

STIMSON

Protecting Civilians



Proposed Principles for Military Operations

By Max Kelly

Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations

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Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*

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Acronyms

AJP	Allied Joint Publication (NATO)
AOR	Area of Responsibility/Area of Operations
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
COG	Center(s) of Gravity
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FM	Field Manual (US)
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication (UK)
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication (UK)
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MOE	Measure(s) of Effort
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MOP	Measures of Performance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPSEC	Operations Security
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Section 1: The Context and Purpose of the Principles

1-1. **Background:** Whether as the primary goal or a key operational objective, protecting civilians from systematic violence and mass atrocity creates unique considerations for military operations. This document is the culmination of several years of research by the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program on those considerations, and what such operations require to succeed. It is informed by research into the fundamental drivers and dynamics of violence against civilians; analysis of military operations that attempted to protect civilians across a variety of regional, institutional, and theatre contexts; and wide consultations with experts, policy makers, and practitioners who have worked on these operations. In particular, it draws on the results of a workshop organized by the Stimson Center and held at the UK Defence Academy in September 2009. That event brought together scholars, doctrine writers, and military officers from around the world for a series of planning exercises around scenarios involving threats to civilians of varying nature and intensity. The result was a wide-ranging discussion of the challenges and key concepts for military operations tasked with the protection of civilians. The lessons identified in the discussions were combined with additional research and consultation to produce the Principles captured here.

1-2. **Purpose:** Research by the Stimson Center and others over the last decade has highlighted the gap in guidance, doctrine, and training for military actors tasked with protecting civilians from deliberate attacks. Despite an increasing number of operations tasked to provide such protection as either a strategic goal or operational objective, interviews with military officers and a number of recent reports consistently describe confusion about how to operationalize the concept.¹ More than a decade after the crises in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, and despite years of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Darfur, little guidance exists to help military actors plan and execute operations designed in whole or in part to protect civilians from systematic or mass violence.

1-3. While there is an emerging consensus at the strategic level regarding the importance of civil security to the success of military operations, and fundamental military tactics remain largely applicable to protecting civilians, ambiguity persists at the operational level.

¹ See Victoria Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*, Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2006; Thomas Szayna, Derek Eaton, Amy Richardson, *Preparing the Army for Stability Operations: Doctrinal and Interagency Issues*, RAND Corporation, 2007; Genocide Prevention Task Force, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers*, Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008; Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, independent study jointly commissioned by United Nations DPKO/OCHA, 17/11/2009, available at: <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20PKO.pdf>.

The operational level is the vital link between tactics and strategy, where resources are aligned and tactical actions are sequenced to achieve campaign objectives. As campaign objectives are achieved, they in turn accumulate to accomplish strategic objectives.² Our research suggests it is at this level where the lack of guidance is most acutely felt, even by relatively well-resourced military operations. Moreover, by making it harder to answer questions about how to align military resources and actions to address threats to civilians, the ambiguity at the operational level in turn hampers prioritization and decision-making at the strategic level. These Principles are intended as a first step towards addressing this gap in the hope that they will offer insights into the challenges of protecting civilians and catalyze further discussion and organic doctrine development processes in relevant national and multilateral institutions.

1-4. **The challenge:** The category of “systematic or mass violence” is broad, and encompasses many different patterns of attacks on civilians. It includes everything from rampant gang violence to terrorist or insurgent attacks on civilians, ethnic cleansing by state or non-state actors, and outright mass killing at the far extreme. This broad approach to the challenge of civil security³ acknowledges that in many cases, campaigns of targeted violence may only kill a few civilians in any one incident, but cumulatively may both exact a large toll and sow widespread terror. Such violence may include torture, sexual violence, or mutilation, as well as killing. It need not be explicitly politically or ideologically motivated; as has been evident in a number of theaters,⁴ often the boundaries between criminal and political violence are unclear, and the motivations mixed and difficult to conclusively determine in the moment. The point is that action to protect civilians is required regardless of whether the attacks against them fall into a particular conventionally recognized category, such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.

1-5. Notably, because the intended operational effect is an *absence* of severe violence, defining the desired end state and identifying criteria of success is intrinsically difficult and highly context-dependent.

1-6. **Scope:** This project does not seek to provide guidance on how military operations should address all threats to civilians. This guidance is intended to address the specific challenges involved in the planning and execution of military operations to protect civilians against systematic or mass violence. It is relevant to both standalone military operations and multidimensional operations in which the military is integrated with other components, whether undertaken by individual nations, ad hoc coalitions, or multilateral organizations.

1-7. **Relationship to existing operational doctrine:** These Principles do not independently provide a basis for the planning and execution of operations; they should be read in conjunction with the existing doctrine relevant for a given type of operation. They are intended to supplement that doctrine by highlighting the additional issues and concepts that must be addressed when planning for operations in which civil security is either the

2 For a succinct discussion of the operational level and its importance, see Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, “Thinking about the Operational Level,” *RUSI Journal* (December 2005) pp. 38-43.

3 *Civil security* refers to the security of the civilian population—the basic goal of protecting civilians. See the section entitled “A Note on Terminology” below for further explanation, and the Glossary for a doctrinal definition.

4 For example: Haiti, Sierra Leone, DRC, Sudan, Rwanda, Iraq.

primary goal or a key objective. Accordingly, this document does not seek to address the full range of issues relevant to each type of operation. Rather, it solely discusses the additional requirements generated by the protection objective. For example, the discussion of information operations does not attempt to cover the entirety of that complex issue. Nor does it presume that information operations are being executed as part of a stability operation versus a major combat operation. Only those considerations that directly arise from the objective of protecting civilians are covered, particularly those that may not have already been captured in existing doctrine or may not be self-evident to planners unfamiliar with the dynamics of systematic and mass violence against civilians.

1-8. **Applicability to the spectrum of military operations:** These Principles are designed to be relevant to a wide spectrum of operations in which the protection of civilians from systemic or mass violence may be a key objective. That spectrum includes humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace support, counterinsurgency, limited interventions, and major combat.⁵ This is intended to reflect the wide range of contexts in which civil security may have to be addressed, and the different types of operations that may be required to prevent or halt systematic or mass violence. The last two decades have provided a wealth of examples of stability operations confronted with the threat or reality of attacks on civilians in the context of UN and African Union peacekeeping missions, NATO peace support operations, and counterinsurgencies. That same record suggests that major combat operations or limited intervention may be among the few viable military options to halt mass atrocities in a situation resembling the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where the state is the perpetrator and will use its military to forcibly resist efforts to halt the killing. It is not presumed that all the various approaches discussed will be relevant or possible in all types of operations; clearly some methods that may be employed by a combat operation are not available to a peacekeeping operation. Thus the Principles are drawn broadly enough to apply across that spectrum, while acknowledging that they will have to be applied differently depending on, among other factors, the type of operation.

1-9. The Principles do not specify which type of operation is most appropriate for a given context, or whether the protection of civilians will be the primary or subordinate objective of the operation. They do, however, recommend a careful and frank assessment of the situation to determine whether and what type of military operations have a reasonable prospect of effectively protecting civilians.

1-10. **Host nations, peacebuilding, and sustainable security:** The types of operations encompassed by the spectrum described above vary considerably with regard to the relationship between foreign military forces and the host nation. In cases where non-state actors exploit the weakness of the state to commit systematic or mass violence,⁶ partnership with the state and efforts to build the capacity of its institutions may be critical to halting the pattern of violence. Such capacity building may constitute the main effort, or occur simultaneously with operations undertaken by the intervening force itself. Conversely, where the institutions of the host nation are complicit or responsible for attacks on civilians (e.g.

5 See the Glossary for definitions.

6 E.g. the Lord's Resistance Army [LRA] or sectarian militias in Iraq.

during the Rwandan genocide), intervening forces⁷ may have to disable those institutions in order to halt the violence. In such cases, once abuses have been halted or averted, major efforts will likely be required to ensure temporary security gains become sustainable, and to prevent the recurrence of systematic or mass violence against civilians once the intervening force withdraws. The Principles presented below are not intended to fully address the complexities of the state- and peace-building processes involved in creating sustainable security, topics well covered by a rich body of existing doctrinal and scholarly literature. To the extent that relationships with host nations and local partners are discussed, it is only with regard to preventing systematic or mass violence against civilians.

1-11. Draft nature of Principles: Operational doctrine must be attentive to the strategic-level policy and doctrinal framework in which it is nested. While drawing heavily on established doctrine, the Principles outlined below are intended to have relevance across a broad range of national and multilateral institutional contexts. Thus they attempt to avoid relying too heavily on strategic-level assumptions that may not hold true across different institutional contexts.

Further, these Principles are not intended to supercede the doctrine development processes organic to those institutions. Rather, they are intended to:

- ▶ Catalyze further consideration of the challenges involved in protecting civilians by the relevant doctrine-development bodies;
- ▶ Capture knowledge and experience from scholars and practitioners who have confronted those challenges in a variety of institutional settings; and,
- ▶ Feed that knowledge into institutional doctrine-development processes.

1-13. In the end, the Principles have been written with the knowledge—even the intent—that different elements, ideas and themes will be useful for different consumers. We encourage readers to draw on the elements they find most applicable to their own efforts.

