consultations. Nonetheless, a number of senior DPP members attended the meeting, among them Joseph Wu Jaushieh, executive director of the party’s policy research committee, who formally wore an academic hat for the occasion but described himself to the press as attending in his party capacity. He and others in the party identified a series of policies and steps Beijing had taken that offended people in Taiwan and had contributed to a heightened sense of “Taiwanese” identity and support for independence.

Moreover, Wu charged that Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress revealed a shift in the PRC’s Taiwan policy away from using economic interest as the motivating force to promoting three political issues: forming a pre-unification political framework, establishing a military trust-building mechanism, and negotiating a peace accord. This strategy, he said, is designed to create an irreversible framework for unification and make unification the sole option. (Sun responded that these long-standing issues are complex but the Mainland has the patience to talk them over in working toward what he hoped would be a gradual consensus. The important point, he said, is that no one should set “preconditions,” otherwise it would be difficult to continue discussions.)

The passport issue

Among the offending items Wu and others raised were PRC passports that were issued starting in May. Not only did they have images of the Chinese version of the Sino-Indian border and the (in)famous “nine-dashed line” around the South China Sea, which upset many countries concerned, but that latter line was extended by a tenth dash along the east coast of Taiwan. Moreover, the passport contained images of two popular tourist sites in Taiwan.

According to one Taiwan press report, a PRC official explanation was that these images showed “scenic spots in our country’s Taiwan province” (我國台灣省的山水名勝). While avoiding the provocative reference to “Taiwan province,” the TAO tried to downplay the significance of the images. As the TAO spokesman put it, the Mainland’s consistent position has been that the Mainland and Taiwan both belong to one China (大陸和台灣同屬一個中國). The Mainland’s policy of continuing to improve and develop cross-Strait relations has not changed, he said; “regarding this particular matter [the passports] a question does not exist along the lines of what the Taiwan side has said about ‘stirring up a dispute’ or ‘changing the status quo.’” (這件具體事情並不存在台灣方面所說的「挑起爭議」，「改變現狀」的問題).

From Taiwan’s perspective, however, the new passport implied that the PRC was asserting, in the quintessential document reflecting sovereignty, that Taiwan and the area of the South China Sea belong to the PRC. The PRC explanation not only conflicted with the Republic of China’s (ROC) claim to the South China Sea area,
but even more insensitively, appeared to claim that Taiwan is part of the PRC. This handling not only raised cries of outrage in Taiwan, but ran directly against the position frequently articulated by senior PRC officials, that in a cross-Strait context, Beijing only talks about “China” and not “the PRC,” leaving open to future agreement between the two sides how one might structure relations between Taiwan and the Mainland and what the unified entity would be called.

On instruction from President Ma, the Mainland Affairs Council issued a formal statement about the inclusion of the map and images of the Taiwan tourist sites. Observing that the latter were parts of the ROC and “not under Mainland China’s authority to govern,” the MAC said that their inclusion “entirely ignores existing facts and provokes controversy, while at the same time not only harms the foundation of mutual trust established through efforts by the two sides over the recent years, but also hurts the feelings of Taiwan’s 23 million people. The Mainland’s action is absolutely unacceptable to the ROC government.” It then continued with a statement about the status quo.

The ROC is a sovereign and independent country. Under the ROC Constitution, the ROC’s territory has its existing national boundaries. The mainland Chinese authorities should squarely face the fact that the two sides are divided by the sea and governed separately, thus pragmatically and objectively face up to the ROC. It is believed that the Mainland side must “shelve disputes and face realities” on the existing foundation, and resolve disputes with wisdoms of self-restraint. Therefore, the MAC sternly reiterates that mainland China should avoid giving the outside world the impression of making a unilateral change to the status quo, which undermines the hard-earned achievements of cross-Strait relations, and thereby hinders and sets back developments of cross-Strait interactions.

As for Ma’s own views about the passport issue, his spokesman said that the president hopes the Mainland will not take “inappropriate action” to upset the hard-earned stability across the Strait.

Meanwhile, accusing the Ma administration of “doing nothing” in response to the Mainland’s action, the DPP arranged to hand out 10,000 passport stickers that would go over the entire cover of Taiwan passports, with the slogan “Taiwan is my country” and a map highlighting Taiwan’s territory and its geographical position. To boot, the Taiwan Solidarity Union burned and spray-painted large images of the PRC passport.

The head of MAC said Taipei would decide by late December how to treat the new passports. In the meantime, however, Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) responded to the MAC’s complaints about the passports by saying those complaints were “invalid” and that the passport design had only become an issue because pro-independence activists had made a big fuss. Without specifying
any consequences for Beijing’s dismissive response, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) termed ARATS’ handling “unacceptable.”

**International Space – Hu doesn’t mention it, Ma does**

Hu’s report made no mention of Taiwan’s “international space,” including his statement to Lien Chan at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders Meeting in Vladivostok in September that he would “seriously study” whether there was an “appropriate way” for Taiwan to participate in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

At the time of the Vladivostok meeting, Taiwan officials expressed optimism that they would be able to participate in the ICAO Council meeting in 2013. After the 18th Party Congress, however, there were reports that national security officials in Taipei were concerned and looking into whether Hu’s failure to mention the issue reflected any change or readjustment of Beijing’s policy.

Ma Ying-jeou nonetheless seized the occasion of his speech on the 20th anniversary of the “1992 Consensus” to raise the issue and to observe that Hu had discussed it with Lien. In this case, however, Ma went beyond his National Day general reference to Lien Chan having received a “positive response” (正面回应). This time he openly stated that Hu had said that “the two sides could discuss an appropriate way for letting Taiwan participate in ICAO” (双方可以讨论让台湾参加国际民航组织的适当方式), suggesting that the Taiwan leader is not as averse to the image of such consultations as some of his associates. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen what steps Beijing might take to follow up Hu’s APEC remarks.

As it considers the future, one point Beijing might do well to note in Ma’s speech was his statement that the “1992 Consensus” “amply reflected the government’s principle that the parties to negotiations must interact as equals and treat each other with dignity.” Mainland officials frequently speak about talks on the basis of equality, but rarely mention dignity. It is a point Ma made in his first inaugural address that continues to matter to him as well as to people in Taiwan.

Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement is often cited as an achievement of the Ma administration. The apparent recent downgrading of Taipei’s status under the agreement underscored the sense of insult Taiwan often feels at the hands of the Mainland.
Other Aspects of Cross-Strait Relations

Other Taipei-Beijing ties continue to develop – but slowly

At the time of the 18th Party Congress, Ma Ying-jeou sent parallel messages to Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao. Like his Mainland counterparts, Ma stressed the critical importance of upholding the “1992 Consensus” and said that, on the basis of the existing “good foundation,” he looked forward to “remarkable results in matters of consequence” such as expanding and deepening exchanges and the establishment of reciprocal offices by organizations from the respective sides (i.e., SEF and ARATS). In closing, Ma talked about future cooperation.

Going forward, in an international arena that’s complicated and unpredictable, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait need to enhance mutual trust and cooperate sincerely to cope with the new challenges, and to create more peaceful dividends that benefit people on both sides.51

Statements from both sides indicate that concerted efforts are being made to conclude a cross-Strait services trade agreement in the near term. In October, indications were that an agreement was expected to be signed by the end of 2012, though perhaps only covering priority items rather than all services.52 By late November, Wang Yi signaled some delay, speaking in terms of hoping to sign it before the lunar New Year (which comes during the second week of February 2013).53 As of early January 2013 no firm date had been set.

At the same time, Wang identified three other “main points of focus” for deepening cross-Strait economic relations now and in the future: fully implementing the Cross-Strait Investment Guarantee Agreement, pushing ahead on cross-Strait cooperation on financial services, and moving ahead steadily (but gradually) on reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices.54 (This last is addressed in more detail further on.)

These points seemed to parallel Ma’s agenda, though implicit in Wang Yi’s points was an expression of concern that financial ties were not balanced. Perhaps anticipating such concerns, some weeks earlier Ma Ying-jeou made clear that he is looking to liberalize controls on foreign investments in Taiwan, including from the Mainland. Although most investment will come in under the principle of “normal opening and exceptional control,” with post-notification rather than advance permission being the norm, Mainland investment will still require advance approval. That said, Taipei’s minister of economic affairs said it was the government’s intention to speed up approvals of Mainland investment, lifting existing restrictions on a basis that would not affect national security and other national interests. In the process, he said, the ministry is reviewing a fourth round of liberalization for Mainland investments, expanding on the
current rules that already allow investments in 97 percent of manufacturing industries and 51 percent of both service industries and infrastructure.\(^5^5\)

Another aspect of cross-Strait relations related to economic relations as well as international space is Beijing’s attitude toward Taiwan signing Free Trade Agreements or economic cooperation agreements. In a backhanded way, there was a somewhat encouraging development. The PRC minister of commerce made clear that Taiwan’s ambition to participate in regional free trade associations or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have to be addressed under the “one country” or “one China” concept, with Taiwan approaching these possibilities in its capacity as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” (its designation in the WTO). \(^5^6\) This is perhaps not ideal from Taipei’s perspective, but it would seem to be an endorsement of the Ma administration position toward such trade agreements. While the PRC minister’s comments are a warning not to touch on sovereignty questions, in fact Ma has been careful to avoid those topics, so the minister’s remarks also signal an implicit green light for Taiwan to go ahead as planned.\(^5^7\)

A similar line emerged in connection with the PRC foreign ministry reaction to the question of a possible Taiwan-Japan fishing agreement in the area of Diaoyu/Senkakus. The ministry spokesman said any such negotiations would need to be handled “scrupulously” within the framework of the “one China” principle,\(^5^8\) but, again, there was no suggestion that an agreement that avoids sovereignty issues would be a problem.

On the issue of establishing reciprocal offices, after almost two years of consideration, with several indications over the past year that they were “just about to be established,” Taiwan’s leading trade promotion agency opened offices in Shanghai and Beijing in December (with more to come in other cities in future months), and its PRC counterpart was actively seeking a site in Taipei.\(^5^9\)

But the question of reciprocal SEF and ARATS representative offices is still moving slowly. Discussion of such offices goes back at least a year and a half,\(^6^0\) and the topic continued to garner substantial attention in the summer and fall of 2012.\(^6^1\) Once again, in his National Day address, Ma raised the issue as one of the key points of focus for cross-Strait relations in the period ahead.\(^6^2\) He did so again in his letter to Xi Jinping in early November\(^6^3\) and yet again at a KMT central standing committee meeting in early December.\(^6^4\)

In October, the recently-appointed SEF chairman, Lin Join-sane, said that the two sides had agreed to “fast-track talks” on establishing reciprocal representative offices, but also acknowledged that they were still at the stage of conducting separate studies with no agreement yet on timetable or functions.\(^6^5\) For his part, while endorsing the goal in principle, as indicated above, TAO Director Wang Yi signaled a go-slow approach in describing how the two organizations would, through consultations,
“steadily push” for the establishment of the offices, while their functions expanded gradually, step-by-step. Considering the practical needs for establishing the offices, he also prescribed that to achieve these goals the mantra of addressing easier issues before difficult ones should be followed.\[66\]

Speaking about the issue some weeks later in response to Ma’s mention of it in his letter to Xi Jinping, the TAO spokesman reiterated the Mainland’s view that the reciprocal establishment of offices would benefit people on both sides in handling practical questions. He further expressed the hope that both sides could complete their research and planning as soon as possible so as to reach a common understanding.\[67\]

While these kinds of statements apparently continue to reflect a positive attitude in Beijing as well as Taipei, they also seem to indicate that there is still some distance to go before the two sides can come to an agreement on arrangements, including on functions the offices are to perform. Indeed, MAC head Wang Yu-chi said in late December that his office would work toward the goal of establishing reciprocal representative offices over the next three years.\[68\]

**Is “mutual benefit” to replace concessions?**

Observers in Taiwan listened carefully to remarks by Mainland officials in recent weeks and thought they heard hints that the days of one-sided deals (in Taiwan’s favor) may be over. While both sides have been talking in terms of concluding a merchandise trade agreement in 2013, and indeed that all ECFA follow-on negotiations should be completed before the end of 2013, Taiwan observers have paid great attention to Mainland officials’ references to conducting those talks on the basis of “mutual benefit, balance, and high standards.”

Chen Deming, PRC minister of commerce, made such references in mid-November—the first time such language had been used in this context, analysts said, taking it as a sign that Beijing probably would not make one-sided concessions in the upcoming negotiations.\[69\]

Calls for balance and reciprocity by Mainland interests are not new. They became especially prominent after the signing of the ECFA agreement in June 2010, which seemed to significantly benefit Taiwan. However, the rationale for treating Taiwan well has not changed. As discussed earlier with respect to Hu Jintao’s political report, it is part of a strategic effort by the Mainland to create a greater sense of common economic interests, common national identity, common destiny, and mutual goodwill. Even as Hu spoke in his report about promoting the “common well-being” (共同福祉) of people on both sides of the Strait, he made special mention of preserving the rights and interests of people in Taiwan.
In fact, this comment followed Wang Yi’s late October article in People’s Daily noting that in recent years, the Mainland has paid more attention to orienting Taiwan-related work to the people and more concrete services for Taiwan compatriots (especially at the grassroots), and that it has more actively implemented beneficial measures for the people there.  

In mid-November, the TAO spokesman proclaimed: “We will as always take care of the concerns of ordinary Taiwan people and try our best to look after the interests of small enterprises, traditional business, and common people, especially those in the southern and central part of Taiwan.”

So while Chen Deming’s words merit attention, one must believe that the thoughts Wang Yi has expressed regarding the strategic importance of Taiwan work will dictate a continuation of the general effort to win hearts and minds on the island through appealing to the people’s interests, including their pocketbooks.

The DPP Wrestles with Itself over Cross-Strait Issues

Former DPP chairman, premier, and presidential candidate Frank Hsieh Chang-ting traveled to China in early October, ostensibly to attend a bartender’s competition and to visit his ancestors’ graves, but clearly his goal was to open a new line of communication with the Mainland. Predictably, the visit was highly controversial within DPP circles, bringing out both detractors and supporters, and party officials went to great lengths to describe Hsieh’s visit as “private” and to make clear he was not carrying any messages.

In the run-up to the visit, the TAO made no direct statement about how Hsieh would be received but, when asked about the senior DPP member’s possible visit, reiterated the PRC’s “consistent policy” that “DPP personnel, coming in an appropriate capacity, are welcome to come and look around the Mainland.” In the end, not only did Hsieh meet with Chinese scholars who are cross-Strait experts, but also got together with a broad swath of senior PRC officials responsible for Taiwan policy including TAO Director Wang Yi, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, and ARATS Chairman Chen Yunlin, and was the guest of a People’s Liberation Army-sponsored think tank.

Upon his return, Hsieh sought to promote a number of variants of his idea regarding “respective interpretations of constitutions,” hoping the Mainland could accept them as “good enough” to meet the “one China” requirement for beginning party-to-party dialogue, while at the same time the DPP would be able to assert it had, in fact, not embraced “one China.” (In reality, neither is likely to be the case, which Hsieh presumably realizes, but his proposals have stirred debate within the party about what might be possible.)
One upshot of all of this was that, although the party finally announced it would set up a policy-level “China Affairs Committee” by mid-December, not only was its mandate to be restricted to “studying” or “researching” various matters pertaining to the Mainland77 (rather than being charged with coming up with a policy as Hsieh had hoped), but DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang took on the role of “convener” of the committee rather than inviting Hsieh to do so as had been planned. Moreover, because of difficulty in getting senior DPP leaders to sign up as members, actual establishment of the committee was delayed.

We will look at these issues in some detail our next essay.

Notes


4 Hu’s discussion of the requirement regarding the issue of “Taiwan independence” is a bit confusing. Here, Hu adopts a somewhat softer formulation of not “advocating” (主张) Taiwan independence. (Xinhua’s English translation says “not seek.”) In most cases the requirement is stated as the need to “oppose” (反對) independence. Since the basic requirement is to accept “one China” that includes both Taiwan and Mainland, it seems unlikely that any substantive change was intended. This also seems clear from a later statement in the same section of Hu’s report: “We resolutely oppose any separatist attempt for Taiwan independence. The Chinese people will never allow anyone or any force to separate Taiwan from the motherland by any means.” (我们坚决反对 “台独” 分裂图谋。 中国人民绝不允许任何人任何势力以任何方式把 台湾从祖国分割出去.) We take note of it, however, because some colleagues from Taiwan seem to see in the language a degree of possible flexibility.

5 Wang Yi later amplified what is meant by “fair and reasonable.” Fair (合情), he said, means to take care of each other’s concerns and not forcefully impose measures on the other party (就是照顾彼此关切， 不搞强加于人); reasonable (合理) means to abide by legal principles and not to engage in “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” (恪守法理基础，不搞“两个中国”、“一中一台”).
Across the Taiwan Strait

(“Wang Yi’s speech at the seminar commemorating the 20th anniversary of the ‘1992 Consensus,’” op. cit.)


Kelven Huang and Lilian Wu, “China will step up pressure on Taiwan for political talks: MAC,” CNA, December 5, 2012.


In September, in discussing how the Mainland would give impetus to the institutionalization and mechanization of cross-Strait relations, Wang had stressed four “constant directions” in the Mainland’s cross-Strait policy: the fundamental principle of insisting on the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations; the fundamental position of insisting on opposing Taiwan independence and recognizing the 1992 Consensus; the fundamental stance on insisting on easy things first and proceeding step-by-step; and the basic concept of putting people first and serving the people. (“Wang Yi: ‘Four no changes’ of cross-Strait relations,” China Times (carried in translation by Kuomintang News Network, hereafter KMT News Network), September 24, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=11908.)


Ibid.


Following the 18th Party Congress: Moving Forward Step-by-Step

20 “Director Wang Yi’s remarks at the reception to welcome the members of the visiting joint village, town, and city citizens delegation” (王毅主任在欢迎台湾乡镇市民代表会联合总会参访团招待会上的致辞), Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), December 7, 2012, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wly/201212/t20121207_3429888.htm.


27 Although Wu formally attended as a research fellow of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University (NCCU), the written text of his speech at the conference stated clearly that he is also executive director of the party’s policy research committee and the (newly-named) DPP representative in the United States. In an interview after the seminar he said he used the NCCU title to “show respect” for the conference organizer. (Su Lung-ch’i, “At the Taipei Forum, Green cadres and Mainland officials are at the same table,” CNA (domestic), December 11, 2012, http://www.cna.com.tw/News/aIPL/201212110377-1.aspx.)


A number of reports from various sources suggested that these passports had been issued by the Ministry of Public Security, not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A rather faint photograph of a page with the line is at http://gulfnews.com/news/world/other-world/taiwan-protests-chinese-passports-1.1109020. One should note that a number of official PRC maps include this “tenth dash,” but the important point here is that it now appeared in PRC passports for the first time.


Chris Wang, “DPP’s passport stickers to show Taiwan, not China,” Taipei Times, December 5, 2012, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/12/05/2003549409. The foreign ministry in Taipei warned that use of the stickers would be a violation of current regulations and could cause trouble for tourists when clearing customs and entering foreign countries, but the DPP countered that the interiors of the passports would not be affected. (Chris Wang, “DPP’s passport stickers to show Taiwan, not China,” Taipei Times, December 5, 2012.)


Elaine Hou, “Taiwan expecting progress on ICAO bid next year,” CNA, October 8, 2012.

Although Yu Keli, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Taiwan Research Institute, said at the mid-December Taipei forum that the Mainland kept an “open-minded attitude” on the issue of Taiwan’s international space (“DPP scholar: Beijing hurts Taiwan’s feelings, Beijing scholar: Beijing never begs questions,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 12, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12287), attendees at the forum also no doubt noticed that another speaker from the TAO suggested that a lack of mutual trust lay at the heart of the international space issue. (Hsieh Ai-zhu, “TAO says “we have been continuously studying” a cross-Strait peace accord” (兩岸和平協議 國台辦：一直在研究), Commercial Times, December 11, 2012, http://money.chinatimes.com/news/news-content.aspx?id=20121211000073&cid=1208.) If the implication of this latter remark is that forward progress will only come with the establishment of mutual trust, that would not be good news for Taiwan.

Ma continues to underscore the importance of Taiwan’s participation on various occasions, as he did in a meeting with visiting diplomats in mid-December. (“Ma: If Taiwan does not participate in ICAO it will be harmful to international civil aviation” (馬: 未入ICAO不利國際民航), CNA (domestic), December 13, 2012.)


The quote is from Ma’s oral remarks on the video posted on the presidential website. (“President attends the symposium on the 20th anniversary of the “1992 Consensus” [總統出席「九二共識」20週年學術研討會], Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), November 9, 2012, http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=28520&mrid=514.) The video makes it appear that Ma was saying U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talked about consultations regarding ICAO, but the Chinese-language text and especially the English-language text make it clear this was not the case. (“As for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), mainland leader Hu Jintao stated to Lien Chan during the APEC meetings this past September that the two sides could discuss the possibility of letting Taiwan participate appropriately in ICAO activities.” The English text is available at http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=28543&mrid=2355). The president seems to have skipped over some text in his prepared remarks, but the proper attribution of the ICAO remark to Hu is obvious.

Taiwan did make some progress in other areas of international space where Beijing has no role. It has officially become a member of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization, the latest in a series of fishing organizations to which it has gained access. (Grace Kuo, “Taiwan joins South Pacific fisheries body,” Taiwan Today, September 24, 2012, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=196570&ctNode=445.) Taiwan also will join the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S) in 2013, which will assist it in obtaining the latest drug data and sharpen local manufacturers’ global competitiveness, by among other things speeding up the time required to obtain certification from Canada, Europe, and the United States. (Meg Chang, “Taiwan set for PIC/S membership in 2013,” Taiwan Today, October 4, 2012, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=197012&ctNode=445.)
Taiwan was also elected as deputy presider for 2013 in the Early Transition Countries (ETC) Fund under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the first time a non-member of the Bank has been elected a deputy presiding position of one of the Bank’s multi-donor funds. (Y.F. Low, “Taiwan elected deputy president of Early Transition Countries Fund,” CNA, December 7, 2012.)

Meanwhile, Taipei has launched a high-profile public relations campaign to demonstrate its qualifications to participate in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It not only has issued a colorful brochure entitled “When all hands need to be on deck, Taiwan: Ready, Willing and Able,” (“Taiwan touts UNFCCC credentials,” Taiwan Today, November 27, 2012, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=198983&ctNode=445), it has even released a short film on YouTube in English with Chinese subtitles. (Elaine Hou, “Taiwan releases film on UNFCCC bid,” CNA, November 29, 2012.) Oddly, the film refers to the island during eleven of its twelve minutes as “Formosa” even though it uses “Taiwan” in the title [Taiwan, Green wonderland, 臺灣-綠色奇境]. It can be viewed at http://youtu.be/S-iGaC7wJV A.)


“Cross-Strait services trade agreement to be signed by year-end,” UDN (carried in translation by KMT News Network), October 5, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=11972. Services identified as likely to be covered in the first wave of liberalization include cultural innovation (such as pop music, cinema, and talent agencies), logistics, financial services, and perhaps medical cosmetology and physician check-ups.


In this connection, one might note that Taiwan-New Zealand trade negotiations are apparently proceeding smoothly and an economic cooperation agreement could be signed either by the end of 2012 or early in 2013, ahead of an agreement with Singapore. (Chen Hsiu-lan, “Taiwan-NZ trade pact making unexpectedly good progress,” WantChinaTimes.com, December 7, 2012, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20121207000086&cid=1101.)


As this process was in train, the TAO spokeswoman spoke enthusiastically about it as “a new development in cross-Taiwan Strait economic relations.” (Huang Chi-kuang and Lilian Wu, “Trade offices in Taiwan, China to begin operating soon: official,” CNA, December 12, 2012.)

She also indicated a positive view about Taiwan Culture Minister Lung Ying-tai’s idea about establishing cultural offices. However, the fact that the TAO spokeswoman spoke of doing this on a reciprocal basis led Minister Lung to say that she would continue internal discussions, consultations, and coordination with the Mainland Affairs Council and National Security Council, as setting up Mainland cultural centers in Taiwan was likely to be politically sensitive. (“Mainland’s TAO favors establishing cross-Strait cultural offices on reciprocal basis,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), December 13, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12296.)


President Ma Ying-jeou’s National Day Address, op. cit.

“Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping separately reply to KMT Chairman Mao Ying-jeou,” op. cit.


"Wang Yi: Cross-Strait comprehensive offices to be established gradually on a reciprocal basis,” op. cit.


"Mainland official: ECFA follow-up consultations to be based on principle of mutual benefits,” op. cit.

Wang Yi, “Peaceful development, broad prospects – across the decade,” op. cit.


Chen left the door open to special treatment of agricultural issues. While he repeated his previous call for Taiwan to open its agricultural markets to the Mainland to the same degree it does for others as a member of the WHO, he also said that, in consideration of the sensitivity of Taiwan farmers, agricultural trade would be handled separately from other issues when discussing the ECFA follow-on agreement on merchandise trade. (“Mainland official: ECFA follow-up consultations to be based on principle of mutual benefits,” op. cit.)

Wang Yi, “Practical achievements and theoretical innovations of the past 10 years in Taiwan work,” op. cit.


Chi’iou Kuo-ch’iang, “Regarding Frank Hsieh’s visit, Mainland: Welcome to come in an appropriate capacity” (謝訪問陸: 歡迎以適當身分來), CNA (domestic), October 1, 2012,


As Beijing moved through the winter to establish the new state leadership at the 12th National People's Congress (NPC) and its companion meeting, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), in March 2013, People's Republic of China (PRC) officials continued to stress policy consistency toward Taiwan along lines laid out in the context of the 18th Party Congress held in November 2012. They expressed growing confidence that, as cross-Strait relations had already entered a “period of consolidation and deepening” (鞏固、深化期), and as the PRC’s growing national power earned it greater international influence, they had the ability to take more initiative in managing cross-Strait development and to cope with foreign “interference” in cross-Strait relations in a calm manner. That said, as one PRC legal scholar pointed out, the central issue regarding Taiwan is “the problem of the Republic of China.” That is both a political issue and a legal issue and at present, he noted, there is no solution. The newly appointed head of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), Zhang Zhijun, underscored the point when he stated, “as viewed from any perspective, there is no possibility the Mainland will accept the ‘Republic of China’” (要大陸接受中華民國, 無論從哪個角度, 也不可能).

