Sustaining Proliferation Prevention: Gaining Ground in the Global South

February 23, 2011

When the threat of proliferation is raised among developed states, the discussion focuses on preventing the acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons to states and terrorist organizations. Many developed world governments have concluded that the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the greatest threat to our collective security. By contrast, however, the proliferation debate for audiences of the Global South more often centers upon more immediate threats, such as the scourge of small arms and light weapons. This divide offers policy constraints... and innovative opportunities.

Representatives of the developing world repeatedly state that small arms are the true weapons of mass destruction and they do so with considerable merit. According to the Small Arms Survey, the largest human burden of armed violence-approximately 245,000 deaths each year-occur in non-conflict and non-war settings. Countries like El Salvador, Jamaica, and South Africa suffer from extremely high homicide rates, often yielding more deaths each year than witnessed in modern wars. And of course, the proliferation of small arms is not the only burden on these cash strapped governments. The spread of infectious diseases, drug trafficking, gang violence, economic underdevelopment, and myriad other urgent threats compete for attention of these governments. If we are to sustainably prevent the spread of WMD, bridging this North/South security paradox will be imperative.

There is little question that the evolving forces of globalization are pushing the capacity to contribute to the WMD supply chain into more hands, in more countries, in more corners of the globe than at any other time in history. Today, the ability to innovate, manufacture, transship or otherwise contribute materially to proliferation can just as easily occur in Belmopan as Berlin, or in Luanda as in Los Angeles. Yet throughout the atomic age, convincing most governments of the Global South to take a more proactive role in WMD proliferation prevention has been-not unreasonably-a significant challenge. Consider this:

• According to a joint report by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank, the Caribbean Basin is home to one of the highest murder rates in the world at 30 per 100,000 population annually;
• The same report found that these high rates of violence across the region and in parts of Central America, have both direct effects on human welfare in the short-run as well as longer term implications for economic growth and social development; and
• A major factor in the surge of gun-related criminality in the Caribbean Basin, beyond the ease of access to the US market, is the trafficking of narcotics and the corresponding difficulties governments face in adequately securing their borders.

In the face of these immediate threats to human security and development, it is unsurprising that there is limited bandwidth in much of the world to sustain wide ranging programmatic efforts to prevent proliferation. This is especially true given the very real financial and human capacity constraints of governments across the Global South. Here, the case of Dominica is telling. With a GDP of $377 million and a population of just 74,000 people, appropriating scarce resources to implement legal and regulatory frameworks to prevent WMD proliferation-as opposed to attending to urgent security and development needs-represent a false dichotomy for this small island nation. Indeed, even while Caribbean governments comprehend the threat, and recognize the need to meet their nonproliferation obligations, these issues remain distant priorities for most across the Caribbean Basin-and not unreasonably so. 

It would therefore come as a surprise to learn that Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Member States have aggressively pursued a wide spectrum of nonproliferation activities and have committed to fully implement global nonproliferation mandates. In the past year for instance, CARICOM members have:

(1)    Participated in commodity identification training (CIT) exercises which were staged in the Caribbean for the very first time and served to raise awareness among  both enforcement and policy personnel in the region, regarding WMD-related technologies;

(2)    Commenced a comprehensive legislative initiative that will include a regional review of the national legal bases for strategic trade controls, or "gap analysis" of existing legislation, and will result in the formulation of model legislation, including domestic export controls, which will be enacted by CARICOM members;

(3)    Deepened cooperation with regional enforcement entities including the Caribbean Customs Law Enforcement Council (CCLEC) and regional industry stakeholders in the maritime domain, such as the Caribbean Shipping Association (CSA). The CARICOM 1540 Implementation Program is partnering with the CSA in implementing its Regional Integrated Management System (RIMS), which will focus several of the region's non-proliferation objectives; and

(4)    The region  is also partnering with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on a major initiative to ensure that state parties within the Caribbean meet their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, thereby simultaneously fulfilling key UNSCR 1540 mandates

Furthermore, governments across the region have moved to fully comply with their WMD nonproliferation reporting requirements under UNSCR 1540. They have also developed an uncommon engagement with proliferation issues, more broadly, by linking available international security assistance with other high priority issues from counter-drug and small arms trafficking, to preparedness and responsive capacities in the event of natural (and by extension, man-made) disasters, to issues of disease surveillance and environmental safety, and economic development more broadly.