1-14. A note on terminology: There is a confusing array of language used to describe the prevention of mass or systematic violence against civilians. Some actors use the term “civilian protection” to refer to a range of humanitarian, human rights, and development actions undertaken to secure a broad array of rights of individuals and communities, even where they are not affected by conflict. UN peacekeeping policy and doctrine generally refers to the “protection of civilians” as a key task for missions, deriving that phrase from UN Security Council mandate language, and intending to capture at minimum the prevention of mass or systematic violence. Recent US doctrine employs the term “civil security” to describe the task of providing security for the population against a wide range of violent threats, including (as demonstrated in Iraq) mass and systematic violence (Field Manual [FM] 3-0, FM 3-07, FM 3-24). UK peace support operations doctrine refers to

⁷ Note that the terms “intervening force” and “foreign military forces” are used interchangeably in this document. These terms are only intended to indicate the presumed expeditionary nature of military forces undertaking the operations discussed herein. Neither is intended to convey an assumption regarding whether the military operations under discussion will be conducted with or without the consent of the host nation. In the case of peacekeeping operations, such consent is a fundamental requirement for their deployment and continued existence, and while the terminology used here is meant to encompass PKOs, it is not intended to elide or obscure that basic requirement.

“humanitarian law enforcement” (Joint Warfare Publication [JWP] 3-50), and the November 2009 UK stability operations doctrine is among the most complete and sophisticated in its treatment of the issue, referring variously to “human security,” “protection of civilians,” and “protecting the population” (Joint Doctrine Publication [JDP] 3-40). Building on the strategic emphasis on preventing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in the organization’s Charter, African Union peace support operations doctrine from 2006 refers to the “protection of fundamental human rights” and the potential need to “curb human rights abuses.” Although currently under revision, NATO refers to “human rights abuses directed at civilians” (Allied Joint Publication [AJP] 3.4.1); and, despite confusion as to its meaning during the 1990s, the phrase “safe and secure environment” appears in the doctrine of a number of different nations and institutions.

1-15. For the purposes of this document, the terms “protection of civilians,” “protecting the population,” and “civil security” will be used interchangeably to refer to the prevention of mass or systematic violence against civilians. In this context, “systematic or mass violence” refers to physical violence deliberately targeting civilians that directly affects or threatens a significant proportion of a geographically definable population (population of a province; ethnic group in a city; etc.).⁸ The distinction between “mass” and “systematic” is ambiguous, but acknowledges that in many cases campaigns of targeted violence may only kill a few civilians in any one incident, but cumulatively may both exact a large toll and sow widespread terror. These definitions are not intended to capture isolated criminal acts unless they are perpetrated as part of a wider pattern of organized violence (e.g. illegal taxation, forced labor, rampant gang violence).

8 The concept of a geographically defined population is used here as part of a definition that takes the intensity of violence against civilians as its central concern, rather than the targeting of a group based on ethnic, religious, political or socioeconomic class identity. At the same time, it seeks to distinguish between grave and systematic but small-scale human rights abuses that are endemic in many parts of the world and are best addressed through non-military means, and larger-scale abuses whose severity and intensity render military action a reasonable response and sometimes the only viable option. One thousand civilians killed in violence across a large politically unstable country in a year is a distinct problem from one thousand civilians killed in the space of a few weeks in a single city, district, or province.

Section 2:

Strategic Framework: Civil Security in the Contemporary Operational Environment

2-1. The contemporary operational environment (COE) has changed significantly over the last two decades. One of those changes has been to the status, significance and role of civilians in modern conflicts. Although deliberate violence against civilians has been a frequent facet of war, in most conflicts its significance to victory or defeat was relatively marginal. During the Cold War the fate of civilians was a key factor in revolutionary wars, but in the post-Cold War era it has become critical to outcomes across the entire spectrum of conflict.

The Operational Environment

2-2. The rapid global dissemination of information through pervasive, decentralized, and democratized media has transformed the operational environment. The reach of media coverage has expanded and changing technology has made cameras a nearly ever-present reality on the battlefield. That same technology has decentralized media access, empowering groups and individuals beyond professional journalists to vie for the attention of the global audience. This has notably included many who disregard traditional journalistic standards and ethics in favor of speed, impact and propaganda value. Today, traditional media outlets, governments, civil society, and belligerents themselves compete to shape perceptions—and thus politics—in an unregulated global marketplace of ideas.

2-3. Those perceptions impact military operations in a number of ways. Global public opinion shapes international politics, affecting the policies and postures of actors whose decisions to support or oppose an operation—even rhetorically—can influence strategic outcomes. When military forces are deployed internationally, domestic audiences must remain convinced of the merit of the operation despite the inevitable costs and casualties. Finally, the perceptions of civilians in the area of operations (AOR) can both impact global public opinion, and have direct implications for military outcomes in certain circumstances.⁹

2-4. This battle of narratives has intensified the scrutiny on military operations. National and multinational military actors are continually challenged to demonstrate that their conduct conforms to the ideals they espouse, and that their use of force is justified by a reasonable prospect of success. Moreover, changing conceptions of national and international security have redefined success, often in terms of the (re)establishment of stable, legitimate states that uphold basic human rights. As a result, in the COE military

⁹ E.g. peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. See Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-07* (2008) para. 2-71, p. 2-14.

force alone is rarely if ever sufficient to accomplish the overarching political goals for which it is employed. Rather, force is used to set the conditions for other political, economic, and diplomatic tools to produce the desired end state. As General Sir Rupert Smith argues,

In seeking to establish conditions, our true political aim, for which we are using military force, is to influence the intentions of the people. This is an inversion of industrial war, where the objective was to win the trial of strength and thereby break the enemy's will. In war amongst the people the strategic objective is to capture the will of the people and their leaders, and thereby win the trial of strength.¹⁰

2-5. Thus the evolving nature of modern conflict has moved civilians from the sidelines to a central consideration for military operations.

Civilians in Modern Conflict

2-6. As outlined above, the real and perceived impact of military operations on civilians is a critical factor in determining strategic outcomes. Different actors draw vastly different implications from this observation. Some belligerents seek to “capture the will of the people” by deliberately targeting them for violence in order to:

- ▶ Impose or undermine disputed political authority (as in some counterinsurgencies and insurgencies, respectively);
- ▶ Tax, enslave, or forcibly recruit civilians (as with warlords lacking a political agenda);
- ▶ Exert political pressure on states or the international community to give in to political demands (terrorism); and,
- ▶ Eliminate certain sub-populations from a given area through either ethnic cleansing or outright elimination.

2-7. Despite the clear illegality of such strategies, deliberate violence against civilians remains a disturbingly common feature of contemporary conflicts, and a challenge for national and multinational operations ranging from peacekeeping to major combat.

2-8. As outlined above, for national and multilateral military operations, “capturing the will of the people” involves building and maintaining legitimacy among the global audience and local populace alike. Often this will require more than simply taking steps to avoid causing civilian casualties. Operations will be judged not only on their own conduct, but their ability to create and maintain security and stability in their area of responsibility (AOR). Where belligerents seek to use violence against civilians to discredit a government, terrorize a population, capture resources, or destroy an entire group, intervening forces will frequently have to take steps to ensure the security of the populace.

2-9. Recognition of this imperative is evident in the increasing proportion of military operations explicitly tasked with protecting civilians from systematic or mass violence. In

10 General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London, UK: Penguin, 2005, p. 277.

most cases, civil security is identified as an operational objective required to achieve strategic goals. In a few, the protection of civilians from violence is identified as a strategic objective unto itself. Even where the protection of civilians is a strategic objective, the requirements for military action to provide immediate security must be balanced against the steps necessary to establish a secure environment that will guarantee the safety of civilians after foreign military forces withdraw.

Implications for Military Operations

2-10. **Compression of the levels of war:** In addition to placing civilians at the center of modern conflict and making their protection a priority for military operations, as described above intensified scrutiny of military operations is a prominent feature of the COE. The dissemination of images and ideas at unprecedented speeds by individuals, journalists, and belligerents alike has fundamentally altered the way perceptions of the conflict are shaped among both local and global audiences. This increased transparency heightens the risk that action and inaction at the tactical level can have profound repercussions at the operational and strategic levels.

2-11. Failures to protect civilians from attacks can undermine the credibility of the operation among the local population, domestic audiences, and global onlookers whose support may be critical to the success of operations. Conversely, forceful action against belligerents to protect civilians carries risks of its own, particularly where it challenges conservative interpretations of state sovereignty. Strategic and operational commanders must ensure that tactical leaders possess a thorough understanding of their intent in order to ensure that all actions are consistent with and support the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. At the same time, tactical leaders must be empowered with the authority to take action without consulting higher echelons of command when faced with an emergency.

