The Defense Policy Review Initiative: a reflection
April 27, 2007
by Yuki Tatsumi
This piece originally appeared in PacNet Newsletter,
distributed by Pacific Forum/CSIS on April 27, 2006.
At
the end of 2002, the United States and Japan launched an ambitious
initiative to transform the US-Japan alliance. Officially called the
Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), the talks aimed at figuring out
how to adapt the US-Japan alliance to the security environment in the
21st century when the nature of threats has changed dramatically. With
the agreement over the weekend regarding payment for the relocation of
US Marines to Guam, it looks like the DPRI will finally come to a
conclusion. The two governments will likely announce agreement on the
realignment of US forces in Japan at the next Security Consultative
Committee meeting, which is expected to be held soon. But the success of
the DPRI may prove illusory.
The circumstances under which
the DPRI began seemed to promise good results. The terror attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001 provided an imperative on the part of the United States
to adjust its alliances to meet new security challenges. Sept. 11 also
created a political environment in Japan in which security issues could
be discussed more openly. Japan was led by Koizumi Junichiro, a prime
minister who was overwhelmingly popular, adept at communicating his
policy goals to the public, and instinctively inclined to strengthen the
US-Japan alliance. The two countries' leaders enjoyed a genuinely close
personal relationship, which was supported by a group of officials who
valued the alliance and were dedicated to sustaining and strengthening
it. If difficult decisions needed to be made about the future of the
US-Japan alliance, the DPRI would have been the opportunity to address
them. The DPRI could have been a springboard from which the two
countries made their partnership truly global.
The DPRI did not
go as hoped, however. Despite rhetoric that the US-Japan alliance has
never been better, the DPRI came to the verge of collapse several times
over the past three years. Each time, it took political intervention at
a very senior level to save it. In particular, the base realignment
process has been a painful process for both countries.
There
are several explanations for the slow progress of the DPRI. No
significant political figure in Japan has championed the DPRI in the way
that Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro did for US force realignment in
Okinawa in the mid-1990s. Even Prime Minister Koizumi's interest in this
issue has been sporadic at best. Japan also scores poorly on
interagency coordination and its attitudes toward the negotiations. The
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) often neglected to consult with the Defense
Facilities Administration Agency, the ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Treasury, and relevant offices in the Cabinet Affairs Office. The lack
of notification to affected local governments slowed progress in the
JDA's efforts to convince them to accept the force realignment plan that
was agreed between Tokyo and Washington in October 2005. A string of
leaks to the Japanese media on the negotiation generated resentment and
mistrust among U.S. officials, fueling their frustration. Most
importantly, stubbornness on both sides created a sense of "us vs.
them," often overshadowing the ultimate purpose of the negotiation to
strengthen the bilateral alliance.
The US side was not without
problems. The preoccupation with other security challenges, such as
Iraq, North Korea, and Iran left Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Richard Lawless with virtually the entire burden of concluding an
agreement with the Japanese government. Most senior officials in other
US agencies who could have been helpful in facilitating a successful
conclusion of the DPRI have left the government and their successors do
not have a similar level of interest and expertise. Today, the US
negotiation team, primarily consisting of Defense officials, is
overworked and frustrated with little interagency support to buttress
its effort.
Such observations aside, the DPRI suggests a more
fundamental problem in the US-Japan alliance. Simply put, there is a
gap between Tokyo and Washington in their perceptions and expectations
of each other. US negotiators were encouraged by developments in Japan
in the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, including its decision to send
Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the Indian Ocean and Ground
Self-Defense Force troops to Iraq. Other developments - the Council on
Security and Defense Capabilities Report, the enactment of contingency
legislation, the decision to introduce ballistic missile defense, and
the revision of National Defense Program Guidelines - encouraged U.S.
officials to believe that Japan was ready and willing to fundamentally
change its security policy, and rapidly expand its role within the
US-Japan alliance and beyond.
That expectation was "betrayed"
in the DPRI. To be sure, Sept. 11 created momentum for Japan to take ad
hoc measures, as demonstrated by the passage of two special measures
laws to support US-led coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sept.
11 also created enough political support to create a basic framework
that guides Tokyo if Japan faces clear and present security threats.
But
the steps often identified as the sign of fundamental changes in Japan
took place without any change to the existing constitutional
framework. At the end of the day, Japan still chooses not to exercise
its right of collective self-defense. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
cannot operate overseas without the government-imposed and often
unrealistic restrictions on its area of operations and rules of
engagement, which practically rules out any meaningful contribution to
efforts by multinational coalition forces. The political context -
which prohibits the SDF from being dispatched to high-risk areas -
remains unchanged. Constitutional reform, which was often thought to be
ready to move forward, has essentially stalled. In short, all the legal
and political constraints that existed at the end of the Cold War
remain.
As a result, exchanges between the two governments in
the DPRI remained largely unchanged: Washington requests (or demands)
changes and Japan drags its feet in response. This is hardly an
exchange between two mature allies, and is met with great frustration in
Washington. Japan's behavior begs the question: Are Japanese
government statements about its willingness to change and become a
proactive partner in the US-Japan alliance genuine? Or, more troubling
still, do the US and Japan really share a common vision for their
alliance
The realignment plans will be announced with much
fanfare, and celebrated as another step forward in the transformation of
the alliance. But the frustration and animosity that emerged during the
negotiations may linger. In fact, as both sides enter an even more
difficult phase of implementing the force realignment plan, resentment
can easily resurface. If Japan can execute the realignment plan without
using political calendar-based excuses to delay the process, it would
go a long way to restore the confidence that was lost during the DPRI.
But that alone is not enough.
The DPRI challenged the
assumption that the U.S. and Japan share a vision and goals for the
future of their alliance. If the two governments are serious about
transforming the US-Japan alliance into a global strategic partnership,
they must find ways to identify the gaps in perception and expectation
and address them in an honest yet constructive manner. In the absence
of such efforts, the US-Japan alliance may enter another period of
drift.