This all would suggest that there is ample room for optimism in bridging the North/South divide on proliferation. We can learn from a successful engagement in the Caribbean; and indeed, evidence suggests similar progress in Central America, across governments of the OSCE, in East Africa and elsewhere. Building upon this success, a few lessons should be learned as we move forward:

(1)    Leveraged responses are a learned behavior. Our experience indicates that although leveraged security and development goals and resources is a logical and ultimately organic process, it is not necessarily a process that is naturally occurring. Institutions across the Global South as well as the Developed North have been inadvertently constructed so as to hinder joint responses. Success therefore will depend upon our willingness to force changes to our traditional approaches to these threats by developing real programming that meaningfully operationalizes the rhetoric of "whole of government."

(2)    Early success is personality dependent: Working across the policy silos of government is a time consuming and challenging endeavor. Without committed individuals willing to advance change, institutional inertia often prevails. Success more broadly depends upon our ability to encourage the emergence of these advocates, and our efforts to identify these individuals are well spent. Advocates should be cultivated who can serve as a single point of contact for the donor community, as well as a provocateur within governments of the Global South. These individuals, be they within national governments, sub-regional organizations, or within the UN Secretariat itself, not only serve to encourage the latter to better understand their international obligations, but also assist governments and multilateral entities  to tangibly link their domestic  and development goals with the global nonproliferation agenda.

(3)    Interdisciplinary approaches work better, cost less: We now have tangible evidence that we can build sustainable nonproliferation by emphasizing the softer and often longer term approaches to nonproliferation that not only address the near term threat, but also its root causes. Nonproliferation assistance can address a wide cross-section of global challenges from the spread of infectious diseases, to underdevelopment, to a broad spectrum of human security threats. And in an era of financial austerity, both the donor community and the recipient partners have a joint interest in stretching dwindling financial assistance.

(4)    The Global South is not the only recalcitrant actor: Although we routinely point to corrupt, disorganized, and maladroit governments as a central challenge to successful donor engagement, it is equally clear that stove-piped and often inflexible practices, and a failure of imagination, remain central challenges for much of the developed North. Dictating approaches to developing a common threat assessment have and will continue to be counterproductive. Rather, our efforts would be better directed toward developing innovative connections that will inculcate common and durable approaches to mutual and also disparate challenges. In short, government officials that develop flexible, joint programming should be rewarded, not obstructed.

(5)    There is no one-size-fits all approach: The successful nonproliferation engagement across the states of the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War is an impressive, but ultimately inadequate, model for future activities. Because the nature of the proliferation threat varies from region to region, and the needs of the recipient partner differ, future programming will be varied and labor intensive. But by leading with a needs assessment that seeks to validate and respond to defined in-country needs, rather than under the auspices of WMD nonproliferation, we can more effectively build trust and long-term buy-in to preventing the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

(6)    The benefits of a regional approach: Engaging with states in the Global South in a regional context of their choosing has proven advantageous in the Caribbean Basin through CARICOM, but also under the auspices of the Central American Integration System (SICA). There are also signs that in the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council has a role to play and Eastern African regional organizations undoubtedly can make positive contributions. A regional approach is logical because of the transnational nature of regional development and security concerns, as well as global WMD nonproliferation objectives. Making progress in all three of these areas unquestionably entails cooperation between neighboring countries. A regional approach can also help ensure consistency so that efforts are not duplicated, that already scarce resources do not go to waste, and one country's advances are not immediately undercut by a gap in its neighbor's implementation.  The regional context also provides an opportunity for states to discuss and establish, among other things, cost-sharing plans, exchange model legislation and collaborate on enforcement mechanisms.

Photo Credit: South Sudan Police Recruits at Training Academy, July 2010 (UN Photo ID 453292 by Paul Banks).

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