On Thursday, November 15, Jim Lewis spoke on the role of
deterrence in the nuclear, cyber and space domains as a part of Stimson’s
programming on Space Security, supported by DTRA and the New-Land Foundation.
Lewis is Director and Senior Fellow of the Technology and
Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
where his recent work has focused on cybersecurity, space, and technological
innovation. Prior to joining CSIS, he served at the Departments of State and
Commerce as a Foreign Service officer, and as a member of the Senior Executive
Service.
Deterrence of unwanted actions in space is linked to
deterrence in the nuclear and cyber domains.
Of the three, mechanisms for deterrence against nuclear attack are most
highly developed. Space deterrence mechanisms are a work in progress. Of the three domains, restraints on cyber
deterrence are weak. What are the
ramifications of cyber attacks for space and nuclear deterrence?
Lewis argued that though the US has the most advanced
cyber and space forces in the world, these forces fail to deter our opponents from
malicious actions; the nuclear model of deterrence is not appropriate for the
cyber and space domains. Asymmetric vulnerability to attack, new classes
of opponents with very different tolerance of risk, and the difficulty
of crafting a proportional and credible threat, all erode the ability to deter in
the cyber and space domains.
In these domains, actors confront asymmetrical degrees of
risk tolerance in their opponents. Unlike cold War deterrence, States may have
difficulties in holding non-state actors “hostage,” as these actors have
minimal infrastructure or populations to defend from counter-attacks. The
challenges of attribution in the cyber and space domains both emboldens
attackers and restrains states seeking retaliation. Questions of proportionality
also confound efforts to apply a model of deterrence to the space and cyber
domains. Lewis stated that crime and espionage do not justify the use of force,
just as nuclear deterrence failed to deter espionage, proxy wars and low-level
conflict during the Cold War, cyber and space opponents seem to have calculated
the threshold they cannot cross in peacetime, and know to operate below it.
Finally, Lewis argued that an essential aspect of
deterrence is that it must threaten vital interests as understood by senior
political figures – usually defined as territorial integrity and political
independence. Lewis does not believe that this threat to vital interests is
possible to achieve in space or cyber. In the case of cyber, he stated that the
destructiveness of a cyber-attack is usually overstated. Cyber attacks
can shape the battlefield and environment, but “they don’t create existential harm.”
He concluded by stating that states should not seek to deter unwanted actions
in the space and cyber domains, but should “acquire and maintain the ability to
fight through an attack and win,” sustaining continuity of operations and war
fighting abilities should be the focus of strategy and not deterrence.