

Japan's Global Diplomacy: Views from the Next Generation

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Transcript

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Tatsumi: Good afternoon everybody and thank you for coming out all the way to visit Stimson in this kind of wet, dreary day. My name is Yuki Tatsumi. I'm a Senior Associate here with the East Asia Program at Stimson. For the last two years, we have been putting together a project where I would ask the younger generation – but everything is relative here so take your guess – policy experts in Japan to write the short essay about Japan's policy in the particular region of their expertise. Last year around this time, we released the first tranche of this project, which looks at Japan's vicinity, which included Japan's relations with China, South Korea, North Korea, and Southeast Asia. This year I thought I would just broaden the horizon a little bit. I was actually inspired by Prime Minister Abe's speech about the diplomacy that spans the earth globe or "*chikyuugi wo fukan suru gaiko*." It's probably more fitting to say Japan's global diplomacy and I picked the countries that Japan has strategically important relations [with] outside the vicinity of Northeast Asia. So, the countries and areas that I picked this past year were Australia, Europe, India, and Russia. And as soon as we launched the project there were all these things that started happening in Ukraine, so I thought, "Oh my gosh." I felt really bad for Dr. Hirose who was assigned to write on the Japan-Russia relations, but we'll see how that goes. You have all in front of you the final product of their twelve-month effort of writing this policy brief. Today, I would ask each of them to speak very briefly, just around ten minutes or so, based on their paper in this report, but then also talk about more current issues and more recent developments in Japan's relations in their region. And to wrap up before we go to the question and answer session, I welcome back old Stimsonite Benjamin Self who's currently an adjunct fellow at CSIS, to say a few words about what Japan's diplomatic maneuvering will mean from a US perspective. So without further ado, let me quickly introduce in the order they will speak. First will be Dr. Tomohiko Satake, from the National Institute of Defense Studies, who will talk about Japan-Australia relations; followed by Dr. Michito Tsuruoka, also from NIDS, who will focus on Japan-Europe relations; and they will be followed next by Mr. Takaaki Asano, who is a research fellow at the Tokyo Foundation, and who wrote the paper on Japan-India relations; and last but not least, Japan-Russia relations will be addressed by Dr. Yoko Hirose,

who teaches at Keio University. You all have their quick, short bio in front of you, so I won't waste your time by going through that with you in great detail. And now without further ado, I'll turn the microphone over to Satake-san.

Satake: Thank you very much, Tatsumi-san. And my thanks to the Stimson Center for this inspiring opportunity to be here and thanks to everyone who [is] in this meeting. To be honest, I didn't expect so many people to come out, so I'm actually getting nervous. I'd like to talk about Japan-Australia cooperation, and if you are a student of international relations or used to be a student of international relations, you must know that there are three areas of analysis: one is international systemic factor, second is domestic factor, and third is individual factor. I'd like to explain why Japan has been developing cooperation, by using this framework based on the three areas of analysis. The first point, which is international systemic factor, is the change in power balance and division, which is the rise of newly emerging states relative to the decline of US power. This focal power shift has already undermined the US-led liberal and inclusive regional order, which has been maintaining the stability of the Asia-Pacific region since the end of World War Two. In response to that, the United States has been pursuing a policy called "rebalance" to the Asia Pacific, but at the same time, the US has called for greater "burden-sharing" from regional allies and partners. Naturally, Japan and Australia, which are known as the most important allies to the United States, will assume greater security roles by further enhancing their long-standing security partnership. So that is [the] international systemic factor, but actually, only focusing on this systemic factor cannot explain why only Japan-Australia cooperation has been developed compared to other things, such as Japan-South Korea or Japan-India cooperation. This draws attention to the second factor, which is mentioned earlier. This chapter's opening focal point is Australia's changing perception of Japan after the Cold War, because even during the Cold War, there were some opportunities for momentum for closer security cooperation between Japan and Australia. But that kind of cooperation was never realized, partly because of Australia's concern for Japan's greater security role in the region, including the possibility of so-called Japan's "remilitarization." But I think that kind of concern entirely disappeared after the Cold War. Especially as Japan has been accumulating this kind of record of cooperation in terms of regional order security issues, such as peace-keeping operations or HA/DR missions, alone. As they accumulate records of cooperation, Australia expects Japan to assume a greater security role in the region. Today, Australia's encouraging of Japan's "normalization" is one of Australia's most important status quo in terms of Japan's security cooperation. And finally, I'd like to mention the part about individual factors, which are the personal characteristics of Prime Minister Abe and also Prime Minister Abbott. Prime Minister Abe, who is well known as a kind of conservative politician, continues to stress Japan's security cooperation since his first term from September 2006 to August 2007; and actually he was prime minister when joint declaration of security cooperation was announced in March 2007. He also supported the quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, Australia, India,

and the United States. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who is also known as a very conservative politician – he is quite interested in Japan’s security cooperation, calling Japan Australia’s best friend in Asia. Prime Minister Abbott also pleased Prime Minister Abe by saying that Japan has been “an exemplary international citizen” since 1945, and he also said that Japan “should be judged on its actions today, not on its actions 70-odd years ago.” So, we see there is a strong chemistry between those two conservative leaders, which greatly contributed to the development of Japan’s security cooperation, especially since 2013.

So, what are challenges Japan and Australia are facing? Now, I think the most immediate challenge is the possibility of leadership change in Australia. Unfortunately, Mr. Abbott is not so popular in Australia and some people are worried that the future leadership change in Australia will weaken the bilateral security tie between Japan and Australia. But I tend to be optimistic about this issue, because as I said, close security cooperation between Japan and Australia not only comes from an individual factor between two leaders, but also from domestic and international structural changes after the Cold War. I think that Japan’s security cooperation is well institutionalized through various meetings, such as two-plus-two, and you know prime minister meetings and senior officials that have meetings and so on. And also Japan and Australia have concluded some important agreements such as ISA, Information-Sharing Agreement, or ACSA. So, I think this institutionalization is very important. Also, Japan and Australia have enjoyed some bipartisan support since 2007. You have to remember that some important agreements, such as ISA and ACSA were concluded between non-conservative governments in both countries: in Japan’s DPJ and Australia’s Labor Party. So, that kind of bipartisan support to this relationship is quite important. So, for those reasons I think the close Japan-Australia security partnership will more or less continue, at least in the foreseeable future, even if there’s a leadership change in those countries. So, in this context I think the more important problem is how to manage the so-called “China gap” between the two countries. By “China gap” I mean there’s a kind of perception between the two countries in terms of how they view the impact of the rise of China in the region. This “China gap” is particularly strong at the public level. For example, according to a recent survey, 93 percent of Japanese respondents had a negative impression of China, whereas 65 percent of Australian respondents understand the growth of China as a positive development to their country. Also, 64.3 percent of Japanese view China as a “military threat,” whereas only 30 percent of Australians think of China as a military threat. It is very common in Australia to argue that the closer security cooperation between Japan and Australia is not desirable because otherwise Australia is entrapped in the Sino-Japanese conflict. This kind of argument is very popular in Australia, so unless carefully managed, this issue can become an important obstacle for future cooperation between Japan and Australia. Despite this gap existing between two countries, there are many issues between Japan and Australia with which they can further their cooperation. One of the most important areas is capacity building of Southeast Asia and South

Pacific countries. In this area, Australia has much more experience than Japan. Australia has been, traditionally, engaging with Southeast Asia and South Pacific countries in terms of defense issues. Actually, Japan's Ministry of Defense has one Australian civilian from the Department of Defence of Australia and that official works for the capacity building office of the International Policy Division of the Ministry of Defense, and she or he helps to develop Japan's security cooperation in terms of capacity building. I think this kind of people-to-people exchange between two countries is taking more and more importance. Also the maritime capacity building in maritime law enforcement and surveillance capabilities in Southeast Asia and South Pacific countries are getting more important between these two countries.

