Under Caution: Assessing Arms Transfer Risk in Ukraine

Those providing assistance to Ukraine should consider the immediate and long-term security implications of arms transfer decisions.

By  Elias Yousif  •  Rachel Stohl

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized unprecedented global support for the government in Kyiv. And with stories of Ukrainian heroism and resistance commanding public sentiments across the globe, governments have rushed to provide military hardware and materiel to support Ukraine’s defense.  From body armor to anti-aircraft systems, many countries, particularly NATO members, have either delivered or pledged millions in additional arms and defense equipment. While the response to provide more weapons to Ukraine is understandable and enjoys broad support from governments and civilians around the world, it would be prudent to consider the immediate and long-term security implications of arms transfer decisions and apply lessons hard-learned from past armed conflicts.

The West has poured millions in security assistance to Ukraine in the years since the 2014 Maidan protests. The United States alone provided more than $1 billion in assistance over the last year, including in the days following the invasion. Russia’s aggression has catalyzed a dramatic escalation for the United States and other longtime allies who have been quick to join in the effort to arm Ukraine. The United States has already begun delivering additional material, including stinger missiles, body armor, and other small arms. But even countries that have long been reluctant to provide arms into active hostilities have reversed course – Germany, Finland, and Sweden have each pledged new lethal assistance to support Ukraine.

But the desire to urgently send arms as a matter of practical and symbolic support for Ukraine has obscured some of the well-known risks associated with funneling arms to conflict zones. Even amidst a breach of sovereignty and invasion by Russia, the United States and its partners may be doing a disservice to the very people they aim to protect without considering the potential risks of the infusion of weapons to the country.

While there have been noteworthy pledges of additional military assistance, the lifecycle of an arms transfer is often quite long. Arms promised today may not be available for months or even years to come, at which point the situation on the ground will have evolved. Though these pledges have symbolic value they may have little real effect on the battlefield. In the meantime, the symbolism of these pledges may serve to further enflame Russian perspectives on the conflict, and fuel further escalation, including more intense fighting or tactics.

Even when these arms do begin arriving in Ukraine, their utility to frontline forces may be complicated by issues of absorptive capacity, interoperability, and training. Many of the proposed transfers are for advanced military hardware that requires certain technical training and sustainment capacities that may be lacking in Ukraine, particularly among the civilian defense forces that have been constituted since the start of the invasion. While an assault rifle is relatively simple to use, a surface-to-air missile or aircraft will require additional training. Moreover, the ability to integrate transfers from different countries, involving different sets of training, logistics, and sustainment packages may be simply beyond the abilities of a force already stretched thin.

Beyond the technical, and despite the discomfort it may cause, it is the responsibility of policymakers to consider the strategic risks of transferring arms to an area of active hostilities. There are historical lessons to be drawn upon that demonstrate that supplying arms to a warring party, however noble or ethically sound, has the effect of exacerbating conflict, extending the duration of wars, increasing lethality, and contributing to civilian harm. Moreover, arms have a long shelf life, and will still be around long after the guns inevitably fall silent.

Of course, there is a tremendous difference between small arms that have been handed out to civilians as compared to more sophisticated weaponry provided to government forces. But the risks are real and the potential negative legacy of arms transfers need to be acknowledged and addressed. We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields, often in the hands of groups at odds with U.S. interests or those of civilians. This is especially true for small arms and light weapons, which hold some of the highest risks of loss, diversion into the illicit market, or misuse. From Afghanistan to Iraq to Colombia, well-intentioned transfers have a habit of outliving their political contexts, and risk fueling new conflicts, being captured by illicit groups, or contributing to enduring ecosystems of insecurity. In the end, it may well be the case that a thoughtful, and dispassionate assessment of the risks and rewards of arms transfers to Ukraine offers a strategically sound case for sending more weapons to combat the Russian invasion. But the risks of these arms transfers must be considered, and, where possible, mitigated. Any weapons transfers – particularly small arms and light weapons – need to have appropriate end-use monitoring mechanisms attached. Moreover, the conduct of use stipulations must also be put in place to ensure that these weapons are not used indiscriminately or harm civilians. While the defense of Ukraine is paramount, no one is better off when arms flow with disregard for the real risks associated with arms transfers. The people of Ukraine deserve assistance, and it is the responsibility of those making arms transfer decisions to ensure that assistance is thoughtful, responsible, and strategically sound in the short and long term.

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Elias Yousif • Rachel Stohl

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