A Generational Divide in Iranian Leadership

August 11, 2011

The continuing power struggle between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei may be characterized as a generational conflict. The clerical establishment in Iran, which has dominated Iranian politics since the 1979 Revolution, is now being challenged by younger men who were foot soldiers in the Islamic Revolution and veterans of the 1980s war against Iraq; they seek to establish an Iranian, as opposed to Islamic, republic. As Ahmadinejad's closest adviser and chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei has stated, "An Islamic government is not capable of running a vast and populous country like Iran.... Running a country is like a horse race, but the problem is that [the clergy] are not horse racers."[1]

Ahmadinejad's supporters have attempted to curry favor with Iran's mostly young population by appealing to their Persian nationalism.  Furthermore, Ahmadinejad has attempted to undermine the power of the clerics, and Khamanei in particular, by insinuating that he and others are in contact with the hidden Mahdi, the twelfth Imam of Shi'a Islam, who is expected to return one day to rid the world of injustice and tyranny.

In early 2011, Ahmadinejad said of Khamanei, "Hazrat-e Agha [His Excellency] is a good man and leader, but there are other people who are in constant and direct contact with Emam-e Zaman [Imam Mahdi]."[2]  By suggesting that lay people are capable of connecting with the hidden Mahdi, Ahmadinejad is questioning the usefulness of the Supreme Leader, who claims to be the "earthly" deputy of the Prophet Muhammad and the twelfth Imam. Needless to say, Khamanei and his allies in the clerical establishment have not let these challenges go unanswered.

Public political warfare heated up in April, when Ahmadinejad fired the Minister of Intelligence, Hojjat al-Eslam Heydar Moslehi, a close ally of Khamanei, who very quickly reinstated Moslehi to his post.  An infuriated Ahmadinejad then refused to attend cabinet meetings for two weeks. Following this incident, Ahmadinejad nominated himself the interim head of Iran's Oil Ministry. The Guardian Council, led by Iran's clerics, soon declared that this move was unconstitutional. In June, the clerics began a campaign to remove several of Ahmadinejad's closest followers. The Iranian parliament, largely supportive of the Guardian Council, moved to impeach the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, over the selection of his deputy.

In late June, several Ahmadinejad loyalists, including Mashaei, were arrested and charged with "sorcery."  Those arrested were labeled part of the "deviant current" in the government. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, a firm supporter of Khamanei, declared that defying the Supreme Leader amounted to "apostasy from God."[3] Ahmadinejad, reeling from the clerics' counterattacks, acknowledged the rift to reporters in June, "It is very clear now that we are 180 degrees away from them - we are actually on opposite sides."[4]

Key to the outcome of the conflict will be the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In recent years, the IRGC has profited greatly from its increased involvement in the Iranian economy, often to the chagrin of the clerics. The IRGC has economic interests in the construction industry, investment firms, engineering firms, and auto manufacturing, among many other sectors. Thus, it is in the IRGC's interest to keep Ahmadinejad from amassing too much power. So far, General Ali Jafari, commander of the IRGC, has openly sided with Khamanei, declaring in July that the Revolutionary Guard would handle the "deviant current" in the government.[5] For his part, Ahmadinejad has countered the IRGC's attempts to strip him of power by issuing veiled threats of exposing the widespread economic corruption in the Revolutionary Guard.

The IRGC has to tread carefully, as many of its senior officers and rank and file troops are either supporters of Ahmadinejad or the reformist Green movement. Approximately a year after the 2009 election protests, four former IRGC officers who had fled Iran spoke anonymously to The Guardian about the IRGC's use of torture and rape against dissidents. The officers also spoke of widespread discontent amongst Revolutionary Guard soldiers regarding the regime's brutality. One former officer decided to go public with his anger with the Iranian government.  Muhammed Hussein Torkaman, once a member of Khamanei's security detail, told The Guardian, "I want people outside to know what is happening and what this regime is doing to them."[6]

Last February, a group of IRGC officers sent an open letter to General Jafari, asking him to order restraint should there be massive protests in Iran, such as those then-occurring throughout the Middle East. The letter declares, "We promise our people that we will not shoot nor beat our brothers who are seeking to express legitimate protest against the policies and conduct of their leader."[7] The former minister of culture and Islamic guidance and current IRGC officer Mohammad Hossein Safar Harandi has acknowledged the "disobedience of some forces in the Sepah [IRGC]."[8] If there are popular protests against Khamanei or Ahmadinejad in the near future, neither man may be able to rely on the IRGC as a tool to crush the opposition.

For the time being, it appears that Ahmadinejad's attempts to change the status quo in Iranian politics and gain more power for himself have largely failed. The clerical establishment, as well as the conservative Iranian parliament and the IRGC leadership, motivated by power and economic interests, have successfully blocked moves by the nationalists to transform the country from an Iranian theocracy to a republic based on Persian nationalism. However, the fractured nature of the Iranian leadership and its institutions has left plenty of room for speculation about the future of this conflict.  

[1] Reza Aslan, The Atlantic ""Do We Have Ahmadinejad All Wrong?" < http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/do-we-have-ahmadinejad-all-wrong/69434/ > January 13, 2011

[2] Muhammad Sahimi, PBS "Analysis | Ahmadinejad-Khamenei Rift Deepens into Abyss" <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/05/opinion-ahmadinejad-khamenei-rift-deepens-to-an-abyss.html> May 7, 2011

[3] Saeed Kamali Dehghan The Guardian "Ahmadinejad allies charged with sorcery" <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/05/ahmadinejad-allies-charged-with-sorcery > May 5, 2011

[4] The Guardian "Iran's President Admits Rift with Country's Senior Islamic Figures" <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/07/iran-president-rift-islamic-figures> June 7, 2011

[5] Al Arabiya "From Iran Primer: Ahmadinejad vs. the Revolutionary Guards" <http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/07/12/157226.html > July 12, 2011

[6] The Guardian Angus Stickler and Maggie O'Kane "Former Elite Officers Reveal Tensions in Iran Regime" < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/11/iran-revolutionary-guards-regime > June 11, 2010

[7] Con Coughlin, The Telegraph "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Appeal for Restraint against Demonstrators"  <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/concoughlin/100076944/irans-revolutionary-guards-appeal-for-restraint-against-demonstrators/ > February 19, 2011

[8] PBS "Fissures in the Revolutionary Guard's Officer Corps?"  <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/03/fissures-in-the-revolutionary-guards-officer-corps.html> March 1, 2011