

Japan as a “Peace Enabler”: Views from the Next Generation

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Tatsumi: Well, good morning. My name is Yuki Tatsumi. I am a senior associate here at the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center. I heard that the Metro had some major issues [on the] blue, orange, and silver [lines]. That means many of you were probably stuck, and spent unpleasant hours on the metro this morning, so thank you for laboring your way through.

I’m very happy to release this report today. I would like to thank the general support from the Japanese Embassy to make this project possible. Japan’s efforts in the United Nations is not exactly a topic of the day issue, and it’s very difficult if you’re in Washington, D.C. to focus on that, so their support really allowed me the opportunity to do so on this project. And this is, if you know my professional writings and analysis, this is a little bit off from what I normally do. I normally talk about North Korean missiles and Australian sub deals and things like that, but this is a very, very different flavor. The reason I chose this topic for this year is precisely because this is a very big year for Japanese multinational diplomacy. Japan [will] host the G-7 summit, and also, Japan is the host of the Tokyo International Conference for American Development (known as TICAD). [This will be] the first time it will be hosted in Kenya, but Japan has been the initiator and a longtime supporter for that effort focused on African development. So, in other words, this is the year that Japan has the opportunity to be at the front stage of the multinational diplomacy on global issues. And not to mention that Japan [was] just selected last fall to serve the two-year term for nonpermanent membership on the UN Security Council, so I thought the timing would be very right to discuss what Japan has been doing in the United Nations (although many of the efforts have not been known, or Japan has not been particularly good at advertising what it has been doing), and what more can be done and what needs to be done for that to become possible.

I always try to bring a new group of people who are not usually known to Washington audiences, and I think I’m thoroughly successful here. This is a group of people that I have here today with me...there are former diplomats, some of them have worked in the UN agencies [in] the field, and then, actually, we have the great privilege of a serving Ground Self-Defense Force officer writing a paper for us talk[ing] about Japan’s effort for peacekeeping operations. And Professor Toshiya Hoshino from Osaka University (who cannot be here today, but he) provided the important context in this report; you will see his thoughts in the overview section. And we very much miss his presence, but he has a very important duty at home at his university, so he cannot escape.

And let me just briefly go through how today is going to go: I will turn over to each of the authors, each of whom will speak about five-to-seven minutes, and then I will turn to my fellow Stimsonite, Aditi Gorur, who’s sitting right in front, for some comments. For those of you who work on Asia, she may be new to you, but for those who work in the peacekeeping field, she is not new at all. She is quite a veteran. She has worked a long time in the field, she travels to probably one of the most dangerous places around the world, looking at displaced people, looking into responsibility to protect-related

issues, so I will turn to her for her thoughts, and then we'll open it up for further questions. So without further ado, I will turn the microphone over to Kazuo Tase, who is managing director of Deloitte Tohmatsu Consulting, but he also used to serve for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan.

Tase: Thank you very much. Good morning. I [will talk] for just five-to-seven minutes about the success and failure of Japanese diplomacy in advancing the concept of human security. Maybe some of you have heard of or are familiar with the concept, which Japan [has] pushed for the past fifteen years in the United Nations. Japan has been half successful but half unsuccessful mainstream[ing] this notion in the United Nations. And I was with OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), in charge of allocating the resources for the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, which was mainly [funded] by the government of Japan – about \$500 million for about ten years.

The biggest success of Japanese diplomacy in human security was that it could demonstrate how this notion could be translated into actual, concrete support for communities and people on the ground in both humanitarian and developmental contexts. The fund tried to bring together different sectors, like education, poverty, and health, and also other areas such as humanitarian, emphasizing that human security is a multidimensional, interconnected idea to bring together different aspects of human lives. The fund forced the United Nations organizations to work together (that was the condition for allocating funding). So, for ten, fifteen years, the fund has demonstrated and achieved lots of life-saving and people-empowering effects and impacts on [inaudible] and also post-conflict situations.

The biggest failure was that Japan wanted to keep the concept as Japan's. Japan didn't want to open the conversation to other UN member nations to together develop the notion, unlike the responsibility to protect. I was [a] very close friend to the Canadian government, and we fully understood how this responsibility-to-protect idea came [about]: the Canadian Rwandan experience. In the late 1990s, Canadians pushed for the notion of humanitarian intervention, and that was somehow developed into the responsibility to protect. Containing the idea, which originally exceeded the coverage of the UN charter – it successfully contained how the Security Council can enhance the notion of security, the coverage. So the LDP was quite successful, but on the other hand, Japan wanted to keep the notion as Japan's original policy and also tied with Japanese ODA, so it has shown very limited development, both conceptually and institutionally in the United Nations.