Another point I'd like to emphasize is the importance of seeking the possibility of middle-power cooperation between Japan, Australia, India, and South Korea. I know there are some scholars who argue [against] this middle-power cooperation, but I think the important thing is that kind of cooperation should not be a kind of exclusive military block by focusing on targeting another country. Instead, this kind of cooperation should focus on some less-controversial areas, such as capacity building, non-traditional security threats, and promoting universal values such as democracy, human rights, and rule of law. Okay, I'll stop here, and thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Michito.

Tsuruoka: Thank you very much for the introduction and thank you very much for the invitation. I am very pleased to be here today and to talk to you. Yes, my topic is Japan-Europe relations, and one of the messages that I always want to give is that there have already been various things taking place between Europe and Japan. But the problem is that not many people are aware of the depth of this cooperation already taking place. So I think, in total, one of the problems that we face, in terms of thinking about Europe-Japan relations, is that there are too few people who know what is taking place. So I wanted to start by giving some examples of cooperation, and one is that joint exercises are now taking place between NATO and Japan and the EU and Japan, and so far it's only been in the context of counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. So two exercises with NATO forces there saw on a daily basis, the Japanese contingent and the EU forces cooperating and sharing information in the context of counter-piracy. Also, we are thinking about doing more bilateral things as well: the UK and Japan are now thinking about doing exercises together, and especially in the context of bilateral relations with major European countries there's the UK – we had a two-plus-two Australia meeting in London two months ago in January, and as for France, there's the second two-plus-two meeting coming this Friday. So, there are things taking place. One of the newest pillars of that cooperation is defense equipment cooperation. That has started with the UK and with France as well, and perhaps I think Italy is coming as well. So, various operation cooperation, including joint exercises and intelligence cooperation and equipment cooperation.

These are already taking place, but not many people are aware both on the Japanese side and the European side. But seeing from Tokyo, what is not clear is that Europe is very much a natural partner for Japan because if you want to find partners with which Japan shares values, then many of which are to be found in Europe and many of which are members of NATO or the European Union. So, in that sense it's quite true that Europe and Japan are natural partners. But on the Japanese side, we have yet to come up with a clear idea of what we expect Europe to do in Asia. What role do we expect Europe to play in Asia, not only in terms of trade and economy, but also in foreign policy and security or defense? I think Japan still has homework: to think more about how we can use Europe or how we can expect Europe to do in Asia. On the European side as well, they have to come up with what Europe is prepared to do or willing to do in Asia. But too much focus on what we can do together in Asia I think is too narrow. There are various opportunities for Japan-Europe cooperation in other parts of the world, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. Especially in Africa, as long as Japan continues to be engaged in Africa, then various European countries, especially Britain and France and the European Union, are very active there; although, Japan has been very much engaged in Africa, especially in the context of offshore development assistance, as for political engagement or security, including the security sector for more defense capacity building, we have yet to have huge expertise in Africa. So, it is very good for Japan I believe to cooperate with the Europeans in Africa, and that also includes intelligence cooperation. Two years ago, in Amenas, Algeria, ten Japanese businessmen were killed in a hostage crisis there and also obviously with the Islamic State, a hostage crisis took place. Those incidents demonstrated that Japan has a very weak intelligence base in those areas, in Africa or in the Middle East, and that demonstrated the need for Japan to cooperate with more the Europeans who have expertise and experience in those areas for intelligence cooperation.

On the Japanese side, another aspect of this is that Japan's sort of overture to Europe started before the first administration of Mr. Abe. And that continued after the end of the first Abe administration, and that continues today. But what I think I can say is that, under the second Abe administration, Japan's activities, approach, and cooperation with Europe is most active. One of the features of the Abe administration is that, in addition to traditional European partners like Britain or France, we are expanding the network of security partnerships with other new European partners, most notably Poland and some other countries. Italy is becoming a more promising security partner for Japan in Europe. Just a few days ago, last week or so, Polish President Komorowski visited Japan and the cooperation and security and defense, peace and security, was actually the first item for the two leaders in the joint press statement. That is actually a very new development. Japan is expanding security partnerships with a larger number of countries in Europe – that is very new under the administration. Finally, before concluding, I just wanted to say a bit of concern on the Japanese side about the future of Europe-Japan political, security, and defense cooperation. That concern has to do with – it

seems that Europe is losing interest in Asia, or more precisely that Europe might be too busy to think about Asian issues for obvious reasons – because of the Ukraine crisis and also Libya, and other Middle East problems, including having to deal with ISIS/Islamic State things. So, for some countries in Europe, especially the southern countries like Italy, Greece, or Spain – Libya actually is really a big challenge. For them the Libya crisis is more important, more immediate, and more urgent than the Ukraine crisis. In Japan, we don't pay much attention to Libya right now, but for Europeans that's really a huge issue. Four years ago, the Europeans and NATO intervened in Libya, so there are still some possibilities for Europeans again to be engaged there whether they like it or not. It's a huge problem. It used to be that, because of the rise of the Asia, Europe is becoming more and more interested in Asia, and in that context it was very good for Japan to seek more security, defense, and political cooperation with Europe on the assumption that Europe is more and more interested in Asia. But now this situation is a bit different. Last month, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative for the European Union on Foreign Security and Defense Policy, said that "Europe is in flames." That is a huge change, because if you remember the 2003 European Security Strategy, it starts by saying, "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free." But now the head of EU foreign policy says, "Europe is in flames." So it's no surprise that they have no time to think about Asia. That's actually my concerns in thinking about the future of Europe-Japan cooperation, especially in Asia. But of course as I said, the cooperation in Africa or the Middle East that's also a possibility certainly, and that too gets missed. But I just wanted to say I'm a bit concerned about Europe's sort of preoccupation in its neighborhood. Thank you very much.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Takaaki.

Asano: Thank you. Thank you for having me here. I've written the chapter on Japan-India relations. When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Tokyo last September, Mr. Abe described that the India-Japan bilateral relations have the most potential in the world. And for a very long time, the bilateral relations have remained just that: potential. And how Japan manages its relations vis-à-vis India I think could be a test case for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's global diplomacy whether Prime Minister Abe succeeds in transforming Japanese foreign policy into something more proactive, more strategic, and bring Japan out of sort of isolationism. The Abe administration has been trying to diversify Japan's foreign policy tools and taking in a very comprehensive approach in terms of conducting diplomacy: drafting of the first National Security Strategy, establishment of the Japanese National Security Council, relaxing of the weapons export ban, and Cabinet's decision last July in regard to the right of collective self-defense, and the new charter on overseas development aid. All these efforts are done with the clear intention to diversify Japanese government's needs for conducting foreign policy and using them in a very comprehensive manner. In terms of Japan-India relations specifically, it is about how Japan can cultivate and deepen ties with India,

