

STIMSON

Military Planning To Protect Civilians



Proposed Guidance For United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

By Max Kelly
with Alison Giffen

Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

*By Max Kelly
with Alison Giffen*

September 2011

Note: This publication offers proposed guidance. It has not been officially vetted or endorsed by the United Nations. It is not intended to supplant or supersede efforts already underway at the UN to develop guidance, but rather to offer potentially useful ideas and concepts based on the research conducted by the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program and its partners.

Presented in conjunction with

*Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit:
Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians*

Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations

A Project of the Future of Peace Operations Program
The Stimson Center, Washington, DC

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Cover and book design/layout by Crystal Chiu, Shawn Woodley, and Alison Yost

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Stimson Center
1111 19th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: 202.223.5956
Fax: 202.238.9604
www.stimson.org

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Preface

It is with great pleasure that I present a new Stimson Center publication, *Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, by Max Kelly, with Alison Giffen. This publication builds on the cumulative body of research developed by the Future of Peace Operations program in its quest to develop solutions to prevent mass and systematic violence against civilians. This is an integral component of our work on all aspects of peace operations, and resonates with Stimson's overall mission — to offer pragmatic steps to enhance international peace and security.

For a number of years, Stimson research identified a lack of adequate guidance, planning, and training on the protection of civilians as a critical liability for national militaries and peacekeepers around the world. For this reason, the Stimson Center launched the project "Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit," which began with a workshop in September 2009 at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham, gathering current and former military and civilian experts with experience in field operations deployed in the context of protection crises. The workshop was designed to capture insights that could be distilled into guidance for future missions mandated to protect. The project resulted in four products:

- ▶ A workshop report entitled *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians*;
- ▶ A set of proposed guidance entitled *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations*;
- ▶ *Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*; and,
- ▶ A case study *Saving Port-au-Prince: United Nations Efforts to Protect Civilians in Haiti in 2006-2007*.

The Stimson Center is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to developing pragmatic approaches to enduring and emerging problems of international security. The Center's work on peace operations has been supported in recent years by the Carnegie Corporation, Compton Foundation, Humanity United, and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. We are deeply grateful for their support.

Sincerely,



Ellen Laipson
President and CEO,
The Stimson Center

Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| AO | Area of Operation |
| AOR | Area of Responsibility |
| CAR | Central African Republic |
| CAS | Civil Affairs Section |
| CASEVAC | Casualty Evacuation |
| CC | Critical Capabilities |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation |
| CMCOORD | Civil-Military Coordination |
| COA | Course of Action |
| COE | Contemporary Operational Environment |
| CoG | Center of Gravity |
| CONOPS | Concept of Operations |
| COP | Common Operational Picture |
| COY | Company |
| CPTM | Core Pre-Deployment Training Material |
| CR | Critical Requirements |
| CV | Critical Vulnerabilities |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DDRRR | Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration |
| DFS | Department of Field Support |
| DOCO | Development Operations Coordination Office |
| DP | Decisive Point |
| DPA | Darfur Peace Agreement |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |

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|--------|---|
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| DSS | Department of Safety and Security |
| DUF | Directives on the Use of Force |
| ECHA | Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs |
| FDLR | Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda |
| FGS | Force Generation Services |
| HNP | Haitian National Police |
| HQ | Head Quarters |
| HUMINT | Human Intelligence |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IEMF | Interim Emergency Multinational Force |
| IMPP | Integrated Mission Planning Process |
| IMTF | Integrated Mission Task Force |
| INTSUM | Intelligence Summary |
| IPB | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield |
| ITF | Integrated Task Force |
| ITS | Integrated Training Service |
| J2 | Intelligence Staff Section |
| J3 | Operations Staff Section |
| J5 | Plans and Policy Staff Section |
| JCAT | Joint Tactical Collection and Analysis Team |
| JEM | Justice and Equality Movement |
| JMAC | Joint Military Analysis Centre |
| JOC | Joint Operations Centre |
| JPT | Joint Protection Team |
| LOO | Lines of Operation |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| MI | Military Intelligence |

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|----------|---|
| MILAD | Military Advisor |
| MINUSTAH | United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti |
| MPS | Military Planning Service |
| MONUC | UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| MONUSCO | UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NTM | Notice-to-move |
| OAT | Operational Advisory Teams |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OHCHR | Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights |
| ONUC | United Nations Operation in Congo |
| OPORD | Operational Order |
| PBSO | Peacebuilding Support Office |
| PDT | Pre-deployment Training |
| PIP | Pre-deployment Information Packages |
| PIR | Priority Information Requirement |
| PKO | Peacekeeping Operation |
| POC | Protection of Civilians |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| RREW | Rapid Response and Early Warning Cell |
| RRF | Rapid Reaction Forces |
| RUF | Revolutionary United Front |
| S2 | Intelligence Staff Officer (Battalion or Brigade) |
| SG | United Nations Secretary-General |
| SIGACTS | Significant Activities |
| SIR | Specific Information Requirements |

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| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| SWOT | Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats |
| TAM | Technical Assessment Mission |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Countries |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMID | African Union/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur |
| UNAMSIL | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDG | United Nations Development Group |
| UNEF | United Nations Emergency Force |
| UNHCR | Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNMIS | United Nations Mission in Sudan |
| UNMOs | United Nations Military Observers |
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UNSCR | United Nations Security Council Resolution |
| USG | Under Secretary-General |
| VHF | Very High Frequency |

Section I: Conceptual Issues

1. Introduction

Diplomacy not backed by power is tantamount to hollow gesturing. It is the punch of power that lends conviction to the suasion of diplomats. Where it is lacking, the well-meaning are left to the mercy of the reckless, and brute force rather than reason sustained by might determines the outcome of conflict.¹

- Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (1996)

Since 1999, an increasing proportion of UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) have been mandated to use force to protect civilians from physical violence. Although recent research and UN efforts have helped clarify that the protection of civilians (POC) is a critical and unavoidable requirement for UN PKOs, its implications for UN planning, and particular planning for the military component, prior to and during deployment remain largely unaddressed in formal guidance.

A 2009 OCHA-DPKO commissioned independent study, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations*, examined the creation, interpretation and implementation of POC mandates in detail. Although many of the conclusions and recommendations of the study are beyond the scope of this guidance, two principal findings are important to highlight:

1. The protection of civilians is critical for the legitimacy of UN operations, the political processes they seek to support, and the United Nations in general; and
2. A major disconnect exists between Security Council resolutions mandating UN PKOs to protect civilians, planning processes for those operations, and the implementation of POC mandates in the field.

Following the publication of this study and others, the UN Security Council and UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping requested that the UN Secretariat develop formal guidance on the concept and implementation of mandates to protect civilians. Recent initiatives by DPKO and individual missions to develop guidance, conceptual tools, and working methods to implement POC mandates have demonstrated remarkable ingenuity.

This document is intended to support those processes by drawing on recent scholarship and operational research on the challenges of ending complex civil conflicts.² It seeks to apply that research to better employ the military capabilities of UN PKOs to alter conflict dynamics in order to end attacks on civilians. Drawing on lessons from recent UN PKOs and interviews with mission personnel from a wide variety of contexts, it proposes a shift from a primarily reactive approach based on crisis response, to a proactive one that seizes the initiative and applies pressure on armed actors³ responsible for violence against the civilian populace.

1 International Commission on the Balkans, *Unfinished Peace* (Brookings Institution Press for the Aspen Institute: Berlin, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington DC, 1996) p. 73.

2 This guidance draws on Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations*, (Stimson Center: Washington DC, May 2010).

3 Throughout this publication, the term “armed actor” refers to any armed group threatening and/or perpetrating violence against civilians. An armed actor may be an individual/group that is A) a member of or affiliated with a host state government or main party to a conflict or B) acting independently in the context of international and/or non-international armed conflict.

This document offers proposed guidance only: it has no official vetting or endorsement by the United Nations. In no way is it intended to supplant or supersede those efforts, but rather to offer potentially useful ideas and concepts based on the research conducted by the Stimson Center’s Future of Peace Operations program and its partners.⁴

Why Protecting Civilians is Critical to Mission Success¹

Civil Security in the Contemporary Operational Environment

The contemporary operational environment (COE) for UN PKOs has changed significantly over the last two decades. One of those changes has been to the status, significance and role of civilians in modern conflicts. Although deliberate violence against civilians has been a frequent facet of war, in most conflicts its significance to victory or defeat was relatively marginal. During the Cold War the fate of civilians was a key factor in revolutionary wars, but in the post-Cold War era it has become critical to outcomes across the entire spectrum of conflict.

The Operational Environment

The rapid global dissemination of information through pervasive, decentralized, and democratized media has transformed the operational environment. The reach of media coverage has expanded and changing technology has made cameras a nearly ever-present reality on the battlefield. That same technology has decentralized media access, empowering groups and individuals beyond professional journalists to vie for the attention of the global audience. This has notably included many who disregard traditional journalistic standards and ethics in favor of speed, impact and propaganda value. Today, traditional media outlets, governments, civil society, and belligerents themselves compete to shape perceptions—and thus politics—in an unregulated global marketplace of ideas.

Those perceptions impact military operations in a number of ways. Global public opinion shapes international politics, affecting the policies and postures of actors whose decisions to support or oppose an operation—even rhetorically—can influence strategic outcomes. When military forces are deployed internationally, domestic audiences must remain convinced of the merit of the operation despite the inevitable costs and casualties. Finally, the perceptions of civilians in the area of operations can both impact global public opinion, and have direct implications for military outcomes in certain circumstances.

This battle of narratives has intensified the scrutiny on military operations. National and multinational military actors are continually challenged to demonstrate that their conduct conforms to the ideals they espouse, and that their use of force is justified by a reasonable prospect of success. Moreover, changing conceptions of national and international security have redefined success, often in terms of the (re)establishment of stable, legitimate states that uphold basic human rights. As a result, in the COE military force alone is rarely if ever sufficient to accomplish the overarching political goals for which it is employed.

¹ This text box is excerpted and adapted from Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations*, (Stimson Center: Washington DC, May 2010).

⁴ The proposed guidance outlined in this document is largely based on *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations*, a previous Stimson Center publication. Readers may find it useful to read this previous Stimson publication for conceptual clarification.

Rather, force is used to set the conditions for other political, economic, and diplomatic tools to produce the desired end state. ***Thus the evolving nature of modern conflict has moved civilians from the sidelines to a central consideration for military operations.***

Civilians in Modern Conflict

The real and perceived impact of military operations on civilians is a critical factor in determining strategic outcomes. Different actors draw vastly different implications from this observation. Some belligerents seek to “capture the will of the people” by deliberately targeting them for violence in order to:

- ▶ Impose or undermine disputed political authority (as in some counterinsurgencies and insurgencies, respectively);
- ▶ Tax, enslave, or forcibly recruit civilians (as with warlords lacking a political agenda);
- ▶ Exert political pressure on states or the international community to give in to political demands (terrorism); and,
- ▶ Eliminate certain sub-populations from a given area through either ethnic cleansing or outright elimination.

Despite the clear illegality of such strategies, deliberate violence against civilians remains a disturbingly common feature of contemporary conflicts, and a challenge for national and multinational operations ranging from peacekeeping to major combat.

As outlined above, for national and multilateral military operations, “capturing the will of the people” involves building and maintaining legitimacy among the global audience and local populace alike. Often this will require more than simply taking steps to avoid causing civilian casualties. Operations will be judged not only on their own conduct, but their ability to create and maintain security and stability in their area of operations. Where belligerents seek to use violence against civilians to discredit a government, terrorize a population, capture resources, or destroy an entire group, intervening forces will frequently have to take steps to ensure the security of the populace.

Recognition of this imperative is evident in the increasing proportion of military operations explicitly tasked with protecting civilians from systematic or mass violence. In most cases, civil security is identified as an operational objective required to achieve strategic goals. In a few, the protection of civilians from violence is identified as a strategic objective unto itself. However, even where the protection of civilians is a strategic objective, the requirements for military action to provide immediate security must be balanced against the steps necessary to establish a secure environment that will guarantee the safety of civilians after foreign military forces withdraw.

2. Purpose

The following guidance is intended to primarily apply to UN peacekeeping operations mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to use all necessary means to protect civilians.⁵ In most but not all cases, UN missions authorized under such mandates are deployed into the context of complex civil conflicts, sometimes with transnational dimensions. While framed in terms of the initial planning process that takes place at headquarters for the deployment of a UN PKO, military planning is an iterative process that continues in the field. The concepts, analytical frameworks, and processes outlined below can be usefully applied by PKOs in the field at force, division and brigade headquarters.

This proposed guidance is intended to complement existing guidelines and guidance currently under development. As such, it should be read in association with the relevant UN and other policy guidance, including but not limited to:

- ▶ *Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines* (June 2006)
- ▶ *IMPP Guidelines: The Role of Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences* (May 2009)
- ▶ *Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment* (May 2009)
- ▶ *Planning Process for Military Operations* (September 2001)
- ▶ *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008)
- ▶ *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept Note on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2010)

⁵ Up to and including lethal force as a last resort.

3. Policy Framework

3.1 Relevant Policy Guidance

Two documents provide the conceptual and policy framework for the actions of the military components of UN missions to protect civilians:

1. *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) (hereafter referred to as the *Capstone Doctrine*) and,
2. *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept Note on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2010) (hereafter referred to as the *Concept Note*).⁶

The *Capstone Doctrine* lists as a part of the ‘Core Business’ of UN peacekeeping the “[creation of] a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights.”⁷ It explains that,

Most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential.⁸

The *Capstone Doctrine* also points out that “In contrast to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations, multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict.”⁹

Building on the *Capstone Doctrine*, the *Concept Note* adopts a three-tiered approach:

- ▶ Tier 1 is ‘protection through political process,’ encompassing political engagement, advocacy and assistance by the UN mission to the effective implementation of a peace agreement or other political process to resolve the conflict.
- ▶ Tier 2 is described as ‘providing protection from physical violence,’ involving actions to prevent, deter, and respond to situations in which civilians are under the threat of physical violence.

⁶ As this publication was drafted and published, UN DPKO also developed a “Strategic Framework,” which provides guidance on the development and implementation of an operational-level mission-wide strategy on the protection of civilians for UN peacekeeping missions. This publication focuses more specifically on planning for the military component, which should be nested in mission-wide planning and strategy.

⁷ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) para. 40, p. 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 42, p. 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 43, p. 15.

- ▶ Tier 3 focuses on ‘establishing a protective environment’ that enhances the safety and supports the rights of civilians through promoting legal protections, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and supporting national institutions.

These tiers are neither hierarchical nor sequential: all three are to be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated manner to produce synergistic effects that achieve the overarching objective of a durable peace in which civilians are not under threat from physical violence or other human rights abuses. As the *Concept Note* explains:

Although there is no inherent hierarchy between the tiers, the mission must ensure that it has taken all possible measures within its capacity to help the host authorities to protect civilians from physical violence when mandated to do so. Peacekeeping operations are generally the only international entity responsible for playing a direct role in the provision of protection from physical violence; in that regard, they have a unique responsibility among protection actors.¹⁰

3.2 The Fundamental Principles of Peacekeeping

The cardinal lesson of Srebrenica is that a deliberate and systematic attempt to terrorize, expel or murder an entire people must be met decisively with all necessary means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion. In the Balkans, in this decade, this lesson has had to be learned not once, but twice. In both instances, in Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community tried to reach a negotiated settlement with an unscrupulous and murderous regime. In both instances it required the use of force to bring a halt to the planned and systematic killing and expulsion of civilians.

- Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica (15 November 1999)

Both the *Capstone Doctrine* and the *Concept Note* emphasize that actions by the military component – including the use of lethal force – to protect civilians must be in accordance with the three foundational principles¹¹ of United Nations peacekeeping:

- ▶ Consent;
- ▶ Impartiality; and,
- ▶ Use of force only in self-defense and defense of mandate.

These concepts were originally developed in association with traditional peacekeeping, and their interpretation and application continue to evolve in policy and practice.¹² Despite the evolving nature of the principles, they remain central to the practice of peacekeeping, and in particular to the role of the military component.

10 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, *Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept Note on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2010) para. 15, pp. 2-3.

11 These are the three foundational principles as defined in the *Capstone Doctrine*, see United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) Section 3.1, p. 31.

12 A full exploration of these concepts and their evolution is beyond the scope of this document.

3.2.1 Consent: UN peacekeeping operations deploy with the strategic consent of the Host Nation and, where relevant, the main parties to the conflict. The strategic consent of the Host Nation is paramount: its withdrawal generally ends the mission. The impact of the loss of consent of other parties, however, varies according to their political standing in the eyes of the international community, and more specifically the Security Council.¹³ In cases where missions are deployed to assist fragile states in extending their authority over their territory only the consent of the Host Nation may be required, as in the cases of UNAMSIL in relation to the Revolutionary United Front; MINUSTAH in relation to Haitian gangs; or MONUC (now MONUSCO) in relation to armed groups in Ituri and the Kivu.

Below the strategic or formal level, UN policy and practice recognizes that consent at the operational and tactical levels may be highly fluid:

The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.¹⁴

The Host Nation government and/or main parties to the conflict are rarely if ever monolithic – their various components may have differing agendas and interests that will dictate their behavior. As a result, formal consent may not translate into de facto consent on the ground. The degree of consent should be conceptualized as existing along a spectrum, not as either present or absent. Rather than a fixed politico-legal precondition, consent is a critical feature of the operational environment that UN peacekeeping operations should manage at the tactical, operational and strategic level in consultation and with the support of the Security Council.¹⁵

3.2.2 Impartiality: UN peacekeeping operations are expected to implement their mandates impartially, without favor or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is distinct from neutrality. Neutrality implies avoiding actions that could affect the local balance of power, for instance by taking action against one party but not another. Impartiality refers to taking action where necessary to uphold the mandate in an evenhanded manner, akin to a referee.


13 Alison Giffen, *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians*, (Stimson Center: Washington DC, Spring 2010) pp. 32-33.

14 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) para. 66, p. 22.

15 Giffen, *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians*, (2010) pp. 31-33.

Figure 1: This figure depicts authority, command and control from civilian and military components of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations per the Capstone Doctrine.¹⁶

The Capstone Doctrine explains that authority and command and control in a UN peacekeeping mission differs from other military operations and depicts the tactical, operational and strategic level as below.



16 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) Figure 5, p. 67.

Figure 2: This figure depicts the levels of war and the relationship between strategy, operations and actions at the strategic, operational and tactical level for military forces. This guidance document employs these concepts of the strategic, operational and tactical levels throughout.¹⁷



¹⁷ Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), FM 3-0: Operations (2008) p. 6-2.

The Brahimi Report stressed that:

Impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement. In some cases, local parties consist of not moral equals but obvious aggressors and victims, and peacekeepers may not only be operationally justified in using force but morally compelled to do so.¹⁸

The *Capstone Doctrine* reiterated this principle, stating that, “The need for even-handedness towards the parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behavior that clearly works against the peace process.”¹⁹

3.2.3 Use of Force: UN peacekeeping operations are directed to use force only in self-defense and defense of mandate. They are expected to do so only as a last resort when other measures of persuasion have been exhausted, and only in accordance with “the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and mandate.”²⁰ The *Capstone Doctrine* permits the use of force at the tactical level, prohibits it at the strategic or international level, and is silent with regard to the operational level.²¹

The *Capstone Doctrine* also recognizes a distinct category of operations authorized by the Security Council to “use all necessary means” to, as directed by the mandate:

- ▶ Prevent the disruption of the political process;
- ▶ Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack; and,
- ▶ Assist national authorities in maintaining law and order.