Especially, the limitation came from the vagueness of the definition of the notion itself. By human security, Japan wanted to express this multidimensionality, interconnectedness, and so on and so forth, but it did not succeed [in] develop[ing] a clear-cut, academic definition that can [with]stand critics and arguments/discussions of academics. So still, human security, although it has been endorsed by GA resolutions in 2011 and 2013, there is no such agreed definition in the United Nations system. So my recommendation here in this paper is to give the notion a distinct definition that is different from existing notions and shed light on the physical security and also the psychological security among people and individuals, especially the psychological aspect. Psychological security is very elusive to grasp and also difficult to quantify, but in the current academic [world], there are lots of people now [studying how to] quantify well-being and happiness, and all these psychological values. So my recommendation is to redevelop the concept of human security [so] that [it] integrates both the physical safety or security and also psychological security and other values, and also develop an index that can put together physical side and psychological side so that we can have a clearer notion of the human security concept.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Tase-san. First, until I read his paper, I had no idea what human security [was], and after reading his paper, I think I have a little bit of an idea of what it is *trying* to be, but what is still has not been *able* to be. So if you're interested in how to quantify or how to conceptualize the interconnected notion of how you measure people's happiness, how you measure people's welfare, this may be a good – in internationally doing so – this may be a good guide. Thank you, Tase-san. Next I will move to Kazuto Tsuruga, who is currently an associate professor of international development at Osaka University's Global Collaboration Center. He has worked in Japan's Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York, and he has also worked as a strategic planning officer in the UNDP in Afghanistan. In this report, his main task was to look at Japan's assistance for fragile states and how that's been different from what we consider assistance to those areas in the United States, and how Japan can enhance its efforts in that realm. So, Tsuruga-san:

Tsuruga: Thank you. Good morning everyone. I wrote about state fragility, and I mainly focused on three aspects of US-Japan collaboration: one is the financial aspect, the second is deployment of personnel (human resources), and the third is commitment to the political process.

As everyone is aware, the issue of state fragility is becoming a hot issue in the international community, [which], including the United States, has been struggling to solve the problem, and in [my paper], I examined how Japan can play a significant role to tackle that problem. And looking at – well, before [I get into] that – even though there's a lot of talk about state fragility, there is no universally agreed-upon definition, but there are many aspects to state fragility, including economic, political, and social, and it's multidimensional, and my argument is that military action cannot solve the issue of state fragility.

Looking at the financial contribution[s] of Japan and the US, there is no doubt that the US is by far the largest contributor [of] ODA and [to the] UN for addressing state fragility. Japan is also becoming a big part in contributing ODA to state fragility since the decade of 2000, and by revising [its] development charter, Japan started addressing the issue in Afghanistan after 9/11 and also East Timor and Aceh, in Indonesia, and in Sri Lanka, and there has been a lot of money put into those countries to help those countries recover from conflict. And in terms of the amount of financial contribution, Japan has made a big contribution, but what is important here is not really the amount of money put into it, but what is important is really how Japan can leverage that influence in making policy formulation, and Japan still has a lot to do in that regard. By making political contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, as well as other UN agencies, Japan can play a bigger role in the international community.

In terms of track record – personal contributions – I think, Mr. Suda will talk about deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. I think [that] over the past 20 years, Japan has made big steps towards sending troops toward peacekeeping operations, but I think what is lacking is that Japan has not sent other types of personnel, including police. When we look at the current status of peacekeeping operations, I think there are a lot of aspects that have to be dealt with, and there is a lot of potential for police to play a role in current peacekeeping operations, and I think Japan has not made enough contributions in that regard, and I think Japan can do more in partnership with the US.

Looking at the civilian part, Japan seems to lack a talent pool at the higher level. I think, Professor Uesugi will talk about the Hiroshima Peacebuilding Center, and I think that's a good contribution, but I guess what Japan needs are higher-level experts who can deal with the political process and negotiate settlements with counterparts in the US – and also in countries in conflict – and I think that's missing. I think there's an acute need for Japan, and also civil society, to develop that talent pool.

With regard to political process, I think the Cambodian case in the early 1990s was a successful case for Japan, but – I guess – the Cambodian case, in retrospect, was not that complex compared to what we have been observing nowadays, because it was simply a one-country settlement, and Japan could play a big role in terms of making financial contribution, sending SDF, and also having top-level representatives in the UN. But like in the case of Afghanistan, Japan had a very limited role, and there are lots of issues to be dealt with in recent cases, like in Iraq, and also in Syria. Japan can play a bigger role with the US by developing research analytical skills and also developing joint, rich personal resources to tackle state fragility. And I also talk about what the US can do in terms of deploying personnel in the UN, but I think my time is up, so I have to cut it off here. Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Before this session, I reminded everyone that if they catch my head start moving in their peripheral vision, that means their time is up, and I am kind of thankful they've been paying attention to my head movement.

Tsuruga-san talked about human resources. For Japan and the UN, we know Madame Ogata, and we know Dr. Akashi, but then we really can't come up with further names, for now. So I think that is an excellent segue [into] how to develop those people and [to] move on to Dr. Uesugi, who is a professor at Waseda University at its School of International Liberal Studies, but prior to his current assignment, he actually was managing this human resources development program grant program at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and if you're interested, he brought some materials over there, along this wall. There are not that many copies, but if you are interested in knowing what those activities are, those materials are free to take, so please do feel free to take one for your reference. And without further ado, Uesugi-san.

Uesugi: Thank you very much. Good morning, my name is Yuji Uesugi. If you look at the book, the top title says, "Views from the Next Generation." I did my master's [degree] here in the US, [at] George Mason University, over twenty years ago. I don't feel like I'm [part of] a new generation, but at the same time, this morning we had a chat, and the colonel is going to retire after a few years, because in the military, retirement is quite early, but for the university, I have twenty-five years to go, so maybe you can say that I *am* part of the new generations.

Unlike others [on the panel], I have never worked in the Japanese government, but as Yuki pointed out, I have been working for the Japanese government in the endeavor [of] trying to develop human resources, particularly for rank-and-file soldiers in the field of peacebuilding. And my talks [today] are related to this human-resource development for peacebuilding, and my focus is on the civilian part. I have three challenges highlighted in the report, and also three relevant recommendations, so my talk this morning will be on these six points.