We devote a good deal of this essay to updating our discussion about the new PRC leadership’s approach to Taiwan. In addition, we review the state of “international space” deliberations, the Taiwan-Japan fisheries agreement, and the continuing drama of Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

Cross-Strait Relations—Political Dialogue and All That

Speaking in his newly assumed role of president at the NPC in March, Xi Jinping, as he had after the 18th Party Congress last November, laid stress on the importance of having people on both sides of the Strait work together for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations; improving the well-being of compatriots across the Strait; and jointly opening up new prospects for the Chinese nation. Foreshadowing this positive but patient approach, several weeks earlier in a meeting with Honorary Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan, Xi had observed that the Mainland was
“soberly aware that historical problems remain in cross-Strait relations, and that there will be issues in the future that will require time, patience, and joint effort to resolve.”

At a post-NPC press conference, newly installed Premier Li Keqiang struck similar themes regarding the prospects for progress on the basis of firm principles and close bonds. He stressed the importance of the people on both sides being “compatriots” (同胞) and expressed confidence that by safeguarding that emotional bond and persisting with adherence to “one China,” there would be tremendous potential for advancing cross-Strait relations. Li pledged, “the new government will carry out the promises made by the previous government” (新一届政府将会履行上届政府所做的承诺). And he said that as the Mainland proceeds with its own greater opening up and development, it “will give even more consideration to the well-being and interests of Taiwan compatriots” (会更多地考虑台胞的福祉和利益) and “share development opportunities with Taiwan” (与台湾共享发展的机遇).

Although these remarks did not repeat earlier comments about “reciprocity” that had led people in Taiwan to believe that the days of one-sided agreements in their favor were over – in fact, it was quite the opposite – Li did nonetheless say something that raised that prospect again in people’s minds. In an echo of Wen Jiabao’s comments in a similar post-NPC press conference three years earlier, he observed that the Mainland and Taiwan were the common home (共同的家园) of the people on both sides of the Strait. A widely shared interpretation of that remark was that if Taiwan did not embrace a shared vision of one family, the Mainland would be less inclined to treat Taiwan so kindly in the future.

Still, the Ma administration chose to respond only indirectly and in a low-key way to the “common home” theme. Buried toward the end of a 300-word Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) press release was the statement, “the Republic of China is our country and Taiwan is our home” (中華民國是我們的國家，臺灣是我們的家園). Rather than focusing on this issue, the MAC statement instead emphasized the more conciliatory message that the two sides should work together to secure cross-Strait peace and stability and the well-being of the people on both sides.

Positive messages for Taiwan were echoed throughout the speeches of the PRC leadership. In February, even before he was elected chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC, Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng, who is assuming the leading role on Taiwan played by Jia Qinglin under Hu Jintao, spoke at a Taiwan-related work conference in Beijing. Yu hewed to standard lines, emphasizing that peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is the only way to achieve peaceful unification and that peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is also an important part of the PRC’s broader grand strategy of peaceful development. He encouraged academic dialogue on cross-Strait political issues “from
a non-governmental perspective” and repeated that the rights and interests of Taiwan compatriots should be protected in earnest.  

Conveying the most detailed message, Wang Yi’s successor in the Cabinet-level role as director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (and of the Taiwan Work Office under the CCP Central Committee), former Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, made his first major statement in the keynote address at a symposium in Pingtan, Fujian Province, in mid-March. Zhang expounded on the theme of “steady progress and comprehensive development” (稳步推进，全面发展) as the objective for the coming year. In addition to predicting great progress with respect to mutual trust as well as along more concrete economic, cultural, and educational axes, like his political seniors Zhang reaffirmed the Mainland’s commitment to maintaining current cross-Strait policies. “There is no reason,” he said, “not to adhere to correct policies, and we will not only not change effective practices, but we will carry them out even better” (正确的方针政策没有理由不坚持, 行之有效的做法不仅不会改变，而且还会做得更好). Citing no less an authority than Deng Xiaoping, Zhang said that if the course you are on is correct, the policy will not change.

Zhang referred several times to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and its contribution to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴), citing the fact that “even some people in the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party]” were rethinking their positions and seeking to enhance understanding of the Mainland and to improve cross-Strait relations. He framed the task in the coming year in dynamic terms, calling for promotion of new progress and achievement of new results, pushing forward the comprehensive development of cross-Strait relations. Expanding on this theme, Zhang said that there will be difficult obstacles ahead, but that pursuing a comprehensive approach, making progress in various fields, would have a mutually reinforcing effect in achieving sustainable development. As he put it, “a four-wheel drive, off-road vehicle is always better than a two-wheel drive car for overcoming obstacles” (四轮驱动的越野车总比两轮驱动的车更能爬坡越障).

Reiterating the basic catechism of cross-Strait relations, Zhang expressed the hope that, on the common political foundation of consolidating opposition to “Taiwan independence” and adhering to the “1992 Consensus,” the two sides could enhance mutual political trust. He expressed confidence that, despite the many differences between the two sides, those relations will have a broader and brighter future by maintaining and consolidating the “one China framework” and “making fair and reasonable arrangements regarding cross-Strait political relations in the special circumstance when the country is not yet unified” (对国家尚未统一特殊情况下的两岸政治关系作出合情合理安排).

Zhang went on to talk not only about promoting further economic links, but also about actively following up on the two sides’ agreed intention to establish “integrated”
representative offices and pursuing cooperation agreements across the fields of culture, education, and science and technology (S&T). He then addressed the issue of the complex and difficult political problems between the two sides.

Zhang suggested a three-pronged approach to political issues: face the problems squarely without setting restrictions; think positively and seek solutions; and adopt for those issues the same approach agreed upon for overall relations, that is, deal with easy matters first and more difficult ones later, “moving step by step to build consensus” (逐步累积共识).

Refining the PRC’s position on political dialogue at the 18th Party Congress where Hu Jintao called for “jointly exploring” cross-Strait political relations, Zhang suggested building on various Track 2 efforts already under way, conducting dialogue among academic institutions and experts on both sides in order to help create conditions for cross-Strait political talks in the future. He also told reporters at Pingtan that he hoped to have a chance to visit Taiwan and to welcome “the chief of Taiwan’s concerned authorities” (i.e., MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi) to visit and “have a look” around the Mainland. Wang had commented several days earlier not only that he would like to visit the Mainland, but that Zhang would be welcome to visit Taiwan “at an appropriate time, in a suitable capacity and when related conditions are right.”

Zhang took note of Wang’s remarks but said it was “completely unnecessary” for the Taiwan side to set “certain conditions” for him to visit the island. “If both sides have the same feelings and hearts for [arranging such a visit], the question about under what title and in what form I will visit will be easy to handle.”

The MAC fended off Zhang’s suggestion regarding “agreements” of various sorts by noting that cultural and educational exchanges involve a wide range of issues and related problems could not be resolved by signing a single agreement. Moreover, the MAC said that since the two sides had engaged in academic S&T exchanges for years and already have an existing model for diversified exchanges and cooperation, there is no “pressing need” for an agreement in that area.

Nonetheless, the push by Beijing for agreements in these areas is likely to persist. Indeed, in his inaugural speech as the newly installed head of the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the quasi-official PRC agency for negotiating with Taiwan and counterpart of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), Chen Deming echoed Zhang Zhijun’s line on the need for such agreements as well as for the systemization of cooperation and exchanges in those fields.

When Taiwan’s defense ministry issued the 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review, it deflected any idea of near-term cross-Strait military confidence-building measures, saying the time was not ripe given the lack of mutual political trust. Making clear
the significant challenges in the way of any such process, Vice Minister of National Defense Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang said that, even though both sides must put in place measures to reduce tensions, military confidence-building measures (CBM) will require that Taiwan and the Mainland each give assurances of respect for the other side's territorial integrity and sovereignty and that each side renounce military invasion of the other side.\(^\text{23}\)

Despite this clear signal of Taipei's lack of interest in military CBMs, Yu Zhengsheng persisted in identifying ending the state of war across the Strait and signing a peace accord as “fair and reasonable arrangements” in the political realm.\(^\text{24}\) And, in the context of indications that Xi Jinping has ordered all Taiwan affairs units to propose specific measures to advance cross-Strait relations,\(^\text{25}\) it was reported that the Mainland has identified work on cross-Strait mutual military trust-building measures as a “national research project” (國家專案) for the next three years.\(^\text{26}\)

**Other Dimensions of Cross-Strait Relations Remain Active**

Meanwhile, other dimensions of cross-Strait relations continued to be very active through the period. After repeated postponements since late 2012, it was reported that the two sides were closing in on completion of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) follow-on agreement on trade in services. Even there, however, the signals about how soon such an agreement could be completed were mixed. Initially there were hopes it could be signed in April or May,\(^\text{27}\) but then that appeared to have been pushed off by at least several months.\(^\text{28}\) Now again, as this essay is heading for the editors, there seems to be optimism about conclusion of an agreement before the end of June,\(^\text{29}\) to take effect by the end of the year.\(^\text{30}\) Moreover, despite earlier nervousness about PRC demands for strict reciprocity, as discussed earlier all signs point to an agreement that strongly favors Taiwan,\(^\text{31}\) in many sectors according Taiwan what has been termed “World Trade Organization (WTO)-Plus” treatment.\(^\text{32}\) Not unexpectedly, the DPP cast doubt on the agreement, suggesting the net impact on Taiwan had not been sufficiently studied.\(^\text{33}\)

At the same time, officials on both sides have continued to express hope that a trade in goods agreement and dispute settlement agreement, the other two ECFA-related negotiations under way, could be concluded within 2013.

Although issues obviously remain to be worked out with respect to the reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS branch offices, following two rounds of lower-level consultations, agreement was reached in March to place the topic on the formal negotiating agenda (though apparently not at the meeting envisioned for June\(^\text{34}\)), and two rounds of official talks on the subject were held, the first in mid-April\(^\text{35}\) and the second in mid-May.\(^\text{36}\) The Executive Yuan in Taipei approved a draft bill governing the establishment in Taiwan of an ARATS office\(^\text{37}\) and MAC head Wang Yu-chi said
he was looking forward to having the whole matter completed by the end of next year, that is, 2014.8

Among the arrangements already worked out, it has been agreed that while the offices will be “non-official” in nature they will be staffed by officials from a number of relevant agencies and will each be headed by someone at the vice minister level.9 Because there are so many more people from Taiwan living in the Mainland who will need the services of these offices than there are Mainlanders living in Taiwan, Beijing has also reportedly agreed that Taiwan may establish three offices on the Mainland while the PRC will have only one in Taiwan.10

As TAO Director Zhang Zhijun observed in late May, certain difficult issues still remain to be resolved. Among these is likely Taiwan’s strong desire that the offices carry out the “substantive functions” of a consulate (even if not the name), including the authority not only to process travel documents but also to undertake such activities as visiting their nationals imprisoned by the other side. Nonetheless, Zhang asserted that good progress had been made and that the remaining issues were not insuperable. Overall, he expressed confidence and optimism about ultimately establishing reciprocal offices.11

Hence, even if political dialogue is confined to Track 2 or Track 1.5 events (with some officials participating in their “individual” capacities), and there is no prospect of moving to the governmental level in the foreseeable future, nonetheless, if SEF and ARATS offices can at least be agreed upon this year, and if not only a services agreement but agreements on trade in goods and dispute resolution can be concluded, taken together with anticipated exchanges (if not necessarily formal agreements) in the fields of education, culture, and S&T, this would represent a considerable advance in cross-Strait relations.

Even beyond those items, Taipei was also preparing to facilitate cross-Strait exchanges in a number of areas, including easing restrictions on Mainland students,12 drawing up regulatory changes to allow Mainland white-collar managers and workers at Taiwan-owned multinational enterprises located in new “free economic zones” soon to be created in Taiwan,13 and possibly further easing of regulations limiting Mainland investment on the island,14 including in the banking sector.15 Cooperation was also evident with respect to the latest bird flu outbreak when, despite some initial indications that Beijing would not collaborate, eventually the Mainland did provide specimens of the virus to Taipei to help with its research efforts on prevention and treatment.16

To the consternation of Taiwan farmers, as part of these efforts to liberalize cross-Strait relations, the Ma administration was reportedly planning to allow processing of over 800 kinds of Mainland agricultural products in the “free economic zones.” Even though those products would theoretically not be allowed into Taiwan in their
original state, it was reported that 10 percent of them would, in fact, be allowed in after processing.\textsuperscript{37}

In response to farmers’ protests, the Council of Agriculture minister said that in determining which products would be allowed in, three principles would apply: protecting the interests of Taiwan farmers, guaranteeing the sustainable development of Taiwan’s agricultural sector, and adding value to that sector – with the last being the most important. Still, he acknowledged that the Mainland might well ask Taiwan to further open its market to Chinese products and that if Taiwan’s cross-Strait agricultural trade deficit dropped, Beijing would inevitably ask Taiwan to ease current restrictions.\textsuperscript{48}

Despite this flurry of concern on Taiwan, Beijing has shown itself sensitive to reaction from the Taiwan farmers and fishermen it has been courting. A TAO spokesman asserted that the reports regarding pressure to take more agricultural products from the PRC were “inaccurate” and that the Mainland was not currently considering any such plan. Treating the two sides as one family (again that critical assumption), he said the Mainland always looks after the interests of the people in Taiwan, especially farmers in central and southern Taiwan.\textsuperscript{49} Addressing the issue again several days later, a spokeswoman seemed even more definitive, saying that the Mainland would not force Taiwan to open its doors to Chinese agricultural produce. “The question of whether China will force Taiwan to allow imports of Chinese agricultural produce does not exist. Farmers and fishermen in Taiwan can rest assured.”\textsuperscript{50}

Also reflecting the increasing pace of activity between the two sides, not only was the first cross-Strait submarine communications cable completed,\textsuperscript{51} but the number of direct cross-Strait flights is being increased to 616 per week, adding eight more destinations on the Mainland (bringing the total to 49) and one more in Taiwan (bringing the total to 10). An important driving force in this area is the rising number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan, up to 2.2 million in 2012 from 1.78 million in 2011.\textsuperscript{52}

On the prospectively less positive side of things, blind Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng is scheduled to visit Taiwan for two weeks starting in late June. Chen is being hosted by the Taiwan Association for China Human Rights, which raises the possibility of activities and statements that could stir a bit of cross-Strait unhappiness. His sponsors originally said that Chen’s visit would be low-key and that he had no plans to meet with political figures.\textsuperscript{53} As it turns out, however, he will hold an international news conference, speak at the Legislative Yuan (LY),\textsuperscript{54} and meet with DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang. \textsuperscript{55} Moreover, there is speculation that he might meet with President Ma Ying-jeou as well. Beijing has cautioned that Chen “should understand how to protect the dignity of our country when overseas and how to fulfill his responsibility as a citizen.”\textsuperscript{56}
**International space**

As readers will recall, Ma Ying-jeou has been pressing for greater participation in U.N. specialized agencies in recent months, arguing that it would enable Taiwan to make a greater contribution in areas such as global aviation and sustainable development. He has taken note of the fact that not only have the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress supported a greater role for Taiwan, but that even Hu Jintao expressed willingness to “seriously study” possibly helping Taiwan secure International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) participation in an appropriate fashion.57

Asked whether the Mainland would show “more good will” toward Taiwan’s aspirations for greater international space, a TAO spokesman stated in February that Beijing has continued to support the idea of making “reasonable arrangements” regarding Taiwan’s international participation through “pragmatic consultation” (务实协商) with Taiwan on the premise of not implying “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”58 However, at that same time, Xi Jinping told visiting KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan that while he was aware of Taiwan’s desire to enhance its international profile, this is a political question that has to be sorted out with patience when the conditions are right.59

In mid-March, after identical bills were introduced into the U.S. House and Senate directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly meeting in Canada in September,60 Beijing repeated the guidance used in February but added that Beijing opposed “interference” by foreign forces, which could only complicate things61 (a position that has been emphasized in private by senior PRC officials62).

A few days later, Taiwan’s foreign minister reaffirmed Taiwan’s hope to participate at the September ICAO conference, although he could do no better than say that it “appeared” the Mainland was still considering the extent to which it would tolerate Taiwan’s participation in ICAO.63 By the end of March, in light of the Mainland’s continuing reserved attitude, the foreign ministry in Taipei began to press its case with greater vigor, arguing that Taiwan’s quest for participation in ICAO was pragmatically based, in order to promote safety, and that it was consistent with the overall thrust of cross-Strait engagement, as well.64

The Mainland Affairs Council’s comment at this juncture was even more sharply edged than the foreign ministry’s. MAC said that the Republic of China is an independent and sovereign country and it is the people’s common aspiration to participate in international organizations and activities with dignity. “It is our right as well as our duty.”65

However, lack of progress on the ICAO issue was not Taiwan’s only frustration in the area of international space. It came in the midst of three other issues that were cited
by a broad spectrum of people in Taiwan as demonstrating Beijing’s hostile attitude toward any expansion of Taipei’s international participation.

The first of these concerned Ma Ying-jeou’s invited attendance at the March 19 inauguration of Pope Francis, the Vatican being one of Taiwan’s 23 remaining diplomatic partners. According to the official transcript of the press briefing, when asked about the Mainland’s reaction, the PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman expressed congratulations to the new pope but then went on to say:

The Chinese government’s position on China-Vatican relations is consistent and clear. We hope that under the leadership of the new Pope, [the] Vatican could work with China to create favorable conditions for the improvement of relations.

The Chinese government’s two basic principles in dealing with China-Vatican relations are consistent and unchanged. We hope [the] Vatican could adopt a flexible and practical attitude and take concrete actions to create conditions for the improvement of China-Vatican relations.66

Press coverage of these remarks created a confused picture. As reported by Mainland, Taiwan, and international media alike, the spokeswoman had spelled out the “two basic principles” for establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing: that the Vatican would have to break ties with Taiwan and it should also stop “interfering” in the PRC’s internal affairs in the name of religion.67 The fact that these terms were spelled out gave people the impression that Beijing might be about to break the “diplomatic truce” that had been in effect since 2008, a tacit agreement not to steal each other’s diplomatic partners. After all, if the Mainland was laying out terms, maybe it was interested in making a deal.

In fact, however, as cited above, the official transcript includes no reference to the spokesperson spelling out the conditions, only referring vaguely to the “two basic principles.” There are at least two possibilities for the discrepancy between the official transcript and those press accounts. One is that the press, knowing what the conditions were, spelled them out even though the spokeswoman had addressed them only in the more elliptical fashion of the above citation. And, as happens so often, correspondents merely picked up on what others had written.

The other is that she did spell them out but the longer version was expunged from the record.

The truth of the matter seems to be the latter case, that the spokeswoman did, in fact spell out the two principles and that it was decided this took things too far, and the record was “sanitized.” In any event, it generated a loud response across the political spectrum in Taipei. While MAC Minister Wang Yu-chi, for example, described the PRC’s reported “demand” that the Vatican break relations with Taiwan as standard, he
also characterized it as “unacceptable,” putting on an “unfriendly face,” and unhelpful to boosting cross-Strait ties.\(^{68}\)

Another issue contributing to unhappiness in Taipei was an incident in Indonesia, where a Taiwan delegation about to attend the third annual Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD) was uninvited at the last minute at PRC insistence.\(^{59}\) Taiwan had sent a delegation in 2012, hailed at the time by the ministry of national defense in Taipei as a “breakthrough.”\(^{70}\) Some people took note of the fact that the PRC delegate this year was a deputy chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) general staff, a considerably more senior official than attended last year’s meeting, perhaps generating greater sensitivity on this occasion. Many, however, saw the sudden reversal this time as evidence that the new Xi Jinping leadership was going to take a tougher stance toward Taiwan’s international participation.

A third factor in the negative reaction in Taiwan to how the PRC was approaching Taiwan’s international space was Beijing’s response to the courtesy extended to Taiwan’s representative in Tokyo on the occasion of the memorial service marking the second anniversary of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. More than simply attending, he was invited to present flowers and to sit in the area reserved for foreign ambassadors.

As background to understanding this, one should know that although Taiwan had been the single largest donor of relief and reconstruction aid to Japan in the wake of the tragedy ($260 million), the representative was not invited either to sit in the diplomatic area or to present flowers at the one-year memorial service in 2012. This led to considerable criticism by Japanese parliamentarians and media over what was considered shabby treatment. Then-Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko apologized, and Taiwan was accorded the more prestigious treatment this year.\(^{71}\)

Beijing reacted to this not only by staying away from this year’s memorial ceremony but by issuing a sharply worded foreign ministry statement. Noting that the PRC expressed condolences and support to the Japanese people and recognized that “China’s Taiwan region” had “also provided assistance,” the statement nonetheless went on to object to the seating arrangement accorded Taiwan as having “violated relevant principles and spirits of the China-Japan Joint Declaration” and Japan’s commitments on the Taiwan issue. Expressing strong dissatisfaction, protest, and opposition to any country’s attempt to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” in any form, the statement called on Japan to correct its mistakes and honor its commitments.\(^{72}\) The perceived violation of the unofficial nature of Japan’s relations with Taiwan would doubtless have been enough to produce the protest. The fact that Japan was in the process of negotiating a fisheries agreement with Taiwan in important part apparently to prevent a cross-Strait coalition over the Senkakus/Diaoyu issue (discussed below) was doubtless a compounding factor.
The Taiwan opposition parties seized upon all of these developments to note that the PRC has never ceased its efforts to limit Taiwan's international space even as it has sought to win hearts and minds in Taiwan through economic incentives. Beijing's hawkishness, a DPP official asserted, showed that Ma's touting of a "diplomatic truce" was merely wishful thinking and that cross-Strait exchanges under the PRC "framework of containment" did not serve Taiwan's long-term interests. A legislator from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) went further and accused the foreign ministry and Mainland Affairs Council of malfeasance for staying quiet about Beijing's interference.

When former Vice President Vincent Siew led the Taiwan delegation to the annual Boao Forum in early April, he was treated as an honored guest. His picture was prominently displayed, he was seated at lunch directly across from Xi Jinping, and he met privately with Xi and other officials. In this favorable setting, Siew raised the question of international space with Xi, apparently focusing especially on Taiwan's hope to participate in regional economic activities. According to the TAO spokesman, Xi responded that the two sides could sit down "at the proper time" to negotiate a way for Taiwan to join in regional economic cooperation projects. The spokesman characterized this position as an expression of goodwill "in consideration of Taiwan's needs for economic development," voicing the hope that Taiwan could "find a new space for its economic development" and that "new vitality can be injected into cross-Taiwan Strait economic cooperation." Though Siew seemed open to the idea of such collaborative efforts, others saw yet further attempts by Beijing to contain Taiwan's connections to the region under the rubric of "one China."

Meanwhile, Taipei made clear it will continue to actively pursue Free Trade Agreements (or FTA-like agreements) beyond those already nearing completion with Singapore and New Zealand, perhaps including Indonesia, India, the Philippines, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.

As this article was heading to the editor, Taiwan's health minister attended the World Health Assembly (WHA) for the fifth year where he spoke at sessions of many of the WHA's committees. Even with regard to this one bright light in the international space firmament there is a downside. Taiwan still feels constrained in its ability to participate in the health organization's activities, and the minister used his presence at this year's assembly to make a pitch for greater WHO access both in his meeting with his American counterpart and in his address to the WHA plenary.

Taiwan-Japan Fishing Agreement

Taipei's sporadic negotiations with Tokyo over fishing rights in the vicinity of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkakus islets resumed last fall after a three-year hiatus, and in
early April the 17-year-long process was successfully concluded, opening vast new areas to Taiwan fishermen.\textsuperscript{81}

The immediate 12nm territorial waters around the islets themselves are not included in the arrangement, however. And while Ma said that neither side yielded on its territorial and maritime claims,\textsuperscript{82} and the sovereignty issue had been put to the side for now in accordance with the principles of his East China Sea Peace Initiative,\textsuperscript{83} he also said that Taiwan fishermen still had the right to fish in the 12nm zone and that Taiwan's coast guard would act to protect them if their activity were interrupted by Japanese authorities.\textsuperscript{84} The Japanese government responded that it would enhance patrols near the islands\textsuperscript{85} and would seize and “deal harshly” with any Taiwan fishing boats operating outside bilaterally agreed areas.\textsuperscript{86}

While the potential for miscalculation obviously remains, and although the exact terms of many provisions remain to be worked out – the first meeting on May 7 of the bilateral fishing commission created to handle this task failed to reach agreement\textsuperscript{87} – an important underlying factor in people's expectation of successful implementation going forward is that Taiwan fishermen's association leaders have welcomed the agreement. One called it a “major breakthrough” in the protection of Taiwan's fishing rights, “definitely good news for Taiwan fishermen.”\textsuperscript{88} Another leader took a somewhat more reserved position, characterizing the agreement as “not satisfactory but acceptable” and calling for the government to continue to work to expand the area open to Taiwan fishermen.\textsuperscript{89} Nonetheless, even this leader said that his men would follow basic rules under the agreement to avoid trouble with Japanese fishermen from Okinawa Prefecture.\textsuperscript{90} So, while the level of enthusiasm is mixed, the achievement is widely appreciated and the potential for actual confrontation has been substantially reduced. In the first two weeks after the agreement took effect, three Taiwan fishing boats were detained on separate occasions and fined for straying over the agreed lines. But the fishermen acknowledged their trespass, paid the penalty with minimal complaint, and were quickly released.\textsuperscript{91}

Although the two governments are committed to work to avoid fishing incidents and to resolve any problems amicably, the question of efforts by “protect Diaoyutai” nationalist activists in Taiwan may prove more difficult. In mid-January, a leading activist's effort to land on the islands and plant a flag fell short by 16 nautical miles, but his boat was escorted throughout the voyage by four of Taiwan's coast guard vessels, which exchanged water cannon fire with the Japanese coast guard.\textsuperscript{92} The same activist returned to the area in March, reportedly to test Japanese awareness and to harass the Japanese coast guard.\textsuperscript{93} Yet a third foray was announced for sometime before the end of April,\textsuperscript{94} although it seems not to have materialized. The two sides’ handling of any such efforts in the future will be an important indicator of how well the agreement will work.
There was also a cross-Strait dimension to these nationally oriented forays. The activist had apparently let the PRC know ahead of time of his venture in January. As a result, three PRC marine surveillance vessels were on the scene and made a show of assisting the activist’s boat. This brought into even sharper relief for Tokyo a concern Japan has long had about the potential for Beijing and Taipei to join hands in pressing a “Chinese” sovereignty claim. In fact, the Ma administration had made clear from the outset that it would not collaborate with the Mainland over the islands, and during the January episode the Taiwan coast guard vessels warned the PRC boats to stay away. Nevertheless, a spate of press stories not only reported that the Mainland had used that occasion to demonstrate a “united front” but speculated that the Ma administration had cooperated in allowing the protest boat to set sail in the first place in deference to Beijing. There is no evidence to support such an assertion, but the fact that it circulated was indicative of popular sensitivity to the cross-Strait implications of the entire Diaoyu/Senkakus issue.