2-12. **Designing operations to protect:** The nature of threats to civilians will vary considerably across different conflicts. However, whether criminal or political, state or non-state, conventional or irregular, actors choose to attack civilians in order to achieve strategic goals. Such actors have often proven to be ruthless and determined adversaries, capable of rapid innovation and adaptation. As experience in a number of theaters and variety of institutional contexts over the last ten years have demonstrated, adjustments in tactics, techniques, and procedures are not enough to address such threats. Tactical virtuosity alone is insufficient to achieve operational objectives. No force can protect all civilians all the time, and belligerents intent on attacking civilians will always be able to find opportunities to inflict violence. Therefore a coherent operational approach based on careful analysis of those belligerents is required to reduce both the threats to civilians and their vulnerability to attack. Clear objectives must be identified whose accomplishment will contribute to achieving the desired end state, and a campaign plan developed to sequence and synchronize tactical actions in order to generate operational effects. Equally, planners and commanders must account for the additional force requirements associated with civil security objectives or risk deploying forces without the resources required to execute the

plan. Fundamentally, military operations to protect civilians must seize the initiative from belligerents and act systematically to improve civil security.

2-13. **Observing the laws of armed conflict:** Given the importance of legitimacy for contemporary military operations of all types, careful adherence to relevant laws is a fundamental requirement. While military operations to protect civilians will frequently be controversial even where necessary and successful, they must at minimum be conducted at all times and at all levels in accordance with the applicable laws of armed conflict. Where military operations are conducted in partnership with local groups or host nation security forces, steps must be taken to ensure that such local allies also observe relevant legal regulations. The importance of such considerations is evident in the frequency with which belligerents who flagrantly violate such laws try to create false perceptions of moral equivalence by accusing their adversaries of similar behavior. Clearly demonstrating through words and deeds the difference between military operations tasked with the protection of civilians and their unscrupulous adversaries can help such operations achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

2-14. **Employing a comprehensive approach:** While military forces are often a necessary component of a broad effort to protect civilians from violence, they are rarely sufficient. The efforts of diplomatic, emergency assistance, economic, and development actors are all required to fully address the proximate and root drivers of threats to civilians. A “comprehensive approach” is required that coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes military and civilian efforts to achieve synergistic effects in pursuit of commonly held goals. Such “unity of effort” is necessary to avoid partners working at cross-purposes, leaving critical issues unaddressed, and/or creating opportunities for adversaries to exploit. Depending on the particular circumstances, operations may also need to engage with the host nation, sub-state institutions, local civil society, and the private sector. For the military component of multidimensional operations, this means a more complex, iterative, and consultative approach to planning than typical, but one that can yield substantial dividends in terms of operational effectiveness.

2-15. Depending on the situation, the military component may be either the lead actor or operating in support of civilian actors. When the military is in the lead, commanders should seek input from civilian components to ensure that military actions to address immediate and short-term priorities are aligned as much as possible with long-term goals.¹¹ Conversely, when civilian actors are in the lead, the military component should seek full integration into the decision-making process as a supporting partner.

2-16. Even as military forces plan to “win the war,” they must work with civilian partners to also develop plans to “win the peace.” Such planning is necessary to ensure that the security provided by the presence of foreign military forces becomes sustainable once they depart. Inadequate planning for such transitions can generate security and governance

¹¹ For example, in the context of combat operations to neutralize genocidal state forces in the immediate to short-term, decisions about target selection to cripple critical infrastructure may benefit from advice from civilian experts on what will be required to rapidly reconstitute essential services in the stabilization phase. For peacekeeping forces, information about the location of agricultural lands and important trade routes for conflict-affected civilians may help inform which areas are prioritized for clearance operations and the establishment of forward positions.

vacuums that can undermine progress towards the desired end state, and endanger the accomplishment of the overarching political goals. However, as with the direct provision of civil security, transitioning to sustainable security requires concerted efforts across many areas, and the application of an array of non-military tools.

2-17. **Continuous learning and adaptation:** The most prominent features of the COE are its complexity and fluidity. Planning should be a continuous activity, evolving in response to changes in the operational environment. Soldiers and their civilian partners must constantly assess and reassess the threats to civilians, adapting their operational approaches to the continually shifting conflict dynamics. As intervening forces begin taking action to protect civilians, belligerents will respond and adapt by altering their tactics and patterns of operations. In some cases, they may abandon violence against civilians altogether in favor of other approaches. More frequently they will adjust their approach and continue perpetrating such attacks, requiring operations mandated to protect civilians to adjust in turn. Military operations seeking to protect civilians have to maintain the initiative in such strategic interactions, analyzing shifts in the operational patterns of their adversaries and rapidly countering them until the threat is neutralized.

Section 3: Principles for Military Operations to Protect Civilians

Understand the strategic logic behind attacks on civilians

3-1. **The rationale for violence against civilians:** Although often portrayed as irrational, belligerents deliberately target civilians in order to achieve their strategic objectives. They act in accordance with a bounded rationality¹² which may appear irrational to others. In some cases, the violence is intrinsic to the goals or ideology of the armed group. Examples include sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. In such cases, whatever the nature of the original or underlying drivers of conflict (e.g. land tenure; control of natural resources), one or more belligerents come to view the very existence of a portion of the civilian population as a threat, and thus adopt a strategy that targets them.

3-2. In other cases, violence against civilians may be more instrumental than intrinsic to the belligerent group or its goals. For example, terrorists may attack civilians as part of a strategy to seize political power, a government may use indiscriminate violence as part of a coercive counter-insurgency campaign, or an insurgent group may seek to terrorize a population into submission as part of its campaign to seize power.

3-3. Finally, for some armed groups violence against civilians is intrinsic not to their strategy, but rather to their existence and perpetuation. In some cases, violence against civilians may yield rewards in lieu of payment—looting, for example, or the transfer of land tenure to the victors.¹³ Attacking civilians may also be an integral part of an armed group's recruitment and retainment strategy. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) uses forced recruitment to replenish and expand its ranks, and consolidates that recruitment through mandatory participation in brutality, often against the recruit's own community or family. The LRA would not be able to survive if it ceased attacking civilians.

12 Bounded rationality refers to the idea that human decision-making rarely conforms to the predictions of classical rational actor models. Observers and actors often have radically differing perspectives on what constitute optimal outcomes and viable strategies to achieve them. These differences are attributable to the cognitive limitations of human beings, and the influence of ethnic, religious, political, class, and professional identities on perceptions. See Henry Hale, "Explaining Ethnicity," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 37 No. 4, May 2004, pp. 458-485; Roger Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, "Ethnicity as Cognition," *Theory and Society* (2004) vol. 33, pp. 31-64.

13 "In the Masalit wars in West Darfur in the 1990s (Flint and de Waal, 2008, pp. 56–66), and in the first flush of the counterinsurgency in 2003, the government sought recruits for the PDF and *mujahideen* (holy warriors). But service in Islamist militias was rewarded with war booty—not salaries—and the largely uneducated, impoverished Abbala who formed the backbone of the counterinsurgency wanted cash, not ideology." Julie Flint, *Beyond 'Janjaweed': Understanding the Militias of Darfur*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2009, p. 21. Available online at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP-17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf.

3-4. It is important to note that multiple logics may be at play in a given situation, with different motivations dominating at different levels of organization. Often strategic or ideological considerations will dominate decision-making at higher levels of command while criminal, emotional, or opportunistic motivations drive behavior at lower levels and may be manipulated by the senior leadership.

3-5. Addressing attacks against civilians requires an understanding not only of the identity, capacity, and recent operational patterns of belligerent groups, but also the underlying logic behind such attacks. In this respect, it is similar to other types of military operations, and requires the same level of analytical rigor. Where violence against civilians is used instrumentally, strategies that seek to raise the costs of such violence may induce belligerents to seek alternative means to achieving their goals. Where such violence is intrinsic to a belligerent's goals, it is not only their choice of strategy that must be altered, but their fundamental framing of the situation and understanding of their interests—a significant challenge requiring a wider spectrum of action.

3-6. Finally, where attacks on civilians are intrinsic to the belligerent group itself, strategies to deter further violence or alter their strategic calculus are unlikely to prove effective, and may have perverse effects.¹⁴ For this type of armed actor, violence against civilians is a requirement for its continued existence, and commitments to halt attacks generally prove hollow. In such cases, the outright defeat and dismantling of the belligerent group may be required to secure the civilian populace.

Develop a counter-strategy that reduces threats and vulnerabilities

3-7. Strategies to protect civilians should be firmly founded in an understanding of the nature of the threats they face. The challenge in developing such strategies is that they must address threats directed against civilians, rather than (or in addition to) threats against the friendly forces. Approaches designed to neutralize the capacity of belligerent groups to function as effective military forces while minimizing risk to friendly forces may not adequately address the ability of such groups to inflict violence on civilians even as their effectiveness is degraded. A fundamentally different analytical framework is required that treats the civilian populace as “key terrain” or even a friendly critical vulnerability.

3-8. **Violence against civilians and centers of gravity:** Understanding the logic motivating attacks on civilians is the first step. Analysis of the belligerents' center(s) of gravity (COG)¹⁵ and critical vulnerabilities, and the relationship between COGs and such violence,¹⁶ is then required in order to determine how best to employ military force to protect the targeted population. Both conventional military considerations and the issues specific to violence against civilians must be analysed in order to develop effective counter-strategies. The latter include but are not limited to: the geographic distribution of the civilians under threat, the

14 Examples of such belligerents include the Lords Resistance Army; the Rwandan Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, and their successors in ALIR; and arguably Al Qaeda in Iraq.

