The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

The Issue | Obstacles | Q & A | Quick Facts |Legislation | Agreements | Talking Points | Recommendations

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The Issue

In January 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force concluded that "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."[1] In order to address this threat, the Task Force recommended that approximately $30 billion be devoted to reducing the threat of possible proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons and materials over the next eight to ten years.

Russia possesses 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons outside the United States, but is unable to fully account for, or adequately secure, this vast nuclear stockpile. Further, Russia expends only a fraction of the resources the US devotes annually to ensuring its nuclear weapons do not proliferate. A recent report by nuclear specialists Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir faulted the security of Russian nuclear arsenal facilities, stating, "Security in many cases falls far short of what is needed."[2] In addition, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that exist in numbers and locations of which the United States is unaware. These weapons, because of their relatively small size and greater portability, are highly desirable to terrorist groups or hostile nations. Also, Russia still possesses about 40,000 tons of chemical agents, a huge biological weapons complex, and tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and others who once worked in the Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex who are now unemployed or underemployed.[3]

Since the proliferation of former Soviet WMD is a security threat to the entire world, it is appropriate that this problem be addressed by an international coalition. An encouraging step in this process was the agreement of the G8 leaders in June 2002 to create a "Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction." The G8 leaders agreed to "support specific cooperation, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues." To those ends, the G8 countries committed to "raise up to $20 billion... over the next ten years."[4] The US stated that it "intends to provide half that total."[5] The number of Global Partnership (GP) donor countries has expanded to include 13 non-G8 countries, yet to date, the GP has not reached its financial goal and only a small portion of the pledges have been turned into projects.

The $20 billion figure, if provided in full, would represent an increase over total worldwide spending on nonproliferation programs at present. However, the G8 agreement proposes devoting to those purposes only two-thirds of the resources that the Baker-Cutler Task Force suggested. Moreover, the US portion amounts to a slight reduction in the US effort compared to projecting the FY 2003 budget for programs focused on the former Soviet Union (FSU) alone over the 10-year period and adjusting it for inflation. In addition, there are a number of other issues that must be addressed to ensure that the G8 effort lives up to its full potential, including: ensuring access to Russian WMD facilities, coordinating amongst the various countries involved in the G8 effort, and removing duties on items assisting threat reduction in the FSU. That said, if these issues can be worked through, the G8 Global Partnership has the potential to contribute measurably to meeting the urgency of the WMD threat from the FSU in addition to other parts of the world, and improving US and global security.

From the Strengthening the Global Partnership Project website[6]

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Obstacles

  • The G8 Global Partnership does not include an authoritative mechanism for coordinating the efforts of the various countries, which can result in problems such as misplaced priorities, duplicative or inconsistent efforts, gaps in programs, and a failure to learn from the experiences of others.[7] The absence of such a mechanism compounds the lack of central direction and coordination of the various US government programs, as well as those of its allies.
  • The US and other countries funding nonproliferation efforts have at times had difficulty gaining access to sites where threat reduction work is occurring. There have also been problems regarding duties on equipment being brought into Russia for nonproliferation projects, taxes on the funds involved and payments to local personnel and contractors, and the extent of the protection of the funding countries' personnel and contractors from liability arising from the performance of the projects [See Issue Brief - Liability]. Negotiations with funding countries need to resolve these issues at all levels of government.
  • Not much of the $10 billion from countries other than the US that was pledged has been expended. France and Italy in particular have spent very little of the money they committed.[8] Fortunately, many non-G8 countries have made pledges, including Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and several European countries.[9]

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Q & A

Q: What are the countries included in the G8?
A: The G7 countries-the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan-plus Russia.

Q: How much of the "up to $20 billion" G8 goal has been pledged?
A. In addition to the $10 billion that the US has said it intended to provide, pledges totaling approximately $7.5 billion have been made, as follows: Germany, $1.5 billion; UK, $1.1 billion; Canada, $804 million; Italy, $1.1 billion; Japan, $200 million; and France, $893 million. Furthermore, Russia itself[10] has pledged $2 billion; and the European Union and several other countries have made pledges or contributions totaling about $1.42 billion.[11]

Q: Is the $10 billion pledged by the United States "new" money or does it take into consideration other threat reduction programs already funded?
A: All of the United States' ongoing programs over the next ten years count towards the $10 billion total. It is troubling that this may well end up in a net decrease in the amount the US spends on these important programs.[12]

 

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Quick Facts

  • Russia possesses 95 percent of the world's nuclear weapons and materials outside of the United States.
  • Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons exist in numbers and locations of which the United States is unaware. These weapons, because of their relatively small size and greater portability, are highly desirable to terrorist groups or hostile nations.
  • In addition, Russia still possesses about 40,000 tons of chemical agents, a huge biological weapons complex, and tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and others who once worked in the Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex who are now unemployed or underemployed.

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Recent Legislation

  • Each year, the Congress enacts a National Defense Authorization Act, providing authorizations for appropriations to help Russia scale down its massive WMD complex and re-employ the country's weapons scientists. These programs work to ensure that weapons, materials, and expertise from Russia do not fall into the hands of terrorists or terrorist states. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Section 1303, Public Law 109-163) grants the President permanent authority to waive the certifications for Cooperative Threat Reduction funding (which is used for Global Partnership projects) required under the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (Public Law 102-228) and the FREEDOM Support Act (Public Law 102-511).