In any event, although Tokyo’s motives were no doubt mixed, it is widely believed that Japan’s willingness to reach such generous terms on opening areas to Taiwan fishermen was related to its desire to forestall cross-Strait collaboration.

For its part, Beijing has emphasized that compatriots on both sides of the Strait have a common responsibility to safeguard Chinese sovereignty over the islands and to protect resource rights. It has pledged to defend the interests of fishermen coming from both the Mainland and Taiwan. But not only was Taipei not about to agree that the PRC had any role in protecting Taiwan fishermen or that Taiwan had any interest in assuming responsibility for protecting Mainland fishermen, the Ma administration went so far as to assert that it would expel any PRC trawlers that encroached on areas covered by the Taiwan-Japan agreement.

Specifically regarding the sovereignty issue, as the fisheries negotiation between Taipei and Tokyo seemed increasingly likely to reach a successful conclusion, then-TAO Director Wang Yi stated: “In safeguarding sovereignty over the Diaoyu islands, the two sides can have their own methods, but our attitude must be resolute, the goal must be the same, otherwise we will be unworthy before our ancestors and future generations” (在维护钓鱼岛主权上，两岸可以有各自的方式，但我们的态度应当是坚定的，目标应当是一致的，否则上对不起列祖列宗，下对不起子孙后代).

The day after Wang Yi’s statement, without referring to it, Ma Ying-jeou declared that Taiwan has a “very important role to play” (on its own) in the Diaoyu dispute. Other people were not used to such a visible role, he said, and often asked Taipei to stand aside. But Taiwan should stand up and let other people know that it can, and will, play a part in trying to achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

Taiwan used to be considered a troublemaker in this part of the world. But that is no longer so. And most importantly, in the past, Taiwan sometimes
was a silent bystander. But now, it has decided not only not to be a troublemaker, but it wants to be a peacemaker.\textsuperscript{101}

In response to the fisheries agreement, Beijing has continued to warn Japan to “properly deal with Taiwan-related issues in strict accordance with the principles and spirit of the China-Japan Joint Statement” (严格按照中日联合声明确定的原则和精神妥善处理涉台问题).\textsuperscript{102} While the agreement is unlikely to be a major factor in their ongoing dispute over the islands, it likely will reinforce Beijing’s determination not to allow Japan to “compromise” the PRC’s sovereignty claims in the Diaoyu area.

As for its attitude toward Taiwan, the PRC is clearly frustrated at Taipei’s unwillingness to make common cause and has repeated its mantra about “common responsibility to safeguard sovereignty over the Diaoyus.” The defense ministry did so again in late April.\textsuperscript{103} But since the agreement did not directly touch on sovereignty, and hence did not “give away” anything, and since Beijing will not want to oppose anything that benefits Taiwan fishermen, that frustration is unlikely to affect the course of cross-Strait relations.

In the meantime, although some academics in Taiwan have raised questions about whether the fisheries agreement adequately protects Taiwan’s sovereignty claim,\textsuperscript{104} the political opposition has generally hailed Ma’s achievement.\textsuperscript{105}

Two final comments on the fisheries agreement and its relationship to President Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative. First, while at this point it seems unlikely that the PRC and Japan will follow the model laid out in this case of setting aside sovereignty issues and focusing on practical benefits – after all, the dispute between Tokyo and Beijing is all about sovereignty – nonetheless the agreement serves as an example for others to consider. Moreover, in and of itself, removing the potential for clashes between Taiwan and Japanese fishing and coast guard vessels is a significant contribution to maintaining peace in the area.

Second, included in Ma’s East China Sea Peace Initiative was a proposal to create a code of conduct, and one of Ma’s important objectives in putting the initiative forward appears to have been to snare a seat at the negotiating table. This parallels Taiwan’s strong interest in participating in negotiations over a code of conduct in the South China Sea, where it has vast claims and a significant presence. But, sensible as inclusion of Taiwan would be from a practical perspective, this goal is likely to prove elusive in both cases due to the well-known sovereignty concerns.

Still, just as Taiwan is thinking about participating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) drawing on the same concept it used to join the World Trade Organization (i.e., as the “separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”), it isn’t impossible to imagine a similar formulation in these cases. The fact that following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders
meeting in September 2012 former Vice President Lien Chan reported that most of the ASEAN member states in attendance expressed support for Taiwan’s inclusion in the South China Sea talks has led some people to think that, over time, a way will be found to bring Taiwan in.

**Nuclear Issue**

Among the other issues that drew great attention during this period, and that could affect future Taiwan political leadership – and hence cross-Strait relations – none was more controversial than that surrounding Taiwan’s almost completed Fourth Nuclear Power Plant.

The plant has had a checkered history. In 2000, one year after it began, construction was suspended by the Chen Shui-bian administration, only to be resumed in 2001 under pressure from a court decision and the KMT-dominated legislature. Since then, the plant seemed to be on track for completion in 2015. At this point, 95 percent of the construction work on the plant’s Number 1 reactor has been completed and almost three-quarters of the work has been tested.

The Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in Japan in 2011, however, led to an upswell of concern in Taiwan about beginning commercial operations, and in recent months that concern has exploded into a full-blown political storm.

We do not have space here to go through the details of the issue, but the Fukushima Daiichi events seemed to feed into a general nervousness about the overall safety of nuclear power, and a lack of trust that the fourth plant, specifically, would be safe. Opposition to the plant, largely led by the DPP but in many respects cutting across party lines, has focused on halting construction altogether – preferably to abandon the project, but at least not to proceed with it until a final determination has been made regarding both safety and public opinion.

The DPP initially considered introducing a referendum on the issue. Few thought a referendum could pass (none of the six referenda put to a vote thus far has succeeded), but in light of the KMT’s instinctive opposition to referenda the idea was apparently to create a stir that would knock the administration off balance. Unexpectedly, however, Premier Jiang Yi-huah (in close consultation with President Ma) endorsed the referendum idea, not because he was giving up on the fourth plant, but because he was not giving up on it. As Ma put it, “If we can help people fully understand the two choices’ challenges and the price we will have to pay for those choices, we will be able to shoulder the consequences together and help our society become more harmonious.” Unspoken was Ma’s assumption that once people had such a “full understanding” they would support the fourth plant.
Given the near impossibility of a referendum’s passing, the administration chose to frame the question to be put before the voters in such a way that a “no” response would allow construction to continue.

Thus the question put forward by the KMT LY caucus was worded as follows: “Do you agree that the construction of Nuclear Power Plant No. 4 should be halted and it should not become operational (你是否同意核四廠停止興建不得運轉)?” Failure of the referendum would mean that the voters did not agree construction should be halted or operations blocked, and so it would continue on course. Moreover, under the provisions of the Referendum Act, this decision would not be open to another ballot test for eight years after the plant was up and running.

The opposition charged that the administration was insincere, seeking to fool the voters into believing it wanted to be guided by public opinion when it really did not. While the administration denies this, many in the ruling KMT are nonetheless leery about the referendum, fearing the outcome will be a lose-lose proposition for them no matter which way it comes out. They believe it will simply fuel anti-nuclear – and anti-KMT – sentiment, with negative effects on the party’s chances in the 2014 local elections as well as the 2016 presidential contest.

In fact, jockeying for position in the 2016 KMT presidential nomination contest seems already to be under way as two of the leading contenders have staked out different positions on the issue of the fourth plant. Taipei’s KMT mayor, Hau Lung-bin, has said that, because of safety concerns, he would vote against a referendum if it were held tomorrow. And even though, like his probable rival for the nomination, New Taipei Mayor Eric Chu Li-luan, he originally supported holding a referendum, more recently Hau has suggested that public opinion polls are so overwhelmingly negative that the time and costs of a referendum are not necessary, and construction should simply stop now.

For his part, Chu has reserved his position on the issue of stopping construction, but he continues to back the holding of a referendum. He also dismissed Hau’s comment on voting against the referendum if held “tomorrow”: “It is meaningless to talk about hypothetical questions because the referendum is not being held now.”

The political impact of the nuclear issue is also visible with respect to President Ma’s popularity. While other factors are undoubtedly also at work, including corruption scandals involving some of Ma’s close associates, one presumes that sentiment about the nuclear issue has played a role in the president’s continuing drop in the polls.

In the meantime, however, the administration is trying to change the public mood and understanding of what is at stake. First, it has said that it would not allow a referendum to proceed unless the plant is rated “safe” during a rigorous inspection process, and it would withhold an operating license until safety is assured. But
second, it has argued that if the plant is deemed safe, and if construction is allowed to proceed, when completed it will provide vitally necessary electricity at a reasonable price. Otherwise, if nuclear power were suddenly abandoned, Taiwan would likely experience energy rationing, substantially higher electricity prices, a slowed economy, and lost jobs, as well as suffering negative effects on the environment.\textsuperscript{122}

Although the opposition argues that these alleged ill effects are grossly exaggerated, even a less drastic picture could sway public opinion once the safety of the plant is established (if it is established). As the head of a major economic research organization pointed out, the public has regularly opposed even slight increases in electricity rates. Whether they could accept the more serious consequences that are forecast is, he reasoned, highly questionable.\textsuperscript{123} Moreover, the head of the Environmental Protection Administration has argued that, viewed from a scientific perspective, the risks of climate change from coal or other likely substitute fuels would be more serious than they would be from nuclear power.\textsuperscript{124}

Like Premier Jiang, President Ma has identified himself with the ultimate goal of a nuclear-free Taiwan, but he has strongly endorsed achieving it gradually, without cancelling the fourth plant.\textsuperscript{125} In light of public concerns about nuclear power, however, the government has also indicated that, if the new plant does go on line, efforts would be made to phase out the older, existing plants earlier than their planned decommissioning dates, perhaps over the next five years rather than the ten years now envisioned.\textsuperscript{126}

Although one poll in late March revealed that over 70 percent of respondents said they would participate in the proposed referendum, and almost as many people said that they favored stopping construction now,\textsuperscript{127} the administration is counting on the fact that this could change. A poll conducted by the government found that, if safety of the fourth plant were affirmed, almost 57 percent of respondents did not support a drastic change, but supported Ma’s approach of a gradual movement toward the goal of a nuclear-free homeland. This included sticking to the decommissioning schedule for the three existing plants by 2025 and allowing the fourth plant to come on stream as planned, and then taking steps over the coming 40-year life of the fourth plant to reduce the country’s dependence on nuclear power,\textsuperscript{128} eventually phasing it out altogether.

Meanwhile, the opposition is seeking to challenge the legality of the government-favored referendum on a variety of technicalities, but that effort does not seem likely to succeed. The opposition has run into a brick wall in the LY as well. Holding only a minority of seats, the DPP was unable to pass a motion to stop work on the plant\textsuperscript{129} and although it was able to delay consideration of the KMT referendum bill for several weeks, that bill is proceeding to its second reading in the LY and the DPP seems destined to fail in efforts to defeat it.\textsuperscript{130}
Nonetheless, the DPP has announced that it will continue to fight the fourth plant – and nuclear power in general – even if the LY passes the KMT’s bill. Initially it considered proceeding with its own referendum alongside the KMT proposal, but that idea appears to have been dropped. Rather, through a massive series of events to present facts and statistics to bolster its case and to generate enthusiasm, it is seeking to rally support for participation in the referendum vote, trying to beat the odds and actually get enough people to the polls to vote it down. At the same time, however, the DPP is trying to amend the Referendum Act to lower the bar for passage to 20 percent participation rather than 50 percent.

The government has also initiated a campaign of its own to present what it sees as the facts about risks and costs of the project. It is distributing a booklet and has even launched a dedicated website. All of this is in line with Ma’s belief that once people have been truly educated about the issue, and assuming safety is assured, then they will support the fourth plant.

At best, it appeared that a referendum could not take place before July or August. However, with extensive safety inspections by dozens of experts now scheduled, and with a new element of allowing absentee voting having been introduced (preparation for which will take time), it is likely that a referendum will not be held until the very end of 2013.

As noted earlier, this issue has the potential to affect the political balance of power in Taiwan and hence the question of who will face the PRC in cross-Strait dealings after 2016. We will therefore continue to follow it.

**Final Note Regarding the DPP and the PRC**

Although we indicated in *CLM* 40 that we would devote attention to the DPP’s internal debate over cross-Strait policy, we will save that for a later essay. The first meeting of the party’s China Affairs Committee took place May 9, with Frank Hsieh Chang-ting having joined at the last minute following a personal appeal by Su Tseng-chang. Despite this obvious effort at unity, tensions were reported to have surfaced at that meeting, with Hsieh and others clashing over the role of the constitution and former DPP Chair Tsai Ing-wen reportedly walking out early. The committee is due to meet again July 11, and we will look at the state of play after that.
Notes


5 “Xi Jinping: Speech at the first session of the 12th National People's Congress” (习近平：在十二届全国人大一次会议上的讲话), Xinhua, March 17, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-03/17/content_2356344.htm. In his Lunar New Year greetings to Taiwan, then-TAO Director Wang Yi affirmed once again Beijing's intention to create more benefits for Taiwan compatriots (“Chinese Mainland confident in cross-Strait relation development,” Xinhua, February 8, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/china/Off_the_Wire/2013-02/08/content_27918362.htm), a theme that continues to resonate in high-level statements despite concerns in Taiwan about Mainland demands for greater reciprocity. (Romberg, CLM 40, p. 10.)

As it was Commerce Minister Chen Deming whose comments occasioned the initial concern about greater reciprocity (ibid.), Taiwan observers will watch attentively as Chen moves into his new role replacing Chen Yunlin as head of the PRC's quasi-official negotiating arm, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Most people believe that, whatever Chen was seeking to convey in his earlier remarks, he spoke in his role as minister in charge of trade negotiations and that in his new role he will become much more of an advocate for the underlying policy of winning hearts and minds on the island.


It is worth noting that Lien's use of a 16-character phrase in his meeting with Xi caused a minor political kerfuffle in Taipei. One issue was whether the statement (“one China, peace across the Strait, mutual benefit and integration, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” 「一個中國、兩岸和平、互利融合、振興中華」) had been coordinated with Ma Ying-jeou. The president's office said it had not, Lien's office insisted that, in substance, it had. On the assumption that the president had known of – and possibly even approved – it, the DPP charged that this showed Ma was yielding on the "respective interpretations" formulation he has insisted upon to demonstrate he has not caved in to the PRC’s pressure to accept their version of the "one China principle."
In the end, this controversy faded in Taiwan, but the Mainland's appreciation of Lien's role in promoting cross-Strait relations in a positive direction was seen in Xi Jinping's flattery of him: "Chairman Lien is a visionary and a sagacious statesman with deep national feelings, and he has done a lot of hard work for the improvement and development of cross-Strait relations. We highly evaluate Chairman Lien's outstanding contributions to the development of cross-Strait relations." (Wang Ping, "'Xi Lien Meeting' carries on from the 'Hu Lien Meeting,' makes clear the continuity of the Mainland's Taiwan policy" ["习连会"接棒 "胡连会"凸显大陆对台政策延续性], People's Daily Overseas Edition, February 26, 2013, currently available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0226/c64387-20600034.html.)

7 "Premier Li Keqiang and others meet with Chinese and foreign reporters covering the two meetings and answer their questions" (李克强总理等会见采访两会的中外记者并回答提问), Xinhua, March 17, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/2013lh/content_2356400.htm.

8 See endnote 5.

9 And while in his new role as head of ARATS, Chen Deming called for greater access to Taiwan's finance industry, he also reiterated that the PRC would grant Taiwan "better than WTO" treatment in the services agreement. (Lin Tse-hung, "Regarding the services trade agreement, 'concessions' will exceed commitments to WTO" [服務貿易協議「給惠, 將超過對WTO承諾'], Interview with Chen Deming, UDN, May 24, 2013, http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAIN1/7918516.shtml.)

10 In his post-NPC press conference in 2010, Wen had drawn attention to the fact that, in an earlier internet chat, he had spoken of letting Taiwan benefit more from the then-pending ECFA "because we are brothers." Though cast in positive terms ("I believe that as brothers, we will eventually solve the problems"), the implicit warning was that if they were not interacting as brothers, then negotiations would not go so well. ("Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao press conference, full-text, March 2010," MaximsNewsNetworks, March 18, 2010, http://www.maximsnews.com/news20100318ChinaWenJiabopress11003180101.htm.)

11 Comments by Xi Jinping to Vincent Siew at Boao also led people to draw the same conclusion. This reading was not only made in Taiwan (Y.F. Low, "China Times: A pragmatic approach to cross-Strait exchanges," Central News Agency (hereafter CNA), Editorial Extract, April 11, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aopn/201304110006.aspx), it was made on the Mainland, as well. A well-known PRC expert, Zhang Nianchi, interpreted Li's "everything can be discussed between brothers" comment as implying that if both sides are not "brothers," then there is nothing to talk about. Zhang went on to reason that the Mainland might not make more concessions to Taiwan in the economic and trade area unless the two sides could further enhance their fraternal relationship. (Jung Fu-t'ien, "Zhang Nianchi views cross-Strait relations, no urgency for political dialogue" [章念馳看兩岸 政治對話不能急], Want Daily, April 8, 2013, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20130408000843-260301; Jung Fu-t'ien, "Analyzing Xi and Li's attitude toward Taiwan, if not brothers, then talking will be delayed" [分析習李對台 不是兄弟就免談], Want Daily, April 8, 2013, https://tw.news.yahoo.com/分析習李對台-不是兄弟就免談-213000506.html.)


13 Chen Jianxing, "2013 Taiwan-related work conference held in Beijing; Yu Zhengsheng attends and delivers an important speech" (2013年对台工作会议在京举行 俞正声出席并作重要讲话), February 19, 2013. Now at http://www.360doc.com/content/13/0220/13/1147381_266735547.shtml.

The theme of “steady progress and comprehensive development” had been adumbrated by outgoing TAO Director Wang Yi two weeks earlier in meeting with reporters on the margins of a discussion with the Taiwan delegation to the NPC. “Steady progress,” he said, meant that the Mainland would continue to adhere to easy issues first, harder ones later, and a step-by-step approach in promoting cross-Strait relations with the focus on improving the quality and effect of exchanges in various fields. “Comprehensive development” meant no more man-made restrictions or blank areas in development of cross-Strait relations. The focus would still be on deepening and advancing cooperation in the economic area, while strengthening cultural exchanges. As to sensitive political issues, which were getting more and more attention on both sides of the Strait, the Mainland was willing to explore these questions through nongovernmental channels such as think tanks in order to create conditions for them to develop in due time. ("Wang Yi: Steady progress, comprehensive development" [王毅:稳步推进,全面发展], China Taiwan Net, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/bwkx/201303/t20130306_3867722.htm; "Wang Yi: Safeguarding the sovereignty of Diaoyu Islands is the common responsibility of compatriots on both sides of the Strait" [王毅:维护钓鱼岛主权是两岸同胞的共同责任], China Taiwan Net, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201303/t20130306_3867848.htm.)

We cite both stories immediately above to highlight the fact that in the NPC context, Taiwan is openly identified as a “province.” In the first story, the banner proclaiming the title of the group was clearly visible in a photograph: “Delegation of Taiwan Province to the first session of the 12th NPC” (十二届全国人大一次会议台湾省代表团). Although the word “province” (省) was omitted from the text of the report, in the second story, where the picture did not appear, the full title of the delegation was included in the report.

At the same time, Taipei did apparently get some satisfaction from a protest to the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding Taiwan’s designation in a report on the H7N9 bird flu epidemic. Although corrections had not been made on all WHO sites, the WHO West Pacific office changed the designation from “Taiwan, China” to “Taiwan.” (Tseng Ying-yu and Elizabeth Hsu, “Taiwan’s protest on WHO designation has been answered: official,” CNA, April 30, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304300029.aspx.)

By early 2013, at least two and perhaps more academic conferences were being planned along the lines of Zhang Zhijun’s suggestion. One, to be held in Beijing in early summer, will focus
on strengthening shared identity and mutual trust, essentially a sequel to a conference series that started out in April 2010 in Japan and took place in Sydney and Taipei subsequently, including DPP participants. (Private conversation with a participant. The 2010 meeting was discussed in Romberg, "Ma at Mid-Term: Challenges for Cross-Strait Relations," China Leadership Monitor, no. 33, endnote 84.) As in 2010, although the Ma administration will be aware of these meetings it is not likely to give them any official blessing or authorization. The Taiwan Affairs Office in Beijing, however, will very likely be involved in preparations on the Mainland side.

How these conferences will address the subject of shared identity remains to be seen. But comments coming from the Mainland indicate some recognition of the importance of accommodating trends in Taiwan if progress is to be made on political relations. Taking into account recent polling in Taiwan showing growing "Taiwanese" identity, a deputy to the National People's Congress who is an expert in cross-Strait relations suggested in mid-March that if Beijing is to succeed in persuading the majority of people in Taiwan to acknowledge the relationship of the "Republic of China" with the Mainland it will need to adopt a flexible, innovative and inclusive definition of "one China." (Minnie Chan, "New leaders should seek flexible definition of Taiwan, NPC deputy says," South China Morning Post, March 14, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1190120/new-leaders-should-seek-flexible-definition-taiwan-npc-deputy-says.)

Moreover, in an extensive article about "strategic thinking" regarding ultimate unification, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Taiwan Studies Institute raised the need for "sensible and reasonable treatment of the political status the Taiwan authorities should have" (合情合理看待台當局應有的政治地位) and for appropriate handling of the issue of international space. On the latter score, the author argued that, within the context of "both sides of the Strait belonging to one China" (兩岸同屬一中), in addition to being flexible with respect to the name Taiwan uses in the international community, the Mainland also "could make suitable concessions at suitable times on the issue of suitable international participation by Taiwan" (還可針對適當的台國際參與問題適時做出適當的讓) Citing the views of scholars with whom he obviously agreed, he called for "overcoming the constraints of conventional thinking" (突破傳統的慣性思維的束縛) about cross-Strait relations, "maximally expanding the idea of 'one country' and interpreting the implications of unification as loosely as possible" (兩岸統一將最大限度地擴充“一個國”的概念，最為寬鬆地解釋統一的含義), and "creating a unification concept that is more flexible" (形成更具有彈性的統一觀). Both sides need to "emancipate the mind" (解放思想), he wrote. (Leng Bo, "Evaluation and strategic consideration of the overall situation in current cross-Strait peaceful unification" [當前兩岸和平統一總體形勢評估及戰略思考], China Review News, February 10, 2013, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1024/2/2/5/102422542.html?coluid=54&kindid=0&docid=102422542&mdate=0313103958.)


19 And, in fact, public opinion in Taiwan is favorably inclined toward a visit by Zhang, with 56.4 percent of respondents to a recent poll supporting it as against only 22.2 percent opposed. ("Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, Last 10 days of March, 2013 and summary of the results of a survey on questions during this period" [台灣民心動態調查2013 年 3 月下旬，台灣民心動態調查與本期議題調查結果摘要], Taiwan Indicators Survey Research [TISR], March 29, 2013, http://www.tisr.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/TISR_TMBS_201303_2.pdf.) These results
compare with only 50.3 percent of respondents who supported the planned visit of ARATS head Chen Yunlin in late 2008 with 31.2 percent opposed.

20 When Taiwan’s culture minister, Lung Ying-tai, proposed setting up cultural offices in various Mainland cities before concluding an agreement, Beijing responded by suggesting the reciprocal establishment of such offices. At that point, Minister Lung retreated, saying she would need to continue “internal” discussions, consultations, and coordination with the MAC and NSC. (“Mainland’s TAO favors establishing cross-Strait cultural offices on a reciprocal basis,” Kuomintang News Network [KMT News Network, from Taipei papers], December 13, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&a num=12296.)


28 In a pattern that became familiar during negotiations over the investment protection agreement finally concluded in August 2012 (see Romberg, “Shaping the Future, Part II: Cross-Strait Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 39, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM39AR.pdf, p. 3), in mid-December it was announced that the services agreement negotiations were in the “final stage” and would be completed by the end of the year (Scarlett Chai and Kendra Lin, “Taiwan, China to complete service trade talks soon: negotiator,” CNA, December 17, 2012, http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201212170016), only to have that date pushed back some 10 days later (“Signing of cross-Strait services trade agreement to miss year-end target,” KMT News Network [from Taipei papers], December 27, 2012, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12360). The TAO spokeswoman who announced that delay also pointed out that, once terms were agreed, implementation would proceed gradually, step by step.

In late February, another delay was announced, until April or May, this time attributed to the likely change of key PRC personnel at the upcoming National People’s Congress and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. (“Talks on cross-Strait services deal may be delayed,” WantChinaTimes.com, February 23, 2013, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130223000047&cid=1201.)

29 Chen Deming was quoted as telling the audience at his maiden ARATS meeting that he hoped to hold a formal meeting with his Taiwan counterpart, SEF Chairman Lin Join-sane, in the
first half of 2013 to sign an agreement on trade in services and to push for completion of a merchandise trade agreement. (Scarlett Chai et al., “Taiwan sends congratulations” CNA; see endnote 22.)

