The Security Agenda for a Changing Middle East

July 29, 2011

The Arab revolt that began in late 2010 throws many assumptions about the Middle East and regional security into question.  States that were once considered strong have shown themselves to be hollow at the top, and Arab societies are showing unprecedented courage.  The power equation within many countries has shifted, although it has certainly not found a new equilibrium yet.  This leads to many uncertainties about security: security for states, for relations between states, and for the newly assertive citizens within states.  In the region and in the international community, there is a critical need to be working tactically and strategically on a very wide security agenda.

The political models of the modern Middle East have concentrated considerable power in the security services that surround a king or president; these "mukhabarat" (intelligence) states preyed on their citizens to protect leaders from any source of dissent, and created a culture of fear and mistrust.  That model has been destroyed successively over three decades by revolution in the case of Iran, by US intervention in the case of Iraq, and by popular uprising in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia.  One can worry that in each of those cases, the authoritarian impulses of the state can creep back, but democratic processes and values remain the most powerful antidote to such a trend.

Other states in the Middle East have suffered from the opposite ailment, where weak states based on careful power-sharing arrangements or colonial legacies never fully professionalized their security sector.  In Lebanon and Palestine (and post-Saddam Iraq), the international community, through the United Nations or western powers, has provided direct support and security assistance to compensate for security deficits.  But that is not a long-term solution.

The new turbulence in the region provides many opportunities for reforming state-society relations, and security is a powerful component of that process.  Security is increasingly seen as a public good, a service that states provide to their citizens, rather than the exclusive purview of the powerful.  Of the countries in new transitions, Tunisia is the most receptive to rethinking its security culture, and its partners are offering to help in lustration (the cleansing) of the police force, for example. In Egypt, while the military retains considerable power, it generally enjoys popular respect (in contrast to the police) and appears willing to minimally accommodate the interests of newly empowered citizens.  Iraq is nearly a decade into the process of reconstituting and retraining its security forces, and getting the balance right between professionalization and embracing the sectarian and ethnic identity politics of the country has proven tricky. 

Several countries are experiencing national crises that do not yet lend themselves to various reform processes.  Libya is at war internally, with NATO as a reluctant combatant alongside totally inexperienced opposition fighters.  Despite the uncertainties, it is not too early to begin to work with the transitional council on reconstituting the security sector for a post-Qadhafi Libya. Syria's revolt is the starkest case of security forces loyal to a regime rather than the society as a whole; should Assad fall, a radical restructuring of the security sector could well be needed or demanded by the country's rage from decades of repression.  Yemen's crisis is in the political realm and only partly playing out in armed conflict, but should the power structure change in Sanaa, it will have implications for the armed forces and police of that fractured polity. 

Beyond these confusing and unfinished national stories, there are regional security implications of the Arab revolt.  Not all, if any, will lead to full scale conflict, but the shifts in power balances between neighbors, the spillover from a country in crisis to a more stable neighbor, or old grievances resurfacing from the turbulence in the region suggest a long list of possible flashpoints.

• Egypt's course has direct effect on Israel and Palestine.  A dramatic shift in Egypt's approach to Gaza could raise tensions in Israeli-Gaza relations, and exacerbate problems in establishing Palestinian political unity.
• Tunisia faces a daunting cross-border challenge from Libyan refugees and from displaced migrant workers, whose numbers could overwhelm the country at a time of economic and political weakness. 
• Syria's crisis is creating political and economic pressures on Lebanon, still working to establish its own political competence free of domination from Damascus.  In both the short term and the long term, Lebanon's political equilibrium can be easily disrupted by Syria's problems.
• Iraq and Saudi Arabia, already plagued by deep mistrust since Prime Minister Maliki came to power, could face sharper tensions over Bahrain.  Iraq has felt strong solidarity with the Shia majority, while the Saudis have supported and protected the Sunni royal family in power in Manama.

Over time, a more salutary realignment of regional security relations could emerge.  A more confident and active Egypt, once it has a new constitution and a new government, would change Arab politics.  Iraq, despite its political growing pains, will almost certainly be a stronger and richer country by the end of the decade.  An Arab world with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq all pulling their weight could be a more effective counterbalance to Iran's ambitions than any effort by external powers to thwart Iran's rise.  The banding together of the six Gulf Cooperation Council members in support of Bahrain could signal a greater willingness of that organization to coordinate its policies, with possible benefit to regional security vis-à-vis Iran.  Whether this potential realignment augurs well for the democratic aspirations of Arab citizens is another matter; it is a reminder that "security for whom" remains a critical and unanswered question.