To date, all UN peacekeeping operations mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack have been authorized to use force to achieve this objective.

3.2.4 Interpreting and Applying the Principles of Peacekeeping in POC Missions: Tensions between these three principles are evident in the *Capstone Doctrine*, and are even more acute in practice. Contradictions between formal consent and the conduct of the Host Nation, other armed actors, or their proxies are often extreme and difficult to manage. For some operations, the consent of some armed actors is not sought, and the UN Security Council directs PKOs to support national governments in the extension of their authority over their territory, entailing the cooptation or defeat of other armed actors. Such a decision may be perceived by stakeholders on the ground as a contravention of the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force (e.g. MONUC/MONUSCO; MINUSTAH). Moreover, mandates often set out multiple objectives and instructions that contradict each other, creating fundamental tensions that must be resolved or managed by planners and operational leaders in the field.

18 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (*Brahimi Report*), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 50.

19 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008) section 3.1, p. 33.

20 Ibid, section 3.1, p. 35.

21 See Figure 1 for a description of the tactical, operational and strategic level of authority and command and control.

With specific reference to the protection of civilians, tensions may arise with reference to:

1. Consent of the host nation and armed actors;
2. Support of the host nation; and,
3. Other operational objectives.²²

In each case, the imperative to protect civilians in the immediate and short-term must be balanced against the other imperatives. The risks of forceful action to protect civilians must be carefully weighed against the alternative courses of action (COAs) in terms of both immediate and long-term consequences for the civilian population, the stabilization process, and the UN PKO itself. These trade-offs will be explored in Chapter 7, *Designing Peacekeeping Operations to Protect Civilians*.²³

²² For additional detail on managing tensions and trade-offs, please see Giffen, *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians* (2010), pp 25-30.

²³ Chapter 7 details analyzing an armed actor, choosing courses of action and managing consent while protecting civilians.

Tensions

Maintaining Consent: UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians will have to balance the imperative to protect civilians in the immediate or short-term with the requirement to maintain consent to achieve longer-term objectives. Actions taken to protect civilians – particularly those involving the use of force – may risk causing the erosion or complete withdrawal of consent by an armed actor. The consequences for consent will vary depending on the armed actor’s identity and relationship to the main parties to the conflict, and especially the host nation. Action against a group unaffiliated or only loosely affiliated with the main armed actors, or a low-level commander whose attacks on civilians are not supported by his or her chain of command may entail few consequences with regard to strategic consent. If attacks on civilians are endorsed by the commander’s superiors, the risk to consent may be more significant. Where attacks are perpetrated by host nation security forces acting on direction from their chain of command, the risks to strategic consent posed by direct confrontation may be considerable.

Supporting the Host Nation: When mandated to support the host nation as well as protect civilians, UN PKOs may be tasked with working with host nation officials or security forces complicit in current or past violence against civilians. Moreover, if the UN PKO is mandated to support host nation security forces undertaking military operations to defeat other armed actors and/or extend state authority, the operation may undermine the principles of impartiality and consent in the eyes of other armed actors. When attempting to reconcile such mandates, missions may seek to influence host nation security forces through high-level demarches, liaison and embedding, joint planning, vetting of host-nation partners, and in some cases making direct support for operations conditional on respect for human rights in the field. The results of such efforts have been mixed at best, and working with abusive host nation security forces remains a challenge for UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians.

Other Operational Objectives: More generally, UN PKOs must reconcile multiple strategic and/or operational objectives in planning and executing operations. UN missions are generally established to help foster political transitions, either in the context of a peace agreement or a stabilization process. Such transitions involve multidimensional peace-building, including political, economic, humanitarian, and legal aspects that help create a durable peace and sustainable security following the withdrawal of the UN PKO. Tensions can emerge between the task of protecting civilians on the one hand, and the objectives associated with other dimensions of the stabilization process on the other. For example, these tensions may arise in the prioritization and distribution of scarce resources. Although protecting civilians and other tasks to stabilize a state may be necessary to build lasting peace and security in the long run, they may clash in the short term.

4. The Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Deterrence, Compellence and the DPKO-DFS Operational Concept on Protection

4.1 Deterrence and the Operational Concept on Protection: Assurance, Prevention and Pre-Emption

Deterrence is based on a threat to punish an actor if it behaves in certain ways – “to stop open aggression before it starts”.²⁴ For deterrence to work, the commitment to follow through on the threat must be credible in the eyes of the targeted actor, and the threatened costs must exceed the target’s expected payoffs.

UN PKOs have long claimed a reliance on both direct and indirect ‘deterrence’. Direct deterrence implies that a UN PKO will follow through with a threat at the operational and tactical level. In comparison to other military operations, UN peacekeeping operations are often constrained by political guidance or limited capacity from using force to directly punish actors that challenge an operation on the ground. As such, UN PKOs also depend on indirect deterrence to bolster compliance. Indirect deterrence may come in the form of sanctions or criminal prosecution if peacekeepers are attacked. The degree to which an actor is susceptible to indirect deterrent threats will vary, however, and must be evaluated carefully on a case-by-case basis rather than adopted as a baseline assumption.

The concepts of direct and indirect deterrence are discussed in the DPKO-DFS Operational Concept of Protection of Civilians’ Second Tier, “Providing protection from physical violence,” which describes a four-phased approach to protecting civilians from physical violence, although it emphasizes that these phases are not sequential. Direct and indirect deterrence would fall under Phase I Assurance and Prevention and Phase II Pre-Emption.²⁵

When direct or indirect deterrence fails to dissuade the target, three outcomes are possible:

1. The threat is carried out to induce the target to cease the undesired behavior;
2. The threat is not carried out, and is revealed as a bluff, allowing the target to continue the undesired behavior; or,
3. If carrying out the threat is insufficient to end the undesired behavior, deterrence may be replaced with compellence – operations to persuade the target to comply.

²⁴ John Foster Dulles, “A Policy of Boldness”, *Life*, 19 May 1952.

²⁵ Note that the concept of deterrence discussed in the *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians* differs from the definitions used in military doctrine and strategic studies.

Excerpt from the *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*¹

19. **The second tier** involves protecting civilians from physical violence, which includes any of the mission's efforts to prevent, deter, and if necessary, respond to situations in which civilians are under the threat of physical violence. In most cases, an increase in military and police activities in this tier should be matched by heightened political engagement. In Tier 2, tasks include patrolling, ensuring freedom of movement and route security for both humanitarian aid and refugees/IDPs, evacuation of non-combatants, public order management, conflict mediation and support to inter-community dialogue, monitoring (including of the human rights situation) and early warning measures, and political engagement, among many others. This tier requires close coordination between – and concerted action from – the civilian and uniformed components of the mission. It is important to note that these phases do not necessarily occur in sequential order, as a mission may have to respond to rapidly unfolding circumstances.

Phase 1 – Assurance and Prevention: The measures in this phase are aimed at reassuring the local population of the mission's intent to protect them, largely through routine, passive measures. They may also include assessing the intent of and signaling to potential aggressors or perpetrators of human rights violations that they will be held accountable. Standing police and military patrols, deployment of human rights and other civilian staff, conflict prevention, mediation, active liaison and advocacy with government and non-government armed actors and potential parties to a conflict, as well as monitoring and early warning measures are fundamental elements of this phase.

Phase 2 – Pre-emption: Where measures under Phase 1 prove insufficient, or when heightened risks are detected, more active pre-emptive measures may be required. Increased liaison with government and non-government armed actors, and potential parties to a conflict, enhanced human rights monitoring, reporting, and advocacy, as well as heightened political pressure are engaged during this phase in order to deter violence against civilians. The increased involvement of other civilian elements of the mission, including civil affairs and public information, among others, should be considered. With regard to the military and police component, the deployment of forces and an increase in proactive, high-visibility patrolling could be employed.

Phase 3 – Response: When the threat of physical violence to civilians is apparent, and if actions under Phases 1 and 2 are not sufficient, more active measures aimed at deterring potential aggressors from conducting hostile acts may be necessary. Deployment of police and/or direct military action should be considered as an option, such as the interposition of peacekeepers between a vulnerable population and hostile elements or the use of force as a last resort when the population is under imminent threat of physical violence. Heightened political engagement, including at the international and regional level, must be employed here.

Phase 4 – Consolidation: This range of activities addresses the stabilization of a post-crisis situation. The aim is to assist the local population and host authorities to return to a state of normalcy, and create the conditions in which a return to crisis is diminished. Liaison with the parties to the conflict, and dialogue with the conflict affected members of the community and investigation into human rights violations committed during the crisis are essential elements of this phase. Re-establishing ties between the population and governance structures, including the police, where they have been broken, will be central.

¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2010) p. 8.

4.2 Compellence and the Operational Concept on Protection: Response

Compellence differs from deterrence in two ways:

1. It presumes the undesired behavior is already underway; and,
2. It involves the infliction of costs on the relevant actor, including potentially through the use of force, until the undesired behavior ends.²⁶

Compellence is captured in Phase III ‘Response,’ of the Second Tier of the *DPKO-DFS Operational Concept of Protection of Civilians*.²⁷

Both deterrence and compellence seek to alter the incentive structure for the target, but one is preventive while the other is remedial. Compellence also differs in iteration or timescale: restoring deterrence might involve a single punitive strike against the target to convince him or her to desist. Compellence assumes that a prolonged campaign will be required to convince the armed actor to alter its behavior through cumulative effects, and the promise of further punishment if it persists.

Neither deterrence nor compellence will be effective in all situations. The threat or infliction of damage on an adversary will only induce the desired change in behavior if the demands and the interests of the UN PKO and the armed actor are not diametrically opposed. For example, if the core interests of an armed actor involve criminal attacks, forced recruitment, or mass killing against civilians, attempts to deter or compel a halt to that behavior are unlikely to succeed. Where the behavior targeted for change is intrinsic to the goals or the existence of armed actors, strategies designed to pressure them to adopt alternate means of pursuing their goals will likely prove ineffective. In such cases, the only viable option may involve using force to neutralize armed actors – that is “[t]o diminish the effectiveness of the [armed actor], to the extent that [it] is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill [its] intention.”²⁸

Therefore to properly implement deterrence, UN PKOs in the contemporary operational environment must be willing and able to launch punitive strikes. In traditional UN PKOs, where the mission could deploy along clear lines of separation, an adversary would have to attack and defeat the mission in order to reach its intended target. Through their pattern of deployment and exercise of the right of self-defense, UN PKOs could deter the resumption of hostilities by becoming a ‘speed-bump’ of sorts: one that could be overcome, but hopefully at such cost that it deterred all but the most determined and deliberate return to outright war.²⁹

26 The term ‘compellence’ is not commonly used in the UN lexicon, but is integral to international relations theory and military strategy. For further information on the concept of compellence, please see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University: New Haven, 2008 [1966]).

27 See Text Box: Excerpt from the *DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* on page 28 for the full description of this phase.

28 This quote is the definition of defeat in UK military doctrine: “To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill his intention.” Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions* (June 2006) p. D-4. See Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (2008) p. 4; and Kelly, *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations* (2010) pp. 19-20 for more on this point.

29 Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (2008) pp. 50-51. Schelling refers to this alternately as ‘deterrent defense’ (as opposed to forcible defense, which may actually succeed in blocking an offensive operation through force of arms) or ‘dynamic deterrence’ (in which the threat is communicated through progressive fulfillment).

In most intra-state conflicts such clear lines don't exist, and the UN PKOs themselves may be circumvented in order to attack widely dispersed civilians. ***Thus deterrence through presence alone will likely be inadequate to protect civilians and in some cases could exacerbate the risks for UN personnel and civilians alike.***³⁰ UN PKOs must be willing and able to carry out threats in order for their presence to have a deterrent effect. Doing so will often require a combination of forceful defense of their positions and punitive strikes involving limited offensive operations.

Moreover UN PKOs must be prepared to switch to compellence if deterrence cannot be reestablished in the short term. Finally, UN PKOs must be prepared to counter attempts by an adversary to engage in escalatory retaliation. Escalatory retaliation is an attempt to deter the UN PKO from further action, often through retaliation against either civilians or troops from UN PKO contingents that are particularly casualty-sensitive. Dominating escalation poses a particular challenge for UN PKOs given the presumed and widely publicized political limitations on their use of force. The fundamental dilemma of peacekeeping operations has been described as:

How to use their military presence and strength as a deterrent without having to prove their willingness to use force by actually using it. That displays of military might or token shows of force are of little use when there is no willingness to actually use force in any significant way was demonstrated repeatedly in the Congo and replicated in Somalia and Bosnia.³¹

UNPROFOR and Failed Deterrence

The fall of the UN-designated safe areas in Bosnia represents a clear example of failed deterrence with regard to protecting civilians. Persistent attacks against the safe areas and the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 demonstrated that UNPROFOR's extremely limited responses and reluctance to impose costs on the armed actors were insufficient to deter. In August 1995, a mortar attack on Sarajevo killed 43 people and triggered a shift to compellence. UNPROFOR's Rapid Reaction Force broke the siege of Sarajevo, and NATO launched a campaign of air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets to force them to the negotiation table. As one senior civilian UNPROFOR official said later that year, "We thought deterrence could be based on the moral authority of the United Nations, but we learned that the moral authority is not enough. When the Serbs realized there was a 155-millimetre cannon on top of Mount Igman, they understood the language." UNPROFOR came to realize that, having lost credibility with regard to deterrence, compellence became its only viable option to exert leverage over determined spoilers using attacks against civilians to achieve their objectives.

³⁰ Civilians who might have otherwise fled an area may remain there if they believe UN military presence will afford protection. Alternatively, civilians may flee towards UN military presence expecting protection. If UN military personnel are unwilling or unable to carry out threats required to deter attacks against civilians, those who relied on the UN for protection could be at greater risk than if they had fled elsewhere. Civilians may also be put at greater risk when an armed actor targets peacekeepers to reduce their presence, or targets civilians in order to de-legitimize the peacekeeping operation.

³¹ Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) p. 67.

Effectively applying the concepts of deterrence, compellence, and escalation domination all clearly may require the use of considerable levels of force. Historically, missions in a wide variety of theaters and eras have justified such action under the rubrics of self-defense, ensuring freedom of movement, defense of mandate, and the protection of civilians.

Recent Examples of Deterrence and Compellence in Peacekeeping

Failed Deterrence: In late May, 2004, fighting broke out between government troops and forces loyal to a rebel commander named Laurent Nkunda and his allies in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Government forces collapsed in the face of Nkunda's advance on the provincial capital, Bukavu. MONUC forces temporarily halted Nkunda's offensive by issuing a threat, warning that if he continued towards Bukavu's airport, MONUC would use its attack helicopters to enforce its Chapter VII mandate to stop him. A subordinate UN commander disobeyed direct orders to defend the airport, instead relinquishing control to Nkunda without a fight. Subsequently, as Nkunda advanced on the city proper, MONUC's political leadership overruled its military leaders – including the commander on the scene in Bukavu – and ordered the UN forces to stand down. The decision was motivated by fears that confronting Nkunda's forces could lead to a breakdown in the political peace process because of his links with other actors. Nkunda's forces looted Bukavu and killed more than 100 civilians, and the fighting displaced roughly 25,000. The failure of MONUC to defend the city sparked demonstrations across the DRC, and had lasting consequences for the mission's legitimacy among the Congolese and its ability to shape the stabilization process.

Successful Deterrence: In November 2006, Nkunda's forces attacked and seized the town of Sake, less than 30km from the capital of North Kivu province, Goma. Ignoring warnings from MONUC, Nkunda then advanced on Goma. MONUC established defensive positions with mechanized infantry supported by attack helicopters, and after the rebel forces failed to heed warning shots, the mission opened fire. Nkunda's offensive was repelled, and as his forces retreated, MONUC advanced to retake Sake and push the rebel forces back to their original positions. Although sporadic fighting continued for several weeks, causing significant insecurity for the civilian population in North Kivu, the more severe protection and political crisis that could have resulted from the fall of Goma was averted by MONUC's willingness to follow through on its threat against Nkunda.

Successful Compellence: In the fall of 2004, MONUC launched a campaign against a number of militias in the Ituri region of the DRC that were responsible for ongoing attacks on civilians. Sometimes operating independently, sometimes jointly with Congolese government forces, the mission used offensive operations to apply steadily building pressure on the militias to negotiate a political settlement with the government and join the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program. By August 2005, the Secretary-General reported that over 15,000 combatants had entered the DDR program, leading to the effective demise of two major militia groups. While threats persisted from other groups, calibrated military pressure successfully compelled militia members to lay down their arms, and leaders to engage in political negotiations with the Congolese government.

Indirect Deterrence: In January 2009, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels held the South Darfur town of Muhajiriya, where 196 UNAMID peacekeepers were also stationed. In preparation for a major offensive, on 1 February the Sudanese government asked the UN to withdraw all the peacekeepers stationed in the town. Upholding their mandate, UNAMID chose to ignore Sudan's request for withdrawal and decided instead to remain in the town to protect the 30,000 residents and IDPs. Following limited bombing by Sudanese government forces, the JEM rebels withdrew from the town and the government took control. UNAMID's refusal to withdraw from the town as the Sudanese government requested likely prevented a far larger assault on the town that could have cost more civilian lives. The mission did so not by presenting a credible threat of military retaliation, but rather by accurately assessing that the Sudanese government would be unwilling to bear the international political costs that would be associated with a direct attack on UN peacekeepers by its uniformed forces. In this case, the mission's willingness to contravene the host nation's wishes was key to fulfilling its POC mandate.

When Deterrence Fails

UN PKOs are never deployed with the *prima facie* intent of employing force to defeat a particular armed actor. However, some missions have found it necessary to “diminish the effectiveness of [an armed actor], to the extent that [armed actor] is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill [its] intention.”¹ These include cases where the goals of armed actors prove fundamentally incompatible with the mission’s strategic or operational objectives. Two such examples are detailed below – one historic, one contemporary.

ONUC: When initially deployed in 1960, United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) operated under relatively restrictive guidance that limited its use of force to self-defense. The mission stretched the concept by adopting a strategy of interposition at both the operational and tactical levels: if peacekeepers put themselves in the way of an attack and the attack continued, they could respond with force. ONUC was authorized to use force to protect civilians,² but was still restricted to doing so through the interpositional approach.

This posture changed radically in December 1961. Subjected to intense harassment by the forces of the secessionist government in Katanga province, ONUC launched an offensive operation to establish air superiority and capture key towns and cities. Justifying the operation on the basis of self-defense and restoring freedom of movement, the Force Commander ordered the regional UN commander in Katanga to “use all the troops at your disposal to restore law and order. To achieve this you are authorized to use all force necessary.”³ As Trevor Findlay notes, “The whole operation was understood to be a *preemptive* attack, justified as an act of self-defense, using whatever means were necessary.”⁴

That operation stopped short of defeating the secessionist forces outright, in the hope that a settlement could be negotiated. By December 1962, negotiations had proven fruitless, and secessionist attacks on ONUC forces had resumed. In response, ONUC launched Operation Grandslam – another joint air-ground offensive that essentially defeated the secessionist forces and led to the collapse of the Katangan secession.