Although much was made of the fact that Taiwan firms were apparently going to be able to gain access to a portion of the Internet Content Provider market, there was not agreement in certain other significant service areas such as law, accounting, practice of medicine, and architecture. These would be the subject of later negotiations. (Sofia Wu, “Cross-strait service trade pact in offing,” Talk of the Day, CNA, April 26, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201304260040.aspx.)


37 Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Cabinet drafts bill on cross-Strait offices,” Taipei Times, April 12, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/04/12/2003559413. The bill provides that, on a reciprocal basis, the offices would be immune from search and seizure and their personnel would enjoy civil and criminal immunity when engaged in official duties. They would also be granted certain tax exemptions and other privileges at the discretion of the authorities.

Opposition party and pan-Green commentators raised questions about the proposed arrangements for ARATS in Taiwan, suggesting that they appeared no different from those for the Liaison Office of the PRC Central People’s Government in Hong Kong. The MAC sharply disagreed. (Lee Yu-hsin, ”Joseph Wu: If there is not complete diplomatic function, mutually establishing offices has no significance” [吳釗燮：不具外交功能 互設機構沒意義], Liberty Times, April 12, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/apr/12/today-fo3-3.htm.) Concerns were also voiced that the ARATS office could become an espionage center. (”Opposition DPP slams proposal to allow Chinese representative office,” Formosa Television News [FTVN], April 12, 2013, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=7142C123F0A02FEAF3732B885C1F97AD.)

Former DPP chair Tsai Ing-wen argued that since the exchange of offices was highly political and concerned sovereignty, the government should not proceed with it before a national consensus was reached. (Rich Chang, “Consensus needed on cross-Strait offices: Tsai,” Taipei Times, April 15, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/15/2003559675.) Another commentator argued that the Ma administration was cleverly manipulating the process so that, at the end of the day, it would not need to submit
the text of any agreement with the PRC on the exchange of offices to the Legislative Yuan for approval, but only provide it for the LY’s “reference.” (Su Yung-yao, “Ma government using a loophole, evading Legislative Yuan’s substantive examination” [馬政府鑽漏洞 規避立院實質審查], Liberty Times, April 13, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/apr/13/today-p1-2.htm.)


The DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) have mounted opposition to LY approval of implementing legislation, including through a boycott of the Home Affairs Committee. They insist that any representative offices be established under a framework that defines cross-Strait ties as “nation-to-nation relations.” (“Opposition parties boycott cross-Strait offices bill,” China Post, May 20, 2013, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2013/05/20/379023/Opposition-parties.htm.) Given the disparity in party strength in the LY, however, this effort seems destined to fail.


Unsurprisingly, pro-Green forces complained that if the Beijing office could not function as an overseas government office and issue visas or perform other consular work, not only would it be an unnecessary duplication of structures that already exist to take care of trade issues, but it would be like any other provincial office in Beijing. They argued that this was an example of the Ma government simply falling into the “one China” birdcage and was a harbinger of political talks. This was not a matter of reciprocal negotiations, they said, but of self-diminution. (Su Yong-yao, “Commentary: Self-diminution will create a local office in Beijing,” Liberty Times, March 6, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/mar/6/today-p5-2.htm.)

This commentary followed the release of a poll by the pro-DPP Taiwan Thinktank that showed nearly 50 percent of respondents supported the reciprocal establishment of offices but 62 percent expressed concern about a PRC office in Taiwan. A DPP legislator suggested that people in Taiwan are open-minded about cross-Strait exchanges but concerned about efforts by the Mainland to turn Taiwan into “another Hong Kong.” (Chen Hui-p’ing and Li Hsin-fang, “Taiwan Thinktank public opinion poll: 62 percent of the public are anxious about China setting up an office in Taiwan” [台灣智庫民調：中國來台設處 62%民眾憂心], Liberty Times, January 29, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/jan/29/today-p7.htm.)


Zoe Wei and Elizabeth Hsu, "Restrictions on Chinese white-collars in Taiwan to be eased," CNA, March 27, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/ShowNews/WebNews_Detail.aspx?Type=aALL&ID=201303270036. As with almost all such proposals for liberalization of access of Mainlanders to Taiwan, concerns were raised, in this case by legislators from various parties who were concerned they would replace domestic workers, in particular blue-collar workers. Administration officials pledged to implement strict restrictions to ensure that appropriate numerical limits would be observed. (Ann Yu, "Lawmakers fret over inflow of mainland China workers," China Post, March 28, 2013, http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2013/03/28/374425/Lawmakers-fret.htm.) It is estimated that approximately 300 companies would qualify for the program, employing up to 9,000 such workers. Among the complaints is the fact that the government (i.e., taxpayers) would foot 40 percent of the health insurance premiums for these people, which trade union officials termed unfair. ("Taiwan opens doors to more Chinese white-collar workers, raising doubts," FTVN, March 28, 2013, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sn0=8DD6A525604A3360C6BCC4196554A8BD.)


60 The text of the House bill introduced by Congressman Ed Royce, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 14, 13, identical to the one introduced in the Senate the same day by Senator Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1151/text.


68 Scarlet Chai and Lilian Wu, “China unfriendly to ask Vatican to sever ties.”

Across the Taiwan Strait

html#ixzz2OHJvFcIC. The delegation was to be composed of two academics specializing in national security and two people from Taiwan's unofficial representative office in Jakarta.


The TAO's version of this briefing is at http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201304/t20130408_4054049.htm. Terming the Xi-Siew meeting "significant and fruitful" (积极而富有), it contains more expressions of mutuality and has less about benefiting Taiwan, per se, but the strong desire for greater economic cooperation, including in coordinating with the regional economic order, is clear.


80 Romberg, CLM 39, pp. 14ff.


82 Article 4 of the agreement, the "disclaimer clause," stipulates: “The accord or measures taken pursuant to the provisions under the accord shall be without prejudice to relevant positions on issues with respect to the law of the seas held by competent authorities of both sides.” (Shih Hsiuchuan, “Analysis: Academics have mixed outlooks on fishery accord,” Taipei Times, April 23, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/23/2003560505.)


90 "Taiwan fishermen welcome accord with Japan," NHK World, accessed April 10, 2013 at http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20130410_32.html. This concern is not without justification. Although the fishing areas were established in the agreement, the joint commission of Japanese and Taiwan officials is to deal with important details such as catch quotas, the number of fishing boats allowed in an area, and when fishing would be permitted. As a preliminary session of that commission was scheduled to meet in Tokyo in late April, Okinawa's governor expressed "extreme indignation" about the agreement and urged the government to review it. ("Nakaima rips signing of Taiwan fishery accord," Japan Times [from Kyodo and Jiji reports], April 26, 2013, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/04/26/national/nakaima-rips-signing-of-taiwan-fishery-accord/.) A more detailed discussion of the functions of the commission can be found at Ko Shu-ling, "Japan, Taiwan to form joint fishing committee," Kyodo, April 15, 2013, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Japan,+Taiwan+to+form+joint+fishing+committee.-a0326496234.


95 Liu and Low, “Taiwanese boat returning” (see endnote 92).

96 The PRC made a similar display of PRC “comradely concern” when a Philippine coast guard vessel killed a Taiwan fisherman in mid-May, with the Foreign Ministry spokesman explaining "It is the joint responsibility of both the Mainland and Taiwan to safeguard the rights and

A People's Daily commentary put it even more directly: “China does not take the initiative in provoking incidents at sea, but if the Philippines continues to deal in crude fashion with mainland Chinese and Taiwan fishing boats and fishermen, Chinese maritime law enforcement forces should counterattack in timely and forceful fashion, to protect the legitimate rights of mainland Chinese and Taiwan fishermen; we cannot let fishermen's legitimate fishing activities proceed in fear.” (Hua Yiwen, “Philippines' killing of a Taiwan fisherman cannot be left unresolved” [菲射杀台湾渔民案不能不了了之], Xinhua [from People's Daily overseas edition], May 11, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2013-05/11/c_115727633.htm.)

The assertion of PRC co-responsibility in this instance was equally as unwelcome to the Ma administration as it was in the Diaoyu case. (Luo Yin-ch'ung, “Thanks for the concern [but] Wang Yu-chi does not want the Mainland to get involved” [感謝關切 王郁琦不願陸插手], Want Daily, May 15, 2013, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20130516000961-260301.)

97 Although Abe's chief cabinet secretary said Japan reached the agreement with Taiwan in order to “restore order to fishing,” Abe himself told the Upper House Budget Committee, “We took into account Taipei's stance that (it) will not partner with Beijing over the Senkaku Islands.” (“Insight: Abe returns to hard-line approach in response to Beijing, Seoul,” Asahi Shimbun, April 24, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/AJ201304240082.)


100 “Wang Yi: Safeguarding sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is the common responsibility of compatriots on both sides of the Strait” (王毅:维护钓鱼岛主权是两岸同胞的共同责任), ChinaTaiwanet, March 6, 2013, http://www.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201303/t20130306_3867848.htm.


105 Not only did DPP stalwart and frequent Ma critic Bi-khim Hsiao express approval of the achievement on her blog (https://www.facebook.com/Bikhim/posts/10151391880515687), but even former president Lee Teng-hui termed it "very important” (很重要) and a "very big help” (很大的幫助) to Taiwan's fishermen. (FTVN, “Ex-president Lee Teng-hui applauds Taiwan-Japan fishery pact,” April 12, 2013, http://englishnews.ftv.com.tw/read.aspx?sno=E2DB3670B2210097FAD0BE82361A7E14.)


The Referendum Act in its current form stipulates that for a referendum to pass, over half of all eligible voters must cast valid ballots and over half of those casting valid ballots must vote “yes.” The text of the Act is available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCODE=D0020050.


“KMT caucus unveils text of plebiscite question on nuke issue,” KMT News Network (from Taipei papers), March 8, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&nnum=112&anum=12642. In introducing the text, the caucus also presented five reasons to oppose the plant (and hence to support the referendum) and five reasons to support it (and oppose the referendum):

Cons:
- Nuclear plant not safest way to generate energy; risk of irreparable consequences
- Nuclear power not cheapest source of energy taking into account cost of disposing of nuclear waste, decommissioning a plant, and cleaning up construction site
- Many safety issues with 4th Nuclear Power Plant have been discovered
- Frequent earthquakes and typhoons; plant in vast metropolitan area; if threat of radiation leak, no capability to evacuate area
- After Fukushima, many countries working toward being nuclear-free; Taiwan can also adopt such a policy and develop alternative sources of energy.

Pros:
- Relatively clean re CO2 emissions; cut greenhouse gases, meet pledges
- Can’t achieve nuclear-free homeland in one step; nuclear power allows gradual transition
- Terminating construction could lead to power shortages because alternatives such as natural gas are undeveloped, extremely expensive and subject to price fluctuations in the global market
- Halting construction could send electricity prices soaring, severely impacting economy and people’s livelihoods, driving down GDP, driving industries overseas, raising unemployment
- If 4th plant not put into operation, might need to expand capacity of existing three nuclear plants, which could carry serious risks due to the aging reactors.

Article 33 reads: “Whether a proposal of referendum is adopted or vetoed, no more proposals may be raised for the same matter within 3 years commencing from the day when the election commission publicizes the result of voting. However, if a proposal of referendum over an important policy on a public facility is vetoed, no more proposals may be raised for the same matter within the period from the day when the result of voting is publicized to 8 years after the facility is completed and put into use.” (http://law.moj.gov.tw/eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCODE=D0020050.)
119 Taiwan Indicators Survey Research reported that in the first half of April 2013 Ma’s dissatisfaction rate rose to 74 percent, an increase of almost 5 percentage points in only half a month, along with a rise in his mistrust rating by a like amount, to over 60 percent. (“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey First Ten Days of April, 2013”[2013年4月上旬台灣民心動態調查], April 11, 2013, http://www.tISR.com.tw/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/TISR_TMBS_201304_1.pdf.) Other polls conducted in May on the first anniversary of Ma’s second term, whether from the DPP or conservative institutions, produced similar results.

Actually, Premier Jiang indicated that there were two preconditions for early retirement of the First and Second Nuclear Power Plants. First, the Fourth Plant needed to be
commercially operational before 2016, and, second, idle capacity (held in reserve for emergency use) needed to be within safe range. (Su Hsiu-hui, "Jiang: two preconditions for early retirement of First and Second Nuclear Power Plants" [江揆：核一二提前除役二前提], UDN, April 17, 2013, http://udn.com/NEWS/BREAKINGNEWS/BREAKINGNEWS1/7838396.shtml.)

Interestingly, there are some indications that opposition to the fourth plant doesn’t actually carry fully over to opposition to nuclear power in general or to continued operation of the existing three plants. (Chris Wang, "Majority oppose Gongliao plant: survey," Taipei Times, March 12, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/12/2003556882.) Even former President Lee Teng-hui, while saying he would not vote in the referendum on the fourth plant, argued that Taiwan could not afford to abandon nuclear power in the near future and should enhance its nuclear energy program by developing advanced technologies such as nuclear fusion. (Chris Wang, "Lee Teng-hui says nuclear power plants still needed," Taipei Times, April 12, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/04/12/2003559438.)


Chapter Three

Settling In for the Long Haul: Stability with Chinese Characteristics

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The political turmoil created in Taiwan by the Kuomintang’s (KMT) move to oust Legislative Yuan (LY) speaker Wang Jin-pyng in mid-September capped off several months of tumult over such issues as the abuse-related heatstroke death of a military recruit, the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant, and the recently signed cross-Strait services trade agreement (STA). While the extent of the fallout from the Wang episode is yet to be determined, this latest turn of the political wheel has cast into some doubt the shape of politics in Taiwan going forward and the fate of pending sensitive legislative issues.

In this context, and as Taiwan’s economic prospects for 2013 remained shaky, both major political parties began to position themselves not only for the 2014 seven-in-one local elections, but also for the 2016 presidential contest. Although not expected to play a significant role in 2014, cross-Strait political relations emerged as an increasingly visible aspect of that positioning.

A pressing issue regarding international space for Taiwan, Taipei’s quest for observer status at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly starting in late September was finally resolved (Taiwan will attend the ICAO Assembly as a “special guest” of the ICAO Council president). But another issue, Ma Ying-jeou’s desire to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting and perhaps sit down with Xi Jinping, emerged to take its place.

The U.S. role in cross-Strait relations has remained largely in the background, but it merits at least brief attention.

Political Setting in Taiwan

The KMT move to oust LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng over alleged influence peddling is a breaking story as this essay heads to the editor in mid-September. At this early date, it is premature to predict the ultimate scope and extent of the fallout. We will only note here that, however it turns out, this dramatic event — what one commentary called a “political nuclear explosion” — will undoubtedly affect not
only intra-Kuomintang politics but also the course of the KMT’s rivalry with the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). All of this will almost surely affect the handling of important pending issues in the LY even if Wang remains speaker for the duration of his appeal against the KMT decision to remove him. The impact will also almost surely not only be political but economic, as well, given that among other legislative casualties could be postponement of action on the budget, which would constrict the government’s ability to implement stimulus measures, plus yet further delay in ratification of the services trade agreement with the Mainland, which could discourage private investment.

As important and unique as Speaker Wang’s case is, it is not totally out of line with the confrontational nature of Taiwan politics we have seen in recent months. Indeed, one line of speculation in the ever-active and inventive Taiwan rumor mill ties Wang’s sacking to Ma’s frustration with his management of controversial issues in the LY. In any case, there are clearly important substantive as well as political issues at stake, and so emotions and rhetoric run high. But whether the topic is the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant or the cross-Strait STA or the question of the tragic death of a military recruit, and now even apparently this internal KMT struggle as the DPP has been quick to indicate it will seek to impeach Ma over the handling of the Wang case, the bottom line calculations frequently come down at some point to Green vs. Blue, DPP vs. KMT.

Physical confrontations in the LY are not unique in Taiwan’s experience, even its recent experience. But they are distressing in light of the enormous strides Taiwan has otherwise made in democratization and go a considerable way to undermining the extremely positive image that Taiwan’s free elections and peaceful open debate have created throughout the region, including on the Mainland, and around the world.

One domestic result of such confrontational antics as blocking the speaker’s rostrum and throwing inkwells and water bombs at one another is seen in polls that reveal general public dissatisfaction with both parties. One trusts that common sense will prevail in the end and that the people and political leaders in Taiwan will weigh the costs and benefits of the difficult choices they face and insist on decisions that are in Taiwan’s long-term interest rather than to someone’s short-term political advantage. But the disruptive process calls that into question and in any event imposes sometimes considerable costs.

Whatever the rights and wrongs of the dispute over the Ma administration’s handling of the STA (discussed immediately below), new procedures are clearly needed to ensure both the reality and the perception of sufficient consultation with industry and with the LY about important cross-Strait negotiations (albeit in the context of appropriate protection of negotiating positions). Not only is the DPP demanding it,
but so are many in the KMT, and ideas for establishing a satisfactory procedure are already being generated within the administration.  

**Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement**

The cross-Strait services trade agreement was finally signed June 21. It was thought by both sides to be a constructive accord, and headlines in the immediate wake of the signing touted the agreement's benefits. Not only did each side open substantially greater parts of its services market to the other, but, as we noted in earlier analysis, the terms generally demonstrated continued PRC willingness to reach agreements that, at least on their face, favor Taiwan — helping Taiwan economically as part of the PRC’s efforts to win hearts and minds on the island. Moreover, some press reports indicated that since Taiwan service industries are already prospering on the Mainland, they are particularly well positioned to take advantage of this greater opening by Beijing.

However, not only did counterarguments about the STA begin to appear alongside the favorable accounts at once, but in fact the DPP had sought ahead of time to delay the signing, and after the signing immediately sought to start the negotiations all over again. Many affected industries in Taiwan complained that they would face irresistible competition from Mainland counterparts which would now be allowed into the Taiwan market while, whatever the formal terms, Taiwan firms were still effectively blocked from competing on equal terms on the Mainland. Allegations appeared before the agreement was even signed about an influx of Mainland workers, an issue of particular sensitivity, and they continued to be made months later.

The administration responded that charges of undue competition, an influx of Mainland workers, and other similar damaging outcomes were based on hearsay, fabrication, and unfounded rumor. “Many things that never took place have been repeated again and again,” President Ma asserted as he called for a rational debate.

It seemed as though that opportunity for just such a debate would be in Ma’s hands after agreement was reached to hold a two-hour televised debate on September 15 with DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang. But Su pulled out in the midst of the Wang Jin-pyng controversy, arguing that the Wang case had disrupted the political environment. The Ma administration rejected this as a made-up excuse to avoid a debate Su didn’t want in the first place.

In the meantime, proponents and opponents of the agreement began operating in high gear to persuade the public to their side. Ironically, while the DPP has argued that the small and medium-sized service businesses in Taiwan will be especially hurt, the party has also expressed considerable frustration that affected sectors seem
largely unaware of the impact on them and has tried to rally them via the party’s website and thousands of flyers.22

In an effort to control the chaos over the STA in the LY, the KMT and DPP caucuses agreed that the accord will be reviewed and voted on by eight relevant legislative committees, article by article. As in any trade negotiation, there will be winners and losers, but the article-by-article LY review and vote should provide both legislators and the public with a more comprehensive basis on which to judge whether, on balance, the agreement serves Taiwan’s interests and whether the compensatory measures the Ma administration has said it will take to aid those affected will be sufficient.23 Although the LY preemptively said that it would not allow the agreement to come into effect without being ratified by an LY vote,24 the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) sought to calm emotions by immediately promising that it would honor the outcome of the LY review.25

On the other hand, as American trade negotiators know all too well, an article-by-article vote could wreak havoc. Despite the strongly held “principled” positions, and whatever future arrangements are adopted for vetting agreements as they are being negotiated, the choice confronting Taiwan at this time is whether to pick apart the STA, forcing a renegotiation of the entire agreement or whether, if flaws are found during what will now be a detailed LY examination, to find a different way to deal with those shortcomings that avoids scuttling an agreement widely seen to be helpful to stabilizing Taiwan’s growth.26

The stakes are high, because the outcome of this struggle will likely have profound implications for Taiwan’s ability to negotiate future agreements not only with the Mainland but with others, as overturning parts of the agreement will cause potential partners to doubt that Taipei can make stick whatever terms they negotiate.

In the cross-Strait context, both sides had previously expressed hope that negotiations over dispute resolution and merchandise trade could be concluded by the end of 2013 — perhaps they could even be signed by then.27 The merchandise trade agreement is already viewed by many as far more complicated than the services agreement because it involves thousands of individual products as well as complex matters such as certificates of origin and duty waivers.28 So despite reported progress, it is inherently vulnerable to snags. But beyond that, now the problems encountered by the STA have led officials to suggest that conclusion of those negotiations could be delayed until the fate of the STA is clear.29

Moreover, the Mainland has indicated that any hope Taiwan has to participate in regional economic arrangements depends on cooperation between Taipei and Beijing. But in the wake of the STA controversy, People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials have indicated that Taiwan needs to rectify the problems with cross-Strait economic cooperation, including the process for approval of cross-Strait agreements,
before it can try for participation in regional economic integration structures such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which Ma has set, alongside membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as a priority goal. 

The Fourth Nuclear Power Plant

We have discussed in the past another highly contentious issue that while deeply enmeshed in partisan politics, also cuts across party lines. That is the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. This issue, and specifically the question of LY approval of a referendum to be put to the people regarding the future of that plant, is so poisonous that it has been taken off the table for the moment.

As we have pointed out before, whether they support the power plant — and the referendum — or not, many KMT legislators see the issue as highly radioactive, feeling that, no matter the outcome, they will suffer at the polls. Hence, many observers in Taiwan believe that, unless a bill approving placing a referendum before the people can be approved quickly, and a referendum held before the end of the year — all of which now seems extremely unlikely — the entire issue may be put off for a considerable period of time, perhaps not only beyond the 2014 election but maybe even beyond that. This has raised a question about the impact on Taiwan’s energy supply in the not too distant future.

Meanwhile, the plant has received mixed safety reviews. A favorable interim safety report was issued by the World Association of Nuclear Operators, but two European nuclear specialists brought in by the anti-nuclear group Greenpeace Taiwan recommended terminating the project. Neither of these assessments can be considered definitive, and the road ahead is still both long and full of potential potholes.

As is well known, part of the administration’s case for the fourth plant is that without it, individual and corporate consumers will suffer significantly increased electricity costs. That case may have been brought home to many people by reaction against the far more modest hike in rates scheduled for this October. In light of strong public objections, the administration had to adjust the plan so that 85 percent of residential households and 80 percent of small businesses will not be directly affected. Nonetheless, manufacturers in certain sectors still complained that even these modest increases would increase their operating costs significantly and squeeze profitability.

This issue has now been further complicated by the Wang Jin-pyng issue, and while the KMT LY caucus did not go along with the effort of the referendum bill’s original sponsor to formally withdraw the proposal, it has now suspended consideration of the bill until after safety has been assured. This means an LY vote will be delayed at least until mid-2014 and, as suggested earlier, probably for a considerable time beyond that.
Other Issues on the Ma Administration’s Plate

The quick action of the Ma administration to immediately move the investigation of the heatstroke-related death of an army recruit from military courts to the civilian courts, and to move virtually all other military justice cases there as well, may have stemmed rising public anger. But, even though it may seem justified by the fact that several appeals cases have now been brought in the civilian courts, there are many informed people who believe that there will be a cost to pay for this seemingly wholesale action, especially moving cases involving military espionage. The reputation of the military is in need of significant repair, and the resignation of two defense ministers within one week — though for reasons entirely unrelated to each other — adds to the burden. It has also taken a toll on movement toward an all-volunteer force, as recruitment has fallen far short of targets in recent months. And, in fact, the target date for achieving the all-volunteer force was recently delayed from 2014 to 2016.42

While they were not very evident in the polls, which continued to show a lack of support for Ma, there were a number of positive developments during recent months. The Ma administration has continued to earn considerable credit for the successful negotiation of the fisheries agreement with Japan last April and for bringing to an apparently successful conclusion the case of the tragic shooting of a Taiwan fisherman by Philippine coast guard personnel in May. In the Japan instance, while there are not unexpectedly complaints from fishermen both in Taiwan and Japan, overall the agreement seems to be working well and has led to significant catches for Taiwan fishermen. Moreover, the Ma administration’s emphasis on addressing practical issues while setting aside competing sovereignty claims has won much praise.

In the Philippine case, the family of the slain fisherman went so far as to publicly thank President Ma and the foreign and justice ministries for their help, which was certainly a boost for the administration in affirming the significance of the achievement to the broad Taiwan public.

Managing Cross-Strait Relations

As we discussed in earlier essays, however, the outcomes of these two maritime cases were far from entirely to the liking of the Mainland. Beijing had tried to forge common “Chinese” cause with Taipei against the other parties, but failed. Despite some initial indications that the public in Taiwan might even favor cross-Strait cooperation, especially in the wake of the Philippine outrage, the Ma administration firmly rejected such a course, and as it achieved success on both fronts, public opinion swung around to support it.
At the same time, PRC efforts to win hearts and minds in Taiwan through economic benefits (beyond the STA) continued apace. Cross-Strait passenger flights, which had been raised to 616 per week only in February, were increased once again in August, to 670. The number of cargo flights was also increased by over 20 percent, from 56 per week to 68. And in mid-June the Mainland announced a set of 31 measures designed to facilitate travel and assistance to Taiwan job-seekers and businesses in the PRC.

Although Taiwan continues to resist a cultural agreement in the face of a steady push from Beijing, resistance to an education agreement seems to have been overcome. This was evident in the fact that KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung urged conclusion of such an accord in his meeting with Xi Jinping in June (discussed below) while he only called for “strengthening” cultural exchange.

**Reciprocal Establishment of SEF and ARATS Offices, Seemingly Stuck**

We have written a fair amount in the past about the complex issue of establishing reciprocal offices of the organizations that handle cross-Strait relations for the governments, Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Mainland's Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Wu Poh-hsiung pressed on this issue again when he met with Xi Jinping in mid-June. Xi reportedly responded that establishing offices would be an important milestone, but he hoped both sides could overcome “some obstacles that still exist at the moment.”

