Libya: Predation, Protection and Political Change

March 28, 2011

On March 17th, the UN Security Council authorized "all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Its resolution says nothing of regime change in Libya and in his speech on March 28th the president ruled that out as a US military goal, while endorsing it as a US policy goal. But absent a plan for political transition, the risk grows daily that Libya's rebellion will pitch into anarchy.

The military actions still underway against armed forces loyal to Muammar Qaddafi are, in some respects, unprecedented measures to protect a population from the whims of its political leadership. But in several other instances, Security Council resolutions have authorized UN member states, other organizations, or UN peacekeepers to take all necessary measures, or use all necessary means, to oust a regime in violation of its agreements (Haiti, 1994) or protect civilians from the threat or reality of violence, as at present in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Darfur, and Côte d'Ivoire. In Congo, the UN supports the government, in Darfur operates with its reluctant and wily consent, and in Côte d'Ivoire sits in opposition to the ancien regime, defeated in elections but refusing to admit it. The international community has slapped sanctions on the erstwhile government, clearly sided with the electoral winner, and reinforced UN peacekeepers already deployed there, but has thus far limited its use of force to clear instances of self-defense and civilian protection. In Libya, on the other hand, the international community has gone beyond sanctions to the heavy use of air power under Resolution 1973 but without the further legitimating force of elections to spotlight a clear political "change to" regime. Because Res. 1973 does not acknowledge the larger struggle, its implementation cannot resolve that political struggle and instead has accelerated it. The US and its allies and partners are meeting today in London to begin to sort it out.  They have little time to lose.

France has been rather open about the political endgame from the beginning, whereas the United States has tried to separate the military campaign from the political change that both the president and secretary of state have declared is desirable. Thus, France recognized the "Libyan National Council" based in Benghazi a week before the Security Council passed Res. 1973 and it launched air strikes to protect the LNC on March 19th, even as the coalition was meeting to plan the campaign. Ten days later France remains the only country to recognize the LNC as Libya's legitimate government. It is not at all clear, however, by what means of internal validation that group claims to rule either the eastern coast of the country or the whole of it. Nor is it clear whether its role is uncontested within rebel ranks. Its command and control of rebel forces appears to be weak and those forces move forward by the grace of coalition/NATO air strikes, a parting of the waters that will soon reveal cities full of people - mostly civilians - with whom they disagree politically, who belong to other tribes, or who still support Qaddafi.

The Geneva Conventions, which are geared toward international armed conflict, distinguish civilians from members of national armed forces (who bear identifying insignia, e.g., uniforms, as well as arms). Interpretations of the Conventions and other elements of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the International Committee of the Red Cross extend the logic of IHL to "non-international armed conflict," arguing that civilian status - and thus protection from direct armed attack - applies not only to those who never take up arms against the state but to those who do so in self-defense "against violence prohibited under IHL." Qaddafi forces' indiscriminate attacks on Benghazi and other Libyan cities clearly constitute such violence. Libya's rebels, on the other hand, by now engaged "continuously" in armed action against Qaddafi's forces, can be considered "armed groups" not protected from attack under IHL, that is, not civilians.

As the Qaddafi regime's fighting forces are crippled, its mercenary and arms supplies cut off, and supplies do reach the armed opposition (Res. 1973 allows such exceptions), then continuing coalition/NATO action releases rebel forces that would otherwise be tied down defending civilian populations in rebel-held areas. Protecting or furthering their operations falls outside the scope of action authorized by Res. 1973 unless the Qaddafi regime per se is interpreted as an imminent threat to civilians anywhere in Libya. That logic leads directly to regime change as a humanitarian as well as a political objective.

In his address, the president rejected the use of outside military force to achieve regime change. Understandably given the high costs of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has tended to straddle the fence on political endgames in the face of recent political upheavals in the Arab world. Military action against Qaddafi forces may set a precedent or, as the president suggested, be a rare combination of humanitarian need and international consensus on the politics and military feasibility of the operation. Libya's largely coastal targets are, for example, well-positioned to be struck by air power operating safely out of ample, nearby land bases.

So Libya is cast as a unique case in the turmoil sweeping the Middle East and regime change is cast as the "Libyan people's" responsibility, with possible support, albeit non-military, from outside actors. But without continued air support, not only of civilians but of rebel forces, the present hope of change for the better in Libya will fade. Moreover, there is a risk that rebels may themselves engage in mass reprisals against civilians, as loosely commanded, poorly paid militias have a way of doing. Analysts and politicians alike may disagree as to appropriate next steps. But to truly protect the people of Libya, the international community seems to have a pressing interest in either supporting a Libyan political alternative that it hopes and trusts will provide legitimate and vital governance, or in finding such an institutional alternative itself and the sooner the better.

Photo Credit: An AV-8B Harrier jump jet returns to USS Kearsarge for fuel and ammunition resupply in support of Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn, March 20, 2011  (USMC photo by Lance Cpl. Michael S. Lockett)

http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0311_libya2/