ONUC transitioned from an operation constituted in line with the norms and operational approaches pioneered by the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) into a highly proactive mission operating under UN authority and command and control. It engaged in the full range of defensive, offensive, and what we would now call stability operations (e.g. patrolling to maintain public order; guarding safe areas and IDP camps; enforcing curfews; disarming militias). ONUC initially used offensive operations as part of a campaign of compellence against the Katangan government (Aug – Dec 1961), followed by a campaign to defeat them (Dec 1962 – Jan 1963). At the tactical level, this involved engagements designed to kill or capture Katangese forces, not just harry or disrupt them. Notably ONUC proved willing – even as early as 1960 – to forcibly confront the Congolese government military as well as the Katangan secessionists, although on a more limited scale.

1 Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 *United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions* (June 2006) p. D-4.

2 This authorization was expressed in Operations Directive No. 6 (28 October, 1960). The language used is entirely different from that used by the Security Council to mandate UN PKOs to protect civilians beginning in 1999.

3 Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations* (2002) p. 78.

4 Ibid. p. 78. For more detail on ONUC, please see Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations* (2002) pp. 51-86.

MINUSTAH: Following its initial deployment in June 2004, MINUSTAH was heavily criticized for failing to address the rampant gang violence against civilians in Port-au-Prince. Spurred by that criticism and the need to create stable conditions for upcoming national elections, the mission launched limited operations against the gangs in 2005. While the elections were held in February 2006 in relative calm, the violence resumed and intensified in the months following.

MINUSTAH had felt constrained from taking stronger action against the gangs until it had a clear endorsement from legitimate Haitian authorities. With the election of President René Preval, such authorities were in place, but it took several months of intensifying violence against civilians, failed negotiations, and popular outrage before President Preval authorized MINUSTAH to take decisive action in late 2006.

The mission assessed the gangs as criminal insurgents akin to urban warlords, lacking a political agenda that could be addressed through negotiations but determined to resist the establishment of state authority in areas they controlled. Both the fundamental goal of the gangs and the key to their continued existence was the profit they extracted from the civilian population through brutal violence. Since their goals and existence were fundamentally incompatible with MINUSTAH's mandate to stabilize Haiti and protect civilians, the mission launched joint police and military operations, often in conjunction with the Haitian National Police (HNP) to defeat and dismantle the gangs. These consisted of intelligence-led cordon-and-search operations to capture or kill gang leaders. Such targeted operations were coupled with moves to reassert control of neighborhoods by seizing key territory and establishing a persistent security presence to prevent the gangs' return.

The objective of these operations was to defeat the gangs. Voluntary disarmament was offered as an option throughout 2006. However, further negotiations with gang leaders were ruled out as a viable option to bring stability and security to Port-au-Prince. The continued existence of the gangs was deemed to be incompatible with the strategic objectives of the UN PKO and the Haitian government, and as such, the operations were designed to end the gangs' ability to function as para-military forces.

**Section II:
POC in Operational Design**

5. Interpreting Protection of Civilians Mandates for UN Peacekeeping Operations

[T]he Security Council's original intent in providing explicit mandates to UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians from imminent threat was to prevent paralysis in the face of the threat or commission of atrocities, such as was evident in Rwanda and Srebrenica. In the context of UN missions, the role of the mission as a whole, and the military and police components in particular, must therefore include a means to prevent mass or systematic violence against civilians. As emphasized throughout this report, addressing such threats requires comprehensive, integrated action across the entire mission. The more acute the threat, the larger the potential role for uniformed peacekeepers.

- The Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations (2009)

5.1 Interpreting Mandate Language

As described in the OCHA-DPKO commissioned independent study, the Council has been remarkably consistent in the language used to mandate UN PKOs to protect civilians. Despite the consistency of the language, its interpretation has been the subject of intense debate within the United Nations and among external stakeholders. This lack of clarity has severely undermined the effective implementation of POC mandates. Part of the problem stems from the fact that Security Council mandates are not legal documents, but rather negotiated political texts whose meaning must be interpreted holistically.³²

POC clauses in mandates are generally composed of four standard components, which are reflected in the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) as provided by resolution 1590 (2005):

*Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, (i) Decides that UNMIS is authorized **to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment** of its forces and as it deems **within its capabilities**, [. . .] and, **without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.**³³*

Each component is discussed individually below:

5.1.1 'Take the necessary action' should be understood to authorize the use of force to achieve the designated objectives.³⁴ The exact phraseology varies slightly, sometimes appearing as 'use all necessary means' or 'take all necessary measures'. While regulated more precisely by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component and Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for police components, which can be further restricted at the discretion of the Force Commander or Police Commissioner, respectively, this portion of

³² Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (United Nations: New York, 2009), pp. 43-44.

³³ United Nations Security Resolution 1590 of 24 March 2005, para 16(i). (emphasis added)

³⁴ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations* (2002), p. 8.

mandate language provides prima facie authorization to use force up to and including lethal force to protect civilians.

5.1.2 ‘In the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities’ are caveats intended to acknowledge the inherent limitations of UN PKOs. The Council uses this language to indicate that missions are not responsible for protecting all civilians in the area of responsibility all of the time from all types of threats. It is intended to avoid creating unrealistic expectations about the extent of protection a UN PKO will be able to provide. It is not intended as a constraint on operational planning or the judgments of the Force Commander or subordinate commanders concerning the deployment, redeployment, or maneuvers of the military component of a UN PKO. Commanders may redeploy or maneuver forces and assets to protect civilians where deemed necessary and prudent.

5.1.3 The caveat that missions protect civilians **‘without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government’** conveys that the deployment of a UN PKO with a POC mandate does not vacate the responsibility of host nation government to protect civilians from violence. The deployment of a UN operation mandated to protect civilians in no way reduces the responsibility of Host Nations under national law, international human rights and refugee law, or the laws of armed conflict to both refrain from attacking civilians and to protect them from attack by other parties. Nor does the primary responsibility of the Host Nation for protecting its own citizens limit the responsibility of UN PKOs to take action where the Host Nation is unable or unwilling to do so, or where it is complicit in attacks.

5.1.4 The core of POC mandates is the instruction to **‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’**. This clause, and particularly the term ‘imminent’ is central to the interpretation of POC mandates for UN PKOs. UN operations are not limited to taking forceful action only when specific individual civilians are about to be attacked. Imminent threats to civilians may be persistent and generalized, as in the case of an armed actor that engages in an ongoing pattern of attacks against the populace of all or part of the Area of Operation (AO).

5.2 The Doctrine of Ongoing Imminent Threat

Key concepts in the interpretation of POC mandates for UN PKOs include ‘ongoing imminent threat’ to civilians, and ‘ongoing hostile intent’. First explicitly elaborated by the Eastern Division Headquarters of MONUC in 2005, the approach has also been applied in other UN PKOs, notably MINUSTAH.

Where armed actors have demonstrated a determination to attack civilians as part of their pattern of operations, the threat they represent to the population does not dissipate between specific incidents. Rather, such armed actors continue to represent an imminent threat until they lack either the intent or capacity to inflict violence against the civilian population. When faced with such adversaries, UN PKOs may use force proactively to address such threats, including through offensive operations.³⁵

³⁵ Should UN PKOs undertake offensive operations, they should be trained and equipped to manage the escalation curve (decrease rather than escalate violence) and consent of armed actors. Please see sections 7.2.3 – 7.2.6 for guidance on COA development, evaluation, and selection.

Such operations must be conducted in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE) that are drawn from the UN master list and adapted as necessary for particular missions. In POC mandated missions, these typically authorize the use of force to protect civilians from hostile acts or hostile intent. Hostile intent is defined as:

The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorised. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- a. The capability and preparedness of the threat;
- b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack;
- c. Historical precedent within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR).³⁶

The three factors specified for evaluating hostile intent, particularly historical precedent in the AO, provide a basis for assessing that armed actors possess an ongoing hostile intent against civilians. Where ongoing hostile intent is assessed, UN ROE permit a wide range of defensive, stability and offensive operations, including under some circumstances opening fire without warning. While the degree to which offensive operations are appropriate will vary according to the context, existing UN guidance and recent practice establish broad latitude to develop and employ operational approaches that incorporate the proactive use of force to seize the initiative and protect civilians. It is important to note that while often critical, such operations can only ever constitute one aspect of a comprehensive approach to address threats to civilians.

Ongoing Imminent Threats in the DRC

UN soldiers have been witnesses several times to scenes of the most brutal violence by (foreign) armed groups who have burned women and children alive in their houses and conducted barbaric machete attacks on innocent civilians. The perpetrators fled to the bush after their criminal acts waiting for the next opportunity to do it again. Villagers in the area of Walungu in South Kivu Province, for example, are under continuous threat of imminent hostile attack from vicious militia groups. In specific situations like these, MONUC must immediately respond to find the threat and deal with it, by forcefully disarming and arresting the persons who constitute that threat and, sometimes, the only way to implement disarmament is through the (proactive) use of lethal force.

-Major General Patrick Cammaert, 'Contemporary UN Peacekeeping operations: Challenges and Opportunities', *MONUC Force Review – No. 1* (2007) p. 8.

³⁶ Excerpted from Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the Military Component of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC): Annex B – Definitions (MPS/0651) (10 February 2009).

5.3 Defining the POC Objective

In the first instance, UN Security Council mandates to protect civilians are intended to empower UN forces to prevent widespread or systematic violence against civilians, which encompasses a broad range of patterns of attacks on civilians. The category of “systematic or mass violence” includes everything from rampant gang violence to terrorist or insurgent attacks on civilians, ethnic cleansing by state or non-state actors, and outright mass killing at the far extreme. This broad definition reflects the fact that campaigns of targeted violence may only kill a few civilians in any one incident, but cumulatively exact a large toll and sow widespread terror.

Such violence may include torture, sexual violence, or mutilation, as well as killing. It need not be explicitly politically or ideologically motivated; as has been evident in a number of theaters, often the boundaries between criminal and political violence are unclear, and the motivations mixed and difficult to conclusively determine in the moment. *UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians are expected and authorized to take action regardless of whether the attacks fall into a particular conventionally recognized category, such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.* Beyond responding to threats of widespread or systematic violence, *POC mandates provide a basis for addressing attacks against civilians that threaten to undermine other military and non-military efforts to establish the basis for long-term security and stability.* For example, military operations may be one component of a mission-wide response to address situations where criminal attacks against civilians are undermining economic development, or intimidation is being used to undermine political participation.

It should be noted that the military component of a UN peacekeeping operation may not be able to address every threat to civilians within its area of operation. In some cases, this may be rooted in constraints on an operation’s capacity to protect civilians. In others, it may be judged that the actions necessary to protect civilians would risk the loss of strategic consent, and that the benefits of maintaining that consent outweigh the human and political risks of leaving that violence unchecked. Rapid escalations of violence against civilians may pose particularly acute challenges for UN PKOs. *If it is determined that the risk associated with the military actions required to protect civilians exceeds the operation’s thresholds of capability or consent:*

- *The PKO should ensure timely and accurate reporting on the situation; and,*
- *The Secretariat should assist the Security Council to identify other political, economic and/or military options to address the situation.*

6. Issues in Strategic Planning to Protect Civilians

6.1 Overview of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) ³⁷

In June 2006, the Secretary General endorsed guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach – including civil and military components – to the planning of integrated peace support operations. These guidelines outline three stages: 1) Advance Planning, 2) Operational Planning and 3) Review and Transition Planning. Various levels of planning are nested within these stages, each with detail on the objectives, responsibilities, key outputs, phasing and timeframe for each step of the planning process. The guidelines were updated in 2009 to reflect the evolving nature of the IMPP and to clarify that integration refers to the integration of the civil and military components as well as the strategic partnership between the UN field mission and the UN Country Team (UNCT). The guidelines stress that they provide a minimum floor for planning, should be implemented in a flexible manner, and that form should follow function.

Within the IMPP, planning for the military component of a UN peace support operation involves a combination of joint planning with civilian components, and distinct processes to address military planning issues. The September 2001 Planning Process for Military Operations describes the planning process employed by the military component including the conceptual approach to planning, the planning process, and formats for documents that will be generated during the planning process.

This document does not provide a detailed outline of the IMPP or the Planning Process for Military Operations. It focuses on elements within the military planning process for UN PKOs in which POC should be considered to ensure the effective implementation of mandates to protect civilians.

As stated in the Introduction, while framed in terms of the initial planning process that takes place at headquarters for the deployment of a UN PKO, military planning is an iterative process that continues in the field. The concepts, analytical frameworks, and processes outlined below can be usefully applied by PKOs in the field at force, division and brigade headquarters.

³⁷ This summary draws on UN planning guidance including: *IMPP Guidelines: The Role of the Headquarters: Integrated Planning for UN Field Presences* (DPKO, May 2009); *Planning Process for Military Operations* (DPKO, September 2001); and *UN: Guidelines for Strategic Assessment* (DPA, May 2009).

Overview of the IMPP and Focus Areas in the Military Planning Process for POC

Note: The military planning process occurs in parallel to the IMPP and inputs are provided at every step. This textbox highlights some of the focus areas of the military planning process as they relate to the IMPP.

The Integrated Task Force (ITF)/ Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF): The ITF/IMTF is established as the formal headquarters-based planning body responsible for implementing the IMPP for a specific country and is composed of representatives of DPKO, DFS, DPA, PBSO, OHCHR, OCHA, DOCO, DSS as well as UNDG and ECHA. Mission and UNCT leadership should be included in ITF/IMTF meetings and non-UN system organizations may be invited to the meetings on an ad hoc basis. The ITF/IMTF is chaired by the lead UN department (DPA or DPKO) for the country in question.

Strategic Assessment: Planning for UN PKOs begins with a Strategic Assessment, produced by the ITF/IMTF and triggered by the need to formulate or reformulate the UN's engagement strategy in a political crisis, conflict, or post-conflict situation. Designed to address situations where the UN system lacks a common assessment of the problem or understanding of the UN's strategic objectives, it provides "a mechanism for joint analysis and strategic discussions that cut across the political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights aspects of the UN's work." The outcome of the Strategic Assessment is a report detailing 1-3 strategic options for UN engagement, which may include the deployment of a multidimensional UN PKO.

Military Input: The Military Planning Service contributes analysis to the Strategic Assessment. That contribution is subsumed by the overarching political analysis of conflicts which to date does not consider civilian insecurity as a potential driver of conflict. The Strategic Assessments must evaluate the potential for deliberate violence against civilians by all current and potential armed actors either stemming from existing conflict dynamics, or in response to intensified UN or other international engagement.

SG's Planning Directive: If the Strategic Assessment recommends the deployment of a UN PKO and that recommendation is endorsed by the Secretary-General, the SG issues a Planning Directive stating the broad strategic objectives and the proposed form and scope of the UN PKO. According to the 2009 IMPP Guidelines, only one SG directive has been issued since 2006. As such, this step is not emphasized in the 2009 IMPP guidelines or this suggested guidance. **USG's (Operational) Planning Directive:** The Under Secretary-General issues an operational planning directive including a situation analysis, planning assumptions, strategic objectives, priorities, benchmarks, risk assessment/constraints, functions and responsibilities of the IMTF, timing and sequencing of planning activities and outputs, and required decision points.

Development of Draft Mission Concept/Plan: The Lead department of the IMTF develops a draft mission concept or plan which serves as the initial phase for detailed planning among the various components. During this step, the various components, political, military, and police each develop their own detailed planning that describes how they will contribute to the achievement of the UN PKO's objectives as set out in the planning directives described above.

Operational Estimate: The Operational Estimate is an approach to military planning that, while drawn from UK and NATO doctrine, is based on concepts that are common to most military doctrine. It is a six-part process designed to analyze the nature of conflict/problem as a system, and develop, evaluate and select possible approaches/solutions (Courses of Action or COAs) to generate the desired change or outcome. The Operational Estimate “is essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.” In the context of planning for UN military operations, the Military Planning Service (MPS) is responsible for developing the Operational Estimate and the subsequent steps described below, working in conjunction with and eventually handing over to the Force Generation Service (FGS) to secure the participation of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs).

Military CONOPS Development: Having selected one COA from the options developed through the Operational Estimate, additional planning is undertaken to develop the approved COA into a full Concept of Operations (CONOPS).‡ The preliminary CONOPS developed at this stage describes with greater specificity exactly what the force will do, where the force will do it and how the force will do it. This includes undertaking the troop-to-task process to develop an estimate of the required force size and capabilities.

‡ “The CONOPS is a graphic statement in broad outline of the assumptions and intent in regard to the operation or series of operations required to complete the mission. The CONOPS is designed to give an overall picture of the operation; its primary purpose is to add clarity and to provide sufficient details for subordinate commanders and staff officers to undertake the detailed planning required to achieve their tasks.” Planning Process for Military Operations (DPKO, September 2001) p. 5.

Technical Assessment Mission: Once a CONOPS for the military component and its equivalent for other components have been developed, ITFs/IMTF field Technical Assessment Missions (TAMs). TAMs visit the area of operations (AO) to validate existing planning and gather additional information required to produce foundational planning documents. TAMs can take place at mission start-up, during mandate reviews, when mission restructuring or draw-down is under consideration, or in response to crises or specific requests by the Security Council. They provide critical opportunities to consult directly with key stakeholders, obtain crucial and up-to-date information, and work towards a harmonized approach with the UNCT and relevant non-UN actors.

Secretary-General’s Report to the UNSC: Once the TAM has returned from the field, the lead department drafts the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, incorporating the TAM’s findings into existing planning. The SG’s report identifies strategic priorities for UN engagement and proposes a mandate for the UN PKO; describes functional strategies for each component of the operation and how they will contribute to the overall strategy; proposes mechanisms to coordinate the efforts of the UN PKO, the UNCT, and any other relevant actors; and discusses logistical, budgetary and personnel requirements.

UNSC Mandate: The Security Council debates the Secretary-General’s proposal for the UN PKO contained in his report, and then drafts a mandate for the mission. ITFs/IMTFs sometimes engage and support Security Council members in their efforts to draft resolutions in keeping with the proposal, including by providing advice on draft resolutions.

Refinement of Mission Concept/Plan: Where Security Council resolutions modify the parameters and strategies envisaged by the Secretary-General, draft plans will have to be revised accordingly.


Refinement of Military CONOPs: Additional detail is fleshed out regarding the formed units to be deployed, and their strength, tasks, equipment, capabilities, deployment and organization.

Production of Mission Documents: Following the refinement of the Mission Concept/Plan, the IMTF creates mission documents, including a directive to the SRSG that provides political and procedural guidance, outlines the roles and responsibilities of mission leadership and provides other detail on expectations of how the mission should coordinate to reach objectives.

Production of Mission Documents & Formal Start of Force Generation: The finalized CONOPS provides a basis for the preparation of the Rules of Engagement and the Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries. These include background on the conflict and mission area; the mandate as provided by the Security Council; the CONOPS; the mission structure; and details on logistical and personnel issues. Although informal consultations with potential Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) begin in the strategic planning phases, it is at this point that the Force Generation Service (FGS) sets about securing formal commitments of forces from UN Member States for the UN PKO.

