The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

 

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts | Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon underscored the need for increased international attention to the possibility of nuclear weapons or fissile materials falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. A nuclear terrorist attack could easily kill tens of thousands in a dense urban area. Osama bin Laden has expressed his desire to acquire and use nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies and, with enough fissile material, it is believed that al Qaeda could manufacture a crude but effective nuclear weapon rather easily.[1] Furthermore, the vast black market network formerly overseen by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan makes this threat more tangible and imminent. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, managed to outwit the international nonproliferation regime for more than two decades, having unlawfully sold nuclear technology and the expertise to build it to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.[2]

Despite increasing concerns about nuclear terrorism, nuclear weapons and fissile materials remain vulnerable to theft around the globe. This puts the US and the rest of the international community at an enormous risk as very little fissile material is needed to construct a working nuclear bomb. In fact, to manufacture a nuclear weapon, a terrorist needs approximately four to five kilograms of plutonium (about the size of baseball) or twelve to fifteen kilograms of highly enriched uranium (about the size of a softball).[3] Because of the destructive capacity of a single nuclear weapon, insecure material in one country places the entire international community in danger. A former Deputy Secretary at the Department of Energy stated the issue succinctly: "The worldwide system of security for nuclear materials is no stronger than the system at the weakest, worst-defended site."[4]

In order to reduce the risks of a catastrophic terrorist attack and to remedy the current gaps in the international nonproliferation regime, the US and Russia announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism during the 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg. A major goal of the Global Initiative, which will complement the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, is to "prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devises using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities."[5] While many countries, including the US, have ongoing activities to address these threats, the Global Initiative hopes to "expand and accelerate" these efforts in order to form a stable international network of cooperative states.[6]

The Global Initiative could help with the implementation of the International Convention of the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which "calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks criminalizing nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and, as appropriate, arrest, prosecute, or extradite offenders. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions, through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions."[7] The Global Initiative also dovetails with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 [See Resolution 1540 Issue Brief], which mandates that all UN Member States implement a set of supply-side controls on WMD and dual-use technology and criminalize proliferant activities within their territories.

According to a joint fact sheet released by the US and Russia, the main objectives of the Global Initiative are as follows:

  • Improving accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials;
  • Improving the security of nuclear facilities;
  • Detecting and suppressing illicit trafficking activities, as well as other activities related to terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials;
  • Responding to and mitigating the consequences of terrorist attacks;
  • Ensuring cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism;
  • Ensuring that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists; and
  • Strengthening national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution and punishment of terrorists and terrorist facilitators.[8]

The Global Initiative will try to achieve these objectives primarily by building state capacity to deal with the challenges of proliferation. Ambassador Robert Joseph, the former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, stated that one of the Global Initiative's main thrusts would be developing a comprehensive detection architecture which will monitor physical trafficking as well as the transfer of funds and technology through cyberspace.[9] Other activities will include "multinational exercises, expert-level meetings to share best practices, and the provision of assistance from those nations in a position to offer such assistance to those nations requiring it."[10]

However, regarding the issue of assistance, the Global Initiative fails to address a major weakness of UNSCR 1540-the absence of an effective mechanism for encouraging nations that have the resources to provide financial and technical assistance to provide it, and for learning and seeking to meet the needs of nations that cannot fulfill their obligations under 1540 without assistance.

Although the Global Initiative is a hopeful step forward, former Senator Sam Nunn observed on the day that it was launched, "As we have seen in the past, there can be a big gap between pledges and programs, and a big gap between goals and accomplishments." For this reason and because there are certain shortcomings in the Global initiative as proposed, there is a significant role for Congress in overseeing, strengthening, and broadening the Global Initiative.

There are two major shortcomings with respect to the objective of improving the accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear materials: First, the Global Initiative ignores the fact that there are inadequate international nuclear security and accounting standards by which to determine whether nuclear materials (or weapons) are secure; second, the Global Initiative does not cover military nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons.

