

Japan's Emerging Security Partnerships

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Tatsumi: Good morning and welcome to Stimson. My name is Yuki Tatsumi I'm a senior associate here in the East Asia Program. One of the Stimson Japan Program's missions is to facilitate the intellectual exchanges between researchers, more targeting not at the very senior level but at the rising ranks of researchers, policy makers, and government officials. I'm particularly glad in that context that I can host two brilliant researchers this morning to talk to us a little bit about Japan's emerging security partnerships in two key regions, also for the United States, one is in Australia and the other is in Europe. To my right is Dr. Tomohiko Satake, he is a research fellow at the National Institute of Defense Studies. His areas of expertise are Japan-Australia security relations, and also alliance politics. He received his degree from Australian National University, and spent a lot of time doing field work in Australia as well. He actually spent a couple of weeks in Australia just last month, so he got an updated view from Australia and how they see Japan. To my left is Dr. Michito Tsuruoka, he will talk this morning about Japan's relationship with Europe, pretty much focusing on NATO and the security architecture. Dr. Tsuruoka is a senior research fellow at the National Institute of Defense Studies. He has a Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College in London, and as you can tell from his accent he speaks brilliant British English. I will ask Dr. Satake to start, followed by Dr. Tsuruoka, and then we will have questions and answers and discussions. Each speaker will speak for about 10-15 minutes, so if you can hold all of your questions until both of the speakers are finished I would really appreciate it. So without further ado, Satake-san...

Satake: Thank you very much. Sorry for my Aussie English, but anyway...I commenced my Ph.D. at the Australian National University in March 2006. That was exactly the time that Japan, Australia, and the US trilateral strategic dialogue was launched. Since then, the security cooperation between Japan and Australia have rapidly grew. As you may know, Japan and Australia agreed to update their partnership, why it's called "special strategic partnership," in July of this year. I think to some extent this kind of development of Japan-Australia security cooperation is a kind of extension of the short-term security partnership between Japan and Australia. In terms of regional and global opportunity such as peace keeping, institution building, and other non-traditional security cooperation such as counter-piracy and counterterrorist nature deals as well. But nevertheless, what is significant in these 5-10 years is kind of an enhancement of bilateral and trilateral defense cooperation between Japan, Australia, and the United States, as well as regional and global security cooperation. Japan and Australia actually have increased the number of military exercises, bilateral and trilateral military exercises including the United States, some of which have exercises for high intensity conflicts, such as ASW, maritime interdiction, or air combat operations or those kinds of things. Then, Japan and Australia are also boosting some information exchange based on the information security agreement, which came into effect in March of

2013. And you may know that Japan and Australia have recently undertaken some technology cooperation in defense equipment, which is Australia's next-generation submarine's cooperation. Cooperation in cyber and outer space domains is also very activated, demonstrated by the establishment of cyber policy dialogue between Japan and Australia in this year. Japan and Australia have also established a kind of legal foundation for better security cooperation. I think Japan's approval for the right of the collective self-defense is a good example of that. So I think that all of these activities will improve the interoperability between the ADF, SDF and US Military, and thus enhancing collective deterrence capabilities among those three countries. But, having said that, some people say that Japan and Australia are going to establish some sort of formal alliance relationship. I don't agree with that kind of argument. Although I never say never, I don't exclude the possibility of that kind of thing, but so far I think it's highly unlikely that Japan and Australia will have a formal alliance security relationship. This is not only because of a lack of hard-projection capabilities between two countries, but also because of some gap between Japan and Australia in terms of their perception of China. While Japan increasingly sees China as kind of a direct and more immediate threat to their security and sovereignty, Australia tends to see China as more kind of an indirect and future security concern for regional stability. Because of this perception gap between Japan and China, some Australian experts argue that Australia should not get closer to Japan, otherwise we are interrupt for the Sino-Japanese conflict over East China Sea issues and so on. That kind of argument is actually going on right now, but it seems so far that this kind of argument doesn't get wide public support in Australia. But, if the tension between Japan and China escalates in the future, it could be possible that more and more Australian people tend to think that they don't want to get involved in Senkaku issue and other things between Japan and China. So Australia-Japan security cooperation would become more difficult and complicated, so that is the issue we have to actually manage. This is why I think the regional and global cooperation between Japan and Australia is still very important, as well as bilateral and trilateral defense cooperation.

As I said, Japan and Australia have a history of cooperation in terms of peace keeping, humanitarian activities, and strategic aid for developing countries, like institution building and so on. Actually if you look back at the history you will realize how significant Japan and Australia contribute to regional order building based on their common values and interests which are democracy, human rights, and rule of law. For example, Japan and Australia support the peace and democracy of Cambodia, East Timor, and other Pacific countries through peace keeping and other activities. Japan and Australia also contributed to confidence building, and regional integration and rulemaking through building and supporting regional institutions such as APEC, ARF and ADMM Plus. Promoting non-proliferation and disarmament is another big issue between those two countries because Japan also co-chairs the ICNND, International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. So they play a significant role in this area. And of course Japan and Australia collaborate in coping with some non-traditional security threats such as: terrorism, piracy, natural disasters and those kinds of things. So, I think Japan and Australia have been for many years major contributors to regional order building, and I think that kind of aspect is quite important for this bilateral security relationship. The key thing in this regional order building between Japan and Australia is a kind of inclusiveness of this regional security architecture. Japan is a country whose identity has been always between East and West, or Asia and Europe, and Australia has a kind of similar issue. Australia's roots are in Europe of course, but they live in Asia. So their identity has