OVERVIEW OF THE IMPP & THE MILITARY PLANNING PROCESS: FOCUS AREAS FOR POC

Note: This diagram depicts the UN headquarters planning process for PKOs as described in existing guidance. In practice, the process may vary. PoC should be taken into consideration at every step of the IMPP and Military Planning Process. Moreover, military inputs are included in every step of the IMPP planning process. However, this diagram seeks to highlight focus areas (indicated in red boxes) addressed in this guidance, with particular emphasis on military operational-level



6.2 Addressing POC in Advance Planning

6.2.1 Addressing POC in the Strategic Assessment. Although this Proposed Guidance focuses primarily on operational planning, it is critical that the patterns and politics of violence against civilians are taken into account during the Strategic Assessment. The purpose of the Strategic Assessment is to provide “a mechanism for joint analysis and strategic discussions that cut across the political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights aspects of the UN’s work.” It is considered an assessment rather than a planning tool, and is composed of four components:

1. Articulation of the aim of the Strategic Assessment in the context of the country;
2. *A conflict analysis* centered around the aim of the Strategic Assessment, including key conflict factors, their dynamics and risks including, as appropriate, the development of scenarios;
3. *The analysis of priority objectives* for peace consolidation; and,
4. *The articulation of UN strategic options* to address the situation in the country (including, where appropriate, proposals for reconfiguration). A SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis is recommended to help translate priority objectives into a coherent UN strategy.

The current methodology for conflict analysis outlined in the UN *Guidelines: Strategic Assessment* uses a framework grounded in developmental and humanitarian approaches, as do most of the supplemental methodologies listed in the annex.³⁸ Accordingly, they focus more on analyzing structural drivers and features of the conflict than the armed actors, and generally do not capture the full range of information required to assess options and risks for military actors, including the military component of peacekeeping operations.³⁹

Key Questions for POC in UN Strategic Assessments

- ▶ Is there a history in the region or the specific conflict of resorting to mass or systematic violence against civilians?
- ▶ Does the conflict display features and dynamics in common with other cases in which civilians have been deliberately targeted by armed actors?
- ▶ What are the background, personality, interests, and record of leadership figures within the armed actor?
- ▶ Have specific armed actors employed violence against civilians in the past, or are they likely to do so in the future, particularly in response to pressure by the UN or other actors?

³⁸ One partial exception to this is *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development*, published in 2005 by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050200_cru_paper_stability.pdf (accessed April 2010).

³⁹ The analytical framework and list of factors to be considered for the Strategic Estimate outlined by the 2001 *Planning Process for Military Operations* is more comprehensive in this regard, but recent research suggests that it is not fully utilized, and that the armed actors and the dynamics of violence are not systematically analyzed.

While the Military Planning Service contributes its own analysis to the Strategic Assessment, that contribution is subsumed by the overarching political analysis of conflicts which to date does not consider civilian insecurity as a potential driver of conflict.

Broadly speaking, *security must be regarded as a necessary means to achieving a durable peace, not just the end result of political, developmental, and humanitarian action.* In considering potential UN engagement, the nature and scale of the requirement for outside actors to provide that enabling condition should be assessed.

Specifically, *Strategic Assessments must evaluate the potential for deliberate violence against civilians by all current and potential armed actors either stemming from existing conflict dynamics, or in response to intensified UN or other international engagement.*

The conflict analysis should consider the potential for both:

- a. Systematic violence, in which violence is perpetrated against individuals or small groups of civilians over a prolonged period; and,
- b. Mass atrocities, in which large numbers of civilians are attacked over a short time period.

Where the risk of either type of violence is assessed as significant, planners must carefully evaluate whether it is appropriate to deploy a UN peacekeeping force at all, and if so whether it should be deployed on its own or in combination with other forces (e.g. French forces of Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire). This will involve integrating military considerations relating to the protection of civilians into the SWOT analysis. Specifically, SWOT analysis should consider whether the military component of a UN PKO, in light of their inherent constraints, will be able to effectively address threats against civilians where doing so is required to create space for other peacebuilding processes to take hold.

6.2.2 Addressing POC in the SG's Strategic Planning Directive. Where the Strategic Assessment concludes that the deployment of a UN PKO is a viable option and further planning should take place, the Integrated Mission Task Force issues a Strategic Planning Directive. Its role is to identify the strategic objectives and key assumptions that shape all subsequent planning for a potential UN peacekeeping operation. The Strategic Planning Directive must take account of violent threats against civilians in the proposed Area of Operations (AO), and describe how the security of civilians relates to broader political and conflict dynamics.

6.2.3 Addressing POC in the USG's Planning Directive. Based on the Strategic Planning Directive, an Under Secretary-General's (USG's) Planning Directive is produced. This Planning Directive is an important link to operational-level planning. It begins breaking down the specified mission-wide strategic objectives into mission-wide operational objectives. It also specifies the narrowed range of possible scenarios that should be considered for subsequent planning, and the assumptions associated with those scenarios.

The Issue of Planning Assumptions

The deployment of UN PKOs is contingent upon the establishment of a viable peace agreement or political process. In reality UN PKOs are often deployed when such agreements are tenuous at best, with little traction at the operational and tactical levels. Under such circumstances, planning assumptions regarding the intensity of the conflict and the posture of armed actors towards the political agreement and the UN PKO itself should be extremely conservative. Planners should presume that UN PKOs will require the knowledge, capability and will to transform minimal strategic consent into meaningful conformance with political agreements or participation in political processes. Acknowledging that there are prerequisites for the deployment of UN PKOs and inherent limits on their capabilities, planning should nonetheless account for conditions that may approach those limits and contingencies that may exceed them.

With respect to POC, planners should not presume that armed actors that have employed violence against civilians to pursue their goals in the past will be able or willing to comply with political commitments to end such attacks. Armed actors may use violence against portions of the civilian populace to challenge, reshape or undermine the political process once a UN PKO is deployed. Different factions or proxies associated with the armed actors may not be effectively constrained from attacks on civilians by the formal consent of their central leadership. Such violence may also be associated with dissent within armed actors that can lead to splintering and the proliferation of distinct actors. Planning assumptions should not exclude the consideration of these scenarios, their implications for operational planning and resource requirements, and the development of contingency plans to address such crises.

Planning Assumptions in Darfur

In 2006, the UN began planning for the deployment of a UN PKO to Darfur to take over from AMIS. The strategic objectives were identified as contributing to an environment conducive to lasting peace and stability in Sudan, and the protection of civilians. Building on these strategic objectives, the USG's Planning Directive contemplated three possible scenarios in which they would have to be achieved. Scenario One presumed an effective peace agreement with substantial compliance by the armed actors. Scenario Two involved a ceasefire agreement with poor compliance and instability. Scenario Three envisioned a failure to reach an agreement and a continued deterioration of conditions.

Because the deployment of UN PKOs is doctrinally contingent on the existence of a peace agreement or ceasefire, planning proceeded only against Scenarios One and Two, employing the relevant associated assumptions. These assumptions were never revisited, and by the time UNAMID began deploying a year later, the peace agreement on which it was predicated was dead and many of the planning assumptions had proven inaccurate. In fact, the conflict became more complex as armed groups splintered, and attacks against civilians, the peacekeeping forces, and humanitarian actors intensified. Distinct from the challenges the UN faced to full deployment, the scale of the conflict – and of violence against civilians – exceeded what UNAMID was designed to handle, and the mission has to date proved unable to achieve its operational or strategic objectives. As a member of the UNAMID planning team expressed, “The UN must stop planning for the best and start planning for the worst.”

7. Designing Peacekeeping Operations to Protect Civilians

The principles of war remain the basic tenets of military planning and action – whether in a Peace Support or Peace enforcement operation. First, you must have the right force with the right equipment and training at the right place and time in order to conduct operations, then you have to apply those principles within a doctrinal framework to execute those operations. In order to accomplish all of this in a Peacekeeping environment, you need to plan correctly, plan on the realities of the situation and plan for possible escalation in the expected levels of conflict and destabilization which may be encountered.

- Major General Patrick Cammaert, MILAD to the Secretary-General⁴⁰

7.1 The Importance of Campaign Design

UN peacekeeping has its roots in the Cold War, and was originally intended to prevent tactical confrontations in interstate conflicts from disrupting mediation and resolution efforts at the strategic level. Actions by UN forces were extremely limited in scope by design. In regard to the first peacekeeping mission, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskold wrote that, “There was no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military balance in the current conflict, and thereby the political balance affecting efforts to settle the conflict.”⁴¹ The presence of lightly armed military forces was likened to a plate glass window: a visible manifestation of the UN’s engagement, but not capable of withstanding any serious blow.⁴²

Today’s multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping operations are expected to leverage all resources to achieve objectives of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As the *Capstone Doctrine* points out, “In contrast to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations, multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict.”⁴³

For the military component of UN PKOs, this entails a fundamental shift in its role. In traditional peacekeeping the military component’s role was to prevent change at the tactical level while conflicts were resolved through diplomatic engagement at the political/strategic level. The military component’s only real objective was to be present. In modern peacekeeping, the military component must leverage its capabilities to change the conflict dynamics in order to achieve complex and multi-faceted operational and strategic objectives. Doing so requires not merely the deployment, but the employment of military forces in a coherent manner. As in other types of military operations, that coherence can only be achieved through the elaboration of an operational or campaign plan.

40 Major General Patrick Cammaert, *Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues Facing the United Nations in Providing Strategic Information and Peacekeeping Intelligence for its Peace Support Operations*, Keynote address at ‘Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries’ conference, 4-5 December 2003 Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University.

41 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force, A/3302, 6 Nov. 1956.

42 Seyersted, F., *United Nations Forces in the Law of Peace and War* (Sijthoff: Leyden, 1966), p. 48. Cited in Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Operations* (2002).

43 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008), para. 43, p. 15.

The operational level is the vital link between tactics and strategy, where resources are aligned and tactical actions are sequenced to achieve campaign objectives, which cumulatively accomplish strategic ends.⁴⁴ Put another way, “action at the operational level aims to give meaning to tactical actions in the context of some larger design that is itself framed by strategy.”⁴⁵ Doing so requires a systems approach to the problem of conflict, involving careful analysis of the components of the system and the interactions between them. That analysis provides the insight into how military resources can be applied to achieve operational and strategic objectives. A campaign plan captures that analysis and describes the nature and sequencing of the military operations necessary to transform the conflict – it presents a theory of change and how it will be implemented.

The importance of coherent campaign plans for UN PKOs has grown as they have been increasingly deployed to transform complex civil conflicts. As described above, such operations have increasingly been mandated to protect civilians both as an operational objective, and as a means to achieve other operational and strategic ends. However, UN PKOs rarely if ever have enough troops and assets to secure the entire civilian population under threat. As a result, *purely tactical efforts that rely on the proximity of peacekeepers to thwart or respond to attacks are unlikely to achieve the objective*. If permitted, armed actors intent on attacking civilians will almost always be able to find exploitable gaps in patrols, checkpoints or defensive cordons. While such approaches frequently form the bedrock for a campaign to protect civilians, *framework operations⁴⁶ must be complemented by other actions that seize the initiative from armed actors and apply pressure to alter their behavior*. Developing such approaches requires the elaboration of an operational campaign plan that lays out the ends, ways, and means that will be employed to achieve the objective of protecting civilians.

A complete list of factors that contribute to conflict dynamics leading to attacks on civilians would be long, and include factors that are beyond the capacity of a UN PKO to influence. Analytical approaches such as those elaborated below provide a framework for intelligence preparation of the battlefield that may be adapted as required to various operational contexts.

44 For a succinct discussion of the operational level and its importance, see Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, ‘Thinking about the Operational Level’, *RUSI Journal* (December 2005) pp. 38-43.

45 Department of the Navy, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-2: Campaigning (1997) p. 7.

46 ‘Framework operations’ refers to ‘those [operations] conducted by regular military and police including patrolling, base security, searching for terrorist munitions, overt surveillance and control of movement.’ See Iron (2008, p. 177). The purpose of framework operations is not to defeat the opposing forces, but to a) make armed actors work around the static framework operations and b) employ more convoluted and complex operations. In so doing, framework operations compel armed actors to take greater risks and expend more resources to pursue their operational goals, increasing the likelihood that they will be caught. The term was used in the Divisional Commander’s Initial Campaign Plan for Operations in DRC East of 4 April 2005.

7.2 Addressing POC in the Operational Estimate

Developing the Operational Estimate:⁴⁷ The Operational Estimate is a logical military problem solving process that uses in-depth conflict analysis to identify the nature and components of the problem, define the operational level objectives necessary to achieve the strategic end state, and identify the ways and means they will be achieved. It addresses conflicts as systems that must be understood in order to determine the best way to alter their dynamics. At its core, it involves understanding the essentials of the military problem – the assigned mission and the object of that mission.

The Operational Estimate consists of six sequential steps.

- Step i. - Review of the situation
- Step ii. - Identify and analyze the problem
- Step iii. - Formulation of potential courses of action (COA)
- Step iv. - COA development
- Step v. - COA evaluation
- Step vi. - COA selection

There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake, and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence with the ability and determination to defeat them.

- Brahimi Report (2000)

The additional considerations required to address POC within the Operational Estimate are discussed for each step in turn.

7.2.1 Step i. - Review of the Situation. The first step of the Operational Estimate describes the background of the conflict, and analyzes the current situation. The purpose is to ensure that the entire planning staff has a common understanding of the background and underlying causes of the problem, and a full grasp of the political objectives of all parties to the conflict.

The review of the situation should capture both the structural or root causes of the conflict, and the specific contingent pathways and dynamics that have led to its current shape. It should encompass the conflict origins, long- and short-term drivers, and key factors such as cultural issues, ethno-sectarian identities, competition over resources, and regional dynamics. With regard to POC, it should consider:

- ▶ How civilian insecurity may be a product of conflict, an independent driver of conflict (e.g. security dilemma), or both;
- ▶ The identity of attackers, patterns of violence, and likelihood of future attacks; and
- ▶ Interactions between violence against civilians and other conflict dynamics and factors.

⁴⁷ For a detailed description of which actors are involved in these steps, please see United Nations, *Planning Process for Military Operations*, (September 2001).

| CoG ANALYSIS MATRIX | |
|--|---|
| <i>See footnote 50 for further information, and pages 32-33 for examples of CoG, CC, CR and CV.</i> | |
| 1 – CoG <i>(The focal point of an actors’ strength. Physical CoGs are active agents such as individual units or the main fighting force. They are the main strength of a force that counters/destroys adversary capabilities and undermine the will to resist. Moral CoGs are also active agents – leaders, groups of elites, or the civilian population – that influence or control physical CoGs.)</i> | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES (CC) <i>(That which makes it a CoG)</i> |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS (CR) <i>(That which it needs to be effective as a CoG)</i> | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES (CV) <i>(Through which a COG can be attacked or neutralized)</i> |
| Adversary CoG – Exploit Critical Vulnerabilities. Friendly CoG – Achieve Critical Requirements; Protect Critical Vulnerabilities | |

Adapted from JWP 5-00 (UK, 2004) and Strange and Iron (2007).

The Strategic Assessment will have already gathered some of this information, but this review should delve deeper and produce a more precise picture of the current situation. Specifically, it should identify the strategic goals, strategic end-states, and strategic centers of gravity (CoG) for all sides.

*Strategic CoG Analysis in POC Missions*⁴⁸ - *Friendly CoGs*: For UN PKOs, legitimacy is critical to strategic success.⁴⁹ Although UN PKOs may need to carefully and selectively apply military force in some situations, they do not primarily depend on their combat power to achieve their goals. Moreover, as in other types of stability operations, combat power has a limited utility to directly produce the desired end state. For UN PKOs, three dimensions of legitimacy are critical at the strategic level:

- ▶ Legitimacy in the eyes of **the civilian population in the AO**;
- ▶ Legitimacy in the eyes of **the Security Council**; and,
- ▶ Legitimacy in **global public opinion**, including global civil society, UN Member States, Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and regional organizations.

A loss of legitimacy among the civilian population or the Security Council will prevent a UN PKO from achieving its strategic objectives. The civilian population’s active participation and engagement is required for UN peacebuilding processes to succeed. The support of the

⁴⁸ The concept and definition of CoGs is a matter of intense current debate among military officers and experts. This document does not advocate for the adoption of any particular definition, but uses the approach to CoG-CC-CR-CV analysis described in Joseph L. Strange and Richard Iron, “Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz really meant”, *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 35 (Autumn 2004) pp. 20-27.

⁴⁹ See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Principles and Guidelines* (2008), para. 77-80, pp. 24-25.

Security Council is required for the initial deployment, continued operation and freedom of action of UN PKOs. Thus each constitutes a friendly ‘moral CoG’.⁵⁰ Legitimacy in the eyes of global public opinion (as defined here) can also shape the strategic outcomes of UN PKOs, but its impact is generally mediated through the UNSC and the local civilian population.

Strategic CoG Analysis in POC Missions – Armed Actor CoGs: As described above, multidimensional UN PKOs play a direct role in political efforts to resolve conflicts in their AOs. To do so effectively, UN planners should systematically assess the strategic goals, end-states and CoGs of each party to the conflict, including the Host Nation government. Understanding these fundamental characteristics of the problem is a necessary prerequisite to developing both military and non-military logical lines of operation.

The exact significance of the civilian population to the strategic goals and CoGs of armed actors may vary considerably.⁵¹ Moreover, that significance may vary across different portions of the civilian populace (e.g. allied ethno-sectarian group vs. opposing ethno-sectarian group). In addition to determining whether all or part of the civilian population constitute a moral CoG, planners should consider the second- and third-order implications of strategic goals. For example, where illegal exploitation of resources constitutes a strategic CoG for a warlord group, access to forced labor may be a critical requirement, with obvious implications for violence against civilians.

In some cases, violence against civilians may be inextricable from the strategic goals, end-states and CoGs of armed actors. Where the dispossession or destruction of a portion of the civilian population is integral to the fundamental strategic nature or goals of an armed actor, it strongly suggests that approaches based on direct or indirect deterrence will be inadequate to prevent attacks. This will be discussed in greater detail below.

7.2.2 Step ii - Identify and Analyze the Problem. This step is composed of two distinct but interrelated elements: mission analysis and object analysis.

Step ii(a) Mission Analysis: Mission analysis requires planners to dissect higher level planning directives to:

- ▶ Determine precisely what the UN PKO must accomplish;
- ▶ Identify any assigned or implied tasks;
- ▶ Identify any political preconditions or parameters which may act as constraints or provide freedom of action to the UN PKO; and,
- ▶ Consider the role of the military component in relation to other components of the UN PKO in pursuing the strategic objectives.

50 While Host Nation consent at the strategic level is recognized as an absolute requirement for UN PKOs, it is mediated via the Security Council, with which the Host Nation interacts strategically. Thus Host Nation consent may be a Critical Requirement and/or a Critical Vulnerability depending on the context.

51 The civilian population (or some aspect thereof) may be a CoG, a critical capability, critical requirement or critical vulnerability.