The one obvious remaining sticking point is the question of the right to visit detained or arrested citizens. Progress had been anticipated in July, but clearly there was no breakthrough. The most frequently cited issue is PRC law, but it is not clear whether such rights might not also be seen by some in the Mainland as too close for comfort to international consular rights.

Some people have begun to talk of “workarounds” that would allow such access while not running up against PRC legal restrictions or troubling political perceptions. One idea people mention is having local lawyers “conduct” the visits, with resident SEF office representatives ostensibly along as “members of the group.”

How much of a compromise will be possible is unclear. Both sides have talked about the exchange of offices as a priority — Ma having referred to it as an important part of the cross-Strait “infrastructure.” But his room for maneuver may not be great. While it is only the DPP that has boycotted consideration of the relevant legislation in the LY and that has indicated it will continue to boycott until LY supervision is assured and certain parameters established, the fact is that even members of the KMT LY
caucus have said they would not support establishment of the offices if visiting rights were not included in the enabling legislation.\textsuperscript{57}

So it is relevant to note that while reports after a fourth round of discussions in late August pointed to a narrowing of the gap on text and structure of the agreement, they also implied continuing stalemate over the issue of “humanitarian visitation rights.” Taiwan reporting on the meeting had the Mainland saying only that it “fully understood” \textsuperscript{充分理解} the Taiwan position, whereas Taiwan officials said agreement on the visitation issue would be “crucial to the success of the negotiation” \textsuperscript{協議成敗的關鍵}.\textsuperscript{58}

As with everything in this realm, how this is worked out remains to be seen, but both the administration and the opposition in Taiwan have produced polls that reveal strong public support for insisting that the offices have the right to issue travel documents and carry out visitations,\textsuperscript{59}

\section*{The DPP Contemplates the Future of Cross-Strait Relations}

Throughout the recent period there has been a lot of stirring in the DPP over the party’s cross-Strait policy, but there has not been any conclusion nor is there likely to be in the months leading up to the party chairmanship election in May 2014 and the seven-in-one local elections in December. Except for Frank Hsieh, who some people suggest may run for party chair unless another candidate emerges who endorses his “respective interpretations of constitutions” (憲法各表) position,\textsuperscript{60} no one else seems to think that grappling seriously with the issue would be politically propitious at the moment.

The party’s senior-level China Affairs Committee has met, and, in an effort to be more inclusive, several sessions of the so-called “Huashan” seminars have as well. One of the latter featured a debate between Ma’s former National Security Council (NSC) secretary general, Su Chi, and DPP counterparts over the value of the 1992 Consensus (a term that Su Chi coined). So far nothing conclusive has come of any of these discussions, however (nor was that expected), and several more Huashan meetings will be held in the weeks ahead on different aspects of cross-Strait relations.\textsuperscript{61}

Meanwhile, a number of leading DPP members have recently visited either the Mainland or Hong Kong or both, including former premier Frank Hsieh and Kaohsiung mayor Chen Chu, both for the second time, as well as the most popular local leader in Taiwan, Tainan mayor William Lai. None was received “in the capacity” of a DPP official, but their important positions were obviously well known and they all received high-level treatment. Their welcome presumably comes under the guidance that “even people who once supported ‘Taiwan independence’ or engaged in related
activities are welcome to visit the mainland and participate in cooperation as long as they have wishes to improve cross-Strait relations."\textsuperscript{62}

But one can also find hints that the PRC position has evolved even further. Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Deputy Director Sun Yafu is cited, for example, as saying that while party-to-party exchanges are impossible as long as the DPP doesn't give up Taiwan independence, “the PRC welcomes Taiwan independence people to come to the Mainland to have a look around and engage in exchanges” \[但是歡迎台獨的人,到大陸參觀交流\].\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, these same elements seemed contained in the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman's comments in mid-August, when he also reiterated the ban on party-to-party exchanges as long as the DPP doesn't change its Taiwan independence stance, but expressed approval of contact and communication with people from all walks of life who support peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, including welcoming them to come to the Mainland for exchanges and visits.\textsuperscript{64} No reference was made to having to give up any Taiwan independence position.

At the end of the day, however, and despite Frank Hsieh's assertion that the Mainland can “tolerate” his “respective interpretations of constitutions,”\textsuperscript{65} both the TAO spokesperson and Taiwan Studies Institute head Yu Keli expressed skepticism that Hsieh's position went far enough.\textsuperscript{66} As Yu put it, the Mainland is flexible in its Taiwan policy but also has its principle. Explaining further, he said that there is “a wide gap” \[很大差異\] between Hsieh's political idea and that of Mainland China, and while the sides can still communicate and discuss cross-Strait issues, it is impractical to deal with a political issue such as Hsieh's “respective interpretations of constitutions” proposal without having a political negotiation first.\textsuperscript{67}

Hsieh has responded to this on the one hand by acknowledging that his position is that the Republic of China (ROC) only covers Taiwan and not the Mainland (which distinguishes it from Ma's “one China, respective interpretations”), so it is not a “one China” position, but on the other hand asserting that this is not a “Taiwan independence” position because the two sides maintain “special relations.” He warned that if Beijing doesn't recognize either the ROC or the ROC constitution Taiwan would have no choice but to adopt another constitution,\textsuperscript{68} presumably one that will not contain the links across the Strait that exist in the present constitution.

While TAO deputy director Sun Yafu welcomed Hsieh's efforts\textsuperscript{69} he also noted in mid-August that, while recent DPP steps to carry out exchanges with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were worthy of encouragement, “no positive improvement can be seen” in the party's cross-Strait policies.\textsuperscript{70}

In contrast to the bouquets thrown Hsieh's way, in late June Beijing threw some brickbats at Su Tseng-chang. Not only was there a series of apparently authoritatively inspired articles in the \textit{China Review News} in late June attacking Su for what he had said while visiting the United States about Taiwan's sovereign, independent status
and for criticizing the Wu-Xi June meeting, but the TAO also sharply berated him directly. Asked specifically about Su's "offensive remarks" [攻击性的言论] by a Xinhua correspondent in what was obviously a planted question, the TAO spokesman launched into a stinging rebuke:

Some people in the DPP, for their own political purposes, stubbornly stick to the “Taiwan independence” position of "one country on each side" and insist on interfering in and sabotaging cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation. These kinds of actions not only run counter to the current of cross-Strait relations and the common aspirations of the compatriots on both sides, even more they damage Taiwan compatriots’ interests and well-being. There is no way out. This is also at odds with their earlier expressed pretense about “wanting to improve relations with the Mainland.”

According to Su, what he was trying to do was to thread a political needle. As he explained it, public opinion is more and more upset about the ruling party’s existing cross-Strait policy which, he said, leans excessively toward the Mainland. Moreover, he argued, people appreciate the DPP's firm stand of safeguarding Taiwan. At the same time, people have high expectations that the DPP will take “more active” [更积极] measures on cross-Strait relations. In other words, the DPP should carry out the mission of safeguarding Taiwan, on the one hand, while strengthening its capability of keeping various interests balanced, on the other.

Su asserted that during the process of formulating a cross-Strait position, the DPP needs to find ways to create a policy that not only reflects the party’s core foundation, but that also represents the wide support of civic society. As he put it, “whether we like it or not, the DPP has a responsibility to issue a China policy that conforms to the interests of Taiwan’s future . . . what we need to do is to protect Taiwan’s core values, to create the most beneficial interest for Taiwan, and to issue a policy of stability and peace for the region.”

Su also reiterated in the context of opening the “Huashan” meetings that the DPP stands for Taiwan's sovereignty and independence, saying the party would never betray or abandon its basic values. Yet at various times he has said that building the country is more important than actively promoting independence and, in asserting that Taiwan already is independent and that the most important thing is to safeguard Taiwan's democracy and sovereignty, that the issue of de jure independence should be left to academic discussions.

Based on his comments cited above, it is unlikely that Su would disagree with former party secretary-general Chiou I-jen's assertion that the top DPP priority is to convince people that it is capable of handling Taiwan's relationship with the Mainland. Chiou argued that the DPP must get rid of the label of being opposed to anything that has to do with the Mainland. While he offered no alternative, Chiou
said that the DPP’s current policy is insufficient: “We need to find a replacement for the 1992 Consensus.”

How the DPP will do that, however, is not clear.

**Political Dialogue, Consultations, and International Space**

On the overall issues of political dialogue, as we noted in earlier essays, Beijing has for now settled on Track II channels as the most feasible way to lay the ground for eventual elevation to an authoritative level. Mainland commentators have tried to stress that the purpose of such dialogue is not to set the stage for near-term unification (though ultimately, of course, that remains the goal), but rather to promote peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

However, not only do many people in Taiwan not see much distinction between these goals given the unambiguousness of the long-term target, but some people on the Mainland continue to directly highlight the link to unification. For example, in a speech discussing the importance of enhancing cross-Strait identity — a major theme of some of the Track II conversations — Yu Keli told a cross-Strait seminar that “[e]xploiting political arrangements between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan is the first step to realize peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Straits.”

Perhaps seeking to deal with Beijing’s pressure on political dialogue, Ma made the point that some forms of ongoing cross-Strait talks are already “political.” Negotiation over reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices is a form of political consultation, he observed.

Ma also made some interesting gestures to Beijing that, while preserving Taipei’s position regarding the Republic of China, seemed designed to respond to the Mainland’s desire for “more” from him on “one China.”

The first was his dispatch of honorary KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung to Beijing in mid-June to meet with Xi Jinping. This was the first high-level KMT visit since Xi assumed power, and Ma termed it a trip “of paramount importance.” Included in Wu’s authorized set of talking points was a reference to the “one China framework,” a phrase that does not often make it into Taipei’s rhetoric. The authoritative nature of Wu’s remarks — and of Xi’s — was evident as each indicated he was reading from an “approved text,” Wu’s script having been vetted by Ma, Xi’s by the CCP Central Committee.

The second gesture was contained in Ma’s response to a congratulatory message from Xi Jinping on the occasion of Ma’s reelection as KMT party chair in July. In his response, for the first time in many years, Ma referred to the “one China principle” [一個中國原則].
Once again, despite DPP charges to the contrary, there is no indication that Ma was seeking to move away from his previous position. But by citing that sentence from the 1992 negotiations in an apparently approving way, on top of Wu’s reference to the “one China framework,” Ma seemed to be trying to reassure Beijing that he truly has a “one China” approach. And he seemed to find some resonance.

On emerging from his meeting with Xi Jinping, for example, Wu said that Xi told him he had previously been under the impression that Ma was quite conservative about cross-Strait relations, causing relations to come to a standstill or possibly even take a step backward. But now, Wu reported, Xi no longer believed this was true.

Moreover, after Ma’s response to Xi’s congratulatory note, TAO head Zhang Zhijun openly welcomed Taipei’s “one China” stance.

One assumes that Ma has been doing all of this in the service of seeking greater cooperation from the Mainland on a range of issues including the reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices, but also matters connected with Taiwan’s aspirations for greater international space.

In the process, Ma has continued to stress that, while cross-Strait relations are not state-to-state relations, “in cross-Strait relations, we hope that the Mainland could also understand the fact that the existence of Taiwan is something that should not be ignored. We urge the Mainland not to suppress Taiwan in the international community; otherwise this would only cause antipathy among Taiwanese people, which is unfavorable for cross-Strait relations.”

**ICAO**

Ma continued to press in particular for a seat at the ICAO triennial Assembly meeting that was to convene in Montreal in late September. Although Taipei ultimately succeeded in obtaining an invitation to attend as the “special guest” of the ICAO Council president, the path to get there was not easy.

After holding out for some time following favorable remarks from PRC leaders about “seriously considering” Taiwan’s aspirations but seeing no follow-through, the Ma administration tackled the issue head-on. One of the first things it did was to solicit support from the United States and other countries, and these efforts succeeded. In the U.S. case, this came in the form of HR 1151, which passed the Congress without a dissenting vote in either house in June and was signed into law as PL 113-17 by the president in July.

But that success also carried with it some cost. PRC officials complained that passage of the act put the brakes on what otherwise was an ongoing process to try to respond to Taiwan’s desires, and they warned that any further action by the United States would
narrow the room for maneuver even further.\textsuperscript{93} As the Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman put it, “the intervention of foreign forces is not helpful and can only complicate the matter.”\textsuperscript{94} The foreign ministry spokesman called Congress’s action a “gross violation” of the “one China” policy and the three joint U.S.-PRC Communiqués and said China had lodged “solemn representations” with the U.S. side.\textsuperscript{95}

Beijing has also cited other obstacles. For one, PRC officials noted, the rules of procedure for the ICAO Assembly do not provide for an observer that is not either an international organization or a state not party to ICAO.\textsuperscript{96} For ICAO, Taiwan is neither.

For another, the PRC has complained about a lack of cross-Strait consultation. As TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu put it in late August, less than a month before the Assembly was to convene, China’s consistent policy is that, on the premise that it would not create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” fair and reasonable arrangements can be found through cross-Strait consultation, with some emphasis on the last phrase.\textsuperscript{97}

Although President Ma has spoken on a number of occasions throughout his presidency about a willingness to consult with Beijing about international space,\textsuperscript{98} there is a natural sensitivity to doing so in any way that can be interpreted as seeking permission or as acknowledging that Beijing controls Taiwan’s fate.

When Ma revealed that among discussions with other relevant parties there were ongoing cross-Strait consultations on ICAO through civil aviation channels,\textsuperscript{99} it was not clear whether this would suffice, especially since the Mainland had stressed several times that international space is a “political” issue. Moreover, Sun Yafu’s later statement that the necessary consultations had not been held seemed to indicate Beijing wanted something more.

In addition, in the ICAO case, as opposed to World Health Assembly (WHA) observership, where health issues were very prominent at the time Taiwan got its first invitation in 2009, PRC officials indicated they did not accept the argument that Taiwan’s attendance at a triennial Assembly was really related to safety; it was a “status” issue, they asserted.\textsuperscript{100} Taiwan can get all the necessary safety-related ICAO notices and other information through Beijing in a timely way, they say, which officials in Taiwan assert is simply not the case.

All of that said, Taiwan all along was keenly aware of the reality that Beijing held the whip hand on this question. Weeks before the decision was announced, Taipei’s representative in Washington acknowledged frankly that Taiwan’s participation in international organization still “hinges on” China’s goodwill.\textsuperscript{101}

The PRC position was reasonably neatly summarized in an appraisal of the Wu-Xi meeting in June: 1) the two sides must not give the outside world the impression that there are “two Chinas” or that there is an independent Taiwan; 2) the two sides must not
tolerate foreign intervention or foreign pressure; and 3) the two sides must comply with the charters of international organizations. Moreover, the CCP still insists on dealing with cases on a case-by-case, individual basis for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{102}

Whether the “invited guest” formula will in fact turn out to be a step toward observer status in the future as Taipei hopes\textsuperscript{103} remains to be seen. But Taiwan’s foreign minister characterized it as “an innovative formula acceptable to every party, including Mainland China.”\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, while the terms were not revealed in detail, Taiwan officials have indicated that this arrangement will allow Taiwan to get updated information directly from ICAO on new standards and regulations for safety, security efficiency, and regularity, as well as for aviation environmental protection, thus meeting Taiwan’s practical goals in a “professional, pragmatic, decent and meaningful manner.”\textsuperscript{105}

Hence, while perhaps not a “first best” choice for either Taipei or Beijing, and despite opposition criticism in Taiwan,\textsuperscript{106} the denouement of this case seems to have reflected sufficient success for both sides, what one might truly call a “win-win” outcome: Taiwan was able to attend the Assembly and will hopefully get greater access to ICAO information, the outcome emerged from satisfactory cross-Strait consultations,\textsuperscript{107} Beijing’s “one China” premise was not breached, the charter was not violated, and credit was given entirely to the efforts of the two sides—not outside forces.\textsuperscript{108}

**APEC and a Ma-Xi meeting**

Just as ICAO was reaching a satisfactory conclusion, Ma indicated another area where he would like to extend Taiwan’s international reach (and his own personal involvement). That is, he said he would like to attend the annual APEC leaders meeting, and in this context he has raised the possibility of meeting with Xi Jinping.

Although Ma had to acknowledge that conditions are not yet ripe to participate personally (and in the end he named former Vice President Vincent Siew to represent him at this year’s meeting in Bali), he has taken note of the fact that the existing conventions at APEC allow Taiwan to attend as a “member economy” and he has expressed a willingness to participate as head of the Taiwan economy, in accordance with the “Seattle model,”\textsuperscript{109} not as a head of state. “Since I am the leader of the economy in Taiwan, why can’t I attend myself as well as send a representative to participate?”\textsuperscript{110}

Wrapped up in the issue of APEC attendance was also the issue of a possible Ma-Xi meeting. Although Ma has been quite consistent for a long time in saying that “some conditions” would need to be created by both sides for any such meeting, starting in mid-July,\textsuperscript{111} he has mused several times about such a meeting. Among the conditions that would need to be met, in particular he has stressed the need for public support and also for arrangements to provide that the status in which he would attend would
ensure that Taiwan’s dignity was maintained. At times Ma has implied that this latter condition meant he would have to meet Xi in his capacity of ROC president. However, as he has discussed his possible attendance at APEC, he has hinted that by doing so while wearing his “head of economy” hat rather than “head of state” hat, this could cover the status issue.112

Given all of these sensitivities, although many observers argued the possibilities might be greater for him to attend APEC and meet with Xi when the PRC hosts the leaders meeting in Shanghai next year, Ma himself at one point seemed to feel that this year’s meeting in Bali, Indonesia, might be more feasible. He said the Shanghai venue would be highly sensitive.113 Nonetheless, after it was clear he could not go to Bali, he indicated that he would be willing to go to Shanghai.114

Some Mainland observers chastised Ma for raising the idea of attending APEC at all.115 Others thought that, assuming it was arranged carefully, managing a meeting in Shanghai in 2014 could be acceptable to Beijing.116

For its part, however, the PRC government drew a sharp distinction between prospects for Ma to attend APEC, on the one hand, and a Ma-Xi meeting, on the other. As TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu put it, these were “two different matters” [兩回事]. He said that any idea of attendance at the APEC leaders meeting had to accord with the existing MOU between China and APEC that ruled out attendance at such a high level as well as APEC’s “established practice.”117 On the other hand, Sun said, the idea of a Ma-Xi meeting was a “good thing which he really wanted to see realized” [一件好事情, 真的要實現] if the proper conditions could be created by both sides.118

In terms of domestic reaction in Taiwan, while DPP spokesmen have said Ma’s attendance at APEC would be positive if it advanced Taiwan’s international participation and had a positive impact on economic development, they have also said that attending “only” in order to meet Xi would not be supported by the people.119 Some Green advocates went even further, one predicting that a Ma-Xi meeting would mean the “elimination of the ROC.”120 That said, polls show that, though at a lower level than previous support for a Ma-Hu Jintao meeting, a plurality of people in Taiwan (43.2 percent vs. 36 percent) would support a Ma-Xi meeting before Ma leaves office in 2016.121

**International economic agreements**

A cautious attitude also characterizes Beijing’s approach to Taiwan’s aspirations for more economic cooperation agreements (Free Trade Agreements, FTAs). Apparently, the agreement with New Zealand signed in mid-July passed muster, making it the first country with which Taiwan has signed such an agreement that is not only part
of the TPP and RCEP processes but also a non-diplomatic partner of Taiwan’s. A similar agreement with Singapore is expected to be signed shortly.

As to why Beijing has gone along with these arrangements, some Taiwan observers believe the fact that Beijing’s final green light to both New Zealand and Singapore only came after the successful visit of Wu Poh-hsiung in June was not coincidental.

On broader regional economic arrangements, senior officials in Beijing have expressed “understanding” of Taiwan’s economic challenges and its need to avoid being economically isolated in the region. But the PRC position remains that Taiwan should work with the Mainland to coordinate a way for Taiwan to participate. Former Vice President Vincent Siew has endorsed that approach, but, despite the high priority President Ma assigns to Taiwan’s participation in regional integration, working through the Mainland is likely to be politically sensitive. Moreover, as noted earlier, senior PRC officials have indicated that problems over ratification of the cross-Strait services trade agreement should be resolved before Taiwan tries for regional integration.

The United States

Taiwan is no longer the centerpiece of U.S.-PRC dialogues, but it remains a hardy staple and it is unlikely that any senior Chinese official will omit reference to the issue in a comprehensive discussion with American counterparts.

We saw that at the Obama-Xi summit at Sunnylands in June, when an American briefer reported that President Xi had raised the issue “as they often do” and that President Obama had responded in familiar terms. In so doing, the president reportedly noted that the United States strongly supports progress in improving cross-Strait relations and looks forward to more “in a manner acceptable to both sides.”

The PRC state councilor, Yang Jiechi, also made only a brief reference to a discussion of Taiwan between the leaders, but he added a little meat to the bones, at least with regard to Xi’s presentation. Yang said that “President Xi reiterated China’s principled stand on Taiwan issue, stressing that Taiwan issue concerns the national feeling of 1.3 billion Chinese people and hoping that America would scrupulously abide by the three Sino-US Joint Communiques, stick to the one-China policy, support the peaceful development of the relations across the Taiwan Straits with its practical action, and stop selling weapons to Taiwan.”

It was later reported that Xi had made a more pointed proposal to Obama regarding arms sales to Taiwan, suggesting that if the United States halted such sales, China would consider readjusting its military deployments. If Xi indeed did make such a proposal, on its surface it would appear to be the resurrection of an idea that then–PRC President Jiang Zemin made to then-U.S. President George W. Bush in fall 2002, when Jiang
visited Bush at the president’s ranch in Crawford, Texas. The U.S. was not interested in direct talks then — which would be interpreted as a violation of the “six assurances” Ronald Reagan gave to Taiwan on the eve of signing the August 17, 1982, communiqué with Beijing on the subject of arms sales — and it has shown no interest now.

The subject of arms sales also arose in two other contexts. First, HR 419, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013, which was unanimously passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) in August,\(^\text{129}\) contains provisions for upgrading relations with Taipei across a broad spectrum of political, economic, and security issues, including extensive sections calling for expanding and upgrading the list of weapons available to Taiwan.\(^\text{130}\) The bill is unlikely to make it all the way to the president’s desk, and if it does he will likely veto it or refuse to implement aspects that impinge on his foreign policy powers (as he did when signing the ICAO bill). But to make sure no one missed the point, and focusing especially on arms sales provisions, Beijing made its opposition clear, calling the HFAC action “gross interference” in China’s internal affairs.\(^\text{131}\)

Second, following meetings in Washington between Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanchuan and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in late August, the PRC briefer asserted that Hagel had agreed to form a working group to discuss how to resolve the Taiwan arms sales issue.\(^\text{132}\) While it is possible that Chang suggested a working group to address obstacles to improved military-to-military relations, and that Hagel agreed to that without realizing that in Chinese minds that would include Taiwan arms sales,\(^\text{133}\) there clearly was never any intention on the U.S. part to engage in such a dialogue. Quick denials from all quarters of the government put that speculation, if not Chinese concern, to rest.\(^\text{134}\)

**Coda: The Dog that Didn’t Bark—Chen Guangcheng Visits Taiwan**

We noted in our last essay that PRC dissident Chen Guangcheng was scheduled to visit Taiwan for about two weeks in late June and early July and that the PRC had cautioned him to protect the dignity of his country and fulfill his responsibility as a citizen.\(^\text{135}\)

As it turned out, while President Ma “welcomed” the visit he did not meet with Chen,\(^\text{136}\) and Frank Hsieh\(^\text{137}\) and Wang Jin-pyng\(^\text{138}\) both cancelled meetings that had been scheduled. Moreover, when he met with DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang, Chen said that the notion of Taiwan independence was out of date, and, though this needed to be voted on by the people of Taiwan, he favored “one country, two systems”\(^\text{139}\). Thus, in the end, what could have become a point of contention across the Strait did not.
Notes


Moreover, in the wake of the controversy, the administration has given assurances that it will closely consult local industry regarding future Mainland investments as well as scrutinize Chinese investors' identities and background from both an economic and a national security perspective. (Scarlett Chai, Claire Chen, Wang Ching-yi, Huang Chiao-wen, and Jeffrey Wu, “Chinese investment to be examined more strictly: MAC,” CNA, July 31, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201307310035.aspx.)

The administration sought to demonstrate sincerity in its stance by issuing a press release disclosing that it had denied the application of a Mainland bookstore to engage in wholesale distribution, among other things, of cultural and educational materials on the grounds that the case was politically, socially, and culturally sensitive. (Pan Yi-ching, “Chinese book store [application] to come to Taiwan to invest is denied” [中國書店 來台投資遭否決], Commercial Times, August 1, 2013, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20130801000048-260202. The MOEA announcement is at https://www.moeaic.gov.tw/news/view?do=data&id=787&lang=ch&type=new_ann.)

PRC firms investing in the soon-to-be-established “free economic pilot zones” (FEZP) will not be under special restrictions that don't apply to other foreign investors, and thus will benefit from more liberal equity limits than apply to Mainland investments within Taiwan's domestic economy.
However, PRC projects in FEPZs will still be subjected to special case-by-case pre-project review. (Lin An-ni and Chiang Jui-chih, “In FEPZs, Mainland investment will be significantly deregulated” [自由經濟示範區 陸資大鬆綁], United Daily News, August 9, 2013, http://udn.com/NEWS/FINANCE/FIN1/8084919.shtml.)


11 One analysis asserts that the agreement is an “absolute concession” by the Mainland. According to that account, not only does the PRC offer constitute nearly comprehensive World Trade Organization (WTO) treatment in opening up 80 categories to Taiwan, but it even surpasses Beijing’s commitment to opening up under the WTO. Moreover, Taiwan has opened to the Mainland only half the categories accorded to other WTO members (or only 64 categories), among which over 30 percent are categories already open to investment from across the Strait, nearly 30 percent are lower than the WTO standard, and a further 30 percent, while higher than the WTO standard, have been opened to foreign investment from elsewhere in recent years. (Lilian Wu, “United Daily News: Turn Ma-Su debate into win-win situation,” CNA [editorial abstract], September 2, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aopn/201309020023.aspx.)