With respect to the issue of standards, the Global Initiative could provide an excellent opportunity for the development and implementation of international standards-which do not exist today-to ensure that all civilian nuclear weapons-usable materials are protected to agreed-upon standards sufficient to defeat the potential threats that terrorists pose. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all states to take "appropriate effective measures to account for and secure" WMD and to take "appropriate effective physical protection measures." However, UNSCR 1540 does not define the term "appropriate effective." In order to implement those words in a meaningful way, the US, together with Russia, should take the lead in establishing through the Global Initiative a standard that would require each country possessing weapons-usable nuclear material to establish and effectively implement nuclear security systems that could defeat the kinds of insider and outsider threats that terrorists and criminals are known to pose.

Regarding military nuclear materials and weapons, in their 15 July 2006 joint statement, Presidents Bush and Putin stated that the Global Initiative did not apply. In justification of that exception, the presidents stated simply that their countries meet "current requirements" (though there are no international security standards and neither government has full knowledge of the other's military nuclear security) and that they "trust that the other nuclear weapon state parties to the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] will also ensure a proper level of protection. . ." (emphasis added). Thus, with respect to military nuclear materials, facilities, and weapons, the presidents based global safety on their "trust" in the security provided by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), a trust for which they provided no basis-and totally ignored the security situations in states that are not NPT members, such as India and Pakistan, which should be encouraged to become Global Initiative members.

Further with respect to the exclusion of military nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons, it should be noted that the two presidents, in their joint statement launching the Global Initiative, stated that "[o]ne of [their] primary objectives remains full implementation of . . . UNSCR 1540." Unlike the Global Initiative, UNSCR 1540 provides no exclusion for military nuclear installations; and there is little reason to believe that all military facilities housing nuclear weapons or materials are adequately secure.

Thus, Congress should express its view that the Global Initiative should be broadened to encompass the development and implementation of effective international nuclear security and accounting standards for both civilian and military nuclear materials and facilities, as well as for nuclear weapons.

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Obstacles

  • Not every nation that possesses fissile material can afford to dedicate the funding and manpower necessary to sufficiently secure its stockpile; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism currently provides no mechanism for addressing these shortfalls.
  • While there is a broad consensus that fissile materials and nuclear weapons need to be safeguarded, there is disagreement regarding the size and nature of the threats that need to be thwarted.
  • Citing national security and state sovereignty concerns, states have traditionally resisted efforts to dictate security standards for nuclear weapons arsenals and military fissile material stockpiles, even though these categories encompass almost all of the fissile material in the world. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism should provide an excellent opportunity to begin the work of developing such standards.

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Q & A

Q: What types of material can be used in nuclear weapons?
A: The materials used to create typical nuclear bombs are Uranium-235 and Plutonium-239. Uranium ore is relatively common, with the largest deposits in Canada and Australia. However, not all uranium can be used in nuclear weapons. About 99.3 percent of natural uranium is Uranium-238, so the small amounts of Uranium-235 must be separated in an enrichment process.[11] Typical weapons-grade uranium is 90 percent Uranium-235. However, highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is 20 percent or more Uranium-235, can be used for cruder devices. Plutonium must be manufactured, as only trace amounts of it have ever been found in nature.[12] It is most often created as a byproduct in the production of nuclear energy when Uranium-238 absorbs a neutron and becomes Uranium-239 in a nuclear reactor; the Uranium-239 then decays into Plutonium-239.[13]

 

Q: How many countries possess weapons-usable material? Which countries have the most?
A: According to the Institute for Science and International Security, as of the end of 2003, approximately 70 countries have stocks of HEU and plutonium.[14] The following table lists just the ten countries with the largest stocks of plutonium and HEU. All numbers are estimates in metric tons:

Country

Total Stockpile

Plutonium

HEU

Russia

1360-1375

271.2

1088-1103

United States

1208

502.5

705

France

269-270

236.1

33-34.3

Japan

154-156

151.6-153.6

2

Canada

136

135

1.35

United Kingdom

120-126

96.3-102.4

23.4

Germany

94.4-98.7

93-96

1.4-2.7

South Korea

44

44

0.002

Sweden

41.8

41.8

0.002

Ukraine

41.2-41.3

41

0.16-0.25

 

Q: Other than the Global Initiative, what is the US currently doing to help secure nuclear materials?
A: The US Government's nonproliferation programs, led by the Pentagon's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, have been active in securing FSU nuclear weapons and materials for fifteen years. CTR's Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination has been extremely successful in deactivating nuclear warheads, securing nuclear material, and eliminating the delivery systems and infrastructure of the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex. The Pentagon also operates the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security and Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security programs.[15] Furthermore, the Department of Energy has multiple projects devoted to securing nuclear materials. The Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program has secured buildings and material all throughout Russia's weapons complex, as well as at civilian sites. DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative aims to remove HEU from research reactors around the world and provide security upgrades for spent nuclear fuel.