Strategic CoGs for UN PKOs: UNAMID and the DPA

UNAMID was deployed with two strategic objectives: to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and protect civilians. Its ability to effectively protect civilians has been highly constrained, creating frustration among Darfuri civilians. Its legitimacy among the civilian populace was also undermined from the start by its mandated support for the unpopular and unimplemented DPA. This has contributed to the mission's inability to influence Darfuri politics and has severely curtailed its peacebuilding efforts.

While the exact relationship between POC and other objectives will vary, the security of civilians will generally be a pre- or co-requisite for the achievement of the other critical military and non-military peacebuilding objectives.⁵² Moreover, securing the population can help transform political dynamics, undermining the influence of armed groups and empowering moderates.⁵³ Thus civilian security should be considered in the mission analysis process as:

1. An end to be pursued in and of itself;
2. A means to achieve other ends; and,
3. The end result of achieving other military and non-military objectives.

Because of its central importance to achieving strategic and operational end-states, ***the security of civilians should be established as a discrete operational objective against which plans must be developed and resources applied.*** Even where POC is defined as a mission-wide strategic or operational objective in higher planning directives, establishing POC as a military operational objective emphasizes that it is not a discrete task, but is rather an operational effect that must be pursued through the execution of a range of carefully synchronized and sequenced tasks. This is particularly true for UN PKOs because the force requirements⁵⁴ to conduct that range of tasks are significantly different than those for traditional UN PKOs.

Step ii(b) Object Analysis: The second element in this step is **Object Analysis** – a focused examination of the *object* of the mission. For conventional military operations, this is generally the adversary and its military forces; for impartial UN PKOs it may be less obvious. Given that impartial stance and the need to understand and exert influence on all parties to a conflict, UN planners should analyze the culture, doctrine, forces and assets, objectives, operational CoGs, and likely and potential COAs of each armed actor.

The significance of the civilian population to armed actor objectives and operational CoGs is enormously variable, depending on the full range of political, military, economic, social/cultural, infrastructure and information/communications factors. In some cases, CoG analysis will clearly illustrate the relationship of armed actor to the civilian population, and – where applicable – between armed actor goals and violence against civilians.

52 Development of a licit economy; DDR of armed groups; popular participation in politics; etc.

53 Where individuals and communities feel secure, they are less susceptible to political mobilization by extremists and hardliners, and are more likely to support and participate in the nascent political institutions supported by the UN PKO.

54 In terms of troops; equipment and resources; staff requirements; logistics; materiel; force posture; and the execution of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

EXAMPLES OF COG MATRICES

The following CoG matrices provide examples of these variations for illustrative purposes.

Note: *These matrices are not meant to suggest that these are the only CoGs for these types of armed actors, and the relationships schematically depicted here may vary considerably in specific real-world cases. Moreover, planners may assess that the CVs associated with other CoGs that do not directly relate to the civilian population offer better bases for courses of action to achieve POC and other operational objectives. Even where this is true, analysis of the relationship between armed actor CoGs and civilians may prove useful to comparative COA evaluation in subsequent planning. Such comparison may be particularly valuable in assessing the risks to civilians associated with each COA (e.g. from retaliation, etc.)*

CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL COG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: WARLORD MILITIA

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>1 – COG</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Profit-driven militia fighters | <p>2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maintain control of mining areas for illicit exploitation - Force civilians to work in artisanal mines - Extort resources from civilian population - Exploit terrain and guerilla tactics to evade conventional defeat |
| <p>3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revenue from mines via illegal exploitation and export of resources - Access to civilians as a source of forced labor and target for extortion | <p>4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control of mines can be seized - Infrastructure/routes required for illicit exports can be disrupted - Civilian population can be secured |

| CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL CoG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: INSURGENCY | |
|---|---|
| 1 – CoG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civilian population | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Source of recruits, intelligence, finances, operational support - Provide concealment from which to attack government and counterinsurgent forces |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mobilizing ideology/grievances - Intimidation by insurgents | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ideological appeal can be undermined by addressing grievances - Civilians can be protected from insurgents |

| CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL CoG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: CRIMINAL GANG | |
|---|---|
| 1 – CoG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Armed gang members | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Urban civilian population as source of finance, resources, and shelter via criminal exploitation |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control of neighborhoods | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak military capability means control of neighborhoods can be wrested away |

| CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL CoG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: ETHNO-SECTARIAN MILITIA | |
|---|---|
| 1 – CoG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civilian population | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Source of recruits, intelligence, finances, operational support |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Existence/perception of threat to members of ethno-sectarian group | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reality/perception of threat among ethno-sectarian group can be reduced |

| CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL CoG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: GENOCIDAL GOVERNMENT | |
|---|---|
| 1 – CoG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ideologically committed military units | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Willingness to kill civilians en masse |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Logistical support - Intelligence on location of target civilians - Strong leadership to maintain unit cohesion - Ideological reinforcement | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lines of communications can be cut - Access to key sources of intelligence (local administrative structures; ISR assets; etc.) can be targeted - Communications networks required for coordinated action and ideological reinforcement can be disrupted - Leadership figures or elite sub-units can be neutralized |

Analysis of Armed Actor Motives: In the context of UN PKOs, CoG analysis is a necessary but insufficient step to develop and evaluate COAs, particularly for the purpose of protecting civilians. Center of gravity analysis helps planners and commanders identify the key to defeating an adversary. However, UN PKOs are not deployed with the primary intention or goal of launching military operations to defeat armed actors. While doing so may prove necessary in order to achieve both operational and strategic objectives/end-states, it is not the first resort of a UN PKO. Where possible, UN PKOs are expected to deter or compel armed actors, emphasizing the de-escalation of conflict rather than the resort to the decisive use of force at the operational level.⁵⁵

Moreover, COAs designed to defeat armed actors responsible for attacks against civilians may achieve that goal, but fail to protect civilians from (possibly intensifying) violence while doing so. ***Thus object analysis for UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians requires additional analysis to assess whether those responsible for attacks against civilians can be deterred, compelled, or must be defeated in order to halt that violence.***

Understanding the logic behind attacks against civilians is a key step to developing effective counter-strategies.⁵⁶ The reasons why armed actors choose to attack civilians in order to achieve their goals vary considerably and can only generally be discerned through a

⁵⁵ Note, however, that a number of studies of the use of force in UN PKOs have emphasized the importance of such operations being willing and able to use decisive force at the tactical level when challenged. See for example Simon Chesterman, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit External Study, 2004.

⁵⁶ For further detail, please see Kelly, *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations* (2010) pp. 13-14.

thorough study of the issue. Determining how to operationalize that information requires a further evaluation of whether the violence against civilians is a) instrumental to the goals of the armed actor, b) intrinsic to the goals of the armed actor, or c) intrinsic to the existence of the armed actor.

For some armed actors, violence against civilians is instrumental to their goals; such attacks are not the only way to achieve them, but have been selected as the armed actor's preferred approach. For example, terrorists may attack civilians as part of a strategy to achieve political goals, a government may use indiscriminate violence as part of a coercive counter-insurgency campaign, or an insurgent group may seek to terrorize a population into submission as part of its campaign to seize power. In such cases, sufficiently powerful deterrence or compellence by a UN PKO against attacks on civilians is likely to cause the armed actor to seek an alternative approach to achieving its objectives.

For other armed actors, violence against civilians is intrinsic to their goals. Examples include sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. In such cases, whatever the nature of the original or underlying drivers of conflict (e.g. land tenure; control of natural resources), one or more armed actors come to view the very existence of a portion of the civilian population as a threat, and thus adopt a strategy that targets them. In these cases, deterrence or compellence by a UN PKO will have to be significant enough to force an armed actor to reevaluate not only its methods, but its goals as well. This is likely to require significantly more capability – and willingness to apply it – than cases where attacks against civilians are purely instrumental.

Finally, where attacks against civilians are intrinsic to an armed actor's existence, deterrence and compellence are unlikely to be effective. Violence against civilians may yield rewards in lieu of payment—looting, for example, or the transfer of land tenure to the victors. Attacking civilians may also be an integral part of an armed group's recruitment and retainment strategy. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) uses forced recruitment to replenish and expand its ranks, and consolidates that recruitment through mandatory participation in brutality, often against the recruit's own community or family. The LRA would not be able to survive if it ceased attacking civilians, making its interests and those of UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians diametrically opposed. In such cases, the outright defeat of the armed actor may be necessary to effectively provide security for civilians.⁵⁷

The following table provides a basic illustration of such assessments. It is an extremely simplified representation of what should be a detailed examination of the complexities of the conflict, and particularly of the nuances of the motives and methods of armed actors, factoring in ideology, culture, military strength, alliances/strategic relationships, history, etc.⁵⁸

57 If it is determined that defeating the armed actor is not an option for the UN PKO due to limited capacity, consent or authority, other courses of action should be sought to address the situation.

58 Examples of such analyses include: Kasper Thams Olsen, *Violence Against Civilians in Civil War: Understanding Atrocities by the Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda*, Working Paper N° 8, Conflict Research Group, February 2007; Crisis Group, *LRA: A Regional Strategy beyond Killing Kony* Crisis Group Africa Report N°157, 28 April 2010; Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert, *Mapping Conflict Motives: Eastern DRC*, International Peace Information Service, 4 March 2008; Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert, *Mapping Conflict Motives: Province Orientale*, International Peace Information Service, 17 March 2010; Marina Rafti, *South Kivu: a Sanctuary for the Rebellion of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda*, Institute of Development Policy and Management, March 2006; Julie Flint, *Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur*, Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper 17, June 2009; Claire Mc Evoy and Emile LeBrun, *Uncertain Future: Armed Violence in Southern Sudan*, Small Arms Survey HSBA Working Paper N° 20, April 2010.

| ARMED ACTOR | GOAL | LOGIC OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS | RELATIONSHIP OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS TO GOALS/GROUP | LIKELY VIABLE COUNTER-STRATEGY ¹ |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| Janjaweed (Darfur, 2003-2005) | Seize land resources from other ethnic groups | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drive civilians associated with rival communities off land 2. Reward fighters through looting and rape | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intrinsic to goal 2. Intrinsic to group | Deter/Compel, possibly Defeat |
| Communal militias (Murle/Lou Nuer conflict, South Sudan, 2010) | Survival | Inter-communal violence driven by security dilemma and political manipulation by other actors | Instrumental to goal | Deter/Compel |
| Haitian Gangs (2004-2007) | Profit from violence | Extort profit and resources through kidnapping, extortion | Intrinsic to group | Defeat |
| Lord's Resistance Army (Uganda, DRC, Sudan, CAR) | Survival | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Extract resources 2. Forcible recruitment 3. Enslavement for labor and/or sex 4. Terrorize population into non-cooperation with counterinsurgents 5. Discredit and retaliate against opposing forces | Intrinsic to group | Defeat |
| FDLR (Kivus, DRC) | Survival | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Extract resources through illegal taxation of agriculture and mining sectors 2. Extortion 3. Reward fighters through forced marriages | Intrinsic to group | Compel/Defeat |

¹ Deterrence, compellence, or defeat need not be accomplished primarily or solely through military operations. However, military operations are likely a necessary if insufficient element of a broader strategy.

Conclusions regarding the viability of operational strategies with regard to a given armed actor should represent a holistic analysis of that group, the conflict, and the context.

It is important to note, though, that motives may be mixed, and may vary horizontally across different factions of the same armed actor, and vertically along the chain of command. For example, some FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda) factions are not as ideologically committed as others, and are likely more susceptible to compellence coupled with political lines of operation (e.g. DDR or DDRRR, depending on nationality) than others. However, hard-line elements may have to be defeated before moderates are able or willing to accept disarmament and demobilization. ***Thus, assessments of the motives behind violence against civilians should be undertaken for all relevant factions/components of armed actors, and at minimum for each moral and physical CoG.*** Integrating the results of CoG analysis with assessments of motives for violence against civilians should help provide the insights necessary to formulate and begin developing COAs that effectively address POC.

Object analysis also requires an analysis of friendly CoGs. As described above, legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population of the AO is a strategic CoG for UN PKOs. ***At the operational level, for UN PKOs the support of the civilian population will be a critical requirement, and their security a critical vulnerability.***

| CIVILIANS IN OPERATIONAL CoG ANALYSIS EXAMPLE: UN PKO | |
|---|--|
| 1 – CoG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN PKO military component | 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Transform conflict by resolving security dilemma between communities - Marginalize or defeat hardliners and spoilers who seek to perpetuate conflict |
| 3 – CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support of civilian population - Support of UNSC - Host Nation consent | 4 – CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Security of civilian population - Loss of Host Nation consent |

7.2.3 Step iii – Formulation of Potential Courses of Action. The mission and object analysis should provide a foundation for planners to begin formulating potential courses of action. Potential COAs will likely emerge from the analysis of armed actor CoGs, and where multiple CoGs exist, each might suggest a distinct COA. Where there is a single clear CoG, distinct possible COAs may be associated with each critical vulnerability, or various combinations thereof.

Even as COAs begin to take shape, additional critical information requirements will become evident, generating questions that planners will need to answer before final decisions are reached. When developing potential COAs, planners should assess the risks of additional violence against civilians associated with each one. The analysis of armed actor CoGs and motives for attacking civilians should form the basis for such assessments (see section 7.2.2 above).

Develop Integrated Lines of Operation to Reduce Vulnerabilities and Threats: As COAs begin to take shape, decisive points⁵⁹ (DPs) will begin to be identified and linked together into lines of operation (LOOs). To effectively protect civilians, those LOOs must reduce both the vulnerability of civilians to violence, and the threat of attack.

Reducing the vulnerability of civilians involves actions focused on the targeted population, rather than the armed actor, and generally seek to reduce the exposure of civilians to attack. These actions can take the form of:

- ▶ Defensive and stability operations (e.g. defensive positions and cordons; checkpoints; and patrols);
- ▶ Facilitating humanitarian assistance; and,
- ▶ Information operations to inform civilians about threat conditions.

In some instances, infrastructure redevelopment (e.g. repairing roads, irrigation systems, water sources) may also help reduce vulnerability to attack, but should be undertaken in consultation and (where possible) coordination with local stakeholders, other UN PKO components, and relevant partner organizations per UN guidance.⁶⁰

Reducing the threat to civilians entails taking steps to change the behavior of armed actors and may involve reducing their offensive capabilities. As conventional threat assessment methodology depicts:

$$\text{Threat} = \text{Threat's Capability} \times \text{Threat's Intent}$$

⁵⁹ “While it may be possible to defeat the adversary’s CoG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of coordinated actions will be required. Such actions are described as DPs. A DP is therefore best described as an effect, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to unlocking the enemy’s CoG. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance; they may be the elimination or denial of a capability, or an achievement such as obliging an adversary to engage in formal negotiations. The key is the effect that the actions have on the adversary and must be measurable.” *JWP 5-00: Joint Operations Planning* (UK, 2004) para. 227, pp. 2-16. For complete definition, see Glossary.

⁶⁰ The Policy on Civil Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions emphasizes that, “all activities that have a close bearing on the humanitarian and development response shall be approved and coordinated... under integrated coordination structures that may be established by the DSRSG/HC/RC” UNDPKO/DFS Ref. 2010.2. “Policy on Civil Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions,” (January 2010), p. 9 para 30. See also the DPKO/DFS *Policy Directive and Guidelines on Quick Impact Projects* (February 2007 and March 2009). These policies and guidelines seek to ensure that “proposals contribute to an overall strategy and plan developed by the DSRSG/HC/RC that meets the real priority needs of the population, and does not negatively impact on the local population or the activities of the humanitarian and development entities that he/she coordinates.”

By analyzing armed actor CoGs and motives, planners should have an initial estimate of whether an armed actor's intent to attack civilians is susceptible to being altered by pressure applied by the military component of the UN PKO. Such pressure can take a wide variety of forms – including liaison and engagement, information operations targeted at armed actor CoGs, or psychological operations – but in many cases this will also require actions to reduce the capability of armed actors to threaten civilians. Doing so may involve direct military action to neutralize the specific capabilities used to attack civilians.

However, the capabilities and intent of armed actors are generally interlinked, and operations to alter intent may entail military action against armed actor CVs. For example, the extension of framework operations⁶¹ into areas of illegal natural resource exploitation upon which an armed actor depends might induce that actor to end violence against the local population. Thus in some cases, altering the intent of armed actors to attack civilians may involve actions to erode capabilities of armed actors not directly implicated in those attacks. Operations against assets or capabilities that are highly valued by the perpetrator of violence against civilians may alter the strategic calculus of that actor regarding the costs and benefits of such attacks. Operations of this nature can be scaled and calibrated according to the degree of pressure required to elicit the desired change in intent, but should take into account the potential to backfire and produce a rapid escalation or retaliation against civilians.

Where the intent of armed actors to attack civilians is determined to be largely or entirely immune to such pressure⁶² (e.g. where violence against civilians is intrinsic to an armed actor or its goals), a UN PKO will likely have to shift the focus of its operations to reducing the capability of armed actors to attack civilians. Although actions designed to reduce the vulnerability of civilians may neutralize some armed actor capabilities by rendering them irrelevant, under such circumstances effective POC will likely require offensive action to reduce or eliminate those capabilities.

Lines of operation designed to reduce vulnerability and threats should be envisioned as complementary and interdependent. Moreover, they should be fully integrated into the broader COAs under development that address not only POC, but other operational objectives for the military component. Those COAs should in turn be integrated into the mission-wide strategy. While it is generally acknowledged that military and non-military lines of operation are interdependent, this is particularly true for UN PKOs, and for achieving the POC objective.

Mapping Vulnerable Civilians – The Role of External Protection Stakeholders: To develop LOOs that will reduce the vulnerability of civilians to attacks, military planners need accurate and up-to-date information about the geographic location of civilians, the nature and intensity of the threats to civilians, and the vulnerabilities of civilians.

Where UN agencies and programs, independent humanitarian and human rights actors, vulnerable communities, and appropriate host nation government officials have an established

61 See note 46, p.54 of this document.

62 Analysis may suggest that a armed actor might change its intent in response to intense pressure sustained over an extended period of time, but continue to inflict violence civilians while that pressure mounts to the critical level. In such cases, planners should carefully consider whether the toll on civilians – and the potential impact on the legitimacy and success of the UN PKO – would justify categorizing that armed actor as one that must be defeated, rather than compelled over a longer period at greater human cost.

presence on the ground, they may be involved in protection programs and activities and have developed their own analysis of the conflict dynamics. Inputs from these actors often take the form of maps or matrices with varying levels of detail regarding the number and location of the civilians, and the nature and intensity of the threats they face. These inputs may prioritize locations according to the perceived intensity of the threat to/vulnerability of civilians, and indicate where and what kind of protection activities are already underway. In some cases, such inputs propose detailed courses of action for the military component.

The IMPP mandates consultations with these actors and planners should seek input from them in analyzing the situation and developing mission-wide protection strategies throughout the planning process and during mission deployment. However, it should be noted that information provided by other protection stakeholders may be inadequate for military planning purposes. Further, they may propose courses of action that are inappropriate for the military component of the peacekeeping mission. For example, proposed courses of action may be limited to defensive or stability operations. This may be because other protection stakeholders are unfamiliar with: the UN PKO and/or military planning processes; the range of operations that UN PKOs may be able to undertake – especially by the military component (including offensive operations); or the limitations that UN PKOs may face due to consent and capability constraints. Further, other protection stakeholders such as humanitarian organizations may be constrained by the body of principles that guide their work or the communities, funders and institutions to which they are accountable.