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Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

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Talking Points

  • By greatly increasing international cooperation, the G8 Global Partnership has the potential to considerably reduce the WMD threat.
  • Beginning in February 2002, the CIA reported that "undetected smuggling has occurred" from Russian nuclear facilities.
  • In October 2001, the US government became concerned that al Qaeda may have smuggled a 10-kiloton nuclear warhead into New York City. Placed in a metropolitan area, such a device-small by US and Russian standards-would probably kill 250,000 people, seriously injure tens of thousands more, and render a large area uninhabitable for decades to come.
  • Securing the Russian nuclear arsenal is the cheapest, safest, and easiest solution to the current insecurity of the Russian nuclear complex.
  • The G8 Global Partnership, if successful in the former Soviet Union, might begin work to reduce the WMD threat outside of the FSU.

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Recommendations

  • A National Security Council designee should spearhead an interagency process to reassess the global role of cooperative nonproliferation (CNP) efforts in today's context, including those that have arisen in the past few years. This assessment should strive to eliminate duplication, consolidate where necessary, and fill any gaps within the existing efforts. The role of CNP efforts beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU) needs scrutinizing in light of the new opportunities presented by the G8 Global Partnership.
    [See Book Recommendations #1]
  • There is an information sharing deficit among US agencies (Departments of Energy, State and Defense) as well as countries involved in Global Partnership programs and activities. An office housed in the State Department should be created as the US Government's "information clearinghouse" for all agencies' CNP related activities as well as the focal point for timely information regarding Global Partnership programs and field activities.
    [See Book Recommendations #2 and #22]
  • The US Government press the G8 and other contributing states parties to the Global Partnership to: (a) search for domestic commonalities that combine their respective Global Partnership investments with other foreign policy spending, and (b) encourage wider collaboration internationally to better leverage Global Partnership funding across national boundaries.
    [See Book Recommendation #3]
  • There is a common perception on Capitol Hill that CNP has become a collection of welfare programs, rather than a series of mutually beneficial and necessary projects to improve US and international security. Both the West and the states of the former Soviet Union must take steps to reverse this belief, particularly if all stakeholders wish to reap success and benefit from Global Partnership commitments. In light of radically changed circumstances in the region over the past years, particularly with respect to Russia's ability to take ownership for its own security needs, the moment is ripe for transforming the relationship between the Global Partnership and Russia. The commitments made at the 2006 G8 Summit in Saint Petersburg provide an appropriate foundation and propitious opportunity to achieve this objective.
    [See Book Recommendation #5]
  • In order to ensure the value of redirect efforts and to garner international buy-in, the US Government should engage the G8 business communities and the FSU target community in a rigorous baseline informational exchange regarding the types of expertise available and potential advantages of employing the target scientific community.
    [See Book Recommendation #8]

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Endnotes

[1] Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia," Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs, Russia Task Force, January 10, 2001, accessed at: http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf.

[2] Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, available at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/report_cnwmupdate2005.pdf.

[3] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Russia Profile: Introduction," and "Russia Profile: Chemical Overview," November 2005, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/index.html and http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/Chemical/index.html.

[4] Group of Eight Leaders, "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Art%2002%20gp_stat-en.pdf.

[5] White House, "Fact Sheet: G8 Summit -Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020627-7.html.

[6] Stregthening the Global Partnership Project, "Global Partnership Scorecard," July 2006, accessed at: http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/GPScorecard2006.pdf. Also see the website for information on individual contributions by G8 and non-G8 participants.

[7] The G8 countries have established a Senior Group (formerly the Senior Officials Group) as well as an expert-level Global Partnership Working Group in order to provide some coordination of Global Partnership activities. Ultimately, however, the projects and priorities reflect the goals of the individual funding countries. Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Global Partnership Basics," accessed at http://www.sgpproject.org/GPbasics.html.

[8] Testimony of Michele Flournoy, Senior Adviser for International Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, June 30, 2005, accessed at http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/itnhear.htm.

[9] Many of the challenges facing the G8 effort are discussed in: "Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf Provides Details on G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," interview by Leonard Spector, CNS- Monterey Institute of International Studies, accessed at: http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020909.htm.

[10] There is disagreement within the Global Partnership donor group as to whether Russia's pledge of $2 billion should count toward the overall $20 billion goal. The US and Russian governments believe it should not. See the Russia-specific material inStrengthening the Global Partnership, "Donor Fact Sheet," accessed at http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Russia.html.

[11] Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Donor Fact Sheet," accessed at http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Index.html.

[12] Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2002, Kenneth N. Luongo, Executive Director, Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, accessed at: http://www.ransac.org/Official%20Documents/U.S.%20Congress/Hearings%20and%20Testimony/
2002/100902_sfrc_testimony.html

[13] The White House, "US-Russia Joint Fact Sheet: Bratislava Initiatives," February 24, 2005, accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-7.html.

[14] Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders, "The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," op. cit. Note 4.

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Last Updated on June 1, 2007