Chinese Dismissals of Potential Russian Invasion
Before Russia sent troops to Donetsk and Luhansk on February 21, the Chinese policy community did not believe that Russia was going to invade Ukraine, let alone lead a full-scale invasion. In a half dozen dialogues and roundtables with the Chinese experts on this topic since January, not a single Chinese policy wonk bought the idea. Only one expert on U.S.-China relations commented privately that he worried Russia might support the independence of the Donbas.
If private dialogues do not serve as evidence, public statements should. Even after Russia sent troops on February 21, top Chinese experts still refused to believe a war was imminent. On February 22, an article titled “War Will Not Happen, But Frictions Will Continue” was widely circulated in Chinese media. The theme was that a Russian invasion was not in the cards. On the same day, Professor Shen Yi of Fudan University gave a talk titled “A war that will never happen: Ukraine through the lens of great power games among the U.S., Europe, and Russia.” One of the most popular IR scholars in China, Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University, who had predicted the impossibility of the war, posted his apologies on his social media on February 24 that he was “wrong again” in his prediction. The only prominent Chinese scholar who publicly predicted a war between Russia and Ukraine was Professor Tang Shiping from Fudan University. Based on the model about state behavior that he developed, he predicted that there was a significant probability that Russia would invade Ukraine before the end of May.
If scholars and experts do not count, the government officials’ attitude will serve as stronger evidence of the Chinese lack of prior knowledge. According to the New York Times, in the past three months, Biden administration officials repeatedly reached out to their Chinese counterparts sharing information about Russia’s impending invasion and were consistently rebuffed by senior Chinese diplomats, including the Foreign Minister and the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., who said they “did not think an invasion was in the works.”
Skeptics might say that they were lying in order to cover up for Putin. However, according to Chinese nationals in Ukraine, the Chinese Embassy in Kyiv denied the possibility of a war as recent as the week of February 14 and had made no evacuation effort or plan until after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. In fact, the embassy only began to register the 6,000+ Chinese nationals in Ukraine the day after the invasion. After realizing that chartered planes were not an option due to the war, the embassy started to coordinate “other means” on February 27. Given the high importance of protecting overseas Chinese nationals in the war zones for Beijing (as repeatedly portrayed in the infamous “Wolf Warrior” movie series), it is unthinkable that Beijing knew but did not bother to prepare.
Where Did China Fail?
The natural question is how China missed all the signs and made such a strategic misjudgment. Other than an intelligence failure, there are potentially two causes: China’s speculation of Russian behavior through its own lens and Putin’s manipulation.
The Chinese didn’t have to believe the American intelligence, but they certainly had their own satellites to show the troop movements along the Ukraine border. What most likely went wrong is that the Chinese assessment of Russian intentions was based on China’s own military philosophy. For Beijing, “winning without fighting” is the ultimate art of war. According to Sun Tzu’s teachings, the best military operations ranked are: undermining the enemy’s plans, then diplomacy, then defeating the enemy on the battlefield (上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城). An invasion to take over territory is the least desirable. That’s why coercion is such a preferred strategy for Beijing, which in the Chinese view comes with elegance and effectiveness. For China, the positioning of Russian troops already had Ukraine cornered, and the natural next step would be to bargain from a position of strength. It is simply inexplicable for the Chinese that Russia would launch a full invasion in Ukraine when it already had the upper hand.
Other than this “mirror image bias,” the Chinese were also played by Russia. As manifested by the February 4 Joint Statement, the Russians had exhaustively and repeatedly explained their grievances over the expansion of NATO and that Russia had to take actions to address its “reasonable security concerns.” The Chinese position in the Joint Statement suggested its support of these two Russian positions. But as argued above, the Chinese did not expect a full Russian invasion, and they thought China would at most have to stand with Russia for its bluffing and coercion. As such, the understanding and support China rendered were qualified in the Chinese view and not meant to be a blank check for Russia to invade.
The beauty of Putin’s play is that China cannot rebuff
and clarify they didn’t know.