As such, planners should carefully verify and analyze information gathered from these stakeholders even as it is incorporated into planning. Although proposed courses of action and possible risks identified by external stakeholders should be considered, planners must evaluate them independently to ensure their coherence with fundamental military principles and relevant guidance on military operations to protect civilians. In consulting external protection stakeholders, planners should be attentive to the need for some organizations or individuals to carefully manage the risks of sharing or being perceived to be sharing information with political and military actors. ***Established or new mechanisms and opportunities for engagement with civilian actors should be designed in consultation and coordination with appropriate actors⁶³ to minimize any possible risk to these organizations and the populations they serve.⁶⁴***

Possible Protection Stakeholders within an AO

- ▶ Communities and individuals under threat
- ▶ The host state government (where appropriate)
- ▶ Multidimensional peacekeeping or stability operations
- ▶ National and international humanitarian and human rights agencies
- ▶ Other national or international actors in the AO (media, donor governments, embassies, religious institutions, etc.)

⁶³ Appropriate actors may include humanitarian coordination agencies and mechanisms such as the Protection Cluster, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, NGO steering committees and/or secretariats, etc.

⁶⁴ For additional detail on managing information sharing, please see Chapter 7.

Managing The Risks Of Information Sharing

Humanitarian and human rights actors are often reluctant to share information with military actors, including the military components of UN PKOs. That reluctance is often driven by a fear that they will be perceived as sharing information that will put them or the civilians they work with at risk of retaliation by the perpetrators.

As an example, international and national humanitarian NGOs which abide by the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence have been threatened, retaliated against and/or expelled by host nation governments and/or other armed actors in Sudan and Somalia respectively based on perceptions/accusations that humanitarian NGOs were sharing information with judicial, political or military entities that resulted in negative consequences for those armed actors.

Moreover, communities, humanitarian and human rights actors have complained in some contexts that information sharing with UN PKOs is uni-directional. UN PKOs request and receive information but fail to share appropriate information that may have bearing on the protection of vulnerable populations or of the humanitarian and human rights organizations.

To mitigate that risk and enhance communication, UN military components should establish an information collection and sharing strategy in consultation and coordination with appropriate CIMIC, CMCOORD, and other humanitarian coordination and liaison mechanisms. In some cases, the Protection Cluster approach or engagement through UN OCHA or civil military liaisons has proven useful in this regard.

This information sharing strategy should be nested within any mission-wide information sharing strategy related to POC. The strategy should:

1. Establish working methods (including location, meeting formats, etc.) that reduce the risk of such information sharing (particularly in regard to risks of misperception);
2. Prevent perpetrators from determining the source(s) of any specific piece of information;
3. Allow humanitarian and human rights agencies to engage at different levels of proximity to the mission (eg. communicate (share info), coordinate (protection activities) or collaborate (jointly design or implement protection activities));
4. Provide guidance on the kinds of information that it is appropriate and often critical to share (e.g. general trends in threats) to allow effective protection activities external to the mission; and,
5. Provide guidance on handling individual case information that should never be shared in public fora and only gathered by appropriate actors following appropriate protocols.¹

¹ For greater detail on humanitarian and human rights actors' best practices in information sharing see, "Professional Standards for Protection Work Carried Out by Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence," ICRC, October 2009, Chapter 5.

*The Risks of Action and Inaction: Managing Consent while Protecting Civilians:*⁶⁵ Although a UN PKO's ability to protect civilians is critical to achieve a UN PKO's strategic goals and operational objectives, the imperative to use force where necessary at the operational and tactical level to protect civilians may exist in tension with other operational-level objectives. In particular, where parties to the conflict or their proxies are responsible for attacks on civilians, it can prove challenging for PKOs to manage consent while taking effective action to end such violence. In formulating, developing and evaluating COAs, planners should consider the consent of four categories of actors: the Host Nation, other main parties to the conflict, other armed groups, and the civilian population.

- ▶ *The Host Nation:* The strategic consent of the Host Nation is required for the deployment of a UN PKO, and it will generally constitute a critical requirement that must be carefully managed in order to achieve strategic goals. However, the formal provision of strategic consent does not always fully reflect the reality of the situation. Host Nation governments are not monolithic, and their attitudes towards the UN PKO and its goals may vary considerably across and within individual institutions or ministries, and between federal, state/provincial, or local levels. These nodes may wield considerable power to disrupt, undermine, obstruct or outright confront a peacekeeping mission, and planners should seek to identify divisions that must be addressed or usefully exploited in order to achieve operational objectives.
- ▶ *Other Main Parties to the Conflict:* Where an UN PKO is deployed in support of a peace process, the consent of the other 'main parties to the conflict' may be nearly or as important as that of the Host Nation.
- ▶ *Other Armed Actors:* Other armed groups should also be considered, including the full range of other organized armed actors that often proliferate in complex civil conflicts, including inter alia militias, criminal gangs, and self-defense groups.
- ▶ *The Civilian Population:* Finally, a loss of consent among civilians will not generally directly lead to a loss of strategic consent, however, their opinions and attitude towards the operation may be a key determinant of an operation's success or failure.

The dynamics between these four categories are complex. On the one hand, the use of force against Host Nation security forces engaged in violence against civilians could endanger strategic consent. On the other, failing to protect civilians may lead to a critical loss of legitimacy among other actors, including the population, global public opinion, the UNSC, and in some cases, other parties to the conflict associated with the targeted community.

The risk to consent associated with the use of force to protect civilians will also depend on the relationship of the armed actor responsible for threats and attacks to the Host Nation or main parties to the conflict. Further, planners should consider that legitimacy among the civilian population – or at least portions of it – is often also a concern for the Host Nation and

⁶⁵ For a more detailed exploration of the tensions and tradeoffs between managing consent and protecting civilians, please see Giffen, *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians* (2010).

other armed actors. Where UN PKOs bolster their legitimacy through protecting civilians, it may enable them to take further protective action, constrain or challenge potential spoilers (including, where relevant, elements of the Host Nation), and support peace processes. *Managing consent is not solely a matter of influencing elites, but also of shaping attitudes and perceptions among the populations on whom they depend for support and legitimacy.*

7.2.4 Step iv – COA Development. The output of Step 3 is a schematic campaign plan that broadly outlines each COA in terms of intent (including operational end-state and objectives), potential lines of operation, and the relationships between Decisive Points (DPs) and CoGs. In step 4, COAs are developed further:

- ▶ DPs are confirmed, sequenced, and phased, taking into account resource and time constraints.
- ▶ Each DP is analyzed to draw out the tasks required to achieve it.
- ▶ Required forces, their desired order of arrival, and basic deployment and logistical concept are assessed.
- ▶ Recommendations are developed for the operational reserve in terms of size, shape, location, and notice-to-move (NTM).

The focus of this work is to develop COAs that fully reflect the various options to align ways and means to achieve the ends identified in the mission analysis. The additional challenge introduced by POC at this stage is determining the appropriate tasks and forces required to achieve the DPs. Planners should keep in mind that POC does not imply a purely reactive or defensive posture, which would require entirely unrealistic force levels in order to produce a ‘secure and stable environment’. Rather, POC is an operational effect produced through the achievement of multiple DPs involving a range of tasks, some purely military, others where the military component is acting in support of civilian mission components. While in some cases tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) may need to be adjusted to create the intended effect,⁶⁶ for the most part the challenge lies in the sequencing and synchronization of those tasks.

7.2.5 Step v – COA Evaluation. Next, each potential friendly COA is evaluated against the most likely and most dangerous enemy or threat COA. While the criteria for their evaluation will be context sensitive, measures such as risk, tempo, and the degree to which enemy CVs are attacked and friendly CVs protected are commonly included. As a friendly CV, the security of the civilian populace should figure prominently in such evaluations.

It is critical at this step to account for worst-case scenarios. Planning assumptions are not a substitute for the development of contingency plans to address the most dangerous situations. These can include situations in which the basic preconditions for the deployment of a UN PKO disappear after the operation is already on the ground. In particular, contingency plans for escalations of violence beyond the capacity of a UN operation to bring the conflict back under control should include steps to mitigate violence against civilians where possible.

⁶⁶ Modifications to TTPs will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7.3.3.

Integrating POC into Risk Assessments: Risk assessments are a key tool in the comparative evaluation of potential COAs. They rest on two basic formulas. As described above, threats are assessed as an initial step in the COA development process. They are described in terms of capability and intent:

$$\text{Threat} = \text{Threat's Capability} \times \text{Threat's Intent}$$

| CoAs | CoA 1 | | | | | | | CoA 2 | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----------|---------|--------|--------|-------|-------|------|-----------|---------|
| Composition | Unit A | Unit B | UNMOs | UNHCR | NGOs | Civilians | Overall | Unit A | Unit B | UNMOs | UNHCR | NGOs | Civilians | Overall |
| Armed Actor A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Armed Actor B | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Individual C | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Host Nation Security Force Unit A | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Summary of Threat by COA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Threats can be mitigated by the capability of a UN PKO and its supporters, reducing the overall potential for danger, loss, injury or other adverse consequence, or 'risk'. Thus risk is assessed as:

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Threat} - (\text{Capability of UN} + \text{Capability of Supporters})$$

In POC mandated UN operations, the security of civilians should constitute one of the criteria against which they are evaluated, and for which risk is assessed. In addition to considering the population as a whole, it may be necessary in some contexts to consider the merits and risks of COAs in relation to particular groups (ethnic, gender, religious, economic class) or geographically defined populations. While this involves additional research and analysis, it may be required to fully account for the wide variation in threats faced by different components of the civilian populace.

7.2.6 Step vi – COA Selection. Having assessed the risks and merits of potential COAs, those deemed as potential candidates for further development are checked against political acceptability, the availability of forces (will TCC's provide the forces? Will member states pay for them?), and logistical constraints. Viable COAs will then be presented to the UN Military Advisor, who will either seek additional information from the planning team or direct that one COA be developed into an initial CONOPS.

7.3 Integrating POC into the CONOPS

The CONOPS is a critical document, describing the selected COA in clear, concise terms that emphasize how each element of the plan will contribute to achieving the end state. It includes a summary of the situation; a statement of the mission and intended end state; the commander's intent; a description of the actual concept (e.g. how the mission is to be achieved; intended force posture; scheme of maneuver; main effort; directed and implied tasks; force composition and disposition; etc.); organization of forces; and instructions for command, coordination and logistics.

As the core document for all subsequent planning, force generation, and development of operational orders (OPORDs), and the primary reference for TCCs and contingent commanders, POC must be integrated into the CONOPS to ensure it shapes the force generation process and is implemented in the field. Precisely where and how POC should be integrated will vary considerably according to the mandate and context. In some cases, it may figure in the mission statement. That said, *the CONOPS for UN PKOs with POC mandates should address the security of civilians in three sections:*

7.3.1 Commander's Intent. By integrating POC into a “concise and precise statement of how the commander intends to achieve the operational end-state”, the CONOPS will convey how the security of civilians relates to the end-state and to other operational objectives.

7.3.2 Concept. The concept describes how military forces will be used to achieve operational objectives and the overall end-state. Addressing POC in this section involves explaining how forces will be used to pursue lines of operation that enhance the security of civilians through direct (explicitly focused on POC, such as framework patrols or targeted raids against perpetrators) and indirect (likely to enhance civilian security through broader effects, such as mentoring of local security forces) means.

7.3.3 Tasks. In the context of UN PKOs, POC has a dual nature. It is both *an operational objective* to be achieved through the execution of an array of tasks organized into lines of operation, and *a discrete task* to be undertaken when civilians are threatened or attacked in the vicinity of UN forces.

- a. Pursuing POC as an operational objective generally involves the execution of standard tactical military tasks. In some cases, TTPs may need to be adjusted to the particular context and purpose of the mission – e.g. patrols conducted on foot, defensive cordons at team sites established with extra space to shelter fleeing civilians, etc.
- b. As a discrete task, POC involves taking immediate and effective action to protect civilians when they are threatened or attacked in the vicinity of UN troops. It requires that UN forces in general, and particularly commanders down to the company and platoon level, understand that they have a responsibility to take action to protect civilians. On-scene commanders must also possess a sufficient understanding of the context to balance the risks of action and inaction with regard to escalation and consent of various parties.

It may also be necessary to address POC in other parts of the CONOPS, including the scheme of maneuver, intelligence requirements, command and control arrangements, coordinating instructions, and logistical and administrative arrangements. When drafting CONOPS, planners should keep in mind that the tactical demands of operations to protect civilians are generally not self-evident to TCCs and troop contingents, and should be made as clear and explicit as possible.

Although not currently a common practice in UN PKOs, planners should work with the newly appointed Force Commander to develop a Commander's Guidance letter for distribution to all staff officers, contingent commanders and troops. Consistent with the concept of mission command⁶⁷, a Guidance letter should provide a concise (1-3 page) explanation in clear, simple language, of how the Commander's Intent and Concept should shape the force's operations, conduct and posture at the tactical level. The precise organization and content of such a Guidance letter should appropriately reflect the particular context and nature of the UN PKO, and may be complemented by longer, more detailed guidance on POC such as that contained in the MONUC Practical Protection Handbook for Peacekeepers. Commander's Guidance letters should be carefully translated into the languages of TCCs to preserve a simple and clear vernacular, distributed to all members of the military component, and shared with other mission components and relevant actors to enhance mutual understanding regarding the role of the military in the broader efforts of the UN PKO.

67 See Glossary for definition of 'mission command'.

Example of Commander's Guidance Letter Excerpted and Adapted from a Multinational Military Operation

- ▶ **Secure and serve the population.** The people are the decisive “terrain.” Together with our Host Nation partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.
- ▶ **Live among the people.** You can't succeed through intermittent presence. Position Team Sites, Mobile Operating Bases, and Temporary/Helicopter Operating Bases in the areas we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them.
- ▶ **Hold areas that have been secured.** Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Host Nation partners will not abandon them. When reducing forces, gradually thin our presence rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Host Nation forces.
- ▶ **Employ all assets to deter, compel or defeat groups threatening civilians and the peace process.** Military force alone cannot defeat extremists and hardliners that attack civilians. Success requires a comprehensive approach that employs all forces and all means at our disposal—non-kinetic as well as kinetic.
- ▶ **Promote reconciliation.** We will not succeed through military force alone. We and our Host Nation partners must identify and separate the “irreconcilables” from the “reconcilables” through thorough intelligence work, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political initiatives. We must strive to make the reconcilables part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and neutralize the irreconcilables.
- ▶ **Defeat the network, not just the attack.** Focus efforts on the process leading to an attack. Employ intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, bases, financiers, suppliers, and operators.

- ▶ **Fight for intelligence.** A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a “need to share” rather than a “need to know” basis. Disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.
- ▶ **Walk.** Move mounted, work dismounted. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.
- ▶ **Understand the neighborhood.** Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand the local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, religious elements, and local security forces. Understand how local systems and structures—including governance, provision of basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and economic elements—are supposed to function and how they really function.
- ▶ **Exercise initiative.** In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher-level leaders will provide a broad vision and paint “white lines on the road,” but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn “big ideas” into specific actions.
- ▶ **Prepare for and exploit opportunities.** “Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity” (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of “reconcilables” and “irreconcilables”) in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.
- ▶ **Learn and adapt.** Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas. Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and that what works in one area may not work in another. Strive to ensure that our units are learning organizations.

Excerpted and adapted to the context of UN PKOs from General David H. Petraeus, ‘Multinational-Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,’ *Military Review*, September-October 2008, pp. 2-4.

8. Force Requirements and Force Generation for POC Missions

The lessons of Rwanda have been clear – the failures there go back to the absence of a strong mandate. However, we can take this back one step. Had there been a more detailed intelligence assessment considering historical tendencies, the political will and military capability of the belligerents and looking at all escalation scenarios, we could have seen a stronger mandate. This together with a broader, multi-source and credible intelligence capability on the ground, could have prevented the genocide and atrocities which followed.

- Major General Patrick Cammaert, Former Military Advisor to the Secretary-General⁶⁸

The Force Generation process for UN PKOs begins early in mission development. It involves close consultation with potential TCCs at each step regarding the objective and requirements of the mission, the availability of suitable military units and equipment, and the willingness of TCCs to contribute those assets to participate in a UN PKO. The MPS and FGS working together face a significant challenge to elaborate and communicate the force requirements for UN PKOs operating in complex civil conflicts.⁶⁹

8.1 Force Requirements for POC

Force requirements are developed by MPS on the basis of the CONOPS, and thus should flow directly from the operational strategy outlined therein. The experiences of UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians indicate that POC imposes additional force requirements, including but not limited to:

- ▶ **Flexible Force Structures:** Operations to reduce the vulnerability and threats to civilians generally require flexible, adaptable contingents from which subsidiary units can be detached and operate independently for extended periods. Taskings may include long-range patrols and the establishment of company- or platoon-sized operating bases, each of which require significant organic self-sustainment capacity in small units. This has consequences for the configuration of logistical, medical, and communications capabilities that must be taken into account during the force generation process. To enhance overall flexibility of the force structure, capability requirements should be written for generic types of units (e.g. mechanized infantry battalion), rather than for units deployed to specific tactical AOs. This will ensure that units can be redeployed within the mission AO as dictated by operational requirements, enabling the UN PKO to better respond to changes and contingencies as they emerge.

68 Major General Patrick Cammaert, *Conceptual, Organizational and Operational Issues Facing the United Nations in Providing Strategic Information and Peacekeeping Intelligence for its Peace Support Operations*, Keynote address at 'Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries' conference, 4-5 December 2003 Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University.

69 For a more complete description of the UN force generation process, please see Holt and Taylor with Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations* (2009), pp. 139-144; and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations *Planning Process for Military Operations* (September 2001).