First of all, the first challenge is related to the achievement [over] the past eight years of human-resource development for peacebuilding. As Tsuruga-san pointed out, we have been quite successful [in] providing a segue into the UN system for entry level [professionals]. We have been able to introduce more than 200 young Japanese into the UN system. Most of them [are] still working for the UN in the field of peacebuilding; probably eighty percent or more are remaining, are still working in the field. The challenge is that there is a gap between the entry levels and midline levels, particularly in the UN bureaucracies. Tsuruga-san pointed out the senior, more managerial part – but still, in Japan, we have about 200 young Japanese working in the UN, but there's a missing piece. Somewhere between maybe thirty-five and forty-five, at the age when you are thinking about having a marriage, or getting children, or you have to take care of your parents, there's a huge challenge of balancing your private life with that

of your career development, because when we say peacebuilding, you're required to work in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and you cannot bring your family with you. So that's one of the challenges. Although the government wants us to keep recruiting those who have the talent and ambition, but sometimes you felt, "what to do?," if you find you are married and want to raise your children in Japan. So that's one challenge.

The second challenge: the two focuses of our program [have] been on Asia – we have worked with other Asian countries – and also, the UN (is our second focus). Nowadays, when you look at the situation in the world, especially in peacekeeping and other [realms], none of these activities are actually going on in Asia, so Asia and the UN don't intersect any longer in the international peace-cooperation area. So we need to somehow think about the way...how to use this prior investment in human resources in Asia.

The third challenge is related to the US-Japan relationship. We have no formal relationship between the United States and Japan on this particular human-resource development project. Maybe it is a good idea [for] Japan and the United States [to] share the labor in international peace cooperation. For example, Tsuruga-san has worked in [the] UNDP in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Japan took part in the disarmament, and democratization, and reintegration of the former warriors and soldiers. Japan will do that, and the United States will do something different. So sometimes, sharing the labor or sharing the job is one idea, [and] maybe we could have worked together in human resource development, but that has not been there.

Based on these three challenges, I have three recommendations: On the first point, there is the challenge of long-term career development. I suggested in the report that we need to promote the synergy between what we call "peacebuilding" and development: more systematic coordination with (the) JICA, the Japan International Coordination Agency, [which has] a scheme for sending civilians to so-called "developing" countries. Maybe, if you want to get married, you have to retreat from the frontlines of the conflict, but you may [still] be able to work in so-called developing countries. You can bring your wife, you can bring your husband and children, and after ten years or so, when your kids [are] already in the university, then you may be able to come back to the front lines. That's one.

The second recommendation is related to how to utilize the prior investment in human resources in Asia. I would like to argue that we need to establish a platform on which the Japanese peacebuilders and Asian peacebuilders can work together. We have been focusing only on the UN as a platform, but in Asia, we may be able to establish a new regional platform, and that second recommendation, related to this third recommendation, is that Japan, together with the United States, may be able to work together to revitalize some of this existing regional framework, something like ASEAN Plus or ARF, for the Japanese and also the Asian peacebuilders to be able to work together. Of course, my recommendations have a lot of pitfalls and shortcomings and problems, but we need to start [somewhere], particularly in Asia. We have Myanmar, for example. Although democratization has started developing, we have some minorities problems in the north. We have Thailand; particularly in the deep south, Muslims and Buddhists [are] fighting. And we have Mindanao in the Philippines – although [it may be] true that the rebels and the government have agreed to a peace agreement, but they have not been able to follow through, and we have to wait for the new president to implement the peace agreement. And [in] Myanmar, Thailand, and the Philippines, I don't see any significant role of the UN. Perhaps, together (with) the United States and Japan, we may be able to do something.

A good example could be in Myanmar. JICA and USAID, and you have Asia Foundations and we have Nippon Foundation. All of these actors are working in Myanmar, and perhaps we may be able to work to

create some kind of what I call a “hybrid-peacebuilding team”: one on the government (JICA and USAID), and one on the non-governmental partnership (something like Asia Foundation and Nippon Foundation) to collaborate together.

One final note from me: in Mindanao and also in southern Thailand, there’s an Islamic element there, so sometimes it is a good idea to work together – for the Japanese, it is a good idea to work with the United States. But in other times, particularly when dealing with these kinds of so-called Islamic fundamentalists or extremists, we may be able to work separately. We have been able to demonstrate our innocent or benign posture; although we have our national interests, Japan has been able to demonstrate [that it is] innocent, impartial, and [has] no other aspirations whatsoever other than making peace. So sometimes, we may work separately [from] the United States, while on other front lines we can work together with the United States. Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Uesugi-san. Last but not least, I’ll turn to Colonel Michio Suda, who is actually currently at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Headquarters Senior Liaison. Before he starts speaking, I will say this disclaimer on his behalf. What he will say in today’s seminar, and then also what he wrote in this report, represents his own personal views and do not represent those of the Ground Self-Defense Forces, United Nations, Ministry of Defense, or Government of Japan. So without further ado...

Suda: Thank you, Yuki-san. Trying to protect me from the criticism. I am the only one who is not a civilian here today, and Yuki-san has mobilized me to write on this project, because I was wondering whether I should join this project or not, because I don’t like writing papers, and whenever I try to contribute my papers to the academic societies right here, anonymous reviewers give me harsh treatment, which is a frightening experience for me. But Yuki-san just promised me [that] she would not give me such harsh treatment, and that was good, and I was able to draft my paper comfortably. I would like to thank, of course, Yuki-san, and Hana-san. Thank you very much. My dirty English was dramatically improved by their work. Both of you, thanks again, both of you.