especially the political ties by integrating political, economic, or military policy options. And also the big elephant in the room is obviously China. How can Japan and India manage its very complex relations with Beijing? Of course, even with this diversified toolbox, there are always expectation gaps. There are expectation gaps in any bilateral relations. India is a very tough country to negotiate with. The test is: How could Japan overcome its differences and be creative, especially when dealing with issues like defense procurement or civil nuclear cooperation? You need a lot of creativity. Of course, due to this very good personal chemistry between Mr. Modi and Mr. Abe, Japan-India relations are going forward very strong and have been the focus of media attention as well. Of course it's not just because of this personal factor. There's been a long history of friendly relations between Japan and India, in terms of politics, economy, and also cultural interaction as well. With the end of the Cold War and when President Clinton visited Tokyo, Japan-India bilateral relations became active once again. For the past ten years, almost annually there's been a Japan-India summit held either in Tokyo or New Delhi. But of course there's always a gap, as I mentioned, and also there's a difference in terms of policy objectives and, basically, my storylines are here in my essay, so I won't explain all of that right now. But since there have been developments from last year to this year in two specific fields, I would like to update you on those two issues. In my essay, I raised several policy issues that could be tackled by the Japanese and Indian governments to promote bilateral relations: FTA – we already have one, so updating it – and also working on regional and international economic governance structure; defense procurement cooperation; and also civil nuclear cooperation. I would like to touch on two issues: defense cooperation and also civil nuclear issue. Last year, after the Indo-Japan summit in Tokyo, six Indian space- and defense-related institutions were removed from a list. It's called the Foreign End User List. And removing those companies from the list will make it easier to conduct defense and technology development between the two countries. Also, for years the two governments have been negotiating to sell the Japanese amphibious aircraft, the ShinMaywa US-2. Recently, there was a media report that finally the Indian Defense Acquisition Council is very close to reaching a final decision of actually procuring a Japanese aircraft. This is a very big step forward in terms of Japan-India defense cooperation. When they first started talking about this export of the US-2 amphibian aircraft it was to be exported as a civilian search-and-rescue aircraft without the identification transponder. But of course, throughout the course of the years, now the Japanese government has relaxed its blanket ban on weapons exports. Now, it seems that the US-2 will be exported to India probably as a military aircraft. It's not clear at this moment yet. Now, the reason this negotiation takes such a long time is: first, the price and also I hear there's been very tough negotiation in terms of the maintenance contract. But it seems the deal is finally going forward and the key to promote bilateral cooperation in defense procurement is not really how many aircrafts or submarines will be exported to India. It's how the bilateral defense trade can be utilized to strengthen the manufacturing base in India, and, of course, when

President Obama visited New Delhi for the second time earlier this year, it was about coproduction and codevelopment in defense equipment. That was the point of the interest and that was the point that the two governments agreed on. If Japan is willing to contribute to Modi's policymaking initiative, probably all the gates will open for Japanese firms as well. Another development in terms of Japan-India relations is civil nuclear cooperation, and of course there's been a development between the US and India as well in this aspect: the two governments reached a nuclear liability agreement. The Indian law of 2010 – the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act of 2010 – exposes the equipment supplier to unlimited liability claims in case of a nuclear accidents. Now, the US and India have agreed to set up an insurance pool to help incur the cost of accidents. There exists a similar type of international nuclear damage liability regime under IAEA and it's called the CSC. Japan actually recently signed and ratified this CSC, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, and it will come into effect this April. The CSC is a nuclear liability regime under IAEA and it sets limits on liability for suppliers to nuclear power plants and the signatory countries will help cover the cost by setting up an insurance pool. So far, only six countries have signed and ratified it: US, Japan, Argentina, Morocco, Romania, and the UAE. India has actually signed the convention, but it has not ratified it. Adopting the CSC will require India to change the 2010 liability law, which probably will not happen, and of course, given the 1984 faux pas accident, it's understandable. If Japan and India can agree on similar schemes that have been agreed upon by India and the United States – something similar to the CSC – then Japan and India will be a bit closer to actually signing the civil nuclear cooperation agreement. In the case of Japan, the liability issue is not only an obstacle as far as timing or materializing the bilateral cooperation, it's also the nonproliferation issue that has also been a major obstacle. At this moment, it's very unrealistic to expect India to be a part of the NPT or sign the CTBT, which Tokyo has repeatedly stressed its importance in regard to the signing of the bilateral civil nuclear agreement.

Last September when Mr. Abe and Modi met, they agreed that India should become a full member in four existing export controls regimes – MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. The prospect for the Indo-Japan civil nuclear cooperation agreement is very uncertain even at this point, but it's also unclear whether the recent US-India agreement will actually materialize civil nuclear cooperation. For years the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement was signed back in 2008, but there's been frustration on India's side that the US power plant project is not going forward. One of the reasons is – of course the liability issue was the major issue – but also another factor I think is the lack of a Japan-India civil nuclear agreement, because companies like Westinghouse Electric or GE are partnering with Japanese firms. Westinghouse is of course owned by Toshiba, and GE has a very close alliance with Hitachi. So without the existence of a Japan-India civil nuclear agreement, it will be difficult for American companies alone to expand its business presence in terms of

nuclear business in India. So, I think it is very important that Japan proceed, and be creative and find a way to sign the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Last but not least, Hirose-san.

Hirose: Good afternoon. Thank you so much for that introduction, Tatsumi-san. It is a great honor to be here and deep regards go to Yuki Tatsumi and the Stimson Center for the invitation to such a great project. I think all of you have my essay on the Japan and Russia relations. In that paper, I point out the four policy options. First of all, the resolution of the Northern Territories problem and conclude a peace treaty with Russia. This objective is most important for Japan, but at the same time it is a lesser important objective for Japan to keep relations with Russia. Secondly, Japan wants to build a relationship with Russia as a suitable partner in the Asia-Pacific region, because both of them are major actors in this region and a good partnership between Japan and Russia would be the important base for regional security. Thirdly, as related to the second objective, Japan must hedge against China and Russia relations, an important partner for Japan, because the relations between China and Japan have worsened in recent years, where on the other hand, Russia and China are trying to make a strong partnership, although on a global level, not regional level. Lastly, Japan has been trying to develop relations with Russia through political, economic, and cultural cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan and Russia relations have been affected not by vast domestic politics, but by international situations, such as the US and China factors and foreign priorities recently of our own. Especially, Japan has been enduring more between the US and Russia because Japan and US alliance is the most important for Japan, but Russia criticizes our alliance and says that Japan is a puppet of the US. To make the situation with Russia beyond such factors, political cooperation, economic cooperation and humanitarian cooperation would be very important to this.

In addition, there are many opposite opinions about historical understandings, such as perceptions of World War Two and the international stance, such as [inaudible] between Japan and Russia. To resolve such a problem, serious talks and bilateral, mutual confidence is necessary. At the same time, Prime Minister Abe has been trying to cultivate a good personal relationship with President Putin by many meetings and talks. Although, the effort was harmed when Ukraine crisis [began]. The final objective of Abe is, of course, the resolution of the Northern Territories problem, and he can leave his name in history if he [succeeds]. For this aim, Abe is using many people in the Cabinet Office, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diet members and so on. His aim is the resolution of the territory issue, but it is not easy to keep the cooperative work between them because there are additional objectives sometimes, instead of confrontation. For example, the previous Prime Minister Hatoyama is thinking about visiting Crimea now. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is against Hatoyama's plans truly because the

action can be viewed as proof that Japan recognizes the annexation of Crimea by Russia. On the other hand, it is said that the Cabinet Office is troubled by the problem because some people think that it will be beneficial for Japan-Russia relations because Hatoyama had special ties with Russia. Actually, I don't think so because such action would negatively affect the Northern Territory problem and it is against the international norm, of course.