- ▶ ***Twenty-Four Hour Operational Capacity:*** Perpetrators often use the cover of darkness to launch attacks against civilians, and effective protection requires that peacekeeping forces be equally capable of operating at all hours. This requires that both individual troops and their vehicles be equipped with appropriate night-vision or thermal optics, backed by round-the-clock rotary- and fixed-wing operations for the purposes of transportation, fire support, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
- ▶ ***Force Reserves/Rapid Reaction Forces:*** Given the fluidity of the threat environment, POC-mandated UN PKOs should include highly capable Force Reserves/Rapid Reaction Forces (RRFs) equal to 10-15% of its overall force size down to a minimum of two companies. They should have associated air-mobility assets capable of night operations and deployment, substantial logistical self-sustainment capabilities, and be maintained on short notice-to-move. Ideally, they should be constituted so that at least one company can be deployed anywhere in the mission area within six hours, the balance of the force arriving within the following 18-24 hours. Such Rapid Reaction Forces should be drawn from particularly well-trained units, and be prepared to reinforce other parts of the mission in times of crisis, or to intervene to prevent a crisis from erupting.
- ▶ ***Strike Elements:*** In addition to Force Reservers/RRFs, POC-mandated UN PKOs should be provided with task forces composed of Special Forces or their equivalents capable of a range of defensive and offensive operations including: directing attack helicopters and indirect fire; conducting raids, ambushes, and direct assaults; long-range reconnaissance patrols; cordon and search operations; securing key infrastructure; and recovery operations. Such task forces extend the geographic reach of UN PKOs, and significantly enhance their ability to disrupt the military capability of armed groups engaged in violence against civilians in order to prevent future attacks. Depending on the overall configuration of the UN PKO, it may be necessary to assign dedicated transport and/or attack helicopter assets to such strike elements in order to ensure maximal interoperability and common standard operating procedures (SOPs).
- ▶ ***Intelligence Capabilities at Mission and Brigade HQ Level:*** Preventing attacks on civilians requires advance warning, and pursuing operations to seize and maintain the initiative against perpetrators requires detailed knowledge of armed actors. Developing such intelligence involves a thorough analysis of the operational patterns of armed actors, including violence against civilians, in order to drive the deployment of UN troops, shorten reaction times to warnings of threats, and preempt or deter attacks before they occur. Intelligence requirements are further intensified by the expectation that UN PKOs will employ indirect, minimally kinetic approaches⁷⁰ wherever possible. This makes intelligence regarding the intentions, plans, supply

70 E.g. interdiction of arms shipments or export of illegally exploited natural resources.

lines, financing, location and equipment of armed actors particularly important.⁷¹ UN PKOs mandated to protect civilians require:

- *Intelligence collection resources:* Depending on the particular context, missions will require the means to collect imagery, signals, and human intelligence. This implies access to inter alia, manned and unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms; geospatial intelligence feeds from Member States; signals intercept, location, and traffic analysis capabilities for high frequency radio, cell phone, and sat phones; and perhaps most importantly, personnel trained in tactical human intelligence collection methods.
 - *Intelligence analysis resources:* Just as important as the collection of information, UN PKOs require adequate staff to analyze that information and produce actionable intelligence to guide planning and operations. POC mandated missions require trained analysts at Force, Brigade and Battalion HQs who understand the requirements of intelligence processes for civil conflicts, as distinct from military intelligence for conventional inter-state conflicts.⁷² This includes military staff attached or recruited to the Joint Mission Analysis Cell(s).
- ***Augmentation of Intelligence Capabilities Among Tactical Units:*** Strong information gathering and analysis capability at all levels is critical to effectively protecting civilians. In most contingents currently serving in UN PKOs, dedicated intelligence capabilities only exist at battalion and brigade headquarters levels. This is inadequate for the contemporary operational environment. The complex conflict dynamics that generate violence against civilians are often highly localized. While communication and information exchange with higher headquarters is self-evidently important, information often only flows up the chain, and not back down to the tactical level. Intelligence capability should be distributed down to the company level in the form of Company-Level Intelligence Cells. Doing so will enhance the quality of intelligence gathered through operations, and accelerate the decision cycle when units must respond to protection crises in their vicinity.⁷³ Such cells can help make ‘every soldier a sensor’ into a reality by analyzing patrol briefs, tracking and analyzing significant activities, and driving the generation

71 “There are two basic analysis functions at all echelons: analysis of enemy actions and network analysis. Analysis of enemy actions is commonly called current operations analysis because it focuses on current enemy operations. Network analysis focuses on the people in an AO and develops an understanding of interrelationships and the ideas and beliefs driving insurgent actions. Current operations information helps determine threat warning conditions and the metrics of enemy capabilities, while network analysis provides intelligence for targeting, effects synchronization, and planning.” Kyle Teamey and LTC Jonathan Sweet, ‘Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency’, *Military Review* (September-October 2006) pp. 24 – 29.

72 E.g. social network mapping, or financial network analysis. For more on organizational and operational aspects of intelligence gathering in such environments, please see Walter A. Dorn ‘Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 2006-07’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 24: 6, 2009, pp. 805 - 835; and Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Glayton, *Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan* (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 2008).

73 For more on the importance and concept of distributing intelligence capabilities to the company-level, please see Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, Capt. Matt Pottinger, and Paul Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Center for a New American Security: Washington DC, January 2010); Lieutenant Rory M. McGovern, ‘Organizing for Intelligence’, *Fires* (January–February 2008); Major Rod Morgan, ‘Company Intelligence Support Teams,’ *Armor* (July-August 2008), pp. 23-25 & 50; and Glenn and Glayton, *Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan* (2008) pp. 16-19.

of company-level priority and specific information requirements, respectively, to guide information collection in the course of framework operations. That information gathering can be further enhanced through the provision of an inexpensive digital camera to each section.

- **Local Language Capability for All Units Conducting Operations:** Human intelligence is often among the most important sources of information necessary to protect civilians. Positive and professional interactions between peacekeepers and local civilians serves both to enhance two-way information flows between the mission and the populace, and to reassure locals where appropriate. Thus all units conducting operations that do not speak a local language should have interpreters attached, or assigned on a rotating basis if there are not enough to meet demand.

Further consideration should be given to how TTPs may need to be adjusted to address the specific challenges associated with POC, and the impact of such adjustments on force requirements. For example, a greater emphasis on dismounted patrols by mechanized infantry may require changes in the equipment loads and augmentation of personnel and/or armament at the platoon or section level.

Suggested Critical Tasks List for a Company Intelligence Cell

1. Collect data and conduct pattern analysis.
 - Collect and analyze patrol debriefs. Track and analyze all significant activities (SIGACTS).
 - Conduct local intelligence analysis and forecast adversary actions.
2. Conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.
 - Create and execute tactical questioning and sensitive site exploitation plans.
 - Target individuals for bilateral engagements.
 - Supervise detainee operations.
3. Facilitate exchange and dissemination of intelligence.
 - Facilitate information flow between company and battalion S2.
 - Facilitate intelligence sharing with adjacent units.
 - Maintain intelligence board for outgoing patrols.
 - Produce detailed monthly intelligence summary (INTSUM).
4. Advise the commander on intelligence-related matters.
 - Conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) for company operations.
 - Recommend company priority information requirements (PIRs) and specific information requirements (SIRs) to the commander.
 - Provide targeting recommendations to the commander.
 - Provide counterintelligence/deception recommendations to the commander.

Source: Adapted from Lieutenant Rory M. McGovern, 'Organizing for Intelligence,' *Fires* (January – February 2008).

8.2 POC in the Force Generation Process

Once the key mission documents and force requirements are defined, the challenge shifts to fielding a force capable of implementing the strategy. The UN must negotiate with Troop Contributing Countries to secure the participation of troops, equipment, staff officers and UN military observers. Intrinsic to the force generation process is the challenge of accurately communicating:

1. The nature of the operational environment, geography, armed actors, risks, challenges, etc.;
2. The threats to civilians (who, how, where, when and why) and the counter-strategy the UN PKO will execute; and,
3. The skills, capabilities and force posture required so that contingents can execute that counter-strategy.

Discussions with potential TCCs begin early in the planning process, but the scale and terms of their participation are finalized through the engagement of the Force Generation Service (FGS), Operational Advisory Teams (OATs), and the Integrated Training Service (ITS).

The FGS leads the recruitment of TCCs, coordinates TCC reconnaissance visits to the AO, and negotiates the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) specifying the financial reimbursement TCCs will receive for personnel, equipment and services. Although intended as purely administrative documents, MOUs have frequently had unintended operational consequences, constraining how troop contingents can be tasked and where they can be deployed. ***MOUs should be drafted to provide the flexibility, agility and adaptability in force structure and deployment required to address the challenges of the POC.***

The process is driven by the key mission documents, including the UNSCR, the CONOPS, ROE, and the Force Requirements, that are bundled together as Guidelines to Troop Contributing Countries. Until recently, engagement with TCCs took place primarily through the Permanent Missions to the UN in New York. As a result, critical information regarding mandate interpretation, strategy, CONOPS, ROE, etc. has not always reached the personnel that will be deployed, nor the institutions that are tasked with preparing them to participate in UN PKOs (e.g. peacekeeping training centers). Full mission documentation should be transmitted to the national military institutions of TCCs, including where possible the commanders and staffs of the specific units that will be deployed.

Pre-Deployment Training: Having agreed to participate in a UN PKO, TCCs are responsible for preparing their contingents through pre-deployment training (PDT). That training consists of generic and mission-specific components. The generic component is structured around Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) provided to TCCs by the Integrated Training Service. Although ITS has recognized the need for enhanced training on POC, the recently developed CPTM reflects the current lack of clear guidance in formal UN guidance and doctrine:

...The language is often different or vague with respect to the protection of civilians. Even across the United Nations system, there is no agreed upon definition of the term “protection of civilians”. As with the use of force, language used by the Security Council has evolved. Recently, the Security Council has indicated that “without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government”, UN peacekeeping operations should protect civilians under imminent threat (see for example, the mandate of UNAMID).⁷⁴

The CPTM describes the broad function of the military component as creating “a secure and stable environment for other elements of the peace process to be implemented.”⁷⁵ Although citing MINUSTAH’s offensive operations against Haitian gangs in Port-au-Prince as an example of best practices,⁷⁶ the CPTM only lists a narrow range of tasks as the means by which the military component will achieve that objective, namely:

- ▶ Conducting patrols;
- ▶ Establishing and operating checkpoints;
- ▶ Securing major routes to facilitate mobility; and
- ▶ Securing key facilities.⁷⁷

CPTMs should be amended to:

- ▶ ***Reflect the definition of POC for the military component as outlined in Section II-5;***
- ▶ ***Clearly explain the importance of POC to the legitimacy and success of UN PKOs;***
- ▶ ***Include a brief introduction to the challenges of implementing POC mandates, and particularly the concept of managing the consequences of action and inaction;***
- ▶ ***Provide an accurate description of the broad range of tasks that are used in practice to achieve the POC objective; and,***
- ▶ ***Include scenarios illustrating the challenges of implementing POC mandates at the operational and tactical levels.***

74 “UNIT 2 – PART 1: Establishment & Operationalization of Security Council Mandates in PKOs” in *UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core PreDeployment Training Materials*, 1st ed. (2009) p. 23. Available online at: <http://www.cecopac.cl/documentacion/PDF/cptm/CPTM%20Unit%202%20-%20Parts%201-2%20May%202009.pdf>.

75 “UNIT 2 – PART 2: How UN Peacekeeping Operations Function” in *UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core PreDeployment Training Materials*, 1st ed. (2009) p. 48. Available online at: <http://www.cecopac.cl/documentacion/PDF/cptm/CPTM%20Unit%202%20-%20Parts%201-2%20May%202009.pdf>.

76 “In late 2006, the military contingents of MINUSTAH used urban combat operations to overcome the aggressive and organized resistance of the armed groups, with UN Police playing a supporting role by providing a standby force capacity and the use of nonlethal means to arrest gangsters. As the UN military component gained control of the security situation in these neighbourhoods, UN Police were able to enter and work with the Haitian National Police to reestablish law and order, and civilians (civil affairs officers from the mission, as well as UN and NGO humanitarian and development agencies) were able to work with local authorities and community groups to reestablish public services.” Ibid. pp. 50-51.

77 The section on Human Rights in Unit 3 also asserts that “military peacekeepers provide protection, and often armed protection. They patrol, control borders, establish checkpoints and cordons close to refugees/IDPs camps or in areas characterized by conflicts. The peacekeepers’ armed presence can act as an important deterrent to human rights violations. Vulnerable groups and individuals can raise their living standards thanks to the improved security.” “Unit 3 – Part 1: International Legal Standards” *UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core PreDeployment Training Materials*, 1st ed. (2009) pp. 44-45.

Mission-specific training is developed and delivered by TCCs based on Pre-deployment Information Packages (PIPs) and operational training guidance provided by the Office of Military Affairs.⁷⁸ PIPs include information on the host state, mission, mandate, conflict dynamics, UNCT presence, culture, etc. Operational training guidance is provided to TCCs through a number of mechanisms, including the establishment of operational training standards, the issuance of mission-specific training directives, and the provision of advice on an ad hoc basis. A key mechanism for doing so is the Operational Advisory Team (OAT).

The purpose of the OAT is to ensure that the forces provided by TCCs to participate in UN PKOs are adequately trained and prepared to implement the strategy laid out in the CONOPS.⁷⁹ In response to requests by TCCs, it provides advice on the operational and tactical challenges associated with a specific mission. The OAT conducts technical surveys of ongoing and new field missions to identify those challenges, and develops advisory programs and briefings to assist TCCs in developing mission-specific pre-deployment training. TCCs are engaged as far in advance of deployment as possible, not only through Permanent Missions in New York but by sending personnel to TCCs to brief, assess any existing mission-specific pre-deployment training, and transmit lessons learned and best practices that may be relevant for the upcoming deployment. ***Pre-deployment engagement with TCCs by the Operational Advisory Team should be standard practice, and where possible include leadership from the contingent to be deployed.***

OAT Briefing to TCC: Outline of 2009 MONUC CONOPS Revision

- ▶ Supports UNSCR 1856, 1820
- ▶ Conduct Mobile operations to dominate Area of Responsibility
- ▶ Stress Operational flexibility – reserves at all levels
- ▶ Posture based on threat- robust reconnaissance
- ▶ Expeditionary - Extended Day / Night Patrols
- ▶ Camp Consolidation generates patrolling strength (2 COYs plus)
- ▶ Mobile Operational Bases- only temporary for specific operations
- ▶ Supports Lines of Operation- Protect, Compel, Support
- ▶ Directed cordon and searches tactics

Source: Operational Advisory Team Briefing to TCCs on MONUC (2009).

⁷⁸ United Nations DPKO/DFS, *Support to Military and Police Pre-Deployment Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations* (1 October 2009) Ref. 2009.21.

⁷⁹ UN DPKO MPS, *Draft Terms of Reference: Operational Advisory Team* (June 2009).

Section III: Implementing POC in the Field

9. Executing POC Operations

Moltke's dictum that no plan survives contact with the adversary highlights that executing plans is as challenging as developing them. The adversaries that confront UN PKOs are strategic actors that constantly adapt and react in pursuit of their objectives. As with other military operations, UN operations must adapt in turn, treating planning as an ongoing iterative process. Although presented in the context of mission startup planning, the analytical frameworks described in this document may be usefully adapted and applied at Force, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters, and even by companies and platoons deployed to forward bases. Fundamentally, though, campaigning remains an art more than a science, requiring the flexible application of principles and tools. Those particularly relevant to achieving the POC objective are discussed below.

9.1 A Maneuverist Approach

The maneuverist approach involves military operations that primarily target an adversary's critical vulnerabilities. It seeks to neutralize adversaries by shattering their ability to fight in a coordinated manner.⁸⁰ The aim is to “defeat [an adversary] by bringing about the systematic destruction of [its] ability to react to changing situations, destruction of its combat cohesion and, most important, destruction of [its] will to fight.”⁸¹ Employing this approach seeks to throw adversaries off balance by forcing them to confront new problems faster than they can adjust to counter them. By throwing them off balance, interrupting their operations and pre-empting their decision-making processes, commanders can generate effects at lower costs than through the direct application of combat power alone.

In the context of stability operations, and UN PKOs in particular, the maneuverist approach takes on a more expansive meaning. It implies not only a mobile, agile and adaptable approach to employing the military component, but the careful synchronization and sequencing of military efforts with other non-military lines of operation, all bound together by an overarching mission-wide strategy. In some circumstances, the military component will be the lead actor while in others it may play a supporting role for other mission components. In general, though, operational objectives are best pursued through coordinated action by all mission components: public information to help shape local and global perceptions; civil affairs section (CAS) to help map the local political and social dynamics; CAS, child protection, human rights, and others to provide detailed information on the location and characteristics of the civilian population; and in integrated missions, OCHA to help plan and coordinate humanitarian responses as part of a mission-wide POC strategy.

The expansion of the maneuverist approach to encompass coordinated action across mission components is important to UN PKOs for two reasons. First, the objective of ensuring security for the civilian population has multiple dimensions that interact dynamically. Stove-piped efforts by mission components may fail to account for those interactions, and synchronization is required to ensure that the efforts of one component are not undermined by dynamics falling under the purview of another. For example, military action against

⁸⁰ This does not always mean their physical destruction.

⁸¹ Department of National Defence, B-GL-300-002/FP-000, *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1997) pp. 1-4.

an ethnic militia responsible for attacks against civilians may be necessary, but if the community associated with that militia is locked in a security dilemma, military pressure could further intensify that community's perception of an existential threat. Coordination with other sections – especially public information and civil affairs, in this example – could frame UN military action in ways that counter that perception, undermine or constrain the militia, and create opportunities for political engagement and local conflict resolution efforts. Similarly, where military action may result in the unintentional displacement of civilians, humanitarian efforts to mitigate the consequences and ensure a rapid return to secured areas may be necessary not only to protect civilians in the immediate situation, but to prevent unintended second- and third-order effects (e.g. creating suffering or long-term displacement that armed actors may exploit) that could undermine the positive impact of military action.

Second, integrated lines of operation are required to fully exploit the impact of military operations. Military actions are subsumed by the broader battle of narratives in which various actors seek to shape local and global perceptions to their desired ends. Thus while military action may be required to set conditions for other lines of operation, it will rarely prove decisive on its own. Information operations, political engagement, local conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, security sector reform, mine action, legal reform – each may be necessary in different combinations and configurations to short-circuit the dynamics that sustain conflict and prevent their reemergence.

While acknowledging the limitations of military action to achieve the goal of securing the civilian population, its importance should not be underestimated. Moreover, the fundamental principles of military operations still apply to UN PKOs. In coordination with other components, military components should always seek to seize and maintain the initiative against spoilers, expanding the security of civilians and the momentum of the peacebuilding process. In this context, the use of minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect does not preclude the decisive application of overwhelming force at the tactical and operational levels. Rather, it implies careful consideration about where, when and how to do so in order to achieve the desired operational effect.

Security, Land and Conflict in Ituri

Since 1999 the Ituri district in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been the site of an intense ethnic war characterized by extreme brutality against civilians. The Hema and Lendu communities had long-running disputes over land, but the insecurity, external manipulation and collapse of state authority associated with the Second Congo War led to a major escalation that by 2003 had cost more than 50,000 lives through direct violence. Attacks against civilians by armed actors on all sides were driven by a desire to control illegal mining sites and to settle land disputes by force of arms.

In 2003, in the wake of the Ituri crisis and the temporary intervention of the French-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), MONUC launched a military campaign to compel the various armed groups to enter the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program. Intense military pressure applied systematically and often in conjunction with the Congolese government military led to over 15,000 combatants entering the DDR process by August 2005, and a significant reduction in the number of attacks on civilians.

However, MONUC and the Congolese government failed to capitalize on the opportunity created through military action. MONUC viewed the ethnic militias as warlord groups and the conflict as fundamentally driven by illegal exploitation of natural resources. The legitimacy and administrative capacity of the Congolese government in Ituri was limited, and despite efforts by local officials, a key driver of both the conflict and against civilians went unaddressed. As MONUC's main effort shifted to addressing insecurity in the Kivus, analysts and local peacebuilding actors warn that the underlying conflict dynamics have the potential to reemerge and generate new violence as military pressure eases. Thus Ituri serves as an example of the need for integrated military and non-military lines of operation to fully exploit military success and build towards long-term stability.

