The Final Big Push in Afghanistan

December 17, 2009

President Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan and the decision to send additional 30,000 troops are aimed at reversing the Taliban’s momentum in the insurgency. His strategy seems grounded in realism and clarifies that the US commitment is not open ended. The various elements of his strategy however depend on specific conditions on the ground.

Timeframe and Troop surge

In his major address on December 1, President Obama announced a timeline of July 2011 when the US troops would start returning home. The decision was based on several considerations. First, he wanted to signal to the Americans that US troops will not be in Afghanistan forever. Second, he wanted to condition the Afghan leadership to take more responsibility for their destiny. It is also important to note that he said that US troops would begin returning after 18 months, but did not specify any numbers. He is thus going to take further decisions on troop levels and timing based on his assessment of progress in Afghanistan.

Threats

The President said that there was no imminent threat of the government in Kabul being overthrown, but that the Taliban had the momentum. The mere presence of a government, however, does not indicate governance. Dysfunctional governance or its total absence remains a more pervasive concern among the Afghans than the insurgency. The local communities need to take greater ownership of their state of affairs and the US and NATO allies need to choose their local partners wisely and empower them to facilitate basic governance.

Partnerships

President Obama mentioned, “This burden is not ours alone to bear”. There is a prevailing perception in Kabul now that when the US is finally getting its priorities clear on Afghanistan, the NATO alliance is losing its patience. NATO has promised 7,000 additional troops, but thus far only 5,500 troops have been pledged by members. The Dutch are going to start withdrawing their troops (2,160) towards the end of 2010, and the Canadians (2,830) will follow suit towards the middle of 2011. It thus remains to be seen whether the NATO will be able to sustain its commitments.

Goals

He framed the overarching goal as, “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.” It is less clear whether US policy will focus on the underlying reasons for the conflict: the socio-economic, ethnic, tribal, political and regional problems and challenges. Al-Qaeda’s sanctuaries and support in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a result of socio-economic grievances that have paved way for ideologies and movements such as the Taliban (an increasingly amorphous entity). By focusing on Al-Qaeda and not understanding the underlying reasons for “Talibanization”, this enhanced effort would be a long shot at succeeding in Afghanistan or in Pakistan.

Capacity building  

President Obama talked about building the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and handing over the security responsibilities to them. In its current structure, however, it is unlikely that the ANSF will be able to successfully secure the volatile areas in the country when the largest ethnic group (Pashtuns) in the country remains underrepresented in the leadership, officer corps and the troop composition. While the Pashtuns represent 42% of the population, they account for only 30% of the total troops in the army. 70% of the army brigades are commanded by the Tajiks. Similar dynamics are apparent in the recently armed tribal militias that have an overrepresentation of the Hazaras in Wardak province.

Corruption and Coalition building

Corruption has punctuated most debates on Afghanistan, especially after the elections. President Obama stated that those in the government who were ineffective or corrupt should be held accountable. This may be a serious opportunity for the Karzai administration to revamp its image and credibility, domestically and abroad. Given the local realities in Afghanistan, however, it is still likely that President Karzai will continue to rely on local power brokers whose governance credentials are dubious at best. While the US cannot change those realities and determine cabinet appointments, it can identify competent and credible partners as advisors in the cabinet and work with them. 

Conclusion

The new US strategy calls for a time-bound commitment and more accountability. It assumes that the kind of state being envisioned in Afghanistan is what the Afghans actually desire. Most policy debates however have been informed by Afghan perceptions that were gathered by the Afghan government and its international partners. The Afghans are disposed towards expressing opinions in the expectation of immediate benefits or hope for positive change and those may not accurately reflect their views of the situation. Afghan perceptions vary widely at the district level because of differences in history, access to resources, ethnic/tribal breakdown, geography, relations with government, etc. Despite its shortcomings, the strategy offers a crucial, perhaps a final opportunity, for the Afghan government to demonstrate its will and take on more responsibility for governing the country.