Now [the] title of my policy paper is “New Dimensions for Japan’s Contribution to UN Blue Helmets,” but if I [were to add] subtitle following this main title, [it would be] “Double-Triangular-Partnership Peacekeeping.” At the top of this policy briefing note, I just presented three policy objectives. The chief policy objective has been the statement made by Prime Minister Abe when he attended the General Assembly 2014-2015. There is the so-called peacekeeping summit at the General Assembly. Every head of the nations is supposed to make an international pledge [regarding] how they are going to contribute to peacekeeping operations further, not just military, but also civilian, [etc.]. In order to achieve those three objectives, there are two primary challenges.

First, I have to point out the security environment that surrounds Japan. There has been considerable transition in the security environment surrounding Japan. I just highlighted one example: the PLA seems to be trying to change the status quo by coercion. This is not my statement, this is the statement made by General [Kiyofumi] Iwata. This is a direct quotation from his paper, maybe published two years ago. He’s my big boss, and I’m trying to be nice to him [so that he might] give me another promotion, but given that challenging strategic environment surrounding Japan, Japan would have to prioritize homeland defense rather than [send] a large number of troops overseas. This is the first challenge.

The second challenge would be how Japan could respond to increasing expectation[s] following the recent amendment [of the] International Peacekeeping Act. These would be the two primary challenges to achiev[ing] the three policy objectives given by Prime Minister Abe.

Regarding the first challenge, I would like to propose that Western countries, including the United States, are trying to explore the triangular partnership [among] Western powers, the United Nations, and less-capable troop-contributing countries. They kind of – the UN recently invented idea of the technology-contributing country. Japan could be on board with such a project. This is the first proposal I made in this paper to overcome the first challenge.

Regarding the second challenge of increasing expectation[s] following expan[sion of] the scope of the task[s] the SDF can implement in the field of international peace operations (and) together with the associated authority to use weapons, my initial observation is that there will be less pressure for Japan to be on the front lines of those types of operations, including protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping operations. If you have this publication with you, please look at page 76 – I just depicted some table to highlight [that] everybody has a role to play in a UN peacekeeping operation. The upper side of the box basically I just presented how we are going to employ major infantry TCC: those TCC who are less willing to take risk, they should be deployed to lower-risk areas, and then those who are willing to take risk, they should be deployed to the high-risk areas. In Japan, there will be sufficient contributions to the front-line troops, but there will be no room for Japan to commit troops there. This was made clear by the Under-Secretary-General of the UN Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous. He visited Tokyo last year, and he expects Japan to be a technology-contributing country (depicted on the bottom side of the box [in the Stimson report]). The UN Secretariat is now promoting idea of technology-contributing countries, mainly asking Western countries to contribute more in modern technology to operationalize capability of TCC. Everyone has a role to play. Then that would be the reason why there will be less pressure for Japan to commit front-line troops in the field of UN peacekeeping operations.

Now, time is almost up, then I will just move to my policy recommendation, which is a “double-triangular partnership.” The first part: the triangular partnership is just [among] Japan, the UN, and rest of TCC. Please look at [page] 76 of my paper. I just put Japan at the bottom of the box, and there is the statement that [references] the Japan-led ARDEC, which is the acronym Africa Rapid Deployment Engineer Capability Project, which is an innovative project. This is not just capacity-building, but also trying to earmark the standing-enabler reserve, which is quite an amazing project in the history of UN peacekeeping projects. UN never had such a kind of strategic reserve. So I would like to highlight [that] this is a very innovative project. And this is just one example of triangular partnership [among] Japan, the US, and the rest capability of TCC.

The final point would be that against this technology-contributing country project, there is kind of reactionary movement from the conventional, major troop-contributing countries, because their position would be undermined by the expansion of Western countries who [are] trying to promote this idea. They are not so happy with this.

Then my final proposal would be [that] we should promote another triangular partnership [among] Japan, the United States, and the EU powers. This concludes my outline of the key points I have presented in my paper. Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Colonel Suda, and thank you everyone for keeping to your times and then very succinctly touch[ing] upon the points [in] your chapter of this report. Obviously, as you heard – this report really covered a whole range of issues, from human security, to fragile states assistance, to human resource development, to PKO, but there is always the reality that goes on the ground that drives the requirement for Japan to do more or [for] Japan to be more active in a certain areas, or [the] international community writ large needs to be more active in certain areas. So with that, I would like to turn now to my colleague, Aditi, to see if she has a few words to share with us.

Gorur: You're kind of putting me on the spot here. My expertise is in civilian protection and peacekeeping. To ask me to talk about Japan in front of a whole panel of Japan experts, I think she's setting me up for embarrassment, but I wanted to try [to] tie together the theme of human security and the theme of peacekeeping to talk a little bit about how Japan can use – can promote – the idea of human security through its contributions to peacekeeping, because I think that human security has a lot to offer the UN in terms of how it goes about improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.

So I wanted to talk about that on two levels: one is on the ground, and one is at headquarters, and, you know, taking advantage of Japan's place in the Security Council. So, on the ground, you know, the UN has come to a realization over the last five or ten years that it goes into a peacekeeping context with the assumption that the host-state government is a partner in protecting civilians, and that that assumption is very frequently untrue, and that very often, the host-state government is in fact one of the biggest perpetrators of violence against civilians. And this has been a very difficult realization for the UN, because the fact is that it is very difficult for a peacekeeping mission to achieve anything without the support of the host-state government. But that is the reality we face now. In places like South Sudan [and] the Democratic Republic of Congo, the host-state government is actively targeting civilians for violence and is actively interfering with the peacekeeping missions' ability to protect civilians.