24 “LY not to vote on ratification of cross-strait services trade agreement as package,” KMT News Network, June 26, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13087. There has been some concern that the administration would argue that submitting it to the legislature “for review” would suffice, and that it could proceed to implement the agreement regardless of LY action or inaction. The LY insistence on a vote was designed to forestall any such interpretation.


28 Ibid.


num=13272.


41 Private conversations.


43 Ko Shu-ling, "Japan-Taiwan fisheries pact leaves fishermen on both sides dissatisfied," Kyodo, June 10, 2013, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/FOCUS%3A+Japan-Taiwan+fisheries+pact+leaves+fishermen+on+both+...-a0333326427.


45 As we noted in CLM 41, the Mainland Affairs Council openly asked that Beijing refrain from getting involved. (Romberg, “Striving for New Equilibria,” endnote 96.)

46 Some people from Taiwan have been outspoken in favor of cross-Strait cooperation on these issues. (Luo Xiangxi, “China Review News Forum: How to start cross-Strait cooperation on maritime strategy?” [中評論壇:如何開啓兩岸海洋戰略合作?], *China Review News*, August 9, 2013, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102670826.) In addition, a second “Taiwan Association for Recovering the Diaoyutai Islands” (台灣釣魚台光復會) is being created in Taiwan, which explicitly endorses maritime cooperation with the Mainland. (Li Wenhui, “Taiwan Diaoyutai Restoration Society established, old, middle-aged and young activists come together to protect the Diaoyutai islands” [台灣釣魚台光復會成立 老中青保釣大將匯集], *China Review News*, July 22, 2013, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102641125.

It is perhaps worth noting at least in passing that one Mainland academic was so distressed by the settlement with the Philippines that he went on national television to express his regret. He reasoned that crisis is the greatest motivator for cross-Strait cooperation in the South China Sea and resolution of the issue was now a barrier to cooperation in future territorial disputes in the region. (“Xu Liping: Taiwan’s reconciliation with the Philippines is harmful to the Mainland safeguarding its rights and interests in the South China Sea” [许利平:台湾对菲和解不利于大陆南海维权], Phoenix Television, August 9, 2013, http://news.ifeng.com/taiwan/special/taiwanyuchuan/content-2/detail_2013_08/09/28450571_0.shtml.)

47 “Cross-Strait flights increase to 670 per week,” Xinhua, August 12, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/12/c_132624292.htm. It is striking, however, that at least until the latest increase, some 45 percent of travelers between the two sides have had to transit third areas rather than take direct flights, a problem that promises to get worse with passenger volume growing at 20 percent a year. (Wang Shu-fen and Elizabeth Hsu, “Taiwan calls for more nonstop cross-Strait flights,” CNA, June 17, 2013, http://focus taiwan.tw/news/aall/201306170021.aspx.)


Li Hsin-fang, “On the issue of a law regarding the establishment of offices on both sides of the Strait, the Green side will boycott until the end” (兩岸設處立法 綠杯葛到底), Liberty Times, May 30, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/may/30/today-p1-2.htm. Moreover, the DPP insists that there should be no preconditions and that sovereignty, reciprocity, and transparency must be maintained. (Tsou Ching-wen, “On establishing cross-Strait offices, Tsai: Ma must assure that there is no one China precondition” [兩岸設處 蔡：馬須保證沒一中前提], Liberty Times, May 28, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/may/28/today-p2.htm.)


Hsieh Ai-chu, “Regarding the reciprocal establishment of SEF and ARATS offices, a decision is made on how to handle ID cards” (兩岸兩會互設 可辦證定案), Commercial Times, August 30, 2013, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20130830000094-260203.

Beijing’s description of the state of play was more neutral. ARATS affirmed that the establishment of offices “should be facilitated as it can further promote cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges and provide convenience to people of the two sides.” Nonetheless, it said, “considering the current situation of…cross-Strait relations, the two sides should start with easy things, appropriately handle sensitive issues and reach consensus on issues that can be solved at the present stage step by step, so as to create conditions for the establishment of offices.” (“Mainland, Taiwan discuss offices on either side,” Xinhua, August 29, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/29/c_132674922.htm.)

A Mainland Affairs Council poll at http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=104928&ctNode=6409 &mp=1 shows that 71 percent of respondents support the provision of direct services to people, with provision of legal advice and emergency assistance, issuance of travel documents and Taiwan
entry permits, and notification and visiting of Taiwan citizens who have their freedoms restricted by Mainland authorities among the top services hoped for by those surveyed. (An English-language summary of the report is available at “MAC finds support for cross-Strait rep offices,” *Taiwan Today*, June 19, 2013, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=206489&ctNode=445.) A DPP poll in the same timeframe also showed strong support for those same functions. (Li Hsin-fang, “DPP poll on establishment of reciprocal offices, 83% demand visitation rights, 78% favor the possibility of issuing travel documents” [民進黨兩岸設處民調83%要求探視權78%主張可發旅行文件], *Liberty Times*, June 18, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/jun/18/today-fo2-3.htm.) However, the DPP poll also reported that if the offices could not carry out those functions, over 65 percent of respondents saw no need for them.

60 Private conversations.

61 A Huashan meeting held at the end of September addressed ways to bring the DPP more centrally into cross-Strait discussions, eliminating what the party sees as a KMT monopoly. One suggestion was to embrace the ROC constitution and drop the party's 1991 charter plank that calls for establishment of a “Republic of Taiwan,” a point of particular neuralgia for Beijing. (“DPP committee proposes ‘constitutional consensus’ as basis for conducting cross-Strait dialogue,” KMT News Network, September 27, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13511.) We have previously speculated about the possible utility of doing this. (Romberg, “Shaping the Future, Part II: Cross-Strait Relations,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 39, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM39AR.pdf.) Whether the party as a whole would be willing to take this step, however, and whether, even if it did, this would be sufficient to open the door to formal DPP-CCP dialogue is far from certain, as there seems to be no discussion of the DPP going beyond that to explicitly accept anything resembling a “one China framework.”


64 “TAO spokesman Yang Yi is interviewed, talks about upcoming developments in cross-Strait exchanges” (國台辦發言人楊毅接受採訪談近期兩岸交流情況), Xinhua, August 11, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201308/t20130811_4587218.htm.


Across the Taiwan Strait


71 民进党一些人出于自身的政治目的，顽固坚持“一边一国”的“台独”立场，执意干扰、破坏两岸交流合作，这种行径不仅违背了两岸关系发展潮流，违背两岸同胞的共同愿望，更损害台湾同胞的利益福祉，是没有出路的，也和他们先前所谓的“要改善与大陆关系”的说辞自相矛盾。


73 “Chair Su’s speech in presiding over the ‘China Affairs Committee.”


79 Private conversations.


A prominent PRC expert on cross-Strait relations, Zhang Nianchi, director of the Shanghai Institute of East Asian Studies, also sees a form of political engagement already under way, but he approaches the subject from a different angle. Zhang argues that Taiwan’s rejection of cross-Strait dialogue and political negotiation over the long run would be Taiwan’s loss. But at this point agreement on Mainland “free independent travelers” in Taiwan, currency exchanges, and especially the establishment of reciprocal representative offices all represent progress on highly sensitive political issues. In light of these advances in cross-Strait relations, the two sides of the Strait do not need a breakthrough in structured political dialogue at this point; things just fall into place as a matter of course. As a result, even if it has not done so directly, the Mainland has implicitly accepted a framework of “one country, two governments.” It has even accepted Taiwan’s National Unification Guidelines’ concept of “one country, two areas.” Zhang sees no problem with this. As long as everything falls within the ambit of the “one China framework,” and starts from “one China,” various formulations including “one China, respective interpretations,” “one China principle,” and so forth are all acceptable. (Ch'en Yan-ch'iao, “Zhang Nianchi: The establishment

Although he adheres to the more orthodox view about the need for structured political dialogue, and while speaking in prospective terms rather than current terms as Zhang did, TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu seemed to strike a theme similar to Zhang's on the issue of respect for different systems of governance when he said, "under the frame of ‘one China,' I think both sides can begin to discuss potential recognition of each other's governance.” (“Beijing and Taiwan may recognize each other's governance: Sun Yafu,” WantChinaTimes.com, June 22, 2013, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130622000002&cid=1101.)

"Ma eyes closer cross-Strait relations," Taiwan Today, June 11, 2013, http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=206235&ctNode=445. In a radio interview the same day he met with Wu to bless his trip, Ma made clear that the honorary KMT chairman was his chosen instrument for party-to-party (KMT-CCP) exchanges and for receiving Mainland visitors. (Huang Ming-hsi, “President: Establishing representative offices is the structural foundation of cross-Strait relations” [總統:設辦事處是兩岸基礎工程], CNA [domestic], June 10, 2013, http://www.cna.com.tw/News/alPL/201306100318-1.aspx. Now at http://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20130610004884-260407.) He also said that Vincent Siew's work was important but had not been performed on behalf of the KMT.

Though he had previously highlighted the importance of Lien Chan's groundbreaking meeting with Hu Jintao in April 2005, this description of Wu's role as starting from the beginning of Ma's term, and the point made by the presidential office that Lien had not been dispatched on any specific mission whereas Wu's was fully authorized (“KMT's Wu Po-hsiung to meet with CCP's Xi Jinping next week,” China Times, translated by KMT News Network, June 4, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=12996), seemed to some people to be a slap at Lien. People speculated that this might have reflected lingering tension over what Ma had described as Lien's unauthorized remarks when meeting with Xi Jinping in February. (Romberg, "Striving for New Equilibria," endnote 6.) The tension between Ma and Lien also seemed evident in Ma's choice of Vincent Siew to represent him at the APEC leaders meeting in Bali, rather than Lien, who had been the representative since Ma took office in 2008.


In the meeting, Wu raised seven points, Xi raised four. As summarized in one press report Wu's points were:

- Maintain the foundation of political trust by upholding the “1992 Consensus” and opposing Taiwan independence.
- Strengthen cross-Strait economic relations and integration.
- We hope to participate meaningfully in international activities.
- Deepen social exchanges and actively promote the establishment of reciprocal cross-Strait offices.
- Strengthen cultural exchanges and push for a cross-Strait education agreement.
- Expedite the signing of a cross-Strait agreement on currency swap and strengthen cross-Strait cooperation in financial services.
Promote national identity because both sides of the Strait share the same ancestors.

Xi's points were:

- Insist on considering cross-Strait relations through the lens of the overall interests of the Chinese nation.
- Recognize development trends throughout history in order to get a better understanding of the future prospects of cross-Strait relations.
- Enhance mutual trust, engage in mutually beneficial interactions, seek commonality and shelve differences, and be pragmatic and enterprising.
- Steadily promote the overall development of cross-Strait relations.


An account of Wu's meeting with Ma is at “President receives KMT Honorary Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung and the delegation visiting the Mainland” (總統接見中國國民黨吳伯雄榮譽主席大陸訪問團), Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), June 10, 2013, http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=30128&rmid=514&sd=2013/06/05&ed=2013/06/12.

In light of the clear presidential blessing of Wu’s reference to the “one China framework,” a huge uproar erupted in Taiwan. People asked whether using this terminology implied acceptance of Beijing's position or whether, given the fact that the term Wu used (一中架構) slightly differed from the Mainland's term (一中框架), there was any difference from Beijing's position and, if there was, what it was.

A number of people engaged in detailed etymological exegesis, much of it heavily influenced by political positioning. In counting the angels dancing on the head of this particular pin, some people suggested that Taipei was trying to distinguish its position from the PRC's, using terminology that evoked a more expansive “one China structure” as compared with the PRC's more restrictive "one China framework.” But most people rejected this analysis and viewed the choice of the two phrases merely as a reflection of customary language usage on the two sides of the Strait to express the same idea. Moreover, as many observed, the key point was not the issue of “framework” vs. “structure” but the shared embrace of "one China" in both formulations.

And in the end, the DPP chose to interpret Wu's use of the term as implying no difference and as moving Ma away from even his own definition of the 1992 Consensus (“one China, respective interpretations”) in the direction of the PRC's concept. Former DPP chair and 2012 presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen charged that Wu's use of "one China framework” with Xi undoubtedly undermined the sovereignty of the Republic of China and denigrated Taiwan's national dignity. She said this was a betrayal of Ma's duty as president of the ROC and of the trust of 23 million people in Taiwan. (“Wu Poh-hsiung: I lose no sleep over criticism of selling out Taiwan,” KMT News Network, June 17, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13047.)
But the evidence does not suggest any intention on Ma’s part to change his stance. For example, the day after meeting with Wu and approving the text the honorary chairman would use a couple of days later in Beijing, Ma gave a speech in which he stressed that the key to the current stable cross-Strait relationship was the consistency of his policy “under the Republic of China Constitution,” to promote peaceful cross-Strait exchanges on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” (九二共識), i.e., “one China with different interpretations” (一中各表). (“Chairman Ma: KMT’s policies are key to stable cross-Strait relations,” KMT Cultural and Communications Committee, June 11, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=111&anum=13035.)

After the controversy broke out, the Mainland Affairs Council issued a press release restating that there was no change in Ma’s position on “one China,” which, as always, meant “the Republic of China.” (“Mainland Affairs Council: ‘one China’ is the ROC,” News release No. 38, June 14, 2013, http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=104894&cNode=6409&mp=1.) It is interesting to realize that this MAC statement actually foreshadowed the next shoe to drop, which we discuss in a moment, by saying that even “one China” in the phrase “one China principle” (一中原則) refers to the Republic of China.

What he wrote was: “In 1992, the two sides of the Strait reached a consensus that ‘each would orally express its adherence to the one China principle’” (1992年，海峽兩岸達成「各自以口頭聲明方式表達堅持一個中國原則」的共識). (“CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's congratulatory telegram and Chairman Ma’s response,” [中共中央總書記習近平賀電及馬主席回電], KMT, July 20, 2013, http://www.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?id=32&aid=13538.) Having done this, Ma went on to draw attention to the importance of the “1992 Consensus” as the basis for improvement of relations over the previous five years, breaking the deadlock of the preceding decade, and he expressed his hope that “on the existing basis” (在現有基礎上) they could continue to expand and deepen cooperation, further enhance Chinese culture and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (中華民族), and promote sustainable peace and prosperity between the two sides.


“Wu-Xi meeting held yesterday in Beijing,” KMT News Network, June 13, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13040. Moreover, former secretary general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, Su Chi, who accompanied Wu to Beijing, came out of the meeting convinced that while Xi will be tougher where he has been tough (e.g., opposing Taiwan independence), he will be softer where he has been soft (e.g., approaching cross-Strait reconciliation with patience).

This was expressed in a number of ways, according to Su. Commenting that Xi seemed to understand the psychology of Taiwan society, Su said Xi referred twice to “historical wounds” (歷史創痛), observing that it “will take time and patience to heal the wounds and stop the pain” (療傷止痛需要時間和耐心). “Unification,” Xi said, “will also require an inner meeting of the hearts” (統一還要內在的、心靈的契合). Xi summed up by adapting a Chinese proverb: “Three feet of ice is not created in one cold day” (冰凍三尺非一日之寒), adding, “it will also require time for it to melt” (化解也需要時間). (Su’s initial comments were reported in Ch'ien Chen-yu, “Su Chi: Mainland toward Taiwan ‘soft will be softer, hard will be harder’,” United Daily News, June 21, 2013, initially accessed on the day of publication at http://udn.com/NEWS/MAINLAND/MAI1/7977544.shtml, currently accessible at http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0005/239152/web/#2L-4230747. He expanded on his views in an opinion article he penned a month later: “Su Chi/ Trying to analyze Mainland China under...

These sentiments as expressed by Xi were, of course, not entirely new. As we pointed out in our last essay, Xi used similar language when he met with Lien Chan in February. (Romberg, “Striving for New Equilibria,” p. 1.) But based on Su Chi’s reporting, Xi appears to have dwelt on them at greater length this time.


The text of PL 113-17 is at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ17/pdf/PLAW-113publ17.pdf; the President's statement on signing it into law on July 12 is at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/12/statement-president-hr-1151.

Private conversations. Nonetheless, on August 28 the administration did submit a report to the Congress as required under Section 1 (c) of the law describing "the United States strategy to endorse and obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly and at subsequent ICAO Assemblies and at other related meetings. The State Department told Congress of U.S. support for "observer status" for Taiwan in all of the meetings of ICAO. The report pointed to the ICAO Council, which meets regularly, in comparison with the ICAO Assembly, which meets triennially. The State Department noted that U.S. support for Taiwan in ICAO is consistent with the "one China" policy and the TRA. (Shirley A. Kan, “China/Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei,” Congressional Research Service, September 6, 2013, p. 19). Nonetheless, the State Department report seems not to have drawn any further public protest from Beijing.


“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s remarks on the US President’s endorsement of an act supporting Taiwan’s participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization,” July 16, 2013, http://www.china-un.ch/eng/fyrth/t1059285.htm. What is interesting about this statement is that, despite the heading, the commentary was directed at the act of Congress in passing the act, not at the president for signing it. One presumes this had something to do with seeking to maintain a good atmosphere following the Xi-Obama summit in California in June and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July. Also, it was clear that, while the Administration does support Taiwan’s quest for an observer’s seat at ICAO, the impetus for this particular action came from Congress, not the White House.

On the other hand, Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure of the ICAO Council, the operating arm of ICAO, stipulates that “the Council may invite non-Contracting States and international organizations or other bodies to be represented at any of its meetings by one or more observers.” (“In support of Taiwan's observship and meaningful participation in the ICAO,” The Voice, April 18, 2013, http://www.thevoiceslu.com/features/2013/april/18_04_13/In_Support.htm [drawing on ICAO Document 7559]; emphasis added.) So even though attendance at the Council has not been part of the public dialogue in Taiwan, it was considered by some people as another path for Taiwan to participate meaningfully at a high level in ICAO.


98 He mentioned it in his very first statement as president, in his inaugural address on May 20, 2008. (“Taiwan's Renaissance, President Ma’s inaugural address,” Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan], May 20, 2008, http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=16304&mid=23558&word1=inaugural&sd=2008/05/20&ed=2008/05/20.)


100 Private conversations.


103 In welcoming the outcome, Taiwan's Civil Aeronautics Administration said this marked a “step forward in Taiwan's bid to join the organization as an observer.” (Wang Shu-fen and Sofia Wu, “Taiwan invited to attend ICAO assembly as special guest,” CNA, September 13, 2013, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aip1/201309130006.aspx.)


105 Ibid.


107 The TAO spokesman, in a brief statement on the matter, referred to the fact that the matter had been handled through cross-Strait consultations (通过两岸沟通协商). (“TAO: The arrangement for Chinese Taipei civil aviation administration to send an official as a non-voting delegate to attend this year's ICAO Assembly meeting on invitation reflects the Mainland's concern for Taiwan compatriots” [国台办：中华台北民航局应邀派员列席今年国际民航组织大会的安排体现了大陆对台湾同胞的关心], CCP Central Committee Taiwan Affairs Office and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, September 13, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201309/t20130913_4878305.htm.)

A Xinhua story was even more explicit. It said that “relevant authorities of the two sides recently held consultations regarding the question of Taiwan participating in relevant activities of ICAO and exchanged views…and produced an arrangement.” (两岸有关方面近期就台湾参与国际民航组织有关活动问题进行了沟通，交换了看法…作出…安排). (“Chinese Taipei civil aviation authorities invited to send a non-voting official as a guest to the ICAO Assembly” [中华台北民
Across the Taiwan Strait

Even a few weeks before ICAO was scheduled to meet, although Sun Yafu said the necessary cross-Strait consultation had not yet been held, he had hinted it would likely work out by continuing to say that Taiwan's presence at the ICAO meeting was “feasible” (可行的).

(Huang Hsin, “Mainland pours cold water on Ma's desire to personally attend APEC” [馬要親臨APEC陸潑冷水], Commercial Times, August 20, 2013, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20130820000100-260203). In this context, the Mainland may have found the Congressional action particularly unwelcome as it could create the impression that the PRC was acting under international pressure rather than in line with its own consistent policy.

Under the “Seattle model,” created during the leaders meeting in Seattle in 1993, designed to accommodate Taiwan's ability to attend without raising issues of sovereignty, the annual invitation is extended to the president but Taipei is not allowed to send a senior political official, including the foreign minister or vice minister. Thus, the Taiwan representative has typically been either a senior economic official or a senior personage who is not currently holding office. Former vice president Lien Chan has attended several recent leaders meetings, though this year Ma will be represented by his own former vice president, Vincent Siew. Siew attended the APEC meeting in 1993 and 1994, but in those instances he was a senior economic official. In more recent years, both on the eve of taking office as vice president in 2008 and since leaving office in 2012, he has worked with Ma in a number of capacities with senior PRC officials. (A list of Taiwan representatives to the APEC leaders meetings is available at “List of Chinese Taipei Representatives to APEC,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_Taipei_Representatives_to_APEC.)


In the past, when the issue of a meeting with Xi has come up, Ma has tended to push it aside as a theoretical possibility but not something he was focused on. His increasingly frequent references to it since mid-July, however, suggest more serious interest.

The first of these was in an interview with Next TV, when Ma said: “With the support of the Taiwanese people and ensuring that no harm is done to the nation's dignity, we do not exclude the possibility of holding a meeting with Xi to further develop cross-Strait relations.” (Mo Yan-chih, “Ma defends China policy, says meeting Xi an option,” Taipei Times, July 11, 2013, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/11/2003566851.)

Later that month, in an interview with Bloomberg News, Ma identified the very important “conditions” that would need to be addressed, including the nature of the occasion (場合) when such a meeting might be held and his status (身分) in such a meeting. “Because my position is president of the Republic of China, wherever I go I must always maintain that status” (因為我是中華民國的總統,到任何地方去,都要維持這樣的身分). Bloomberg interpreted this as Ma saying that any meeting would be contingent on his being present in his official capacity as ROC president, which is not an illogical conclusion. (Debra Mao and Adela Lin, “Ma says Taiwan people override missiles in deciding on Xi meet,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-26/ma-says-taiwan-people-override-missiles-in-deciding-on-xi-meet.html.)

But foreshadowing the logic he used over the next several weeks for attending APEC – and presumably meeting with Xi on that occasion – Ma seemed to indicate a way around that requirement. He pointed out that the leaders at the annual APEC summit meetings are not there in their capacities as heads of state or government using titles of “president” or “premier,” etc., but are there as “leaders of economies.” That said, because of the special circumstances relating to
Taiwan, Taipei was only able to send the "representative of the leader," and not the leader himself, which created a requirement to establish the necessary conditions for the leader to go. Whether creating those conditions would be possible remained to be seen, he said. In answer to a question about whether removal of PRC missiles opposite Taiwan was one of those conditions, Ma said it would be politically helpful even if militarily not very meaningful if the missiles were removed. But the most important preconditions were the needs of the nation, people's support, and that any meeting take place in conditions that maintained dignity (國家有需要，人民願意支持，且在有尊嚴的情況下). ("President grants an interview to the American 'Bloomberg News,' Office of the President, Republic of China [Taiwan], July 26, 2013, http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=30454&rmid=514.)


115 Guo Zhenyuan, a research fellow at a foreign ministry–connected think tank, the China Institute of International Studies, observed that Ma's attendance at APEC is not a question of fairness to Taiwan (as Ma had suggested in a comment to the press when traveling in Paraguay in mid-August – "President Ma: APEC summit barring my attendance unfair to Taiwan," KMT News Network, August 16, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13324) or in what capacity he attends. Rather it is a question concerning basic principles and the foundation of cross-Strait relations. Guo scolded Ma for doing something that was "very inappropriate" and for a misjudgment that reveals a mindset of excessive expectation and impatience involving issues of "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas." This is an extremely serious issue, Guo said, which will have an impact on cross-Strait relations, mutual trust, and the good atmosphere between the two sides. (Liao Zida, "Guo Zhenyuan: Ma Ying-jeou's way of thinking about APEC is not beneficial to Taiwan" [郭震遠:馬英九的APEC想法對台灣無利], China Review News, August 28, 2013, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=93&kindid=9490&docid=102702126.)

116 Ni Yongjie, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies, for example, thought that a Ma-Xi summit as soon as possible was the key to a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations. He said that Beijing would never accept a Ma visit to the Mainland as president of the ROC, but if he came as head of the economy, this could be possible. Moreover, on venue, Ni said that Ma might attend the APEC leaders meeting hosted on the Mainland, but he could not attend such a meeting in foreign countries. ("Possibilities of Ma attending an APEC summit and a Ma-Xi meeting," KMT News Network, August 20, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13338.)

117 See endnote 109 on the "Seattle model."


“Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, the Ma-Xi meeting and Taiwan-China-US relations” (台灣民心動態調查、馬習會與台美中」最新民調結果), Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, August 29, 2013, http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=3245.


Private conversations.


During his recent visit to Washington, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the “Taiwan question” (台灣問題) as “in a controllable state” (在可控的狀態之內). (Yu Dong Hui, “Wang Yi: Taiwan question is in a controllable state” [王毅：台灣問題處於可控狀態], *China Review News*, September 19, 2013, http://www.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102751896.) He also made a pitch for the United States to “go along with the prevailing trend of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and genuinely appreciate and respect China’s efforts to oppose separation and achieve peaceful reunification,” arguing that this would turn the Taiwan question into an asset and positive factor in PRC-U.S. relations instead of the liability and negative factor it has historically been. (“Toward a New Model of Major-Country Relations Between China and the United States,” Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Brookings Institution, September 20, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjrb_663308/2461_663310/11078768.shtml; the original Chinese text is available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_cmn/zyxw_602251/t1078765.shtml.) The United States has consistently refused to endorse a particular outcome, and Wang’s argument is unlikely to change that.


The text of the bill is available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr419/text.

132 Yu Donghui, “Appeal to U.S. to stop arms sales to Taiwan, Chang suggests creating a working group but gets no response.”

133 The Chinese routinely identify three obstacles to better military-to-military relations: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, congressional prohibitions on certain military-related sales to the PRC, and surveillance activities in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ). While Minister Chang was obviously steeped in this history, it is more than possible that Secretary Hagel was not, and so he did not automatically associate “talks about resolving obstacles to mil-mil relations,” which could be a good thing, with “talks about resolving the arms sales issue,” which would violate long-standing U.S. policy.