always drifted between those two, East and West. In order to solve these identity issues, Japan and Australia have tried to establish a comprehensive, inclusive regional security architecture, what is called the "Asia-Pacific Region," which includes both Asia and European countries and also developed and developing countries, and democracies and non-democracies and so on. This inclusiveness is very important for their regional order building. On the other hand, Japan and Australia [inaudible] to any exclusive framework such as the East Asian Economic Group, for example, which didn't include Australia and the United States. It is from this context that Japan-Australia strongly supported ASEAN's unity and centrality as a driving force for inclusive regional security architecture. But, I think because of some change in balance of power relationships in this region, this inclusive and liberal international order is in crisis right now. Dispute over the South China Sea has already expanded the gap between Continental Asia on the one hand and Maritime Asia on the other, and it also undermines ASEAN's unity and centrality. North Korea has been challenging against the Non-Proliferation regime by continuing nuclear development. While the United States has been still a dominant player in this region, they are increasingly challenged by the newly [inaudible] threat such as Ukraine or the Middle East crises and so on. So, given that kind of situation, I think what Japan-Australia should do is to assume greater burden sharing in order to preserve a liberal and inclusive regional order. Not only expanding bilateral cooperation but also enhancing their regional and global activities. For example, Japan and Australia should include their strategic aid capacity building and non-traditional security in Southeast Asia and South Pacific countries. Japan and Australia should also enhance ASEAN's unity and centrality. In this context I think it's very important to approach what is called "continental ASEAN countries" like Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia, as well as expanding the relationship with maritime ASEAN countries like Philippines, or Indonesia. And, finally, I think Japan and Australia should expand their network of cooperation to other regional players, especially India and South Korea. Some people say that we should establish some kind of middle power coalition in this region, including Japan, Australia, India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, and that kind of things, which is fine but I don't think that kind of coalition building should be targeting at any other countries which is China. This shouldn't be like a military coalition building. Instead what I am saying is that that kind of middle coalition should be established in order to include regional and global order, like capacity building, HA/DR, peacekeeping and that kind of thing. So I think the bottom line is how to establish inclusive and liberal international order which is resilient enough to accommodate the rise of China in the future. But I'll stop here and I welcome your comments.

Tatsumi: Thank you

Tsuruoka: Thank you very much for coming and thank you very much for the invitation, I'm very pleased to be here. My topic today is NATO's partnerships and NATO-Japan relations, but first let me focus more on NATO's...the evolution of NATO's partnerships because in terms of making sense of NATO-Japan relations it's very important to first understand how NATO's partnerships have been evolving. But, at the onset, what I have to say is that it's not a very good time to discuss NATO's partnerships because first now very much NATO's focus is on Ukraine and the collective defense, so now some people are saying that now it's time for NATO to go back to basics. So the expeditionary operations and partnerships, especially partnerships with countries outside the Europe/Atlantic area is not really a fashionable topic. The partnerships were actually supposed to be one of the major topics of the World Summit two weeks

ago, but in the end after the crisis in Ukraine that almost disappeared. The second difficulty in discussing NATO's partnerships now is that NATO's operation in Afghanistan is coming to an end, so at the end of this year NATO's ISAF is going to finish. Of course it will be followed by a new training mission there, but the ISAF is going to end. So this is not a very perfect timing for NATO's partnerships. But, the importance of partnerships for NATO is not likely to disappear after the Ukraine crisis or the operation in Afghanistan. So let me start by reviewing how it all started. So NATO's partnerships started in the mid-1990s, 1994, in the framework of Partnerships for Peace (PFP). It was essentially an assistance program for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, some of whom were wanting to become members of NATO, but of course their alliance at that time was not prepared to accept new members. So it was essentially a postponing, it was to postpone enlargement and at the same time help those countries in the former Eastern Bloc to prepare for NATO membership. But in the mid-2000s in the context of the Afghanistan operation, and especially the expansion of the ISAF operation...the ISAF operation in the first place was restricted to the area in Kabul and the surrounding area, but it gradually expanded to the whole country. That expansion started in the mid-2000s. At that time, the problem was that it was very difficult for NATO to get enough number of troops. So that's why NATO needed to depend on troop contributions from non-NATO countries. During the course the importance of partners became more and more important, and especially Australia became one of the biggest troop contributors to the ISAF operation. So as a result of this evolution, the nature of NATO's partnerships has changed. It was essentially an export of support, but now more and more an import of support, especially in the context of Afghanistan and the Iraq contribution from non-NATO countries. So the partnerships expanded, but what is important is that it is quite something that the alliance really wanted, or really planned in advance because the expansion and the development of NATO's partnerships has been very much driven by the need on the ground in Afghanistan. So it is not something that NATO had a blueprint to develop this sort of partnership, but it was just a sort of byproduct of the ISAF operation or unintended consequences. But they have, perhaps because of the India alliance there was not a huge, solid consensus on what NATO wants to achieve in developing partnerships, especially from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Still, many NATO people say that this is a very demand-driven process, rather than NATO trying to expand its relationships because NATO doesn't want to be seen as expansionist or seen as containing Russia or China, so some people still very much emphasize the demand driven nature of NATO's partnerships. But the fact remains that what the ISAF experience has left is a very unprecedented security network almost around the world. So this network of nations, network of partners, NATO and partner countries, can be a very good basis for future coalition operations and at the same time what is quite interesting and important is that it is a sort of community of shared values. But of course there is no consensus on to what extent NATO needs to emphasize the value aspect of NATO's partnerships but still, as long as NATO is an alliance of values, and a community of values, then this value aspect is always a very important element of NATO's partnerships. So now the ISAF operation is coming to an end, so now the biggest challenge in terms of NATO's partnerships is how it can maintain the level of interoperability between NATO and partner countries that has been built through the experience of cooperation in Afghanistan. So two weeks ago in the World Summit, very few people noticed that there was a defense ministers' meeting in Wales as well as the summit meeting. Very interesting defense ministers' meeting, NATO plus...Actually there were two very interesting defense ministers' meetings in Wales, one was what is called "Partnership Interoperability Platform Meeting" it