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Quick Facts

  • In 1993, al Qaeda operatives met with a military official in Sudan who offered to sell them weapons-grade uranium for $1.5 million. When asked why they were so interested in buying HEU, one of the al Qaeda members responded, "It's easy to kill more people with uranium."[16]
  • In 1994, a smuggling ring based in Prague and made up of Czech, Slovak, and Russian nationals was able to obtain ten kilograms of HEU. The ring told undercover officials that they could easily acquire 30 more kilograms.[17]
  • Four kilograms of plutonium, which is about the size of a baseball, could be turned into a bomb about as powerful as the one that destroyed Hiroshima.
  • Documents found in November 2001 in a Kabul building believed to be an al Qaeda safe house contained details about how to produce nuclear weapons.
  • A terrorist attack with a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon (slightly smaller than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which had a yield of 12-15 kilotons) at the Port of Long Beach in California could kill 60,000 people instantaneously, expose 150,000 to radiation, force some two to three million to relocate from the contaminated area, and cause ten times the economic damage of the September 11 attacks.[18]
  • Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, Palau, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[19]

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Recent Legislation

  • The Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (H.R. 1) includes the Global Initiative in the list of US nonproliferation programs to be monitored by the proposed Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

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Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

 

  • US President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, meeting in Bratislava, Slovakia in early 2005, agreed on a set of programs ("The Bratislava Initiatives") to enhance nuclear security cooperation.
  • Title II of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-228), known as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, authorized the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
  • The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed on 3 March 1980, is the only binding international agreement on the physical protection of nuclear material; and it applies to only a tiny percentage of the material because it only covers "nuclear material used for peaceful purposes" and does not address the question of weapons material.

Talking Points

  • There are roughly 135 research reactors or related facilities that still use HEU as fuel.[21] Combined, these reactors contain approximately ten metric tons of HEU, enough for about 400 nuclear weapons.[22]
  • Despite increasing concerns about nuclear terrorism, nuclear weapons and fissile materials remain vulnerable to theft around the globe.
  • In order to reduce the risks of a catastrophic terrorist attack and to remedy the current gaps in the international nonproliferation regime, the US and Russia announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism during the 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg.
  • The Global Initiative seeks to reduce the risk of proliferation by increasing state capacity to deal with the challenges of proliferation through: improved accounting, storage, and security of nuclear materials and facilities; detection & suppression of trafficking; improved response to terrorist incidents; and other measures to improve the overall effectiveness of anti-nuclear terrorism measures worldwide.
  • The announcement of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism by the US and Russia comes at a time when US-Russian relations are strained. Perceptions of the terrorist threat in Washington and Moscow are very different. While the US Government is much more worried about an improvised nuclear device, the Russian government has concerned itself with the threat of radiological ("dirty") bombs. These differing threat perceptions could lead to conflicts over the order in which facilities receive upgrades and the emphasis that should be placed on different kinds of material.
  • The Global Initiative ignores the fact that there are no international nuclear security and accounting standards by which to determine whether nuclear materials (or weapons) are adequately secure. 

