Tunisia’s Transition: Still the Arab Revolts’ Best Hope

May 14, 2012

A year and a half since a small-town Tunisian set himself and the Arab world ablaze, Tunisia is still the most promising case of an Arab society and state in transition to a democratic future.  The stresses and strains of shifting so abruptly from a dictatorship to a dispersal of power among institutions and untested political leaders are palpable, but the narrative arc is moving to a clear outcome of a new constitution and a legitimate elected government.  Last week, the Prime Minister announced that the Constitution drafting process would be completed by October, slightly ahead of the year-long deadline envisioned after the late 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly.  This means that Tunisia can move beyond the interim phase and be confident that it has a legitimate government with authority to govern in place by early 2013. 

Tunisia's interim coalition is comprised of the Nahda plurality (90 seats in the 217 seat assembly) and two small liberal, secular parties, the Congress for the Republic (30 seats) and Ettakatol (21 seats).  Nahda has the premiership, while the other two parties hold the leadership positions of President of the Republic and President of the Constituent Assembly.   That Troika moved smartly early in 2012 to form committees for drafting the new Constitution, consult with global experts on democratic transitions, engage the public, and build consensus for a new constitution to guide the country into a more democratic and pluralistic political life.

The Nahda party has done many things to build confidence across the political spectrum in the country, and to assure external players in Europe and the United States that it will continue to foster a moderate, tolerant brand of political Islam. 

• The party permitted and then resolved debate over mentioning sharia in the constitution; in late March, the party leaders determined that the Bourguiba-era constitution in which the preface refers to remaining "faithful to the teachings of Islam" was sufficient, and that reference to sharia (Islamic law) was not necessary or desirable.
• The Nahda-led Ministry of Interior responded to Salafist violence in early 2012 by strict adherence to the law; no special treatment was accorded to their fellow Islamists.
• Nahda notables have engaged in a few acts of reconciliation by moving to close prisons housing former regime political opponents who were not Islamists, thus identifying with other victims of the old regime.

But these measures have not been sufficient to tamp down the deep anxieties of the old elite, and of the secular middle class that was apolitical in the end of the Ben Ali era.  Those middle class and professional Tunisians expected that the fall of Ben Ali would usher in a more liberal era for the country; they were quite shocked to discover the deep social and cultural conservatism of their own society, and the emerging "culture wars" over the role of women in public life, and the role of religion in public policy, are acute.  Stresses have surfaced among students, among workers and businessmen who have suffered from the continued downturn in the economy, and in the security ministries where career officers now are led by political forces they once worked to suppress and control.   

The economy is a particularly acute challenge, with 800,000 unemployed and poor prospects for any quick revitalization of tourism or trade with the weak EU economies.  Yet Tunisia is also well-placed, if its leaders think strategically, to strengthen mutually beneficial economic relations with Libya.  Broader regional economic integration, which Tunisia has traditionally favored, for now is too hard.

Another serious challenge to Nahda as the dominant political force in the country is the rise of a more doctrinaire Islamist force, the Salafis.  That political tendency, often thought of as a social movement advocating more strict adherence to Islamist values and behavior, is likely to form a political party, which will create pressure on Nahda to align with it, rather than with the smaller secular parties in the current governing coalition.  Nahda's political philosophy, born of years in opposition, in exile and in Ben Ali's prisons, is convincingly moderate and accepting of Tunisia's history and evolution as a modern state; nonetheless, the emergence of Salafists as a part of the political spectrum could well create new strains within Nahda, and in its relations with other political parties.

The Nahda party and the coalition have a treacherous balancing act as they promote systemic change after years of dictatorship, but do not dismantle some of the inherent strengths of the Tunisian state.  Those strengths include proactive economic ties to Europe and beyond, investment in human capital, and promotion of moderate foreign policies in the region.  Nonetheless, the old elite had allowed economic development plans for the interior of the country to atrophy, and its declared support for a competitive and open economic system were undermined by cronyism and corruption.  The new government has to empower and mobilize long-neglected parts of the society, but somehow not alienate or disempower the talented technocrats and sophisticated business community that will be essential for the country's further development.

Photo Credit: Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Images/2011/11/13/2011111310814905734_20.jpg