was a NATO plus 24 partner countries. Of course as the name of the meeting suggests it was very much about interoperability and also a more ambitious meeting was NATO's defense ministers' meeting with five more advanced, more ambitious partners including Australia and Sweden and Finland and these various selected ambitious partners. It was about the partnership interoperability initiative. So now the works are still going on despite the huge emphasis on collective defense and the crisis in Ukraine but still, this interoperability beyond Afghanistan is still an important agenda for NATO. So within this context the NATO-Japan relationship has expanded. From NATO's point of view NATO's relations with NATO is very much in the context of NATO's evolution and development partnerships in other countries including Japan. And also from a Japanese point of view, Japan's relations with NATO has been in line with Japan's own expansion of security partnerships in addition to its traditional alliance with the United States. So the NATO, for Japan, is a very interesting new kind of partner because NATO is not an ally, and NATO is not even a sovereign state, NATO is an alliance and framework and international organization, so it's a very new kind of security partner for Japan. So there are various aspects at NATO as a partner, there are various aspects. One is political partner, for Japan to conduct political dialogue with NATO there are levels including the prime minister's level and the minister's level and now there are various political dialogue mechanisms with NATO in Japan. So NATO as a political partner is something that Japan is very much keen to develop further. The second aspect is operational partner. Despite the fact that Japan didn't send troops to Afghanistan, the NATO-Japan operational cooperation has been taking place in Afghanistan on the civilian side. So the notion of operational partner doesn't have to be limited to military cooperation, military operation. The third aspect of NATO as a partner for Japan is the fact that NATO-Japan cooperation can take place in the context of the Japan-US alliance, and Japan-US cooperation can take place in the context of NATO-Japan. So of course the United States is the most important member of NATO so from Japan talking to NATO and cooperating with NATO is also very much about cooperation with the United States. The fourth aspect of NATO as a partner is that NATO is a very interesting venue to think about interoperability, multilateral interoperability, and standardization. So what NATO has been doing since inception more than 60 years ago is very much about standardization and interoperability. So conducting operations is relatively a very new thing for NATO, it only started in the mid-1990s. For Japan, it is quite...now Japan cannot ignore the multilateral aspect of international security, cooperation, and also in terms of defense equipment, things are becoming more and more multilateral. So the NATO standardization, what is called STANAGs-The NATO Standardization Agreement, is also becoming a very important thing for Japan. So for Japan NATO can be used as a framework to use in doing various things in the international and security scene. NATO can be used as an enabler for Japan to become more engaged and more active in playing its own international security role. So NATO is now I think an interesting new horizon for Japan, and finally I just wanted to say a few words on two aspects for the future of NATO-Japan cooperation. One is the importance of strengthening interoperability between NATO and Japan. Whenever Japan sends self-defense forces abroad, it is very much likely to be in a multilateral context, so the interoperability with NATO countries, including the United States and major European countries, is quite important because looking at the more than 10 years of history of Japan's international security involvement, defense involvement, especially after 9/11 is that whenever and wherever we send troops abroad we see NATO countries, especially European countries in the areas where we operate. Like in the Indian Ocean for refueling operations in the context of OEF and in Iraq. When Japan sent troops to Iraq, at the time Prime