So given that context, the concept of human security: making sure that people are at the center of peacekeeping missions' efforts and not the state, it is so, so fundamentally important [for] the UN to remember that the protection-of-civilians agenda is a commitment that the UN is making to the population of that country, and it's not that they're committing to protect the population by supporting the state, necessarily. So in places where the host-state government does present that kind of threat to the population, I think Japan can play a really important role by contributing personnel, as we've talked about.

I'm so glad to see that the recommendation for Japan to contribute police was in the report. I thought that was a fantastic recommendation. Japan's role as a technology-contributing country [is] also really important. These are [the] kinds of roles Japan can play to promote human security in a way that just military contributions cannot. So for example, police are trained to respond to riots, to deescalate conflict, to interact with communities in a way that militaries really aren't trained to the same extent at. So that kind of contribution really can improve human security, a broader concept of human security [beyond mere] physical protection. So that's, you know, one way I think Japan can make a really important contribution.

Also, thinking about the role of JICA in countries where Japan has a peacekeeping presence, it seems like often JICA is interested in promoting infrastructure projects. Having a human security lens on that contribution could be very helpful. Infrastructure, you know, often benefits the host-state government, and thinking through the role that the host-state government is playing in perpetrating violence against civilians, and thinking about how an infrastructure project could both benefit the population and

possibly benefit the government that's perpetrating violence, I think that human security lens could be a really important way for Japan to think about its contributions through development projects, as well.

Then last, just moving to the headquarters level, thinking about human security and the potential for the host-state government to perpetrate violence can be so important in terms of the development of mandates. So we've now reached a point in UN peacekeeping where it's somewhere around ninety-seven percent of UN peacekeepers are serving in missions that have a mandate to protect civilians; it is extremely common to give protection-of-civilians mandates, but there is still a little bit of that reluctance – like I mentioned before – reluctance to acknowledge that the state is so often the perpetrator of violence against civilians. So while developing mandates, you know, making sure that other Security Council members are confronting the potential threat that the host-state government [poses], ensuring that the protection-of-civilians mandate is truly thinking about the range of potential threats to the physical security, and also to the dignity, of civilians on the ground. Really trying to integrate that concept of human security into the development of mandates, into the planning process of the UN, into the conflict analysis that drives the deployment of missions. I think this is a really exciting time to have Japan as a champion of human security on the Security Council.

Tatsumi: Thank you, Aditi. So I think we will move on to question-and-answer – and, by the way, that was brilliant – and I will move onto [the] question-and-answer session, so if you would like to ask a question, please raise your hand, wait until I call [on you], and then if your question is toward a specific individual on this panel, please do make it clear at the beginning. And we welcome comments also, but please do not speak longer than all of our speakers have (done) individually. So with that, I will open it up.

Libo Liu: Thank you, Yuki. Gentlemen. There is no doubt that Japan has been very, very generous towards international peacebuilding, providing generous donations to Asian countries, but I wonder if that image: that Japan is a “peace enabler,” resonates in your neighboring countries: China, South Korea, and even Russia. So, Saturday, your government released a survey showing that your own people, the Japanese people, 83% unfriendly toward China, about 65[%] toward South Koreans, and nearly 80% toward Russians. So, I'm wondering: What is going on there? Can you explain the external reason [and] maybe some internal reason for the disconnect?

And then, if I [may] add a second question: you all seem to have peacekeeping working experience in a UN setting. I'm wondering what your interaction with the Chinese [has been], what your experience [has been]. Are they really [interested] in the same kind of goal[s] as the Japanese are in terms of improving peace and order, or do you think that interaction shows they have a different kind of motivation? Thanks.

Tatsumi: That's for anyone who would like to take a first stab at it. I think I will – while they're thinking [about] how to respond – I think I'll probably try to answer your first one. I think that what you see...I wonder if the dichotomy that you see coming out of Japan is on [the] one hand...its seventy-year record is clear: Japan has not invaded any other country, it has been a generous ODA provider, it has been a generous UN supporter since it joined the UN (to the best of its ability), so there's always an aspiration that it wants to contribute to peace, but I think the results of the poll that you are seeing is more a direct reaction from the public to what's going on in their region. With North Korea firing missiles and Chinese behavior seems to be asserting its claim – not necessarily on the East China Sea nowadays, but it continues to pressure that, but then also, it seems to be stepping up a notch in the South China Sea. I wonder if that is the direct reaction of basically, in their immediate neighborhood, the Japanese public

frankly just feels less safe, but it doesn't mean it loses its aspiration to want to do more in the more multinational peacekeeping or peacebuilding arena.

And on your question on Japanese interaction with Chinese: as far as I understand, when Self-Defense Force troops go out there, there are times when they serve side-by-side with Chinese PKO forces, and to the best of [my] knowledge, they work together for the shared cause, and that actually becomes an unadvertised confidence-building [mechanism] between the two countries. So, I would, from my vantage point, I would stop there and see if anyone else would like to chime in.