For more on this subject, see Thierry Vircoulon, "The Ituri paradox: When armed groups have a land policy and peacemakers do not," in Ward Anseeuw and Chris Alden (eds), *The Struggle over Land in Africa* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2010).

9.2 Mission Command and Accountability

Mission command refers to the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution of orders that specify operational and tactical objectives, but allow on-scene commanders to exercise initiative and discretion in determining the best way to achieve those objectives. It recognizes the importance of adaptability in the face of rapidly changing operating environments, and that on-scene commanders often have a better grasp of the situation than superiors at a distant base. It also seeks to avoid paralysis in the face of those changes, which can result from requirements to relay information to higher echelons and await guidance before taking action. Given the need to respond rapidly to threats against civilians, the authority to rapidly assess the situation in light of the commander's intent and decide on the appropriate action must be delegated to tactical commanders even as they exchange information with higher headquarters.

Mission command requires that subordinate leaders at all echelons have a clear appreciation of the commander's intent, and an environment of trust and mutual understanding. For POC in particular, troops serving in UN PKOs have sometimes been reluctant to use force beyond self-defense to protect civilians in accordance with their ROE for fear of being investigated. Tactical commanders must know that they have the backing of their chain of command if political controversy results from their decisions to act (or not) that are consistent with the CONOPS, OPORD, and other guidance.

In turn, leadership at all levels must be held accountable for accomplishing the operational objective of protecting civilians from violence. It must be clearly communicated that a failure to do so constitutes a failure to implement the mandate – in some cases a failure to follow orders – that will result in an investigation and appropriate consequences. Where a UN PKO is mandated to protect civilians, the responsibility of subordinate leaders to implement that mandate in accordance with the commander's intent is not optional. Mission command and accountability for accomplishing the mission are two sides of the same coin, and the discretion afforded to on-scene commanders must enable the pursuit of operational objectives, not become an excuse for inaction.

9.3 Analysis and Adaptation

As evident from the planning process outlined above, information and analysis are prerequisites for effective action to protect civilians. POC mandates are particularly challenging for military actors in relation to both aspects of the intelligence generation process. The PIRs and analysis for POC are more typical of police intelligence than military intelligence (MI) processes, requiring significant adjustments to conventional military TTPs and intelligence organization. Four basic principles should guide such efforts:

- ▶ An 'all source' approach should be adopted. Non-traditional sources of information from both inside and outside the UN PKO should be fully exploited, including other mission components; the local population; independent NGO reports; media stories; humanitarian and human rights actors; development actors; and local civil society. Often these groups have better freedom of movement than military actors,

and a deeper understanding of the situation rooted in longer-term engagement. While the accuracy of information from such sources should be carefully assessed, and background knowledge of their perspective/agenda factored into the analysis process, open-source information can often provide critical insight and should not be disregarded in favor of information generated by the military component's own efforts. As one intelligence official has observed, "Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other 10 percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic. The real intelligence hero is Sherlock Holmes, not James Bond."⁸²

- ▶ Every soldier should be a sensor. Whether on patrol, manning a checkpoint, or conducting operations, every soldier should be informed of PIRs, be encouraged to report what they observe, and be debriefed by their immediate commander when appropriate (e.g. on completing a patrol, completing duty at a checkpoint, etc.) This may require additional training to establish a baseline familiarity with the operational environment.
- ▶ Intelligence collection and analysis capability should be distributed throughout the military component and down to the tactical level. This may include ensuring that each patrol is accompanied by a soldier trained in tactical intelligence collection, and particularly tactical human intelligence techniques appropriate for interacting with the local population.
- ▶ Intelligence must flow both ways between lower and higher echelons. Often intelligence is passed from tactical units up the chain of command where it is collated with material from other sources and further analyzed, but not distributed back down to the units responsible for developing and carrying out operations in their AO. While in some cases operational security may preclude sharing intelligence generated at higher headquarters, information flows should be two-way wherever possible to enhance situational awareness and understanding of the larger operational environment at the tactical level.

These principles should inform how military components of UN PKOs organize for intelligence gathering and analysis.

Because of the variation in operational environments into which UN PKOs deploy, and in the organization and mandates of the UN PKOs themselves, the structures and mechanisms created to gather and analyze intelligence should be developed as the mission takes shape, and adapted as conditions change in the field. However, certain types of structures will be required across different contexts, and others such as Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and Joint Operating Centres (JOCs) are already established in all UN PKOs as a matter of DPKO policy.

9.3.1 Company Intelligence Cells. As outlined in the section of Force Requirements for POC, given the importance of tactical information gathering and intelligence analysis to rapidly assess and respond to threats to civilians, companies should be provided with Company

⁸² Lieutenant General V. Wilson, former director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, quoted in Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (2010).

Intelligence Cells. Depending on the overall force structure and the assets/organization of the troop contingents, this may be accomplished either through the direct assignment of additional personnel to companies, or their augmentation with personnel seconded to companies but still reporting to battalion S2. In either case, intelligence personnel should serve on long rotations, and if possible be staggered in relation to the rest of the contingent in order to significantly overlap with newly deployed contingents. This will mitigate the loss of deeper knowledge of the tactical AO that often accompanies troop rotations. For more specific information on their role and functions, please see Text Box: Suggested Critical Tasks List for a Company Intelligence Cell on page 80.

9.3.2 Joint Tactical Collection and Analysis Teams (JCATs). These should constitute a civil-military equivalent to the Company Intelligence Cells described above. Their purpose is to combine the information collection and analysis expertise of civilian components with those of the military at the tactical level to:

- a. Enhance situational awareness and support joint planning for POC at the company level; and,
- b. Provide intelligence products that reflect joint analysis to support the development of a common operational picture and joint planning at the regional and mission headquarters levels.

The exact composition of such teams will vary, but should ideally include representatives of Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Child Protection, Political Affairs, Public Information, and where relevant DDR or DDRRR components. JCATs should be developed and deployed into a particular tactical AO on a long-term basis in order to build the relationships with the local population required to collect information, and the knowledge of the local situation required to understand local conflict dynamics. Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) fielded by MONUC represent the current incarnation of this concept, but they are deployed on a short-term basis – no more than 5 days at a time.⁸³ Additional personnel and equipment (communications, vehicles, etc.) are required to enhance the effectiveness of this concept.

9.3.3 Surveillance Centers. Another concept introduced by MONUC is the Surveillance Center, a 24-hour-a-day call center staffed by an interpreter and military personnel from a battalion command to receive reports of attacks against civilians and direct patrols to respond. This has created a mechanism for rapid response to threats, but relies on existing communications infrastructure that may not be present in all AOs. Where necessary, this could be overcome through the distribution of communications equipment to local leaders (e.g. VHF handsets). In further developing this concept, Surveillance Centers should be jointly staffed by civilian and military personnel, and linked to relevant Company Intelligence Cells and battalion S2s in order to better inform responses, avoid potential exploitation by adversaries to ambush UN troops and personnel, and enhance response times where reinforcements are required.

9.3.4 Joint Mission Analysis Centers. Since 2006, missions have been directed as a matter of policy to establish Mission Headquarters-level Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs).

⁸³ See *Terms of Reference for Joint Protection Teams* (MONUC, 10 February 2009) and *Joint Protection Teams: Standard Operating Procedures* (MONUC, 10 February 2009) for further information on JPTs.

JMACS have been proven extremely useful in some missions, but as currently constituted are primarily intended to provide intelligence to support decision-making by the SRSG.⁸⁴ As intelligence fusion cells where information from across the mission is brought together for holistic analysis, ***regional and tactical JMACs should be established at the brigade and, where appropriate, battalion levels, and their products more widely distributed to leaders at multiple echelons.*** Although restricted distribution will be required for some products, it should be the exception rather than rule. Because information drives operations, it should be distributed as widely as possible within the mission.⁸⁵ The military component should seek close coordination between their J2/J3/J5 sections and JMACs. To enhance this coordination, JMACs should be organized into three sections:

1. A Strategic Analysis Cell to monitor long-term threats, trends and dynamics, and support long-term planning.
2. An Operational Analysis Cell to monitor current trends, report on existing and emerging threats, and analyze the impact of current operations. This encompasses what is generally referred to as current operational analysis.⁸⁶
3. An Operations Planning Support Cell to develop intelligence required to plan and execute future operations. This cell would handle what is generally referred to as network analysis.⁸⁷

In this context, ‘operations’ refers to efforts by all components of the UN PKO, not just the military component, and JMACs would provide support to mission-wide integrated planning.

Some missions have supplemented JMACs with structures dedicated to intelligence collation, analysis and planning for POC, such as MONUC’s Rapid Response and Early Warning Cell (RREW). Whether separate planning structures are required is likely to vary from mission to mission, in part on the degree to which POC is integrated into existing planning mechanisms. The structure and role of the RREW is very specifically aligned to some of the POC issues faced by MONUC, and may be of limited value in other mission contexts. In particular, it may have the unintended effect of segregating planning for operations to reduce the vulnerability of civilians from planning for those intended to reduce the threat.

In addition to establishing structures to collect and analyze the intelligence required to protect civilians, collection methods must be tailored to purpose. Information should be collected and collated to allow the analysis of threats to geographically or demographically defined populations of civilians within tactical AOs. These relatively detailed PIRs at the tactical level are what create the need for the structures detailed above, and preclude aggregation of data during capture or collation. This may create a requirement for enhanced secure information

84 For more on JMACs, please see *DPKO Policy Directive: Joint Operations Centres and Joint Mission Analysis Centres* (1 July 2006).

85 Although this guidance refers to operations within a UN PKO, such analysis or information may be useful and in some cases critical to effective protection of civilians by protection actors external to the mission. Mechanisms and strategies should be created to share appropriate information with relevant external protection actors. Such information-sharing mechanisms should incorporate operational security issues as required.

86 Teamey and Sweet, ‘Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency’ (2006).

87 Teamey and Sweet, ‘Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency’ (2006).

management and communications systems to capture, store and make that intelligence available to relevant mission personnel.⁸⁸

Intelligence should not just drive operations, but also adaptation by the mission. At the brigade and battalion level, leaders should continually assess the impact of their operations and adjust as required. When operations are apparently successful, it may be advisable to ‘red team’ plans for the next phase in order to preempt adaptation by adversaries.⁸⁹ In particular, the Strategic Analysis Cell of the Mission Headquarters JMAC and the Force HQ J5 should be monitoring longer-term trends and dynamics in the area of operations, and assessing whether the operational approach matches conditions or requires adjustment, revision or wholesale redesign. While reports by the Secretary-General and periodic scrutiny by the Security Council will create external impetus for strategic reviews, Force Commanders should create continuous internal assessment mechanisms, and periodically convene red teams to challenge plans and assumptions, particularly when approaching periods of heightened tensions (e.g. elections, deadlines for disarmament, ethnic or religious holidays, etc.) or transitioning between phases. Continuous adaptation is required to keep adversaries off balance and prevent them from seizing the initiative from the UN PKO and undermining progress towards operational and strategic objectives.

88 For more on intelligence and metrics issues for POC, please see the sections above entitled ‘Deter and Compel – COA Formulation for POC in UN PKOs’ ; ‘Mapping Vulnerable Civilians’ ; Kelly, *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations (2010)*.

89 “Red teams are organizational elements comprised of trained, educated, and practiced experts that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. Red teams assist joint operation planning by validating assumptions about the adversary, participating in the wargaming of friendly and adversary COAs, and providing a check on the natural tendency of friendly forces to ‘mirror image’ the adversary (i.e., to ascribe to an adversary the same motives, intent, and procedures that guide friendly forces).” U.S. Joint Forces Command, *JP 2-0 Joint Intelligence* (June 2007).

Annex I:

Working with Other Components and Actors for POC

This portion of the guidance has not been developed. However, additional work is required to identify key lessons and best practices to inform guidance on how the military component of UN PKOs can best work with other components of the operation, as well as actors outside of the operation (such as human rights, humanitarian and development actors, respectively) to accomplish the shared goal of improving the security of civilians.

Although work is already underway to improve coordination across the components of UN PKOs (such as the Strategic Framework on the Protection of Civilians, which provides guidance for the formulation of mission-wide protection of civilians strategies), a key challenge for such operations is the collection, fusion and analysis of information from all available sources to develop a 'common operational picture' or COP. A COP provides a common understanding of the nature of the challenges as the basis for developing the coherent multidimensional strategies required to address threats to civilians.

Part of the challenge in developing and implementing such strategies is the lack of understanding between the diverse perspectives, capacities, mandates, planning processes, and cultures of the various components that make up a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation. Magnified by distinct professional lexicons, these differences can lead to misunderstanding and mistrust, and a breakdown in the unity of effort that is key to successful PKOs.

A number of initiatives related to integrated missions and specific to the protection of civilians have been considered and/or introduced at the strategic, operational and tactical level to try to bridge these gaps. These include:

- ▶ The Strategic Framework on the Protection of Civilians which provides guidance on creating mission-wide protection of civilians strategies;
- ▶ Pre-deployment or in-mission scenario-based training and/or table top exercises; and,
- ▶ Joint protection teams and community liaison officers (as discussed in Chapter 9.3.2).

However, challenges persist and specific remedies are needed to bridge the divide between the military component and other protection actors. This could be addressed through:

- ▶ The development and updating of mission-specific civil-military guidelines that include protection issues;

- ▶ Increased civil-military coordination training that brings various protection stakeholders to the table and includes protection scenarios; and,
- ▶ Additional outreach by the military to civilian counterparts and non-mission actors to raise awareness of their role, responsibilities, opportunities and limitations.

Operationalizing the final bullet might involve embedding military liaison officers in every other component at the mission, regional, brigade and battalion headquarters levels. Such liaison officers could help:

- ▶ Bridge terminological/conceptual/cultural gaps;
- ▶ Explain military component actions and identify areas of planning/ops that require or would benefit coordination; and,
- ▶ Identify issues that need to be raised at higher level.

Liaisons can only form part of the solution. The guidance that DPKO has developed in coordination with its partners to date understandably focuses on the mission level. What is further required are mechanisms for synchronized mission-wide planning not only at mission headquarters, but also at the brigade and possibly battalion levels (depending on the structure of the mission). Further, as guidance evolves, it should draw on non-UN sources of military (and police) lessons learned for securing the population, as it already does with regard to civilian perspectives on the issue.⁹⁰

Beyond coordination across components of UN PKOs, additional work is required to better codify the best practices that have been established in recent years for sharing information with humanitarian, human rights and development actors.

90 The DPKO *Draft Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (2011) lists documents from the Overseas Development Institute, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, ICRC, the Global Protection Cluster as relevant additional sources to complement UN documents. It does not list any documents relating to military or police operations from non-UN sources.

Annex 2: Glossary

Decisive Points

227. While it may be possible to defeat the adversary's CoG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of co-ordinated actions will be required. Such actions are described as DPs. A DP is therefore best described as an effect, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to unlocking the enemy's CoG. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance; they may be the elimination or denial of a capability, or an achievement such as obliging an adversary to engage in formal negotiations. The key is the effect that the actions have on the adversary and must be measurable. The acid test of a DP is that its removal from a campaign plan in the planning phase would prejudice the overall coherence of the plan and, during the execution, failure to achieve a DP would threaten the plan's viability. When creating DPs, planners should always:

- a. Define them in terms of their effect on the adversary, the environment or friendly forces.
- b. Ensure the extent of their fulfilment can be measured.
- c. Articulate clearly the purpose of each DP.

Source: JWP 5-00: Joint Operations Planning (UK, 2004) p. 2-16.

Integrated Task Forces (ITF) and Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF)⁹¹

ITFs and IMTFs are the principal Headquarters-level inter-agency bodies that ensure a coherent and consistent UN engagement in a given country/region. Following the Secretary-General's decision on integration (decision 2008/24), lead departments are required to maintain such task forces for each integrated UN presence. Task forces may also be formed by the lead department, when there is a need for Headquarters-level coordination, regardless of the type of presence in the field.

The primary role and focus of the task force may shift depending on the situation at hand and/or phase of the integrated presence. For example, the task forces will have a more intensive role in planning at the start-up phase of a field mission, while the focus will shift to a support and guiding role once the field mission is established. Some of the key functions of the task forces include the conduct of UN Strategic Assessments, implementing the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), and providing support and policy guidance to the relevant integrated UN presence.

Source: Guidelines: UN Strategic Assessment (UN, 2009)

⁹¹ In practice, the Department of Political Affairs uses the term "Integrated Task Force" for the inter-agency task forces they chair, whether or not in support of a field mission or office. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations uses the term "Integrated Mission Task Force."

Mission Command

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.

Source: FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of the Armed Forces (US, 2003) para. 1-67, pp. 1-17.

Lines of Operation

229. Lines of operation are planning tools that establish the inter-relationship, in time and space, between DPs and the CoG and are usually functional or environmental in nature. Lines of operation are the link between DPs in time and space on the path to the CoG, forming a critical path to the CoG.

230. Although individual environmental lines of operation, such as an 'air line of operation', can be valid, functional lines such as 'protection of Lines of Communication' will often be more effective. Such functional lines will link DPs that involve several environments, exploiting the different strengths of those environments. Lines of operation also may continue beyond the achievement of the operational CoG in order to reach the strategic end-state. There may be occasions where some lines of operation will go through the operational CoG and continue beyond, as in certain operations, even after defeat of the operational CoG, actions need to be continued to achieve the operational end-state.

Source: JWP 5-00: Joint Operations Planning (UK, 2004) p. 2-17.

Annex 3: About the Authors

While writing this report, **Max Kelly** was a research consultant at the Future of Peace Operations program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He has since joined Booz Allen Hamilton, and is currently supporting the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University. While at the Stimson Center, he worked primarily on military aspects of the protection of civilians in multilateral peace operations and preventing mass atrocities. He helped lead the conception, design, and implementation of Stimson's initiative to address the doctrinal deficit on the protection of civilians. Mr. Kelly was also a contributing author to the landmark UN-sponsored study, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges* (2009). Prior to joining the Stimson Center, he was the Managing Director of the Cambodian Genocide Group's R2P Initiative, where he organized public education, research and advocacy on the Responsibility to Protect. As Policy Director of STAND Canada, Mr. Kelly developed policy recommendations and promoted Canadian engagement on the conflicts in Sudan. While studying at the University of Toronto's Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he was selected as a Beattie Scholar and conducted field research in Central and East Africa.

Alison Giffen is the Deputy Director of the Future of Peace Operations program. She is responsible for leading the program's efforts to increase global preparedness to prevent and respond to violence against civilians in war-torn societies, including in its most extreme manifestation – mass atrocity and genocide. Ms. Giffen writes for, and speaks regularly to, military and civilian audiences on the challenges of protecting civilians in conflict – where civilians are not just caught in the crossfire, but a direct target. Ms. Giffen joined Stimson in 2009 with more than a dozen years experience monitoring and advocating on human rights and humanitarian crises.

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The program is led by Director William Durch and Deputy Director Alison Giffen and supported by researchers Madeline England, Guy Hammond, Michelle Ker, and Fiona Mangan, and project management specialist Nicole Dieker. To learn more about the program or to offer feedback on our work, please visit www.stimson.org/fopo or contact us at 202-223-5956.

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Stimson Center

1111 19th Street NW, 12th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

p 202.223.5956 | f 202.238.9604

www.stimson.org

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