In conclusion, I'd like to point out some recommendations for the Japanese government. Firstly, Japan should create a flexible policy for Russia that depends on the situation. Secondly, Japan should encourage Russia to keep international norms, such as democracy, rule of law, humanitarian problems, and so on. Thirdly, Japan should develop Japan-Russia relations in many dimensions including the potential areas. Fourthly, Japan must seek regional cooperation with Russia. Actually, Russia shifted its diplomatic focus from the West, or Europe, to Asia, mainly by the Ukraine crisis. This occasion is a great opportunity for Japan. Lastly, Japan should act on Russia's isolation while limiting its policy options. Russian leaders consider themselves to be the victim of betrayal by Western countries and such feelings have been one of the big sources of a series of events such as the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, Ukraine crisis, and so on. Japan must talk with Russia and care about Russian feelings, stances and so on. Such attitudes must encourage peace for resolution of the Northern Territory issue. Thank you so much for your kind listening.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Finally, to finish us all out, Ben Self is going to put this all in perspective, I hope.

Self: That's a tall order. Thank you, Yuki. I appreciate the invitation to come back and speak where I used to work and to come to this new Stimson for the first time. I appreciate your wonderful new office. I'd like to also thank the authors. They did a wonderful job. If you learned anything from the presentations, the papers are even richer and I think very fundamentally sound and excellent information and analysis, so I'll endorse them. That makes for a boring commentary, so as a discussant I've been trying to think of things to say that are more provocative and a little more challenging. In that spirit, I've come up with a few things. I don't want these to seem like my main takeaway. My main takeaway is that this is truly an extraordinary collection and these are really excellent scholars and excellent papers brought to you. Again, that said, it's more interesting just trying to improve and raise the bar, so I'm looking for some ways in which I might push the authors and the editor a little bit further. One thing I liked about it – I keep coming back to the things I like – one thing I liked is the accessibility in each of the essays through the same structure. They start with these policy goals and they end with policy recommendations. It's easy for a Washington-based audience like us to get what they're talking about. That said, one of the weaknesses of the structures all of them follow developing the historical aspects of the bilateral relationship, the relationship between

Japan and the given region, is that you weave through a lot of information in history before you get to any of their argument and conclusion. And so, you're wondering sort of what are the bullet points – they've [done] a good job today in the panel presentation – but as you're reading through it can be a little bit difficult to know where's all this going. I think an American audience is used to a style that comes with the conclusions first, tells you what the answer is, and then gives you the evidence for why you should believe that. These draw it out more, so I encourage you to read carefully and patiently to get to those conclusions because again, they're quite robust.

The other weakness that comes from that structure, I guess it's inherent in anything that tries to link this question of the study of bilateral relationships, is the study of foreign policy. And they're sort of trying to bridge between this question of examining the history and sets of institutions that have been developed in each of these bilateral relationships, and all of the legacy and all of the momentum in that relationship, and then connect that to what we're all interested in: the current and forthcoming foreign policy of Japan. And that's a difficult link to make and I think at some points it sort of breaks down. What I'd like to see – and it's not just this set of authors, it's pretty much anybody trying to do this job – but I'd like to see more of a conscious effort to explain what are the linkages between all of the history and all of the legacy in these studies, and the current political leadership and future political leadership. Particularly, when we're talking about Japan, of course, we all know the disparate sources and locations of power, and in foreign policy the *Kantei* has emerged clearly as a significant force, as in security policy, but we still have a lot of bureaucratic momentum. We might think back to the Hatoyama administration and recall the *Kantei* taking one position and the *Gaimusho* and *Bōeisho* working with the Pentagon and White House basically against Hatoyama. So, where we have now, we have Abe, and Abe is a strong leader with a strong national security team around him, and he's able to exert quite a bit of control and enforce discipline over the bureaucracy. But we don't know how long that will be sustainable, and that's one thing I would like maybe to draw out a little bit is what's the future – for the rest of the Abe administration but eventually post-Abe – for these relationships.

The third thing – and again it's not this set of essays in particular, but it's probably true of any type where you shine the spotlights on particular issue areas and then try to amalgamate them – is that it's very hard to assemble the different pictures, and even listening today you might have pinpoints of information about Japan-Australia, Japan-Europe, Japan-India, and Japan-Russia, and how do you make that into your own comprehensive understanding? What is Japan's global diplomacy? That's hard to do and I think it's Yuki's job really to do a little bit more of that. So I'm hoping we can draw her out based on her editing of the previous version of this, "Japan's Challenges in East Asia," and this version to try and tie it all together more coherently so that I could give these to a group of my undergraduate students and say, "Read

this and you'll understand not only the whole set of bilateral issues in Japanese diplomacy but the totality of it." Obviously in each presentation and each essay, they talk about the elephant in the room, but there is no essay on the United States. China is clearly, tremendously important and it deserves a lot of attention in each of these as well as in the previous volume, but the question I guess always comes down to, "What about the United States and Japan's global diplomacy?" And if you're talking about a diplomatic strategy or a grand concept of Japanese diplomatic goals, the US has to remain central to that. So if you spend all of your time and energy looking around the periphery at what are the other things, without putting that front and center, I think you fail to establish what I talked about: a single, comprehensive picture of Japanese global diplomacy. At least it's very interesting to me to look at the tensions between those two – now, going forward, but also historically, because we know that Japan has tried to carve out autonomous diplomacy space around many of these issue areas, and that's partly what middle-power diplomacy talks about, that's partly what Japan's autonomous diplomacy under the Fukuda Doctrine in Southeast Asia – or towards China in the past and more recently with Russia – Japan's trying to find this space set aside from the preeminence of US interests for something uniquely-Japanese diplomacy and how that tension resolves itself and moves forward. We have in Abe someone strongly endorsing the notion that Japan is back and Japan is a good partner for the United States – I think Yuki's concluding essay really does a good job of tying together how Abe is leading Japan in that direction – and yet with this rhetoric of a Japanese diplomacy that looks at the entire world, is that within the concept of Japan as a partner of the United States, perhaps on a global basis? Or is that a parallel? I think we need to tease that out to really have a sense of what the future directions might be in Japanese diplomacy. And I won't waste any more time because I'm sure you all have a lot of interesting questions too. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Thanks, Ben. From here, I'd like to open up [to] the floor. Before I open up [to] the floor, I think there's one aspect which kind of runs through all the four essays, which is the individual leadership qualities, and I think it was most prominent in the Japan-Australia discussion. And I think that kind of ties into the question that Ben just raised, which is – right now, we are seeing robust diplomatic efforts and engagements in these broader set of countries, primarily because of who Abe is and what Abe thinks about, how he wants to conduct, how he wants to see Japan in an international community. So this is kind of a sixty-thousand dollar question, but in your own mind, in your own sense of the areas, how sustainable is this, post-Abe, which probably we're talking about couple of years down the road, if not longer? But if you can just openly speculate in your own area, how might a leadership change in Tokyo affect any of these efforts that's going on in your area, I'll be grateful. So I'll start with maybe Satake-san, again?

