Pakistan and Afghanistan: Turbulence and Transitions

October 21, 2011

The anticipated drawdown of international forces in Afghanistan is adding to the turmoil in the domestic and foreign policies of Afghanistan and its key neighbor, Pakistan.  Few expect the "reconciliation" of the various combatants in the war in time for the planned withdrawal of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) by 2014.  Despite the uncertainties of the security environment, efforts to improve government effectiveness, in part by strengthening subnational institutions, are producing results.

A recent trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan demonstrated the complexity of the current moment: not all trends are moving in the same direction or at the same pace.  From afar, security conditions trump all other factors, and each violent incident dampens optimism about a stable transition in Afghanistan and further strains US-Pakistan relations.  Close up, there are other interesting and important developments in the national lives of these two critical countries.

Pakistan is much more than the neighbor of Afghanistan.  It has some of the attributes of the middle powers that are the dynamic new players in international politics.  It is a country of 180 million, with an impressive, educated elite, a sophisticated civil society and an expanding middle class.  That elite has embraced new technologies and is using the natural resources of the country to generate economic growth.  Ambitious moves to devolve more power to the five provinces suggest a state with some capacity to address its national challenges with vigor and boldness.

At the same time, the maldistribution of income, opportunity, and access has created many social deficits, and Pakistan does not live up to its potential.  Deep identity issues dating from its partition from India more than 60 years ago and a stalled democratization process that has enabled the privileged armed forces to remain the dominant power center keep Pakistan from joining the ranks of the rising middle powers, and from satisfying the demands of its citizenry.

Pakistan's view of its threat environment compels its leaders to place its security concerns above other public policy priorities.  India's rise is deeply worrying to Islamabad, and profoundly shapes Pakistan's sense of urgency about its role in Afghanistan.  Pakistan invokes its vital interests in Afghanistan, and insists that India does not have comparable stakes and should limit itself to development activities.  So Pakistan believes it has a higher claim to influence in Kabul; the recent strategic partnership agreement between Kabul and New Delhi is a severe blow to Pakistan's interests.  It suggests that Islamabad only will be more, not less, attached to its non-state client/partners, such as the Haqqani group and various Taliban elements.  Opinions varied among Pakistanis as to whether a post-ISAF government in Kabul should or would be entirely under Taliban control or in a power sharing arrangement with other political forces.

On the Afghan side, the reconciliation plans of the international community do not seem to be gaining traction.  The assassination of former President Rabbani was a severe blow, and there was much cui bono talk in Kabul - did the attack represent a split in Taliban ranks, or his own Tajik adversaries, or was it unnamed powers in government that did not want him to succeed in reconciliation talks?  While Secretary Clinton presses for renewed efforts at reconciliation during her visit this week, some key constituencies - including women - are not sure it's a desirable goal.  Others say is may be desirable but not achievable, so best to focus on government effectiveness and the basic security requirements of the population.

The Afghan government is making headway in improving the delivery of basic services to its people.  Access to public education has expanded, for girls and boys, and the Ministry of Education aims to move from 8 million kids in school to 14 million over the next few years (from a 2001 base of one million).  Public health services have improved.  Strengthening the capacity of the provincial and district level governance structures is a key way donors and international non-governmental organizations are helping.  Planning for economic growth and weaning the country of foreign aid dependency is underway, but is a decades-long process and will require technical support from the international community even when the foreign forces have left.

There is brave talk of protecting Afghanistan from the predatory behavior of its neighbors, through non-aggression or non-interference clauses in various agreements, but the reality is that Afghanistan will remain the weaker party in several of its bilateral relationships.  Outside powers, such as the ISAF contributing countries, will not likely be able to insulate Afghanistan from outside manipulation, but strategies to engage the neighbors - who at some level all have a stake in a stable Afghanistan - are critical during the period of withdrawal.

It may well be that Pakistan is the most important neighbor now, with its nominal control of the territory from which many insurgents operate, but other trade and investment partners including India, Turkmenistan, and Iran have roles to play in helping Afghanistan develop a post-war economy.  In this regard, the Obama Administration's Silk Road initiative offers an ambitious vision of regional trade and interaction.  It will require Afghanistan to have robust enough transport routes, and trade regulatory rules.  It may also require the US and other international players to address the likely conflict between ongoing sanctions to isolate Iran, and the equally compelling requirement to build a more stable future for Afghanistan.