Minister Koizumi emphasized the Japan aspect of this, but when we went there we didn't see many Americans there because the area where we were deployed was some part of Iraq called Samawah where the UK was in charge of security in the region. And after that the Dutch took over the security responsibility in the area. Also, in the counter piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, and the Gulf of Aden we are cooperating with EU forces and other European countries. So one of the biggest lessons we have learned in the previous, and have experienced, in the past 10 years is that whenever and wherever we go abroad then we see Europeans side-by-side operating on the ground. The second aspect of future possibility of NATO-Japan cooperation is a capacity building cooperation, a capacity building assistance. Because in the inexperience of NATO's various partnerships, especially NATO's assistance to countries from the former Eastern Bloc was very much about capacity building, how to build democratic control of armed forces and other things, so NATO has a huge accumulation of expertise in capacity building and Japan has just started. A couple of years ago Japan started a very small defense capacity building assistance. I think there is a future possibility for Japan/NATO cooperation in capacity building. Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you both. Before I go into a question and answer session I would like to make one disclaimer on behalf of both of them. They are both from the National Institute of Defense Studies, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, but today they are here for their personal capacity. So whatever they say here does not reflect the official stance of NIDS nor the Ministry of Defense nor the government of Japan. I just wanted to get that out of the way for both of their sakes. So with that, the floor is open...there are two microphones lying around the room so if you can raise your hand and wait until the microphone gets to you, and please do introduce yourself briefly so that Dr. Tsuruoka and Dr. Satake know who they are getting their questions from. So with that, the floor is yours...right there...

Oros: Hi I'm Andrew Oros from Washington College. My question, I was looking at your bio Tsuruoka-san, you were in Brussels during the first Abe administration, and I think in Washington there was a lot of attention to the first Abe administration, immediately following Koizumi, and at that time there seemed to be a lot of momentum for Japan to play a greater role in international security outside the Asia region. I think that Prime Minister Abe might have been the first Japanese prime minister to speak at NATO, but...so you were there on the ground, as it were. Now you are studying these issues in a second Abe administration, and I wonder if you might sort of contrast that a little bit. It seems to me, for example, that Japan's regional security situation has deteriorated substantially, compared to earlier time, so in my own personal view it seems that Japan is less interested in working with NATO or in international security roles, more interested in beefing up its security and regional partnerships like Satake-san was saying. But, I'd love to hear your insight on that.

Tsuruoka: Thank you very much for the very, very good and important question. Yes, I was in Brussels when Prime Minister Abe came to Brussels, and came to NATO for the first time as the Japanese prime minister and he addressed NAC, the North Atlantic Council, and it was a very important turning point for NATO-Japan cooperation. You are quite right that now the security situation surrounding Japan has deteriorated a lot. So I think you can argue that Japan is less interested in Europe; that might be true. But at the same time we can argue differently *because* of the more difficult security situation that Japan is located. Now, we need to talk more to countries outside the region because it may be becoming more

important to involve other partners, other countries, in dealing with the issues in the Asia-Pacific region. But at the same time the one thing that I have to add here is that some people argue that Japan's overture to NATO and Japan's interest in cooperation with Europe or NATO is very much about China. Some people argue that way. When Prime Minister Abe, for the second time, visited NATO in May of this year, there were those press reports that because of China now Japan is more interested in NATO, that sort of argument. It is not...It's nonsense to deny that sort of argument 100%. Of course there is some sort of "China" factor in Europe-Japan and NATO-Japan relations, that's for sure. But at the same time what is important is that Europe-Japan relations are not 100% about China, that's also the case. So of course Japan doesn't really expect Europe to play a direct, substantial military role in Asia if something there happens. But still, given the fact that Europe still keeps various political influence, and also the UK and France are permanent members of the UN Security Council. So that whenever and wherever the military conflict happens in Asia, then those UN Security Council permanent members matter. So in that sense they are talking to Europeans and they are trying to share perceptions about security and political issues in Asia still is quite important. So, for Japan and the second Abe administration, Europe is not less important, it is still an important partnership...sharing values and...so this value aspect is also very important in the Abe Administration. If you look at the world map, there aren't actually so many democracies, advanced democracies, in the world outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Of course Australia is one, and New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, these are countries with which we share values, but other than that almost-not all of course-but many such countries sharing values are in NATO. So that says something about why Europe is still important for Japan.

Tatsumi: Right over there...

Ashizawa: Kuniko Ashizawa, I teach at American University. I think my question is also relevant to the previous question, but getting more concrete to Tsuruoka-san...I heard there is a discussion, particularly within NATO but also led by Germany, about the post-'14 Afghanistan. And that there may be the possibility that there will be a kind of UN peace operation, peacekeeping operation, led by NATO, Germany, United Nations, that kind of arrangement. Do you think that Japan would also be discussing participating in this kind of post-2014 peace operation in Afghanistan? In a way that...to continue playing an important role in international security. That's one question, and then another question for Satake-san, you've mentioned about this Australian-Japanese interest in inclusive regional order. I'm wondering, do you come across that how the Japanese, also the Australian political leaders indeed, kind of see what's the exact position of China, the role and position of China, within this inclusive regional order? And I'm wondering, is there any kind of gap between Japanese and Australian views toward that particular role of China, within that regional order.

Tatsumi: Which one do you want to go first?

Tsuruoka: Okay, thank you very much. As far as I'm aware there is no discussion taking place in Japan on the idea of sending Self Defense Forces to Afghanistan after the end of this year. As far as I see it there is almost no possibility of Japan to send troops there. Having said that, of course Japan remains very committed to help Afghanistan in stabilizing the country, and also especially in terms of economic and development assistance. Yes of course Japan is really committed to continue to contribute to the

rebuilding of the country, and that has been expressed by various Japanese leaders including the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. So we are still very much in the international efforts to help Afghanistan.

Tatsumi: Satake-san...