Satake: Okay, thank you very much for the tough questions, as always. Sustainability of leadership change: our leader Prime Minister Abe has been making some very important reforms on Japanese security policies. He established National Security Council, Japan's first national security strategy; also he announced what is called the three principles for arms export; and exercised the right of collective self-defense. These are all significant developments in Japanese policy. But having said that, I see many continuities as well as differences on the past defense and security policies of Japan. Three principles of arms exports, for example, that's not the LDP government, but the DPJ government which first actually announced new standards for arms export, and what the LDP government did was kind of a continuation from what the DPJ government did in 2011.

Collective self-defense, you know, we have been discussing this issue since the early 1990s, and everyone says – if you are an expert on security issues, people tend to think that this is kind of an assignment for Japanese security rather than doing something new. Also, the reality is that the SDF has been expanding their cooperation, expanding their roles within the framework of US-Japan alliance. In 1997, we revised the Guidelines between Japan and the US to provide the rear area support for the first time in contingencies in Japan. And also, in 2001, Japan's SDF ship did some refueling missions to US ships in the Indian Ocean, which is kind of exercising collective self-defense in my understanding, although the government of course denied this from what I understand. So what the government has been doing is to provide some framework to the reality of Japanese policy, because there is a gap between reality and legal and normative framework. So the Abe government has been trying to fill the gap, but what they have been doing – I mean the role of SDF has not changed a lot in this sense.

So if we understand it in this way, I think that even if Prime Minister Abe resigned in the future, the basic strategy of Japanese security policy will remain the same rather than [make] a huge difference.

Tsuruoka: Thank you very much for the question. I very much believe that at least as the UK, France, NATO and EU are concerned, I think these relationships are very sustainable, even after the current Abe government. But for others, I'm a bit skeptical, because Abe expanded the list of countries, the list of European partners. But of course, it's not easy to maintain the momentum for those other – I wouldn't say less important, but still compared to France, NATO and EU – some smaller countries are, of course, not very high on the agenda.

Also, in terms of thinking about getting things started, I think we needed some political leadership. For example, for the case of equipment cooperation with Britain and France, when we started that, we needed political leadership. But in terms of sustaining and developing already-started things, I don't think we need a huge political leadership.

And another reason why I'm a bit optimistic about the sustainability of various cooperation with Europe is that it is not just a coincidence, but I think it's a reflection of reality, that wherever and whenever Japan sends Self-Defense Forces abroad, then it is quite likely for us to see European forces in the same theatre. If not, I would say command. So in the case of Iraq, when Prime Minister Koizumi sent troops there, and the political explanation for that at first was that this was very much for cooperation with the US, but when we went there, we didn't see many Americans in the same theatre because it was one of the most secure areas of Iraq and that was the area where the UK was in charge of security, and that was handed over to the Dutch forces, and also in the [Inaudible] context. Because there is a huge difference between what Americans are likely to do and what the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are likely to do in international context and international operations, what is more likely is for Japan to cooperate, and when it comes to operational context, it is more likely to see and cooperate with the Europeans, and that reality is not going to change.

Tatsumi: How about India?

Asano: What's going to happen between Japan and India, post-Abe...Personally, I am rather optimistic in terms of the Japan-India bilateral relationship even after Abe, because there is always an intent, at least on the Japanese side, to promote the bilateral relationship, even before Abe. President Clinton visited New Delhi in 1990, I think, and before that, it was President Carter in '78, and soon, right after the US presidential visit at the time...wait, can't be 1990...[from audience: he wasn't president in 1990]...(laughs)...And, Mr. Prime Minister Mori followed suit right after, and 2000 – I'm sorry, jetlag kicking in. Anyway, Prime Minister Mori followed suit. First they called the bilateral relationship a global partnership, then they upgraded to a strategic and global partnership. Last year, you know, now they are calling it "special global and strategic partnership."

So at least G-to-G level, Government to Government level, the intention is always there to strengthen the bilateral relationship, so in that sense I'm optimistic, even after Abe, that a bilateral relationship will continue to deepen. But the focus might change, because what's new about Abe's diplomacy is that India is now stressing and trying to materialize, and not just a rhetoric, he's actually trying to materialize bilateral cooperation in geostrategic issues, specifically maritime security and other security aspects as well. That's what's new about Abe's diplomacy towards New Delhi.

This may change after Abe, so I think that's why the current administration is eager to institutionalize all the dialogues and trying to formalize the – they're trying to establish two-plus-two dialogue, Japan and India as well...but of course, nowadays, strategic dialogue are all about [inaudible], but I don't know how much that means, but still... So post-Abe Japan-India

relations will continue to develop but the focus may change. It depends on how successful Mr. Abe would be in terms of materializing the bilateral cooperation during his term.

Hirose: Abe is making important role and diplomacy with Russia, because Russia has looked down the former regime by the Democratic Party. Because top leaders thought we can change in a short time. In addition, the leaders of the Democratic Party did not try to make good personal relations with Russian leaders. Russian leaders thought it was meaningless to talk with leaders of the Democratic Party. Abe's effort to make thick relations with Putin has been good for Japan-Russia relations actually. Such personal friendship made possible to realize the meetings between Abe and Putin last year, although it was a very serious international situation with the Ukraine crisis. So Abe's policy will be special key for the improvement of Japan and Russia relations during his sustainable regimes. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Thanks. I'll open the floor to questions. I think the first question goes to Mike Mosettig. Can you wait for the mic please? And then if your question is about specific relations, if you can just identify that.

Q: Mike Mosettig, PBS Online NewsHour. I can almost split the table down the middle, the two of you on this side [left] are dealing with countries that are always potential, if not actual strategic rivals in China, whereas on this side of the table [right], you're talking about relationships that can really only – and you may have more of this in your paper, unfortunately I haven't read it – that can only go so far because of Europe's desire to deepen its economic relationship with China. Every time Merkel and Cameron go to China, they look like travelling salesmen with their planeloads full of corporate executives. And Australia is basically an economic ally of China – the China economy softens, the Australian economy softens even more. And Australia in fact just told the US, we're going to go so far with you on China, i.e., Taiwan, but no further. And so in terms of putting together a coherent global strategy, particularly vis-à-vis China, there's just going to be limits on what Japan can do with Europe and Australia?

Asano: In terms of China policy, I think India, I mean I think I should sit closer to them. Because...I talked about the expectation gap...And for Mr. Abe, obviously, it's about creating diplomatic pressure vis-à-vis China, but Mr. Modi, his first policy priority is the economy, his number two and number three policy priority is also reviving its economy, so in that sense, Mr. Modi – the situation he is in – is very much similar to what Mr. Abe was in when he assumed office for the second time back in December 2012. Everything depended on his success in economic policy that would create room to maneuver in terms of foreign policy. Mr. Modi is exactly in that same position. And he's made clear that the deepening of political ties, and possibly maybe military ties with Japan, or with Japan and US, does not really mean targeting

any specific country is made very clear. So in that sense, even Japan-India relations, if you see it from China angle – there's a limit to what Japan can do.

Tatsumi: Satake-san goes into this China gap in his paper on Japan and Australia, but for Tsuruoka-san, [what] I'll pick up from Mike's question about China is that – especially when, you know, Japan is on the roll, and Japan's equipment cooperation with some of the European countries – England, not so much, but then France, and potentially others – they have a very strong interest in exporting to China. So is there a concern there about technology transfer, because that is oftentimes a US-side concern about European trade practices.