15 See the Glossary for the definition.

16 For example, if violence against civilians is critical to garnering or maintaining popular political or financial support, that constitutes a COG. See for example Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker, “Portrait of a Failed Rebellion: An account of rational, sub-optimal violence in Western Uganda,” *Rationality and Society* (2005) Vol. 17(1): 5-34.

pattern of violence against them, their relationship to the broader society in which they live, and their response to the violence.

3-9. **Use integrated lines of effort to achieve the objective:** Operations to halt attacks on civilians require the use of military, political, legal, and economic tools in a coordinated manner, and all military actions should be planned and implemented within the framework of an overarching political strategy. In support of that strategy, the military component should apply the full range of its lethal and non-lethal capabilities across multiple lines of effort.¹⁷ Building on a detailed understanding of the belligerent and the dynamics of violence against civilians, operational planners should develop a series of integrated lines of effort that seek to *reduce the vulnerability* of civilians to violence on the one hand, and *reduce the threat* of attack on the other. These two operational themes can be used to develop and organize complementary lines of effort to achieve the overall goal of protecting civilians.

3-10. *Reducing the vulnerability* of civilians involves actions focused on the targeted population, rather than the belligerent. It often includes security frameworks designed to control access to civilians—everything from the use of barriers, checkpoints, and patrolling, to defensive positions that block the advance of hostile forces. Humanitarian assistance can reduce the requirement for civilians to expose themselves to attack in order to seek food, water, shelter, fuel, and other necessities. Information operations and engagement with the community and its leaders can help civilians take steps to mitigate the risk of attack, and can lead to the creation of rapid alert systems that can help the operation respond quickly and inform other civilians of incidents. In particular, engagement by the operation with the targeted population can also create opportunities to manage its response to attacks, potentially forestalling reprisals against other civilians.

3-11. In some cases, more extreme measures may be required, such as the consolidation of widely dispersed vulnerable populations into more defensible temporary settlements in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. Wherever possible, such temporary evacuations should be done on a voluntary basis, and measures taken to ensure that those displaced have access to adequate food, shelter, healthcare, and other essential services, and that their right to reclaim their homes, land, and property are both recognized in law and implemented in practice.¹⁸ Finally, it may be necessary to create, mentor, train, equip, and assist indigenous forces to protect their own communities. The latter two options have serious risks associated with them, though. Displacement can separate civilians from indigenous coping

¹⁷ See the Glossary for the definition.

¹⁸ According to the ICRC, “Authorities faced with a non-international armed conflict may decide to transfer a civilian or group of civilians from one place to another within the national territory. In this case, the authorities’ decision complies with international humanitarian law only if the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons (our underlining) so demand. Even then, the decision is in line with humanitarian standards only if all possible measures are taken ‘in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition’” (Article 17(1) of [the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts] Protocol II). International Review of the Red Cross no. 305 (30 April 1995) p. 181-191. Available online at: <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwplList74/7DD0CC08E02E3914C1256B660059344F>.

mechanisms, increasing their vulnerability,¹⁹ and in some cases is the goal of belligerents (e.g. ethnic cleansing). While local defence forces have proven critical to improving civil security in some contexts, in others they have only contributed to insecurity by preying on the very civilians they are intended to protect. Moreover, such forces can prove difficult to demobilize or integrate into state security institutions. Thus intervening forces should only contemplate using these approaches where the alternatives are not viable, and/or where they are justified by the intensity of the threat.

3-12. *Reducing the threat* to civilians entails taking steps to change the behavior of belligerents and may involve reducing their offensive capabilities. It includes a wide spectrum, ranging from liaison and engagement at one end through information operations, shows of force, and interposition, to direct action and outright defeat at the other. These actions can be conceptualized as targeting two dimensions of the threat: the belligerent's intent to attack civilians, and its capacity to do so.

3-13. **Targeting intent:** The intent to attack civilians can be understood as a belligerent's decision to employ violence against civilians as part of its strategy to achieve its goals. Often it will be evident from an emerging or established pattern of operations on the part of a belligerent, and reflected in its ideology, some of its public communications, and/or its pattern of mobilization and deployment. Internal communications will often be explicit about the intent to attack civilians.

3-14. The intent of a belligerent may be changed in a number of ways. Liaison and engagement to persuade an armed actor to halt attacks against civilians can work in some cases, but is generally most effective when there is an existing relationship between that actor and the intervening force, or an opportunity to build one. Where persuasion is insufficient, the military or political costs of attacking civilians may be raised to the point where belligerents seek alternative strategies to achieve their goals. For example, information operations publicizing attacks against civilians by a belligerent may be used to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of its allies and supporters, forcing it to find another strategy or risk losing access to critical resources. Doing so will often require close coordination between the military and political components of a multidimensional operation, and between the field and headquarters to match public efforts with behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

3-15. The costs may also be raised through more direct military action. Operations that raise the risks or impose additional costs on a belligerent to make it more physically difficult to attack civilians can also alter the strategic calculus of belligerents. Examples include cutting off easy access through interposition, creating defensive positions that will have to be overrun to reach targeted civilians, inflicting retaliatory strikes against the belligerent, or threatening outright defeat if civilians are targeted.

¹⁹ Consolidating civilian populations has in some cases also created "pull factors" for further displacement to the area for protection or for access to humanitarian assistance. This should be planned for in advance to ensure adequate protection and assistance is available. Further, civilians consolidated into an area has also been reported to lead to other protection concerns (e.g. increased exploitation and/or abuse of civilians by community leaders and members, land and resource disputes in area of consolidation, voluntary or forced recruitment of civilians (including children) by belligerents in and militarization of camps, and/or creating areas that are easier for belligerents to target).

3-16. In cases where violence against civilians is intrinsic to the goals of the armed group, taking action that places those goals clearly and entirely out of reach may force a wholesale reevaluation of their viability and desirability. Doing so may lead to the abandonment of such extreme positions, or the marginalization of hardliners in favor of more moderate leaders. A peacekeeping operation presented with evidence of impending violence might alter its force posture, seek reinforcements, raid arms caches and enforce a weapons-free zone, for example—actions which in sum would both indicate the operation’s willingness and capacity to respond to attacks on civilians, and potentially strike at the capacity of the belligerent to execute its plan by a) alerting the targeted population to the threat and b) seizing some of the military materiel required to carry out the attack.

3-17. As described above, where violence against civilians is intrinsic to the existence of the belligerent group, attempting to alter the group’s strategic calculus is likely to prove fruitless. In such cases, targeting capacity is the only viable option.

3-18. **Targeting capacity:** Targeting the capacity of belligerents to attack civilians may, on the face of it, seem more straightforward. However, as recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, adaptive perpetrators may present significant challenges for even the most capable military forces. Moreover, the capacity to attack civilians often persists long beyond the point where such belligerents are capable of operating as coherent military units (see for example Operation Lighting Thunder against the LRA in the Ituri region of the DRC). This reinforces the requirement for an analytical framework and operational approach that is different from that used for military operations in which the security of civilians is not an objective.

3-19. In most cases, operations targeting intent and capacity will overlap significantly, but both will be necessary. Strategies of attrition, maneuver, and political maneuver may each prove most effective, depending on the context, the nature of the belligerent, and the capacity of the operation. In developing and selecting a course of action, other issues must also be considered, including:

- ▶ The tempo and intensity of the violence against civilians;
- ▶ The potential for escalation of that violence in response to intervention;
- ▶ The potential for retaliatory violence by the victim group following intervention; and,
- ▶ The potential for regional destabilization due to trans-boundary dynamics (refugee flows, mobilization of groups in other countries, etc.).

3-20. **The balance between defense and offense:** A basic dilemma that must be carefully addressed during planning is the balance between defensive,²⁰ stability,²¹ and offensive operations.²² Many of the stakeholders involved in calling for better protection of civilians (including some political leaders, human rights organizations, humanitarian agencies, and

20 See the Glossary for the definition.

21 See the Glossary for the definition.

22 See the Glossary for the definition.

communities at risk) may presume that doing so involves primarily defensive and stability operations. However, defensive and stability operations alone will only suffice when there is a clear and defensible geographic divide between the perpetrators and the target group, and/or the intervening force is capable of effectively securing or dominating the relevant area. When either of those two factors is absent, a largely reactive posture will be insufficient to secure the civilian population from determined and adaptable belligerent groups.

3-21. Defensive and stability operations should be complemented by offensive operations designed to, at minimum, temporarily disrupt the capacity of belligerent groups to attack civilians (e.g. cordon and search operations in the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUC]). In cases where the threat to civilians is more acute, or the targeted group is widely distributed or intermingled in a larger population, it simply may not be possible to conduct effective defensive and stability operations everywhere required. In such cases, a stronger emphasis on offensive operations may be necessary, involving the application of a maneuverist approach²³ striking at the critical vulnerabilities of perpetrators to neutralize them as rapidly as possible.²⁴

3-22. Conversely, dedicating part of the force to offensive operations will inevitably widen the gaps in the measures taken to directly secure the populace—a tradeoff that has generated considerable criticism for some operations (e.g. MONUC). The degree to which that tradeoff applies to a given force is largely tied to the troop density it expects to be able to generate in its AOR. Effective stability operations generally require high troop densities, and where high troop density cannot be achieved, alternative approaches must be explored, including ones consisting primarily of offensive operations.