This ambiguity is precisely where Putin played China. Where the Chinese meant limited support for Russia’s “reasonable security concerns,” Putin projected an image of Chinese support with “no limits.” That term was specifically used in the Joint Statement to describe their bilateral cooperation. The beauty of Putin’s play is that China cannot rebuff and clarify they didn’t know. If they do, it would be telling the world that China was played by Russia and their alignment is not nearly as solid as China wanted the U.S. to believe.
Chinese Reactions to Russia
China is certainly not innocent. Its eagerness to present a strong alignment with Russia to counter perceived U.S. hostility in the era of great power competition coaxed it into the dangerous direction. While Beijing thought it was manipulating Russia for its own counter-U.S. agenda, Russia was manipulating China in a much more vigorous and realistic way. And people have to question the competence of the Chinese intelligence gathering, especially in and on Russia.
China’s discomfort with Russia’s entrapment of it is evident. On the second day of the invasion, Chinese state-owned banks imposed restrictions on financing for Russian commodities. The “Five Points” raised by Foreign Minister Wang Yi have also been more balanced with calls for de-escalation and negotiations. In addition, China abstained rather than vetoed the UN Security Council Resolution on February 25, a major sign of lack of support for Russia. On February 28, the Chinese Foreign Ministry implicitly criticized Russia that “no country should unscrupulously damage other countries’ sovereignty and security in pursuit of its own absolutely military advantage and absolute security.” According to Reuters, China so far has not helped Russia to evade Western sanctions.
If anything, the “Rashomon effect” involving China’s role in the lead-up to the Russian invasion tells more about the state of China-Russia relations than anything else. The relationship is clearly motivated by their shared threat perception about the U.S. But on the other side of the same coin exists distrust and manipulation between the two. The Chinese may have suffered from tunnel vision regarding Russia’s value in the competition with the U.S., and what they thought was support in rhetoric and principle was exploited and cashed in by the Russians as a blank check. Regardless of the result of the Russia-Ukraine war, the lesson about Russian manipulation and exploitation will be one of China’s most important takeaways.
Ukraine: Did China Have a Clue?
By Yun Sun
In China
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one of the most intriguing questions related to China is whether Beijing had been informed of the plan when China and Russia issued their Joint Statement on February 4. Given the strong language about mutual support in that document, if China did indeed know, it would mean it had played the role of an accomplice. The question is important as it defines the nature and depth of Sino-Russian relations as well as what can be expected from Beijing in the days to come. Despite the impression that Putin intentionally created, a careful examination of the events suggests that China was, in fact, played.
Chinese Dismissals of Potential Russian Invasion
Before Russia sent troops to Donetsk and Luhansk on February 21, the Chinese policy community did not believe that Russia was going to invade Ukraine, let alone lead a full-scale invasion. In a half dozen dialogues and roundtables with the Chinese experts on this topic since January, not a single Chinese policy wonk bought the idea. Only one expert on U.S.-China relations commented privately that he worried Russia might support the independence of the Donbas.
If private dialogues do not serve as evidence, public statements should. Even after Russia sent troops on February 21, top Chinese experts still refused to believe a war was imminent. On February 22, an article titled “War Will Not Happen, But Frictions Will Continue” was widely circulated in Chinese media. The theme was that a Russian invasion was not in the cards. On the same day, Professor Shen Yi of Fudan University gave a talk titled “A war that will never happen: Ukraine through the lens of great power games among the U.S., Europe, and Russia.” One of the most popular IR scholars in China, Professor Jin Canrong of Renmin University, who had predicted the impossibility of the war, posted his apologies on his social media on February 24 that he was “wrong again” in his prediction. The only prominent Chinese scholar who publicly predicted a war between Russia and Ukraine was Professor Tang Shiping from Fudan University. Based on the model about state behavior that he developed, he predicted that there was a significant probability that Russia would invade Ukraine before the end of May.
If scholars and experts do not count, the government officials’ attitude will serve as stronger evidence of the Chinese lack of prior knowledge. According to the New York Times, in the past three months, Biden administration officials repeatedly reached out to their Chinese counterparts sharing information about Russia’s impending invasion and were consistently rebuffed by senior Chinese diplomats, including the Foreign Minister and the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., who said they “did not think an invasion was in the works.”
