Public Programs, Private Opportunities in the FSU

April 02, 2007

By Alex Reed

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union pressed their best scientific minds into a massive program to design and build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Thousands of former Soviet scientists, engineers, and technicians with expert knowledge of these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems remain available for recruitment by terrorist groups and rogue states. Despite the successes of the Nunn-Lugar programs aimed at reducing the threat posed by the former Soviet weapons complex, the "human challenge" is proving to be a growth industry as witnessed in Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and elsewhere around the globe. In order to solve the problem in a sustainable manner, US programs aimed at redirecting these specialists to peaceful pursuits must be reformulated to promote greater involvement of the private sector.

From the outset of efforts in the mid-90s to engage weapons specialists in the FSU, US government programming has focused on locking the target community in place in its erstwhile weapons facilities and placing the individuals on science welfare where their whereabouts and activities can be monitored. Individual scientists are awarded temporary grants to conduct research of little commercial value. When these grants finish, the scientists return to being under- or unemployed, negating the short-lived redirection benefits. In order to make redirection to peaceful, civilian employment sustainable, the US needs to do more to bring private companies in as partners to these critical national security efforts. Many US companies have already found tremendous value in the scientific capacities resident in the FSU, and if provided the appropriate incentives, could serve as permanent employers of these scientists, engineers, and technicians. Only by pulling the WMD personnel out of their institutes and into commercial jobs can the human element of the proliferation threat be addressed in a sustainable fashion.

Any US program aiming to reduce the threat of proliferating WMD expertise will have to be selective in the companies it engages. Most US companies are unaware of government nonproliferation programs that provide a gateway to low-cost, high-quality FSU science and engineering, so an enhanced recruiting effort is clearly needed. However, a flood of private companies using government funds to scope out the available expertise in the FSU will be a waste of taxpayer dollars. Any recruiting strategy will have to be paired with a systematic survey of the available expertise within FSU weapons institutes.

With a list of companies with specific, market-based reasons for acquiring FSU expertise and an accompanying "grocery list" of FSU expertise, US Government programs can effectively pair companies with the requisite FSU personnel. Additional incentives such as salary cost-sharing and protection within the still-risky FSU business environment (as it politically infeasible to systematically import the FSU's best scientists) will help to persuade companies that would otherwise remain on the fence. These changes, while complex and time-consuming, would greatly enhance the sustainability of US redirect programs. Getting the model right in the former Soviet Union will pay national security dividends globally as the world is faced with a rising tide of states and sub-state actors intent on building an offensive weapons capacity. If the political will exists, the US Government is capable of making improvements in the race to secure WMD expertise.

For more information, see: Frederick P. Kellett, , USIC and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention: A Survey of Companies Doing Business in the Former Soviet Union.

Alex Reed is a Research Assistant with the Cooperative Nonproliferation Program at the Stimson Center