Tsuruoka: Yeah, it's quite true that they never reckon on dependence between Europe and China has increased quite a lot in the past decade or so. But it varies across various inferior countries in Europe. I mean, Germany is a very big player in Europe's trade with China, and the other countries are less so. But the point is that this relationship is mutual, not just a unilateral European dependence on China for economic trade and economy, but China needs [the] European market, first and foremost, and European foreign direct investment – I mean foreign direct investment from Europe and technology transfer from Europe – that's really fundamental for China to sustain its own economy growth. So yes, we tend to see this situation as the European dependence on China, but the fact that the EU is the biggest trading partner for China means very much that China also depends on Europe for various things.

Also, one of the greatest European challenges is when it comes to its approach to Asia, has been to go beyond China and go beyond economy. Of course, that hasn't been quite successful so far, but I think there is a growing realization and recognition among Europe that Europe needs to go beyond China, because Asia is much wider than just one-country-China, and there are various other issues beyond trade and economy – that's another thing.

Also for Japan, Europe's closeness to China, especially in economic terms – it's not just a source of concern for Japan, because as I said, it means that China is also vulnerable to Europe, and also the fact that the Europeans are very close to China, for Japan, reinforces the need for Japan to engage Europe more. Europe has at least in theory been quite successful to utilize that factor – but at least in theory, Europe has various leverages as a huge market for Chinese exports and investments and technology. So, we can think more about how Japan can engage Europe, in thinking about and dealing with China. Thank you.

Satake: Can I just quickly...Although I emphasized the China gap, I think this shouldn't be vigilant too much, because you mentioned that Australia is an economic ally of China, which might be true, but if you say so, Japan is also an economic ally of China. We are depending on China's economy, and US is too, and South Korea is in the same position. So these Asian countries have similar problems, more or less, in terms of economic relations with China. So I

think a more important issue is geographical distance from China, and Japan is close to China, whereas Australia is really far from the mainland of China, which actually creates this perception gap over the threat of Chinese military.

Q: Stan Kober. One of our most famous Generals of the Second World War, Omar Bradley, is reputed to have said, "Amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics." I go to a lots of meetings like this when people talk strategy – I have to be blunt, I'm getting tired. I need some discussion of the resources to arm the strategy. Here in the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were on Capitol Hill a few days ago, pleading for more money – they said otherwise they can't execute the strategy. They were told bluntly, "You're not getting money. Come up with a new strategy." That means something's going to drop out, whether it's the pivot to Asia or something else, I don't know. But the strategy has to be tailored to the money. Japan faces serious fiscal constraints, but also an additional problem – the demography. Japan has one of the worst demographic ratios – the working-age to retirees – in the world. That means Japan in the future needs people in the private sector, as opposed to the public sector: people producing tax revenue as opposed to consumers of that tax revenue. This means government spending, including defense spending, diplomacy spending, has to go down. So let us say defense spending in Japan goes down to ½ of 1% of GDP: what can you do?

Tatsumi: Sounds like plan C for proposition. Anyone? While you think about this question, because it can go in a number of different ways, I'd like to collect a couple of other questions before going back to you guys. Any other questions?

Q: Good afternoon. **Hiroshi Waguri, CSIS.** I think from a global diplomacy point-of-view, the most imminent news in the international society is what's happening in Ukraine, and probably IS, but I don't know if Tsuruoka-san's and Yoko-san's opinions is coordinated, but I'd like to ask once again, what Japan should do with the situation with Ukraine. I need a more clear policy direction from you.

Tatsumi: Ben, I think I would probably put you in a little bit of a weird spot – I would like you to indirectly respond to this declining trend of defense project here in the States. What is your speculation from congressional testimonies, I tend to agree – the current top line defense budget is not going to go through. And if that is the sustained persistent trend, how do you see US recalibrating its strategic priorities. When they came up with the last strategy, one of the biggest assumptions was that Europe is safe, and now that presupposition is gone. And then I'll pose the question to, probably, most relevant here is probably Tsusuoka-san and Satake-san, because it has to do with specific defense budget spending here and defense budget in Tokyo. So, I'll ask you to start, and then you can take your time to develop your responses.

Self: I'll try and stall for time and give them time to come up with good answers while I just come up with a bad answer, because it's not my area of specialty. But, I have to say, I'm always leery of straight-line extrapolations. I'm old enough now to have seen a lot of curves in relative power share of different countries come and go. I've seen the looming this and the emerging that, and they go away. And I've seen the trends that popped out of nowhere that people didn't see coming. So I really hate to say, "Oh, look at Japan's population, therefore its GDP and its available resources will be limited in this way." I don't think it's legitimate for us to predict that because of the technological transformations that are taking place in the world today. Particularly, I think the big problem in all advanced societies, is actually finding enough jobs for all the people: not finding enough people for all the jobs. My one word answer would be robots. Japan can do a lot, and is doing a lot, and will do a lot more with robots, but you add to that the power of information technology and smartphones, it's conceivable to me that the Japanese defense capabilities could leapfrog. And they do spend quite a bit of money. Maybe they can't grow, but maybe they can certainly increase the efficiency with which they spend the money they do spend and get more back for the buck in that sense. So I'm not complacent or comfortable drawing any kind of line very far into the future, but certainly not such a downward trending one. And I would add that the major focus of the Abe administration has been economic revival, and has been a way to ensure that those resources are available.

In terms – and to answer Yuki's question, finally – I would also not be comfortable extrapolating a straight line in the United States about what our defense budget or what our budget levels will be. If we still have a Republican Congress and we still have a Democratic administration, we'll still have the tensions we have, but the economy is getting stronger and stronger, so it may be possible to have some kind of consensus on a robust defense budget. Obviously, if we have a republican administration, and a republican Congress, we'd probably see a surge in defense spending again, and I don't think the budget hawks could overwhelm that. Again, I'm not an expert on US defense budget politics, but I would hesitate to draw straight-line extrapolations from the news of the week, to say, "Oh, this means the US will not sustain the pivot or the rebalance to Asia, or that Asia will fall lower down the priority list." I deal mostly with US government officials who are concerned about Asia, so it's not a fair sampling, but they seem completely to get the importance of Asia for US interests, both national interests of the US and the global interests of maintaining international order, that the US has to make Asia a huge priority.

Tatsumi: Is Japan getting the bang for the buck with defense spending?

Tsuruoka: I'm not an expert in defense budget, but yes of course, resources – that's really needed too for Japan to implement strategy – that's for sure. That's a very important point. But at least in the short- and medium-term, the Japanese defense budget is not likely to go down

substantially. Now the trend is opposite, at least as far as the current administration is concerned, that we are going to increase the budget. It's a very small increase, but still, it's not falling. I think that is important.

And also, in thinking about various new security and defense partnerships with other countries, I think it is a way to – I think it's a partnership, essentially a partnership for more efficiency. So I don't think it costs a lot for Japan to build various defense partnerships with other countries, but by cooperating with more and with other countries, then Japan's international engagement, including the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defense Forces abroad, can be done in a more efficient way, by cooperating with others rather than doing things alone. That is one thing.

Another aspect of this is that one of the other [inaudible] of Japan's interest in political profile or security abroad is has to do with the planning budget for the Official Development Assistance, ODA. Japan's ODA has declined quite a lot in the past ten years or so, and during the same period, we get more interested in doing things more in the political and security field. I wouldn't say that the security or defense engagement are cost-free – it costs something. But still, the given fact that it's very difficult for Japan to increase the ODA budget, then there are other ways for Japan to raise its profile in Asia. That has been one factor [inaudible].