Perhaps signaling that Beijing is not going to press its original interpretation of the Chang-Hagel meeting, a week later the ministry of defense briefer took what appeared to be a half step back. After reiterating resolute opposition to U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan, which, he said, has a bearing on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and “involves China’s core interests” (涉及中国的核心利益), the briefer reported that Chang had “frank and in-depth discussions” (坦诚深入的交谈) with DoD and military leaders regarding development of Sino-American military relations and the proper handling of contradictions and differences between the two sides. Both sides, he said, felt there should be “stepped up dialogues and specific discussions” (加强对话, 进行具体商谈) regarding the obstacles and differences in the development of military relations. He expressed China’s desire to strengthen contacts and cooperation to try to take those relations to a new level. Asked again about the arms sales issue, the briefer reiterated that they constitute a “major obstacle” (重要障碍) affecting “in-depth development” (深入发展) of bilateral military relations, closing with the hope that the U.S. would strictly abide by the principles of the three joint U.S.-PRC communiqués, “particularly the August 17 communiqué” and halt the sale of weapons to Taiwan. But he did not assert there had been agreement to take up the topic in a working group. (Ministry of National Defense press briefing, August 29, 2013, http://www.mod.gov.cn/affair/2013-08/29/content_4463850.htm.)


When People's Republic of China (PRC) leader Xi Jinping met with the Taiwan’s former vice president, Vincent Siew, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders meeting in early October, he went beyond reiterating the standard position on the importance of promoting peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. Xi said that, in the “long term,” political differences between the two sides must be resolved and not be passed on from generation to generation. In this essay we explore that statement and its implications.

Xi Jinping Pushes Political Dialogue . . .

Just as CLM 42 was being posted online in early October, PRC leader Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s former Vice President Vincent Siew were meeting in Bali, Indonesia, where each headed his government’s delegation to the APEC leaders meeting. Predictably, Xi emphasized the importance of enhancing cross-Strait political trust and hammering out a common political foundation as the key to guaranteeing the continued peaceful development of cross-Strait relations.

But Xi then went on to say that, looking to the long term, the longstanding political differences between the two sides must eventually be resolved step by step and not passed down from generation to generation (总不能将这些问题一代一代传下去). Elaborating on how this could take place, Xi noted that the Mainland had stated many times that, within the “one China framework,” it was willing to hold “equal consultations” (平等协商) with the Taiwan side regarding cross-Strait political questions and to make “fair and reasonable arrangements” (合情合理安排).

Xi’s call for eventual political talks was not new. It is a staple of virtually every policy statement by a senior PRC official about cross-Strait relations. But his “generation to generation” comment was not standard fare and it raised questions about whether he was amending or even discarding the “patient” approach laid out in Hu Jintao's December 31, 2008, “six-point” speech, indicating that he would push harder for
political talks in the short term, perhaps seeking unification within a more compressed timeframe, or whether he had something less ambitious, and less hurried, in mind.

Xi’s line was echoed and amplified in a series of high-level remarks in the following weeks. At a cross-Strait “peace forum” several days after Bali, State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Director Zhang Zhijun observed that Xi’s “generation to generation” remarks had “deep meaning” (寓意深刻), were based on a “profound sense of history” (厚重的历史感), and bespoke a “sincere aspiration” (真诚的愿望). “At the same time,” Zhang said, “they clarified fundamental considerations involved in the resolution of cross-Strait political differences” (同时讲清了对解决两岸政治分歧问题的基本考虑).

Even though the two sides agreed the easier and economic issues should be addressed first, economic and political issues are not always strictly separated from one another, Zhang argued. Moreover, a number of the cross-Strait agreements already concluded, as well as topics of interest to Taiwan for future agreement, have political dimensions. For example, the handling of Taiwan’s participation in foreign-related activities cannot circumvent political aspects of cross-Strait relations.

Admittedly, Zhang went on, the differences between the two sides are complex and will take time to resolve. The Mainland recognizes this and “has the strong determination as well as the necessary patience” (有坚定的决心，也有必要的耐心) to ultimately realize reunification. “But that does not mean waiting passively without doing anything” (但这并非意味着消极等待，无所作为). While “some political differences can be shelved temporarily, it is impossible to avoid them totally or for a long time” (一些政治争议尽管可以暂时搁置，但不可能完全和长期回避). Paying attention only to economics and not politics (只经不政) is not sustainable.

Putting a gloss on the adage Xi had used with Wu Poh-hsiung in June about how the Mainland realized that “three feet of ice cannot melt in a day” (冰冻三尺, 非一日之寒), Zhang cautioned that, nonetheless, if the two sides did not have communication and dialogue about difficult political questions, and did not start talking, then not only would there be no way to resolve the problems, but the ice “could become thicker and harder” (有可能会结得更厚，冻得更硬).

... and Senior Officials Link It to Reunification

Zhang and other senior officials went further, linking political talks and peaceful development to ultimate reunification. It is virtually a requirement in comprehensive remarks on cross-Strait relations to talk about reunification. But often when speaking to Taiwan audiences in recent years, Mainland officials have gone out of their way to draw a distinction between peaceful development and a final resolution in the form of reunification. Zhang himself has done so in the past.
Obviously, the objective of that approach is, while not retreating from the ultimate goal, to try to assure people in Taiwan that peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is about the here and now, not about creating a path straight to unification. Lately, however, speeches by senior PRC officials have not made such an explicit distinction and have actually drawn quite direct links between political talks, peaceful development, and reunification, all in the context of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

In his speech at the “peace forum” in October, Zhang Zhijun made a number of references to reunification, including linking it to peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, but these points were not highlighted and seemed more or less to follow a well-trodden path. But when State Councilor Yang Jiechi addressed a seminar in November, he appeared to take things a bit further. Yang asserted that the “most distinctive feature” of the important thought of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations is the “close integration of the historic mission of completing the unification of the motherland with the ambitious goal of revitalizing the Chinese nation.”

This point was repeated again several days later by recently retired TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu at a conference in Hong Kong. While citing Xi Jinping’s “generation to generation” remarks, Sun turned the connection around a bit. He spoke of the necessity to address and resolve some important political differences in order to create conditions for the advancement of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. But then he seemed to change direction and closed his speech with ringing rhetoric not only linking peaceful development of cross-Strait relations to completing the great task of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation but also identifying unification as an “historical necessity” in the course of moving forward in that cause and expressing confidence that, in the rejuvenation process, all Chinese could with one heart complete the great work of unifying the motherland.

The connection between peaceful development and reunification was also advanced in an article that Zhang Zhijun published in People’s Daily on December 31, 2013, to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the path-breaking January 1, 1979, Standing Committee “Message to Taiwan Compatriots.” In the course of his comprehensive look at Taiwan policy and cross-Strait relations, Zhang both began with a reference to achieving reunification and ended with one, including seven such references in all. Moreover, in his concluding paragraph he made the same sort of linkage Yang had between the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and that ultimate goal.

We should fully implement all the requirements of the 18th CPC [Communist Party of China] National Congress regarding Taiwan-related work, unswervingly implement the central authorities’ fundamental policies regarding Taiwan-related work, steadfastly take the correct path of
the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, continue to create new prospects for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, and in the course of realizing the Chinese nation's great rejuvenation accomplish the great cause of the motherland's reunification.\(^\text{10}\)

One month later, at a Taiwan work conference in late January, Politburo Standing Committee Member Yu Zhengsheng gave an “important speech” in which he made the linkage even more explicit.\(^\text{11}\)

The general goal of Taiwan-related work in the current circumstances is to achieve reunification of the motherland in the process of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Taiwan-related work should focus on maintaining the correct direction of cross-Strait relations' development and consolidate the political, economic, cultural and social foundation for the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties so as to create favorable conditions for peaceful reunification.

### Taiwan Pushes Back

Whatever Xi’s intention and that of his colleagues, Taiwan's response to all these statements was to reiterate Taipei’s view that it was premature to address the question of authoritative political dialogue, much less to resolve significant political differences or even speak of unification. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) press release on the Siew-Xi meeting made no reference to the “generation to generation” comment, reporting instead that during their conversation Xi had “strongly affirmed and valued the spirit of shelving disputes and building mutually beneficial cross-strait relations shown by the two sides.”\(^\text{12}\)

 Asked about the matter at his press conference after meeting with Xi, Siew stressed the importance of the 1992 Consensus, saying that the political differences across the Strait arose out of the history of the past 60 years and could not be resolved in just a few years. Rather, one must slowly accumulate mutual trust, and only when that process has reached a certain point can those differences be resolved. Pressed specifically on Xi’s “generation to generation” remark, Siew said that as long as leaders and people on the two sides enhance mutual understanding, interactions, and trust, and create a consensus, they will probably find a way to create a fair and reasonable plan to solve differences slowly. But, he added, no one knows how long that will take.\(^\text{13}\)

When the Mainland sought to press Taiwan participants in the October Shanghai “peace forum” to endorse a more rapid pace of political dialogue and negotiation it backfired, not only creating open disagreements, but also generating outspoken complaints about the PRC’s high-pressure tactics. Debate was particularly intense about the idea of a “peace framework” (和平架构), which was one of the four main topics at the forum.\(^\text{14}\) The controversy was triggered by a PRC paper arguing in
favor of a peace accord, characterizing it as a “national accord” under the premise of protecting China’s territorial integrity “during the interim period before unification.” The author insisted that the principle that “the two sides of the Strait belong to one China” was crucial to a peace pact. But he also went further, arguing that while a peace accord was not a unification pact, its “political connotations of unification” could not be ignored.\(^\text{15}\)

Taiwan attendees reacted strongly. As one Taiwan participant put it, placing a peace accord in a “before unification” context does not “face reality.” “It’s like the Republic of China does not exist.”\(^\text{16}\) If the Mainland did not face objective reality and if it set a “one China framework” as a precondition, said another participant, it would be difficult for the two sides at the forum to continue their discussion.\(^\text{17}\) In essence, as one press account described it, the two sides largely talked past each other and often were diametrically opposed, with the Blue and Green members from Taiwan holding a largely unified position against their Mainland counterparts.\(^\text{18}\)

Thus, the most that participants could agree on were broad generalities such as fostering conditions for the leaders of the two sides to meet and “enhancing” coordination and cooperation in external affairs. But when it came to specifics, particularly on political and security issues, there were yawning gaps. Even the official Chinese news agency took note of that.

Despite the consensus reached among academics from both sides, their views differ on particular issues, such as how to make reasonable arrangements for cross-Strait political relations in the context of continued political confrontation; how to clarify the legal relationship between the one-China framework and the existing rules of the two sides; the political meaning of an official end to the state of hostility between the two sides; and how to establish a mechanism to build confidence in military security across the Strait.\(^\text{19}\)

Similarly, at a Kuomintang-Chinese Communist Party (KMT-CCP) forum several days later, the Mainland side sought to include reference to the “one China framework” in the preamble to the concluding report. As at the peace forum, Taiwan participants not only resisted including such a reference but opposed any reference to political issues in the conclusions, and it was only after what one media report characterized as “intensive discussions” (密集商談) and “political wrangling” (政治角力) that a set of 19 common recommendations was agreed upon, none of which touched on political questions beyond the standard reiteration of opposition to Taiwan independence and adherence to the 1992 Consensus.\(^\text{20}\)

Speaking at a dinner with Yu Zhengsheng on the eve of the KMT-CCP forum, honorary KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung apparently tried to square the circle by employing a “generation to generation” formula that would be acceptable in Taiwan.
Wu said he “hoped that people would continue to promote peaceful relations between the two sides of the Strait from generation to generation and achieve the mission of jointly rejuvenating the Chinese nation” (希望一代接一代, 繼續推動兩岸和平關係, 實現共同振興中華的任務; emphasis added). 21 But at the same time as these rhetorical tugs of war were going on, Taiwan officials, including President Ma Ying-jeou, insisted that Taipei had not “avoided” politics when necessary. Ma pointed to the 1992 Consensus, which he identified as a “high-level political issue.” Moreover, even if making a rather different point from Zhang Zhijun’s, in ways Ma argued together with the TAO director by asserting that some of the cross-Strait agreements already contained “low-level” political aspects. In any case, Ma denied he was willfully seeking to push handling of political issues off to future generations. The point was not whether an issue was political, it was whether it needed to be addressed.

It is not that we avoid touching the political issues and pass them on generation to generation. [In fact my administration is] willing to discuss any issue as long as it is an urgent one.22

Ma pointed to the fact that there was no consensus in Taiwan to talk about the kinds of steps Beijing had raised such as a peace accord or mutual military confidence-building measures. Reiterating a point he had made before, Ma argued that the essence of cross-Strait peace already existed so a formal accord was unnecessary, whereas there were still tasks to complete in the economic area.23 “We don’t exclude such negotiations, but there are priorities. We don’t see now as the right time, and there is no need to discuss a peace pact (with China) at the moment.”24

The Ma administration clearly wants to maintain momentum in cross-Strait relations and to make progress to the degree that it is possible. But as MAC head Wang Yu-chi observed, while Taipei believes the direction of cross-Strait relations must be positive and that they must not be allowed to backtrack, public opinion must be taken into consideration in determining the pace of cross-Strait exchanges.25 Based on that public opinion, Wang said, it is still too early to talk about political issues. In line with Ma's thinking, Wang commented that a peace accord is neither a high priority nor urgent.26 Accordingly, he said, “we are keeping to our own schedule.”27

Wang-Zhang Meeting

In laying out his view about not passing political differences on from generation to generation, Xi Jinping also told Vincent Siew that the people in charge of the responsible departments from both sides of the Strait could meet and exchange views on those issues that needed tending. It was not by accident, therefore, that Wang Yu-chi and Zhang Zhijun had a short “encounter” in the lobby of the Bali hotel on the margins of the APEC meeting where Xi and Siew met in October. The fact that
for the first time they referred to each other by their official titles became a major topic of discussion in Taiwan, though it is worth noting that PRC media did not even report that they had done so, much less comment on it.

Zhang invited Wang to visit the Mainland, and arrangements were eventually made for them to meet in Nanjing and Shanghai between February 11 and 14, 2014. In the meantime, however, there was obviously a certain degree of verbal arm-wrestling going on. As late as January 10 Wang said the two sides were still discussing time, venue, and agenda, and formal confirmation of the visit did not come until January 28.

In the run-up to the trip, both the Legislative Yuan (LY) and the Mainland side put severe strictures on what could be discussed – apparently either in private or in public. The LY ruled out anything that touched on “one China” or any cross-Strait political topic. And despite efforts in Taipei to deflect the question, the Mainland reportedly insisted that Wang avoid topics such as “the ROC” [Republic of China], human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as any reference to the title “president.” (When asked about any PRC limits on what Wang could raise, a TAO spokesman responded only indirectly, saying that China did not want anything to happen that “could disturb arrangements for the talks.”)

On the other hand, a PRC official reportedly said that Beijing hoped that at least a “consensus memorandum” could be signed at the end of the talks as the “enforceable” basis of future talks. But this was clearly way beyond anything Wang was authorized to do and any kind of joint document was ruled out by Taipei before he set off for Nanjing. Indeed, the MAC head said he would not even touch on any sensitive political issues – “I think it’s better to make this meeting simple” – although Wang said he would “stand firm” on the government’s positions on cross-Strait relations and would make “appropriate comments on suitable occasions” (在適當場合說該說的話).

To demonstrate his follow-through on these last points, Wang later highlighted the fact that he had attached a name card with his official MAC title to a wreath he presented at the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum in Nanjing and that he had publicly referred to the “Republic of China” in remarks he made on leaving the mausoleum. Perhaps not as directly “confrontational,” at several points Wang also called on the two sides to face the “cross-Strait reality.” Finally in this regard, Wang reported that, while in their meeting Zhang Zhijun had referred to Ma Ying-jeou either as “Mr. Ma” or “your leader,” Wang had consistently referred to Ma as “president.”

As things turned out, the two ministers focused primarily on “operational” issues such as health insurance for students, prospects for advancing the post-Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) follow-on agreements and for Taiwan’s participation in regional economic activities, communication channels between TAO and MAC, exchange of media bureaus, and the proposed exchange of offices between the two “unofficial” bodies that handle cross-Strait relations on a day-to-day
basis, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Mainland’s Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS).

On the communication channel, as of this writing, details are apparently still being worked out. But they reportedly will involve telephone links between the two ministers, their deputies, and chief secretaries. Moreover, it was agreed that Zhang Zhijun will pay a return visit to Taiwan “soon,” perhaps as early as April, with a second Wang trip to the Mainland anticipated for later in the year.

With regard to Taiwan’s drive for participation in regional economic activities, there seems to be a delicate minuet going on. First of all, there is the question of the priority between cross-Strait economic relations and engaging in regional economic efforts. Which, if either, comes first? And then there is the issue of whether and how Taiwan and the Mainland relate in terms of regional structures.

On the former, although the MAC speaks of advancing cross-Strait economic cooperation and participating in regional economic integration as activities to be pursued “side by side,” and the briefings of both sides following Wang’s visit implied that this was a view shared by the Mainland, it seems that Beijing in reality has a different perspective.

In any enumeration of goals, Mainland briefers have consistently listed completion of ECFA follow-on agreements ahead of discussion of regional activities. Moreover, Zhang is reported to have told Wang that before the two sides can jointly explore a viable approach “to building a link between cross-Strait economic cooperation and regional economic cooperation” (previewing the Mainland’s view on the second topic), the two sides should finish up the post-ECFA work, including ratification of the services trade agreement still awaiting LY approval as well as completing and ratifying the commodities trade agreement and the agreement on dispute resolution.

On the second issue, how cross-Strait economic relations tie into participation in regional activities, it is reasonable to assume that Taipei has no desire to be subsumed within a “Chinese” membership or delegation to either the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), both of which are high priorities for Ma. Nonetheless, as indicated above, Beijing has consistently talked about how the two sides need to work together to link up their bilateral economic cooperation with regional efforts.

It was therefore intriguing when at this year’s APEC leaders meeting in Bali Vincent Siew spoke about “jointly participating” in regional economic activities. But the likely limits of his conception were evident in his advocacy to Xi that Taiwan needed to sign bilateral trade agreements with economic partners and join both the TPP agreement and RCEP. Moreover, he complained that Beijing was preventing Taiwan from asserting its own international identity by blocking its entry into international
institutions and signing free-trade deals with its Asian neighbors: “It’s not only a very unfortunate situation, it’s also not a fair one. We should be able to participate in all these efforts.”

Against this background, it is noteworthy that when he spoke of his agenda for talks with Zhang Zhijun in mid-February, Wang Yu-chi said they would discuss “both sides of the Strait jointly participating in regional economic integration” (兩岸共同參與區域經濟整合), and MAC used similar words in summing up the meeting afterward.

But while one doesn’t know what Wang specifically had in mind, clearly Taipei is not looking to directly partner with Beijing in such efforts or, as we have said, to operate under Beijing’s aegis. Based on the precedent of other experiences relating to Taiwan’s “international space,” at a minimum Beijing will insist on consultation. But one hopes that Mainland officials recognize the sensitivities involved inside Taiwan. And, indeed, in private conversations PRC officials say they understand that any perception of Taipei seeking “permission” from Beijing is poisonous in Taiwan, and they deny that is their intent. Yet the fact is they insist on arrangements that strongly convey the impression that permission is necessary, so there will be some delicate maneuvering in the months ahead.

Regarding the long-pending reciprocal exchange of SEF and ARATS offices, during their meeting in Nanjing, Zhang Zhijun urged Wang to engage in joint efforts to reach a consensus. But the most the MAC could offer after the conversation was that the two sides “agreed to more proactively discuss feasible measures and pragmatically handle issues related to the establishment of reciprocal institutions.” The TAO statement tracked that pretty closely, saying that the two sides would continue to consult on the matter, concretely and appropriately handling the remaining issues so as to realize the plan of establishing the reciprocal offices as soon as possible.

That after all of this time they could not come up with a mutually satisfactory solution to the one significant remaining question, that of SEF officials paying “humanitarian visits” to Taiwan citizens detained on the Mainland, speaks volumes about the gap in the approaches of the two sides, both how politically important the issue is in Taiwan and how sensitive the Mainland is to perceptions the SEF office would be functioning like a consulate. Failure to close that gap by the time Zhang visits Taiwan this spring could very well dampen any sense that qualitative advances in overall cross-Strait relations are feasible in the short run.

The use of “titles” was handled sufficiently well for both sides to come away satisfied, though clearly not all of Taipei’s druthers were fully met. Each principal used the other’s “ministerial” title in their face-to-face meetings. Even there, however, whereas Wang spelled out Zhang’s entire title as Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office Zhang (國臺辦張主任), Zhang merely referred to Wang “Minister Wang Yu-chi” (王郁琦主委). Wang
took note of this in their meeting with cameras rolling, saying that he hoped the day would come when they could call each other by their official titles (互稱職銜).\(^{52}\)

At the same time, although the Mainland has now started to refer to the Mainland Affairs Council by its full name (大陆委员会), and Mainland media prominently reported on the meeting, those media reports, including the official announcement of Wang’s visit and discussions of it afterward, nonetheless abstained from using Wang’s ministerial title, only identifying him either as the “responsible person” (负责人)\(^{53}\) or “head” of the MAC.

Pressed to explain this practice, the TAO spokeswoman explained that the matter of titles was handled in accordance with the “real situation” in cross-Strait relations. Zhang’s employment of Wang’s ministerial title in their talks, she said, was a “pragmatic arrangement” (务实安排) designed to deepen the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. The meetings between “those responsible for the departments handling cross-Strait issues on the two sides” (双方两岸事务主管部门负责人) were held “on a common political basis” (在共同政治基础上) and “in the spirit of mutual respect, seeking common ground while putting aside differences and promoting positive interactions” (本着相互尊重、求同存异、良性互动的精神来进行). But the handling of politically sensitive issues (implicitly meaning use of titles beyond this very specific context) “should be resolved through political dialogue and negotiations” (应该通过政治对话和谈判来解决), she said.

All this may seem arcane for most readers, but the fact that it is being so carefully orchestrated is testament to its significance.

In fact, this usage of Wang’s title was good enough to draw praise even from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).\(^{54}\) That said, however, the opposition criticized many other aspects of the trip, voicing suspicions ahead of time that Wang would make big concessions in secret negotiations in order to promote the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting,\(^{55}\) and charging afterward that Wang had made several “fatal mistakes”\(^{56}\) and calling on him to provide a full accounting of his conversations.\(^{57}\)

A Ma-Xi meeting was broached in the final Zhang-Wang “tea” in Shanghai, when it was raised by the TAO head. Apparently each side merely stated its position (including Taiwan’s view that APEC would be the most appropriate venue because it would render moot the issue of using official titles) but no effort was made to discuss it further. The gap between the two sides was underscored by a TAO spokesperson shortly after, when she made an even more definitive statement than usual rejecting any international venue, including APEC.

This is all related, of course, to a fundamental difference over approaches to the “ROC.” One cannot refrain from inferring a connection between that difference and Zhang’s activity while Wang Yu-chi was paying homage to Sun Yat-sen at Sun’s
mausoleum the day after the Nanjing meeting. Not only did Wang’s TAO escorts absent themselves during the mausoleum visit, but Zhang Zhijun took the occasion to pay a widely reported visit to the “Memorial Hall for Compatriots killed in the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Forces of Aggression.” While there, Zhang called on Taiwan compatriots to “bear in mind national history and resolutely fight back against Japanese right-wing provocation.” His moral was explicit: Although there are many differences and disagreements between the two sides, when confronting a challenge to the fundamental interests of the Chinese people, they must adopt a common position.

In light of the various constraints imposed on Wang’s visit, it would seem that its “larger” achievement, beyond the use of titles and agreement to enhance communication and conduct further visits, was simply that it took place. Wang termed it a “milestone” and Ma Ying-jeou said it signified a significant step in the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and normalization of bilateral interactions. The TAO spokeswoman also hailed it as “an important step” for promoting comprehensive development of cross-Strait relations.

At the same time, reflecting a healthy sense of realism, both sides cautioned that the road ahead will be rough and further breakthroughs not easily come by.

Still, and even if communication has not yet fully “institutionalized,” a pattern of exchanges seems to be emerging. What will happen in those exchanges, of course, is yet to be seen. But it is a notable first step toward consolidating more reliable communication.

**Prelude to a Summit?**

In the context of the Wang-Zhang meeting, much attention has been focused again on the possibility of a Xi-Ma summit. Both sides are clearly interested, but, at least at this point, their visions of the “necessary conditions” needed to pull it off remain far apart.

On the Mainland side, when TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu was asked in October about the prospect for such a meeting, he echoed the enthusiasm he had voiced earlier. Sun said that holding leaders talks had been the Mainland’s policy for three decades and that Beijing would work to make it happen. After all, he argued, there were many issues that had not been resolved because the leaders of the two sides had not been able to meet to resolve them. As the atmospherics were now improving, the two sides could discuss conditions for holding a meeting. Rather optimistically, given how it has turned out so far, he added that direct contacts between officials dealing with cross-Strait affairs could create the necessary conditions for such a meeting.
At the same time as it voices support for a Xi-Ma meeting, as already noted, the TAO continues to rule out the possibility that such a meeting could take place either at APEC or any other “international occasion.” This position was reiterated at the time Sun spoke, and again in the wake of the Wang-Zhang meetings in February.

For his part, Ma has continued to make clear that he is quite open to the idea of a cross-Strait summit, but he has also stood by his previous position that any such meeting would have to be supported by the people in Taiwan, serve Taiwan's interests, and take place under circumstances that maintained the dignity of the nation, with equal status for both sides. And as it had last summer, in response to Sun's statement the MAC amplified the dignity point by saying that any meeting must “fully manifest” Ma's capacity as president of the ROC. Especially with the MAC's focus on APEC as “the most appropriate venue,” however, no effort has been made by Taiwan to try to define further how that requirement could be met.