3-23. It is important to note, however, that offensive operations in particular heighten the risk of retaliation by belligerent groups against the civilian population. Thus decisions to employ offensive operations or an approach focused on disrupting or defeating belligerents must weigh the risks carefully, and accept that mitigating them requires that such operations seek to defeat the opponent as quickly as possible. Offensive operations restrained by a reluctance to apply force *decisively* could heighten the chances of intensified violence against vulnerable civilians.

3-24. **Constraints and tradeoffs:** In developing counter-strategies to address threats to civilians, it is evident that the political context and resources available to the operation are key. The political constraints imposed on operational planning at the outset will often significantly narrow the options available. It is imperative that, having developed potential courses of action at the operational level, the tradeoffs between employing force decisively to protect civilians in the immediate and short term on the one hand, and the political and long-term ramifications of such actions on the other be carefully considered and reconciled at the strategic level.

23 See the Glossary for the definition.

24 See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla* (Oxford University Press, 2009) p. 204 for a discussion of the application of these concepts in the contexts of operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

Target the desired outcome

3-25. Developing criteria for success is critical to developing coherent operational approaches. The civil security objective can be conceptualized as an end in and of itself, and as a necessary condition for non-military lines of effort to establish a basis for long-term security and stability. The objective can be divided into two tiers. The first tier involves preventing or halting extreme forms of violence against civilians. Such “extreme” violence is recognizable by the numbers of civilians directly and indirectly affected, and/or the political impact of such attacks. This may include but is not limited to: intense gang violence in an urban setting, terrorism, indiscriminate attacks by insurgent or counterinsurgent forces, mass sexual violence, ethnic cleansing and inter-communal violence, or genocide. The second tier is more general, and involves addressing forms of insecurity that impede the progress of both military and non-military lines of effort. For example, if rampant criminality is undermining economic development, or intimidation being used to undermine political participation, the military component may, in consultation and coordination with other relevant actors, develop and carry out operations to counter such threats.

3-26. The intended operational effect is to improve the security of all civilians under threat of mass or systematic violence in the AOR. Where an analysis of the belligerents suggests that it will be effective, limited action should be used to convince, deter, or coerce them to halt attacks on civilians unless there are other compelling reasons to target them for defeat. Immediate and short-term actions to protect civilians should, insofar as possible, conform with the steps necessary to establish long-term security that is sustainable once intervening forces leave. The targeting of behavior rather than designated “enemies” may avert unintended or unforeseen escalations of the conflict. In particular, where there is a perception of a security dilemma²⁵ between different groups, avoiding the appearance that an intervening force is “taking sides” in a war for survival may be key. Using information operations²⁶ to make clear that the operation’s goal is the security of all civilians under threat regardless of identity may help counteract any misperceptions and/or propaganda from the belligerents perpetrating attacks on civilians, but actions speak louder than words in this regard.

3-27. This is not to preclude the selected targeting of key belligerents as part of that effort in order to alter the behavior of the group or shape the environment. In certain circumstances, the capture or killing of hardliners bent on perpetrating violence may be a necessary step in halting attacks on civilians. It is critical, though, that it be clear to the population, to local and global observers, and to the belligerents themselves that such individuals or groups are targeted because of what they do, not who they are. For the selective application of violence to succeed in changing the behavior of belligerents, the structure of incentives and disincentives must be clear.

25 In a security dilemma, each step one group takes to protect itself appears to other groups to be an aggressive move, making them less secure. This creates a dynamic of escalation that, unless interrupted, can lead to conflict. Security dilemmas leading to civil war are often associated with a loss of confidence in the ability of state institutions to mediate intra-societal disputes and ensure security for all groups. For more on the security dilemma in civil wars, see Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict” *Survival* (1993) no. 35, vol. 1, pp. 27-47.

26 See the Glossary for the definition. Information operations includes but is not limited to public information efforts.

3-28. Finally, where (as described above) violence against civilians is intrinsic to the nature of the belligerent, it may be necessary to neutralize the ability of an armed group to continue to threaten civilians through the application of force alone, or through a combination of force and political maneuver.²⁷

Act quickly to address crises

3-29. Violence against civilians can occur suddenly, exacting a significant human cost and altering the strategic, operational, and tactical environments very quickly. A clear example, albeit extraordinary in the intensity of violence, was the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Conversely, an established pattern of attacks against civilians may suddenly become a priority for action. This can occur as a result of an actual or expected increased intensity in the violence, greater media exposure and/or political attention, or emerging dynamics that could trigger wider instability. Regardless, where civilians are at risk of mass violence or where attacks have already begun, there is frequently a high degree of urgency from both strategic and operational standpoints. Rapid action to address such crises is necessary even where interim end states must suffice in the absence of fully developed long-term plans.

3-30. **Exploiting windows of opportunity:** At the strategic/political level, the urgency arises from the relatively brief window of opportunity that exists when the broadest range of policy options is viable. Public pressure can spur the political consensus—however fleeting—necessary to permit the dedication of national or international resources to address the problem. In some cases, a wider range of policy options are available during the early stages of the crisis, before the views of states and institutions coalesce around positions often dictated more by geopolitical considerations than the reality of the situation. That window of opportunity narrows as positions become more polarized, as the situation continues to evolve, and often as the belligerents responsible for attacks on civilians take steps to obscure the situation, fulfill their campaign objectives (often through intensified violence), or secure leverage against potential outside intervention (e.g. seizure of hostages).

3-31. In other cases, windows of opportunity for action may arise as perceptions of conflict shift over time. Entrenched positions and geopolitical inertia can be shifted by specific incidents that reshape the global consensus about the costs and benefits of action. For example, the Second Markale Market Shelling in Sarajevo in August 1995 triggered the NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces, and eventually led to the Dayton Accords.²⁸ Operational commanders must be attentive to dynamics at the strategic level that may expand or constrict their options to take action, and adjust accordingly.

3-32. At the operational level, the urgency derives from the imperative to halt the attacks on civilians—in part to control the potentially destabilizing political ramifications that such attacks create if left unchecked—and to preempt moves by belligerents to take actions that close the window of opportunity to act (e.g. the Revolutionary United Front advance

²⁷ In this context, “neutralize” should be read as equivalent to the concept of defeat in military doctrine: “To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfil his intention.” *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions* (June 2006) p. D-4.

²⁸ For more detail, see General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, pp. 364-368.

towards Freetown, and particularly Lungi Airport in May 2000,²⁹ or the seizure of Kavumu Airport in Bukavu by Nkunda and Mutebutsi in July 2004³⁰).

3-33. Such urgency can overtake forces already deployed into theatre as well: peace support operations or peacekeeping operations have to date not typically been well-equipped or prepared to address escalating violence against civilians. Likewise, Western forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have at times found it challenging to make theatre-wide adaptations to the shifting challenges of those conflicts, notably including sharp increases in violence against civilians. In such cases, the issue is not the complete absence of a defined end state and plan to achieve it, but rather unforeseen dynamics emerging in the conflict that render the plan—and sometimes the end state itself—moot. Under such circumstances, wholesale reevaluation of the campaign plan is often required, a process commonly impeded by resource shortages and a reluctance to reexamine baseline assumptions.

3-34. **Balancing short-term action with long-term plans:** In both cases, the implications for operational planning and design are that there will rarely be enough time to generate a fully developed end state and plan to achieve it before the window of opportunity for effective action to halt further escalation of violence against civilians closes. Operations will frequently have to plan and deploy (or act, if they are already deployed) based upon interim end states in the short term without having a fully-formed transitional and long-term strategy in place. Thus operations should exploit the windows of opportunity to take effective action to halt attacks against civilians, both at the tactical and operational levels, even when full consequences of such actions for the long term are not fully apparent. At the same time, operations must be cognizant of the necessity to develop and implement such transitional and long-term plans to ensure that short-term gains in the security of civilians achieved through military operations are sustained when those operations change or end.

Engage the full range of actors at each step

3-35. The contemporary security environment is extremely complex, and as described at the outset, the comprehensive approach—bringing to bear all available sources of power and legitimacy—is frequently necessary to achieving strategic objectives. This applies for military operations at the operational level as well, and operational planning and design should seek to coordinate, cooperate, or liaise with the full range of stakeholders that can impact operational objectives. While some categories of engagement will primarily take place at the strategic level, operational level planners and commanders must be prepared to address not only the traditional range of great powers, international and regional institutions, neighboring states, and host nation governments, but also international non-governmental organizations; humanitarian and human rights actors; local power brokers, political parties, and civil society groups; and non-state belligerents themselves. The role of such groups vis-à-vis conflict dynamics should be evaluated carefully, and they should not be assumed to

29 For more detail, see Andrew Dorman, “Case Study 6—Sierra Leone (2000)” in *Transformation Case Study Series: Network Centric Operations (NCO): Case Study—The British Approach to Low-Intensity Operations, Part II* (2007: UK Ministry of Defense) pp. 173-206.

30 See Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, with Max Kelly, “Case Study 1: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)” in *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping*.

be impediments, opponents, or allies in protecting civilians except as is evident from their conduct. Moreover, their role is likely to shift over time and the salience of various issues.