And also it is very much about how we can make better use of our defense assets. This is still not a very popular argument, but for example, looking at Britain, now they are very much emphasizing defense engagement. And their concept on defense engagement is very much about how they can use defense assets more efficiently, for various national interests beyond conducting operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. So after Iraq and Afghan operations, now what the British are thinking about is how they can make better use of defense assets for various national interests. And I think the same can be said for Japan as well, so the – that's why I am a very strong proponent of more defense engagement or defense diplomacy by Japan.

And about the question of Japan's approach to Ukraine crisis, I think there are three or four things I wanted to say. One is that this is very much about an initial change of status quo by force or abortion. So it used to be that this is a challenge, particularly for East Asia, but now, in the wake of Ukraine crisis, Europe and Asia, including Japan, face similar challenges. So that's why Prime Minister Abe often says that the Ukraine crisis is not just a regional problem, it's a global problem. That is one aspect. The other aspect is that – what the NATO and the US can do to reassure Eastern allies of NATO, that part of states, or Poland or Romania. So, yes, it is a fact that NATO didn't defend Ukraine – I'm not going to say that it was okay, but at least what we can say is that Ukraine is not a treaty ally of United States, so the US or NATO doesn't have any obligation to defend Ukraine. But when it comes to NATO countries, the Baltic states and other countries, NATO has to defend those countries. And what sort of things NATO or United States

can do to reassure them is something that is very important – seen from Tokyo as well, because in the context of [inaudible], the credibility of external deterrence.

And the third aspect is that, it is about hybrid warfare, and what Russia has been doing in Crimea or the Eastern part of Ukraine – the Russians have used various techniques and cognition of various techniques, and that is why it is called hybrid warfare. In a Japanese context, we are very much highlighting now the concept of gray-zone, somewhere between war and peace, so low-intensity type of conflict and situation contingency. And so there are some similarities between hybrid warfare, its use and the gray-zone. So that is why we are very much interested in seeing how NATO and US deal with this hybrid warfare.

And finally, as Tatsumi-san mentioned, one of the most biggest, most important assumptions of the US pivot to Asia is the fact that Europe was seen to be very safe, and now [this is] no longer the case. And so I am very much concerned about to what extent US needs to pay attention again – returning attention back to Europe – because now, the US forces in Europe, UCOM, has been doing various and large amounts of exercises in Baltic states or Poland, and of course that costs a lot. So they encourage certain kinds of austerity. There is, of course, some trade-off between cost for project in doing an exercise in Europe and doing exercise in Asia. I am a little concerned about that.

Tatsumi: Hirose-san, do you have a response to the question about what Japan needs to be doing in terms of Ukraine?

Hirose: Thank you for your question. Actually, Japan doesn't want to activate the sanction on Russia concerning the Ukraine crisis. The reasons are mainly the following: Abe is trying to keep good relationship with President Putin. And if he activated sanctions on Russia, maybe it will be harmful to the personal relationship. And secondly, to be honest, Ukraine is not so important for Japan than Russia; however, Japan cannot escape to activate the sanction for Russia as one of the member of G-7 and the member of Japan-US alliance, so Japan activated the sanctions to Russia. But first, Japan's sanction [was] not so heavy, it was a very light one when Russia annexed Crimea; but it was not only Japan, but also European countries and America did not activate heavy sanctions at the time. After Obama's visit to Japan, Japan activated sanctions heavily. It made Putin angry [at] Japan, so Japan is in a very serious situation and dilemma between Russia and the US. But Japan is the country that has future problem with Russia, so if Japan doesn't take [a] strong attitude to the Crimea problem, Japan will be thought that its attitude is weak for territorial problem. So Japan should keep strong attitude for not only Northern Territories problem, but also Crimea. So it is very important to keep a private relationship between Abe and Putin, and as I said, it will be also very important to keep the talks at the meetings at many levels, but Japan should keep a strong attitude for the territorial problem.

Tatsumi: Thank you. Question in the back?

Q: Hello, [inaudible]. I have a question for Takaaki Asano on India-Japan relationship. Both India and Japan have territorial issue with China. I wonder if you believe that these two countries can count on each other if either country comes to military conflict with China over territorial dispute. Do you think they can count on each other? And also, second question related, can you think of ways that United States can foster that relationship between India and Japan? Because United States is interested in maintaining order in that region, maritime or just international security.

Q: Ian Rinehart, with CRS. I wanted to ask about the possibilities for collective self-defense with these peripheral partners. The partnership with Australia is sort of a pseudo-alliance, so it seems to me that there are a lot more potential there for collective self-defense to enhance the cooperation. But I read recently that the discussions between LDP and Komeito in the coalition, they're talking about strictly limiting the application to just the United States. So have you heard any discussion, not only with Australia, but I'm also curious about India, for example, or perhaps with partners like the UK and France, whether they've decided to, you know, even privately make some overtures to Tokyo about being included in this interpretation. And if you have a sense of what the opportunities are, and so what might be lost if Japan strictly limits collective self-defense to just United States.

Q: My name is **[Kakumi] Kobayashi**, with Kyodo News of Japan. I would like to ask you something: Japan's overall ability to make foreign policy. It's been more than a year since Japan established the first National Security Council, so I would like to take advantage of this opportunity where we have experts in many regions. Have any of you found any remarkable change in the process of making foreign policy in Japan before the council was established? If you have found or felt any memorable change, or if you have heard from any of your fellow researchers or colleagues about the change, that will be great if you can share with us. Thank you.

Tatsumi: Okay, so first, Japan-India, I guess that will naturally be Asano-san's question. And CSDL, I'll ask all of you to pitch in.

Asano: Will Japan or India come to the other's aid in terms of when there's a military conflict, in terms of territory disputes – No. No, I mean is it realistic to expect Indian navy to come to East China Sea and help Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force in defending Senkaku Islands? No, not even Mr. Abe expects that. And will Japan send Ground Self-Defense Force when there's a military dispute between India and China? Of course not. It doesn't go that far, at least for now, for a very long time it'll be very difficult to expect something tangible in terms of actual military. That is not very realistic. And what was your question about US role?

Q: Right. Can the United States foster a defense relationship between India and Japan to help the United States maintain a security order in Asia.

Asano: Well, there's already been a trilateral maritime security cooperation going on. The purpose of that trilateral is not to help United States maintain regional order in Asia – that's not the purpose. Sometimes, actually, US presence makes cooperation vis-à-vis India difficult, because of India's strong desire to maintain strategic autonomy. Jokingly, when I have a chance to talk with Indian policy experts, they would often – we were joking – come to me and say, "When would Japan become a true sovereign nation?" And we are a sovereign nation, just for the record, I want to say. But that is the perception in New Delhi, and so bringing in the United States doesn't automatically strengthen the ties vis-à-vis India, sometimes it makes it difficult.

Tatsumi: About the collective self-defense...you're [Satake] closer to the domestic bay, so...

Satake: Sorry, before that, let me talk about the domestic constraint issue, because I mentioned about this in my chapter as one of the most important challenges Japan and Australia are facing. I really think that Japan has [inaudible]. Unfortunately, I have no solution to that because I am still an amateur strategist rather than professional strategy. But I think that the Japanese government is aware of the limitations and that is exactly the reason Japan has been expanding cooperation with other countries. Because even if Japan cannot thoroughly incorporate regional issues using [inaudible] – we can do that with other regional partners, including India and US, and so on. So that completely makes sense, strategically, I think.