Skeptics might say that they were lying in order to cover up for Putin. However, according to Chinese nationals in Ukraine, the Chinese Embassy in Kyiv denied the possibility of a war as recent as the week of February 14 and had made no evacuation effort or plan until after Russia launched its full-scale invasion. In fact, the embassy only began to register the 6,000+ Chinese nationals in Ukraine the day after the invasion. After realizing that chartered planes were not an option due to the war, the embassy started to coordinate “other means” on February 27. Given the high importance of protecting overseas Chinese nationals in the war zones for Beijing (as repeatedly portrayed in the infamous “Wolf Warrior” movie series), it is unthinkable that Beijing knew but did not bother to prepare.
Where Did China Fail?
The natural question is how China missed all the signs and made such a strategic misjudgment. Other than an intelligence failure, there are potentially two causes: China’s speculation of Russian behavior through its own lens and Putin’s manipulation.
The Chinese didn’t have to believe the American intelligence, but they certainly had their own satellites to show the troop movements along the Ukraine border. What most likely went wrong is that the Chinese assessment of Russian intentions was based on China’s own military philosophy. For Beijing, “winning without fighting” is the ultimate art of war. According to Sun Tzu’s teachings, the best military operations ranked are: undermining the enemy’s plans, then diplomacy, then defeating the enemy on the battlefield (上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城). An invasion to take over territory is the least desirable. That’s why coercion is such a preferred strategy for Beijing, which in the Chinese view comes with elegance and effectiveness. For China, the positioning of Russian troops already had Ukraine cornered, and the natural next step would be to bargain from a position of strength. It is simply inexplicable for the Chinese that Russia would launch a full invasion in Ukraine when it already had the upper hand.
Other than this “mirror image bias,” the Chinese were also played by Russia. As manifested by the February 4 Joint Statement, the Russians had exhaustively and repeatedly explained their grievances over the expansion of NATO and that Russia had to take actions to address its “reasonable security concerns.” The Chinese position in the Joint Statement suggested its support of these two Russian positions. But as argued above, the Chinese did not expect a full Russian invasion, and they thought China would at most have to stand with Russia for its bluffing and coercion. As such, the understanding and support China rendered were qualified in the Chinese view and not meant to be a blank check for Russia to invade.
This ambiguity is precisely where Putin played China. Where the Chinese meant limited support for Russia’s “reasonable security concerns,” Putin projected an image of Chinese support with “no limits.” That term was specifically used in the Joint Statement to describe their bilateral cooperation. The beauty of Putin’s play is that China cannot rebuff and clarify they didn’t know. If they do, it would be telling the world that China was played by Russia and their alignment is not nearly as solid as China wanted the U.S. to believe.
Chinese Reactions to Russia
China is certainly not innocent. Its eagerness to present a strong alignment with Russia to counter perceived U.S. hostility in the era of great power competition coaxed it into the dangerous direction. While Beijing thought it was manipulating Russia for its own counter-U.S. agenda, Russia was manipulating China in a much more vigorous and realistic way. And people have to question the competence of the Chinese intelligence gathering, especially in and on Russia.
China’s discomfort with Russia’s entrapment of it is evident. On the second day of the invasion, Chinese state-owned banks imposed restrictions on financing for Russian commodities. The “Five Points” raised by Foreign Minister Wang Yi have also been more balanced with calls for de-escalation and negotiations. In addition, China abstained rather than vetoed the UN Security Council Resolution on February 25, a major sign of lack of support for Russia. On February 28, the Chinese Foreign Ministry implicitly criticized Russia that “no country should unscrupulously damage other countries’ sovereignty and security in pursuit of its own absolutely military advantage and absolute security.” According to Reuters, China so far has not helped Russia to evade Western sanctions.
If anything, the “Rashomon effect” involving China’s role in the lead-up to the Russian invasion tells more about the state of China-Russia relations than anything else. The relationship is clearly motivated by their shared threat perception about the U.S. But on the other side of the same coin exists distrust and manipulation between the two. The Chinese may have suffered from tunnel vision regarding Russia’s value in the competition with the U.S., and what they thought was support in rhetoric and principle was exploited and cashed in by the Russians as a blank check. Regardless of the result of the Russia-Ukraine war, the lesson about Russian manipulation and exploitation will be one of China’s most important takeaways.
Recent & Related