Satake: Thanks for the very important point. I said there is a kind of perception gap in terms of how they view China. That is kind of a threat perception when it comes to, how to say...I think Japan and Australia are in the same boat to welcome China's peaceful rise, personally. We also encourage China to be a constructive regional player which can provide [inaudible]. We also welcome China's integration into regional order building as I said. Unfortunately Japan and China have kind of difficult issues, including history and other kinds of things. In that case I think Australia is more advanced than Japan in terms of engagement with China. For example, when Prime Minister Abe came to Canberra and he had a very impressive speech in Australia but, within one week Chinese CMC came to Australia, and they agreed to have a bilateral military exercise between China and Australia. And Australia has many challenges, not only military but also economic and political rival. So I think that either way Japan should also follow, and I think that Japan and Australia can probably engage China by information exchange and that kind of thing.

Tatsumi: Jim, the gentleman over here...

Armington: Jim Armington now with the Boeing Company, former US Air Force Retired. Very good presentations and a very timely topic. I think, one question that comes to mind is: can you share a little insight into the interagency process within the Japanese government, on the agenda and the priorities and the strategic goal setting for these emerging partnerships? How does MOD and the regional bureaus, MOFA, NSC, come together in order to formulate these agendas, and who leads, etc.?

Tsuruoka: Thank you very much. When it comes to relations with NATO, it is quite true that the Foreign Ministry has been taking the lead for more than several years. It, I think, started in mid-2000. At that time, the Foreign Minister Aso came to NATO and addressed the North Atlantic Council for the first time as a Japanese cabinet minister. The other time the Foreign Ministry was very much taking the lead, but NATO as a military alliance we of course needed to involve the Defense Ministry in addition to the Foreign Ministry. For example, looking at what Japan and NATO cooperated in Afghanistan, it was very much on the civilian side. So Japan's official development assistance, all the aid money, was used for PRT related projects in various parts of the country and it was 100% for the Foreign Ministry to deal with. And also in Afghanistan, we sent a liaison officer to NATO's SCR, the Senior Civilian Representative's office in Kabul which is literally situated in the ISAF Headquarters Compound but it is on the civilian side. And so it was also something for the Foreign Ministry dealt with. So for this moment there have been various things in NATO-Japan cooperation that the Foreign Ministry took charge of. But now, looking at interoperability and standardization and equipment things there is now a bigger role for the Minister of Defense, that's for sure, and we have been attending various NATO conferences on the military side of the house, and also we have sent observers to various NATO exercises, of course the Japanese officers were present as observers. And also now when Prime Minister Abe visited NATO this May, May this year, now there is the idea of joint exercise between NATO forces and Japanese forces, this is likely to be in

the context of counter piracy operations off of the coast of Somalia. Of course, this is very much MOD business. So now I think the role of MOD is becoming bigger than it used to be. Also, as you can imagine the National Security Secretariat on the National Security Council, the NSS is also in charge of NATO-Japan kind of business. I think now more MOD involvement and more NSS involvement in addition to Foreign Ministry is something that we can see.

Tatsumi: What about Australian house?

Satake: Yeah, I agree with Tsuruoka-san. Even in Japan the interagency cooperation and information sharing between MOFA and MOD is going well. And we have many common issues, like defense technology cooperation, or capacity building, or those issues between MOD and MOFA, we have frequent dialogues between those two institutions. Tsuruoka-san mentioned the establishment of NSC is really significant in that sense, they have a kind of director-level discussion among different agencies and different ministries, and periodically I think that [inaudible] so, that contributed to a kind of relationship between MOFA and...

Le: Thank you for a very great presentation, my name is Lena Le from SAIS Southeast Asia Studies, and I have a question to Dr. Satake about how I have heard you mention about the potential mid-power partnership between Japan and several Southeast Asian nations, so I'm wondering, can you give me some insight about how Japan sees ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, in Asian-Pacific security? And especially ASEAN's security arrangement, for example AIF or EAS, so yeah could you please give me some insight about that, thank you.

Satake: As I said, ASEAN is a very important partner for Japan for many years. Japan became ASEAN's first unofficial direct partner in 1973, and actually Australia became ASEAN first official direct partner in 1974, and since then Japan and Australia have been encouraging ASEAN's unity and security as I mentioned. Nowadays ASEAN is going to be more and more important for many reasons, why it's kind of a common perception [inaudible] ASEAN is kind of a regional center of development in this region. ASEAN has a huge economy combined. And also, from a security perspective ASEAN is located in a very important area for Japanese sea lanes of communication. Also, as I mentioned, for some security institutions such as ADMM Plus or ARF or East Asia Summit are also a very important arena to engage not only the Southeast countries, but also China and other regional powers. Having said that, I think ASEAN is increasingly criticized by some people that...they can't...some important issues such as South China Sea, for example, properly... ASEAN is almost...they are very significant but they can't solve these more traditional security concerns, and people are increasingly frustrated by how ASEAN money is... that's an issue. So what I think Japan and Australia should do is revitalize that kind of institution, especially ASEAN, to do more activity with that kind of South China Sea issue for example. And also we can probably engage with China, jointly with Japan-Australia. For example, we have a HA/DR expert working with ADMM Plus for example. And we can probably engage China in dialogue and hold some TPX or other exercises with those countries and that kind of thing. So these are a way we can probably take advantage of ASEAN-central institutions – ASEAN-central institutions are not perfect of course, but still we have no alternative...

