Whether one looks at the Scorpène data leak from a commercial point of view or a state espionage point of view the facts simply don’t add up.
Here is what we know thus far. Sometime before 2011 someone collated a document that by the laws of secrecy – specifically to compartmentalise sensitive information – should have never been collated. This was a comprehensive sheet of specification of three weapons systems – The Scorpène class submarine, the FREMM class frigates and the Mistral class Helicopter Carriers/Amphibious operations support ships. This document was then according to The Australian newspaper either stolen or transmitted to a South Asian Subsidiary of French shipbuilder DCNS and was then transmitted to a private company in South East Asia in support of a bid. That document was then transferred to a private company in the same South East Asian company and was mysteriously emailed to an Australian Company. DCNS surprisingly has yet to make any public statement at the time of writing. In private they have suggested that the leak may have happened on the Indian side – with Mazagaon Docks limited. Now the story has shifted that this was a French ex-naval officer who stole the document. The problem is none of these stories make sense and here’s why.
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