And about practices with this issue – I'm sorry, I don't know much about the development, because I'm not an insider, but my understanding is that our Cabinet decision in July last year did not list the United States as a country [with which] Japan can exercise collective self-defense. The question is how to set conditions which can allow SDF to exercise collective self-defense – that's the real issue.

Asano: Just a couple of things – the collective self-defense, when it comes to cooperation with Europe – what is more relevant is not the collective self-defense, but the use of arms in the international context and international peace operations, including UN operations. So that is really important, for Japan to think more about what other new areas that Japan can do, perhaps together with Europeans and others, in UN context or in other context.

So the NSC issue, at least how I see it that the – this is just my 100% personal view – but the NSC or NSS can be effective only when the Prime Minister is committed to security and defense issues. Otherwise, even if you have a structure, if it's not used, it cannot be very effective. So it depends on the prime minister's personal commitment and personal engagement in these issues.

Tatsumi: Anyone have anything to join in on the NSC or collective self-defense? I think, very quickly on my part, the NSC and collective self-defense issue, I think the debate between LDP and Komeito right now is not so much about how the countries other than the United States is included or not, but just a general condition – the cabinet decision last July is about Japan reinterpreting the current interpretation of the Constitution’s Article 9, specifically on Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense. They are going to reinterpret that and allow Japan to exercise that right on a limited condition, and I think the contention point between LDP and Komeito to define that limitation.

From my understanding, it has much more to do with how much certain circumstances, any circumstances, is critical to Japan’s national security and the nation’s survival, as opposed to what countries are involved. This debate gets often mixed up here – there are a couple of issues that are at play, so the definition of what’s the limitation is one, but then there’s probably, in the context of Japan’s global diplomacy, the more important debate that’s taking place right now, how to revise the existing set of national defense-related legislation. Tsuruoka-san mentioned this about Japan’s participation in international cooperation, and Self-Defense Forces with a global standard rules of engagement means more to European countries, rather than Japan basically exercising NATO-like CSD in the Ukraine situation, for example. So that’s how far self-defense can go in terms of its participation in the out-of-area operations, in terms of peacekeeping, civilization, that is also at play. There are a couple of different distinct issues that are longstanding in the existing legislative structure, in the defense-related laws that the people in Japan who focus on this issues have been pointing out as problematic and prohibitive for the Self-Defense Forces to do more outside the vicinity of the Asia Pacific. So not everything is about CSD. I think that’s probably the shortest way to answer it.

[Is] there any last questions? Thank you for your patience.

Q: Thank you very much for doing this. My name is **[Hiroaki] Wada**, I’m with Japanese Mainichi Newspapers. My question is about upcoming visit by Prime Minister Abe. Maybe it’s a bit a difficult question. He is said to be making a speech at the joint session of Congress. In your view, what kind of message do you think he should send in terms of Japan’s effort in trying global diplomacy. In contrast to this poor [inaudible] effort, [inaudible] diplomacy, what kind of balance do you think he should try, to solve the so-called history issues with neighbors?

Tatsumi: I’ll take a first cut at that, and people can either give me morale support or material support. Hopefully, him standing in front of the joint session of Congress, first of all will be done with the full consultation with the White House, that’s my wish, after seeing all this craziness that goes on with – with all due respect, the Prime Minister Netanyahu’s speech to the joint session of Congress. So that’s one.

Secondly, it's funny you ask that, because we were actually talking about this – when we were having lunch amongst ourselves – what we would like to see. There is a general sense that, if you recall the speech that Prime Minister Abe delivered in Australian Parliament when he visited there– that, to me, is the embodiment of the message that he actually has been intending to send out all along and has not been quite able to get through. That is the balance that you touched on, between the reflection of the past, remorse of the past behavior, but at the same time, inviting people to focus more on what Japan has been doing since 1945. So I think that is probably the tone, in the best-case scenario, that I personally would like to see, and I very much hope to see. But I don't want to put my own words into the mouths of all my colleagues here. So if they have any additional hopes or aspirations that you would like to put in there, I would invite them to do that.

Asano: Personally, I would like to see Mr. Abe explain more in a clear manner in terms of recent developments in defense policy. All these initiatives, policy developments, cabinet decisions on all this defense/foreign policy related issues, these are reported, not just domestically, but internationally, in a separate manner: it should be put in a wider perspective. And today, earlier, there was a question about resources. It's about how Japan is responding to the change in security environment, and it's also about how Japan should utilize limited resources, and not just military budget, but how could we secure our national security of utilizing this limited resource that we have – that is the backdrop of all these developments in defense policy. And personally, I would like to see Mr. Abe explain on those issues.

Tatsumi: Ben, you have a wish list? Sorry to put you on the spot.

Self: I hope that for the sake of the domestic audience in Japan, that Prime Minister Abe isn't too apologetic. And I know a lot of Americans, and obviously a lot of other Asians, are expecting a very apologetic speech. I think, there's a certain amount of reflection of history that's necessary, but the number of apologies is reaching a saturation point, and further apologies don't seem to me to be adding much in terms of Japan's diplomacy while costing Japan internally. And so Prime Minister Abe has to be balanced in that regard – not simply to respond to the pressure of the situation. Very many politicians and speechmakers address their audience narrowly, right, and so before one group of automakers, they'll say great things about autoworkers, and in another group they'll say something else. Prime Minister Abe has a global audience, even if he's addressing the Congress. And particularly, it's very important that he remain aware about this domestic audience. We may not like it, as Americans – we may have our own views of history – but we also have to understand that he is the leader of Japan, and the Japanese people have their own values and expectations. I think what I'm trying to allude to is what happened after the Yasukuni Shrine visit at the end of 2012, when – I'm sorry, the end of 2013 – when international condemnation, including from Ambassador Kennedy, contrasted

sharply with Japanese public opinion, which actually supported Prime Minister Abe, and his approval rating went up. I don't think that's the Japanese public embracing militarism at all. And I think it's enough, we Japanese have had 70 years of accomplishments to be proud of, and we're looking forward to being – contributing positively to international security, not as a threat to any nation, but as a pillar, and supporter of global order. And so, it's important not to succumb, and I think there's a lot of pressure coming out of many voices in Washington and in the Congress for Prime Minister Abe to be ever more penitent. I think that could be a mistake, but these are my personal views, of course.

Asano: And of course, if Mr. Abe wanted to be apologetic, he would go to Pearl Harbor (laughter).

Tsuruoka: Um, just a few words. On top of my wish list, for that visit – for that address in the Congress, we should not focus too much on history, because there are so many other issues that are quite important, in terms of thinking about bilateral relationship, but also Japan's international role. And just for your information, another thing that I wanted to say in this one is that, yesterday in Tokyo, on Monday, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, made a public speech in Tokyo, in which she said – and it was a response to a question from the floor – but what she said about history is that, "I'm not here to teach something to Japan about how to deal with this issue," and after that, what she said was quite interesting, because, "Yes, Germany faced the reality of war and apologized quite a lot, but at the same time, Germany was lucky enough that France was prepared to accept that." So I think this is a very interesting and important message.

Tatsumi: Thank you. With that, please now join me in thanking all the authors and the discussant who gave us a terrific insight into Japan's various challenges and thank you all for joining on this rainy day.