Unsurprisingly, although lambasting Xi Jinping for intensifying pressure on Taiwan to open political negotiations that it said were designed specifically to lead to unification under the “one China framework,” the DPP primarily focused its fire on the Ma administration for seizing every possible opportunity to promote a Xi-Ma summit at APEC. The party charged that, in effect, Ma was seeking to transform APEC, one of the few international and regional events in which Taiwan can actively participate, into merely an occasion for cross-Strait political dialogue. In so doing, it went on, the administration was turning Taiwan's international relations into “cross-Strait affairs” and downgrading Taiwan's international status, all in the service of promoting a cross-Strait summit and establishing Ma's place in history.

Despite these charges, the possibility of a summit-level meeting was in fact not raised at the APEC meeting in Bali when Xi and Vincent Siew met. And, as indicated earlier, it got the barest mention during the recent Wang-Zhang encounter.

Meanwhile, although there has been considerable speculation that, in his new responsibilities as Secretary General of the National Security Council, Taiwan's outgoing representative to the United States, King Pu-tsung, will really focus on year-end local elections, more likely his main official tasks will extend outward. This will include managing Taiwan's entry into regional economic organizations and promoting Taipei's bilateral relationship with a variety of countries, not least among them the United States. King's responsibilities will also, however, relate importantly to advancing cross-Strait relations, including the possibility of a Ma-Xi meeting.

Future Prospects

Whatever progress on political issues Xi hoped to stimulate with his comment to Vincent Siew it would seem that Taiwan's realities will continue to impose significant
limits. Track II political dialogue will certainly continue (and a second round of the “peace forum” is expected to take place in Taiwan in 2014), but the notion that common positions will emerge that might be the basis of rethinking at the governmental level seems premature at best.

This is not to say that Beijing will not continue to press for political dialogue. It will. But even though Xi’s remarks have been echoed a number of times by senior PRC officials, and even though “reunification” seems to have become a more prominent feature of high-level statements, we have already seen signs that the Mainland is not going to find many allies among the Blue or Green camp in Taiwan in its efforts to press for formal agreements such as a peace accord, especially if they are premised on a “one China” foundation.

What is less clear is how far Taipei will go to cooperate with Beijing’s desire to coordinate Taiwan’s participation in the international community. As unlikely as it seems that the public in Taiwan would support working through the Mainland to achieve greater political or economic space, some level of cooperation is obviously needed or else Taiwan will be locked out. In the diplomacy that led to Taiwan’s invitation by the International Civil Aviation Organization Council president to the organization’s triennial meeting in Montreal last fall, it was very clear that the issue was not only that “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas” be avoided, something that the government in Taipei certainly understands and does not seek to challenge. But, as Mainland officials consistently emphasized, consultation between the two sides is also necessary in order to come to “fair and reasonable arrangements.”

The biggest question is how serious Beijing is about trying to press for serious political talks in the foreseeable future. It seems to this observer that, while the intention is quite serious, those guiding Taiwan policy in the Mainland realize the limits to what Ma Ying-jeou can do. As former TAO head (now foreign minister) Wang Yi used to say, “We won’t ask Ma to do what he can’t do.” But assessment of what “can” and “can’t” be done is a judgment call.

Beijing has broadly hinted that if Ma could do more on key issues such as establishing a cross-Strait military security mutual trust mechanism and negotiating a cross-Strait peace accord within a one China framework, then Beijing would be prepared to go quite far in agreeing to “fair and reasonable arrangements” for Taiwan’s participation in a broad range of international activities and in the entire realm of future development of long-term cross-Strait relations.

As we have seen, however, while Taiwan indeed wants greater international space, especially but not only in the economic sphere, and while Ma has personally endorsed the concept of “one China” and a one China framework, formalizing such positions in cross-Strait relations is a matter of extreme political sensitivity on the island. Hence, my inclination is to agree with an experienced Mainland scholar who observed,
“This year won’t be suitable for Beijing to broach political negotiations because the Taiwanese public is not behind it. But Beijing has become more confident in dealing with Taiwan. So continuing to boost cultural and economic exchanges will pave the road for more sensitive discussions in the future.”

**The DPP Factor**

One point to understand about the push by Xi and his colleagues is a continuing concern about what might happen if the DPP returns to office in the presidential elections in 2016. In my judgment, the idea that moving to formal “Taiwan independence” could become a goal of a future DPP administration is fanciful. And although this concern continues to animate PRC statements to a certain degree, I believe that informed Taiwan hands on the Mainland understand that is the case.

What is not fanciful is that, for all of its internal wrestling with the future of its cross-Strait policy, the party is unlikely to come up with a policy that is based on “one China.” Former Premier Frank Hsieh has tried to push the party somewhat in that direction. However, not only has he been rebuffed by the party, but he has had to make clear that he is not actually advocating “one China” and that he dropped an earlier formulation (“one China constitution”) because it was misconstrued and seen as leaning too far in that direction. So even he has his limits. Still, Hsieh believes the party has evaded the issue and he has explained that he is running for party chair in the May 2014 election in order to promote a “breakthrough” (突破) in the DPP’s cross-Strait policy.

The “report” of the DPP China Affairs Committee issued on January 9, 2014, shunned not only Hsieh’s proposal but also one by the party’s LY whip, Ker Chieh-ming, to “freeze” the 1991 so-called “independence” party plank that calls for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. Party officials have long argued that the 1999 Kaohsiung Resolution on Taiwan’s Future superseded the earlier plank, but they have not, and apparently will not, either remove the earlier provision from the charter or even “freeze” it.

The Mainland has, of course, taken note of all of this and, having welcomed the proposal to “freeze” the 1991 plank as a “positive sign” (积极的信号), it then sharply criticized the DPP for its inability to accept that proposal or in any other way to move away from its essential position on “one country on each side of the Strait.”

In his November speech, Sun Yafu observed that as long as the DPP continued to support Taiwan independence and did not abandon the party’s Taiwan independence party platform or its 2007 “normal state” resolution, Beijing would not have formal party-to-party relations with it. Following up on Sun’s remarks, the TAO briefer noted that instead of abandoning those positions, the DPP was trying to use some
“vague concepts”（模糊的概念）to create a political foundation for interacting with the Mainland. She said “the Mainland cannot possibly accept this” and called on the DPP to face reality and with earnest resolve really abandon its unrealistic position of “Taiwan independence.”

Though not reflected in the official TAO briefing transcript, it was reported that this criticism was at least in part directed personally at DPP Chair Su Tseng-chang, who, the spokeswoman said, “has never given up advocacy of Taiwan independence.” But the fact of the matter is that no DPP chair would seek to have the party embrace “one China,” and so if the DPP won in 2016, even if it dropped the 1991 plank, Beijing would have to confront a difficult choice of how to deal with authorities who had not accepted the “required” framework for smooth cross-Strait relations.

So, in addition to trying to move the DPP off of its philosophical base, one presumes that some of the Mainland’s motivation for the seemingly more urgent push for political dialogue with the Ma administration is to try to lock in a relationship based on a “one China framework” that cannot be reversed after 2016, no matter who wins the Taiwan presidency. To succeed, of course, Beijing would have to convince the majority in Taiwan that such a relationship was in their interest.

In addition, we will also be interested to see how the DPP plans to gain the support of the crucial electoral center in circumstances when it is clear the PRC will not accept the party’s current approach as a basis for advancing relations.

Afterword

As this essay was heading to publication, Xi Jinping met with KMT honorary chairman and former Vice President Lien Chan. Xi focused on the common weal and woe of the people on both sides of the Strait and the advantages that would come from striving together for their mutual benefit.

Xi did not reengage on the “generation to generation” point he had made to Vincent Siew last October, and he did not pick up on the “reunification” linkage other senior officials had recently made. But his basic theme regarding the importance of peaceful development under the “one China framework” and common identity was unchanged.

Xi appealed to a sense of “family” and cultural and historical affinity of people on both sides of the Strait as part of the Chinese nation. He said he fully understood the feelings of the people of Taiwan regarding their own experience and aspirations and fully respected their choices regarding their social system and way of life. People on both sides of the Strait would benefit from the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, Xi said. The China dream is their common dream, and both should work to make it come true.
Some analysts have suggested that this “softer” line means Beijing will ease off on the push for political dialogue. But this seems doubtful. While Xi may have avoided some of the more “provocative” ideas he and others have voiced in recent months, it is unlikely that this signals an abandonment of the Mainland’s desire to pursue such a dialogue. Xi’s statement to Lien that he welcomed ideas from all elements of Taiwan society about how to help promote peaceful development of cross-Strait relations perhaps reflected a clearer understanding of the political realities in Taiwan than he showed in October and a greater willingness to accommodate them. But the thrust of his remarks remained focused on achieving that further development, including in the political realm, which clearly continues to be high on his agenda.

Notes

1 “General Secretary Xi Jinping meets with Siew Wanchang and his party” (习近平总书记会见萧万长一行), Xinhua, October 6, 2013, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201310/t20131007_4979072.htm]. The full paragraph of relevance reads: 习近平指出, 增进两岸政治互信, 夯实共同政治基础, 是确保两岸关系和平发展的关键. 着眼长远, 两岸长期存在的政治分歧问题终归要逐步解决, 总不能将这些问题一代一代传下去. 我们已经多次表示, 愿意在一个中国框架内就两岸政治问题同台湾方面进行平等协商, 作出合情合理安排. 对两岸关系中需要处理的事务, 双方主管部门负责人也可以见面交换意见.


4 Ibid.


6 Zhang said that continuing to push forward cross-Strait relations and peaceful development, to promote peaceful reunification of the two sides of the Strait, and to realize the great cause of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the common historical responsibility of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. (继续推动两岸关系和平发展, 促进两岸和平统一, 实现中华民族伟大复兴, 是两岸同胞共同的历史责任.) (“Zhang Zhijun delivers a speech at the opening ceremony.”)


10 We must comprehensively implement the general requirements of the 18th National Congress on work with Taiwan, unswervingly execute the major policy guidelines of the Central Government on work with Taiwan, unswervingly adhere to the path of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, constantly create new prospects for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations in order to complete reunification of the motherland.

11 “Top political advisor urges stronger cross-Strait ties,” Xinhua, January 24, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/24/c_133072074.htm. The Xinhua Chinese-language summary posted on the TAO website reads a little differently, but makes essentially the same points, when it speaks of continuously consolidating and deepening the political, economic, cultural, and social foundation of peaceful development of cross-Strait relations in order to create even more favorable conditions for peaceful reunification (为实现和平统一创造更加有利的条件). (Chen Binhua, “Yu Zhengsheng attends 2014 Taiwan work conference and gives an important speech” [俞正声出席2014年对台工作会议并作重要讲话], Xinhuanet, January 24, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201401/r20140124_5587997.htm.)


14 As Zhang Zhijun identified the other three points of focus they were: political relations (政治关系), foreign affairs matters (涉外事务), and security mutual trust (安全互信). (“Zhang Zhijun delivers a speech at the opening ceremony,” see endnote 3.)


16 Ibid.


21 “Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung: Continue to promote peaceful cross-Strait relations from generation to generation” (吳榮譽主席: 一代接一代 繼續推動兩岸和平關係), KMT Culture Communication Committee, Press release 295, October 25, 2013, http://www.kmt.org.tw/page.aspx?id=32&Caid=18150; now at https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/zh/news/2330616. *Liberty Times* reported that, for his part, in a closed door conversation after dinner Yu sought to keep the focus on political relations, expressing the hope that political trust between the two sides could...
be strengthened "to allow a breakthrough in political relations" (讓兩岸「政治關係」有所突破; Peng Hsien-chun, "KMT-CCP forum opens today, the two parties engage in mutual political propaganda" [國共論壇今登場 兩黨相互政治喊話], Liberty Times, October 26, 2013, http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2013/new/oct/26/today-p2.htm).


Nonetheless, despite the TAO dismissal, there has been some discussion in unofficial exchanges of using titles in encounters between officials of the two sides in "non-political" areas (culture, education, environment, etc). (Private conversations) In this regard, Taiwan's culture minister, Lung Ying-tai, said that to accept the Mainland's invitation that she visit, she would need to do so in an "appropriate status." (Cheng Ching-wei, "Lung Ying-tai: to visit the Mainland requires that she have an appropriate status" [龍應台: 訪陸要有適當身分], Want Daily, January 15, 2014, http://www.want-daily.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=99691. Now at https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/ch/news/2390864.)
On a related matter, although the TAO said that the new direct communication links between TAO and MAC would not lead to a change in communication links between other departments (Lawrence Chiu and Jay Chen, “TAO, MAC’s direct link won’t apply to other agencies: China,” CNA, February 17, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201402170010.aspx), the fact is that direct telephone links are commonplace between working levels of agencies across the Strait other than those concerned with foreign policy or security matters.

29 “Zhang Zhijun welcomes a visit to the Mainland by the responsible person in charge of the Taiwan side’s department handling Mainland affairs” (張志軍歡迎台灣方面大陸事務主管部門負責人參訪大陸), Xinhua, October 6, 2014, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/wyly/201310/t20131007_4979070.htm.


31 Katherine Wei, “Beijing says MAC chief to visit Mainland in Feb.,” China Post, January 29, 2014.


33 Lai Chin-hung, “At the Wang Yu-chi–Zhang Zhijun meeting there are three topics that may not be discussed” (王郁琦, 張志軍會面 3個不能說), United Daily News (hereafter abbreviated UDN), January 27, 2014, http://paper.udn.com/udnpaper/PID0001/252355/web/#10L-4471149L.


The TAO spokesman cited Zhang Zhijun as saying that the question is not whether there can or cannot be visits, but rather how to arrange matters so that they respect the regulations of both sides and accord with the proper role of each office, as well as constitute fair and reasonable arrangements that serve to protect the rights and interests of the people concerned and their families. (Lin Yan and Hwang Boining, “Ma Xiaoguang reads aloud the consensus of the Zhang-Wang meeting, major decisions” (馬曉光宣讀張王會共識 重大舉措), China Review News, February 12, 2014, http://hk.crntt.com/crn-webapp/doc/docDetailCNML.jsp?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=103017269.)
From Generation to Generation: Advancing Cross-Strait Relations


62 Even assuming the MAC-TAO channel is “regularized,” however, it will not displace the SEF-ARATS channel as some have speculated, at least in the short run. The TAO and MAC are policy organizations, not negotiating entities, and as affirmed by both sides following the Wang-Zhang talks, they will not seek to take over the process of “normal” negotiations.


64 Ibid.


67 Kelven Huang and Sofia Wu, “President expounds vision on APEC leaders’ meeting,” see endnote 23.


70 One presumes that Ma has two goals here. First, as long as his preconditions are met, he likely sees a meeting with Xi as a way of consolidating stability in the cross-Strait relationship. Moreover, in so doing, he would go far toward creating a lasting legacy. Assuming this were all in the service of forging a stronger cross-Strait bond on the basis of a “one China framework,” Beijing would likely have no problem with this.

Second, however, Ma likely has in mind an objective that animates Beijing’s rejection of the APEC suggestion. That is, he would create an opportunity to promote Taiwan’s international personality even if only on a de facto as opposed to de jure basis. Although Ma’s motive is not to challenge the PRC in the same way Chen Shui-bian sought to do, in Beijing’s eyes the opportunity for Ma to hobnob with world leaders at APEC or any other international event would create a situation very much akin to what Chen sought, and is simply not acceptable in a circumstance where a “one China framework” has not been consolidated.


Private conversations.


In line with this, it was made known that at the 10th round of SEF-ARATS talks to be held at the end of February, in addition to trying to advance the post-ECFA agreements in commodities trade and dispute resolution, agreements on earthquake-monitoring cooperation and meteorological monitoring will be signed. An agreement to avoid double taxation and foster taxation cooperation that has been under negotiation for four years has been put off, reportedly due to concerns on the part of Taiwan enterprises and opposition parties that firms could be subjected to an overall tax inspection by authorities on both sides. (Luo Yin-ch’ung, “Tax agreement will not be signed at 10th high-level cross-Strait meeting” [兩岸高層10次會 不簽租稅協議], *China Times*, February 8, 2014, http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140208001021-260301.)


As stated, the party’s position is that the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future is the basic statement regarding the DPP’s position on Taiwan’s status, and according to party rules, it has superseded the 1991 “independence” plank. That said, undoubtedly taking into account the complex politics within the DPP, party chair Su Tseng-chang has made known that he has no intention to revise, much less remove, the 1991 plank, and that he intends to focus instead on winning the trust of more people in Taiwan. (Jennifer Huang and Christie Chen, “Taiwan-China relations important, complicated: DPP chair,” CNA, January 24, 2014, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201401250018.aspx.)


In 2007, the party’s national congress adopted “by applause” a resolution that called for the “rectification” of the name “Taiwan” as soon as possible and the writing of a new constitution. It also called for holding a referendum “at an appropriate time” to “emphasize Taiwan’s independent statehood.” Although the congress rejected a more strident proposal that said, “Our nation should write a new constitution and correct its official title to ‘Taiwan,’” this “Normal Country Resolution,” as it came to be called, was seen by many as, at least in spirit, returning the party to the position laid out in the 1991 Taiwan independence plank. (Flora Wang, "DPP passes 'normal country' resolution," *Taipei Times*, October 1, 2007, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/10/01/2003381145.)


Sun’s full riff on the DPP was as follows:
在這裡，我還想談一下關於民進黨的問題。2012年以來，民進黨內要求正視大陸崛
起，與大陸往來，調整對大陸政策的呼聲較之以往任何時候都大。但是，民進黨沒
有放棄“台獨”立場，廁避廂除“台獨黨綱”，“正常國家決議文”的問題，繼續阻
撓兩岸關係法發展。我們決定對台灣各政黨的態度，是看他們怎麼認定兩岸關係的
性質，發展基礎及其前途。以往，今天，將來都是這樣。我們對民進黨的要求說到底
就是一條——放棄“態度”立場和“一邊一國”主張。如果他們這樣做了，我們願作
出正面回應。台灣各黨派之間的事情，只要不屬於涉及中國領土和主權的問題，不
屬於兩岸關係發展及其前途的問題，由他們之間去處理，去解決。

Informal translation:
Here I also want to talk a bit about the question of the DPP. Since 2012, calls inside the
DPP to face up to the rise of the Mainland, to have exchanges with the Mainland, and
to adjust policy toward the Mainland have been greater than at any time in the past.
But the DPP has not abandoned its “Taiwan independence” position, it has dodged the
question of repealing the “Taiwan independence party plank” and the “normal country
resolution” and it continues to obstruct the development of a cross-Strait relations law.
In determining our attitude toward all Taiwan political parties we look at the way they
define the character, evolution of the foundation, and future of cross-Strait relations. In
the past, today, and in the future alike, we fundamentally have one consistent demand,
that they abandon their “attitude” and stance and their advocacy of “one country on
each side.” If they were to do this, we would respond positively. Regarding the matters
among political factions, as long as they don’t touch on questions of China’s territory
and sovereignty, and don’t touch on questions of the development and future of cross-
Strait relations, we leave it to them to manage and resolve these among themselves.

fbh/201311/t20131127_5274787.htm. The portion on the DPP read in full: 民進黨與大陸交往的
根本障礙是其仍堅持 “台獨” 立場。從民進黨舉辦的幾場 “華山會議” 情況看，民進黨还
没能真正認清問題本質之所在，企圖在不放棄 “台獨” 立場和 “一邊一國” 主張前提下，用
一些模糊的概念作為與大陸交往的政治基礎。大陸不可能接受。民進黨應认清現實，痛下決
心，真正放棄不切實際的 “台獨” 主張。

84 “Mainland’s TAO lashes out at DPP’s Su over Taiwan independence stance,” KMT News Network
(from Taipei papers), November 28, 2013, http://www1.kmt.org.tw/
english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=112&anum=13779.

85 “Realize the China dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” (共圓中華民族伟大复兴
Reflection: Alan D. Romberg
 as a Policymaker

Jeffrey A. Bader

Alan Romberg's career at the State Department coincided with the rise of Asia from underdevelopment to a position of wealth and power in the world. First Japan, then Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and China became manufacturing and trade hubs, export dynamos, and homes to burgeoning middle classes. In the process, their political influence expanded and power shifted from the West toward the East. This was the global transformation that Alan spent his life studying. These were the countries he dealt with as a diplomat.

As a foreign service officer (FSO), Alan spent an early tour in Hong Kong, where he charted the tail end of the Cultural Revolution and acquired a lifelong interest in China. He then returned to Washington, where he helped shape Asia policy as a director at the National Security Council (NSC) and deputy director for the Office of Policy Planning in State Department. The major challenge facing American policymakers at the time was establishing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) without degrading critical U.S. relations with allies, who were uneasy about the tectonic changes brought about by Nixon and Kissinger's opening to China. Alan was an important actor in shaping the diplomacy of the 1970s toward China, from the visits to Beijing by presidents and secretaries of state to the three U.S.-China joint communiqués, and just as much in adapting U.S. relationships affected by the U.S.-China strategic partnership.

After President Nixon's visit prefiguring establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC, there was a widespread belief that Taiwan had no future as a separate self-governing entity. Alan spent much of his time in the State Department and after helping to define, refine, and strengthen the framework that secured Taiwan's future while building strong ties between the U.S. and the PRC. He was that unfortunately too rare expert who didn't dismiss or devalue one or the other.

He helped a generation of U.S. government leaders and FSOs understand the content of our “one China” policy and what it meant for Taiwan's status. Before Alan published the definitive volume on the subject as a scholar (Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice), he explained that the “one China” policy, which he always punctuated with quotation
Across the Taiwan Strait marks, was not so much a positive assertion of one China as a negative definition—no support for Taiwan independence, for a one China, one Taiwan policy, or for two Chinas, and acknowledgment but not explicit endorsement of the mainland position that there is only one China. He argued strongly at every turn in the relationship for a principled U.S. position that was consistent over time and lived up to U.S. commitments, not an opportunistic, salami-slicing approach that might produce temporary advantage but ultimately erode both U.S.-PRC relations and Taiwan's security. He was one of a handful of courageous senior FSOs who challenged President Clinton's decision to grant a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in 1995 to speak at Cornell University, which triggered the sharpest downturn in U.S.-China relations since Nixon's visit and ushered in the PRC's military buildup. He argued consistently against Cabinet-level visits to Taiwan, which he saw as contrary to the promised unofficiality in U.S.-Taiwan relations, but at the same time he argued publicly for the PRC to alter its opposition to Taiwan's participation in international organizations and denial of international space for Taiwan. He tirelessly sought to persuade PRC and Taiwan officials to find a basis for direct government-to-government talks, even during periods of cross-Strait chill, trying out on them a range of formulations he thought they could accept without sacrificing their fundamental positions. Along with a small number of former U.S. officials including Richard Bush and Doug Paal, Alan was listened to and respected by both Beijing and Taipei.

In the 1990s, when he returned to the Office of Policy Planning, Alan worked within the walls of the State Department to persuade the secretary of state of the importance of continuing adherence to the fundamental principles of the three-way U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relationship. But he also worked directly on U.S.-PRC diplomacy with PRC counterparts on the most important issues. In the decade after Tiananmen, there was a host of issues besides Taiwan burdening an already intensely challenged relationship—proliferation activities by China, China's military relationship with Iran, human rights, nuclear tests. The culmination was President Clinton's 1998 visit to Beijing, the first presidential visit since Tiananmen. There were monthly visits to Beijing by a small NSC-State Department delegation to negotiate all these issues before Clinton's visit, with Alan as the State Department representative. The result was a highly successful and widely acclaimed Clinton visit to China that effectively renormalized U.S.-China relations after a decade-long freeze.

While the core of Alan's work at the State Department focused on the U.S.-PRC-Taiwan triangle, he was deeply involved as well on issues concerning other major countries in Northeast Asia.

As Director of the Office of Japan Affairs in the late 1970s, he wrestled with Japanese market access barriers and industrial policy, inadequate levels of Japanese financial support for U.S. military forces in Japan, and Japanese development of plutonium breeder reactors that threatened to set a precedent for other would-be nuclear powers.
Alan also worked on U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s when momentous changes were occurring that unfroze the status quo prevailing since the Korean War. He was involved in setting U.S. policy as the Clinton administration sought to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and opened a direct dialogue with North Korean leaders to try to achieve that objective.

Leaving aside the particulars of these issues, what stood out about Alan’s advocacy was his relentless emphasis on balance in U.S. policy. He pushed hard to get results from Japanese and South Korean leaders, but he never underestimated the importance of maintaining strong alliances with them in the face of resistance or domestic criticism. He was comfortable in holding conflicting goals and thoughts in his head at the same time, and remembering that winning battles was less important than sustaining and strengthening America’s strategic partnerships.

Alan’s primary legacy lay in using his special gift in language to advocate for and articulate the policies in Northeast Asia – China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan – that became the basis of U.S. strategy in a dramatically changing world. He did it less through developing revolutionary breakthroughs than by keeping all U.S. objectives in proper balance, upholding faith with our commitments, preserving alliances, and by doing so laying the basis for decades more of U.S. leadership. He also trained and mentored a large cadre of young Asia experts who have brought his ideas and temperament forward into the modern foreign policy establishment, much to our benefit.
About Stimson and the Author

**Alan D. Romberg**

Alan D. Romberg was a Distinguished Fellow and the Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson from 2000 to 2018. Before joining Stimson, he enjoyed a distinguished career working on Asian issues including 27 years in the State Department, with over 20 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. Romberg was the Principal Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Deputy Spokesman of the department. He served overseas in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Additionally, Romberg spent almost 10 years as the CV Starr Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and was special assistant to the secretary of the navy. Romberg received an M.A. from Harvard University, and a B.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

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Across the Taiwan Strait

These volumes compile the articles by Alan D. Romberg previously published in the Hoover Institution’s China Leadership Monitor. A dedicated scholar of East Asia, Romberg wrote on Taiwan for the Monitor for over a decade, closely tracking the political and economic developments of cross-Strait relations and analyzing them for American observers.

About the Author

Alan D. Romberg was a Distinguished Fellow and the Director of the East Asia Program at Stimson from 2000 to 2018. Before joining Stimson, he enjoyed a distinguished career working on Asian issues including 27 years in the State Department, with over 20 years as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. Romberg spent almost 10 years as the CV Starr Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and was special assistant to the secretary of the navy.