3-36. **Engage the civilian population on all sides:** Intervening forces will often need to draw on other actors for critical information to plan and guide operations. Engaging with civilians themselves is consistently an important aspect of operations to prevent or halt systematic or mass violence, in large part because of their ability to provide detailed tactical information. The civilian population is rarely passive in the face of violence; they can provide the intervening force with information about the threats they face, the steps they have taken to reduce their vulnerability, and their perspective on how operations will affect them. In turn, engagement with civilians can be viewed as part of the force's information operations: an opportunity to explain the nature and purpose of the operation, and to build confidence and legitimacy among the populace.

3-37. Such engagement can be equally useful where civilians are ostensibly aligned with a belligerent group that may be a target for operations. In such cases, the engagement represents an opportunity for the intervening force to foster a dialogue that will enhance its understanding of how that community sees the situation, offer an opportunity to dispel rumors and misinformation, and potentially open lines of communication that bypass hardliners.

3-38. Engagement with the civilian population should not be relegated solely to a specific line of effort. Intervening forces should not only create formal opportunities for dialogue with civilians, but also encourage every soldier to engage with the populace on a routine basis as an ambassador and an information gatherer. This requires that soldiers be provided basic training in language, cultural issues, observation and information gathering techniques (e.g. basic questions that align with the commander's critical information requirements), and appropriate guidance on interacting with civilians.

3-39. Civil security and the flow of information from civilians is mutually interdependent. Generally speaking, civilians provide information to the force in control of their area if they believe that they will be protected from reprisals for cooperating.³¹ Where they face a choice between one side that engages in indiscriminate violence and another willing to protect them, they provide information to the latter.³² Thus protecting civilians in the short run helps obtain the information necessary to consolidate and extend that protection, enhance situational awareness, and improve force protection.

3-40. Engagement with local leaders and communities can also help to lay the foundation for a post-conflict political order capable of ensuring the security of civilians after intervening forces leave. However, even as a force engages with the broad array of actors that shape the conflict and the wider environment, it must be wary of attempts to manipulate it to serve other agendas. Belligerents may attempt "Red Flag" operations in order to trick the intervening force into attacking their enemies. In particular, allegations regarding the nature of human rights abuses and the identity of perpetrators should be treated with caution. Regardless of

31 See Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 173-209.

32 See Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, pp. 146-172.

the source, operations must carefully verify such information before taking action to avoid being drawn into the conflict. In this type of operation, cultural understanding is likely to be of particular importance.³³

3-41. Working with local partners: In some cases, working “by, with, and through”³⁴ local partners may be preferable, particularly when building the capacity, credibility, and legitimacy of host nation’s security forces is an important objective. Doing so can help build sustainable security for the long term. However, where inter-communal violence and mass atrocities are a serious threat, reliance on local partners can be counterproductive. Early attempts by the US-led Coalition in Iraq to train large numbers of Iraqi security personnel to whom the Coalition could turn over primary responsibility for counterinsurgency operations backfired. Sectarian Shiite militias systematically infiltrated the Iraqi Security Forces—especially the Iraqi Police and Ministry of Interior forces—and exploited their positions to operate as death squads targeting Sunni civilians.³⁵ The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC has encountered similar challenges working with Congolese national security forces, which stand accused of systematic human rights abuses against civilians.³⁶ As this and many other examples illustrate, choosing which local partners and institutions to empower, and the way in which that empowerment is executed in association with other state-building efforts is an extremely challenging endeavor. Often intervening forces must provide sufficient security to temporarily “solve” the security dilemma before such processes can make significant progress.

3-42. Sequencing and signaling: Decisions about when, where, and with whom to engage should be for the subject of careful deliberation. Such decisions are interpreted by other actors as indications of the intervening force’s stance and intentions, and misinterpretations can be difficult to dispel. For example, engagement with non-state actors can create tensions with the host nation by appearing to legitimate those challenging the authority of the government. The sequence, setting and selection of representatives involved in engagement with various actors, while often shaped by pragmatic and logistical issues, can become a form of communication in and of itself, one that should be considered carefully.

3-43. Engagement and competing objectives: The impact of an actor on civil security will not always be the decisive factor in determining its relationship with the intervening force. Where the protection of civilians is not the intervening force’s primary objective, it will in part depend upon how civil security relates to the force’s larger goals. Stability operations, for example, often must manage tensions between different objectives: promoting adherence to peace agreements or political deals, rebuilding state institutions and host nation security

33 See Florence Gaub, “Culture Matters: Where Security Force Assistance Needs to Improve” in NDC Forum Paper, *Complex Operations: NATO at War and on the Margins of War* (forthcoming).

34 See Headquarters, Department of the Army (US), FM 3-07.1 *Security Force Assistance* (May 2009) for further detail on this concept.

35 See Ned Parker, “Interior Ministry mirrors chaos of a fractured Iraq,” *Los Angeles Times* (30 July 2007); *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq* (6 September 2007); Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp. 309-315; Dexter Filkins, John F. Burns, Qais Mizher, Khalid Al-Ansary, Ali Adeeb, and David Rohde, “The Struggle for Iraq: In Shadows, Armed Groups Propel Iraq Toward Chaos,” *New York Times* (24 May 2006).

36 See Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, with Max Kelly, “Case Study 1: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)” in *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping*, pp. 241-290.

forces, extending state authority, and protecting civilians. In other cases, actors with strong influence over the conflict may be well beyond the ability of the intervening force to coerce or compel, as with an external state ally. This can generate a requirement to try to change an actor's behavior through persuasion and influence rather than coercion, even where the latter might otherwise be justified. Intervening forces weighing such competing priorities and the appropriate tone and form of engagement must keep in mind the potential for violence against civilians to undermine an intervening force at the strategic level even if it is operationally and tactically successful.

3-44. **Engaging with the host nation:** The relationship with the host nation represents a distinct challenge for military operations tasked with protecting civilians from systematic or mass violence. The issue of whether and how to respect formal sovereignty when: it is being exercised to engage in violence against civilians, it is not matched by the ability of the state to secure its citizens against attacks, or a mixture of the two, has serious ramifications at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

3-45. Demanding clear guidance from policy makers on the issue at the outset is an important first step. In many cases, political guidance for intervening forces tasked with protecting civilians will contain unacknowledged tensions or contradictions between that objective and other objectives related to supporting the implementation of peace agreements or working with host nation institutions. It is incumbent upon planners and commanders to discuss these tensions and contradictions with policymakers, particularly to highlight the potential for strategic repercussions arising from tactical action or inaction in the face of violence against civilians. On the one hand a failure to protect civilians can discredit the intervening force and significantly, sometimes irreparably undermine its legitimacy. This can in turn undermine its ability not only to protect civilians but also to achieve its other objectives. On the other hand, taking action to protect civilians that is perceived by the host nation as violating its sovereignty may result in a loss of consent, which may also jeopardize overarching objectives. While some military operations to protect civilians may disregard some aspects of formal sovereignty at the outset, most will have to grapple with these questions. Thus operational planning should take account of these issues, determine the balance to be struck between them, and elaborate an approach for managing the consequences of tactical actions that may have larger repercussions.

3-46. Nonetheless, in line with the concept of "mission command," deference must be given to the commander on the scene. Typically on-scene commanders will have better information sooner than their superiors, and a limited window of opportunity in which to act. Imposing a requirement that all difficult decisions be referred to higher headquarters or national capitals can be counterproductive to the point of mission failure. The complex dynamics of situations in which civilians are under threat cannot be fully accounted for in operational planning or orders. Thus information, understanding, and the authority to act must be decentralized down through the echelons, and tactical commanders empowered to assess the situation at hand and determine appropriate courses of action in line with their orders and the operational commander's intent.

Use information operations to shape the environment

3-47. Operational level planners and commanders must keep in mind that the contemporary security environment is characterized by rapid and global information dissemination. Information operations cannot be compartmentalized: messaging to those in theatre and those outside must be consistent and truthful, or risk the intervening force's future credibility. Moreover, the speed of information flows and the power of information to radically reshape security situations—particularly given the potential strategic repercussions of attacks on civilians—requires agile responses that are, insofar as possible, consistent across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

3-48. **Be first with the truth:** Information operations (IO) are a critical tool for commanders to shape the environment in which they must operate. Perceptions of the intervening force and its actions are as important in determining the outcomes of operations as the facts. This general feature of the contemporary security environment is magnified for intervening forces tasked with protecting civilians. In particular, belligerents that target civilians tend to either obscure their actions through disinformation (e.g. the Rwandan Ambassador to the UN at the Security Council during the 1994 genocide³⁷), or publicize their actions to demonstrate their ability to perpetrate attacks (e.g. Al Qaeda in Iraq; the LRA). In either case, they frame events in ways that are designed to influence the behavior of other actors, constructing a narrative that serves their strategic goals. Often their messaging will seek to escalate fear and hostility between groups and/or terrorize certain groups of civilians into submission. A key role of the intervening force will be to undermine the belligerent by providing accurate information, reassuring the populace, reducing the uncertainty and fear the belligerent is attempting to foster, and discrediting it as a source. Further, such forces can help disseminate information to civilians to help them protect themselves, such as the location of belligerent forces or humanitarian assistance.