Uesugi: On the point of [the] human-resource development project for peacebuilding, we have had the participant[s] coming from South Korea and China since the inauguration of the program, so we have worked very well together with our close neighbors. And, in fact, all of us share the same aspirations and visions, and there is no hard feeling between the Chinese participants and Japanese participants. And also, I myself have been dispatched to East Timor as an electoral monitor, and while I was monitoring polling stations, my partner [was] a Chinese police[man], and also we [had] a South Korean electoral monitor also working very closely [with] us. So in the field of so-called peacebuilding or peacekeeping, I think we have been able to work very closely with our close neighbors.

Suda: If I [could] make just one comment on Japanese...on the military front of Japan's exchange, there are three levels of exchange: the top level, and the staff level, and the local unit level. All three levels have been working [toward] dramatic progress since the 1990s. I was one of [those] to promote this staff-level defense exchange between South Korea – Republic of Korea – and Japan. I actually graduated from the Staff College in Republic of Korea fifteen years ago. Staff level and local level...if we talk about the local-units level, the Western army and Japan's Self-Defense Force, Ground Self-Defense Force, there is a mechanism to ensure commander-level exchange between the army commanding general of the Western army has the has mutual with the other side of the [inaudible]. And [on] the military front, the three levels of defense exchange have been making progress. This is just...I would like to highlight this. Of course, this kind of defense – I would say – cooperation is also ongoing in South Sudan, with the Republic of Korea and Japanese contingent[s] doing the same type of task, like military engineering (and the Chinese [are] also committing infantry for senior assignment there). This is something I can comment [on] from the Japanese military front [in terms of] exchange with neighboring countries.

Tsuruga: In terms of diplomatic relations at the UN, I didn't see any difficulty dealing with our neighboring countries like China and Korea. Of course, there are many aspects to diplomacy, but at least at the UN, we have a very good relationship with Korea and with China, and in many settings, like peacebuilding commissions and the Security Council. So, of course, what's being discussed in Japan is mainly influenced by what's being reported in the media, and what's being reported in the media about the UN is about North Korea, mainly, and naturally so. And China being reluctant to impose very strict sanctions on North Korea is widely reported, and that may have some impact on what the Japanese public sees in the UN. But that's not the whole picture of what we are doing in the UN, so I guess what's being reported in the media has [a] very strong influence on that whole [thing].

Rachel Oswald: I heard a lot of comments about what the US can do, in partnership with the United States, under the leadership of the United States to improve diplomacy and peacebuilding. What happens if the United States takes a more isolationist role under the next president? How critical is active US involvement in the United Nations and in potential other multilateral initiatives? How important is that to Japan taking a more active role?

Tatsumi: I think our...probably everyone's unanimous reaction will be that we hope it will not be the case, but since we're talking about a rather unusual presidential election this year, any extreme is actually, frankly, within the realm of possibility in discussion.

The US, as you know, is the biggest financial contributor to the UN in all aspects of its activities, so if the next president does take highly isolationist positions, policy toward [the] UN and other multilateral organizations will be one of many, many areas where US foreign policy overall will be affected, and it will have a tremendous effect across the globe. Then we're talking about not just what Japan can do, but then I think we would be talking about the countries other than the United States trying to figure out what they can do now that the United States has this very unique president who has a very unique foreign policy outlook. But it's really on that notional level that I think we can talk to. But Aditi, do you have anything to add on that? Would anyone like to comment?

Tsuruga: I am very concerned. Even now, the United States has a very special place at the UN, and since it's too powerful, the US doesn't seem to have faith in the United Nations, even with the current administration. I don't see any proactive contributions in peacekeeping, and I think the US can do – and it is beneficial for the US, as well – to do more at the United Nations to share burden instead of just leaving it aside.

Gorur: In September last year, President Obama released a presidential policy memo on UN peacekeeping, in which he outlined – well, it was followed by a plan of action that is going to be released soon for how we best can contribute more to UN peacekeeping. He outlined three pillars. One is direct US contributions in the form of military observers and other experts, and I think it's extremely unlikely that the US would ever return to being a major troop contributor, but along the lines of Japan being a technology-contributor, contributing police and military experts, contributing civilian experts. And then the second pillar is training other countries, so especially African countries, to build up their capability to contribute to peacekeeping missions. And then the third pillar was reform at the UN level to make peacekeeping more effective. All of that was outlined in the presidential policy memo that obviously could be superseded by whatever president takes over next. I think a President Clinton would be very likely to maintain that plan of action, and a President Trump would be very unlikely to, so that's the current US policy, and we're actually hoping to work with some US government and other civil society partners to present the US plan of action of peacekeeping in the next month or two, so keep your eye out for that.

Uesugi: Compared to the US defense budget, what has been given to the UN is very, very tiny, and there are some statistics saying that the annual budget of the UN is equal to the annual budget of the fire department of New York City, which means that if [the] US is becoming more and more isolationist, [that] makes the UN, I think, less and less relevant to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. So I would say that the isolationism of the US would be critical for the relevance of the UN [to] maintaining international peace and security.

Audience Member: I just had a question about the infrastructure that you're already – in your time in Asia – that essentially you've invested in. Several made comments to that effect, and I wonder if as you work with partners and work through this particular thing, are you sharing your information and even maybe training some of these nations...their capabilities, not only to provide troops, but ideas: how technology, in their case, they could apply to Africa and other parts of the world. That might be a way

that Japan might be able to lead, where you have that participation in these successes and even things where you've learned lessons. That might be one way of capturing it. Are you going to sort of make that a little more formal, or is that an area you've even considered?