Tatsumi: Oh, hold on, wait for the mic...

Lea: I'm Cate Lea for the Center of Naval Analyses, my question is for Dr. Tsuruoka. You mentioned in your comments Japan's interest in strengthening interoperability with NATO, and I wanted to ask a follow-up question on that subject. So specifically, could you talk about Japan's issues and concerns in regards to interoperability with NATO? What are the areas that Japan is looking to strengthen in terms of interoperability, and how interoperable is Japan looking to be with NATO in terms of mission areas, communications, for instance?

Tsuruoka: I understand that there are various technical issues that we need to deal with in thinking about interoperability with NATO. But, the issue of interoperability is not limited to those technical issues, like communications and other things. It is also a political and more the planning side because what is unique about NATO is its way of planning and conducting multilateral operations. So how to plan and how to conduct multilateral operations is something that Japan is not quite familiar with. So in the context of Japan-US alliance, we have been very much familiar with the US way of conducting operations and planning operations, and also the Japan-only national thing and the US-Japan bilateral thing are things that we have been doing for many, many years. Now they are looking at the possible operations that Japan is likely to be part of in the future, it's very much likely to be multilateral operations. Japan in the past 10 or 15 years, we have been gradually becoming more involved in multilateral things. So when we sent troops to Iraq for example, it was essentially a national operation, but we of course needed various coordination and cooperation with other countries, and also in the Indian Ocean the refueling operation as well, as it was in the context of OEF we sent the liaison officers to Tampa, the CENTCOM Headquarters, and we participated in various coalition meetings. So these multilateral things, whenever the United States and other countries do multilateral operations it is very much like a NATO model they use. So how we can operate in a multilateral context, and especially the fourth generation process, there are things that something that NATO has developed in its experience. So one of the things Japan is looking at is how to plan and how to conduct multilateral operations beyond technical issues of interoperability in NATO. So I think that is quite important and also a very new aspect for Japan. So that's why I often argue that NATO can be used as a multilateral school for Japan, to learn about multilateral defense cooperation in the world, and NATO has been taking the lead in sort of standardizing how multilateral operations can be conducted and planned.

Halpin: Thank you for your presentation, I'm Dennis Halpin from the US-Korea Institute. I wanted to ask, as I recall, in the first Abe administration, Prime Minister Abe had this concept of "Arc of Democracy." This was the idea of engaging India and Australia, and I believe other democracies that sweep around China. But as you know, India has had several military issues with China, but the idea didn't seem to go very far...I heard at the time, the Indians and Australians thought it sounded too much like containment of China. But I was wondering, out of that what has been the cooperation with the Indian military since Prime Minister Abe has come back, has he pursued any of those concepts from his first term?

Satake: Yeah, I think India is still of course important for Japanese security, and certainly Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi met quite recently. They announced to establish a exactly like a special strategic partnership-special strategic global partnership between Japan and India and I was really

surprised to know about that because I thought Australia and India totally different for Japanese security, but they treat them as equals. I thought, "oh no, India is different from Australia!" I thought it's a very important agenda. But still, as you mentioned it's too early to have that quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, US, India, and Australia. Australia is still reluctant for that kind of security framework even under the current coalitional government. And as you mentioned, probably Australia doesn't like containment image of this kind of cooperation. I think that as you mentioned the Abe administration's, what is called, "Arc of Democracy," he doesn't use that concept anymore. Instead he says "Security Diamond", Japan-US-India-Australia. And also he become a kind of "value based diplomacy." But what value based diplomacy is kind of two things. One is to expand Japan's cooperation with some democracies, regional democracies, including India, Australia, South Korea, and probably beyond the region-NATO countries. That is what the Abe administration has been exactly doing. But the other aspect of that value diplomacy is to spread norms and values, such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law to the region. This area of value diplomacy has not been progressed, I think, enough from the Japanese government. I know MOFA have been doing very well in that kind of values diplomacy, but when they talk about value based diplomacy they tend to talk about Japan's coalition building among democracies, which is kind of important. But what I think is that we have to focus more on the regional order building in terms of spreading regional norms and values and so on, so that's another aspect of value diplomacy which, in Japanese government, should promote with other regional players including India and South Korea.

Tatsumi: Do you have anything to add?

Tsuruoka: No

Tatsumi: Okay

Liu: Liu from Voice of America, just have a quick follow-up to the previous question, why do you think India has become so important in Japan's security partnership? As you mentioned, Japan is treating India as equal to Australia in security aspect. Also, a recent survey in China shows that more than half the respondents think that war between China and Japan is inevitable, what's your take on that? Thank you.

Satake: Yeah, I said India is important because obviously they share some common values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and that kind of values more or less. The reason because I said India and Australia are different is that the history of engagement in order building is sort of different. Australia has very active accounts of regional order building by providing such as ODA or peacekeeping, or that kind of issues. Whereas India has been more inward looking for many years, they couldn't afford to do that because they are preoccupied with some domestic development/issues. But, it seems to be that India is going to be more and more extroverted, they are looking east; they are more willing to contribute to regional order building. As you know, India has a huge capacity in terms of not only military but also economy and other democracy issues, so why not take advantage of their resources in order to build more stable and prosperous regional order. This is nothing about containment of China of course, but again, regional order building. That is why I think India is really important.

