Issue | Obstacles | Q&A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

Signed in 1993, the US-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement has eliminated more than 300 metric tons of HEU-"the easiest material for terrorists to make nuclear weapons from."[1] While the HEU Purchase Agreement is a landmark achievement, the rate at which that agreement is rendering HEU unusable for nuclear weapons will leave very large quantities of HEU in storage in Russia for an unacceptably long period of time. Moreover, when action under that agreement is completed in 2013, Russia will still possess hundreds of metric tons of HEU, enough to build thousands of nuclear weapons.

Under the HEU Purchase Agreement, Russia takes HEU that has been removed from its dismantled nuclear warheads and down-blends it into low-enriched uranium (LEU), which cannot create an explosive nuclear chain reaction. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a private corporation serving as executive agent for the HEU Purchase Agreement, purchases this LEU and resells it to US companies that use it as commercial nuclear reactor fuel. At present, about 30 metric tons of HEU are blended down each year under the agreement-enough for approximately 1,500 weapons.

The utility of the agreement has been summed up as follows: "the HEU purchase provides financial incentives to dismantle thousands of warheads, destroys hundreds of tons of weapons-usable material that could otherwise be vulnerable to theft, provides employment to thousands of Russian nuclear workers, and provides hundreds of millions of dollars a year to the desperate Russian nuclear complex-all at little net cost to the US taxpayer, since funds to purchase the material come from its value as commercial fuel."[2]

The September 11, 2001 attacks placed the United States and Russia in a radically altered security environment. US-Russia cooperation to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, the most dangerous weapons known to humankind, has greatly increased. The United States and Russia realize that they cannot allow multiple decades to pass before vulnerable nuclear weapons and materials are properly accounted for, secured, and, where feasible, eliminated.[3]

One of the most encouraging steps in accelerating work to address the problem of loose nuclear weapons and materials came during the May 2002 US-Russia summit. The summit's Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation stated that the two countries would "work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information, expertise, and material [and to]... expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material... [And also] establish joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons usable fissile material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies."[4]

To accelerate the down-blending of HEU, a report released by Harvard's Belfer Center and the Nuclear Threat Initiative suggests that "by paying Russia a fee for service to blend additional HEU to LEU and then hold it in storage in Russia (rather than flooding the uranium mining, enrichment, and conversion markets with it), the national security objective of destroying HEU could be decoupled from market constraints."[5] This would be a significant advance since the current rate of blend-down-about 30 metric tons per year-is determined by what the commercial market can bear rather than what national security requires. By placing LEU into a national security reserve of sorts, rather than flooding the LEU market, the national security benefits of the agreement can be strengthened while the LEU market will not be undermined. The same report also contends that with $50 million in annual funding, approximately 20-30 additional metric tons of HEU could be downblended- essentially doubling the current rate. This would result in more than one thousand bombs' worth of additional HEU being neutralized every year.

The national security benefits to the United States of accelerating the down blending of Russian HEU are obvious, as Russia possesses almost 95 percent of the military HEU outside of the United States. By accelerating the pace of disposing of Russian HEU, much of which Russia has deemed in excess of its defense needs, the United States could greatly decrease the likelihood of this material falling into the hands of those who wish the US, its allies, and deployed troops deadly harm.

Estimated military stocks of HEU, 2005 [6]

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Obstacles

• Russia and the United States have not started negotiations aimed at accelerating HEU blend-down activities beyond what is currently envisioned under the HEU Purchase Agreement.
• Some fear that accelerating HEU blend-down and expanding the amount to be down-blended would cause the uranium market to suffer, but this can be addressed by carefully designing an approach so that the industry has confidence the material will not flood into the uranium mining, enrichment, and conversion markets.
• To increase the likelihood that Russia will agree to blend down additional HEU and to accelerate current blend-down efforts, the United States must reassure Russia that it will purchase the LEU or assist in marketing it, and possibly provide other incentives.

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Q & A

Q: Why would Russia agree to downblend more HEU?
A: Russia possesses HEU far in excess of its defense needs. Moscow has already agreed that 500 metric tons can be considered surplus HEU. Furthermore, as Russia's nuclear arsenal continues to shrink, its need for HEU will continue to decrease.

Q: Won't accelerating the blending down of HEU lead to a dramatic decline in the price of uranium, thus harming, for instance, the US uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment industry?
A: Not if the material is placed in a type of national security escrow-basically placing it in safekeeping in Russia and gradually introducing the material into the uranium market. This will make it possible to reduce rapidly the number of Russian nuclear warheads and otherwise decrease Russia's excess HEU stockpiles. In fact, the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act (sec. 3157) specifies that the uranium blended down under the prospective new program may not be released for sale until the earlier of (1) January 1, 2014, or (2) the date on which the Secretary of Energy certifies that the uranium can be absorbed into the global market without undue disruption to the uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment industry in the US. What the uranium industry wants more than anything is predictability-to know with confidence, ideally more than a decade in advance, how much material is coming to market and at what rate so that investments in mines, enrichment facilities, and the like can be planned.