Uesugi: In terms of human resource[s], most of our so-called trainees have been juniors and entry-levels, so we need to wait and see maybe another five or ten years. The first years of our alumni are now serving at kind of mid-rank levels, so once they reach more senior positions, we may be able to develop more useful activities, but up until now, there [have] not been formal activities. That is why I made a recommendation that we need to utilize this prior investment. Having said that, perhaps in the Philippines, and also maybe [in] Indonesia and so forth, there is a human-resource network, and they have occasionally, not as systematically as we wish, but occasionally and in an ad-hoc manner, they collaborate, and hopefully these will be materialized.

And also, our new peace and security regulations allow the Japanese government to work outside the UN framework, and this I think will give more opportunities for the Japanese to explore the opportunities to collaborate with other Asian powers. On top of that, the Self-Defense Forces have started training in so-called peacekeeping training centers in other parts of the world (in Africa and also in Asia). They also started activities called capacity building projects, and actually, [the] Self-Defense Forces are now in Timor-Leste to develop the capacity of the local military forces, so slowly, we are trying to [pass] on knowledge and experience to our Asian friends.

Suda: If I might add just one point in addition to Professor Uesugi-san, he covered everything in our project regarding East Asia, the Asia-Pacific region; I just put one project in my paper: the Africa Rapid Deployment Engineering Capability Project. Last year, that was a trial project, where Japan could not send more than ten trainers to train for African rest-capability TCC, and the students were just ten, or something like that. This year around, I think it will expand to more than ten nations and more than thirty students. This is just...I'm hoping the same kind of project could be done, I mean triangular cooperation or partnership: some kind of UN-related facility could be built in this Asia-Pacific region. Japan could increase our capacity-building support, hopefully in addition to not just capacity-building, [but also] kind of [through] creation of a standing-capability reserve to respond to UN peacekeeping emergenc[ies]. This is just my personal idea [that] I can present to you

Stanley Kober: Let me broaden this out, because I'm a little puzzled about the effectiveness of peacekeeping as such. When I think of peacekeeping, I think of things like the Camp David Agreement and Sinai. There is a force in Sinai. See what's happening in Sinai recently? Or Lebanon, South Lebanon – UN forces on the border. See what's happening in Lebanon recently? If we are going to discuss peacekeeping, these are long-term efforts in peacekeeping which now seem to be endangered by deteriorating situations. Shouldn't that inform the conversation?

Tatsumi: While everybody is appreciating that deep question, I would like to solicit one more from the floor, if I can. Okay, let me take a first cut. Of course, it *should* inform the conversation, and we are not pretending that it is a comprehensive effort in our peacekeeping or peacebuilding, but we all have to start from somewhere, and it is also true that the traditional notion of peacekeeping no longer holds, either, so I think the whole challenge right now is, too, how to have those unraveling realities on the ground inform the conversation, at the same time with acknowledging that the two examples that you mention, that type of clean-cut peacekeeping doesn't seem to be the norm anymore, and I think I'll just stop at that. Do you [Aditi] have anything to add to that?

Gorur: The two examples you mention: Lebanon and Cyprus, they're not really representative of most peacekeeping missions. Most peacekeeping missions are in Africa, they are much larger and multidimensional missions. They have mandates to protect civilians, build [the] capacity of the host-state government, to implement rule of law; they have extremely wide-ranging mandates, and we're talking more like 10,000, sometimes even 20 or 25,000 personnel on these missions. They're a very different profile. And I think Yuki is absolutely right that the profile of peacekeeping has changed a lot and is continuing to change. Right now we are talking about...we have a peacekeeping mission in Mali that is confronting violent extremism, and we're talking about potentially deploying peacekeeping missions to Syria, to Libya, maybe to Yemen. These are big changes that the UN is grappling with, so I think that question of whether peacekeeping is effective is certainly being discussed, and whether peacekeeping [can be effective] in that new kind of environment [of] countering violent extremism, that's also being discussed, but the idea that Lebanon is sort of representative of where UN peacekeeping is today is a little inaccurate.

Tsuruga: In terms of [the] effectiveness of peacekeeping, I agree. I mean, peacekeeping is not a solution. I think [a] political solution must come before peacekeeping, and I wonder whether member states at the United Nations are taking advice [outlined] in the recent report on peacekeeping very seriously. Many member states, including the United States, seem to dump the difficult part on peacekeeping and not [exert] serious effort in solving issues at the political level, and without that, there is a limit to what the UN can do. I think the US and Japan can do more to enhance the political-settlement process driven by the United Nations, and I think that's one message that I tried to convey in this report.

Uesugi: I would say that the peacekeeping was relatively successful in Cambodia and East Timor, although they have setbacks. If you look at the situation right now, I don't see Cambodia going back to civil war, although Hun Sen has been in power for so long...but [it is] stable. In East Timor, we had setbacks in 2006 and [in] 2008 with the assassination attempt, but if you go there right now, it's very stable. So there have been cases of success when there are certain political reconciliations and maybe functional government there. But at the same time, most contemporary peacekeeping involves protection of civilians, which means [that] on the one hand, you have the tradition sense of what a UN peacekeeper is: impartiality, minimum use of force, so on and so forth, and our government mentality still operating under such [a] traditional notion of peacekeeping. I was quite surprised when we discussed [the] peace and security new regulation, and in fact, what is related to UN peacekeeping is almost unchanged; they were still operating under the Cold War peacekeeping [mentality].