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Recommendations

  • A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of CNP efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. Such a close examination of the entire suite of programs across all relevant government agencies should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, prioritize activities, and fill any gaps within existing efforts.[See Book Recommendation #1]
  • The Global Initiative dovetails with US efforts in the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and with obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The US Government should look for ways to combine its efforts under the three programs.[See Book Recommendations #3 and #4]
  • The emphasis on cooperation in the Global Initiative makes the Initiative an attractive starting point for consensus-building around potential threats arising from unsecured nuclear materials. For example, the Global Initiative can help Russia and the US find common ground on their differing threat perceptions of radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices.[See Book Recommendation #6]
  • Create a bicameral congressional task force whose objective is to regularly provide briefings from a broad array of the actors involved in actual implementation of nonproliferation initiatives. Greater Congressional understanding of the relevant issues could lead to greater support for the implementation of Global Initiative programs once the Initiative matures. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Public Affairs office should also be encouraged to actively promote nonproliferation activities.[See Book Recommendations #7 and #15]
  • Channel scientist redirect programs to meet the needs of other government programs. US programs to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the FSU require access to security technology; this demand creates opportunities for new FSU businesses. Former nuclear weapons scientists can help design this technology and create new safeguard equipment to aid Global Initiative programs. By coordinating programs to redirect scientists with internal US Government programs to achieve specific technological advances needed to solve our own energy, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, intelligence and other needs, the US could better achieve its existing nonproliferation goals with respect to brain drain while exploring potential technological solutions to existing security concerns at lower cost.[See Book Recommendation #8 and #17]
  • The Pentagon, as the lead department in warhead dismantlement efforts, should team with the State Department to create a "Master Plan" for countries involved in cooperative nonproliferation efforts. This will ensure that other foreign policy objectives (such as human rights and democracy promotion) complement and do not compete with the Global Initiative.[See Book Recommendation #10]
  • Ensure that every agency involved in nonproliferation is adequately staffed. The Department of Defense Inspector General noted shortfalls in the Pentagon's nonproliferation bureaucracy that prevented efficient implementation and effective oversight of the programs under its purview. The State Department continues to experience similar shortfalls. Adding Global Initiative activities to a bureaucracy that is already overworked and understaffed, without reassessing objectives and needs, may further hinder efficient program management of nonproliferation efforts.[See Book Recommendations #11 and #23]
  • The State Department should create an "information clearinghouse" for US Government-wide nonproliferation activities. The confluence of US Government programs, G8 Global Partnership programs, the Global Initiative and other nonproliferation programs necessitates a single gateway for information.[See Book Recommendation #22]

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Endnotes

[1] Mike Boettcher and Ingrid Arnesen, "Al Qaeda Documents Outline Serious Weapons Program: Terrorist Group Placed Heavy Emphasis on Developing Nuclear Device," CNN 25 January 2002, accessed at: http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/24/inv.al.qaeda.documents.

[2] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," The Washington Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2005), accessed at: http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring_albright.pdf.

[3] The amount of fissile material necessary for a nuclear explosion depends on the level of enrichment and design of the nuclear weapon. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the given measures, taken from: Matthew Bunn, Anthony Weir, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Harvard University, March 2003): 13.

[4] Charles B. Curtis, "Reducing the Nuclear Threat in the 21st Century," Symposium on International Safeguards, Verification and Nuclear Material Security: International Atomic Energy Agency, 29 October 2001, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/c_press/Curtis_IAEA_F.pdf.

[5] White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," 15 July 2006, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/69021.htm.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Steven C. Welsh, "Nuclear Terrorism Convention: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism," Center for Defense Information (17 May 2005), accessed at: http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ntc.cfm.

[8] State Department Office of the Spokesman, "US-Russia Joint Fact Sheet on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," 15 July 2006, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69016.htm.

[9] Robert Joseph, "The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism," Speech to the National Defense University Foundation (14 July 2006).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Environmental Protection Agency, "Radiation Information: Uranium," (8 March 2006), accessed at: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/uranium.htm.

[12] Environmental Protection Agency, "Radiation Information: Plutonium," (6 October 2006), accessed at: http://www.epa.gov/radiation/radionuclides/plutonium.htm.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Institute for Science and International Security, "Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials: Summary Tables and Charts," Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (7 September 2005), accessed at: http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/summary_global_stocks.pdf.

[15] Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Cooperative Threat Reduction: Programs," accessed at: http://www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm.

[16] Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "The Bomb in the Backyard," Foreign Policy November/December 2006, accessed at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3597.

[17] Zimmerman and Lewis, "The Bomb in the Backyard," 2006.

[18] Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander, Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack (Santa Monica: RAND Corp., 2006), accessed at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf.

[19] US Department of State, "Current Partner Nations to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," May 11, 2007, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/82787.htm.

[20] Group of Eight Leaders, "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Art%2002%20gp_stat-en.pdf.

[21] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir, Securing the Bomb 2006 (Harvard University and the Nuclear Threat Initiative: July 2006):19.

[22] Ibid.

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Last Updated on May 30, 2007