Q: How much will it cost accelerate the HEU deal?
A: Thousands of additional warheads' worth of HEU could be down-blended each year for around $50 million per year.

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Quick Facts

• Russia possesses about 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and materials outside of the United States, including over 1,000 metric tons of HEU, enough to build thousands of weapons.
• With approximately 1,070 tons of HEU, Russia could produce approximately 50,000 warheads, but under the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), Russia and the US are each allowed to have no more than 2,200 deployed, long-range nuclear weapons on December 31, 2012.
• Only 29 percent of fissile material, such as HEU, in the former Soviet Union is in facilities that have completed their security upgrades.[7]
• There are at least 18 documented incidents of "proliferation significant" fissile material trafficking from facilities in the former Soviet Union between 1991 and 2001. In one incident in 1998, an insider conspiracy at a Russian nuclear weapons facility attempted to steal 18.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. In another incident, 2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium taken from a research facility in Sukhumi, Georgia, have never been recovered.[8]

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Recent Legislation

• The Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 contained a few key references to highly enriched uranium issues:
  • Sec 3157, Public Law 107-314 authorized the Department of Energy to use $10 million of FY03 appropriations for its defense nuclear nonproliferation programs to explore options to accelerate the disposition of Russian HEU, including additional blending and storage facilities in Russia.
  • Sec 3162, Public Law 107-314, expressed the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Energy should, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, develop a comprehensive program of activities to encourage all countries with nuclear materials to adhere to, or to adopt standards equivalent to, the International Atomic Energy Agency standard on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4), relating to the security of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu).

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Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

• Annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts provide funding ($19.3 million for FY06) for the Department of Energy's HEU Transparency Implementation Program, which is responsible for monitoring implementation of the 1993 agreement so as to assure the US that the terms of the agreement are being met.
• For information on the activities of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the executive agent for the HEU Purchase Agreement, visit its website: http://www.usec.com.
• The 1993 US-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement calls on Russia to downblend approximately 500 metric tons of HEU and sell the resulting LEU to the US.
• The IAEA's Information Circular "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities" (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) is a guide for states on how to protect their nuclear material from unauthorized removal, sabotage, and transport.

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Talking Points

• Highly enriched uranium is "the easiest material for terrorists to make nuclear weapons from."[9]
• Counting materials both in assembled warheads and in other forms, worldwide totals are estimated to encompass some 1,900 tons of highly enriched uranium (enough for 143,000 nuclear weapons).[10]
• As of early 2007, Russia held over 1000 tons of HEU (enough for over 80,000 nuclear weapons), which constitutes over 60% of the world's stockpiles.
• Russia has already agreed that 500 metric tons of HEU are in excess of its defense needs. The US should engage in negotiations to strongly encourage Russia to dispose of several hundred more tons in its stockpile.
• At the current rate, it will take seven years for Russia to blend-down 500 metric tons of HEU; but even after that has been done, Russia will still have several hundred metric tons left.
• It behooves the US to help Russia decrease the size of its fissile materials stockpile, thus making proliferation less likely. The longer it takes for the HEU to be disposed of, the longer the material is sitting in stockpiles and vulnerable to theft or loss.

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Recommendations

• A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing efforts. One such gap is the slow rate of blend down in the HEU Purchase Agreement.
  [See Book Recommendation #1]
• At the start of any program, the US agency involved should build consensus with the respective host country to ensure buy-in. A stronger consensus and better understanding with the Russians could help the US push for an accelerated HEU Purchase Agreement.
  [See Book Recommendation #6]
• In light of the obstacles internal to the legislative branch and the need for greater communication between agency officials and their congressional counterparts, a bicameral congressional task force should be created to provide regular briefings from a broad array of the actors involved in actual implementation of cooperative nonproliferation initiatives.
  [See Book Recommendation #7]
• DOE officials must be given a better way to inform Congress about the benefits of the HEU Purchase Agreement. A better informed Congress can apply additional pressure to speed up the downblending of dangerous nuclear material.
  [See Book Recommendation #19]

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Endnotes

[1] Much of the material in this paper is drawn from Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, "Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action," Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, May 2002, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/securing_nuclear_weapons_and_materials_May2002.pdf.

[2] Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, "Securing Nuclear Weapons...," op. cit., note 1.

[3] Ibid.

[4] The White House, "Text of the Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation," May 2002, accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html.

[5] Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, "Securing Nuclear Weapons...," op. cit., note 1.

[6] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Fissile Materials of Special Concern: In-Country Stocks of Separated Plutonium and Total Stocks of HEU, ISIS Estimates," Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security, June 24, 2005, accessed at: http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyAlbright.pdf.

[7] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006 (Cambridge, MA and Washington, DC: Harvard University and the Nuclear Threat Initiative): 48.

[8] "Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2007," S.328, Title III, Subtitle C, Sec. 322.

[9] Bunn, et al, "Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials..." op. cit., note 1.

[10] "Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2007," S.328, Title III, Subtitle C, Sec. 322.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007