3-49. This is not to suggest prohibiting the use of military deception in the context of such operations. Taking steps to mislead belligerents may be an important element of the overall IO campaign, but as with other actions, the benefits should be carefully weighed against any potential to temporarily place civilians at greater risk. More broadly, operations security (OPSEC) will typically be necessary to protect the force and to deny belligerents information they would use to disrupt or evade civil security operations. At the same time, excessive secrecy can be counterproductive and commanders must recognize and consider the tradeoffs involved.

3-50. **Under-promise and over-deliver:** A key challenge for intervening forces tasked with protecting civilians is that they will inevitably prove unable to protect all the civilians at risk. Determined and adaptive belligerents will find ways to perpetrate attacks that they will use to attempt to discredit the intervening force. Undermining the force's credibility may result in its isolation from the civilian population, the reluctance by civilians to cooperate with the intervening force in measures to improve their security, and the loss of access to a

37 See United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the 3368th Meeting Thursday, 21 April 1994, New York (S/PV.3368), and United Nations Security Council, Verbatim Record of the 3377th Meeting Monday, 16 May 1994, New York (S/PV.3377) for examples of the Rwandan Ambassador's distortions, and Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to Genocide* (Ithaca, NY: 2002, Cornell University Press) pp. 145-147 for further discussion.

critical source of intelligence. Thus managing the expectations of the population regarding the force's actions to provide security is critical, and should be pursued through continuous and convincing public information campaigns and key leader engagement. The precise form of such campaigns will depend heavily on the context, but should include coordinated messaging at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Coordination rather than control is the key, and junior officers should be enabled to engage in information operations as part of their routine interactions with the civilian population.

3-51. **Match words with deeds:** Information operations are not a substitute for actions; the two are mutually supporting. A key component of managing expectations, building and maintaining legitimacy and credibility, and defeating the belligerent is to consistently match words with deeds. This applies to threats against belligerents as much as to promises to the populace; an intervening force that issues an ultimatum or draws a line in the sand and fails to follow through with decisive force will be thoroughly discredited. The resultant loss of credibility and legitimacy can be difficult to recoup, and often will have negative political repercussions.

Continuously assess the impact of operations³⁸

3-52. While measuring success on the battlefield against a conventional force is relatively straightforward, measuring the impact of operations on civil security often proves challenging for intervening forces. In part, this is because military assessment training and information gathering tools typically focus primarily on measuring the impact of operations on the capabilities of the opposing force(s). Where the objectives of an intervening force are defined in more intangible terms (e.g. civil security), traditional military metrics only capture a small part of the picture, and can be outright misleading. Developing appropriate metrics to measure the effect of operations on the security of civilians is also intrinsically challenging due to the nature of the issue. However, developing and using appropriate metrics is critical to ensuring that operations are achieving the intended effect, and are furthering progress towards the force's objectives.

3-53. **Measuring inputs, outputs, and effects:** Metrics can examine three different aspects of operations. Measures of effort (MOE) capture the activities accomplished by friendly forces. Measures of performance (MOP) reveal whether those activities were performed properly, and measures of effectiveness are “a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”³⁹ An MOE might be the number of patrols conducted in a tactical AOR, and an MOP the quantity and quality of the information gathered during those patrols. Measuring the impact of those patrols on the

38 This section draws heavily on three publications: Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Glayton, *Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008; Bernard Fall, “Insurgency Indicators,” *Military Review* (April 1966) Vol. XLVI, No. 4, p. 3-11; and David Wilson and Gareth E. Conway, “The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework: A Short-lived Panacea,” *The RUSI Journal* (2009) 154: 1, 10-15.

39 U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (12 April 2001, As Amended Through 31 October 2009).

security of the civilian populace is more challenging, but measures of effectiveness are far and away the most important.

3-54. **Direct and indirect metrics:** Measuring civil security directly can be extremely difficult. Conventional military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets can be useful, but only capture part of the situation. In particular, because the targets of such assets are determined by the intervening force itself, they may not detect unexpected sources of civilian insecurity. Thus civilians themselves become critical sources of information, both in terms of their reports and their behavior.

3-55. In many cases belligerents take steps to conceal the extent of their violence or their presence in an area, and intimidate or eliminate witnesses who might report incidents. Civilians that do not have confidence in the force's ability to protect them from insurgent reprisals will often be reluctant to provide information. Conversely, where populations face indiscriminate violence they may be eager to provide information, but be difficult for the force to access. Further, in the COE, allegations of attacks on civilians have strategic implications, and thus may be distorted or fabricated by civilians or intermediaries to serve political purposes.

3-56. Intervening forces must develop metrics that examine both direct indicators of civilian (in)security such as the number and scale of attacks on civilians (or evidence thereof, in the form of bodies or reported disappearances), and indirect ones such as the size and duration of displacements of civilians, the local price of critical commodities (gasoline, cigarettes, charcoal, foodstuffs, etc.), and the number and quality of interactions between the intervening force and the civilian populace. These should be analyzed in tandem with metrics related to the strength of belligerents and their posture towards civilians in order to accurately reflect the impact of operations on both threats and vulnerabilities.

3-57. **Reflect local conditions:** There is no generic set of metrics that will be applicable across all theaters, or even across all tactical AORs in a given theater. Just as operational objectives and end states as expressed in the Commander's Intent are interpreted into a set of subsidiary tactical lines of effort and objectives, metrics must be relevant and appropriate at the tactical level to be meaningful at the theater level. Identifying metrics that are relevant to a specific situation and locale requires a careful analysis of the civilians to be protected, and the belligerents and their pattern of violence. For example, in an ethno-sectarian conflict, metrics that track the number of attacks on civilians may not be relevant in an ethnically homogenous tactical AOR. On the other hand, if that AOR is a recruiting or resupply area for a belligerent group perpetrating violence in other areas, tracking the movements of suspected members, the frequency of extremist political graffiti, or the price of commodities subjected to illegal taxation by the belligerent could provide insight into the intensity of belligerent operations. In the process of developing metrics, intervening forces should draw heavily on a detailed analysis of the situation, and assign staff members to "red-team" proposals, pointing out potential shortfalls and limitations of the proposed metrics.

3-58. **Metrics should probe causality:** Military operations use metrics to determine which activities are achieving the intended effect and which are not, in turn influencing subsequent decisions about the allocation of resources and the type of operations to undertake. However, indicators may vary for reasons unrelated to an intervening force's actions. Developing metrics capable of distinguishing correlation from causation is difficult, but should be the ideal. In order to do so, measures of effort, performance and effects should be combined to provide a complete picture of the force's operations, and qualitative observations and intelligence used to determine whether the causal relationships presumed by the force's lines of effort are valid. This also highlights the necessity to continually reassess metrics in light of continually changing conditions and adaptive belligerents.

3-59. **Use quantitative and qualitative measures:** Military organizations have traditionally heavily favored quantitative metrics, in some cases to disastrous effect. This is not to say that quantitative metrics should be discarded, only that they provide an incomplete picture of situation. Numbers without context have limited utility. Intervening forces should employ quantitative measures (number of attacks against civilians, number of casualties and fatalities, number displaced, etc.) but should require that quantitative reporting be accompanied by qualitative reporting as well. This is in addition to monitoring specific qualitative metrics, the nature of which can range enormously. Examples include the variety and quality of products available at local markets, the apparent condition of civilians (health, mood, dress, etc.), the state of infrastructure, and the nature of observed interactions between civilians from different groups or between civilians and government officials.

3-60. In prolonged operations, intervening forces may choose to employ public opinion polling as a metric. While useful in some circumstances, developing and implementing appropriate survey methodologies that take account of local realities, social structures, etc. can be extremely challenging. Moreover, the gap between reported opinion and actual behavior can be significant, distorted by a range of factors that are difficult to minimize. In general, the results of iterative polling are more useful as indicators of change than as absolute values.

3-61. **Aggregation and compound metrics:** The purpose of metrics is to measure progress towards the achievement of key objectives and to identify the need to shift resources or make other adjustments to operational plans. Thus while metrics must be developed that are locally relevant, intervening forces must also find ways to aggregate them into theater-wide assessments without obscuring the nuances and complexities that are critical to understanding the situation and the impact of operations. This creates an imperative to develop compound metrics that incorporate both quantitative and qualitative indicators, and can be represented in a straightforward manner that can be interpreted across different echelons and AORs.

Annex I

Glossary of Terms

Center of Gravity

A *center of gravity* is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 3-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” The loss of a center of gravity ultimately results in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for designing campaigns and major operations. It provides a focal point for them, identifying sources of strength and weakness at the strategic and operational levels of war.

Modern understanding of the center of gravity has evolved beyond the term’s preindustrial definition. Centers of gravity are now part of a more complex perspective of the operational environment. Today they are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are typically easier to identify, assess, and target. They can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and complex. They are dynamic and related to human factors. Examples include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone are usually ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Eliminating them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), FM 3-0: Operations (2008) paras. 6-35 and 6-36, p. 6-8.