Tatsumi: What about her second question, about the...In Chinese opinion poll more than half of Chinese think war between Japan and China is likely, and what's your reaction to that?

Satake: I don't know

Tatsumi: It's not only you, if Tsuruoka-san has something to say that's also...It's a hard one

Satake: [To Liu] You know the reason why?

Tsuruoka: I don't think war between the two countries is inevitable, I don't think so. But, I understand that some people are becoming more skeptical about the future of the relationship between the two countries, and that's something I'm very concerned about. Coming back to India, one thing that I wanted to add is that there is, I think, a solid consensus that India is an important country for Japan. But, as to why India is important I don't think there is a solid consensus. Because some people argue that India's important because it's a democracy. But other people argue that India is important because India is India. So, regardless of whether it's a democracy or not, India's important, those people say. So almost all people say India is important, but some people look more at more strategic side of India as a strategic partner for Japan, but other people are looking more at "India as India" type of argument because India is a big country, and India is a vibrant, interesting country and that's why it's important. But other people say that India is a strategic partner, especially given the rise of China, India is becoming more important, those people say. I don't think there is a consensus. But what is interesting is that even under the previous government led by the Democratic Party of Japan, Japan's effort to strengthen security and defense cooperation with India continued under the previous government. So the security and strategic partnerships with India is shared by not only the current government but also the opposition parties. So that's I think one of the remarkable and interesting aspects of India-Japan relations.

Tatsumi: There...

Self: Thank you, I'm Ben Self I teach at GW and I'm an adjunct fellow at CSIS, Japan Chair. Thank you for your excellent presentations, you were both very interesting. I have a challenge, not quite a comment not quite a question, but a challenge for Satake-san. You mentioned the "China Gap" as an important factor limiting Japan-Australia defense cooperation. As evidence for this you cited some opinion, that Australia fears entrapment, and I think we talked about Hugh White, and the important, prominent role he's played in voicing this opinion, but that it is not, by any means, a mainstream governmental opinion. And I would add to this, I think it's an important distinction, he also fears entrapment by the United States. That it's his expression of Australia's national interest separates Australia from the US as well as from Japan. And so, is even further from a mainstream Australian view. I then note that in your replies to the comments and questions from the audience you emphasize so many ways that Japan and Australia share views of China, that welcoming China's rise as a responsible stakeholder in the region, and is contributing as a rule builder. They both have deep economic relationships with China that are tremendously important. So I'm wondering if I can challenge you to give more evidence of a gap that's different between Australia and China, as opposed to gaps that exist within Japan between those that are pro-China and pro-engagement, and those that are more hawkish. And the gap obviously exists in

the United States as well as within Australia. But is it really that big a gap between Japan and Australia to prevent that security relationship from blossoming? Thank you.

Satake: Yeah, that's a very important point. I probably should have said the "Senkaku gap" rather than the "China gap," maybe. I went to Australia a few months ago and interviewed some policy makers and researchers and I asked the same question, "What happens if conflict occurs between China and Japan and are you going to support us..?" that kind of question. And what they said was that it really totally depends on the context of the conflict. If Japan did something wrong over Senkaku or other issues, then we are not quite sure about that. But if China apparently violates the rule of law, or freedom of navigation or that kind of thing, then of course Australia must be involved, and of course close US allies, and of course they have a common interest in terms of that kind of thing. So yeah, I think that you are probably right, that "China gap" is not the appropriate word to describe this kind of thing. But as for Hugh's argument, I totally agree with you that his argument is not shared by the Australian government at all. And people don't treat it as a kind of serious argument I guess. But, beside the government, some researchers are deeply committed to Hugh's argument, some of them, and also some ordinary people or military people, I see some influence of his argument actually. And he's very influential...so yeah, that's my point. And thanks for your point, that's very helpful.

Tatsumi: I actually have a question for both of you. Japan-Australia, and then also Japan and some NATO countries like England and France, have recently agreed on some defense technology cooperation. From both of your perspectives, what do you see as a short-term challenge and a long-term challenge for these relations to develop? So, I've been asking Tsuruoka-san to start first, so I'll ask you to start first next.

Satake: I know something about Japan-Australia defense technology cooperation, and I also know that some media report said that the two governments have already agreed to sell Japanese submarines to Australia. But my sense is that things are not as easy as media says. There are many obstacles, there are many hurdles they have to get over to realize that kind of cooperation. That's not only Australia's domestic military industry, but also from the Japanese side there are some people who are reluctant to sell that kind of high technology to other countries, even Australia. So I think it's too early to conclude that governments have reached some conclusion, I think there are many things to do before that.

Tatsumi: Do you see the challenge primarily for those technical issues, at the industry level? Or more of that, I guess, culture in defense industries of both countries?

Satake: I'm not a technological expert, but my sense is everything, including technologies, languages, cultures, those kinds of things.