But at the same time, UN is in dilemma over whether they want to maintain their traditional principles of neutrality when you face a situation like one of our civilians are killed. If you wanted to be an effective actor protecting innocent civilians, you may not be able to maintain an impartial law. You have to step in, and defend for the weak. If you do that, then there will be a problem in Japanese society. We don't expect to send our forces in such a situation when you become a party to the conflict, so that's the kind of challenge [we face]. So we may be able to...we are ready to work in a situation like Cambodia or East Timor, but the reality is that a situation like East Timor probably isn't going to happen again. More severe, difficult cases [are the new reality], and then we are still undecided about how Japan can actively cooperate in such a dangerous situation.

Suda: If I [could] make just one point [on] UN peacekeeping, use of force, and [the] effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. A UN peacekeeping operation is just about the tactical use of force under Chapter 7 of the UN charter. I'm not talking about strategic Chapter 7, which is the peaceful enforcement without the consent of the host government; this is beyond the responsibility of UN

peacekeeping operations. Professor Uesugi mentioned the three principles. That is [what] the member states would like to adhere to – continue to comply with the three principles: the consent of the host government, impartiality, [and] the minimum use of force (except protection of the mandate, which is the tactical use of force). If the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations reached this limitation, UN is extend[ing] partnership with EU countries. For instance, in early 2000, when the crisis happened in eastern DRC, we invited the EU force to make a breach to counter [the] emerging deterrence situation in [the] eastern DRC, which was quite effective. During that time, [the] UN generated additional forces to reinforce that area. This is a fact, and if we look at UN operations in Mali, that is a hybrid operation, an offensive counterterrorist operation that's been done by the French forces, which is beyond UN command...UN is just providing support, or information, or the peace agreement process – protection of civilians. Everyone has a role to play, and we cannot...I am UN military staff; I cannot endanger our civilian colleagues. When we use excessive force, this is something that [could backfire] on our civilian colleagues, [whom] we have to protect force first. This is what I can add [as it relates to the] effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. This is effective, but there are limitations. This is [the] point I would like to make.

Yumi Hashimoto: I wanted to ask a question specifically to Professor Uesugi of the human resources development. First question is: Can you think of any other factors for the gap between the entry level and the midlevel that you mentioned in your presentation? Second of all, I hear that Japanese students, nowadays, young people are not as ambitious to go abroad and to be in an international arena, work in [the] international arena, and even though there might be some ambitious students out there, what do you think you can do about the fundamental [inwardness] – or, I would say – of the Japanese students who do not wish to leave the safety of Japanese society?

Uesugi: Thank you very much for your questions. In addition to what I said, there are two different qualities [that] are needed in [the] UN system [from] entry levels, and most of our trainees are field-oriented persons: they want to go to a refugee camp and save people, and you get instant feedback on what you're doing, but once you become [involved with] managerial positions, probably you spend most of your time in a meeting room talking to the government officials, and you need a different skillset for such work. What we have been doing in training is to prepare young professionals working in the field for this kind of skillset, [yet this is] probably different [from] the skillset that is required in the meeting room, so that's one challenge. And then, that's why we have started what we call meet-career courses.

Another challenge, maybe: the Japanese style of management [is] not equal to UN styles of management, and some of [us] are criticized that “you don't [represent] what you have done fairly.” Japanese have a tendency [to say], “this is teamwork, and I contributed very little;” while I heard that her supervisor criticizes her, this is your project, you should be claiming what you have done, but this is very unlike Japanese to claim, “the success is all on me,” not other teammates. We have a tendency to see that this is a team project, and [that] we have been successful as a team. This kind of different style also prevented, perhaps, Japanese from being promoted to higher positions.

Also, I think it's okay if Japanese are inward-looking and [some] want to stay in Japan, a safe environment. That's their choice. I also see a number of young students who are willing to work in a harsh environment, so those who are willing to do so, then I would like to give an opportunity for them to work there. I don't have to say that every Japanese needs to go out.

Tsuruga: On that inward-lookingness, I disagree. I don't think the recent young generations are inward-looking compared to the old generations. The majority of the Japanese population [has] been inward-looking, and it's not fair to the young generations to do more while many adults are restricting the youngsters [on] many fronts, including the university system, including the job recruitment systems in Japan. I think there a lot of things that society or adults can do for young generations to go beyond its own boundaries. There are many, many Japanese – young professionals – who can do more.

Tase: I agree. Tsuruga-san said there are lots of young people, Japanese young people, who are willing to contribute to the international cause, but I also agree with you that something should to be done to raise the awareness or trigger the actions. One option may be to increase communication between generations. Young people at universities, students and young professionals, should organize their own societies or forum to discuss their career or international contribution. For example, I was looking as Mrs. Ogata's achievements, the achievements [of] my seniors. Now it is our time to show our energy and passion to you, your generation, so that somehow you become...you feel the same passion and feelings. So my option would be to increase intergenerational communications a lot in Japan.

Tatsumi Thank you. If you look quickly at each speaker's bio, with the exception of Colonel Suda, who has faithfully served for his country for twenty-nine years, everybody else switched jobs, and that is very atypical of Japanese professionals in this field. So, here, you have a group of very non-typical Japanese professional who still thrived, though, in those environments. So if that would be some encouragement to those young Japanese who are aspiring to go abroad and try out new things, especially in the international peace field, I think they will collectively be very, very happy.

I will then end this session [in a] typically Japanese way, by concluding that I am just a humble editor. All of the words and wisdom came from [the] people next to me down the line, and then also Aditi, for tying the two very, very separate themes all together very nicely and also very briefly. If you could just also join me in thanking all of them. And thank *you* all for joining on this dreary Monday morning. Thank you.