Civil Security

Civil security involves protecting the populace from external and internal threats. Ideally, Army forces defeat external threats posed by enemy forces that can attack population centers. Simultaneously, they assist host-nation police and security elements as the host nation maintains internal security against terrorists, criminals, and small, hostile groups. In some situations, no adequate host-nation capability for civil security exists. Then, Army forces provide most civil security while developing host-nation capabilities. For the other stability tasks to be effective, civil security is required. As soon the host-nation security forces can safely perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), FM 3-0: Operations (2008) para. 3-77, p. 3-13.

Defensive Operations

Defensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. The defense alone normally cannot achieve a decision. However, it can create conditions for a counteroffensive operation that lets Army forces regain the initiative. Defensive operations can also establish a shield behind which stability operations can progress. Defensive operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve control over land, resources, and populations. Defensive operations retain terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks. They can be used to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere.

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) para. 3-53, p. 3-10.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance consists of programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance.

Source: Adapted from: Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) para. 2-30, p. 2-7.

Information Operations

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also computer network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations.

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (12 April 2001, As Amended Through 31 October 2009).

Information is a powerful tool in the operational environment. In modern conflict, information has become as important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations. Every engagement, battle, and major operation requires complementary information operations to both inform a global audience and to influence audiences within the operational area; it is a weapon against enemy command and control and is a means to affect enemy morale. It is both destructive and constructive. Commanders use information to understand, visualize, describe, and direct the warfighting functions. Soldiers constantly use information to persuade and inform target audiences. They also depend on data and information to increase the effectiveness of the warfighting functions.

Since information shapes the perceptions of the civilian population, it also shapes much of the operational environment. All parties in a conflict use information to convey their message to various audiences. These include enemy forces, adversaries, and neutral and friendly populations. Information is critical in stability operations where the population is a major factor in success. While the five stability tasks are essential for success, without complementary information engagement that explains these actions to the population, success may be unattainable. Information must be proactive as well as reactive. The enemy adeptly manipulates information and combines message and action effectively. Countering enemy messages with factual and effective friendly messages can be as important as the physical actions of Soldiers. The effects of each warfighting function should complement information objectives (the message) while information objectives stay consistent with Soldiers' actions.

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) paras. 4-9 and 4-10, p. 4-3.

Information Operations seeks to influence the behavior of target decision-makers or audiences through the use of information and information systems. Conversely, Information Operations also seeks to shield or defend friendly decision-makers or audiences from being unduly influenced by a target's use of information or information systems. This is no different from the exercise of the other forms of national power, be they diplomatic, military, or economic. In this instance the means is information, but the resulting outcome is the same.

Source: U.S. Army War College, *Information Operations Primer* (November 2006) p. 1.

Limited Intervention

Limited interventions are executed to achieve an end state that is clearly defined and limited in scope. Corresponding limitations are imposed on the supporting operations and size of the forces involved. These operations may be phased but are not intended to become campaigns. Although limited interventions are confined in terms of end state and forces, their execution may be lengthy. Joint task forces usually conduct limited interventions. The most common types of limited interventions are the following:

- ▶ Noncombatant evacuation operations
- ▶ Strike
- ▶ Raid
- ▶ Show of force
- ▶ Foreign humanitarian assistance
- ▶ Consequence management
- ▶ Sanction enforcement
- ▶ Elimination of weapons of mass destruction

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) para. 2-25, p. 2-7.

Line of Effort

A *line of effort* links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian organizations, where unity of command is elusive, if not impractical.

Commanders use lines of effort to describe how they envision their operations creating the more intangible end state conditions. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to each other and to achieving the end state. Ideally, lines of effort combine the complementary, long-term effects of stability or civil support tasks with the cyclic, short-term events typical of offensive or defensive tasks.

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) paras. 6-66 and 6-67, p. 6-13.

Major Combat Operations

Major combat operations occur in circumstances usually characterized as general war. States, alliances, or coalitions usually resort to war because significant national or multinational interests are threatened. Combat between large formations characterizes these operations...These operations typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates...Major combat operations often include combat between the uniformed armed forces of nation-states. Even then, these operations tend to blur with other operational themes...Civil wars, particularly within a developed nation, often include major combat operations. The American Civil War, the Russian Revolution, and Yugoslavia's collapse all involved recurring, high intensity clashes between armies. Even in less developed regions, civil war leads to massive casualties among combatants and noncombatants alike. Insurgencies can develop into civil wars, particularly when external powers back both the government and the insurgents...Successful major combat operations defeat or destroy the enemy's armed forces and seize terrain. Commanders assess them in terms of numbers of military units destroyed or rendered combat ineffective, the level of enemy resolve, and the terrain objectives seized or secured. Major combat operations are the operational theme for which doctrine, including the principles of war, was originally developed.

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) p. 2-13.

Maneuverist Approach

The Maneuverist Approach to operations applies strength against identified vulnerabilities, involving predominantly indirect ways and means of targeting the conceptual and moral component of an opponent's fighting power. Significant features are momentum, tempo and agility which, in combination, aim to achieve shock and surprise.

Emphasis is placed on the defeat, disruption or neutralization of an opponent through ingenuity, even guile, rather than necessarily or exclusively through the destruction of his capability or gaining territory for its own sake. Degradation of an opponent's ability to make timely and well-informed decisions, for example, reduces his ability to act appropriately or conceivably to act at all. In practice, direct and indirect forms of attack are not mutually exclusive, and any operation is likely to contain elements of both...The Maneuverist Approach does not preclude the use of attrition; it does, however, offer the prospect of achieving results that are disproportionately greater than the resources applied. It calls for an attitude of mind in which originality and producing the unexpected are combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

Source: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: British Defence Doctrine (2008) p. 5-7.

Offensive Operations

Offensive operations are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. In combat operations, the offense is the decisive element of full spectrum operations. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to achieve decisive results. Executing offensive operations compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. Successful offensive operations place tremendous pressure on defenders, creating a cycle of deterioration that can lead to their disintegration.

While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending, defeating an enemy at any level sooner or later requires shifting to the offense. Even in the defense, seizing and retaining the initiative requires executing offensive operations at some point. The more fluid the battle, the more true this is.

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), FM 3-0: Operations (2008) paras. 3-37 and 3-38, p. 3-7.

Stability Operations

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They help to establish a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance. Stability operations must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. (See paragraph 3-13.) Stability operations cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives.

Source: United States Headquarters, Department of the Army (United States), *FM 3-0: Operations* (2008) para. 3-68, p. 3-12.

Annex II

About the Author

While writing this report, Max Kelly was a research consultant at the Future of Peace Operations program at the Henry L. Stimson Center. He has since joined Booz Allen Hamilton, and is currently supporting the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University. While at the Stimson Center, he worked primarily on military aspects of the protection of civilians in multilateral peace operations and preventing mass atrocities. He helped lead the conception, design, and implementation of Stimson's current initiative to address the doctrinal deficit on the protection of civilians. Mr. Kelly was also a contributing author to the landmark UN-sponsored study, *Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges* (2009). Prior to joining the Stimson Center, he was the Managing Director of the Cambodian Genocide Group's R2P Initiative, where he organized public education, research and advocacy on the Responsibility to Protect. As Policy Director of STAND Canada, Mr. Kelly developed policy recommendations and promoted Canadian engagement on the conflicts in Sudan. While studying at the University of Toronto's Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, he was selected as a Beattie Scholar and conducted field research in Central and East Africa.

About the Project

In 2009, the Stimson Center launched this project to address the doctrinal deficit. The project included a workshop in September 2009 at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham, gathering current and former military and civilian experts with experience in operations deployed in the context of protection crises. The workshop was designed to capture lessons learned and insights that could be distilled into draft doctrinal principles. The project resulted in four products:

- ▶ A workshop report entitled *Addressing the Doctrinal Deficit: Developing Guidance to Prevent and Respond to Widespread or Systematic Attacks Against Civilians*;
- ▶ A set of proposed guidance entitled *Protecting Civilians: Proposed Principles for Military Operations*;
- ▶ *Military Planning to Protect Civilians: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*; and,
- ▶ A case study *Saving Port-au-Prince: United Nations Efforts to Protect Civilians in Haiti in 2006-2007*.

Alison Giffen is the lead author of the workshop report. Max Kelly is the lead author on the corresponding draft doctrinal principles and planning guidance. Guy Hammond is the lead author on the case studies. All three authors worked collaboratively to develop this project and the resulting products.

About the Program: Future of Peace Operations

The Future of Peace Operations program builds a broader public dialogue on the role of peace operations in resolving conflict and building lasting peace. Peace operations comprise peacekeeping, the provision of temporary, post-conflict security by internationally mandated forces and peacebuilding, those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a war torn society create a self-sustaining peace.

The program's goals are to advance, through research and analysis, the capacity of peace operations to promote the rule of law, protection of civilians, and regional security; enhance US peace operations policy by building bridges between the Administration, Congress, international organizations, and NGOs; and to advance UN reforms for peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to bring those reforms to the attention of key public and policy audiences.

The program is led by Director William Durch and Deputy Director Alison Giffen and supported by researchers Madeline England, Guy Hammond, Michelle Ker, and Fiona Mangan, and project management specialist Nicole Dieker. To learn more about the program or to offer feedback on our work, please visit www.stimson.org/fopo or contact us at 202-223-5956.

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