Tsuruoka: Yes, the equipment cooperation with selected European countries is a new phenomenon, a new thing, for Japan. And one of the biggest consequences of the relaxation of Japan's non-arms export principle has been more possibilities for cooperation with European countries; Britain came first, to be followed by France. So last year in, I think it was July 2013, Japan and the United Kingdom signed a framework agreement on equipment cooperation. We started a very small project on the chemical suit, and we are now developing new assessment majors for the quality and capacity of chemical suit with

Britain. Of course it's a very small project, not likely to become the headline, big article of the first page of newspapers, but our approach is to start small and then based on small experiences we can then gradually move to a bigger project. Now the air-to-air missiles are something we are starting to discuss between the two countries, between Japan and the UK I mean, and also between France and Japan, we are about to start a new equipment cooperation project. And also some other European countries have been expressing its interest in doing different equipment cooperation like Italy. But what is a bit strange is that Germany hasn't been quite visible in this context, despite the fact there are many competitive defense companies in Germany. But still, my impression is that Italy looks more eager to start defensive equipment cooperation with Japan. So Britain, France, and perhaps Italy is coming next, but our approach, again, is to start small. Because Japan doesn't have a huge experience in international, and especially multilateral, defense equipment cooperation. Research and development and production we have almost no multilateral experience. Between Japan and the United States of course we have been doing various things, but beyond the United States almost nonexistent before the relaxation of the three non-arms export principles. So one of the challenges, I think, is how we can manage expectations. Because on the European side, there are various people or various companies who are very ambitious in doing very big new projects with Japan. But Japan's approach, again, is to start small and they are still very cautious. So we are in the process of learning how we can manage these things. Certainly, how to manage expectations is a huge, huge challenge. And also, in the long-term I think how to ensure synergies between on one hand the Europe-Japan defense equipment cooperation and the US-Japan thing on the other. How to ensure synergies is going to be a big question in the long-term, but it's not a short-term challenge. I understand that some Americans are becoming a little bit more nervous about what Japan and Europe are doing together, but my sense for the time being is that you don't really have to worry about it because we are still in the very early phase of equipment cooperation between Europe and Japan. But of course in the future we may have to think about how we can manage Japan, the United States, and Europe equipment cooperation. But, I think still it's a long-term challenge and a long term agenda.

Tatsumi: Actually because you mentioned this word of "managing expectations," I want to flip that onto Japan-Australia and ask you a question. Because yesterday we talked about how different perspective about how Australia sees its security relationship with Japan as opposed to how Japan sees Australia as a security partner. I saw a slight difference there. So if I can explore your thoughts on how to manage the Japanese and Australian expectation of each other as the two countries continue to go down that road of security partnership, I'd really appreciate it.

Satake: That's a very tough question. This is just my impression but what I thought is Japan tends to see more security, in terms of more traditional security-Japan prefers to talk about traditional security aspect, like state-to-state conflict. Whereas Australia is more interested in kind of nontraditional security issues like terrorism and HA/DR and that kind of issue. So that's why I saw some difference between Japan and Australia in that sense. But, what I am saying is that of course traditional security issues are very important, especially for Japan because Japan has China, North Korea, those two powers are really influential for Japanese security, but at the same time it's better to broaden its scope from Northeast Asia to broader regional cooperation. And where Japan and Australia can probably

cooperate more, when it comes to traditional security concerns there is a kind of gap between Japan and Australia, but when it comes to those broader regional frameworks they can cooperate more, I think. They can put more resources in that kind of context, so that's my temporary solution. Please let me think more in the future...

Tatsumi: If you could wait for your microphone...

Lankowski: Hello, G'day I should say, Michael Lankowski from the Australian Embassy. I just had a question for Dr. Satake, actually following up on your question which was a good one about expectations, in addition to the expectations that Australia and Japan have of each other, just noting your biography here...you've written about the burden sharing issue, that obviously raises the question of what the United States' expectations of Australia and Japan are with our bilateral cooperation are – there is since some challenges perhaps in terms of managing US rising expectations that as Australia and Japan do more, then the US has its own expectations, and then do those expectations get out of step with the actual progress of bilateral cooperation between our countries?

Satake: I think that's a really good point. What the US expects from regional allies are quite divergent not only defense buildup but also regional cooperation like capacity building, hosting some maritime or military exercises, and also institution building and that kind of thing. I think especially important is how to bridge the US and Asian countries, including ASEAN. Because Japan and Australia have sometimes been playing the bridging role between the US and Asian countries by establishing the inclusive regional framework such as APEC, ARF, ADMM Plus and... So, for example, if Japan and Australia host some multilateral military exercises in Southeast Asia and invite US and possibly invite China and that kind of thing then we can make that kind of good cooperative framework which is also important burden sharing assumed by Japan and Australia.

Tatsumi: Well, thank you everyone for your interesting questions, thought-provoking I'm sure for both of these gentlemen. They will hopefully, if their calendar matches, I hope to bring them back with two additional researchers next spring at the release of, essentially, their paper. So hopefully you'll all join me when that happens, I'm sure you'll all get the notice of that. So with that thank you for, again, coming and joining us this morning, and thank you to you both. Thank you.

-Applause-