Osama and U.S.-Pakistan Relations
May 02, 2011
Abbottabad is a quiet, lovely city. The Stimson
Center convened a Track II workshop there for rising Pakistani strategic
analysts. The city’s most prominent feature remains Kakul, the Pakistani
military academy where outstanding recruits begin their studies and service
careers. On April 23rd, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General
Ashfaq Kayani, visited Kakul to congratulate recent graduates. According to
press accounts of the Army Chief’s remarks, Kayani claimed that Pakistani
security forces “have broken the back of terrorists and the nation will soon
prevail over the menace.” Kayani also asserted thatthe Pakistan Army “was
completely aware of internal and external threats to the country.” Osama bin
Laden’s compound was a mile away from the parade ground where Kayani
spoke.
Pakistani authorities must be feeling acute embarrassment and
resentment at this juncture: embarrassment at Osama’s presence within Pakistan,
despite numerous official denials of this possibility, and resentment at a
severe breach of Pakistani sovereignty in a settled area. Had U.S. special
forces and intelligence failed in this effort, the repercussions on
U.S.-Pakistan relations would have been horrific. Having succeeded in bringing
Osama bin Laden to justice, the repercussions are extremely trying but not
grounds for a divorce. Pakistan’s civil authorities have put a positive gloss
on Osama’s death, pointing to longstanding and oft-repeated U.S. statements
that, if the location of al-Qaeda’s leadership were correctly ascertained,
military action would result. That Pakistan’s security apparatus appears to
have been kept in the dark speaks volumes about the growing difficulties of this
partnership.
As a reflection of his competence and Pakistan’s extremely
troubled internal and external security environment, General Kayani received a
three-year extension by the current Pakistani civilian government. The
Director-General of Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha,
has received two one-year extensions. The presence of Osama bin Laden near
Kakul reflects very poorly on both of them. The number two ranking al Qaeda
figure, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the worst offenders of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, are widely believed to be on Pakistani territory.
Hard
times lie ahead for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Our interests in Afghanistan
diverge as well as converge. Groups that engage in violent acts against U.S.
and allied forces in Afghanistan and against targets in India are based, trained
and equipped on Pakistani soil, without serious interference by Pakistan’s
security apparatus. It is far more convenient and popular for Pakistani
politicians to rail against U.S. drone strikes than against extensive
Muslim-on-Muslim violence within their country.
Osama bin Laden’s
violent demise comes at a time when U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan are
reaching the half-trillion dollar mark. It is far from clear that the tactical
achievements of U.S. forces there can result in long-lasting gains. It is even
more apparent that Pakistan loses by being a safe haven for violent extremists.
Osama’s death provides an opportunity for Pakistani and U.S. authorities to
reconsider the sources of their deeply troubled relationship.
